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LANKA
GUAR
VO. 18 No. 11 October 15, 1995 Price R
BACK TO
THE BATTL
SINHALA-BUDD
WHY GALLE V
OEVOLUTI
 
 
 

DAN
S.10.00 Registered at GPO, Sri Lanka QD/33/NEWS/94
WAR-WAR
- Mervyn de Silva
E FOR JAFFNA
- Indra de Sogsa
HIST CHAUVINISM
- reply by H. L. D. Mahindapala
WAS BORNING
- independent report
ON DEEBATE
- S. Sathananthan
- Kamalikca. Pieris
G : THE BURGHERS

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tSyOUF
 

t

Page 3
BRIEFLY. . .
India Wants Prabhakara
Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee tolda news Conference at the United Nations that his country's request to the Sri Lanka government to arrest LTTE leader Prabakaran and and him. Over Still Stood. "We Playe asked Sri Lanka to expedite it", he said,
| dia Wärts Prabhakarri foT the Turder of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.
SUBSCRIPTION RATTES
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Calzi d:l'U.S.A.
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Rs, 250 W = for 1 year Rs. 150/- for 6 Tonths
India's opposit separatist Cause in the Foreign Mit at the news COI Lanka's ethnic pl Testic Ole "to b the Sri Lankar keeping with the of the country".
Death it
Chalci
An open lett Akka (Presiden dTETlEike :: KUIT; LTTE's official Pulgal says: "... ted so many pro realise that you self in the positio Prema dasa, Ath mini Dissanayal rate....." All of th Were aSSaSSinat
The letter is pseudonym Dhe
Tigers
The LTTE as ties of upto 500
a thCUISiFj Ilir days of fighting "Operation Thur tary spokeSIIrTman a briefing. Thes bed the Security as one of the WC ed by the LTTE
W.
President
WIWITIT
PSdt C
lake Kurlarat
War-Tongers at tical parties th: disrupt the Gos

Om to the LTTE'S was also implicit lister's Statement feren CE that Sri
roblem was a do
3 TE50|WEId Withi I Constitution il territorial integrity
hreat to
ika Akka
er to 'Cadrik
El Carrika Balaratunga) in the Oural WLada
, you hawe Creaboles for us that have placed yourn of Rajiv Gandhi, Lula thrill Ludali, Gake, Ranjan Wijelese Personalities led by the LTTE. signed with the
U.
mau led
S SLIfЕTEd CаELJal
Cadres killed and "g Wounded in six | in the on-going där Striké B mi|-
told the media at pokesman de SCriforces operation irst defeats Sufferin twelve years of
denOLInCeS
|Ongers
andrika Bandaraunga denounced dopposition poliat were trying to vernment's peасе
InitiatiWg. Thig Presidelt. WaS speaking at a ceremony honouring trade union leaders.
President Chandrika said: "Are We prepared to mobilise another 100,000 youths for the forces? If those W10 Walt War Carl find arother 500 billion rupees we might til El SUCCEEd II til 5 Eiffort".
A Sri Lankan victory
Sri Lankan cricketeers beat Pa
kiStirli Crick gterS, il ä Test Cricket
SEErie:S i Pakista. THIS WES - Sri Lanka's first ever Test Series Victory, against Pakistan.
Sri Lanka lost the first Test by an innings but rallied and Won the remaing two by 42 and 144 runs.
GÜARDIAN
Wol. 18 No. 11 October 15, 1995
PTICE H5, ULJU
Published fortnightly by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd. No. 246, Unior Place Colombo -2.
Editor: Merwy'r de Silwa Telephone: 447584
Printed by Ananda Press 825, Sir Ratriajotti Sara warmiam Littlu MaWatha, CICl, is ib) (, , 13. Telephone: 435975
CONTENTS
News Background Low Intensity Containment The Wigalegnica irri Galle (3) PLA's Digivolution Plani (2) THTi-LTTE-FEElahi S.W.R.D.: The Making of
En Intelectual ךך Conflict and Foreign Policy (3) 14 English Writing (2) 19

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WWEM WAS EA CAGAFOLWMWD9
Goodbye to the F
Mervyn de Silva
as the tide finally turned in
Colobo's favour? It is Sri Lanka's protracted War against the separatist Tamil "Tigers" We have in mind. The army has done surprisingly Well in the four large operations which started With LEAP FORWARD, followed by HANDSHAKE II and 2 and finally THUNDER STRIKE.
If only Commander-in-Chief Chandrika Kumaratunga had done her job as Well as the army is now doing its job, Sri Lanka's chances to recover her old and new image - tropical paradise, booming economy, excellent investment prospects - Would have been much stronger. Instead all We read in the regional-and-international press is how "big investors" are taking a good look at Bangladesh and Burma, after Wietnam perhaps. And Our Own business investor Community remains deeply disturbed.
What's the problem? Governance. Not the "good governance" which the pompous authors of the P.A. manifesto pledged as Itern No. 1, together with "transparency" and "accountability". What is now manifestly obvious is that the U.N.P.'s "one-Tilar SHOWS" hawe been replaced by a dozen extravaganzas, Which may hawe prowed quiteentertaining but for the "little war" in the North-and-East, Where Commandante Welupillai Prabhakaran fooled the P.A. leadership with four long months of "peace talks", while he built up his armoury. In itself, the peace initiative Was a good move, ... if only the P.A. had kept its powder dry and gone for its gun as soon as the LTTE fired the first shot, Far from being ready for a fastdra W, the P.A.'s massive publicity Caml
모
paign "Peace in Ol Nobelprize for the P. lese, including the every ministry. Whe CO litted itself to E age" Which was gé satisfy ALL but the L P.A. offer Was per Sinhala opinion aS ii ISIT). And federaliST
- the F-Word as W ft – in the wig W of gentsia, and Cons opinion-leaders.
Anybody can be by an Organisation LTTE. The newly el EDUCch Of edLJCatecd: cians and professic O Seasoned strate ception was SLFP Banda raraike, the Ste WC TBFO) United Front too. A Bardara:like WBS but the prime minist ITIOre than CererTIOrl
Though it is no SE "brainstrust" (the h; Campus and aSSO Was assisted, if not Well-knit group of does Strike El dataCl prevailing confusior don't deserve even
Why is the P.A. a. a TESS and the bus obviously Worried?
While Candidate ma was the simple astounding63%vot polls, the "brainstrl

PeaCe DiViden C
Lur Time" (and the A.) lulled the Sinhadecision-Takers in It is Tore, the P.A. "Devolution Packanerous enough to T TE HOW W grott ceived by hardline FILI-blooded federaiSfJUT-IgtitET WOTd WE äWE IntrOdLICéd
the Sinhala intelliSarwatiwe Buddligt
duped - Certainly as Cunning as the ected P.A. led by a and intelligent politirials, had however agist. The only exleader, Mrs. Sirima former prime minidid put together a Illas, the ailing Mrs. la da Prie MinistET er's Office Was little ia.
Creat that the P.A.'s ard Coreis Color:TEJO ciated think-tanks) tutored, by a small NATO diplomats, it Ted observer Of the that the teachers a B. Tirus.
Tinistration in Such iness Community. So
Chandrika's Charis
explanation to the eattle Presidential St" of the P.A. WES
an elite corps of academics. "Peace" and the "peace dividend" were the two vital assumptions of the politburo's "grand strategy". The co-optation of all the "minority" parties, Tamil, Muslim, Indian plantation Tamil was imperative O Cethe electoral a rith Thetic Was Clear. No party, UNP or SLFP, could be certain of Victory without these voting blocks, That suited the P.A.'s foreign tutors and patrons perfectly...... a peace candidate supported by the Taril/Muslim parties could Work out a formula, an offer of devolution, Which the LTTE W| find it difficult to reject. If the negotiations with the LTTE at least produces a stable ceasefire, NATO diplomacy Would make sure that the Eelam diaspora (the fund-raisers of the LTTE) subjected the LTTE to sustained pressure. The Westerfin do IOFS in turn Could a TTT-tWijst the P.A. to accept the Tamil exiles).
The LTTE may not be advised by Phd's and Professors. And yet Velupilla Prabhakaran had the Cunning and the "feel" for Warfare (plainly a gift) to deceiWe the Indian foreign Service and intelligence acclarat. President Chandrika and Colombo campus 'conflict Solution Olayg. Washave prowed easy meat for an operator of Prabhakaran's class.
SO EELAM WAR 3 has now taken a predictable course - an advance on Jaffnabefore the rains hold up the offersive. The army has done exceedingly Well. The LTTE has taken heavy casuties - at least 150 in the last encounter, and close to 3OO Since 'LEAP FORWARD".
But What happens when the monsoon rains begin and the LTTE guerrillas return to their anti-IPKF carpaigntactics?

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Low intensity containme
Indra de Soysa
t has been Over a year now since
the Peoples' Alliance government and its leader Chandrika Kumaratunga promised to solve the LTTE Tamil problem. The peace package that the government offered, apparently one With a significant devolution of power to the North and East, was rejected by the Tigers. They are now back to doing what they do best. The euphoria surrounding the issue of "peace at last" is all but dissipated and the men and Wome of the armed forces Continue to die, with large civiliancasualties too and enormous costs incurred in material destroyed. This is the reality. Peace is the only hope.
The popular consenSUS, however, seems to be that since peace has failed through political means, the final solution must rest with the military. Of course, the PA and the president can fervently hope for any peace, regardless of the means by which it is achieved, thus prudently following both strategies. This strategy, however, is ironically the very same strategy that the UNP governments had followed Vainly for so long. Further, this approach can only help the Tigers becauseit plays into their overall strategy, which is to "talk, talk, fight, fight." I argue that the efforts at bringing about peace is largely fueled by the domestic political imperative of "putting an end to the probler," popularized in the Sinhala phrase “fиалаќаWa oалла." It is argшеd here, however, that the solution lies neither in anticipating a military "victory" nor in negotiating a "just political" settlement involwing the LTTE, both of which seem to be the only options for the government. I will show that what is politically expedient, once again, has tremendous short and long-term Costs. It will be shown here why the War cannot be "Won" and Why a just political solution with the LTTE is not feasible. The "only solution" outline be
OW.
The Tiger strategy of "talk, talk, fight, fight" is typical insurgent Warfare. This is the strategy of the Weak, outlined by Sun Tzu and Mao tse-tung and practiced to theletterby General Giapin Wietnam. This is a different kind of War which holds that winning the Waris not necessarilya matter
of winning battles. every battle in Viet Likewise, let US aSS kan army is Victori Jaffna, but what gu ensure that the Tige More than likely, it W Org“ after tréTEIld dent is absolutely Prabahkafans Waiti present one should of. Thus, bending to that Want to See til LTTE is shortslighte too costly too.
Why would a milit The Sri Lankar ar IT eighties) tried to fig because that is all insurgency in 1971 because it violated surgent Warfare by head Ol. The JWP decided by a few Nevertheless, in th Conflict in the North, by Gen. Tissa "Bull" the Tigers the same Orle made famous simply put, is пеє defeating him. Inco as W.W.Iaid W.W. necessarily involve: ability of the enem scenario is defined ing heads together, the use of massive "center of gravity" essentially is the enery's industrial ne) with strategic enemy the ability to to the "head bangi terms, the War Will of One side's "host the other's "hostile
On the Other hal vity" of an insurger the term "people's gency, the most e ting the centre of g to Will "earts and mely difficultif thew nally. Strategic b0

ent: the only option?
After all, the US W.On |ą but OSt the War. that til Sri LOLJS ir thB Datt for arantees are there to problem goes away? ill be back to "Square JUS Costs, The preSicorrect to See many ng in the Wings if the
somehow be got rid pressure from groups lE. CleistIUCtion of tflE d. Ultimately it will be
ary Solution not Work? ty initially (in the early ut a COmwentional War t ke W. The first JWP Was a thGrough flop every principle of intaking on the forces insurgency, thus, Was COwentional battles, e early stages of the the armed forces, led "Weeratunga, treated Way. His strategy was at Sandhurst, which зliпg the enemy and nventional Wars, Such | defeating the enemy Sth G destruction of the y to field forces. The as two a Tries knockThis necessitates also force to destroy the of the enemy which destruction of the capability (war machibombing, denying the bring more fire-power ng." In purely military decided on the basis ile ability" overcoming Will."
ld, the "centre of graicy is "people," hence war." Thus, in an insurffective way of upsetravity of the enemy is minds," which is extrevaris fought Corventioimbing and other me
thods of conventional Warfare tends to create a better centre of gravity for the enemy, mainly by raising the "hostile Will" of the populace at large. Besides, insurgents do not depend on an industrial War-machine to carry out their struggle, for them it is Warfare on the cheap, depending solely on the active or passive support of the populace. Insurgents win by not completely losing, governments and their forces can lose by not completely Winning. Bombing every Tiger "out-houSe"therefore, doeSTOl CaLSE TLC daImage. They can be out from behinda tree in seconds to attack you. While you are enjoying creature comforts, Bombing and oler de Structive "COVEtional offer Siwes" also serve to alienate the populace further, ln post-Wietnam US military parlance, counter-insurgency requires a "Captain's War," nota Colone's, Againin purely military terms, superior "hostile ability" of the government prowides no guarantee for overcoming the "hostile Will" of the guerrillas.
There is no real way in which the Sri Lankan government forces can lose cortpletely on the battlefield, except if the Tigers win what they are fighting for in a political settlement, also hold that it is not feasible to think of the Tiger problem as something that can be solved by Winning a huge victory such as a "battle for Jaffna." | believe that the failed Counter-insurgency phase (initially not fought as one) of the conflict in the north was purposefully abandoned (lost) by the government forces, either to turn a hopeless situation into a conventional was rather brilliantly sometime in the late eighties, or as the only possible thing to do; i.e. falling back om defensible positions, thus minimizing costs and incidentally handing the Tigers a de facto state of Eelam, albeit only of Jaffna town. However, the Conventional standoff between Tiger forces and government forces is merely a strategic change in a military sense, which brings me back to the point of not expecting the problem of Tigerinsurgency to go away even if the "big battle for Jaffna" is Won. Merely Controlling the entire Jaffna peninsula will not ngan the end of the LTTE.
WEATH PWLL772.4 5777IIZDW

Page 6
GALLE AE77HWVC VIOLEWCE (3)
Witnesses Testify
Mr. K.V.:
On the 2nd of June we were repeatedly Warned by some well wishers and friends about the possibility of violence against Tamils. We did take that seriously. I, personally, went to the Police station and complained. That was around 5.30 p.m. also asked Mr. Siwasubramaniam to lodge a cost plaint with the HOl. My shop was closed at 5.15. I was not satisfied with the answer from the police. So, I went again to the station around 7.00 p.m. to see whether could meet some senior officers. I could not meet any officers but lodged a complaint again and returned home. Around 8.00 p.m. We heard explosions in the bazaar area. We were too afraid to go out but managed to find refuge with a Muslim family. The next day around 4.00 p.m. We came to this refugee camp. I have lost all my belongings.
Mr. R.:
We have been listening to various rumors and stories since the killing of Wen. Dimbulagala Thera. On the afternoon of the 2nd, friends came and told us that a group of people are planning to attack Tamil shops. They said that they heard the story at the Galle market. Our shop was set on fire around 9.00 p.m.. There are eye witnesses to this. We hawe already identified a person called Ranji, a supporter of the ruling party who actively took part in burning our shop. We told the police about him and no action has been taken so far.
An Employee of One of the Shops:
We received information from Some of Our Sinhalese friends that bombs were being produced by a group of people. informed the OIG, Galle and he assured me that nothing Would happen, closed the shop around 3.00 p.m. and returned home. Welive close to the Kathiresan temple. From 8.00 p.m. onwards We heard explosions and shouting. This lasted until 3.35 a.m. I saw a group - 50 to 60 people - running down the streets shouting around that time.
MS. K.T.:
It was between 9.30 and 10.00 p.m. on Friday the 2nd when a mob of about 100 men making a loud noise came to our house. We ran through the back door and hid in a Muslim neighbor's house. About 25 - 30 Muslim boys stood in front of our house and tried to prevent the mob from attacking the house, Our house is owned by a Muslim family. The mob did not harm the house, but Went inside and destroyed allourthings LLL LLLLLS LLL LLL LLL LLLLLL aLLLLL aLLLLLLS LLL LLLL L LLLLLL neighbor's house until the police came the next day, in the late afternoon and took us to the Sivan Temple. The Muslim people saved our lives. If not for thern We Would all be dead.
Mr. S.S.:
an a student who is studying business. I was in the Bazaar On the 2nd and Saw the attacks. I have come to the Siwar Temple because it is not safe. Right now it's too dangerous for us to go back to our homes.
Everybody knew something was going to happen that day. About ten days before, I called the police and asked them for
4

protection. But they didn't do anything. At 3.00 or 4.00 p.m. on the 2nd We began calling the police again. We called them every half-hour. We told thern about the people who were coming into the shops and harassing the shopkeepers. Each time we asked for protection but the police told us not to worry. The attack was planned but I don't know by Who.
When I came to the Sivan Temple is was very unsafe. There was no police protection. But now it's safe here. The police and officials have told us that we should go home and continue With our businesses. They haven't told us how they will protect LS.
Mr. S.:
Our shop was set on fire after 12.30 a.m.. I know this for sure because I asked a Sinhalese friend of mine to go and check the bazaar to see whether my shop was burned or not. That Was around 12.00 a.m. He returned and told the that other Tamil shops were all on fire but not mine.
| hawe made Seweral Complaints to the police. They hawe not responded to any of our complaints. The transferred police officers have been very cooperative with us. We do not know Why these officers have been transferred. I see this violence as a Well organized job of a group with Wested interest. The idea behind these events is to chase us Out of Galle.
Mr. S.S.:
| hawe been in Galle since 1968. I haven't gone to Jaffna since 1983. My children, one son and one daughter, have been educated in the Sinhala medium. We lowed peace. Due to the present situation in Jaffna. We couldn't go there. As it is, we live in peace, I am fluent in all the three languages. So are my children. There are rumors that no houses will be given to Tamils.
I feel if We are sent Out of Galle it will facilitate the division of the country. I don't like that. Sri Lanka should be one country. My son told me we should have a caravan so that if there is trouble in the South We can go to the North and if we are chased out of the North, we can come to the South.
ANALYSIS OF THE ACCOUNTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
Governor Kanakeratna's assessment (see Appendix Ill) that there were no violations of the human rights of the people in Galle is clearly erroneous. While the fact that no one was killed in the Galle attacks is indeed fortunate, human rights guarantees protect more than individual life and bodily integrity. The human rights of the people affected by the Galle attacks were, in fact, violated.
One of the fundamental tenets of international human rights law is nondiscrimination. Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states that:
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Page 7
ranee o a/persas equia/ and effective profection agais OLOuCHCLHCCLC0 CLGHe CTMCT TrGLGLHHL LLLLH LL0L LLLSLS LTLTLCLCSS 0LCS (anguage.... dolesales.
Thus, according to international human rights standards, the hurtar rights of the Tamil shopkeepers impacted by the fires were violated by the racially motivated attacks. The state of Sri Lanka in general, and the Southern Province in particular, failed to protect Tamil shopkeepers from the discriminatory attacks despite Warnings of impending violence and requests for protection against such violence. Whether the attacks arose from business or political Competition, retaliation, or something else, they were nonetheless racially Totivated; Tamils were directly targeted by the attacks.
Furthermore, in violation of international human rights standards, the police failed to provide equal protection to the Tamil people of Galle. Implicit in Franklin Burke's admission that the lack of police protection was directly linked to Sinhalese pressure against providing such protection is an acknowledgment of the racial bias with which the police acted.
The failure of the police to provide protection to the Tamil shopkeepers before the attacks was compounded by their lack of response during and after the attacks. The Governor admitted that the 'police Were a little late in coming' and that, had they responded promptly, they may have been able to prevent the da Tlage.
Lastly, a component of the racially motivated harassment, intimidation, and attack of Galle shopkeepers is an attempt to disrupt an ethnic minority's right to community within the city of Galle. Again, the failure of the state to protect this right to community violates international human rights law. Article 27 of ICCPR states that
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THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE
President Chandrika Kumaratunga issued an immediate response to the attacks in Galle, deploring the violence that took place and appealing to the citizens of Sri Lanka to assist the government's efforts at peace. (See Appendix IV). She reported that the police, army and other authorities had been ordered 'to take stem action to quellany acts of violence'. The President also reported that the police had been able to bring the situation under control Within one hour. Accounts by the individuals targeted by the attacks as well as Governor Kanakeratna, however, refute this claim.
Additionally, the President appealed to the public for any information regarding the identity of those indiwiduals responsible for the attacks. Although the President accused the opposiLaLL LLL LLL LLLaLLLLLLLaaLLa LS La aLa LLLLLaLLLLSSSLaL LLLLLL responded that the President's allegations were "baseless'. The CormirTittee of Inquiry, however, did not hawe infor TT lation sufficient to establish the responsible parties.
SECURITY MEASURES
As a result of the Galle attacks and a general escalation of tension in the area, the government has taken steps to increase security. There is presently a visible military presence in ll8 BäZäär ärêä Öf Gällé.

While in Galle, the Committee attempted to take photographs of the destroyed shops.The military, however, quickly responded to the Committee's initial attempts, demanding that the Committee relinquish their camera. The Committee refused to comply with this demand, choosing instead to leave the area and seek assistance from the local police. Ultimately, the Committee secured a police escort that, in turn, allowed thern to return to the scene to take photographs, The military personnel patrolling the Bazaar were noticeably irritated by the return of the COT1 Tittee.
Additionally, on their Way to Galle the Committee Was Subject to irregular scrutiny. They were subjected to two security checks. The first occurred as they exited a restaurant. The committee was met by several uniformed and undercover police officers who targeted two members of the team, requesting I.D. from each of them. In a subsequent roadside stop, these two members of the COTrittee Were again specifically targeted. That time, however, the police also thoroughly SearClEdit3 WECIE.
Although there is a recognizable need for increased security during times of increased tension, security measures cannot target individuals based on race or ethnicity, Article 4 of the ICCPR states that
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RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The parties responsible for the Galle attacks must be
promptly identified and Swiftly brought to justice.
2. " The Government must provide justand appropriate restitution to the shopkeepers and their families, including adequate compensation for their losses and financial support sufficient to reestablish their businesses.
3. Tille Gower riment mL u St prOwide ju IStand appropriate restitution for those whose houses and property Were damaged, destroyed or stolen.
4. The Government must ensure that the shopkeepers are able to Taintain their businesses in their original locations.
5. The Government must aid the people displaced by the
attacks in Securing adequate housing.
0S LLLLL LLOLLLHHLLLLLLL LLLLHHHHHHHLLLLLLL KLaLLLL aaa LLLLL0LLLLLLLLOLaLL HL
Further investigate allegations of police and government mismanagement.
7. The Government should issue an official acknowledge
ment of responsibility based on their failure to adequately respond to the attacks.
8. Guidelines should be adopted to provide clear standards and guidance for coordinated and collaborated efforts of the police and military.
9. A public education campaign should be employed in Galle
for better police and ethnic community relations,
10. An anti-racism campaign should be initiated in Galle, led
by prominent leaders of the community.

Page 8
11. The Police should be given leadership and emergency
response training.
Appendix I: Tamil Busine SS Establish ment S BLITT ed in the Fires
Name of Business Name of Proprietor EstäblishmEnt
1. Pettah Agency 1. Siwasurania 2. R.A.T. Trades 2. Arul Murugathas 3. Raj Ran 3. S. Thramaraj 4. Leth SECTES 4. Na Warath inläT 5. Holands 5. Nadarasamany 6. Abaya Stores 6. PääKL 7. Pathma Stores 7. Rathnarajah 8. Rari STOTE5 8. P., Shanmuganathan 9. Sun Agency 9. P. Shanmuganathan 10. Nilo Traders 10. Chardfär 11. Nawa Colombo Stores 11. Rathnarajah 12. Walee Wideo 12. KrisГВП 13. Siya Stores 13. Sundarampillai 14. Siwa Hotel 14. Sumtharampilai 15. PESTES 15. K. Waratharajah 16. Amanda Storës 16. Waratharajah 17. Krishna Stores 17. Kriglar 18. Cigar Factory 18. Ar Lulariër EldaSundaraT) 19. Ramachandran Stores 19. Ramachandran 20. Wijaya Stores 20. Wijayan 21. Stores 21. Mrs. P. KanagalinganT
Appendix II: Sinhalese and Muslim Business
Establish Tets Burned in Fires
Sinhalese Business MILISIIT BLI SingSS Esta-SS Establisherts
S.U. MohanTned Hajiar Building 2, Vega Electricals
1. Ratna Pharmacy 1.
Wisaka Printers and
Booksellers GärTiini StorES OrappLIwate Wine Stords Ponnamperuma Stores
(Dапаged)
5.
Appendix III
ACCount of Neville Karakeratina, Governor of the Southern PTOWICE:
According to Governor Kamakeratna, Friday, June 2, at approximately 10.00 p.m., 22 shops were burned in Galle of which 17 were owned by Tamils, 3 were owned by Muslims, and 2 Were owned by Sinhalese. The Governor denied that there had been any violations of human rights because no One had been killed or injured in the attacks in Galle,
Go Wernor Kanakeratna contends that neither he mor the police had any Warning of the attacks prior to June 3, rebuffing rumors of riots by stating that ultimately there were no riots. Further Tore, he claimed that intelligent people should notheed
LITT CTS.
The Governor stated that the attacks in Galle were not racially riotivated and speculated that they were the result of business competition. He maintained that it was not logical to link the events in Galle with the assassination, six days prior, of Wen.
6

Kithalagama Seelalankara Thera. According to the Governor, there are many places besides Galle where such a retaliation would have occurred. He asked why Galle would have been the site for Such actions.
In regard to the attacks, Governor Kanakeratna admitted that the police were a little late in coming to the scene, stating that the police might have been able to prevent the damage if they had responded more promptly.
In response to a question posed regarding other incidents, he reported that there had been one subsequent incident in Galle Fort. According to the Govemor, a Tamil house had been set on fire in the Fort after a molotov cocktail was thrown into the house. He did not, however, feel that there was necessarily any connection between the attackson the shops and the Galle Fort incident,
The Governor stated that two refugee camps had been established for the approximately 85 Tamil families who hawe left there homes as a result of the attacks of June 2. He reported that each camp shelters approximately 40 families of 200 individuals, stating that the conditions of the camps were unsanitary and crowded and that efforts were being made to move people promptly back to their homes. He said that protection would be provided to the people when they returned to their hones.
According to the Governor, the ArtTy and Navy had been deployed to the area on June 3. He also said that measures LLLLLLLL0LLLL LLLLLLLL HLLL LL00LL LLLLLLLLuuDLDLLLLLLLS LLLLLLaaLLGLLGLL assessed the current situation as "under control'. He reported that 11 individuals responsible for the Galle attacks had been arrested and Were currently in police custody.
Appendix IV
LCCCCLCCLCCCCL LC LSCCLCLCLCCCLCLLJCCCLCS TLCHCCHLHCCLC CCLCLCLCCCmHCC CCCCLCCLCCCCCC LGLCCT CC uLDLLLLLLL LC0 CCCCTS KK CCCHCCCCL TT CCCC LLLLLLLHHLHS CCCHLLLCLS S CL LCJCLCCCSLCCCC S 7995).
In the heart of Galleyesterday the 2nd of June 1995, several shops were damaged and burnt, and the government and the police were able to bring this situation completely under control Within an hour.
It is very clear that a leading opposition party is involved in this incident having pre-planned with the motive to instigate communal Violence in order to achieve its narrow political gain. It is obvious from the statement made by certain members of Parliament of the Opposition in the press during the last few days that they have tried to provoke the people. It is evident that these conspirators do attempt to lead the people of Sri Lanka to the period of terror by provoking the people of the South to create another Black July. The Government has ordered the police, the army and other authorities concerned to take stern action to quell any acts of violence that would help the separatist terrorists achieve their objectives.
appeal to you to provide any information to the Police and the government, Members of Parliament in regard to those responsible for the Galle incident and the elements behind this |TOWE:
learnestly appeal once again, to all citizens of this country to rally round at this moment to protect the efforts of the government consolidate the democratic and peaceful atmosphere in the Country after a period of seventeen years.

Page 9
AAA72
P- A.*'s DeVolutior
S. Sathananthan
ECOOT1iC TeSOLIrC9S
(a) The President's Proposals include only Agriculture, Forestry and Energy in the Regional List. Moreover, they are silent on the basis of power-sharing. For instance although "Agriculture" is allocaLLLLLL LL LL0L LLL LLLLL LaLLLLLLLL LLLLLL reserved for itself powers over "national standards relating to research and development and training" in Agriculture.
(b) More or Iliriously, the Proposals reserve "National Planning" for the Centre (Reserved List). It follows that all powers of RCs with respect to resource utilization Will be directly subordinate to the Central GCWETTEgt.
(c) Most economic resources needed for regional development are included in the Reserved List. Similar provisions had
DE 31 Tħad in - the 1972 Model Constitution (art 16), - the 1985 Draft Framework (annex 2), - the 1987 13th Amendment (list II) and - the 1991 Thondaman Proposals
(list).
ECOOTicifra Structure
(a) The President's Proposals allocate only "Transport", "Minor Ports and Harbours" and "Roads and Waterways" to RCS (Regional List).
(b) On the other hand infrastructure vital for regional development are included in the Reserved List. Similar provisions had
jBBirl Tale ir - the 1957 BC Pact (part B), - the 1972 Model Constitution (art 16), - the 1984. Annexture C (para 10), — the 1985 Draft FrameWork (para 4), - the 1985 TULF Proposals (list), - the 1987 13th Amendment (list II) and - the 1991 Thondarian Proposals
(list).
Education
(a) The President's Proposals declare that "Education and Higher Education will be devolved subjects" (sec 5.1). This is
an apparent improv A Tendment (list I). Sed tra Sfer Of a Uth excluding Schoolsar fiBd as "national ins replain Lider the) { (sec 5.2).
(b) The Proposals rial Educational Co be Set Up"COTipOSE Of the Centre and t However, there is Weightage between Region,
(c) The NEC is to Centre and one of it fying national School Consulation with reg and stipulating Criter 5.6a),
The appointment Centre and the pref tion", instaad Of "C. that the sharing of . terrin "Union of Regii practice,
Employment
(a) Tha President': oblique reference to Affi" i gR: іп геgагdto employп Regional List. Howe
to 1972 MO shrined the "right to
- the Report of C 1984 APC provided function related to Employment Progre and
- the 1985 Draft that employment WC natory" (para 17).
Culture
(a) The President' powers of RCs to "ti

h Plan
rement on the 13th However this propoority is restricted by id Liversities classititutions", which will Central Government
specify that a Natiommission (NEC) Will d of representatives |e Region" (sec 5.6). indication of the
the Centre and the
be appointed by the sfunctions is "Identds and Universities in Ola || Chief Ministe TS a for admission" (SEC
of the NEC by the BrEITCE fOT "CGT1Sultaoncurrence", implies power imputed in the s' Carlot tail
S Proposals make an "YÖLItlarld Worları'5 rved List. No powers Erti Sincluded in the
We
el Constitution en Work" (art 28);
OTrittee "A" at the for the delegation of "organizing Special ammes" (annex 2.7);
Framework specified Luld be "rol-di SCTiT|-
s Proposals limit the le regulation of Cultu
ral activity within a Region, including public регіогпапces" (regional List). The 1972 Model Constitution similarly wested powers in the Central Government (art 15):
(b) Incontrast, sorThe previousinitiatives provided slightly more powers to PCs.
- the 1984. Angxurg CalliðCated"Cultural Matters" to RCs (para 5):
- the Report of Committee "A" of the 1984 APC reserved the subject for Central Government While delegating to regions the functions of "organising religious cereTomięsard festiwals", "promoting drama, art and music" and "award of prizes for artists and craftsmen" (annex 2.5);
- the 1985 Draft Framework provided for delegation to regions the functions related to "religious Ceremonies and festiWals" and "development of arts, drama,
music, etc" (annex 1); and
— the 1987 13th Amandr Tērt Wested limited powers in PCs over burials and burial grounds", "libraries and museums" CLCLL SLLLLLLLL LLG a LLLLLaLLLL LLLLHHLLLLLLLS (list 1).
Inter-regional relations
(a) The President's Proposals west powers regarding inter-regional relations exclusively in the Central Gowerient (Reserved List).
(b) In contrast, powers were allocated to regions in
- the 1957 BC Pact, which provided for "two or more regionis to a Talgar māte" and for "two or more regions to collaborate for Specific purposes of cornton interests" (part B);
- the 1972 Model Constitution provided that "states may conclude agreements among themselves" whilst it granted the Central Goverenment veto power "to prewent the execution of such agreements" Under specified conditions, (art.8);

Page 10
– 1B 1984 AFC StatemElt oftle Prg Sdet d5Clared that twWO OTTOTE Districts in a Province could amalgamate "Where the District Councils resolve to join".
- the 1986 Chidambaram Proposals envisaged powers for PCs "to consult with Bach Other and act in COOrdination Qn LLLLLL LL LLLLLL LLLLLLLL0L0LLL 0LLL LLLLLL L00LLLS (preamble), and
- the 1986 Bangalore Discussions proWidEd for E. Creatif öfàf "Intär-Pr WirlLK LaLLLK LaaLLHHLS S aLLL LLLL LLLS solved todo So (para 3).
National flag and anthem
The President's Proposals are silent on the subject. However, provinsions regarding national flagandanthem were included in the 1964 Annexure C (para 12) and the 1984 APC State Tet Of the President (para 3).
Concluding remarks
Power-sharing
The method and degree of decentralization imputed in the Proposals do not kLHH aLLL a LLLLLL LLLLLLLOLLLK LLLLLLaLaLLLL out by the term "Union of Regions". The word "Union" appears irrelevant, like the word "Socialist" in the country's name which never had any relevance whatsoever to its market economy.
Moreover, even the limited provisions made public in the Proposalarm RCs with powers to enact only Subordinate legislatid. And the Central GOWEITEt COLld impose its will on the RCs and/or CMS through "consultation". These characteristics are typical of a unitary State and reWeall tha Lunderlying tendêncy to Wards centralization of decision-making in the Centre. If devolution is to make any sense, it is imperative that the Centre be required to secure the concurrence of the Region in Centre-region interactions.
Indeed any remaining illusion of a "federalistic" power-sharing within a "Union of Regions"-primarily because the Proposals dery the Centre põOWêrs to Lumilaterally dissolve a RC - is shattered by the sweeping amendment to the Proposals which Prof Peiris reportedly intends to HLLLaaaL0SSS SS a S LLLLLLLL LL LLLLLL that a SilLation las arisen in Wlich the regional administration is promoting an
B
ared rebellion ori ging in an intentional 5titution, which COIT present danger to th gnty of the Republic by proclamation as: self all or any of administration of the of the powers wested Gower, the Chief
Of MilStd S OTTE EO Region. The Presid powers to dissolvet by proclamation in til (5Lw7afay 7ñw77a5, 13 ment requires the F "Satisfied" that there Région under his/| OWer, the ter ITIS "sa "engaging", "unity" : open to extremely
ad f l P: "open-ended powe claims ought to be
6/8/95). And the ab requiring concurrent Cit Evie W. Of LEFTE further reinforce the
tralization of power Of the tg TT "Union o
National questions
The Proposals fai de Centraliză tiCT för Muslim and Up-Cl groups. The empha graphical borders ri bOuidari E.S. COSE State contin Les to I. hala national aspira of national policy, address the national Muslims and Up-CC vement in the Propo. shortcoming.
To WaT batLISta:
The Proposals i Central Gowerle ring between ethnic As a result, the Propi federal structures; ir regioпalisпn: a c based Cor de Centrali Councils but Within unitary State. Such authority Could in gei concentration of p Government and e

nsurrection or engaWiolation of the Constitutes a clear and le Unity and SOWërei, the President may Lume to himselfillerhe functions of the regiоп апci all oгапу or exercisable by the Minister or the Board ldy of authority in the lent Shlla|| also hawe he Regional Council lese circLJITStarCEes" 8/95). The amendPresident to only be is a need to bring a er direct rule. Moretisfied", "promoting", and "sovereignty" are Wide interpretations sident precisely the r" which Prof Peiris avoided (776 (Sard. )sence of pr0visions ce of the RC and judisident's decision Will Current extreme Celland make a mockery f Regions".
to identify the unit of
the Sinhala, Tamil, ountry Tamil ethnic sissplaced on geoather than on ethnic -quently, whilst the epresent argely Sintions under the clock the Proposals fail to aspirations of Tamils, Juntry Tamils. Improsas mLStrenedythis
gnore the reform of tto allow power-shagroups in the Centre. Osals do not envisage lstead they advocate or promise solution ration through elected
the frare Work of a 1 däCéntfälzällor of rleral help to dilutethẽ ĐWEr in the Central ncourage democrati
zation. But in the Specific context of solwing the national questions, decentralizati vītntārāfTftī Cērā Čvērnment will prevent power-sharing between ethnic groups in the Centre; and so deny minor ethnic groups access to a Veto Oreven decisive power in the Central GOWETTITEпt. THUS WПЕТВ SUСП dЕСЕПtraiztic Coiricided With territorial budaries of ethnic groups, the minor ethnic groups Will be further regionally and politically marginalised. At the same time the major ethnic group will consolidate its grip on the Central GowerTiment.
Power-sharing in the Centre is an indispensable pre-condition for successful devolution of power to the Regions. However, as the Proposals stand now the delegation of authority to the Regions will be carried out Without a simultaneous power-sharing in the Centre. It follows that the Central (GoWarisTat Wil|| Cortir Le to be controlled by the Sinhala major ethnic group; and that it will create Bantustan-like units for Tamils, Muslim and Up-Country Tamils. The resulting regional and political marginalization of Tamil, Muslim and UpCountry Tamil minor ethnic groups will intensify ethnic conflicts and again justify Separatist demands and agitation.
The military option
The Proposals themselves are appearing increasingly superfluous. After the Proposals were released Prof Peiris LLL aLLLLLLLa LLLLLaLLLLLLL LLLLLL COITIFTIUFicate the IT) to the Libération Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), because the LTTE unilaterally ended the cessation of hostilities (COH) and allegedly spurned previous offers (We sand 108.95). This is an obviously irresponsible approach. Moreover there is no record of previous proposals submitted to the LTTE, Indeed the President failed to publish her PropoSals before tha breakdown of the COH. Given this background, the present refuSal to re-establish Communications With the LTTE holds ominous implications. It confirms that the so-called "peace process" which ended on April 19 was in fact an eye Wash; and it indicates that the Proposals are one more ploy to politically legitimate the impending military assault on Jaffna. Like its predecessors, the PA Gowerintent to Was and still is belt on a military Solution to the national questions. History teaches us that the military option will fail.

Page 11
Tami = LTTE =
H. L. D. Mahin dapala
here are Several points raised
by Bramaganan7/who criticised Dayan Jayatilaka's book, Sri Lanka. The 77awalls of a Democracy. Unfinished War, Protracteal Crisis (f. G Septeтбег 7, 1995. I will confine myself only to a few of the Tiany points that need to be Corrected.
The first is that Dayan Jaya tillaka, once the supporter of the Tamilar Ted struggle for self-deter Tiination, has abandoned it and become (1) a Sinhala-Buddhist chauwinist and (2) a proponent of counter-insurgeпcy theories. Had Branтадалал/ being less wituperative and more balanCedhe Would not hawe mixed up (1) With (2). As far as I am aware, Dayan Jaya tillaka interests in insurgency and Counterinsurgency movements stem not only from his being a Committed left-Winger (Marxist-Leninists) but also as a serious student of Sri Lankan politics which, from the SEVerties, Were distorted and misdirected by insurgents of the South and the North. Anyone familiar with his Writings will be aware that he has been a consistent and an unrelenting critic of these insurgency movements because he sees them as grotesque expressions of monstrous fascism. When he was a regular contributor to the Sunday Observerhe flayed the JWP fascists mercilessly. They were the Sinhala-Buddhist "revolutionaries" plugging an anti-Indian and anti-Tarmilline. In fact, if my memory serves me right, it was precisely the Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism of the JVP that he exposed in his analytical and authoritative style. Baragara/, who evinces a familiarity with Dayan Jayatilaka's career obviously decided to skip this inconvenient and embarrassing fact, because if he did acknowledge it he could not have castigated him aS a Sihala-Buddhist Chau Willist.
Of course, in the political vocabulary of the Bra/Tagana is "Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism" is the most Over used phrase which expresses everything that they love to hate in the South. It is also a labelreadily pasted on two categories (1) those Who attack their holy trinity residing in Jaffna, i.e. Tamil=LTTE=Prabhakaran, and (2)
PraO
those who oppose tr of the TamilS. Clea is targeted becaus Categories. It does
that the Souther: LTTE and the extre for reasons other th chauvinism. For ins community of Sin oppose both the LT der Tarlds. Sinhala F lectuals too have T ched analyses and
oppose both the LT demands. The pro-l hasapathological te other side of the a in any Way Totiwa te Chla Lu WiniST. To tha: WIO does not subsc dist lina til at the "a LTTE ha 5 taken a
authentic politicals and therefore they : phenomenon" is eit his Senses".
To the Braniagar, ble political reality from fascist Germar Bin Fuéhrer The T; formula has been E byists like Bramag: a holy doctrine. Mr. to be "the sole IE Tamils" is only an political equaliоп: Karaп. Dayап Jaya has rejected this E a perverse politic: Prabhakaran's One It does surprise me Jaya tillaka, adhēri should sewer all Cl FuGrerS. NOW th pointed this out, Dayan Jaya tillakaf lutionary principles any fascist group he is not the only 0. "the aпmedistrugg| tically, all the othe Who, like Dayan armed struggle in

karan
- Reply to Bramaganani
a extTeTiStd Blads y, Dayan Jaya tillaka he falls into both lot enter their heads rs can oppose the mist Tamil demands an Sinhala-Buddhist ance, there is a Wast lala Christians Who TE and the extremist dro-Siala inteoLunted Well-rEa5ear"ational arguments to TE and their extremist TTE lobby, however, indency not to see the gument which is not by Sinhala-Buddhist se lobbyist, any Writer fibe to their propaganTied struggle of the Concrete for IT as the truggle of the Tamils are One and the same 1er "paranoid" or "lost
ал/stheопly acceplais the One borrowed y: Ein Volk; ein Reich, amil adaptation of this levated by LTTE lobas to the status of Prabhaka ram'S ClairT presentatives of the ther variation of this Tamil=LTTE=Prabhatillaka, quite correctly, quation because it is ill ploy to justify Mr. man regime in Jaffna. in any Way that Dayan ng to his principles, firections. With Tamil at Балтадалал/ has I must Congratulate r returning to his revorather than embracing n Jaffna, Incidentaly, e Who, abandoned the "of the fascists. PracTaTTil revolutionāriēS ayatilaka, joined the he early stages, have
abandoned it, Is it because they are Sinhala-Buddhist ChauVinists or is it beCat5e these TaTTiTi|itants t00 ha We Ealised that the primary task is to liberate Jaffnafron the "latestad the Cruelest Pol Pot in Asia", as stated by the prestigious WgW York Times?(More of this later.)
The call to delegitimise the fascist regime in Jaffna has come also from Tamils intellectuals like Prof. Rajan Hoole Who, in publications of the University Teachers Human Rights, Jaffna and in a forthright article in the Sunday 777 as (November 6, 1994), has documented the atrocities of the Jaffnagulag, is he also a Sinhala-Buddhist Chauvinist? Or is he a conceTed and sensitive Tamil intellectual Who has courageously resisted Compromising with the LTTE crimes perpetrated in the name of "liberating" the TarTil-speaking people? Dayan Jaya tillaka is not doing anything different to this. The humane World, shocked by the monster bred in the Womb of Jaffna, agree that the one-man rule in Jaffna must be delegitimised. Dayan Jaya tillaka's crime seems to be that he has expressed it with analytical skill and a degree of honesty that cuts deep into the cliches and the rhetoric of a ruthless regime and its propagandists like Branagarian
Besides, it is quite clear that Barnagasian, is arguing, under cover of self-deterTination, for the establishment of a racist state in the North of Sri Lanka. All this flapdoodle about the so-called liberation struggle is nothing but a naked attempt to legitimise a racist state. In fact, by labelling the movement to set up a racist state as a "liberation Towerment" Balagara/7s has revealed his hidden ra Cist agenda. So how can Branagarian who roots for a racist state accuse others of being racist? If he is also prepared to take an honestlook, he will realise that racism flows more copiously in his text than SanBaron (osa (In case he comes back saying that this reveals my racist bias let me Confess that any day I will swap Dom Perignon and Beluga malasol for sar77 behar and (rosa.) He is only deceiving himself if he thinks that he can hoodWink those

Page 12
who have witnessed the unfolding horror ImJafїпаby repeating, like a cagedрагтоt, the political jargon of LTTE apologists screeching about "self-determination", "the liberation struggle" and "the oppression and the repression of the Tamil people by the Sinhala state".
The Braniagarians must cling on to these cliches to justify their mindless violence which they shamelessly glorify as а "liberation struggle". Балтадалал/ Sheds Crocodile tears for the civilians caught in the crossfire in the event of any army assault on Jaffna, lf he is genuinely Concerned about violations of human rights why isn't this anonymous person raising his/her angry voice against the atrocities of the most abominable type in any Asian country since Pol Pot Before Barnagarian brands me as another Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinist, let me quote an unimpeachable source. In the respected Wew York TWresof May 28, 1995John Burns reported under the headings of A Sri Lan7kan evokes Powpai, Asias lasest set of Terry. "It is a safe bet that not too many people outside Sri Lanka and its neighbour India, know much about the Tigers; fewer still would recognise their leader, Velupillai Prabhakran. But they should. He has shown a bloodthirstiness in dealing with opponents that has been Compared with some of the cruelest figures in recent Asian history, including Pol Pot. Meanwhile, Mr. Prabahakran has established a rule of terror in the city of Jaffna. According to scores of accounts frOIT defectors and Others Who have es Caped the Tiger tyranny, many of his own lieutenants have been murdered; Tamils Who havecriticsedhim, ewem mildlyin jest, have been picked up, tortured and executed; others have been held for years in dungeons, half-starved, hauled outperiodically for a battering by their guards....." Do the Balagarians dismiss this also as the analysis and interpretation of SinhalaBuddhist chauvinists? Or are the Balaganasis mortally afraid of the reality threatening to destroy the invented illusions about their "liberation" movement? Against the mounting evidence, against the grim realities of tyranny and oppression in Jaffna the Branagarians keep repeating their cliches partly to reassure themselves that they are doing the politically correct thing, and partly to prevent the reality from dislodging the illusions controlling their febrile minds. To accept the hard reality is to drop the scales
10
blinding their visio and the jargon, to
racist state and fait history and their Jaf the LTTE T10Star.
Of course, they because since the gandists, particular educated diaspora, a racist "nation"f elusive concept wh ting them, has impri of this elusive stat banded together an in 1976 with the p; kodidali Resolution. ' arming of the Tamil quent rise of the LT to the LTTEther Efy the "Sinhala state brutal Violence of th ded by the LTTE. V state oppression"js isanisSue Which | re. But please note how is distorted deliber: Wiolan Ce... Tea Tar certainly deserved fied and Orchestrate

to drop the cliches rop the illusions of a the hör TOTS of tgir a society which bred
an't and they Won't ties the Tamil propaamong the Englishhawe been inventing If the TaTiS — an ch, instead of liberaoned them. In pursuit } the É5ra7/77agarla7/7,ßs | Unleashed Violence ssing of the Wadduhis led directly to the youth and the subseE. Having given birth Zagarians now blame oppression" for the a Tamills Taster-ThirWhether the "Sinhala the Sola Causė Or 10t serve for another day. the political language ately to justify Tamil it grievances, which attention, are magnidas "oppression".
Incidentally, the fascists of the North and the South both used the same language to justify their violence. If they defined their problems as "grivances" there would hawe been no justification for violence. So they use the emotive term "oppression" which, in the Marxian sense, justifies revolutionary violence. Marxism has been used to justify both pre-revolutionary violence against the state and post-revolutionary Wiolence of the state. What is relevant here is that Marxist revolutionary violence Was conceptualised as a Weapon against an oppressive ruling class which ends up producing fascist dictators. In this context it is legitimate to ask: who are the oppressors of Tamils and Who are the oppressed Tamils ofJaffnatoday?|tis the Tamils fleeing the horrors of Jaffna who are increasingly questioning the legitimacy of the self-proclaimed "liberator" in Jaffna. No do a Tamils see this "liberators" desperate attempts to retain his one-man rule in Jaffna as a "liberation struggle", Bramagyarтал/will, I hope accept this, and concede that those who oppose the "armed liberation struggle" (e.g. Dayan Jayatilaka) need not be even remotely Connected to Sinhala-Buddhist chauwinists.
Waiting - 10 Cocoon
coLild be spared the pain fReason, hoLUeller plausible That further need for clarity Viller Polair lly I could see OLITelyes did not Stirlice therl Tuile rriir lesti II leapt ir u flarre.
Ile luas fettered me ріппілg sцгеӀу.fїom bотd to bопd lese years Le tread together
ley cannot be
1st a cocoon spl. In by my Lality LLLLLL GLCCLLGLGLLLGLGLL LL GGLLL LLLLLL Lough yoLI teaseduvitfı yourgentlesmile
is Silker Skeir.
TU. Kaunatilake

Page 13
S. W. R. D. The mak
Ananda Wellihena
Τς aim of this paper is to examine an aspect of Mr. SWRD Bandaranaike's academic Career during his time as an undergraduate at the UniVersity of Oxford (1921-1924). At that time, Oxford Was "WW2 flüs Effffassa. Kaise dW77' ew.svg|Jy of Erg/aY77"(Hollis, C. 1965, 102).
The emphasis of this study will be on the features pertaining to the Oxford Union and its debates which might have either directly of indirectly influenced or contributed to his political career in Sri Laska. His return from Oxford Was is March 1925 and his untirely demise was on 26 September, 1959. The Union served Mr. Bandaranaike as the first perch on the flight to political eminence and the first rung of the political ladder of success.
It is possible to identify a few factors which originated from his relationship with the Oxford Union. They hawe contributed to his national political option which he took in favour of the common man.
They are: 1) his first speech; 2) the role of the Union; 3) Union debates; 4) his Contact with Mr C. Suntheralingam; 5) his Success as an Oxford debater; 6) his attitude to India; 7) offices held in the Union; 8) his life of silent reflection and active listening.
(1) His first speech
"777s territoria's of Oxford at W //rado been fi//7/5/W'g' sa Kongy, иеге ат last goan o mg';
These were the sentiments expressed by Mr. Bandaranaike after his first speech at the Oxford Union Society debate on 17 Now, 1921. The Totion for the debate was "that the present Parliamentary system d'OES fot al SWEET till:3 legd S of moder democracy".
LTT LLTeT sO K TLCLLCLLe HHe L L EELlSeuLe eLLHOHOH00 L L LHHOHO Dagi niyani ay PaWical Science, Liarsity of PEvaСалја.
The speech was ful; his experience political career. He recognition and hl issues bacang Wic
The University ported that he, "in evening", laid stres He pointed out that WS. People had no Capital W.S. Labour hereCollected this its ir Tipact on hir TI.
"A few days af: Wara TawseW arrax Isis/ai'adrys eиелwng".
E. Marjoribanks, TE 3 MEITET Of Cazalet, failed to ac rously while Mr. E ded. As he wrote:
"W progress a Wiliwn a fo'rfynig/ * 3 */ £75 kilogy (77eg fod C, detae. Wis SM, Mara, ar77 biex "לחסלו.
HG TE WEald thild one of his boyhoc rently Come true, brilliant political call wings too:
*.。点凸”*凸 Италагвагис 5 W7//la d'5ѓалса, f off a a W. Speacy а тетр, дал, олигасs/леа
ātīgie
MW7é#/7evé#r. / 5yüc Wouried forg/wel/7, so sie säSASVSy

ing of an intellectual
enormously successWas a lar dark in his a began to command s outlook om political
är Sir CE3 thĒ.
Magazine 77tess rethe best speech of the son the Word"Todern". the old division of King W. given Way to that of ". In his own Writings, TOrientous event and
Зг / We/a/'у и*оќe typ fo US We Byron, for the 7geac/775 F7g 5957 N7g
Who ewentually becaParliament, and W.A. drēSS the ISSU e dexte= Bandaranalike SLCCee
"Whe L/7św. Kas répół тf ofлтуfffsfsдаас/, / g for77 F7g Presiden7. "aGa Tawar "We ar" Me Ws//w/gyof Wia UWKMJoy) 2ќег7s defліїе лесоgү7/.
after his first speech, ld drearns had appaHe was destined for a eer. Buthe had misg|-
2 soture of the thisty eesa Eurg sea/77 илтгалзtharifлттаytwл age affer a W. Was W77y Яссауатта //55/7/77//ha Wagood Speakerald" SLCCSS-5 Sffs L/J/7? WG Werefore Wer7753уђesгала's w7улоv7еої "resource/possessed
Wilf, added to the fact perhaps had а геа/ fa/елf fогspeaќўтg, дroоўлced'a as LW Raf was over Wes Wig W is гишүтд/?”(wfff).
Mr. Bandaranlaike, participated Coscientiously in the Oxford debates, used every resource at his disposal to cultivate his fluency, eloquence and debating skills and techniques. He gained clarity of thought and precision in expression. This WaS One reason Why he believed that Union debates exerted a profound impact upon his future life, outlook and political
CETEBT.
(2) THE OXFORD UNION
The Oxford Union originated from the United Debating Society (UDS) formed in 1823 by a group of twenty-five Oxford men. They prepared a code of rules. The Tnotions to be debated according to the rules Were "the historical previous to the preSent Century and the philosophical exclusive of religion" (Hollis, 1965, 15).
The first debate Was held on 5 April, 1823. The UDS was dissolved on 3 December, 1923 and on the same day it was LLLCLLLCLL LLLL LLLLHHLLLL LLL LLLLLL LTELCTLYLTLTLTL Society. The role of the Union was described by Hollis as:
"Oxford was a High Tory place. The пeи деfating societу и аsanaristocraEccl., COSSIWrg largely of Esedanbers with a high subscription of two душмwleas, excMмsion of wholes/WabWе салтÝaates by blackbaWay 77 7o preserceg of dates and quite Confessedly formed а скуше. М иаs for Old Etorians and "We Wike, What sy tygsreg Wey77 Wie araear of a Wha" //w/seays My ay. My7season777a7 Par:War 77egori:Y" (WEKW, 76),
Oxford was not originally planned to train students of social science but those seeking to enter Holy Orders. The training in Sacred eloquence was compulsory as they were obliged to preach the Word of
11

Page 14
God from the pulpit. As time passed by, power political eloquence replaced the existing sacred pulpit eloquence; As Hollis SayS:
"PaWYCa My 77Ŵ7a'a'ai'a sistocrats wereg rať as a иWho/a MicWad" to /77/x //harmsa/was Widebating Enfideltating was recognif. Sea/a su/Wсел//y respectaђ/a fo be a "ТалаWсар No7 a subseqушал" career ала" SpeғcolifyWлд7 ика 5 , a spov7 там//y whay'y- Syed by those who waited to acqLWe pracїce fаг ӱ7еў"stлђseć7үvалfахerc/se W7 (Wiepowolf" (WEVall, 74).
Oxford and the Union in particular, Witnessed a change from the religious to the political, its purpose was "to be a nursery of statesmen" (Ibid., 176). As he says:
"If s WJaeed certa Pat W7/77/eace
иears if flas 5М/дгоyeo (self capable ofas Ihe WrsfsfердWg sfоле (ороиег. Look Wolgi (a (soft's Officers and WOL. W. Wanara after Targ (a was gase 14’artis for £7it':7f7 sow772 Agostorower of political roorlace" (E,d).
However, Hollis has admitted that there Was a remarkable difference between the Urior thCard 10W and that it Was Tot uniwersally popular in modern Oxford: "Many undergraduates will not join it. Many Will not attend its debates" (Ibid., 225).
Evelyn Waugh in his We First WoWire of an ALICE gaycomments on the role of the Union and its members during his time. Anyone with a small subscription could join it and in effect, it has now become more cosmopolitan with Asiatics being referred to as "black men" (Waugh, E., 1964, 184). He says:
"W7 fac", лоf 7іалу of Whe Pres/afалѓs of Глу Саућаие 7se7 fogveаѓ/7еg//s. My олMy солГалтдогаду Га басолтер Рлла MWNStarадагfffолт /fmg W-fafeg Bandaгалтайa) иха5 Syr AMEас Нол77ва, гутал лауттаo/Loro/Duyg/ass. He wheиеy spoke affle (/ficy1 погод 7e, as / rarne rijef, fake a/7 activa parf ŵ7ary offWhile politica/ CLEs "(..., 785).
12
THE UiO ir vited to speak at its meeti ke Came im Contact this foru T. Mr. C. , Arrig Besat Were Whom he has comr Writings. The wisit p poet Rabindranath address On "A Voi made a deep impres
"H's persoлаWїya a ceep Wтдуез5% MSIE, Taj Mij MT.".
The Oxford Uni Hall was the meetir and Visiting intellect Was unique; it bega by Benjamin Woodw structural alterations Francis Jeune. It wa and reSembled the f the House of Coln held in this hall regul night during terril. Th dāti WS Simā and the President Mr. Speaker. The Int sition and the Oppos Selves as the gover group and the Oppo Wely, It had Committe benches and a Visit traits of old Unions
Walls. t. häd Tarbl: derits; some of Whor Prime Ministers. Ins Was "a Tiniature Pa 1965, pp 161 and 1 of the Union Dabat Bandaranalike Writes
"7ле ићоle atmos саkсүм/afec/fодлои I a speaker еѓесfолл7е. 777е! LW7&27, 1727 752 Yr Olew of irripalpable yo,
Fs réosässic S. Oxforyодл/, /үлт WaW. We COO, aft: Store and AsqLW. Iogfие оfулуѓas"

Irmiment personalities gs. Mr. Bandaranalwith such persons at Suntheralingam and some of those about ented briefly in his aid by the illustrious Tagore and his fro the Forest" Sion O hii:
по водиетce таoe у од a) fasa и ћа.
on Debate Society g point for students lals, lis Construction n in 1853, designed 'ard from Dublin and were carried out by s completed in 1857 Ormarlj StПUClure Of ions. Debates were arly, every Thursday e Seating accommoto that of Parliament If the Urio Wa:Slike ambers of the Propotion, regarded themment parliamentary sition party respectibenches, Ternbers rs galery. The porls were hung on its : busts of ex-presihad become British ort, the debating hall liament" (see Hollis, 193 for photographs e Society Hall). Mr.
phare Off'repača s a a supreme Inspira! Mi always trad Ffrair 7rea traditions of the Joeа/олеWќеалаг777у sis, haagis FCSS offié èsse of ga'typ fo oу7е /ѓол7 IVie глNye ga2e of Ciao. aways SLWreure "WeyWay, 27),
(3) UNION DEBATES
Mr. Bandaranalike thought that his relationship with the Union constituted an important part of his recollections of Oxford and that it really had a contribution to his education and development. For him, the Union was "I final the Cradle of riversitythough"
He also noted that the Union dreW together all intellectuals who were active. Gladstone, the first Secretary of the Union, Salisbury and Asquith became Prime Miisters. Mr. Bandaranalika WāS elected Secretary of the Union and he recalled the day When heth Lumped through the pages of the Union minutes' book and compared his handwriting With those of his predeCGSSOTS.
It is well known that those who actively participated in the Union debates were talented. The new recruits Were identified at this forum and socialised so that they might function as link belts between their party and the Union Society. The Conserwative, the Liberal and the Labour political parties demonstrated concern over the debates with this motive of recruiting new members. The Conservative party had much influence in the Union during the pre-war era as Oxford was a High Tory Place. Its members were a group of "exquisitely garbed and rather supercilious young aristocrats" (Ibid., p. 29). Subsequently, there was an influx of relatively poor students, whose aim was to earn a living after receiving their degrees. This segment was inclined to think and act in a radical, Socialist fashion. They received the support and good Will of the Labour party. The Liberal party adopted the middle path strategy. However, Mr. Bandaranaike admitted that Voting at elections in the Union did not take place on a rigid party basis. He did not claim membership in any of these three parties but called himself a nationalist. These Parties Taintained links with the Union students through their respective party journals: the sis was liberal, the Oxford Magazine Was moderately conservative and the Fortnighty Review Was Conservative. Labour did not have a journal of its own.

Page 15
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Page 16
COWAL/CTAND FOREIG/WAOLICY(3)
Indira’s Regional Cor
K. M. de Sil Wa
[: in the initial years of its independence was busy making itself a
nation-state out of a huge and diverse state-nation under the able leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, Economically and militarily, India then was far below the level that Would be commensurate with its potentialities. By the mid-1970s, however, India had become a formidable power of consequence in the South Asian/Indian Ocean region and even beyond.
During the early years of the tightbipolarity and the containment policy in the international system, Sri Lanka assumed more strategic significance to the West as reflected, interalia, in Great Britain's Comitinued defence links with its former colony and in Colornbo's wirulent anti-Communism. India, during the time, earned the Wrath of the West for its "immoral nonaligned policy. The global system became diffused in the 1970s and 1980s, spelling general uncertainty for Smal powers like Sri Lanka and according more leverage to regional great powers like ridia.
In the late 1970s, there was a rapid deterioration in the general global politicostrategic climate. The Sino-Alterican
normalisation, that began with President
Nixon's historic "rapprochement visit to Beijing in 1972, was consolidated in the latter half of the decade. In South-east Asia, pro-SowietWietnam militarilyinterwened in Kampuchea in 1978. China then invaded Vietnam and engaged in a short but bloody War. AE|| || this Witressed the intensification of the two superpowers' involvement in the region. In the Middle East, the events were more dramatic and significant. Ananti-American, radical Islamic revolution swept Iran in 1978 representing a threat to the conservative Arab
14
COLIItries and marki narchy of Reza Shia his country a bulwa the region. Then, hic change, came the e can hostage crisis, aggression of Iran in 1978, there was a M. South Yer Ten, Cor threat to the conser around and consolid tion in a strategicall the north-western q Ocean. Earlier in 19 gained another st switching sides from Marxist Ethiopia whe and Cuba deployed
Successes in Angol As a result, the Na Talks (NALT), that E June 1977 concertir Were broken off by February 1978." E sought naval facilities MaldiWE:s ard Was
President Ibrahim N.
BL ut the Sowiet li Afghanista ni in Decer CGTĒTS, EJack. TE S epitomised by the sig the Helsinki Filla||A. respectively, came to "arc of Crisis", in th Brzezinski, develope decade Of 1975 "E shores of the Indian WedirTitlersificati OI O the "Great irrespons themselves locked in
clair to a historical ti fied in terms of th future...".

CerS
gan end to the moТ Pahlavi WhО ПТade k of U.S. interest in on the heels of this isode of the Amerishen came the Iraqi September 1980. In larxist coup d'etat in Istituting a Serious vative Arab regimes ating the Soviet posisignificant place in adrant of the Indian 77-78, Moscow had ategic foothold by Somalia in favour of are the Soviet Union forces following their a and Mozambique. wal Arms Lirilitation legan in Moscow in ng the Indian Ocean, the United States in Earlier, the Soviets at Gansland of the politely rebuffed by isir."
litary intervention in mber 1979 broke the uperpower detente, gning of SALT-I and til 1972 and 1975 ajuddering halt. An e Words of Zbigniew d by the end of the tretching along the OCēān" With a relethe rivalry between sibles". Who "find oakind of perpetual ask historically justiepresent and the
Northern Tier
As the "Northern Tier was in disarray by the late 1970s, the American policy was devoted to the twin objectives of preventing a projection of Soviet power southWards towards Pakistan and the Persian Gulf area, and to maintaining a naval presence in the Indian Ocean in the interest of American global deterrent strategy as well as for the purpose of countering an Indo-Soviet build-up of naval forces in the South Asian region." This policy called for a revision of the "Vietnam syndrome" and it was reflected in the "Carter Doctrine" on the use of military force in the Persian Gulf as an "inviolable sphere of U.S. interest" and in the resurrection of Américan Self-ConfidenCE and a resumed policy in American global responsibilities under the Reagan administration which took detente as a fundamentally mistaken concept and was bent on reestablishing the power position of the United States through apolicy of strength, including military. The United States, therefore, concentrated its policy mostly On the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf area With a view to upgrading the facilities at Diego Garcia and with an eye on Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
India found its strategic environment seriously threatening to its security interests. Prime Ministar Indira Gandhi Stated in ParliarTent that "the focus of the Cold War has shifted from Europe to the Indian Ocean littoral. Our South-West and South-east Asia flanks are flash points. New armament are being piled up in our region, not only around the Indiam Ocean but in a nurrber Of isländ COUntrles..... Never in the last two decades has the international outlook been as grim as it is today'." Members of the Lower House

Page 17
of Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha), while debating on the Defence Ministry Demands for Grants, alsa painted a grim picture of the security impinging on India's interests. They stated that "the outbreak ofiari Toled Conflict betWeign Iranari dira..... and developments in Afghanistan and the competition of big powers for Taking their presence felt in the lпdiап Oceап аге additional burning issues of vital importance...", "o Earlier om, in 1978, Prime Minister Morari Desai, his External Affairs Mirmister Atal Behari Valpayee, and several other MPs had expressed their concern at the presence of superpowers in the Indian Ocean, particularly at that of the U.S. strengthening of its base at Diego Garcia o
Clearly, the oceanic front assumed greater significance for India. As India began to orient itself in an extended strategic framework from the later half of the 1970s, when India had already established its predominant status in South Asia by means of the 1971 Victory over Pakistan and the 1974 nuclear explosion, the altered strategic Scenario came as a chal|lenge to her 'natural status and role" making it Vulnerable, in its Own perceptions, through its vast and exposed southern Oceanic front. India, therefore, ble CanTTE sensitive about its neighbours' stability and their foreign policy and security postures, particularly of those in its South.
On the other hand, Sri Lanka under President JaygWarderne folloWBd a proWest foreign policy. There was, indeed, a pronounced pro-American tilt in his policy. While this pro-Western orientation WaS Clear to a|| Sri Lanka, the WiëWS om the causes attributable to Such a course Varied. Some people, representing the Whole spectrum of Sri Lanka's power elite, including the government and Opposition, officials, and the academic and media World, contended that the determining factor in the foreign policy orientation of the post-1977 UNP administration was its EICOTIOTT1ic Cor Tipulsiors; thëse apparently pushed the country to the doors of the Western rations which are capable of
releasing the Tuch: reign Capital to Col Jayewardene's new policy, which of Cou foreign policy, Was
priority. At a later st Warderle hirTSelf mi stated: "The main pli policy of a Country its indépendence ar
The SECO dirTip00 the preservation o Thirdly, its trade, b0 Ewen the ideological chrments depend n tors". Clearly, the Sri Lanka's foreign its security. But Sec
Obviously, it was se ofitsincreased p| Sciously built up OWe dene Was apprehe treat from a TOE country's Security, past. Even before |Eader, he Once a Sil people who live in a CUT LE dian O selwes against a hu India) of five hundre Sri Lanka's Securit Continued to be the lance against India. that While India's
Tight WaS attitudi rally more accomm. personally not being neering towards the TiB5 and their Bad
adlinistration Was ding respectively to tense atmosphere regional relationshi question of India'ss let-up in its eterial of the complexion in New Delhi.
Jayewardene's apparently found til the United States,

--GddirfloW of foonbo. But in reality open-door economic rse strengthened his а Пtra coincidental age, President Jayeade, it clear Wher hle urpose of any foreign is the preservation of thus its defence.
ritat factOT WOLuld 03 f its food supplies. th export and import. Ifriendships and attamainly on these facprincipal objective of policy was to ensure urity against What?
against India, becauJWercapabilities Conгthe years.Jayewагisive of the potential powerful India for his Jespite his Indo-phile 3aComing Sri Lanka's %ed: "... hOW aľe the
the SITha| COurtries
Céalto d'Eifeld LherThge and mighty nation ld million people....." y strategy, therefore, building of CounterbaIt may be mentioned Janata Party goveally softer and bilatedative and its leaders imperious and domi3 leighbouring COUIlers, the Congress (I) much less so, leaa Warner and more
in the South Asian p. However, on the security, there Was no Vigilance irrespective of the party in pOWer
UNP goverriment TIS COLInterbalance irl Pakistan and, to a
GSSCf Extēt, in China. But it was ESSEtially more of a strong pro-American bias than anything else. As mentioned earlier, the UNP has always been an advocate of a West-oriented foreign policy, and Jayewardene himself was known as "Yankee Dickie". Nomalignment, the second of Sri Lanka's security "tripod, was downgraded but redirected in favour of the West, while the UNP government was practically not interested in vigorously pursuing in the efforts to implement the UN resolution om IOZOP.
In Sri Lanka, it is a commonly held view that President Jayewardene's foreign policy Was too obviously pro-Western, that was essentially prejudicial to India as it appeared to be oblivious to India's security Sensitivities and ignored the regional geo-strategic funda Tentals intrinsic in a situation of proximate and asymmetric power balance. Such trends and turns in Sri Lanka's foreign policy was observed in her nomaligned policy, in her: attitudes towards the concept of IOZOP and U.S. bases in Diego Garcia, in its position on Certain important international issues, and in the nature of relationships with the U.K., Child, Pakistan and the ASEAN.
Jayewardene government's Nomaligned Policy
The UNP government of President Jaye Wardene officially professed adherence to nomaligned policy. In his ina Lugural address to the Colombo Ministerial Meeting of the Coordination Bureau of Nolaligned countries in June 1979, President Jaye Wardene stated: "Non-alignment runs like a golden thread through the fabric of our country's foreign policy. At no stage has our country deviated from that policy. At no stage, I will lake bold to say, Will it do so in the future".' But in his policy Statement made On 4 August 1977 in the National State Assembly, there was no mention as to What its policy towards NAM Would be. Instead, he declared that the principles of Non-Alignment which were first adopted at the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in 1955 Will be supported. In fact, stress was laid on 'strict non-align
15

Page 18
ment, ostensiblyto"correct Mrs Bandaranaike's with a 'bent towards one side'.
Although President Jayewardene once stated to the press that he was more non-aligned than Mrs Bandaranaike who had leared more towards sole states than the others, his assurance of purSuing a strict or genuine non-aligned policy was, as rightly told by Naweed Ahmad, "an implicit promise to be more friendly to the U.S. and other Western Countries, instead of being more partial towards the socialist states". As a matter of fact, the rhetoric of the Sri Lankar leaders did not accord With the Substance of the country's foreign policy. One Opposition MP aptly put it. When he stated in Parliament that "Non-alignment can only mear nOrl-aligned. A circle is a circle. One cannot be more round than the other. You cannot truly say you are non-aligned". Whether this pro-Western strand in Sri Lanka's non-aligned policy was governed by economic factors or not, it appeared to larly as a harking back to the foreign policy of the UNP regimes of the 1950s With its owentomes of anti-Imdiamismo Kodikara aptly putit When he Wrote that "the UNP and the government led by it, while addբting non-alignment as a generalprinCiple of foreign policy, hawe always been more prone to seek reinsurance against dia in the West, that is Britain and the United States". While India's Janata goverrirrent had found Sorne sort of Similarity. With Jayewardene's brand of non-algnment, Mrs Gandhi was clearly irritated by it. This was evident from the way she resented Jayewardene's proposal at the NAM summit in 1983 in New Delhi for a non-aligned initiative to acquaint countries of the North with the economic plight of the South. The proposal envisaged visits by a rowing team of Heads of Government led by the Indian Prime Minister to important World Capitals. Iridira Gandhi sharply reacted by saying that she would not like to go abroad with a begging bowl in hand. She betrayed her resentment again when replying to a query at a press conference later on.
16
Jayewardene go" Indian Ocean Po
Although Sri Lan port the IOZOP in genthusia 5Tl id-Ed 1977. President Jay hear Siwa oflrltlia's fili that would be create
| S EWErll f Wills. powers from the a faVOured a balance Ocean that Would sa security, in practice exhibited an explicit
Tarif35tEd il the foll
First, Sri Laka's military build-up at Wourable to Washing Sed to it as it resent: tion between the sup dia teneighbourh00 Lanka abstā ired fra Calling om al|| rl Luclear stationing nuclearw ries of ther StatgS. resolution. Third, F
S іп 1983 a proposa dia CCEPT Ta clear Weapons Fr including the littoral Sri Lanka, along W Nepal, supported it. thought that it was the old Pakista mi pro Asia a NWFZ, and the scope of the prop pation of Afghanist: also rejected a Pak regional Collectives Olga ir 1979.95
Fourth, in 1981 S Candidate, AmbaSS: to, for the post of C La W Of Le Sga CO Way for Singapore's Kohl. Ora emireant S tor Was of the wiéW be happy to note th lobbying too hard sc Sri Laikā WS til

Wernment's
Iісу
ka continued to supprinciple,' the initial declined sharply after зwardeпe was appreng the powerwacuum dir ta Irdia OCT
rä Wall of the ExtgrTä! rea. He, therefore, of power in the Indian ifeguard his country's ho Weyer, Sri Lanka pro-U.S. tilt. This was |lowing:
position on the U.S. Diego Garcia Was fagton, India Was oppo2d the naval competiearpowerS iri1 its immed. Secord, in 1982, Sri Til a U.N. TESO|Lutiji
"State.5 to refrain from eapons on the territo
India Supported the Pakistan presented at SLIITTiti NgW Delhi I Wanting the entire to bē dēClarad a Nuee Zones (NWFZ), and hinterland states. ith Bangladesh and India Tejected ita S. She aired at bringing in posal to make South also including within Osal the Soviet occuII. Earlier, India had istani proposal for a Security in the Indian
ri Lanka. Withdraw its ador Christopher PinHäIITTlal Of the Tif пference to pave the Ambassador Tommy ri Lankar COTT TTD ritathat the U.S. Would at Sri Larika Wās not r OZOP.” And fifth, Chairmar of the UN
Special Committee on the Indian Ocean. But President Jayewardene was not keen on the convening a conference of this Committee. He tried to avoid responsibility by saying "What can We do if one or both of the Superpowers do not agree to come to the Conference, I am afraid We Cannot do much. It is up to the United Nations to think of What to do".
The developments in the Indian Ocean area and the changed perspective of Sri Lanka regarding the IOZOP were percelVed by India as having deleterious effect on her security. After all, the IOZOP is the maritime corollary of India's regional strategic policy", which is to deny or neutraliSe any extra-regional role, to maintain the status quo in the South Asian power balance and to maintain stability in the region. India was concerned about its Security as it believed that the Indian Ocean South Asian region became apossible area of Cold War Confrontation which would also undercut her politico-military primacy in the area, Sri Lanka's revised Indian Ocean policy just compounded India's security concerns. The other trends in Colombo's foreign policy did So Still more. India appeared to Hawe beat Tost CONCETTEd OWET Sri Lafka's alleged offer of base facilities to the U.S. Navy at the Trincomalee Port, Over the grant of contract regarding the Oil Tank FarrT1 (TTF) atTrim1Comalgetd3a U.S.:-affiliatad Consortiu, and over the Woice of America (MOA) agreement between Washington and Colombo.
*77 kg Corff L'Ég)
Notes
71. See for datails of NALTEikЕР.S.Jayaramu, India's National Security and Forgign Policy, ABC Putlishing House, New Delhi, 1987, pp. 95-49.
72. Shella Harder, Smäl| 3 Därgerous, Micro Stälä5 C C KLuuLLLLL LLLLLLaS LLLLMLGLLLLL LLLLCLS SLLaaLaS aLL0aLS р, Ё.
73. Тіппе паgaziпв, 3Јапшагу 1979, p. 4.
74. Hedley Bull, "The Great Irresponsibles? The United Slalä5,lf ScovialLInior,änd World Order" |nleifriätional Joufräl, Wol. XXX W., No.3, SLIITITIEF 1953, p.
구.
OL0S L LLS LLLLLSLLLMLL0LS S0CLLLLLCHLOLL HHaLCCLLLLS S S S

Page 19
구,
B1.
Hedley Bull (ed.), Interwention in World Politics, Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 58.
LLL aS LLLLLLLLSSHLLLLtttLLLLLLLtLmLLLa LLL Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka". An Unpublished re55arch paper, Colombo, undated, p. 30; Paul X. Kelley, "Putting "Lethal Teeth" in U.S. Foreign Policy", The Christian Science Monitor, 20 August 195미, p. 22
Sea President Carter's State of the Union Message, 23 January 1980 in Current Policy, No. 132, U.S. CCLLCLLMLGLL LLL CCMS LCC LLLLLS LLLLLLLLS LLLLCLS shington, D.C.,
Lok Sabhi Debates, SEventh Series, Vol. XV, Flo, 00S 0 LLLL 000SCL0LLS SLLLLLLS00LLSS a000 LLLLaL LLLLLL that "...today, We find it (Indian Ocean churning with danger. The frantically increasing pace of TilitarLLLLLL L LL LLaL LLMLL LTuuaLLL LLLLL LLaL 0000 LMLLLLL L LT LaLaL LLLLLa LMMMMLMLMSSS SSS L LM LM LHHHCLCL LLeMuL LLLLLL LLLLLLLOLL LLLLLLLHLLLLLLL LLLL L LLL aHLS LL LLL LLLL LCCCL LML M LLLL LL LLL eLeMCCuL LL LLuLLLH GGMLLLLLL LLLLL LLLLCLCLLLa cold War with all its saverity". Selected Speeches Earld Writing3 Cf Indira Gardii, Wol. IV, January 1930-December 1981, Publication Division, Ministry
LTTML MMMLu LLLLuuuLMTS S LTLGLMLLLLLL L India, New Delhi, 1985, pp. 513-14.
Hid Co. 25 Bärich, Wo. KXW, No.2H.25. Märch 198?, Cols, 339-410.
Lok Sabha Deball BS, Sixth Sarias, W, X, No. 6, 27 February 1978, Cols. 250-2B1, La llar cm, in 1932, or MP states in the Lok Sabha that "by establishing LL LLaaLLL LLLL LL LLLCLa CCLLLCS LMLLLLLL LLLLLLLLS CC in the garne of chess, put a check or the sovereignty OLLL LL LLLC LLLLLLS aL LLLL LL LLLLLLCLS LLLLLLS Lok Sabha Dębates, Sgwėnulih Series, Wol. XX WI, No. 25, 25 March 1982, Col. 1.
SEE foi olari. 7
Report of Proceedings of the Twent oth CorritorLLLLLMMMLLMLCM CTeMLLLLLL LLLL LL LLLLLLLHHH In September 1974, Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, LDikiri, n, dip, dll.
Under the Janatagawarnment"Indiagawa top priorLL LL MLLLM a LLL LLLLLLLOLuL OLLL LLL LMLLLM LMS aLLLLLLL0 LLCCLTTa LLL LLLLLMTLLC LLLCLLLLLCLLLS LlTT relations, developed on the basis of equality, goodWill Bnd mutual trust, helped towards creating a climate of mor Tial:Station Erdfriendship, thus promoting the cause of peace in the region". See Ministry of Exterial Affairs Report, 1977-78, New Delhi, 1979, p. 1. By contras, the critral theme of the neighbourhood policy of the Indira Gandhi govgTiment Was "India's desire to promote the estabisfilment of peace in tha regioni tu grabla individual LMLLCCL HH CLLLC LL LLLLL LL LLCLLLMM LML LLL GLLMLLLLLL LLL LLLL LLCCLLLLS TCC CTTLGLLLLL LLLLLLTT LLL CCCLOLLS LLLLLLLCCCOLOHCCCSCLLLkLSSLLGLL LLLLLL isis a gű rightürgy félkitörts" ErTiphasis added]. SBa, ibilid, 1980-81, p.w.
Tüxley Speech in Sri Lanka Foreign Affairs Record, Wol, 1 July 19 FB-Juni 1979, CelkonTiba.
H.S.S. Nissanka, Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy". A Study in Nor-Alignment, Wikis, New Delhi, 1984. p. 3-45; T.D.S.A. Di 35äilyä käll, J. F. JayEWEardlema of Sri Lanka, Swastika Press, Colombo, 1977, pp, 70-72; President Jayawarderesaid in an interview: Та па поп 5 digs are Equal. I would like to be
E구.
E9.
1.
2.
Érigrdly with all Courtrie
Tf Tg F.
Sunday Observer, Colo
Flyd i AHLI kad, "REH Likā". Pakis Hriz Cшапат, 1979, p 42.
SC for Dhir Tallinga Tı': ASSETıbbiy Debalas, Offi 25, No.2, 6 Decem:
Käruflütl:1351ls Colhappli in on-aligned politics W. rho Tak: Fictors rallier thal O Wadu MBS trige KHL Case Study of Sri La Special Rifferiç ku ப்ேrேb), நோர, 19 HELITEd Els lid ETıp
Tirsion of nor-agiri: North-South CCIEEL, S TIEJIrl, Wol. 25 (1), N. 418 al Ele 32nd Se 29 September 1977, in ths... 12.
For example to Shiel Address: Geo-strallegi: LE lk E REI tills" i Hi5 Lankan Relations, BCS
Shelor U. Kodikard, Pa. listituli SärTiiriä III P. Asian Cooperation, 7-9 p 21,
Hindu, Madras, 27 April
As ext
Lgபூ, d Unique Looki TT-Le FC
For
Tl o
DCULULT
Flightle
FOI SGLT
His Ze
There .
Kakka
Here

S CTLLTS TTTMkLkS 0 CCCS SS 00S LLLLLLMM LMLLLLLLLL S LLLLLL HLHH LLLLLL LLLLLL LATS Eing of the NAM Cordirlating BLIraau in Hávaria in May 1978 that "We stand umccTipromisingly for Ea total climination of great power military preserica and Ert I DEWETEestis in Sri basis, as being the only certain Tilaams of remowing on, Wool. XXXII, Mao, 3, Third tension and conflict in the area". See Weekend,
Coksimbo, 21 May 1978, Tyrorine Fernardo, Deputy
Faragn Minister, slaled in Farliamantinathis gove
irribo, 11 September: 1977.
5 state Tent, National State rment Was fully CCTrinited totha conceptul IOZOP.
dial Record, Color Tibo, Wol. See FariaTermitary Deobales, (Harisard), Officia
ii r 1977, Gili.: 35-3S. Report, Colombo, Will, 24, No. 5, 10 Junie 1983.
Co. 49.
Tionthal Sri Laika'simtarist L00L OCCGGLLLLLLL LLLOLL KH L L0S S aL0S LLLLL LLLLL SS LS LtkGLLLLLLL CLLLLLL C
Ti political SEE Ph.D). This Cor Tycocation of tha Bardārā laik Centre for Interradasa, Non-Aligrrrigril: A national StucDS wo 24 September 1887 in J. H. nka's Foreign Policy With CCCLHMMLTSLC CLLLLLLL LLLLCCCL LLLSLLLkLLLLLL LL
1970-1982, University of Speches on International Affairs, Starlord Press 38. FoxBign Ministar A.C.S. Pvt Ltd. Singapura, i GKB, p. 20-4,
asis OT the BCCIOTIC I
Session, P. ETT TECTIF art, but Especially sing 95, UNGA, 37th SE:ssion, Provisiin Werbatir
R EE: hills StallarTiiriit Ir Raurita- the 101st Meeting, 13 Decriber 1982, Resolution
2. 5 Deci IIlie 1977, Cal. FO. 3 FEVA, 5sion of UNGA, New York, ges. Times of India, New Delhi. 10 March 1933; ridiari Hameed, Selected Spee- and Foreign Review, New Delhi, Wol. 15, No. 1. 1 March 19f9;
tom U. Kadikara, Keynola 97. Meryn DeSilva, "Operation ASEAN", India Today, El Perspectives of Indo-Sri New Delhi, 16-31 May 1981, p. 116. [red.), Dilar Tırtıq sofilmid-Siri
i, Cikrthbo, 1991, p. 26. 98. Far Eastern Economic Review, Hongkong, 18 June
198호, p. B,
Per Presented at the Marga gg Onkar Marwah, India's Strategic Perspeclivecinthia
rtical Dirt:15:S gC
Indian Ocean" in Willian L. Dowdy and Russel B. Noyer Tıber 1987, Cakribo, Trood (Eds.), The Indian Ocean Perspectives of a Stralagic Arfi, Himaliyan Book-5, NEW Dighi, 1983. 1 SIEF, 0.301.
An Aussie Bird
ric Isle Tas, CCOrding to orles preconceptions. ", CLJ Ld Lr "replaceca Eble, g.JoΓ Πιεπαμ. JiπιαίΓιg πΟΠε, kkapo, easу пеat
gry COILicts and irported Cargo Tats, st flight and fight sans natural predators.
Lould see him fat,
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geist Lucas I tot right5 JA 5 leg.
po o TISTarl.
Tetl door, fue Wife Mal Death.
Patrick Jayasшriya
17

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Page 21
EWGLISH WAF/77WG (2)
The non-formal SeC
KaTTallika Pieris
博 this genre of Comic literature cories the recent writings of Carl Muller. His first Work, ea free Won the Gratian Prize, Welt into Several EditionS, was greeted with reserve by the local critics, and With some degree of annoyance by the Burghers. This work and its sequal, Yaka Yaka, have obvious artístic Weaknesses which hardly need Tiention. However, they hawe providedus, (the long suffering readers of Sri Lankan fiction in English). With a much needed break. Muller's Work Is a "gööd read", Something which most creative Writing in English is mյt.
There is some excellent comic Writing in Muller's Work, The books are full of it and it is difficult to select examples. There is conic monologue, Look at the section which begins "It had been hard since Clarence died. Every All Souls Day she would go to the cemetery and grumble at his grave..." to "Why you die and give me all this trouble don't know. NOW must go. OLI father Who artin Fleaven, hallowed bуThyпапе..."(p10)Thereissшргеппеly comic dialogue, as when Colontotal goes to Teet Cecil prins to ask for the hand of his daughter, Anna.
"My parentshave paddyfields in Gampahaandcoconutardak and buffaloes also "Buffaloes', said Ceciprins Weakly "Six-seven buffaloes' (p. 36)
Yaka Yaka also has an Entertaining dialogue between Sonnaboy, who is disCLussing a Cinder in his eye and an Englishman who wishes to challenge him to a fight. (p. 56-57)
There is amusing description. The BriLLLLLLLL aLLL LLLL LLLLLLLLLLLLLLaLL engines mostly after governors and other colonial big brass, thus did Sir Andrew Mackerizie race LCountry Sir William Horton to the south, Sir Frederick North to the north and Henry McCallum to someWhere in between." (p. 9)
There is accurate rendering of mis-proLaLLLLLLL LLLLLaLLLLGLaLSLLHaL La profferso fellow" (7). He was pooshing (8) "Wyliss she not marriedly if nineteen ears. Yoш wait. I wi|| уarгапgeif| can" (9)
Re-Collections of Sri Lankar life, Writter in English, form another small but clearcut genre. The earlier Writings, such as those of Wijayatunge, Kenneth de Lanerole (10) and M. Chandrasoma (11) Were ina pasto= ral belles lettre style, The Workby Cari Muller described earlier and Corrad Fel
singer's / Was the in asimple una cade with the "truly natic Lankan experience about (12) They w relaxed Ilanner, Wi gusto, and do not hi. identity or style.
Muller and Felsing class, the riddle C 1930's, Felsinger's ассошпt of ап епјо Orthodox childhood, past-times, bird WE теагing gаппе birds, DigiWygl ard W3|| munity of the 19. respectable positior postal service, and cribes the Burghers and takes us throug Burgher funeral anc in his first Work, familiar With this lifes authenticity of some
Because they de bed. Sub-Cultures t CO15idgrable a ITI COLI det Hill. ThiSiS a farĒG Writing. They provid the Burgher|ife styl addition, in Felsing J5 Oficit Cock places such as M audier CE WaSEXCL: of the places. Whe Conducted is also Arrack Was a drink be used for Takir giving the lawatory's We occasions' (p referCE to al "El bred in Ceylon, of had practically no speech often made
Muller’s Work porc Existen C3 Cf. TäCIE Tails Were clair schools and Colleg Sinhalese gravitate .." (13). His Work all Burgher stereotype dent. Further, he st knew that the most of the days of timbe LTOSLIFE di riwearS filo Weed to the diSta1C fFOT COO (14)

tor
WAPyWars as "Writt mic style, provides us mal, authetically Sri "Goonetilleke spoke rite in a refreshing, thout inhibition, With We Luchi trouble With
gardeal With their OWr lass Eurghers in the i is a first person yable but father unwith several unusual atching, hunting and Muller de SCTES LE a Watte Burgher COTI30's, Those holding is in the railway, the tha CLIStOTIS, HE CdSskill at "putting a party" ha Burgher Wedding, di Burgher Christmas, 7 sfff free. TOSE tylehave'affirmed the 2 of his descriptions.
a clearly circumSCritheir Work. COImitain S. a. nt of genuine Social feature in our English leus With a picture of 8 of the period butin er here are descripighling that Whérl Orl edimale, where the sively. Sinhalese. A list re cock fighting Was givеп (р. 119, 123) "kept in those days to g milk wine and for Weeperson their festi12) There is also a glishman borne and poor parents. He had Education and is me gasp". (p. 129)
wides support for the il stereotypes. "The ish anyway. In the es the Burghers and d towards each other so adds Weight to the as funlowing, improviays "Carloboy at eight gallant British Sea dog redships Was Adriiral dinot know how many seain Ceylon and the Tbo to Jafna'. (p 173
Moving now from the informal to the more established forms of Writing, it is clearthat the time is noWripe forta positive Overview of the overall output of post independence writing, "The love affair of the Lankan elites with the English language began almost assoon as the first British sails appeared off the Western seaboard. S 0 LaLLL LaLLLLL LLLL L LLLLL LHHLCaLLLL masters of the Whole island, two young Sinhalese Christians were sent to England for their education and Were soon well Schooled in the protective mimicry typical of a colonial elite. A century passed before Lankans graduated from flirtatiOS With Ell:5-Ettr5 ad al LIT verse with the appearance of the first novel in English, in 1917". (15). Among the major publications thereafter, were JWijayatunga's wignettes from rural life Grass for 772 W seet (1935). Of this Yasmin Gooneratne Says "his characters caught Tidway between autobiographical reminicence and fiction, and his evocations of a richly humane and tranquil Way of life created a new regard for the local environment as a suitable setting for fiction, and a new respect for the Walues and traditions of rural Sri Lanka". (16)
This was followed by the "poised literate' poems of Patrick Fernando, Wie refem of (Wysses (1954), Fernando's poems, LLLLLLLaLLaLaLLLLLLLaLLLL LLLLLLL cut above the usual Sri Lankan effort, took the position that "a Ceylonese Writing to be read by anybody anywhere cannot move in a field that is exclusively Ceylongse Where the idiomandfields ofreference апd thепes are specifically Сеylonese". Fernando selected bibliocal literature, catholic rituals, Greek and Roman mythologyas his external fra The Work and Kuru Willa pOSes the question as to whether his poems could be considered lacking in relevance to the local scene, (17)
There Was a lull in English Writing, with the emergence of Sinhala nationalism in the 1950's, but English Writing did not disappear completely. Furnykanti Wijenaike's 77'ye t'i wa Kwa/7a/7 Was published in 1963. English Writing gathered momentLUIT in the tWOdēCadas that fo||cóWedi and by 1990 the output was such that Halpe felt that English Writing from Sri Lanka was LLLLaLLL LaLLLLL LHHL LLLLLaL LLLLLLLLS res of the country. (18). The academic community, which, initially had looked down on Sri Lankan Writing in English, began to take a sympathetic and positive look at the Tlaterial, Sri Lankan Writing
19

Page 22
began to be increasingly published abroad, and many pieces Were included in anthologies. In addition, fiction written by Sri Lankans was taught in university courses outside Sri Lanka. (19)
A knowledge of English was one of the defining chracteristics of the urban middle class, and quite naturally the Sri Lankan Writer of English generally came from this class. Within this group there exists a distinct sub group of Writers, who should now be assessed as an entity - the Burghers, whose first language was English. They led in the realm of creative Writing, at the outset, for the first novel ever published here, was Lucian de Zilwa's Dica of Wie goos (1917) For "anything adventurously creative" thereafter, one looked to the 'ambiguous and distinctly Surrealist poems of George Keyt of the thirties, and the wit of S.J.K. Crowthers satiric noVel 777eg kr7gWaterrari"(1928). (20) At the present moment, there is the Work of Michael Oondatije, Carl Muller and Jean Arasanayagam. One recalls from the '50's F. H. Bassetts 7äses of Warya (iS
WETAW"
The Burghers Were joined by English language writers from other Communities, notably Sinhala. The Common view of literary Critics is that the English speaking class in Sri Lanka did not participate in the serious life of the country and had nothing to say. This argument cannot be sustained, for it was the English speaking Class the "comprador class, that contralled the plantations, the professions and industry. But it is easier to accept the position that this group, being Westernised and relatively affluent, Were unable to ernpathise With any Other Class in the country. It has been suggested that this group only care to life with the Conflicts of 1971 and 1983. Certainly the whole flock did sit down and Write on these events, but the output was not significant in quality. It is anyway difficult to believe that a Whole group could only be energiSed by national catastrophes.
An examination of the literature indicates that the Sri Lankan Writer in English, totally independant of 1971 and 1983, has shown a capability of empathising with other segments of society and of representing it in evocative terms. In fact that is all these Writers do, as regards fiction. They avoid looking at themselves and there is virtually nothing where the Writer examines his/her own circle and its experiences. That could be attributed to prudeiCE.
Post independence Sri Lanka did not have elites of the "Let them eat cake" type. Most of the urban elites only hit the city about two generations ago. Even then links With the rural areas were Taintained through grandparents, the mahagedera and subsequent ownership of those same
20
lands. In the urbans with the poorer clas: Ce Sector, SUChaSSE It is of interest to The 1927, the Randy H had a short piece great ewent in tha lif thoughts ofalow cas to Cook for a piri Walau Wwa, (21)
It Would be useful SOIThe ObservatiOr1S Gooneratine, in 1981 literaturē. "The Sri | looks to Europa for Unable to derive ins: traditional sources, to an English literary independantly of hin nuous development include hir at āII. H freshly of the locals. Contemporary locals at every turn by the modes and Conwart no clear understand to hawe always been tradition for the India a Complex and Con Containing indigenot experience combine terial"-the ideas, at regarding literary si from the West throug English language. (p. the there that domi tion, poetry and dra а пational, personal "I hawe stressed the psychological conflic Wall as on thig · SOCiE a very large proporti{ fiction, whether ove Satiric or dramatic, treated is interWower 0CCupation. (p. 2,8)
Carl Muller has st identity by gross exa is Some good Writing hilarious 77 g/ ability to sketch a ch: There are striking pe as Richard Dionysit. been pointed out th Writer, while able to HLUTOUTOLIS COr satiric to depict deep em experiences. Mulle ST100thly from the describing the death prins stood looking bil not caring what he w not imagine what it w gone." (p72) This ni ble for its use of pato if hawe". (p 30)
The Sri Laikan Wri deals with universa

ictor, there is contact es through the serviwants and labourers. tion that as early as W. School Magazine y a schoolgirl, "The of a da TSIEI" On the e girl who was asked 1 ceremony at the
include at this point,
made by Yasmine , on commonwealth ankan of today still |lis literary standards, piration or help from ind attaches Himself tradition that evolved and that in its Cont
does not, naturally, is attempts to Write ene and to interprete Ociety are hampered : intrusion of literary ons of Which he has ng, but which appear there". (22). She sees n Writer of English as 1plicated inheritance Is elements of social d with "imported matitudes, and concepts tyle carried to India h the medium of the 35). She argues that rāts tird World FicTla s the Search of oran artistic identity. thcle of Cultural and it on a personal as stal lewal because ini Jl of the Third World try Comic or tragic,
every other theme with this major pre
lved the problem of Iggeration. But there in Mullers bawdy and L“ freis. There is an aracter in a few lines. ersonal la TheS SUCh JS Colontota. It has at The Sri Lankan Write effectively in a all mode, is not able OtiOSOr traumatic * H10 Wewer, TOWEes Comic to the sad in of Maudiegin."Cecilleakly at his wife and "ould do for he could ould be like With her OveliSalSO remarkäis". Just tell Will you,
ter alsoon occasion | issues. Punykanti
Wijenaike, in "Potter and his trade deals With the perennial issue of the father-son conflict, heightened in the rural sector by the added issues of unemployment, frustrated arbitions, and the clash between traditional and modern values. She is able. to illustrate with telling details, "One day he had bought his son a bicycle out of his hard earned money, The boy had looked at him for a second With softness in his eyes. But the next moment he had turned away and once more a barrier had come between them". One characteristic featurein Sri Lankan writing is the introduction of some gentle humour into even the most serious story. The boy's mother Wonders what her son would bring her this time as gift. Last time he had brought her a tin of powder and a jar of foreign cream.
The themes of poverty and rural depriwation were, as shown, dealt With very artistically in the children's stories discussed. SLWimalee Karunarate's Wig fastWä/ 5f5/W also deals With the therTÉ Of making a small amount of money. The story is about Nandasiri, a municipallabourer, who sets about the business of financing a small stall at the Esalaperahera. He borrows money from everybody he knows, has to bribe the 'ralaharily to retain the stall, and supplements his earnings with providing some ganja to tourists. Chitra Ferlando's "The little der deals with jealousy and the belief in black magic. Also the helplessness of those with little actual power in the community.
The landmarkachieve Tent in the genre of the short story is, in this writer's opinion, Chitra Fernando's "Missilin', the story of a Servant in an urban household, told from beginning to end. The only critic who has given this story the prominence it deserwes is Yasmine Goorneratne. (23) It is tightly structured, carefully crafted, with effective use of language. The very next day Missilin was bundled off to the Chest Hospital. There is considerable observation and empathic understanding of the feelings and experiences of alone servant in a lower Tiddle class household. Wirtually all the main issues that arise are included and beautiIly Woven into a continuing narrative. The loneliness, the occasional feelings of insecurity, dependence on her mistress, short lived flirtations, Secret Overtures to accept service in other houses, developing friendships with the few contacts available to her, such as the vegetable seller, the extraction of her saving by her relatives, and the denial of leave to go home for either the New Year or Wesak.
This essay has dealt briefly with several "minor forts of English creative Writing, to which assessments of translations into English, from the indigenous literature should also be added. (24) In addition the eSSay ends With Some observations regarding Writing in the formal sector.

Page 23
s
Why there's sc in this rustici
There is laughter and light baiter Titlist the:
LLLLLL LLLLLLLlLM gLLLLm GmmL LLLLLL 0LLLLLLLLD LLL LLrrClLL leaf in a bir TI, IT IS, CITIE: If the hundreds of such
barns spread tytut in thị: Tid artici Lipmuntry LLLLLLLLH KLLK HuuLLLLLL LlL aBLaLlL uLLLLL LLLLHa LS dallimi, di Iring the Coff 5:2:15 Cor.
Here, with careful nurturing, tobacco grows Fis a LLLLeOLL LLL LLLLCHC HLL LHLHL uuuLGLCL LtgtLLLLLaL LLLLLLLHHL L gold, to the value of Jir Rs. 250 million or more annually, for perhaps 143,000 rural folk.
 

ENRCHING FRURAL LIFESTYLE
und oflaughter tobacco barn.
Tobaccan is the industry that brings er TıployTIEmil tra
hic scienci highest numbe T uf people. Artici ThE:52 people are the colbarra barr, IowTiers, thia' trab.: CCC growers and those who work for the IT, on the land ariri irl, the barms.
For thern, the tobacco leaf means rearingful work,
a carnfortable hife àTird a ocure futura. s. FC
rough reason for laught ET,
CeylonTobacco Co. Ltd.
Sharing and caring for our land and her people,

Page 24
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