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LANKA
GUAR
Vol. 18 No. 10 October 1, 1995 Price RS.1 (
MEDIATION: U.S.
VIOLENCE IN GA
P. A.: St. YE
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ENGLISH WRITIN
BOOKS DEvoL
 
 

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Knock On the door
- Mervyn de Silva
LLE : WhO C Unit ?
AR REPORT
S than pluses
- Pearl Theuanayagam
fO nS S. Sathananthan
AL FORMULA
— Partha GhOSh
NG IN SRI LANKA
— Kamalika Pieris
JTION THE ANSWERP
- Martha McDougall

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WITH THE BEST
ELEPHANT HOUS
GRUALITY AT AFFC
NO 1 JUSTICE A
COLOM

COMPLIMENTS
E SUPERMARKET
DRDABLE PRICES
KEBAR MAWATHA
MEBO 2.

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BRIEFLY. . .
Prelates against proposals
At a meeting of the Maha Sanga Held in Kardy to protest th= government's devolution proposals many prominent prelates said that their views had been ignored by the government. Also, state controlled media was being used to sling mud at opponents of the proposals; only views of the supporters found expression, they said, Dr Bellan Wila WiTataratana. Thera said that the author of the proposals was not Prof. G. L. Peiris as widely believed bout Dr. Tiruchelwam Who had (originally presented these proposals to Rajiv Gandhi in India in 1985 but the Indian Prime Minister had rejected
ET.
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THE TE WES E tional conspiracy Finala face and the AI| t055 Who WE Wider Institution the DOok "Budd Writter by a Tarr OW Behind the P. Wellerablē The Tä
The Most Wer Sri Pagmasara, M. of the Sri Lanka said: However, Were for the de W. posals Were unSI tive set of propos be prepared, ha :
CenS
War EWS Car ship from Septe Ministry Secreta singhe Was app Authority.
Mgdi MiiSite na yake told a pore 135 bJgen distOrt tions (by the pri information beim El sure that ther to this War. Id Such irTESpo anywhere in the
Danger on
Undergraduat pying a hall of th versity are beliw large quantities rails.
A notice issue said: "I WieW security situatior tle information of petrol and mÉ Chased from Ka the Hilda Obey İTimmediate actio to evacuatë the the Hall forcibly
The Liv E3TSGil and the campus Out of CLIS following violen of staff.

powerful internao destroy the Sin
Buddha Sasana. Te attached to thE.
which published hism. Betrayed?" il professor Were 4 GDWթrmrTlämt, the
said.
e Tablē Potte Wela aha NayakeThera RarTiarna Nikaya that the majority olution. If the prOitală ar alternaals Would have to said.
orship
TE LITET CETISOT amber 22. Media ry Edmond Jayaointed Competent
DaTaSiri Senaнssbriefing."There ions and exageraess), Sorme of the g disseminated Will Would og TC) Érd not think there is 1Sible герогііпg World".
the campus
es forcibly OCCLUhe Peradeniya Urnigd to hawe Stocked
of petrol and Wire
ad by the Registrar of the deteriorating in the campus and that large quantities sails have beer) plurIndy and brought to Sekera Hall........... n maybe necessary students occupying
y has been closed Flä5 bSB1 declarés
by the authorities |cē ārīd iridāti
Lankans stuck in Singapore
Crooked job agents have dumped nimety Sri Lankans in Singapore after promising them lucrative employment in Europe, European countries do not grant Wilsas for Sri Lankan job seekers but no visas are necessary to enter Singapore. The unscrupulous job agents unload them in Singapore and disappear.
InwestorS meet FOWzie
Mr FOWie, the Minister of Health and Highways, met with prospective inwestorsin Canada during the XXth World Road Congress held in Montreal. Mr Fowzie explained the opportunities available for investment in infrastructure facilitie:S 0 BOO-BOT basis and COICESSions the government had on offer. Many reportedly expressed Willingness to Invest in Sri Lanka.
GUARDIAN
Wol, 18 No. 10 Cictober 1, 1995
Pri CB R5. 10.00
Published fortnightly by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd. No. 246, Unior Place 2- סHוחםColi)
Editor Mervyn de Silva Telephone: 447.584
Printed by Ananda Press 82/5, Sir Ratnajothi Sarawarliam Littlu MaWatha, ColorT1b0 13. Telephone: 435975
CONTENTS
News Background The Wicalence in Galle (2) A Year of Ups and Downs
fit P.A. Gyelter 5
DeVOLI fiori Prop0535
Ar 1 A55 355 11eg: Tilt 已
A Political Analysis Ethnic Conflict (2) 13 English Writing 15
Books 1E

Page 4
NEWS BACKGROUND
CONFLCT : U.S. M.
Mervyn de Silva
he incorrigibly unpredictable and
uncooperatiwe Mr. Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the House of Representatives has watched Congress, now dominated by the Republicans, approve a resolution on Sri Lanka that was passed unanimously. Since the United States is more than a superpower - the collapse of the Soviet Union made it the sole superpower - few countries can afford to ignore the formal gestures of the US Congress. It has offered its "good offices" to help resolve Sri Lanka's harrowing ethnic conflict. It has gone a step further. In the resolution unanimously passed by the House, the U.S. Would urge ALL parties "to negotiate in good faith with a view to ending the current armed strife and to find a just and lasting political settlement to Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict while assuring the territorial integrity of the country".
Now, the question of Sri Lanka's unity and territorial integrity is precisely the issue raised by some 3,000 Buddhist monks who launched a protest campaign tem days agoin Kandy, the ancient Sinhalese Capital and the traditional seat of "Ma Wate" and "Asgiriya" which some of our British governors often identified with Canterbury and York. Though Sri Lanka is not a theocratic state, both Tajor parties, the UNP in office and the SLFP in opposition (or the other Way about) made it a point to enshrine in the constitution the special status of Buddhism, its "pregrrliilence",
INTERNAL CON FLICT
All this may not have mattered if only President Chandrika Kumaratunga's "Peoples Alliance" could dismiss the Maha Sangha's allegation that the P.A. is Vulnerable to the pressure of the minorities.... and therefore responsive to their demands, often at the expense of Sinhalese-Buddhist interests.
NOU.F.
This is an intensely domestic conflict.
TEPA is no Ordi: PriTe Minister Sir coalition of 1970, W. leading Leftist parti E C.F. The SE WC hawe sharp differe, Sowjet Marxist-Liter Communist party. E "Trotskyism" of the In practice than T! impression on the . of the party's poWer Perera, Dr. Colvin
Leslie Goorewarder
Presider li t IKLI I rari NOT the ideological ples Alliance, thoug affect the political" tuent party. On a pi agenda of the P.A Numbers rather that differences Take life derland Cabinel dif majority in the 225 se the SLFP-Left Coalit the Conservative U 90-95 Wotes. On a before the national a
As for the clergy, only ask "how Tian TULF (Tamil United SLMC (Sri Lanka Mu C.W.C. (Ceylon Wor The U.N.P., though means crushed. Bei ble Satisfied With a li the August parliame whelming majority . the island's populatic des, the Conflict that tiny island apart is a COTictrootgdinant: ties. The more heig the stronger the ho giance. The Maha impact tham the Worl their attention and

AKES A MOVE
y"United Front" like Ta Bandaramaike's ich IrlclLIded the Wo is, the L.S.S.P., and Marxist partners did Ces since the promists launched the ut by the 1970's the S.S.P. (more Titoist otskyite) Tmade little ay-to-day behaviour ul troika — Dr. N.M, R. de Silva and Mr.
atunga's proble T1 is diversity of the Pedit does sometimes ilE' Of each COn StirtiCLular iterT1 On the as a government. ideological or policy fre PA.īts PrēSiCult, it has no stable at Parliament. Where ion's traditional foe, N.P. Car Count on ly major resolution ssembly.
its strategists need attalions has the Liberation. Front), the slim Congress) or the kers Congress) got? efeated, Was by no id:S E PA, had to ery modest 50% at tary polls. The over'Sinhalese 74% of n) is Buddhist. Besifeatens to tear this ETHNC conflict, a Jonistic group identtered the tensions. d Of CollectiWë alleangha has greater s great powers, and hergies anyway are
directed to Conflicts nearer home or of greater strategic significance.
Apart from the bipartisan blessings of this rare resolution, the U.S. Congress, it should be noted, must approve the econdmic aid programs of the administration. A powerful Congressman or an influential "lobby" cancertainly block or delay American aid programs. No Sri Lankan party in office can afford to ignore this since Sri Lanka relies so heavily on the IMF-World Bank sponsored consortium for projector commodity aid, tied or untied, Hence the pilgrimage to Paris each April, though the facts and figures are known to officials and the minister long before the ceremonies, The donor group usually pledges between 700-800 million dollars, and the U.S. is quite often the No. 1 donor.
The nearer Big Neighbour, India, was the other country which influenced Sri Lankan decision-Thakers - the powerful and the proximate, the U.S. and India. There was a time, when the policies of the Indian government, ran counter to Washington's South Asian policy. That was obviously true in the Indira Gandhi' years when there was What American Colmentators called a Delhi-MOSCOW axis. There may be a Moscow but there is no Soviet Union any more. The Soviet diS-Union häS in fäct left Präsiden Yallsin's Russia so weak and lonely that the US-led NATO ignored Moscow in the recent Bosnian operation.
During the last years of the Cold War, the years in Which an Organisation called the LTTE became news in Colombo, Prime Minister indira Gandhi was deeply suspicious of the foreign policy of the pro-US President Jayawardene. The hostility was strong enough for Mrs. Gandhi to order covert assistance (training and Weapons) to anti-Colombo guerrilla groups in the Tamil north. No such proble T faces President Kumaratunga who has the unequivocal support of the Congress administration in Delhi.

Page 5
INWESTIGATION
The Violence in Gal
Mr. Burke continued: "The people Were coming from the roofs; that there Were no iron gates to keep people out and that the attacks were so Well organized. Furthermore, Mr. Burke stated that the police were unable to contain the fires because they lacked proper apparatus for putting out the fires. In an effort to disperse the crowds Mr. Burke reported that the police opened fire, away from the crowds, and used large amounts of tear gas.
Although the police were unable to protect the Common Sundry shops, Mr. Burke stated that they did protect the Jewelry shops.
When äsked abJ OL ut the arti-Tamm|| posters that had been reportedly hung throughout the Bazaar, Mr. Burke admitted that there had been posters that the police removed at the request of the shopKeepers.
In regards to the reason for the attacks, Mr. Burke stated that Galle is a very Sensitive place, with a history of racial lensions. Although stating that investigations were still underway, he believes that the Wholesale trade monopoly of the Tamils and Muslims may have provided the motivation for the attacks. He also stated that some Muslims Were responsible for the attacks on individual hortlas in Thala pitiya.
Mr. Burke confirmed that the police had arrESEd péciple in COññEclion With thE attacks. However, he clarified that they had not arrested the arsonists. Rather, the arrests were of secondary actors-those who had looted the stores subsequent to the Etta CKS.
Mr. Burke reported that after the Galle attacks, at the request of the Minister of Education, three police officers had been trasferredo different Stati015.
ACCOUNTS OF THE INDIWIDUALS AFFECTED BY THE GALLEATTACKS NOW LIVING AT THE SIVAN TEMPLE
Mindful of the fact that the affected GTGLLLLLS GLGH LCLaLCH LaL LLLLLLLHHLLL spoke have already been targeted by wio/елсе, апd in an effогї Іo respecІ Іhe
ргїvacy of these iлdi that this report doe Victrization, the la wed have been repl
Mr. P.S.:
About a Week ag in front of rry shop Tafi|S EJE I kille. S Sewes told Tid to Inf it and to get it remc among the people t trouble the army an interyerile: Web dildirilir. After 4.30 p.m. om F and told the police. T thEE Would not be a trouble occurred the After 5.30 om Friday the shops, closed Sed the employeest Ces and || Worlt HOT Friday Went to the K Were a large numbe and || Was glad beca: Bf1 Îltification That thị:
TOLJE.
At about 7.30 p. the Kowl. We COTTOtion Was heal Ware living in a ht MLS, WE TE onto the road. The Some trouble Was go asked me to get int go to a still Ore Sec We Welt to a ga durselves. Then a gr Whether the people there. They were 5 CF Tie to kilo WW Ft being burned. But be Security We did notg such things happen police used to corn. and help us to puta it did not happen this
On the third, a gr informed the police What had happened, provided security. TI two Kovils into refug the Tamil people lost | FadrlotiCd that b. been burned down. ShČIOS had beer bo

le (2)
scLassard so EnSUre
no lead of Ther ries of those Irmier wieaced by their initials.
there was a poster advocating that the The Sinhalese themorm the police about Wald. Targ Was talk nat if there Was any the police would not It take that seriously. riday We felt uneasy he police told us that ny trouble and if any y would see about it. We decided to close 10th my shops, a dwlo go to their residenTie. Because it was Owill to worship. There r of SinhaleSE tillerie use I thought it was are Would not be any
1. Want höfTlé from was at home a big rd from the to W. We use rented from a oise Was heard I got Muslims told me that ing to take place and o the house, and to use place if possible. rby house and hid oup came and asked ! of our shop were Sinhalese. Then We our two shop Were acăuse there Was no O LO See the T1, When ad on other days the and take us there, Lut the fire. HOWOWgr,
time.
up of some people and the MPs about Thereafter the police ha police turned the 2e camps and got all ay there. By that tine th of the shops had
The stores of the roken into antil the
goods - rice, sugar, milik powder, chili, etc. - looted.
Our requestis that facilities be provided fOruisto COntinued OU [b] LJ Sinea SS in the Sa.The places. I have sustained losses amounting to about 25 lakhs.
Mr. A.T.
(as sold rough an Interprefer
| hawe lived here for 45 years. My Son is a shopkeeper in Galle. He lives in Thalapitiya. My som is in the hospital noW. Before the attacks many people were coming into my son's shop, threatening my son and telling him to leave. We did not take the warnings to heart, But then five or six days before the attackaplacard Washung on a tree at a prominent juncture in the Bazaar, for al|| Tar Tills to SēE, that LLLLLLLLS LLLLL LLaaLLaaLLL LaLLa LLLLLL that the Tamils will be harmed if they don't leave. There were other placards too. We informed the police about the placards around the 29th or the 30th of May and they removed ther. We then went on with our business. The shopkeepers asked the police for protection but the police just told us not to Worry. They did not pro Wide security for the shops. On the 2nd of June, as my son was closing the shop, a mob came to his shop. The people were armed. They told us to leave and they looted the shop. There were four groups of people who went to different shops. The mobs were only going after Jaffna Tamils. We Were afraid they WCuld har In Lis SC We left the shop and went home. This happened at 6.00 p.m., Know the police were called about the attacks by 8.00 p.m.
didn't feel safe in my home so I went to Tyson's home in Thalapitiya. The mob came to my son's home. They went into his home, looted it, and set his things on fire. They also assaulted my son. They had Weapons. One of them used a spearlike Weapon and stabbed him - they Stabbed his in the arm. NOW he is in the hospital. Also when the mob came into his home, one of them picked up one of my Son's Children and threw the child on the ground, injuring the child, My Son's wife took the children and ran to the house ext door for protection.
carine to the refugee camp on the morning of June 3. When I gothere there was nosecurity at the camp. But ther, that
3

Page 6
night, a group of parliamentarians visited the camp. After that, security Was providēd.
(NOTE: On 18 June 1995, Mr. A.T. Was physically assaulled by a group of Iеп people in front of the Galle Police Station, Prior to the incident, Mr. A.T.'s son, Who Was assa L'Isfeld FrT EFTER GāWÈ affäCKS, FEDOF fed relaries of Sattackers to the police who subsequently arrested and released the individuals, According to his son, Mr. A.T's atlack Was relasation for the агтвsts.)
Mr. T.T.:
On June 2, around 10.30 p.m. a mob of 150 people came to my place shouting. They were armed with shotguns, galkatas and swords. Some of ther carried a petrol can, Realizing the danger, Iran out through the back door. I Wanted to go to our Muslim neighbors house for protection. Since I could not go there through the railroad had to climb the roof. SOThe Thembers of the mob spotted me. While was on the Foof, They dragged TIE do WF1, assaulted and stabbed the several times,
Then somebody shouted "the police is coming' and the attackers fled. By that time my house had been damaged and our belongings were on fire, Our Muslim neighbors took me inside their house and arranged for medical Care... I stayed With them until the next Torning When the police took me to the hospital around 8.30 g... The doctOTS COLuld rot tret TELJIstil 10.30...heard some of the hospitaler ployees were saying that I should not be given medical care. I was given a bed only after surgery. The hospital environment was wery tense. I Was given police protēti.
know at least fifty of the attackers. The person who led the attack was known as "Hrsg-Wheeler LJkkL" | KrlLW im WEry well. In fact, he bought 60 sacks of Onions from my shop that morning. The names of those Who stabbed the are Fahim and Sakir. Most of the attackers Were front Galle town. There were Some from Ra= thgama too. I never had any fights with these people. Most of the people who came to attack me were either supporters or Tembers of the United National Party. | hawe made Complaints to the police about the identities of the attackerS.
MTS CT.:
On Friday the 2nd of June at around 10 p.m. a mob of about 50 men carrying
swords, knives and with tapered end) C. They were shouting
ÖSB. WBT WB 1Eä towards our house, T' OLur baby and five YE to our Muslim neig CrOWd Stod otside ted my husband's na ding him to come out. attack the Muslim hou out. Fearing that the
hurt as well, We Car The and my husband C: attacked my husban With the sword, cutting bone, and another hit the 'alawangu'. Anot of our five year old
My son Was injure: elbow. Then they se We hawe lost eweryl What we were Weari attack. We hid agai |COLSEN. WÉ WEľE SICE husband to the hOS neighbor's house unt Ext fifted at 5
husband to the hos to the Siwan Temple the Karapity nospita
Mr. S.S.:
The fir 55 Stated E 8.30 I had already C difOITTEdhi Tab0. my mother, father,
TE CITET, ANTLEEr a T1 OD Of ab) OLJt 10Č) down the lane. The Taking a loud nois. all ran to our Musli through the back (d bathroot. We heart the Pettah Agency Word that our shops the mob. They sto shouted and threw StO 25 at the HOUSE boys from the neigh front of thleh0USB Er mob from entering it frOfT a MLS lifa Til the boys Was badly from te ETCkE 1 TE See Ted like an etern that they will be b: Muslim family was and asked US to lea mot knowing What tc. police came the next took us to the Siwan

alawangu' (iron rod arme to OLJT HOLISE. and making a loud rd the mob coming y husband and took ar Cold 50 a Tid fär
br's FLSE. The Lur HOUSE ad Shou= me "Rajah", demanThey threatened to Seifhe did is 10t COf The neighbors would be
back into Courhouse Time out. The Tobi d. Onlig ättäCkĞd hi’T ghisarm through the FiľT1 On the FIBad With her person took hold Son and Lifew hiri, on the head and it fire to our house. hing. We hawe Only ng at the time of the m at our neighbor's red to even take my pital, We hid in Our il the police came the p.m. They took my pital and brought LUS ... My husband is at .
round 8.30 p.m. By | Franklir. Burke Littlefire.S. I VEWit Older Sister and HET 9.00 p.m. We heard -150 people Coming Were shouting and as they Carme). We Ti neighbor’s HOUSE or and hid in their d the Tob calling for people. We had got had been burned by od at the gate and
arrack bottles and
A COW of MLS Hörhood gathered in Id tried to prevent the | ME | DLI CLIEE y. The foot of one of Culby glass pieces ck bottles. After What ity the mob left saying ack in an hour. The "rightened to hide US ve. We Were terrified, | da. We hid until the Edayat 5.00 p.T. and
temple,
M. S. (a5 [old Illi rx Lugli art irrifer) refer:
| own a hotel and a grocery store, both of which were fully damaged in the attack, On June 2, sometime before 6.00 p.m., a group of people came into my store and told me to leave. They said they were going to burnit down. I took them seriously so left. I called the police but they didn't come. When I left my shop. I didn't see any police in the area. This is because the police are anti-Tamil. After left my shop I went home.
At about 9.30 p.m. a mob came to my home. They took mythings from my home. They d'arthaged my things and my home. It wasn't safe there so I had to leave. don't know how the people knew where | lived. The address of my home is not listed any where except with the police. I think the fires started around 8.00 p.m. | Came to the Siwan TeTriple Carl Junie 3rd,
MS. R.S.:
make cigars at home and sell them to raise my three children. On Friday the 2nd of June around 9.30 p.m., a lorry load LL LLLL LLLLLL a aLLL LaLLLLSLLLLLLLL LLLLLLLK about 100 of them. They Werg Sinha lese and Muslims. They attacked our house DLLL aaLaLL LLL LLLLCaaLaLLLLLLLS LLLLLLK LLLLLL HH La aLLLL neighbor's house and hid until the police came the next afternoon and brought us to the Sivan temple, Irent my house from a Muslim family. On the 4th Went to my HOLIGE TO 533 HOW it Wā5. THE OWINĒTS COf my house scolded me and told me not to Cortle back and that they can't rent the house to Tamils anymore. We hear that there are posters threatening death to anyone who gives houses to Tamils.
MS. S.W.:
On the 2rd of Jurie, aro Lund flOO, SOme? of mySinhalese friends came to the stores and inforted me that there were plans to DLLLLLLLS SLLLLL L SaaLLLLLS LLLLLLL LLLL LLLLLL rumors to that effect earlier, Posters by a group called Deshapгenny Sang withапаya called its members to kill Tamils.
We hawe informed LhĒ2 policė Several times. The answer We got was 'mokuth karanna bai" (mothing Can be dome). Om the 2nd I closed the stores at 7.00 p.m. and Went to the police station to Take another complaint. I returned home around 8.00 p.m. Minutes after, a group of people = | Could flot Count ther T — Walked into ITyhouse shouting-Weimmediately ran through the back door. They fermower all Cur belongings Inclu[j]ng TT1ỵ motor bicycle, heaped them on the road ad Stfire,

Page 7
A year of ups and
Despite a year in office, PA government's peace plans,
he 17-year-long rule of the United
National Party had vexed the voting populace so much that the People's Alliance (PA) was in a plum position where the masses Were hungry for a change in government. Hence it managed to swing 63 per Cent of the Wotesto galim power om the election pledges to bring a solution to the ethnic crisis, abolish the Executive presidency, Bradicate bribery andcorгшption, protect fundamental human rights, adopt free market policy and increased measures among other things.
The PA, Was full of Washed-behind-theL0LLLL LLLaLLLLLLL LLLLLL a LLLLLLLLY aaaL0ekS tuals askey ministers much to the chagrin of seasoned politicians; but the end of one year term report cannot give it a definite "pass or 'fall" if one goes by its mixed bag of broken pledges, rising cost of essential COrTITOdities, workers'S LI II rEeStard or the aLLLLLL LLLLLL aa LS LLLLLCLL SS aLHLLLLLLL LaL a devolve power to the regions and institute constitutional reforms, bringing malpractice in State departments before commissions of inquiry and most of all ending the fear psychosis which prevailed during the UNP government,
The PA, pro Tilised to abolish the executiWe presidency within months of comming into power. The issue is in cold storage with the LTTE's unilateral resumption of hostilities on April 19. The information, tourism and aviation minister Darasiri Senanayake said that the PA's performance. So far has been quite good. "The extrertist forces are trying to bring us back to the 1983 tara, but We are not deterred. Tourisri has shown a growth of five per cent and there is a positive approach to investment opportunities. The right to life has also been firmly established". Constitutional affairs minister G.L. Peiris said the PA has achieved some positive results in solving the ethnic issue and it was regrettable the hostilities resumed with the unilateral declaration of War by the LTTE.
The government's peace proposals offering substantial autonomy to the Tinority Tamils by Way of eight regional Coun
The Writer is a staff Writer of the Suriday Leader and Colorbo Correspondent of the Trries of ridia.
cils are interpreted E as detrimental to thi island. However, the WOLuld still hawe the | regional Councils s armed rebellion or ir
Analysts interpret the Constitution and CLITIStarCBS EFIB dč\ to hawe arly Teamim
Recently LTTE Balasingam had e holding talks With Peiris disissa ti present since it Wol the arted forces a Whole especially WF tedly refused oppor negotiated settleme of peace talks,
A Tall| IMF E - although it has been PA, its dewolution pri ablechangefor dem T1Blt Should aké Ör tot hold taks ir With them. Also it sh Sed the economic immense suffering north and east", he:
TMP W TE the military offensiv forces said the CIWi LufortLinate.
Wasudeva Nanay: Marxist Sinhala polit PA performance as pectations of the pli ther, "Expectation: activists and the pe C has gone up consi. looting of public prop Hope of ending the peaceful settlement by the government's to the LTTE's resu he Said.
Takel is ä WF101 the performance of for the first year of added the governm

downs
remain mired, says Pearl Thevanayagam
y Sinhala extremists e Unitary state of the 2 Central government O Werto dSSOVEITE FÖLld ther ble 1 15urrection.
this as a Wilcolatior cof fee|| thild i El Ciriolution Would cease
믹.
spokesman Anton xpressed desire for the government, Mr. 3. ELS IOL COTILJCIV e at Jld be Unfair Tor bgth ind the people as a lef1 the LTTE repeatunities to arrive at a It despite fourro Lunds
iva SilläTEaräT| Säid difficult period for the oposals are a favourOcracy. "The govern1 the LTTE's suggesdreach a settlement JLuld not hawe Teimpoimbargo and caused O the Civilians in the said.
using to comment on e of the government |arl CäSUältes Were
akhara, lhe pro-Tamil ician sumrlled up the
mot meeting the exeople Who Woted for S Were high arTmomg ple. The cost of living derably. Plunder and Berty go or unabated. War and arriving at a asbeerijeopardised sknee-jerk response Tiption of hostilities",
3, Nanayakkara said he PA has been poor any government. He Blā5 tāk Strī
purposeful and meaningful steps. "The proposals it Litforward this Tonth should hawe been made at the beginning and taken up for discussion and debate, Although Workers' Charter was promised in the election manifesto, nothing has materialised. Instead We sa W a proliferation of Workers' unrest", he pointed out.
The positive achievements of the goverent has been the eradication of fear among the people of violence, arbitrary aľTESS EL Tid häTāSS Terit of CIWIlliamS . The Only exception is the recent discoveries of bodies of purportedly Tamil youth found floating in rivers in the last two months. Amnesty International has requested a report on these incidents and despite inquiries by the special investigating team, there had been no developments or clues to the identity of either the murdered youth Or the riders.
Operation Leap Forward, the major offensive of the government forces, starled feWWeeks ago following Tigerattacks om the artTy base in Mandativu island in Jaffrillä also Caused rador T1 Ci William CaSLalties. Particularly when almost 165 civil lians died in air-raid bombing as the church they sought refuge in Was bombarded by eight bombs. To this day, the government denies air force or military involvement although the International Committee of the Red Cross issued a statement of an eye-witness account of the incident as being an air-raid bombing.
Intelligence reports from the East reveal the LTTE to be getting ready for a major Coffersiwe. The LTTE hladissugida CirCLUlar Warning the Tamils in the police and military forces to Vacate their posts. Wide Spread shelling and air-raids and the Tamils in the area are fleeing their homes during the night fearing attacks.
In the North the LTTE is said to be procuring goods meant for civilians by paying retail prices in Colombo regardless of transport charges although only a fraction of goods are being allowed into the North. Therefore, it realis Luceritair Whether the one-year rule of PA has Tade any substantial progress on peace front.
- Trig friidi

Page 8
President Kumaratung Proposals: An Assessr
S. Sathan anthan
he Peoples Alliance (PA) Govern
ment took office about one year ago. Si Ce the numerous indiwiduals and organizations hawe urged the Government to submit a proposal which could for IT the basis for a negotiated solution to the Tamil Ouestion. On the 3rd of August, after almost nine months in office, President Chāṁ drika Bandarä läike Kumaratunga announced her "Devolution Proposals" (Daily News, 48.95).
The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Prof. G.L.Peiris, explained that the President's Proposals are her "basic ideas with regard to devolution that is altost in the form of a Green Paper. The next stage is for the draft chapter of the new constitution or devolution to be presented to the Parliamentary Select Cornmittee (PSC) on Constitutional Refor T. Within about tWO Or three Weeks. We Will try to finalise that document and that will be placed before the PSC.. We will have ful||diSCUSSION tOraa Cha CC 15e SuS Withi that forum. Thereafter it can be presented to ParliaTent where. We Would need a 2/3rd majority. And having obtained 23rd majority We Will be in a position to place these proposals at a referendum. That's basically how We Wil|| Work" (The Island, 6/8/95):
Given that the President's Proposals contain merely her "basic ideas" and are incomplete, it is difficult to reach firm conclusions about the merits of the Proposals. Clearly there is a long way to go before the Government's proposals are finalised through the various stages described by Prof Peiris. Therefore it is necessary to Stress that the PA GOWETTTTTent has stil NOT formulated its proposals for conflict TESLUtil.
O fāc of it Prgije Kuāratunga's Proposals appear to set a frameWork for a negotiated Solution to the Tamil Question. And they appearto reveal some of her views on the nature and scope of political reform needed to re-establish peace.
The presentassessment begirls on the above stated assumption and it will examine the President's "basic ideas" and assess their suitability as a basis for conflict resolution in Sri Lanka, A. The "Devolution Proposals' 1. Nature of decentralization
(a) The term "Union of Regions" in the
Proposals (sec9.1 ( LHB term "Union Of DecerTimber 1985 Ta Front (TULF) Pro, sented to the Print Rajiv Gandhi. In 19 States" Created the Whilst retaining the L Similarly the term today Create the im gions Will enjoya hig that the Provinces Amendment. But t Beca Lyse Substan imputed by the terri is absent in the P SHOW belloW.
(b) The terms "Re Councils" Were firs years ago, in the
Chelyanayagan (B{
There is a Well kn deceptive use of the be remembered that the Der T10.Cratic Soc. Larka. The Word "Si піпg or relevance Country,
2. The centre
(a) The President' an extra geograph Territory" (sec 1.5) w fromany of the Regit based on the Unic Indian Todel; and Central Governmen
(b) However the envisage a structur Governmatto allo tween ethnic group Contrast,
- the 1972 Mode Federal Party (FP)h introduction of a SI "Chamber of States
- the 1984 All Par Statent of the Pr establish Tigent of a "Council of State";
- the 1985 TULF merded that "mem| shal|| reflect the 5th Union", and that "ni part thereof affectin be passed unless a

a's DeVolution
ent
) is an adaptation of states" applied in the Tl| United Liberation Iosals (part 1) preMinister of India, Mr. 5te term "Union of illusion of federalism nitary State structure. "Union of Regions" ression that the Reher level of autonomy oulder the 1987 13t is too is an illusion. tive power-sharing "Union of Regions" roposals, as will be
gion" and "Regional t applied thirty-eight 1957 Bandaranai keC) Pact (Part B).
W precedence for the Word"Umir". It ITILISt the country is named :ialist Republic of Sri ocialist", has no Tea
WhatISO e Ver to the
s Proposals envision ical unit, a "Capital which will be separate ns. This isostensibly In Territories in the
it implies that the WOLuld be reformed.
Proposals nowhere at change in Central W power-sharing beis in the Centre, in
Constitution of the adre Commended the Cornod cha Tiber, the " (art. 82);
y Conference (APC) sident proposed the Second Chamber, a
Proposals recomership in Parliament ic proportions of the Bill or Resolution of any nationality shall Tajority of Members
of Parliament belonging to that nationality agree to such a Bill or Resolution or part thereof" (part II); and
- the 19 December 1986 Proposals suggested the creation of the office of Vice President (para V).
Thus many previous initiatives went far beyond the President's Proposals by at least partially recognising the national questions. They envisaged a degree of power-sharing in the Centre between Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims and Up-Country Tamils. This refort of the Centre is the absolute pre-condition for a successful devolution of power.
3. The region
(a) The President's Proposals refer to "Regions" (se C 1.1) but do not indicate how many such Regions are to be identified. Evidently the intention is to rename Provinces and Provincial Councils (PCs) as Regions and Regional Councils (RCs).
(b) The ProposalsTake reference to the re-demarcation of only the North-East Province (NEP) (sec 1.1). In other words, the Proposals envisage the de-merger the NEP but along new borders which hawe yet to be defined. It follows that the unit of decentralization in the north-east has not been determined.
(c) The Proposals are silent on the question of a RC or other institutional arrangements for MusliiriTis and Up-Country Tamils, in Contrast,
- the 1957 BC Pact provided for the di Wission of the the Easterm PrOWICE ir to "two or more areas" (part B);
- the 1972 Model Constitution recorTended the demarcation of the Ampara District as a "Muslim majority state" (page 3);
- the 1985 TULF Proposals provided that "special provision shall be made to ensure the representation of Muslims and Tamils of recent Indian Origin who do not occupy contiguous areas" (part 1); and that an Assistant Government Agent (AGA) Division for UP-Country Tamils should be demarcated (part IW);
- the Sri Lankan formulation at the 1986 Bangalore Discussions suggested that "three Provincia COLInCi|5 5ha|| be Created for the Eastern Province. One for the Tamil people, one for the Sinhala people

Page 9
and one for the Muslim people" (para 10.2),
- the 1990 Amplified Proposals, jointly made by the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), Democratic Peoples Liberation Front (DPLF), Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF), Eelarn People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) and Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), recognised the need for Weighted representation for the Muslims Within the NEP (paras 2,5,7,8);
Td
- the 1991 Thondaman Proposals suggested that "Pradeshiya Sabhas with a substantial Muslim majority in the Eastern Province...may forma Union of Pradeshiya Sabhas" within the NEP (page 7).
(d) The Proposals do NOT contain proWisions which empower the Central Government to Unilaterally dissolve a R.C. Thus the Governor could dissolve a RC only on the "advice" of its CM (Sec 1.3.2). Consequently, they appear to offer a high degree of autonomy for each Region as implied by the term "Union of Regions".
However, Prof | Peiris clarified that "iri exceptional cases if a regional Council ETbjarkS OTI E COLUFSE of action that is clearly incompatible with the sovereignty and United character of Sri Lanka, in those circuistances the Centre Can intervene. We will incorporate such a provision in the Draft Chapter on Devolution when we present it to Parliament" (The Island, 6/895). The Words "sovereignty" and "United character" are open to extremely Wide interpretations. If adopted, such an amendment Willwater-down the promised autonomy, and so the extent of decentralzation Sin digubl.
4. Legislative power
(a) The President's Proposals will delete Article 76 of the Constitution (sec92) and West legislative power. Within each Region in the respective RC (sec 1.2.1).
(b) The Proposas provide for the establishTent Of a PETTTlament COTTISSion On Devolution to address Centre-Region and inter-regional disputes (sec VIII). This is an improverrent on the previous initiatiWEES.
(c) On the other hand the Proposals make a murky provision that RCs "will Exercise exclusive legislative andexecutiVе сопрetence": The meaning ofthe word "competence" is not defined.
(d) However, contradictions between the subjects on the Regional List and those On the Reserved List Were exa Tilned by the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC). They show that in most instances
powers which are ol List are neutraliser provisions in the RE Times, 6/8/95).
(e) Moreover, the regarding conflicts enacted by the Ceri
The Lula Woidable RCs are empowere dinate legislation, a gion conflicts of law. Centre Will prevail. of the unitary State trayto practice ina
5. Executive pow
(a) The President' cutive power in th region Who Would a the Chief Minister ( Board of Ministers (s mot specify that the be binding on the G VisionS Were Thade
endment (art 154C progressive sugges to Westexecutive po Thus,
- the 1972 Mode executive powerint (art 7);
- the 1985 Draft and Understanding Dell Wgsted i in t the Pro Will Cial CCOLI
- the 1985 TULF cutive power in the Council of Ministers
(b) The Proposal dent to appoint th "COCurrenCE". Oft (sec 1.3). This pro TEt
- the 1985 TULF rEd Tigre "CIOSultä
- the 1987 13th A Wed the Presidentt Without even Cons
Moreover it is in Thondarina In Propo "COCurrence" of provision was ma GOWerror TO e gli each Region.
(c) The Proposa Vernor to appoint persoпwho comm the majority in the 1.4). This clause 1985. Draft Fras Lihat the Cigf Exe "Orne of Life TITET|

ered in the Regional or superceded by served List (Surday
Proposals are silent between legislation fe and the Region.
onclusion is that the to enact only Suborli tat ir CentrE-RE
the legislation of the This is characteristic structure ad is COir"Union of Regions".
; Proposals west exe3 GOWE TOT Of BEC ict on the "advice" of CM) and the Regional ec 9.1 (d). But it does advice of the CM Will iowermor, Similar proIT LE 1987 '13th AT"|-- E). In contrast, Tlore tions had been Tade Werin regional bodies.
| Constitution wested he "state assemblies"
Fra Tie Work of ACCOfd formulated in New "Chief Executive of cil" (para 10); and
Proposals Wested exe"Chief Minister and ;" (part III).
S er power the Prese Gower för With the ECM in Bach Region Wision is an improve
Proposals which requition" (part III); and,
1grdient which allooappoint the Governor Jltation.
keeping with the 1991 sals whichreired the the CM. However, no de for the respective acted by the people of
ils empower the Goas Chief Minister "the ands the confidence of Regional Council" (sec is a throw-back to the awork, which provided cutive of a PC shall be EFS WF || tl: PTES =
dent's opinion is most likely to command the Confidence of the Council" (para 10). In contrast, the 1986 Childar Tibāram Proposals were more progressive and prowded that "the leader of the party which commands a majority in the Provincial Council shall be appointed as the Chief Minister" (annexure 1). It was substantially reproduced in the 1987 13th Amendment (art. 154F).
(d) The Proposalsallow the Central Government to appoint a Regional Public Service Commission (RPSC) "in consultation. With the relevant Chief Minister" (sec. 7.1). Since the "concurrence" of the CM is not required, it follows that the Centre is free to impose its will on the Region; thereby denying the extensive autonomy imputed by the term "Union of Regions".
The for Tlation of a RPSC had been recommended by the 1984 Annexure C (para 8) and the 1985 TULF Proposals (part III),
6. Judicial powers
(a) The President's Proposals envisage the setting up of "a High Court in every Region" (sec 6, 1). Similar provisions had BEEr fladE in
- the 1984. Annex Life C (para "), — the 1985 TULF Proposals (part III), - the 1986 Chidambaram Proposals
(annexUre |), - the 1987 13th Amendment (art 154P) and - the 1991 Thor daman Proposals.
(b) The Proposals provide for a Regionat Judicial Service Commission (RJSC). This is an improverTent on the 131h AITendment. The only previous instance where such a provision Was made Was in the 1991 Thorda mami Proposals.
(c) The Proposalsallow the GovernOrto "appoint a Regional Attorney General WHO W| Advisé Hé Govarror Ol 1B COrlstitutionality of laws passed by the Regional Council" (sec 6.4), However the RBgional Attorney General Would in practice become the Centre's "regional policeTlen". This Wil|| Lundermine the extensiwe devolution promised in the Concept of a "Union of Regions".
7. Official language
(a) The President's Proposals intend to recognise Tamil and Sinhala as "official languages" and English as a "link language" (preamble).
(b) However, the Proposals do not indicate. Whether Tari Will be an official larguage of Sri Lanka. Because, although the 1987, 13tik Arimendiment made both; Sinhala and Tamil official languages, it

Page 10
specified only Sinhala as the official language of Sri Lanka (art. 18).
B. Land
(a) The President's Proposals declare that "Land Will be a devolved subject and State land within the Region will be wested in the Regional Council" (sec 4.1 ). This is an improvement on the August 1985 Draft Framework (annex 2) and the 1987 13th Amendment (list I) which wested State land in Central Government. HOW. ever, the term "State land" is nowhere defined in the Proposals. It is unclear Whether or not "State land" includes land Wested in State agencies, such as the Mahaveli Development Authority.
(b) The Proposals are silent on the subject of Land Policy. In contrast, the 1984 Annexure C had allocated "Land Policy" to the RC (para 5).
(c) The Proposalsallow the Central GoVernment to take back State lands wested in the RC after the formality of "consultation" With the relevant RC (Sec 41). No provision was made to Secure the "Erחנ|- CLITTEITICE" of the RC.
(d) Modifications in the selection of allottees in land settlement schemes are restricted to "future" schemes (sec 42). Thus present schemes and extensions of present schemes are excluded.
Provisions in (c) and (d) undermine the extensive devolution promised in the concept of "Union of Regions".
9. Law and order
(a) The President's Proposals EITIPOWEr the CM to appoint the Re giornal Pol FCE Commissioner "in consultation". With the GOVeTIOr (sec.3.1). This provision offere the CMWide discretion. But the offer WS neutralised by authorising the National Police Commission (NPC) to transfe police officers into and out of a Region merely "In Consultation" with the Regional Police Commission (RPC) (sec 3.4). In addition. use of the Word "concurrence" was avoided.
(b) The Proposalsallocate the functions of "recruitment, transfers within the Region, dismissal and disciplinary control" of members of the Regional Police Service (RPS) to the RPC (Šec 3.3). This tempoWerment was undermined by the proviSion that the RPC will be appointed by the Central Government"in consultation" Wilf the relevant RC (sec 3.5). Again use of the Word "concurrence" was avoided.
(c) The Creation of national and regional Police Services was provided for in
the 1986 Chidambaram Proposals (Annexure II),
- the 1987 13th - the 1991 Thort
(list I).
(d) The Proposal. COTOSition of the EWêr,
- the 1984 Anne "the armed forces quately reflect then: (para 9);
- the 1985 Draft F that "recruitlert to be carried out so : Armed Forces refle far as possible wil frame" (para 17); a
- the 1985 TULF that "the compositio shall be brought in
ficrāti Vinfīvi that "the creation of Muslim regiments (Annexure II).
(e) The Proposals CONTIDOSition of the F
- the 1984. Annex. the Northern and E Police forces forinte reflect the ethnic c regions" (para 9):
- the 1985 Draft that "at least 80 per the Police Force serv Withim any Provincia be those recruited , Council Areas" (ann
- the 1991 Thonda Wided that "the Nation reflect the national
and "the Provincia reflect the provincia (list I).
10. Finance
(a) The President's for a National Financ 2.1). A similar provisio
- the 1972 Model C - the 1984 Annexur the 1985. Draft Fra the 1985 TULFP
- the 1987 13th Ame:
(b) Some previous ther than Proposals ethnic composition o Thus
- the TULF Propos: the Cornmission to co nor of the Central Bar

endment (list) and man Proposals
ara Silant about the Tied forces. HOW
Ire C specified that Sri Laka Will||ace= onal ethnic position"
amework suggested Hē ATTTed FOTCēs to to ensure that the the ethnic ration as in a specified time
Proposals required of the armed forces he with the national years" and specified separate Tamil and all be undertaken."
are also silent. On the PS. In contrast,
re. Crequired that "in astern Regions, the final Security Will also Omposition of these
Framework specified Cent Cof membBrS of ing in Police Stations il Council Area, Will Within the Provincial ax); and
man Proposals proa Police Force shall ethnic proportions" PolfCg ForCe3 shaII ethnic proportions"
Proposals provide e Commission (sec had been included
onstitution (art. 16); е C (para 6);
mework (para 11'); roposas (para Ill);
indment (art 154R).
itāti WeS , Walt suurand specified the | the CorTITissio.
ils, which required Sist of the GOVEık and three merim
bers "one of whom shall be a Sinhalese, one a Tamil and one a Muslim" (para III); and
- the 13th Amendment, which specified that the Commission should be "cor InpoSed of the Governor of the Central Bank, Secretary to the Treasury and three other members representing the three major communities" (art 154R).
(c) The Proposals allowed the RC's powers of taxation in "specified areas" as defined by Central Government (sec 2.2) and enumerated in the Regional List. Similar powers were granted in
- the 1957 BC Pact (part B); - the 1984. Annexure C (para 6); — the 1985 Draft FrameWork (para 11); — the 1985 TULF Proposals (part III); and - the 1987 13th Amendment (list ).
(d) However, powers to tax "income, capital and Wealth of individuals, companies and corporations" are retained by the Central Government. The basis and extent to which powers of taxation will be shared between the Centre and the Regionare unSpecified,
(e) The Proposals empower RCs to "set up their own financial institutions" (Sec 2.3). This provision is an improvement om previous initiatives, none of which granted this power to Regions, However the natuse of these institutions asid the is relationship to national financial institutions are unspecified in the Proposals.
(f) The Proposals authorise RCs to borrow money and impose a "prescribed limit" on their international borrowing. Above this list "the Concurrence" of the Central Government is required (sec2.3). Nevertheless, this is an improvement on previous initiatives, none of which permitted international borrowing by the Region.
(g) The Proposal authorise the RCs to "regulate and promote foreign direct investment, international grants and development assistance. Subject to such condtions as may specified by the Centre" (sec 3.4). This is an apparent advance on previous initiatives. However, "National Planning" is a reserved subject; and RCs cannot receive and disburse grants and development assistance.
The "specified areas" of taxation, the "prescribed limit" con international borrowing and the "conditions" imposed on mobilising foreign investment, funds and development assistance, and the criteria of Centre-Region interaction between financial institutions are unspecified. Therefore the scope of power-sharing is
LukOWI.

Page 11
Chandrika's Federal Pack
Partha S. Ghosh
he Sir Fala-Tai Til ethnic strife is
now about four decades old. Still, there does not seem to be any ray of hope at the end of the tunnel towards its peaceful management. The War between the goveTrrent forces and the LTTE is becoming more and Tore fierce and no one knoWs What would its final outcore be. HOW this point of no return has been reached is a long story but it would suffice here just to underline the harsh reality that successive Sri Lankan governments and Tamil leaderships have missed one opportunity after another to address the problem from a realistic sense of judgement. Their sucCumbing to all kinds of pressures of existential politics is now making the T1 bear an unacceptable cost which the present strife has brought in its train.
This of course, is mot peculiar of Sri Lankan politics. All Societies suffer from similar myopia. Only when Tatters go Out of hard do the leaderships realise the gravity of the situation. But by then it is already too late. What Machiavelli had Said about half a famillennium ago soLunds as valid today as it sounded then:
Physicians say of Consumption (tuberculosis), that in the early stages of this disease it is easy to Cure but difficult to diagnose, Whereas, later on, if it has not been recognised and treated at the beginning, it becomes easy to diagnose but difficult to Cure. The same thing happens in the affairs of state.
Against this perspective of philosophy of history, the two-pronged strategy of Preiet Crīdrikā Bardara laik KLmaratunga airTed at resolving the ethnic problem of her island-state deserves some careful analysis. The strategy is two-pronged because on the one hand there is an all out effort to deal With the Tigers Tilitarily while on the other to address the deep-seated political griewar Cēs of the Tan Tills through Strikirlig a political deal With the latter On a long-term basis. Empirically speaking, she cannot Defaulted as this is a til TE-TE sted tactic:S
KS aKLaaLYYL aa LHHuLuuLMHGS SHMMML S LaHMT M aCeeO Stigrigg Religi FCF, MFK Delfil.
of extending the arm keeping one's powd bles With la LTTE more serious than ju displaying the big st Indian army had failE before discussing tr What Chandrika has politically empoWerir North-EasterT prCWir
Orl August 3, Char federal package, (r fers had leaked the earlier). In the pack Sarı CE3 Cofa || the Taj Ta Tils, namely, the ( la di Sattler Tiëst, la W owera|| issue of regi Virtually conceded c. fulfilment of the Tari mincing Words she primary task was to
a new approachp fied acceptance ol people have ger WCS litics
|-d'Or 10t TBC3|| Ofar to Hawe - ewer Tadi: rémark Infavour oft speaking, it Was .
W IT-St- LEFT E TIL,
The package corn ble provision neces: northy to the Tamils. Cator of the bound rity North-Eastern proposed to divide autonomous region Winces), ThUS, inste state Sri Lanka WO Regions. The terri cities of Colombo : pura-Kotte WOLuld E arrangement and cally Within the Wes be directly administ
The regions WOL Otters of EX

age: A Political Analysis
s of friendship. While er dry, But the promilitancy is much st deterring them by ck. Even the mighty d o lare them. ELIt la LTE EL LIS SEE.
to offer in tells of ng the Tamils of the TCE.
drika announced her cidentally, the Reu
news about a Week age she took Congrior grievances of the կuestion of language, and order, and the Omal autonomy. She in every point to the | cēma ds. Without
ConféSSEd that ler firld,
re-cdicated on LuriqUalittlefECELFlaLLETEIT || uine grievances for ust be found.
y Sinhalese politician 3 Such a Categorical 1e Tamils. Objectively robably a bit of an
taill:53|the COTCCVHsary for granting autoPending the redemarary of the TarTil-TajoOrovince, it has been the Island into eight s (hitherto, Called proad of being a unitary | CW E3 al UiO, COT tories comprising the and Sri JayewardenaDe exclUded fr0ITI this although geographitern region they Would tered by the Centre.
ld be fully autoriornoUS ecutive and legislative
powers. Article 76 of the Constitution which gives absolute power of legislation in the country to the Parliament is to be abrogated as the same power is now to be shared by the Regional Councils as well. The respective powers of the Centre and the regions are contained in the Reserved List and the regional List respectively. The former has 58 subjects While the atter 45. There Would be n0 COICurrent LLLLLLLLS L S LLLLLLaLLLL LSLL LaLK LLLLLL LLLLLLLL0 LL meddle in the affairs of the regions it has been clearly provided that the Chief Ministers Carllot be rellowed from offica 5. long as they enjoy the confidence of the Regional Councils. The Governors are not supposed to be the watch dogs of Central interests as is the Case in India and their appointment by the President will be strictly with the concurrence of the Chief MSES
To resolve disputes between the Centre and the regions or between and among the regions there will be a Permanent Commission on Devolution appointed by the Constitutional Council. The Commission Would hawe po WETS Coffmediation as Wellas adjudication. There Will be a NatioIlla|| FirāTICE COTITissior entru St Ed With the job of allocating grants to the regions keepinginwiew balancedregionaldevelopment. The Regional Councils Will have the power to borrow as Well as to Set up their own finalcial institutions. Internatiomal borrowings beyond a prescribed limit Will, however, require the concurrence of the Centre,
lrn short, the packaga is the r TOS tideal devolutionary arrangement one can think of. But all good things do not necessarily Work, least of all, in the realm of politics. It is surnised that the very genuineness of the offer itself could become its liability. There are forces both Within the Sinhalese and the Tarril populations which hawe reasons to oppose the move. In respect of Tamil response to the proposals the Very fact that the latter tend to receive the approval of the majority of Tamilsit Would be opposed tooth and nail by the LTTE. In a recent article published in the EconoTisc and Political Weekly (Bombay, June 24, 1995), I have explained the underlying
9

Page 12
Cause thereto. It Would suffice here to reiterate that since the proposals have the potential to wrest from the LTTE their own constituency, that is, the Tamils of the North-Eastern province, they cannot agree to them.
It is also apprehended that the nore the Tigers sharpen their teeth against the package, the greater Would be the distance between the latter and the moderate Tamils, if not for anything else but at least for their personal security. The LTTE is capable of driving such fear into the spines of all Tamil politicians, notably those located in the North-East. Topolitically compete with the Tigers for the same hearts of the North-Eastern Tamils the IT10deratië Tamil parties would be obliged to pose as if they are equally on guard against the possibility of being taken for a ride by Chandrika, a garne which according to the Tamils, the Sinhalese politicians have been playing aver since the days of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike (1956-59). In this kind of a Situation their demand for the "Tamil homeland" would come in handy to them thereby raking up the issue of permanent merger of Northern and Eastern provinces. Without any tampering of the existing boundaries. The TULF leader, M.S.Wasithamparam, has gone on record to say that this is one thing which is "non-negotiable". To any student of Sri Lankan politics it is elementary knowledge that the matter is politically loaded and all kinds of ethnic sensitivities are intricately inter Wined.
Then there is also the problem of dealing with the Sinhala hardliners. Since the package Warrants constitutional amendments which require two-thirds majority of the Parliament and then a popular endorsement through a referendum, the possibility of their running into rough Weather is high. In the 225-member Parliament the two arch riwalls, the UNP and the SLFP (the present ruling coalition, the PA - People's Alliance is dominated by the SLFP), are more or less evenly balanced with the UNP having 94 members and the PA 105. The Tamil parties account for 14 and the Muslims for seven. The remaining five seats belong to the small parties. It has been Sri Lanka's experience that the party in power is generally accommodat|We of the Tar Thil darmlands but the One in Opposition gathers all its strength to sabotage it. This has been true right from
O
the Bandara naikaPact (1957) th Senanayake-Chew Agreement (1965)
Lanka Accord (198 Was opposed even Government, most Ster R. Premada sa ILIE flat Tuch Wäte Wali riwar in tha in everyone has lear the danger of proc папсу... Still, as note
ērtial realifik sanity is always the
The UN P Which || after all its prominen |ath mudali, Ranjan|| da Sa and Ganin been killed by the L the opportunity of p defenderS C) ta IT dhist interests. The mēldation in the Cid: declare the state as in place of a unitary it the necessary h Sinhala masses ag Though the UNP Pal der and the Leada Ranill Wickermasing te, Susil Munesingh UNP leader, has go "YOL Carl O. We unitary state". It is significant section of holds this position.
The other point parties would use to rmment Is with rega to make the post of a region inviolable. according to the pac Sler cannot be remo long as һе епјoys t| Regional Council. C Sri Lanka TaTill Weered Tould the di homeland" the spec Lankaloons large ir sild, THE UNFP WOL its political advantag Chandrika Governm |CW ed its torne, G.L. Minister and the c package, has clarif

helwanayakam (BC) ugh the Dudley mayakam (DC) hrough the Indo-Sri ). In the last case it rol Within the UNP tably by Prime Minitis ideed äS Well naSTiGy Withea Mähmainvening period and ed from experience astination and obstat the outset, exishow no logic, and casualty.
swirtually leader less leaders, Laith AthuWijaratne, R. PremaDissanayake, hawe TTE is likely to grap rojecting itself as the Lajority Sinhala-Budrevolutionary recor}volution package to a Union of Regions state Would provide andle to excite the gainst the package, liamentary Party leaof the Opposition, h3, has bēEarn di SCrĒ3, another prominent ne or record to say: anything other than eneral guess that a
the Buddhist clergy
that the Opposition 2rnbarrass the goved to the Suggestion the Chief Minister of S Tentioned above, kage the Chief Minifed by the Centre as e Confidence of the wer the tradition of politics which has mard for a "Tamil re of partition of Sri an average Sinhala d exploit this fear to NO Wonder that the anthas already melPeiris, the Justice if architect of the ld that the Central
Government Would have the powers to dismissa Regional Government if it threatened the integrity and sovereignty of Sri Lanka.
There are also some conceptual problems with the package insofar as the basics of a pluralistic democracy are ConCerred. There has been no effort to distance the state from TE:ligion. Cin the contrary, Chandrika has tried her best to Woo the Buddhist lobbies to support her scheme. One of the subjects in the Reserved Listis "Buddhism", meaning hereby that there is no intention to do away. With the special status clause for Buddhism in the Constitution. Religion is always a divisive political symbol which a democracy can ill-afford.
The most vexed question of all would, however, be the rede Tarcation of the North-Eastern region, an issue which Chandrika's detractors would exploit to the hilt. She has proposed the redemarcatimi "irl full COS Lultati Or With a Wiew to reconciling Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim interests"... If the Muslim and Sinhala majority areas of the present North-Eastern province are excised fron it and added to other Sinhala majority areas than effectively. What it Would mean is that there Would be a rialTiostExclusive. Tars III-Hindu area in the North-Eastern region but there Would be two or three Sinhala majority regions with Tamil-Muslim or Estate (Indian) Tamil districts where they would predominate locally. Far from pallating the symptoms of ethnic distrust it may exacerbate them. From a long term perspective it is unwise and dangerous to freeze the geo-ethnicity of the island. It Would di Wide the COITIITLI mities for alltiITE to Comme. In that Sit LatiO; it WOuld na Wêr be possible to think of a North-Eastern Tamil becoming the President of Sri Lanka. Both ideally and realistically speaking if a minority Tamil or Muslim Community can stayina Sinhala-majority region what is so sacrosanct about Tamil ethnicity that it cannot accommodate a Sinhalaminority Within its territory. These are serious matters and must be so treated lest the price may be too high for the state in the long
LJIT
Let US OW discuss the real issue for everything else is secondary without its

Page 13
solution - the milion dollar LITE question. HOWSOver might the Chandrika GoWernment claim to address the Tarinil pro= blem Without the Tigers, the hard reality is that no Solution can be possible without either accommodating them into the System or breaking their backbone Completely. The Way the War is being Waged against the LTTE it seems that the government Wants totalk to them frorTi a position of strength. But the problem is that Seldo Ti a regular army has been able to overpower a guerrilla force and that too in a jungle terrain of the variety available in the North-Eastern province,
The Indian Tamil (CWC) leader S. Thondaman's suggestion that the LTTE should be offered to form the government in the North-Eastern region under the new Scheme deserves mention in this regard. Indirectly what Thondarian has meant is that the Tigers should join the political process. But is this not exactly what the Chandrika Government tried to achieve by initiating the peace process in the first instance? It has been the experience of all, whether it is the Sri Lankan GoveLLHHLaa aLL LLaL LLLLLatLOaLHaaLLaS LLLLLL Tigers are too Wily in their political deals and Of1çë thay Weather the Current difficulties they go back to their old demard of Eesar. As such, even if it is hypothetically agreed that the LTTE joins the political process, but given the military power that it commands is it not likely that in the elections they would use that Tuscle to brOWbeat the Woters to fallir lire. SOTe kind of "booth-capturing" may be introduced to Sri Lanka's electoral process which the nation is stil mercifully free from, Would notar LTTEGöwérrmièrt Schinstalled in power become a greater liability to
| Sitte?
But granting that Thondaman has proved himself to be the most seasoned Tamil (estate) politiciar who has extracted Tlaximum benefit for his community from Sri Lankarl Gowernmentbysheerpragmatiss II, one should be advised against poohp00hing his suggestion as mere gibbg: fish. But in the present case his advice does not seem to hawe Tiany takers, neither in the government morin the Opposition. Probably he wants to play the role of a go-between to revive the peace process. It is not unlikely that his ulterior motive could be to emerge as a politician of national stature particularly against the
background that of the estate areas ha: lenged by a coup politiciaris.
The Conflict betw. Sri Laka Stat9la that it is extremely . O extri Cateit Sffr LTTE they hawe re road. Ewer if it is hy that they Carry the di Sri Lankan army in tles, it does not fo Of Eg|ERIT WOLld b external recognitior Created il til E. TO SLJCCE55 of Sri La Flık iS aITOst certain thi international recogs the most important dern SoVereign stati almost immediately of the peace proc international aid un precedented US LIrle||||E|| || E fal: munity Waslirnl fawCOLJI
ent of the Ethic Cofidem Ceilte CF
To add to the Com of thig || dia (GWEf LTTE supremo, We the prime accused ESSESSination Case kr1O'WS FOW ichildish rä| 5ē55, BLI FEgr
Sri Lankan decisior
hOStage to the Lips politics. There shot in any body's mind the LTTE are calle Corily man — Prabh for the first time that
We OE-L-E EXC EE WEE|11 a Lankian state. Thes: more than forty per: Chandrika and Prä breakdown of talks Lihat the talk5 SUCCE ran came out of his a government in the Ad te te der Terle Wed.
From the forag Conclusions maybe

late his hegemony in S been seriously challe of up-and-Coming
EEl FC LTE TE Seacle such air Jifficult for either party T the Tess. For the ach Ed the End of the othetically conceded ay and overpower the SEVeral decisive batlow that the i drea II achieved. Without | a The W State Is The Wer er World. Given the izan diplomacy lately it at they Would not get liticus Wich is Ole Of ingredients of a moe. One may recall that
after the breakdown ess in late April the dolors Pol Edgad am SB5C) Tii||Tör. TFIS tha interational Com"Cifa rlegollalErlselleproblem and had full bar:1drika GOVErririlent.
plication is the request rtlet to extradite the lupilai Prabhakaran,
in the Rajiv Gandhi although everybody is the deTaldir. E ein lies the danger of 1 making becoming a and dOWs of Indian uld not be any doubt Lihat the TEE| ShotS ir d by the One and the akaran - and it was the realard Substantiange had taken place the lead of the Sri 2 Was an exchange of Somalletters betwem bhakaran prior to the Imagine a situation !Bded and Prabhakajungle hideout to form North-Eastern region! Tid för Extraditim is
|oing, the following dra WTI although in the
Sri Lankan situational conclusions have to be tentative only.
Orlé, it Tust bei COrcEdédhät W†lätewEr misgiving one might express about Chandrika's federal proposal it is a bold step for which she deserves kudos. Ewer her staunchest critics do not see her as a Wily Sinhala chauvinist politician Who does everything keeping the next election in mind. This is her biggest asset.
TWO, this asset is her liability too for it forecloses the LTTE dream of an Egar coming true resulting in prolonged military and state repression. The danger is that any slightest mishandling of the situation can lead to anti-Tamil riots putting the clock back to the position of 1983.
Three, the War between the Sri Lanka Gower ent and the LTTE Would have to be a War of attrition. In any War of attrition the state has the natural advantage. It all depends on how long it is able to drag it. Without of course causing hardship to the TarTill people of the North-East and Violating human rights of the variety as has surfaced recently- the killing of several Tamil youth in Colombo by the Special Task Force (STF) and throwing their bodies in a lake adjacent to the Parliament HOLISE.
Four, India has a very responsible role Oplay. It Tust beable C. Wiew the SUCCBSS of the Sri Lankan army, if any, with equanimity and steer clear of the pressures of Tarnil Nadu local politics to intervene as ithäppened priorto the food-drop in Jaffna by the Indian Air Force in June 1985. Such temptations must be resisted keeping in view the larger regional Security interests of the country.
Five and last, let usal agree that in any Case no political solution can be foolproof at the first instance itself. What is indeed is a healthy debate in the press, pulpit and platform so that some of the more obvious holes in the package can be plugged, But ultimately that Would be possible only if the present government remains stabla and the disruptive potential of the LTTE is curbed. Together the door must be kept ajar for the latter to Come back to the negotiating table. India may have to se riously reconsider in that case at some point of time its demand for Prabhakaran's extradition.

Page 14
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Page 15
ETHNIC CONFLICT(2)
Regional Factors
K. M. de Silva
Fಳ್ದ relations. With the Countries of Asia was another stand of Sri Lanka's foreign policy. After the British withdra Wall of Tiilitary bases from Sri Lanka, Bandara naike's government accorded a high priority to a regional balance of power strategy. He genuinely attempted for an enlarged Colombo Powers organization, to be established in Colombo, to jointly Voice their common concerns. Having received Scant response from the potential members of the proposed political Organization, Bandaranalike repeatedly called in 1958 and 1959 even for regional economic conferences to be called to deliberate om warious regional economic problems, and deviserleans to Overcorne them to the mutual benefit of all concermed. Although these attempts Were mot CrOWTËd With SUCCESS, the ESSE Ce remains that he made efforts to redress the balance against India through seeking a regional counterpoise.
As part of its regional balance of power strategy Sri Lanka also attempted to forge close relationships with India's rivals, such as Pakistan and China. In the Context of Sino-Indian power rivalry in Asia, China appeared to Sri Lanka as a natural Counterbalance to India. Under Prime Minister Sirinnavo Bandaranalike Sino-Lanka relations became more extensiwe, Cordial and
LIOSE-Oriente d.
An apprehensiveness of potential dariger from India Continued to Condition the foreign and security policy of Mrs Bandaramaike's government. Felix Bandaranalke, Parliamentary Secretary to Mrs Banda rā laike, stated ir Parliament that Sri Lanka's security did not "depend merely upon goodwill towards and friendliness towards India and an assumption that We Will newer get into difficulties with India." Writings and pronouncements of Nehru, Panikkar, Appadorai and other leaders and opinion makers continued to be quoted in the Sri Lankan Parliament, ā5 hese 5 ti corribled to Srī Laikā leaders' threat perceptions. So, from a strategic point of View, China's importance to Sri Lanka continued to be considerable. Sri Lanka further developedits trade relations with China involving rice and rubber, the island's two major import and export Commodities respectively.
ril the light of the abowe wiews and
CCT pulsions, Mrs her, good offices td, Si10-Irdial börder October 1962 and as the aggressor, initiative in Summar förrCe3 Jf. Six 101view to exploring
bringing India and C table and settling t The proposals Whis Conference, tgeth tions, Were persona by Mrs Bandarana |diri Esia i Jan La Delhi by her and res. ad Ghafa the San pted the proposals SO Witi r5gWato Cēt vēTē prosa 5, Mrs Ba displayed her skill er Ceto India While as the aggressor.
Sri Lanka's relāti COSolidated Witt Agreer Tnent on 25 Ji tWC) Countries, grar MMFN. StatLJS.BLut MMr Wellet did it a Of the Chingsg COLIF should use only ship for Sino-Lankar I frOT the abwe is til of building a count IS TIOtto Etjē at the gi national interests, a balancing strategy too Obvious to je friendship with Ney essence of the pilot
Pakista ad Sri threat perceptions CC). Cered. Sri Lil stan, a Country whi always the means por Erdörtlinarice, as a against India. That the Bangladesh cris Was IOE Sympathetic gladesh; the islandto an eventuality of TEITET. FIIC Wim stan's Overflight of which transported P. lian disguise from K
 

Bandaranaike offered
seek an end to the War that broke out in ifused to brand China Instead, she took the ing the Colombo conligned nations with a Ways and means of hinato the conference le boundary dispute. sh emerged from this With their clarificaly explained in Peking kg and Subarldrid of ry 1963, and in New }resentatives of Egypt a month. India accemtoto, while China did s." Although no con
resulted from the SE da Tanaike's initiative avoiding giving offIotcondermning China
Ons. With China Were esigning of a Maritime uly 1963 between the iting each other the S Bandaranaikes goccede to the request terpart that Sri Lanka 15 BPgrಳ್ಗರೆ by China adeo Wigt foo||OWS lat Sri Lanka's policy Brpoise against India 

Page 16
demilitarising the Indian Ocean and guaranteeing peace in the area has been a major foreign and security policy objective of Sri Lanka Sri Lanka's Indian Ocean policy has, therefore, been, On the Orne hand, to remove foreign military presence from the area, particularly its nuclear Component, and to ensure, on the other, that the resultant power vacuum' was not filled by a regional power. While the first part of this policy objective has been Conveniently shared by India, the second part went againstits own Indian Ocean policy, symbolising a gap in security perceptions India and Sri Lanka.
I CCCer 1971 ting Sri La rinkä Prirë Minister, Mrs Bandaranaike, appeared before the UN General Assembly to present the IOPZ proposal. Here she laid down for the first time what the peace Zone Would meam in detail.ooo When the proposal was being considered in the UN First COTTittégé thegrg arO53 (diffgrgr Cg5 bgtween the positions of Sri Lanka and India. Sri Lanka's proposal Was fairly COT preFergiwe Siti Elated E5 TTJCF to the Flä Wall för CES of the liittoral States as to the foTICES of the outside powers. But India Was against the military presence of external powers only. Following behic-the-scene pressures from India, "Shirley Amerasinghe, Sri Lanka's permanent representatiwe to the UN, accordingly had to modify his proposal"...in deference to the restrictions expressed by our critics".' On 16 December 1971, the General Assembly passed the resolution on the proposal of the IOZ OP. In the course of deliberations on this issue, dia's intentions in the Indian Ocean area beca The Crystal clear to Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka, therefore, ewertually grew lukewarm to the implementaaaH La L LaLHGH aLLHHLLaSS LLL S L0LLLLL proposal. Thisinhibition of SriLankavis-a- wisdia, combined with the fact of India's emergence as more powerful as a result of the break-up of Pakistan in 1971 and the Creation of Bangladesh, contributed to Colombo's softening of its attitude toWards the West, particularly the USA,
LLLLLLL L LLLLL LLL LaLLLLL LLLLC0LLLLLLL LLLLLL ger when the latter went nuclear on 18 May 1974 with a successful detonation of a nuclear device at Pokhram in the Rajasthan desert. The emergence of a nuclear powerfromamong the Indian Ocean liittoral States hadradically changed the stratëgic landscape in the Indian Ocean. Consequently, the context of the IOZOP proposal also changed after 1974, and Sri Lanka for Tally changed her position regarding the IOZOP vis-a-vis that of India. For example, Shirley Amersinghe stated HH LLLL LLLLLL SLaH LLLK LLLLLLS SLLL LLLH HLL want any great power there. By the same token, we do not intend that We should
14
drive out Satan by E some other powers |||Drid and Ilil Earl place of the superpo stated on 11 Novem nucléar power Wer Indian Cceапregioп, and also the derfilit would be seriously Cause of her concer Oceam policy, Sri La to Pakistan's propos |BB IBC zong III SOL further Tellowing of the West she permit Sri Lankan ports.
Ocean policy is, ther only with the Outside the ambition and pol
It is clear from th position of those S. argue that India po Lärka añadthält S.W as opposed to his p ged no threat to his C 15 diffiCL||L EO SLJStain hostility and at times rance of friendship bt tri 35 do Col SEET threat perceptions t im ClCTO hawe Ideed, Sri Larka" fear of India, Cause in size and poWer, strategic location as political arTibitions South Asia and th: bogel the ITIÖSt fLIN tids in tilg for Tsulati. Colombo governme rity policy. The SUCCE listrations had diff only in the mannel threat perceptions a gies and instrument J reutraliS8 SLICh th rnments were expl source of potential
Il tB British Ti|it Lanka's security. T rnments professed while maintaining a Britain through the seeking regional CC India through regio|| cultivation of good ddWBFSärie:S SLIC-135
Jayewardene Non-Conformi 1977-83
J. R. JayeWarden Prime Minister of St de Victory in the ge July 1977. He la

ZEElzebub arld allOW Within the group of di states to take the wers". He had also er 1974 at "farley a to emerge in the thg de nuclgarisation arisation of the area jeopardised"." BeSabout India's Indian ka gawe hers Lupport ial in 1974 for 5 flugth. Asia, and With the Har H.Ltitude LOWArdS Ted Tore US ships at Sri Lanka's Iridia efore, concerned not powers but also With
Er Öf die
a foregoing that the thild|airis Whill 0. IE: litil tC) SEOd 0 til TEdit to Sri '.R.D. Bandaranaike. re deceSSOrs, ert Wisäountry from the north, - To be SLUTE, Eck of ewen surface appeaetween the two COLto explain away the hat the goverriments held wis-a-Wis India. s apprehension and d by their asymmetry and by the island's well as New Delhi's in the region of the 3 līda Ocea, tāS amental preoccupain and prosecution of nt's foreign and Secu55ive ColOTO adT1ared for each. Other r of expressing their ind indevising strales that Were employed reats. The UNP gove. Citat Out India as a threat and depended агуpresence for Sri heir successor govefriendship with India S ITSLUITE MICÉlifikS WILH
Common Wealth, and lunterbalance against nal grouping, and the relations. With India's s China and Pakistan.
Government's st India Policy,
of the UNPECastle Lalka after a landslineral elections held in ter on changed the
country's Constitution and becarte the first Executive President in 1978. There was a pronounced pro-American tilt in Sri Lanka's foreign policy following the UNP election Victory in 1977. This was harping back to the policy of the UNP regimes of the late 1940s and 1950s; this time, of course, the policy being more pro-US and obviously anti-Indian, Jayewardene government's strategic centrifugality took place in circumstances that were wastly different from those prevailing during the post-independence UNP rule, The Sinhala-Tamil ethnic problem then Was notatallas acute as it presented itself to be since the late 1970s. Sri Lanka, although a primary products producer subjected for its trade to the Wagaries of Internationał market, had up until 1956 a favourable balance of budget and trade. The island's perforTTläflữẽ Qn bølh. CCLInls aSSufried a Slaggeringly negative turn in the 19705. In other words, President Jayawardene presided over the affairs of a country that had slid down to a much Weaker position as ar actor in the Cor Tity of nations.
Nots
KKSS S LLLLLLMLMLL LLLGS LLeHHMHLHS 0 LLHHLHHLLLLLLL 0000aS LtaLL B LCLOGaCSS K LLLCCHCLLLLLSS 0aL0S LCC CCCLLS LLLLLLLLS LLLKLL LLLLKS Y eLLLLLLLL 0LaaLS
EG. S.W.R.D. Bandara naike Speeches and Wrings, MtCCCH MLLL0S aCCCCLGLLLLL LLLL CCCLLLLMMH and Information, Guerrittent of Ceylon, Colombo, 19ÉST, pp. 41, 421 456. 57. Cyklin: H, PH, Debates, Wol. 53, 29 Agu54, 1953,
CI TOT 2. 58. De Souza, Ceylon; Seriale Debatus, Vol. 19, 23 JanILJEry 1964, Col. 2373; Sirir.Yardır.E, ibid., WCL, 19, 21 Jarl Luary 1954, Cicils, 211 C-13. 59. Sees lordglais, F.F. D. Bardäranaike, CLyon, HF,
LLLLLLLLuS SSLLS K0S Y uHOLLLLLLL 0aL0KSSLLLS KKS
LLLLLS LLL LGGLLLLLLLa LLLGLL LLL LLL LLLLLHH HHHLLLLHHLHLLLLLLL LLLL0L LL K SLMSLHCLKLSMMML L LLLLLLLC LCCS CMLL LLLLL CCLLLS Liriksi, 1972, pp. 459-55, GT. Thig Hiridiu, Madrials, 30 January 1953 and CDN),
Col. E. 15 March 1963.
"B2. CDN, Colorbo, 20 May 1964.
L0SLLLLLS LCCLLCLGL MMMLL OLOLGGG KkLL k HHH L LLLLLLMLLLLLL LLLL L LLaCCS tion of any Chinese curriplicity by stating in a broadCLL HH C CLMLH CL LCMM HLCHLHHLLCL LGGC HLL L LGGLLLLLLL LL LLLLLLL aLLLLLSLLLLHHHHHHHHS K0 KLLLL 1971; Caylım: SEITEta Debates, 1972, Wol. 32 CCl EE, G-4. Sigg. Press Helgas by thir Iridicirmatiam Ministry Col Ceylon on the Lusaka. Address of Mrs Sirimalso Barildararia ikus, September 1970), p., 2. 65. Ceylon Today, Wol, 20, September, October 1971,
pp. 13-14, CDN, 13 October 1971. B6, Philip Towia, Nawal Power in the Indian OCEarl Thirgals, Blulls and Faritasis, The Strategic and Dalerica Sud-Es Caire, Canberra, 1975, p. 57. 57. UN First Cortirrittee, 1834 Meeting, 23 November
11.
L0S K0LCLLCCLL LL LLL LLLLLL KLLGLMMHL LLLLLLLLSS 26th Session, Supplement 29, Resolution 2832 XVI, B DECETEr 1971, p. 337.
LKS S LLLLL LLLLGLLHHL S L00LS LSSL000aaS LOHOHDLLS
Er TF5, p. 35,
70. LINN DOC, AC F'N'''. 2015 d. 12.


Page 17
ENGLISH WRITING
The non-formal se
Kanalika Pieris
considerable amount of Critical attention has been
paid to the major genres of fiction, short story and poetry Written in English in Sri Lanka. Little attention has been paid to comic Writing, political satire and childrens literature. These constitute in a sense the informal sector in Creative English Writing from Sri Lanka. However, this essay also looks at certain elements within the formal sector of novels, short stories and drama in terms of skill and Orientation, and therefore, it must be admitted that the title given this essay, though catchy, does not completely indicate its contents,
Childrens' literature in Sinhala has had a prolific history of about fifty years, and much of it is good. Due to the availability of popular children's literature from abroad, the Sri Lankan Writer did not turn to writing childrens literature in English. But in 1970 there appeared the Taprobane Readers" approwed by the Educational Publications Advisory Board as supplementary readers. This series contains 'stories written for interesting and thrilling reading in language controlled to keep within the vocabulary strength and sentence patterns of the Government readers'. Despite this these stories do not appear to be dedicated to the acquisition of language skills. There is little emphasis on a graded introduction to Vocabulary and Sentence structure. Nor is there any proper analysis of What should Constitute childrens literature in English. For example, the story of the coconut fairy and the magic coconut does not go down very well, because, apart from its derivative nature, there is no tradition of whimsy in our folk literature, What these stories do contain however, are some finely crafted tales on adult themes, which could be considered to be a part of the cortemporary creative Writing in English.
These stories present an interesting situation for they call for a discipline which does not confront those Writing for adults. Firstly as literature for children they are obliged to revive the art of storytelling. Secondly, they have to be Written in simple, clear language - a compulsory excercise in the rudirilents of good Writing. Thirdly, the problem of local idion is settled ever before it can rear its head. These stories are intended to introduce the child to standard English, so local palois and Ceylonisms are out.
The Taprobane readers carry several fine stories by Chitralekha. Her stories have a definite beginning, middle and end, so there is sole resolution. The theries deal With the more Unlovely qualities of human nature. The present" is about greed, 'Sena's friend' is on the loss of innocence, and the introduction to duplicity and dishonesty. Two friends is about Willage enmity and Superstition.
Chitralekha's "Nonchinona and Kotiya' is a brief account of the life of a firewood Seller, and Centers on the arrival in

ector
her life of the kitten, "Kotiya". This story shows considerable empathy and sensitivity as regards the lifestyle of the rural poor, One chracteristic of this life is its routine repetitive nature, With little recreation, food or money, Nonchi's life consists of gathering and selling firewood, buying food, cooking it, and sitting by the fire until it was time to go to sleep,
This story illustrates Well the concern with the purchase of and consumption of relatively small amounts of food. Sometimes she bought a quarter of a pound of little sprats, or a piece of dried fish. Sometimes she didn't buy any fish. She bought only some keera leaves or a piece of pumpkin'. (p. 14) The preparation of this simple meal is described rythmically, Breakfast Was One or two slices of bread with some Sambol and hot tea drunk out of a coconut shell. (p. 15) A piece of seer fish Was a treat. There was to be a grand Wedding lunch at Girigoris Appu's with 'good country rice and polished White rice, fish, meat and many Vegetable curries, curd and honey'. These references are WOwen artistically into the story, helped by the fact that the kitten "Kotiya lowed to hear stories about food." (p. 15)
A simple preference for comfort and riches over powerty is indicated, Kotiya, after all Nonchi's loving care, goes away to a richer hortle, "I like my new name says the kitten, Kotlya," I am Tiger, it is an English name. I like you but like the children better. (p. 24). The themes of poverty and loneliness are intertwined in this story, but it could be interpreted at a higher plane too, in terms of social mobility and Self advancement.
There is also the very understandable preoccupation of the Working classes with the need to earnsmall amounts of money. This is well illustrated in Chitralekha's "Day in the life of Siripala'. which is presented as a mini-adventure story. Here she describes the efforts of a school boy to earn money to go to the cinema. He earns six rupees and fifty cents in slow stages by selling sweep tickets, running errands. He loses two fifty to a crook, and gets another seven rupees by running several LLLHLLLLLLL LLLLL LLLLHL LLLLLLLLS LK L0L0a00 LLLLLL LL L aL LLuK and returns to his parents, father a labourer in the Colombo Hospital and the mother a keeraiseller at the Borella market.
In "Wesaklanterns' Chitralekha deals again with the same LLLCLS LLLS LLLHLHaLaLaHHLaLLLLL LL LLLLGaaS aLaLLLLLLLaLL aLLLLLLL Wesaklanterns. He sells some Tangoes for fifty cents and some garden produce at the pola and he collects One rupee and fifty cents. "His purse Was almost full". There is a balance in this story. The mother, though a servant shows depth in dealing with Piyal's problem, the Wesak decorations, whether of the poor or rich are equally admired, and the story does not forget to include a visit to the temple and a walk looking at the decorations. There is also a neat juxtaposition of English
15


Page 18
and local Words, "Piyal saw mangoes, oranges and pineapples. Nobody is going to buy my gotukola, my Iovis and my jambus' thought Piyal sadly".
Punyakanti Wijenaike's The betel Vine' and The call of the Sea' could be interpreted didactically, in terms of allegories. They could be discussed in terms of social cooperation and sense of Community and sharing and in the case of the The call of the sea' perhaps interns of fate and fatalism. The idiom used is the anglicised idiom, in parts - 'One sunny day when the sky was a bright blue and the birds were singing in the tree tops' (p. 4) but the stories have a lilt and clarity. The development of the "Betel wine' is somewhat unusual, since Suduhamy responds to jealously by offering friendship and the story ends with the two neighbours sharing their compounds,
The influence of journalism on post independence Writing in Sinhala was decisive. The Sinhala newspapers provided space for original Writing, particularly short stories and poems. The Silumina short story is one example. This helped to create a market for Such Writing. Many of the major Sinhala Writers were journalists to start with, and therefore journalism has, un Wittingly, contributed to style. Much of modern Sinhala Writing is in excessively simple, unscholarly language, often Verging om reportage. There is no parrallel influence of journalism on English creative Writing and much which is in fact journalistic instyle, like the prose of Jean Arasanayagam, goes UnrecogniSedas such.
In the realm of political and social satire, certain journalists Writing in English merit consideration. E. M. W. Joseph, who Wrote as Sooty Banda produced a "Political Cookbook. He Coined the characters Ekmon Dirachchalamuwa, Nathanial Gonthambili, Lady BerTipi, Hyacinth de Hoot, Mabel Rastiadu and thus came the nearest to coining anything even remotely resembling "memorable characters'. Tarzie Witachchi who wrote as "Fly by night" is best remembered for his political commentary in the series "Island in the Sun' which went on in the Sunday Observer for about 12 years. It Washighly praised for the aptness of its allegorical figures such as Electric Eel, Tailor bird, Wise Old Owl, "Fly by night" made fun of the Westernised classes and relentlessly exposed all that was phony and superficial in the social and political sphere'. He converted "Colombo 7" from a postal address to an attitude. (1) In the 1980's Lucian Rajakarunanayake in his Column "Light refractions' in the Island Cornmented humourously on the political and social scene and showed a remarkable ability to coin names using Sinhala Words. Ryp wan. Winkle, during the run up to the August 1994 elections, started his column "Voter, voter everywhere".
There is a small amount of political satire in the form of black Comedy. This could be considered a new genre of English creative Writing. Rajive Wijesinghe, author of Acts of faith has commented on the use of the fantasy mode to provide expositions of third World political situations. "I would argue that the peculiar suitability of this sort of technique to exposition of third World political situations is related to the fact that political reality in the third World can often come close What one might ordinarily think of as the fantastic. Some of the more preposterous pronouncements attributed to my president in order partly to establish a fictional character now seems to be echoed by
16

Some of the real President's statements' (2) Attention should also be drawn to the very entertaining short pieces by Rajiva Wijesinghe, "The climax for the Colonel' and The juggler' (3) In the latter story, the events are easily recognised by the contemporary reader, and the tensions and rythmins employed are successful and distinctive.
Another area where Englishs journalism has made a distinct, if little recognised contribution is in comic writing. Mention should be made of Tarzie Witachchi's "Glossary of Singlish Words and phrases which included words like "stubistekcutlis". Hisparodies of Shakespeare, inhisweeklycolumns, make good reading even now, though the political observations have lost their sting. He suggested that Shakespeare was possibly "Williong Shakesper-r-ra’ Shakesperiyanayagam" or "Wilcassim Sheik Suteerdepending on whether you were Sinhala, Tamil Cor Muslim, (4)
Sooty Banda Terits mention for his rather unique parodies of well known English nursery rhymes and songs, using Sinhala and Tamil Words. While it is not possible to equate this sort of Writing With serious creative work, they do reflect a certain inventiveness and a decided ability to nativise the language, and as such should not be ignored in a survey of English Writing in Sri Lanka. Two examples from Sooty Banda's Golden Treasury of Trising Las Verse Ey Mabel Rastad Lare:
Apoi bung Danny, the pipes
the pipes are calling From glen to glen and down the
palanay When Greesmays's gone and ellaing
kola are falling It's you, it's you must po and
mung inding gamay
Sandards and OSES
bring puduma Kalpana of you, Mage hitha reposes
In laissana adahas so true JUnB-ell discl'OSes Lowes maaki drearns sparkling pudhu NilaWu and rosa-mal
bring ninawiwu of you (5)
Sooty Banda also coined original limericks with local colour, Reggie Siriwardene comments "In his trilingual verse Sooty set off against the poetic diction, formal or romantic, of the English anthology pieces the familiar earthy favour of the Sinhala and Tamil phrases he domiciled within ther, the shock of this collision, sharpened by his unfailing resourcefulness in finding unexpected rhymes across the language barriers is an endless source of Surprise and delight as in this immortal couplet:
Golden lads and girls all mus' As thotakaren come to pus." (6)
It should also be noted in passing that the orginal compositions in English songs now contain items like "Pretty foxy hen". Therefore the "pop song" genre maybe Worth Watching in time to Cole.


Page 19
Generic
The World Health Organization kept informed about the facts on knowledge and skills to protect the of drugs.
Public education in drug use wi education Uia the 77 Cass media. The Uill still not provide adequate pro doctor's prescriptions are effectively and promoted for indications which
Generic Drugs are those k names and can be prescribed o indications.
Most Pharmacopoeias nou can giving a brief account of the indicc particular drug. Thus Generic namn. part of this public education progra to prevent brand name promotion in of the Black Arts.
Generic D'L
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in recommends that people should be medication and provided with the mselves from the inappropriate use
ll increasingly become a part of mass knowledge and skills thus acquired tection to the public if the items in disguised by various brand names have not been fully validated.
nown by their pharmacopoeial nly for their established clinical
ry a section on Patient information utions, benefits and risks in use of a ing and identification of use is a Uital mme advocated by WHO which aims Zaking medication revert to being one
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ombo.


Page 20
BOOKS
India-Srí Lanka Consulfation on Devolution, F Nimal Mukarji, Colombo, I.C.E.S. 1995, 49p. Rs... 50.00
Towards Effective Devolution, Text by G.L. Peiris.
Federals and Nationalism: The Future Statu.
1995, 12p. Rs... 50.00
LC00LLLYLYLaLSLLCH 0LLLL YLLLLL LSaL00CHCLCLYYYLLLLLLLHH LLLL Y
1995, 62p. Rs... 50.00
Review by Martha McDougal, Montreal, Summer Intern in
n a Series of four monographs,
the International Centre for Ethnic Studies has published lectures and work it organized this year on international Comparative federalism. Of interest to all pluralistic societies, the stated objectives of the series are "to examine the distinguishing characteristics of ethnically based federalism, the utility of the federal device in managing ethnic tensions and the new challenges and demands faced by federal forms of devolution in plural societies".
The subject of two monographs, "IndiaSri Lanka Consultation On DeWolution" and "Towards Effective Devolution" is, as their title5 indicat, de Centralisation im both India and Sri Lanka. The first of the two Works, transcribed from lectures given at a conference by the same name, has as its the Tle how Sri Lanka can learn from India, Yet, as the readersoon realizes, the lessons from India are mainly about What not to do to Secure a Successful federation, for example in India, the central government largely controls-despite an original intent to the contrary - the various state governors, and Indian states often find themselves penniless because of a constitutional provision that does not ā|[]W tham [[]. ÐCTTQW ITCIT1 thE IIläff{E}{f they owe money to the centre. The end result of these and other arrangements (What some would call the 'corruption' of the original Indian federation) is the now Widespread disillusionment With government in India ata|| || E. Wells. Il One lecture, N. Mukari poignantly describes this turn for the worse in Indian politics: first how
the Indian states turned against the central government as the centre gradually
aSSUITTed TIOrE COrll the largely defunctis government, all of W Wideninggap betWe nities, the people a the result that all real гпment апd governe With Tisunderstandi is, one realizes, how also affects democra
The second mono of the inaugural ad Minister of Justice Affairs, Mr. Peiris, to Ce, is reproduCedin Tamil. Peiris initially Sri Lanka Constiti English colonial tim handle the Conflicts Weer ethnic COITTIu Undoubtedly thinkin the Thirteenth AT1B căutions that future powers in Sri Lank clear, cohesive, and that future provision: Conflict-resolutionmi lingwitable frictions ir
Charles Taylor, a nadian scholar, is th monograph, "Feder lism: The Future Sti explains that after ent SiWe’Or in Ward-lookir - bent on the pre Culture, particularly OUBJECT HE 1960s form of nationalism, as a "citizen' nation

ipers by Ramakrishna Hedge, Ashok Mitra, A.G. Noorani,
olombo, I.C.E.S., 1995, 8p, RS, 50.00
* of Quebec, Paper by Charles Taylor, Colombo, I.C.E.S.,
nic Diversity, Paper by Yash Ghai, Colombo, I.C.E.S.,
Pri Lanka
roll, thern, HOW in turi Lates displaCÉd||CoCal 1ich CäuSEdär EWBfin the ethnic commuld government, with tions between govejare distant and rife ng and conflict. This the Luim Coffederalism Cy.
graph, a transcription dress given by the and Constitutional the ab OWE COnferenEnglish, Sinhala and reminds us that the ution, a relic front Ies, is not able tio hallaVE aris.En bellities in this country. about the failure of dment, the Minister attempts to devolve a must be sincere, forceable. He adds Tust also include a CIST O5Ettet devowed states.
ighly renowned Calectures of another list and Nationaus of Ouebec". He 2irging from a 'delfenform of nationalism grwation of French 10 Catholic faith - ievelopeda moderп that Taylor refers to sm, Taylor's choice
of terminology is a reference to this nationalism's strong link With popular sovereignty, a modern conception of government. According to Taylor, 'citizen' natianalism parallels many otherforms of nationalismbased om ethnicity Worldwide.
Analyzing the future of Quebec, Taylor formulates the major questions that now face both Quebec and Canada: first, Can Quebec find a heightened sense of identification Within Canada Which ISSO ESSET tial to modern nationalists? Or, must it go its own Way by separating from Canada to do so? Secondly, can Canada respond in time to this need for a "CuebBCOs identity, especjalynow that mamy Canadian SG - hawe hardened their attitudes to Quebec and Want only to tackle other matters, most notably multiculturalist and aboriginal rights?
By far the longest of the four monographs, Yash Ghal's Work, "Decentralization and thing AĈConThOdation of Ethnic Diversity" is about the many forms of federalism in the World. Although admittedly very difficult to generalizeabout these constitutional arrangements (which are intimately tied to the unique history of each federation), Ghai Very ably extracts the obtainable lessons of federalism. His study encompasses the topics federatism in Communist and developing countries, 'enclaWes" or Lands resenwed for Thätiwe Indians, 'special status' for regions of particular countries, Corporate and spatial decentralization, and legal pluralism or systems of personal laws. By Way of a tentative generalization, Ghai risks the idea that federalism does in fact diffuse Conflict. But he


Page 21
circumscribes his statement: for instance, corporate decentralization may indeed create antagonisms, particularly if vetoes are involved; spatial decentralization can cause the problem of minorities. Within minorities; and, Tore generally federations cannot always accomodate extreme differences, particularly those between groups with very different beliefs and practices.
Ghai ends his W. for Sri Lanka: decer sion, Even though of secessionis grea are formed by 'disag unitary states that g tions after being pr: responds to the fe: country by saying t results froT a failure
Distant Thunder: Third World Conflict a M. Snow. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993)
his study, by one of America's
leading scholars on United States strategic Weapons doctrine, examines the nature of Third World Conflict in the post Cold War era and the possible responses to them by the First World, now led by the United States. Snow argues that, with the removal of the Cold War overlay from much of the Third World, the developed countries will face many complexities in dealing with conflict within and among Third World mations. Theat LIFE Cof Conflict In the future Will not besirTiple, foras recent events demonstrate, the restraining effect that the Sowjet Union and the United States once imposed on much of this region no longer exists, making it possible for the likes of Saddam Hussein to invade a neighbor, and for Irredientist movements, spurred by the reemergence of nationalism, to take up arms in defense of their disparate causes. According to Snow, the United States’ high-tech military, which has been preparing to fight a conventional War in Europe, Will be woefully ill-equipped to rTeet the new challenges. Snow identifies the emerging trends in the pattern of conflict in the Third World and suggests possible responses, especially by the US military.
Snow argues that nuclear parity be: tween the superpowers made World War impossible, but conventional Wars Were fought between East and West in the Third World for ideological reasons and strategic interests, the nature of the struggle exemplified by the Nixon and Brezhnev doctrines. This struggle imposed a heavy eCJOITiC boLurder1 Or1 the SO'Wiet UniOr1
While the West enjo nomic and tech through the 1980s,
reforms of the COTIT ble and necessitatir East-West relations SÍOka resultad in
Soviet Union, econ national demoraliz United States the Un upon the World's sta
The Third World,
racterized by politic: nomic deprivation,
highly conducive to Many of the problem points out, are Vestig perience. The color ded indigenous Cult Ways at the expens: This fea:SL ulted in theid StrLCture and Takel Thus, many of the independence Were elite class, which of blish its legitimacy. N who opposed this E powerful new religic and a ready ally in t Supplied the Weap carrying out revolut emerged as disorga
Here IS the Crux insurgent Warfare t the Warious "natio ments" will persist sponsors. Snow p. armed lowerments

rk on atopical note ralization and Séces2 says that the threat er infederationStat gregation" (ie. mainly 'ant federal Constitussured to do so), he rs expressed in this at Secession usually to implement federal
arrangements than the result of institutions that allow for decentralization.
Together these four monographs presental verythorough study of comparative international federalism, Here the reader will find both the strengths and weaknesses of devolution. Highly realistic, this Series is a valuable contribution to a topic of heightened interest to Sri Lankans today.
ld the New International Order by Donald
Ved tremendo US ECOological advances making funda Tental unist systern inevita|g a normalization of Gorbachew's perethe breakup of the omic paralysis, and ation, leaving the disputed superpower ge.
by and large, is chaall instability and ecoboth features being producing conflict. is, as Snow Correctly |es of the colonial Exiial powers disregarLures, imposing alien of traditional norms. rasticalteration of the p of these Societies. states that gained governed by a small Bn Struggled to estaeedless to say, those rraпgement founda n in Marxist doctrine le Soviet Union W10 Ins and training for lor, Which often first lized insurgencies.
of this study. The at Was practiced by a liberation Oweeven Without their ints out that, while the Third World do
not pose a great threat to the national interests of the United States (now that there is no Cold War), transnational problems such as environmental degradation, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism Wi||move to the forë,
Snow dwells on "low intensity conflict" and insurgency, which he dubs "the poor Tian's Warfare", because he seems to feel that CounterinSurgency is the "Achilles heal" of the US military. Despite the revolutionary War, which was fought in the classic insurgent style, the US army's psyche seems to have been shaped by the ATerican Civil War and the two World Wars, and it displays a "big battle" mentality. According to Snow, even the US government has not shown much resolve in trying to redress this disparity. The proper course would be to launch a conCerted effort by government and the military to build up special forces for counterinsurgency and peacekeeping and promote greater coordination between intelligence organizations, government agencies, and the Tilitary. "Ad hocracy", as Snow terms Current US policy, Will not yield public support. The Persian Gulf region afforded the perfect situation to carry Out classic US-style Warfare, a situation akin to One that the Western militaries had trained for vis-a-vis the USSR, and the danger is that the military might hawe to face entirely different CirCL J Tistan CeS irnl the Luture.
Counterinsurgency is a difficult task which requires a specialized approach. Insurgency is founded on the principles
19


Page 22
set out by Sun Tzu and Mao Tse-Tung and practiced by General Giapin Wietnam Which Wag to "Wish the hEasts asid filis litris' of the people, who ultimately are the support base for carrying out an insurgency. Snow attacks the "brushfire" approach, which is the use of heavy force to quell an insurgency in its latter stages, as inadequate for effectively dealing with the problem, and he advocates aп вагіy intervention approach that aims attackling the underlying issues. To put it in the Language of the Wietnam Wariera "grabbing by the balls" (President Johnson's retort Wher Corfröstad With the otion of "Winning hearts and minds") is no guaranted that the hearts and finds Will follow. It is acknowledged that the intractable nature of some of the enduring problems in the Third World pose significant challenges, but many persist for the Want of trying.
In addition to the Counterinsurgency problem, perhaps the more serious destabilizing trend, represented by the Iraqi LLLLLaH a LaLHHLLLL LLLLLK L LLLK LLLLLL Gulf, itself a result of the ebb of Soviet influence from the region, is the emergence of regional hegemons. Snow identfies Iran, China, India, Pakista, Brazil, and Argentina as aspirants to regional hegemony status. All of these powers possess Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (NBC) and missile capability. Non proliferation of nuclear technology will pose a serious problem, and Snow seems to place much faith in the GPALS programı, Which is the development of a smaller scale SDI for defending against a missile attack, and this system would presumably be made available to any country that feared such an attack. Nevertheless, Snow proposes the nurturing of regional balances of power, overseen by the United Nations. The US will play a major part in the enforcement because of its ability to project power. If the US earnestly will in the absence of a threat to a wital Interest such as oil, still retains to be seen. However, all is not gloomy in the Third World.The trend See Tisto be demoCratizatičjis and aCOTOTİC liberalization, which according to Snow, "may help to alleviate SoTB incipient Third World ills", but he does not seem to be overly optimistic (197).
2O
This study is an E the crises that plag. SnOW Tasterfully del and high politics of thi the roots of the porC possible solutions, li Out that the West hlas, CFE TLCLUra stically. The summa Wet, of his experience to help but the Well: they can't understant want to help a Weak encapsulates the firl File interaction of alie| together with Sir Rob lement, "relianCE On : always fail particula foreign troops", prO' when placed in the CC tion in Somalia, notto lity of a dangerous : of rushing foreign tro SCOTalliam ad B0:Sni CT gdCE LO STOW’S tyEric Eifeld E lying problems. His Sardero LLPTTN 70Sc) { point, Perhaps Sno
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At cl.II. YÜLI :

xcellent analysis of IE ||E. This T. We is|]. WĖS İL ÖL the CW s region, elucidating blems and offering
is correctly pointed for too long, approa|Third World SolipsiOl Of Orthe Wietrid T1 as, "We Were there a Tease a TE SO Stupid that a great people people", succinctly Jstration caused by ni Cultures (93). This, ert Thompson's Staartilitary solution Will rty. When sought by Wes to be enduring text of US interveTention thë possibiSituation in LFE CASE ops into Bosnia. The an Crises give great argument for early it solving the under
SLSSIC. Cle learly illustrates this W WOLuld hawa dOne
Well to hawe mentioned the Tami|| Separatist crisis in Sri Lanka as an example of a "neglected cancer" that threatens to severely destabilize that region. Further, this study Would hawe greatly benefitted by a more comprehensive discussion om Third World attitudes toward the First, especially on the ongoing debate about the West's human rights crusade which many. Third World nations regard as hypocritical and imperialistic. Further, must We not also assign blame on the bigoted Way in which many Third World nations were goaded into towing one line or the other in the superpower competition, making it impossible to follow nation-Building Strategies compatible with their national and Cultural experience? Much of the instability in many of the African, Asian, and Latin American states can Surely be attributed to this factor. Clearly, there needs to be Priore understanding by all parties, and the end of the Cold War, it is hoped, will finally facilitate it. Hopefully, Third World leaders will learn to follow the Japanese path for earning respect and dignity-competition in the World market, not on the battlefield - there is a lesson here for the aid-giving First World as Well-Tore butter, less guns!
Waiting - 10
Hakkgala
Jloor
par ir īs or Colou"
eta Tirg ble
e islyou LLere flere c! FLCLLe CLSked UOLI Is pLre, LISLullied shade,
| Fielo La Jers too?
s termor botanical, JoLILLOL ld FC Le Leased.
the LUas fill brings toLL's lap psil ng the slanting SLIT and passing light LL LLLLLS LLLLLL GLLLLLLS LLL LLGLGLHHL LL LTGCTLGL LTTa ik bold cardu, mue and a caste Life.
F. És Éorls Ola Lloril Tlales Tille Cral ITI
LLLL L LL LLLLaLaaLL TTLLLLSSTCH GG TCCCTTT LLLLT press disk and secret afterglo I 2nd LIlese bloorris for the Maitri Bosattar.
LJ. Ka Lunatilake


Page 23
Why there's so in this rusticta
There is laughter and light banter armongst these FLITäl då Tisells Lyho Te busy sorting out Eobaccm leaf in a bar. It is one of the hundreds of such
barns spread out in the Tid arid upcountry MLLLHekkLMLu ukuH OHLLLLLLL LL LLLLL LLL LLLLLL fallow during the off season,
Here, with careful nurturing, tobacco grows as a lucrative tash trup and the green leaves turn to gold, to the value of over Rs. 250 million or more annually, for perhaps 143,000 rural folk.
 

pg ENRCHINGRURAL LIFESTYLE
und of laughter obacco barn.
Tobacco is the industry that brings employment to the second highest number of people. Arid these
Exopale are the tobaccuba Tı J.J. TETs, the tobacco grovers and those who work for them, On the land and in the barris.
For the III, the tobacco leaf leans learingful work, a comfortable life and a secure future. A good enough reason for laughter,
CeylonTobacco Co. Ltd.
Sharing and caring for our land and her people.


Page 24
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