Page 1
AFFNA: LESSC
KANDY: MAHA SA
DELHI : INDA
THE COSTS (
CENSORSHIPA
HUMAN RIGHTS AND "
LEONARD W(
 

Price RS.O.OO
AR
nad
ACE
IDIAN
Registered at GPO, Sri Lanka
ONS OF HISTORY
- Lt. Gen. Ragha Uar
NGHA's BLESSINGS
- Mervyn de Silva
N RESPONSES
- Aspattaran Ghosh — Humayum AKabfr
OF CONFLCT
- Mark Nicholson
WD CREDIBLTY
- Michael Drudge
THE WESTERN AGENDA
- Jeremy Seabrook
OOLE - Jeanne Thuaites

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WEMWG 54CKGROUWID
SIN HALA OPIN
Mervyn de Silva
he twelve year "War" is
frequently introduced as an ethnic conflict, majority Sinhalese versus minority Tamils. Though a gross oversimplification it does recognise and respect the nature of the armed struggle launched by an organisation styled the "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam" and its objectives - liberate the Tamil peopole from the "Sinhala State" and establish an "independent" Eelam. In short, a secessionist struggle. That "Eelam" CILJde Stig Not AND the East. ThiS then is the territorial aspect of the war, a Civil or interal War.
The Lion Flag flies over Jaffna, the northern capital, and L.T.T.E. bastion. The Tigers' expelled from Jaffna move eastwards to re-open the other theatre of this protracted War. The P.A. goveTiment also Towes to another front, the Sinhala Constituency-majority Sinhala opinion, and Sinhala opinion-makers. By hitting the L.T.T.E. hard militarily, the P.A., spots a perfect opportunity to recover the Sinhala support it lost by its 5-6 months of "peace talks" i.e. between the elections (parlamentary and presdential) and mid-April. When the L.T.T.E. unilaterally abandoned the peace path". Thus, the visit to Kandy of President Chandrika Kumaratunga and her Depu
ty Defence Minister Anuruddha Ratwat
te. Together President Kumaratunga, who is also Defence Minister, and Colonel RatWatte, paid homage to the SaCTed Toot Relic “to Tark the liberation of Jaffna from the grip of LTTE terrorists and the hoisting of the National Flag in Jaffna". The MahanayakeThera of Malwatte, Wen. Rambukwella Sri Wipassi and the Mahanayake of Asgiriya, Wen. Palipane Sri Chanda manda chanited set Drift. They were conducted to the /ha MVßs/ /7 7ä7/7da,Daya by the DiyaWadana Nilame, Neraпјап Wijeyeratпе.
During the peace talks With the
L.T.T.E., the Mah happy ower the f National Cluestior
Choosing her dent Kumaratung in Jaffna as "the for peace". Peact jective since the problertin-the eth ded "a political sc
By thrashing the Sri Lankan statea F a simple lesson. ultimate objective gle. Without alier morities, Chandrill presented to the think-talks as "t Why? Apart from was bleeding the "numbers game" ral politics, require Substantial backi - Tamils, MUS| "law" applies to party the U.N.P. Butpost-indepen show that the U.N irred u Cibole Tiiriir Willic of COUSee its traditional riv; '''LJnited frOrt5" Or Thus, "Comrad move to discard Sorbonne gown centre — "negr separatist conflic On the field of ed acceptance of t justrinent" strate face", a пecessa By these "adjust electoral arithm: and to the baSi community and date Chändrika tory, Well over 6

ION SHIFTS
'Sanga was far from A.'s policies on the
ords cleverly, Presi(described the victory irst step in the battle
Was the ultimate obtrinsic nature of the nic Conflict - denlarlUtion".
IL.T.T.E. militarily, the ad taught the L.T.T.E. could not achieve its through armed strugating the national mika Kumaratunga Was electorate by the P.A. le peace Candidate".
the fact that the WaT national economy, the that dominates electosa major party to have ng from the minorities ims, Christians. This Ehe main COISE TWatiwa as Well as to its riwal, dence electoral politics I.P. starts with a higher täits rival – xplains why the SLFP, al, is tempted to form pre-election coalitions. s' Chandrika's Smart er fashionably "pinko"
and move towards the
tiated peace" on the "freemarket policies" onomics, meaning the ie IMF "structural adJy but With a "human y Salute to "socialism". Tents" founded on the tic of domestic politics, di Citates of the dOOT leaid agencies, CandiWon a spectacular wic4% of the total Wote S.
She had a price to pay - hardline Sinhala-Buddhist opinion which opposed her devolution/regional autonomy package. The armed forces and OPERATION RIWIRESA (Sunshine) has helped her win back the lost ground. But by that same logic, she has lost the Tamil coalition, starting with the main parliamentary party, the TULF. There the situaton stands — until the military operation in the East decides the balance of Tamil-Muslim-Sinhala opinion in that province.
GÜARDIAN
Wol, 18 No. 15 December 15, 1995
Price RS. TOOO
Published fortnightly by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd. No. 246, Union Place Colombo -2.
Editor: Mervyn de Silva Telephone: 447584
Printed by Ananda Press 825, Sir Ratnajothi Saravanamuttu Mawatha, Colombo 13. Telephone: 435975
CONTENTS
WAAF TПЕ Есопотit. Bшпјвп. 모 Winning the War 3. Censorship Now MearingleSS 3. Will History Repeat itself? - Distant Refugees 5 Jafna SGtbäck —
Sericcus or TerTiporary 5 The di MediaLiCOMOWES India and thig Ethi
Crisgs ir Sri LH ka 7 Western Human Rights 11 G77ārī NAM 2 Prabhakartin's Retrida 13 Nations in Glass Houses 5 Loard W. 18

Page 4
MWAA?
The ECO nomi C BU
Mark NicholSOn
he single-mindedness of the Sri
Lankan government in its military drive to evict the separatist Tamil Tigers from their Jaffna stronghold and the risks to this enterprise are evident in the budget.
What Mr G. Peiris, deputy finance minister, Caled the "compelling meed to intensify military operations" will leave a budget deficit this year of 9.3 per cent of gross domestic product, against a targeted 7.5 per cent. High defence spending will keep the budgeted shortfall near 8 per cent next year, with Rs.38 bn ($455m) set aside for military costs (4.9 per cent of estimated 1996 GDP).
Two military Campaigns against the Liberation Tigers of Tail Eelarn since summer, the latesta three-week-old push towards the Tiger-held Jaffna, city, hawe placed What Mr Lakshman Kadirga Tar, Sri Lanka's foreign minister, this Week called a "horrandous burden" of the island's small economy.
"But," he said, "there are things you have to do, even if you can't quite afford te."
Sri Lanka can barely afford its latest War, Claiming no scope existed for deep spending cuts and that few other sources of revenue Were available, Mr Peiris has banked on earning Rs 2.1 bn from state asset sales and other forms of "public sector reform" next year.
But, a Color ribo-based economist said: "it depends almost entirely on privatisation proceeds. If they don't come through, it could be really explosive. The government Would hawe no choice but printing money and inflation."
Raising such a sum from a privatisation programme which last year garnered just Rs 2.6bn of a targeted Rs 1.3bn Will be difficult. The figure is almost twice that which the previous United National Party administration managed through its own
2
state asset Sales OW 1989 and 1994, T. coalition governme. With likely Union op the danger of poli leftist parties withint a listless stock mark buying interest.
There are other ris: cal, to the governme drivựg in the Orth. Th ally securing Jaffna арparentgoal of the
The broad politica LTTE of its logistical lism of holding territ
GöTamho
At the Sarrie time, Kumara tunge want: LTTE and the island that they have no devolution proposal while satisfying hard Lanka's rimajority Sin She has dOne What 5 LTTE as a military fo
The Sri Lankar for Tore til a WE Jaffna city, moving defusing mines laid ring Jaffna may be but military analyst exists that the finalt higher army Cas Lulties booby-traps and to fighting in a city the Thore than four years
Holding Jaffna c. leaving the army WL fighting at which the excels over the 12 Ðthrlic. CCIllic:l.
There is also the and how, the politica in Jaffna Will actual Mrs Kumaratunge's

rC en
rfive years between e People's Alliance | TuSt als Carllarld osition to the sales, Cal opposition from eruling coalition and at currently devoid of
ks, military and politiit's expensive armed first arises in actufrom the Tigers, the Offerm Siwe.
aim is to deprive the
base and the Syr TuboJry in the name of a lard.
President Chandrika s to persuade the 's Tamils in general option but to back stabled in August, -lime Tembers of Sri hala population that the can to quash the
C8.
пy has been camped k On the Outskirts of forward cautiously, Jy the Tigers. Entepolitical necessity, believe a danger rust could incur far as troops encounter Jghi street-by-Street Tigers have held for
uld also be costly, nerable to guerrilla LTTE has shown it ears of the island's
Uestion of whether, benefits of a victory
infuse energy into bitious devolution
proposals, which would create a form of federalism giving Tar Tills in the north and east, and other regions in the island, elected Regional Councils with considerable governing autonomy.
These proposals need a two-thirdsmajority in parliament before moving to nationa referendum. Proponents of the devoution package suggest a notional timetable for the proposals which would see ther debated in parliament in the first quarter of next year, voted on by April or May, leading, they hope, to the first regional Council fäläctionsbEforethé Endöfriext year.
But while the far-reaching devolution proposals have secured Support from Tamil and Moslem parties, the main opposition UNP has yet to offer the support Mrs Kumaratunge requires. Its leaders say the party is unlikely to back the proposals Without significant amendments.
Neither is it clear that any Tilitary success in the north would necessarily spur their support. "At the moment, one can't see the political and military sides of the government's strategy coming together," says an independent political analyst in Colombo, "For the next few months, it seems both wheels will spin separately."
If so, then uncertainty may continue to cloud both Sri Lanka's political and se Curity position for several months, even if the army plants a flag in the centre of Jaffna. Many economists, businessmen and certainly brokers on the Colombo stock exchange believe this will keep domestic and, particularly, foreign investors on the sidelines, where they have stood for much of this year,
That would bode ill for Mr Peiris' highly ambitious privatisation plan, "It's good that privatisation is finally gathering pace," says one Colombo equity analyst. "The trouble is it will keep hitting a brick wall of bad Sertiment,"
(YAFWri;77c",Ča/ Ww77a75)

Page 5
AOL/WWCS
Winning the War
Mark Nicholson and Mervyn de Silva report on the
Tiger withdrawal or defeat in Jaffna
would be a grave strategic, logistical and political blow. They hawa Lurl the city är id much of the northern Jaffna peninsula as a die face) mini-state for the past four years. "Jaffna would be a significant loss," said a diplomat in Colombo. "It Would make the difference between the Tigers being alerritorial, pseudo-govertifieritora guerrilla mOWETElt Ol Fls LII."
For the government of President Chandrika Kumaratunge, by contrast, capture of the strategic priza could be the best - Some might say only -piece of good ng WS Since sic took power in November last year with a 62 per cent Wote backing hier determination to forge peace with the Tamil separatists.
Having in wested sa much in Engaging tha Tigers in peaca talks earlier this year, Her goverTrentOStsupportand Credibility When the Tigers walked out in April. "It looked to many people that she'd been duped," said Crė diplomat.
Since April, though, Mrs Kumaratunge's administration has hardened its approach. Operation sur risgis tha SGCOII dhlËävy Tiilitary assault in the north since Summer. And herstrategy has now BVolgd inloatwo-track process L.) Hurt and Weaken the LTTE in Jaffnamilitärily, while Cortinuirig to PLIsh her
government's recant addr.a55 The Tamils State by turning Sri federatidlrı,
The detailed deWol rënilly inching throug: Tiittejas ārld Wil|| EWE thirds majority - Whi party and its inTITTI Edi Illard - and a ratic has been predictable sals for extremist priests within the mi. nity, but Sri Lankam is "SiC COISETSUS"
Hawing already tr far-reaching Constitu table, Sri Lankan Offic raturge has secure sympathy, if not bac Jaffna. CQrresti Call ernment's political r SEET TO TEST OF demonstrably Weake the T1 to alternative negotiating table,
This prize is far fri
most aralysts belia',
Censorship now meaning
The present press censorship imprised by the governLLLLLL LHH LLLL HLHaaaaaa S LHHLHL LLL LLLLCLL CLLLLaaaL0S a0K LLLLLL LLLLaLaTHHLLLCCLLLLLLLLmLaaaaa aLCCCL LLLLL LCLCHH CLLLaLLTmHHT LLLLLL LLLLLLLLS LLLLaLL aLL aLLLLL LLLLHHLC LCLLLLL LLLaLLLL L C CCCL release.
The Guild points out that it would be more sensible LL LLL LLL LLLLLL LLLL LLLaL LaLLLLLLLLHHLLaa ttt LLLLLLtaaaa aaHLHHLaaLLLLLLLa mmLLL LLLLCLL LLLLaLL a LLLLLLLHLHHLSamC LL LCC LLLHLLLL LLLL LL LLCLLCLLSS aaaLLLLLLLaaL LLHLHHLH HLCLLaaaCLLLLLC CLOTLLLLaLaa LLaaaCL Laa LLLLC CLaLLaLLS LLLLLL LLLLLLLaaLLS CLLLLL LLLLH LaaaLLL LLLLLL CC aaCLCLCLLa LHLLLLLLL is both patchy and unrelson ille.
The Full text of the press Telease is HS follows.
LLLLLLLLlLLLlLS SCaLLaS aHLHHLLLLLLL LLG CHLaaL0L CCLCaLaLmmLLLH CLLLL LLLLLL LLLLLLLa aLLL LLaaaaLLLLL LLLLLaLLLL LLLL CLaLLLLHaL LLaaHa LLLLLL aaLaLLLLL LLL LLLL Laaaaaa uCHaLL LLTLLLLSSS LLCLL LCLLLLLLLLKS sed the prevailing censorship and its implications.
Given the sensitivity of the issues involved the Guild LCCLK LLLLLL LLLL LLLa LLLaaaLLLLL LL LLLLLL HLCLLLLSSS LLCtLLC aaS CC have kept the national interest in Illind.
We believe that the current crisis demands a will informed public served by a responsible press. While the

WAT
set of proposals to demands for separate Lanka into more of a
ution proposals are curh parliamentary Comritually require a twochMrs Kumaratunge's |Editti. Blies to siúil CCITmal rafa TBridLITI, There oppositioпtothвргороgroups and Buddhist jority Sinhala CommuCofficials maimtaim thara
for the proposals,
ied talks, and With a tional "SCIL tim" om tha iIS DIE W MfS KLITEdit le Stig till king, for the aSSault on W, HOWEVET, her gOWICJITELLUIT WOUuld TOW
securing Jaffna and ining the Tigers leaving # ] Lito fé rj, tie
om Wom, hic W2 War, and
Mrs Cadika and
ESS — Editors' Guild
CaLLLLLLL LL LLLLLLLHLLaC CLLLLLL LCHLC CLCCaaa Laaa LLTGaaammmmmS national security interests, any censorship that may LLaCCCHHC LLLaLCLLCHlCC CHLCC LLLLL LLLLmHLaLL LHLLLLLLL LLCCLLLCLL LLLL CLaaaC mCa CalLCCCLCLLaLCLH HHHLLLLLLL CC LCCCCC CLCLa CLLa
many instances
The Colombo based foreign press has been excluded from the present censorship. With a section of the populaLL CCTT CLLCL0L LL TLCLLLLLCCLL LLLCLLCCm CCCCLL TL LLLmLmmL HHCCLCCCaaCL0 LTa LTLLCMS CLCLLLL LLLCCLa LLLLa other means, much of the present censorship has become CLCCLCaLLaLLLLLLLS LL LLLLLaLLL La HHHLHHLCa aaLaLLa LLLLLLaL LLLLLaLa lCLHHS LLLLLL LLLLL LaLa LLaL LLLLL LL LLLLaLL aLHLLLLHLaa LLLLL GLLCLHHLLLL LLLaLL LLL LLaCL CLLLtLLLLa CHaHLLCM aLa LaLH HH LLLLLL LLLLLL LLLL LLGLLLCCaaaaCLCLaaCL L LCLaLLa CCLLLa LLLLLLaLaaaa LLCCmaGma LLLLL LLLLLL LLaLLLLLLLaL LLLLLLCLCS LLLLL LLLLLL HLCCaLLLL LLLL C LLLLLCLLLLa LOLLLLL LLCCCHHHHLLLLLLL LLLLLLa Laa maLLLLLLLaa aLLLLLL LHHLCaCLLCLaLLLLS
We are confident that the media will fully cooperate LtLHLLa aHaaaLL aLL aLLLLLLLaCaLLHHLLLLLLL aLLa CHLaLaLaL Lt tLLLLLLL HLLaaLLL LLLa LLa LLLLLLaLCLL LtLLLLa aLaaLL aLaLLLLa aaHaLLLTLLS LLLLLL aHaCma LCa aaaaLaLaLLaLLaL LLLL LLLLCCmLLLLLLL LLLLLLCCC LLmLLCCCLLaLLLLLLLLCCC Laa LLLLLL S HLLL LLLLL LLLLLL HL LLLLL LLLaL LLLLLaaaLLLLL LL LLL
1: Tiled.
particularly, her artiled forces, will need both nerve and luck in the next days and weeks. The monsoor rains in northern Sri Lanka, which last until after Christmas, have already begun and though military commanders Say it will be another two weeks before the heawiest rains set in, analysts believe the army will need to have broken through to Jaffna
efore le.
So far the military's progress has, in the view of independer it analysts, been more SUCCESSful than in previous Campaigns.
Both the govern Ilent and a Ty are also Taking much of what they claim is the Tigers' "desperatiCT" ir la Linching Ebr Lutal Tassa Cree:S on Sinhalese villages in the north and east. MöfE, thäm 30 Clựillar15 WäTE häCRäd [[] tilääth in tha late:Stimcidamit recantly,
The Tigers hawe not clair Ted resporisibility for these atrocities, but few doubt them to be their inspiration. The strategy appears to be to try and divert army forces from the fighting in the north to protect willages in the east, while also attempting to spark bloody repris als a CrOSS Sri Lanka in the hope of burying in violence Mrs Kumaratunge's attempts to build political consensus around her devolution proposals.
(FWhirie:M7777777as)

Page 6
Jaffna : Will History
- Lt. General W. R. Raghavan
The LTTE has failed to stop the second offensive by the S the Lankan forces were poised to begin the final offen northern Sri Lankan province. The Sri Lankans need to c. making the final assault. Given their recent successes a by government forces, which are using combat aircraft, military analysts feel it is only a matter of time before been using inordinate force in their drive towards Jaffna, been shelled and bombed to an unprecedented extent. The to this. Se Weralthou Sad Sri Lakan TaTiS have been d water or medical supplies. Jaffna, according to Somer help in the implementation of the political package for forgotten that although the Indian Army during its Sri L control of the major towns, the LTTE had escaped to t It had taken the Indian upwards of four Army divisions protracted regular army versus guerrilla warfare. Questic
Τς Wo de CadeS Old Tali separatist conflict in Sri Lanka seems poised to enter a new phase. The popularly elected President, Mrs. Chandrika Kumaratunga, started the major initiative by first announcing a political package. It devolved considerable powers to the states, apart fгоппguaranteeing the continшаtion of the unique status of the Tamil peoples of Sri Lanka. While most political groups accepted the package with sortie reservations, the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) rejected it altogether. This was not in the least surprising in view of the LTTE's known reluctance to participate in any elections, other than om terTTns which Would ensure its complete majority. A few rounds of talks Were also held between the government and the LTTE, which not unexpectedly, failed to produce any results. In the interim the LTTE shot down military aircraft, hit some naval ships, and launched other well planned attacks against the government forces to make its dominant military position known. Those in India, who hawe had the experience of LTTE's skill in using negotiations to gain its military ends, had foreseen the outcotle even as the new Sri Lankan Government took the first steps to find a solution to the problem. That the LTTE Would fOTICƏ tha Government to take to military operations was anticipated. The nature of the Sri Lankan military response, however, came as a surprise.
4
The LTTE control countryside in north trolis Vīdent in the ErTIITelt forCe:S to Ti the tough combat act to approach the prin The Sri Lanka army support of combatai Sonnel carriers, arti cover of Censorships. With military operatio perfect military appr. cal problem, would i to greater problems Lankan army has g capabilities in manp morale. It is to the political and military has been brought at other hand, the LTT better than to hawe i the Jaffa FerimS forests, and in the e tending from the por to tha TaT il-MuSlin An arity than can mc пoving, is a menace nately, few artinies it for long. The Sri Weaponry Tay bef taking Jaffna and ot it Wil|| Eed to defes hundreds of military other deployment a force. The last few

r Repeat litself ?
i Lankan armed forces. At the time of writing (31 October), ive on Jaffna, the headquarters of the Tamil dominated apture a few more towns on the approach to Jaffna before nd the LTTE's inability to stand up to the frontal assault tanks, armoured personnel carriers and heavy artillery, affna falls. However, the Sri Lankan armed forces have causing very high collateral damage, Civilian areas have : Indian Army's Sri Lankan operations were mild compared isplaced, and the fleeing Tamil civilians are without food, aports, has become a ghost town. All this is unlikely to Sri Lanka's Tamil population. Moreover, it should not be anka operations in the late 1980s had managed to take he jungles and mingled with the local Tamil population. to keep the peace. What had followed was a phase of
n is will history repeat itself?
stile towns and the Til Sri Lanka. Its Cor
inability of the govove freely, as also in ions necessary even ciple town of Jaffna. is operating with the rcraft, armoured per|lery and under the fa || 1ēWS Collected ns. Unfortunately this Jach to a sociopolitin all probability lead in the future. The Sri reatly enhanced its Wer, Equipmentand Credit of Sri Lanka's
leadership that this Out SOSOO1. On the E would like nothing the army strung out ula, in the wast War Ini astern provinces excity of Trincomalee areas of Batticoloa. we and hit, and Keep to Tilitants. Unfortuhistory hawe done ankan amy with its re long, succeed in er towns. After that, the same towns by
posts, patrols, and ld become a static Wears saw the army
blockading the northern areas from mainland Sri Lanka. After taking these areas, it will have to maintain the population and itself by road and rail transport. It will soon become Vulnerable to all the risks a scattered army in a defensive role is faced with. The LTTE. W|thêm CCITE Into its own and іпpose heavy allгitioп оп the army, leаding to the expected response of more operations and resultant civilian casualties. The Sri Lankan government will then face a long drawn occupation of the northe areas and the added burder of human rights and international opprobriul.
During its peacekeeping efforts in the area, India had to use upwards of four amydivisions and para military forces. Sri Lanka will perhaps need more, and over many more years. Its costs Would be heavier in military terms, and incalculable in political terms. The LTTE would target not only the army in the Northern areas, but also the CiWilliaris II Tainland Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan military option would also exacerbate the Tamil refugees problem in the southern Indian states. This gloomyscenario may change dramatically, if the LTTE supremo is removed from the scene by a chance combat action, or, through an internal coup. Unfortunately democracies do not normally hawe such luck.
ASAPIRA (WIDIA MAfow. I'r fy B.A8%grŵp)

Page 7
Sri Lanka's distant refugees
he Clinton administration the
NATO allies and the United Nations hawe made strenuo US efforts to prowide humanitarian assistance to the Wictims of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and to foster a negotiated Peace aff10ng the Warring parties. These efforts were justified not only on ethical grounds, but also because of the demonstration effect that can be expected from successful peacemaking or protracted war in the Balkans.
But even if international exertions for peace in the Balkans succeed, the precedent will be wasted unless the peacemakers demonstrate that their work is not dictated by a double standard.
On the idyllic island of Sri Lanka today,
a reported half-milli fleeing troops of the homeless and expo falling sick and dyi Sri Lankaп gove! Chqdrika KUrmarat it be the entity to C humanitarian aid, governmental Orga ted relief supplies
Sionist Tamil IOWE Liberation Tigers of
Sincetost of the government forces thern city of Jaffn: controlled by the channeled through not help those in intentions of the go
JAFFWA SETEACK
Michael Drudge (WC4)
Jaffna only a temporary setback.
SEItt til BBC.
trLuth.
Serious or Temporary
The Sri Ları kaIT gover "Trzerzt is Uaging ar propagarida z Ivar foi conpler rent its 77 zilitary offensive against Turril separatist guerri llas. CorresCCCCTLT LLCGGL LLTCTTC CCCCCLL0 CHCCHT CLrTCCTGr LLLLLL LCTGLGL LCLL LCCLCCCCCCCT LCCGT Ta aLLL LaLLLLLTu LLLCCLLS
7 erit: Media i obserwers say Sri Lankan government talevision has begun resorting to disinformation in its reporting on the War against Tamil Tiger guerrillas.
A government television news broadcast Monday quoted Tamil Tiger commander Welupillai Prabhakaran saying the military takeover of the northern Jaffna peninaLLLa LLLLLLaL 0 L aaLLLLLLLaL aaLLLLLLLaLLLL LL LLL LLLLL LLHtLLLCCLLLS
| tr Luth, ConTTā nīder Prabhakaram called the loss of
The government newscast said commander Prabha
karan's reference to peace negotiations was a sign of
Tamil Tiger Weakness. In reality, he simply rejected any negotiations as long as the army occupies Jaffna.
LLLLaLaLLLLLLLaaLLLLLLLaLLLLLLLLLLLLaLLLLLLLatLL been interviewed by the Tail language Service of the British Broadcasting Corporation. Actually, he had given a speech on rebel radio and a copy of the text had been
Observers say the televisior newscast was but the latest instance of government media officials hedging the

S
оп Таппll refugees are a central government, 53 d to Thor 1500 | 1 TairiS, ng from disease. The TTIEnt of President unga has insisted that Stribut iteratical complaiпіпg that поп lisations hawe permitto benefit 18 Soces3Tlgt KIWIT ES the
Tari|| EE-glar.
refugees who fled the closing in on the nori are now in territory Tigers, relief supplies the government could
need whatever the W TITEL,
BeCa USethe War Zolle has been Closed to reporters and Cameras, the human Calamity wisited upon the Tamils has become a tree falling unheard in the forest. Yet their suffering in as grievous as that of refugees in the former Yugoslavia.
For the sake of a single human stardard, the United States and other gowelets should insist that humanitaria aid to refugees be delivered underinternational supervision. There is also a need for outside parties Willing to help broker a ceasefire and a negotiated peace between the Tamil minority and the Sri Lankan government. As in Bosnia, LLaLLLLL a LLLLLaaaL LLLLL LLLLLa LLLLLL LL the Tadless of their leaders.
(Bostowт Солg)
The military press office on Saturday iSSLJĒ då State
ment that the Tamil Tigers had used gas on troops, irriplying it was a chemical Weapons attack. Only later did military sources admit the gas in question had been tear gas.
The government continues to ban reporters from the northern War zone. The State information Department hads Out video and Still photographs produced by the Sri Lankan army. Information is provided by fax.
The government is also forbidding reporters to visit camps where hundreds of thousands of civilians have fled to escape the fighting.
Sri Lankan media are subject to military censorship. The local cable operator even blacks out stories about Sri Lanka that appear on foreign television news chammēls.
Lucien Rajakarunanayake is a prominent Sri Lankan journalist and member of the free media movement. He thinks the government faces acredibility gap:
"I think there is a major credibility gap as a result of censorship about the problem of refugees or displa: ced perSons as the government officials Would like: to call them. One does not know how they are being
fed, one does not know how they are being sheltered,
so as a result of censorship, that essential truth. doesn't come to the people and that is very much part of war".

Page 8
The in Cian MeCliat
Humayun Kabir
... P. Venkateswaran, India's new
Foreign Secretary, endeavoured in early 1986 to redefine the Delhi. Accord in favour of the Tamils. However, soon the mediatory role of India Underwent a change as the Indian side started negotiating With the Sri Lankan government virtually on behalf of the Tamil minority of the island. Also, this role was upgraded with the involvement of India's politicians in the peace process. P. Chidambara Ti, India's Minister of Stätig for Personnel, and Natwar Singh, the MiniSter of State for External Affairs, Wera Sert to Colomb)ğ three tiTES im 1986 İrı an effort to persuade the Sri Lankan government to meet some of the Tamil de lands by Towing beyond the Delhi Accord. But the sticking point was the LT TEdE-Tard for the Creation of a Tari|| ethno-region by merging the Eastern province With the Northern. During the Second SAARC summitat the lidian city of Bangalore in November 1986 there Were efforts to break the deadlock. These efforts were continued by the two Indian Ministers during the last of their three Visits to Colombo on 17-19 December 1986. They proposed a formula which envisaged carving a Tamillinguistic entity out of the existing Eastern province, enhancing the Tamils' political strength. This was to be done by exciSing the Sinhala-dominated Amparai electorate from the Eastern province. According to this proposal, which came to be known as the 19 December proposal, the demographic pattern of the east Would change the percentage representation of Tails 42, Muslims 33 and Sinhalese 25 to Tamils 48, Muslims 37 and Sinhalese 14.' President JayeWardene agreed to this proposal. But in the face of reservations of Sorine of his Colleagues in the Cabinet and the ruling UNP as well as stiff opposition from the SLFP and the Buddhist clergy he was forced to renege on it.
6
What Was rela process of Inediat always put pressur goverillent to ground to a CCOmn Talds While lewer the TaTi Side.: T Effects on the Sirl! was the impressior an impartial medi; appeared to be faw TaTils, and the SE India never attempt to line of the Tar position, the latter its Taxinalist del
While playing the India also resorted that Were brought government of Sri tle for II of COWerti bilisation through exerting pressure iteratica||E2W2. || arms, training and TaTil Tebes Who W nist War against the Prime MiliSter Rai ECCUSE IT di i 1 Sri Lanka's interlal ting his country fro for its ethnic unrest Wardene COITiplaine ding arms to the T protest note to lnd Sri Larkaayergd: known that such stems from a move stical, training ando lities, propagardist Sanctuary in the ter Tall Nadu'' A authorities had alw, tCE of Such reb: training,' it had be dge then as Well as did keep these as a to exercise controlo
(Tք եք C

ion MoVes
rkable in the whole ion Was that India e. On the Sri Lankan progressively give modating Tamil dedoing the same on is had at least two Tala Timild. The first 1 that India Was Ot ator as its position ouring the Sri Lanka Cold Was that since led to know the botil, particularly LTTE, never budged from ård for Eel-T.
role of a mediator, to pressure tactics to bear upon the Länka. To This took terwention or "destasurrogates', and of On Sri Lanka at the India gawe sanctuary, financial SUCCOur to aged their secessio2 State of Sri Lärka. asirghe Premadasa 984 of interfering in | affairs and pore Wenm finding a solution .' President Jaye2d about India prowamil rebels. In a a, to government of "... It is equally Wellterrorist challenge Tent which haslog|- perationalbase facilIcchanists and a ritory of the state of Ithough the Indian ays denied the exisel canTipos and arms ecolor Knowleit is now' that India policy option in order WETTS.
de
Notes
136,
13.
138.
19.
O.
141.
14.
143,
(Cr(4) recognition of the right to full Lillgeirkshin Hrid LithGr fundamerikal derfigcratic rights of all Tamils, who look upon the Island as their country. For the texts of ti stāmgts 12 arīd 13July 1985, se Mainstrgam, New Delhi, Wol, 23, No. 49, 3 AL|gust 1985. p. 26.
The Hindu, Madras, 20 December 1986.
L0L0LLLLLLaL LaLaLLLLLLLL LLLLLLLLSLLLLLL hlas, OWOf a COffsiderable period of timg, CarriCdCrna SL-Stalin EdCHT paign against Sri Lanka through surrogata for C2S or agents provocateurs, Pratanding to act as an Orest broker she has misused her mediatory role to the disadvantage of the legitimate gewernimi Erit of the islärd ärld Worked towards her own aggressive purposes in the region". Island, Colombia, 22 June 1ցEմ,
"India Lutters intrLuth:5 about Sri Lanka, ancourages the guerrillas and interfers in the interial affairs of Sri Lanka," he said, International Horald Tribune, 17 December 1934. In 1987 ha said, "gwgryong hiasc&img to recognise who the curring parents of Tamil militants are, who sheltered and who LLLCL LLLLLL LLLLLLLL LLLLLaLLLL LS Sgreats". Bangladesh Cbserver, Dhaka, TIL DET TE
In an interview given to India Today hisaid: "Help is coming from India, Their weapons are coming from India. Wehave found their Weapons with Indian markings." India Today, NEW Dalhi, 15 Decer Tiber 1985, p.38, In a stater Tert Tiada to ABC's South Asia LrTEspondänCB in April 1985 FrésidErll Jaye Wardere Said that if Indiastopped helping tha reballs basgidini South India, thilare LLLLLaL LHaH LLLLLL LLLLHHLLLLGLL LLLLLL ka. Daily News, Colombo, 16 April 1986.
For the text of the Nota saa, Suriday Observer, Colombo, 2 March 1986.
See for exampla tha dignial by A. A. Rahim, dia'5 Minister of State for Ext:Efflal Affair5. Ha 5tat Edirll ParliaITETE: "...WE HE WE COveyed to the Sri Lankan GowerTiment that therë are no CichlBS af arms för trairing Camps Com Indiari territory...". Lok Sabha Debates, Seventh Series, Wol. XLVI, No. 29, 3 April 1994, Col. 404.
A.B. Vajpayee, a prominent Indian opposition leader said in 1991 that "LTTE, which is suspectigd to bg bghind the brutal ac Rajiv Gandhi's assassination), was arried and encouraged by the Congress (I) gowernment". Indian Express, O3 June 1991.

Page 9
India and the Ethnic Cr
Bipattaran Ghosh
thno-political problems often get
aggravated. When externalised. Extraregional linkages of ethnic groups Take the problem more complicated by bringing tħa OutSidità allar TerritSiri the wortdx fwat could otherwise be regarded as an internal affair of a state. Though interstate ethnopolitical tensions are not difficult to come by elsewhere, "South Asia which is a intricate kaleidoscope of ethno-political groups creating one of the most complex LOLLLLL LL LaLL aLLHHLu LaLaLLLLLGL La World', offers a typical example of a region afflicted with Such crises. In the case of Sri Lanka the crisis was generated out of the TiTi di SCOItet ad til 5 rg,Sultat secessionist movement. By the irony of circutstances, India Was Cast in the role Ofa Ediato ille COflict bgtWEgitle Tamils and the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka. The object of the present paper is to analyse this role of India taking into consideration different aspects of the issue, i.e., why and how India got entangled with the problem and how she responded to this mediating responsibility and With What
Ileasure of SUCCESS.
Sri Lanka (un til 1972 known as Ceylon) has been a Tlultiracial, multi-religious and multi-lingual "plural society'. The two major corrurities - the Sinhalese and the Tamils - inspite of a long history of Coexistence failed in developing any Cultural fusion. This has seriously impeded the nation building process. During British rule the Tamils enjoyed preponderance, partcularly in the service sector, education, professions and the econority. This preponderance was disproportionale to their numerical strength, thanks to the cunning British policy of "divide and rule'. The frustration of the majority. Sinhalese community found expression after indepenLLLLLaL LLL LaL LLLLLLL LL La LLL a LaL rightful place". By making use of their numerical superiority they aimed at establishing their dominance in economic and political matters. As has been pointed out by A. Haroon Akrarl-Lodhi. "The der Tocratic instrument of majority rule was thus translating a cultural plurality into the hegemony of one group". Attempts were made to portray Sri Lankan nationalism
LOLOLTS SKSYLELH S S K S LKLKLKLELKS KL S LL LL MlEELKL S 0 sOelOCOLOLOO 77 Liversity of 3 Irika, West Barga (Ga.
as Coterilirious With Sa Buddhist Comrflui and progressive elei se community ha dul fanatics resulting in the significant mino and reinforcing th psyche.
THE SirihlĒSĒ BLIJ попу was revealed pendence in passin dis EnfränchiséTErll Which Virtually rend of the Indian Tamil: plantation Tamils W. been brought by th century from South Work On t3 CoffE är state less and denie It was followed by di the State language E Status On BuddliSIT for greater regional: tion of power failed response from the On the contrary me alter the de Tliograph Other Ed Ee StE by Taking arrange Tleilofri-TarrilSi had traditionally be lätUral Häbilagfllg sed admission polis institutions, particu courses, Was repla Weightage in favour der als and a quiCola detrict of Leir The Tamils, who u chunk of the gove Wergellowed front wantage. The cur til E5E3 and thET (di5 Was the generation deprivation in them began to feel thatthi being deliberately i Concern for their treated as parochial Siriale5 Was la Tamils dermandel discriminatory mea. OWellents tir mëans. The resp"); community to all the rejection of what th

isis in Sri Lanka
the majority. Sinhaleity. Even the secular Tets of the Sinhaletimately to yield to the the Targinalisation of rity Tamil cor TirTurnity alienation of its
ddhist drive for hegein the Wake Of Indeg the citizenship and WS of 1948-49 ered a large number (also known as the those ancestors had
Britis in 19t India as abourers to ld the tea plantations) d them voting rights. eclaring Sinhalese as and Conferring Special 1, The Tari|| cdējādi Lutonomy and de Woluto a WCoke fa Wourable Sinhalese ruling elite. SLrES WĒfE Läker" | LO lic Composition of the In parts of the island Tents for the settleIn thesë regions which er regarded as the Tails. Tellerit-bay in the educational larly in professional iced by a system of of the Sinhalese stusyster T1 Tuch to the ET E55 of the TäTT||5. ised to occupy large Friment ermployment, their position of adTulative result of all criminatory measures of a strong sense of ind of the Tamils. They eir just demands were gnored and that their Dwn community was While to sat of the lad as patriotic, The the removal of the Liris and Car TiCd On |Lugh constitutional ise of the Sinhalese se was Corne of outright ETIIS COTSidered
their just demands. It progressively lardeled the attitude of the Tails. As the moderate leaders failed to realise the just demands of the Tamil community, the radicalTamil elements ultimately declared that their aspirations could be achieved only in a separate sovereign independent homeland in the island and they waged an armed struggle for its achievement. The too late too little concessions granted by the Government of Sri Lanka failed to bring back the discontented Tamil radical leadership to the main-stream. Thus, the Sri Lankan political system was thrown in a legitimacy crisis and the country was plunged into protracted civil War.
The ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka offers a classic case where the ideology of "nationhood' contrived by the dominant groups and the ideology of "independence' held by the lesser groups eventually seek extra-constitutional and extra-territorial remedies. The Government of SriLanka, largely dominated by the Sinhalese, the champions of Sri Lankan nationalism, are LISEccläWE TECOLITSECExträ-COlstitutio)- nal measures to lackle the crisis generated by Tamil discontent, while the Tamils often looked at India for support in their struggle for a separate homeland. However, India had all along considered the ethnic issue essentially an interial problem of Sri Lanka. Of course, she had got to be involved in the matters of the plantation Tamils of Sri Lanka and she concluded three pacts (Nehru-Kotelawala Pact of 1954, Shastri-Sirimavo Pact of 1964 and Indira-Sirimavo Agreement of 1974). But these pacts did not involve the ethnic Tarrils of Sri Lanka nor Were they related to a conflict situation. Even though the ethnic riots involving the Sinhalese and the Sri Lanka Tamils had taken place at regular intervals since 1965 India did not go beyond issuinga Customary stater Terit expressing its concern. During the Janatarule Prime Minister Morarji Desai, under the pressure of domestic public opinion, had set Mr. S.A. Chidarbara to Sri Lanka to study the situation after a riot broke out there in 1977. However, it was reported by the emissary that the riot was merely an internal disturbance of Sri LLLLLL LLLL LL LLL LLLLLLaL GL LLLLSLLLLLLD tenor. It helped relaxing the tension between the two countries. Anyway, it was

Page 10
the wake of the July 1983 riot when the Sinhalese Wrath fell upon both the ethnic and plantation Tamils and the crisis Was internationalized that India became directly involved in the controversy. It was partly the failure of Sri Lanka to solve the ethnic problem within national polity that finally brought India into the picture.
The riot that followed the killing of thirteen Sinhalese soldiers by the Tamil extremists in 1983 exposed the helplessПess of the defenceless Tamil civilians and the inability (and perhaps lack of sincere efforts as well) of the government to protect the life and property of the Tamils. Behind this anti-Tani program the hand of the government itself was not very much concealed. Pressures were mounted on the Government of India not to retain indifferent to the plight of the Tamils in Sri Lanka and the leasures recommended ranged from reminding the Government of Sri Lanka of its obligation to protect the life and property of the minority Communitytoa Cyprus-like solution' of the problem of Bangladesh-type intervention by India."
India asserted that she had a stake in the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka, that it was no longer absolutely an internal probles I of the island country, and that it was a lätter of COCET för both Iridia and Sri Lanka. Smit. Indira Gandhistold President Jayawardene in 1983 that "India could not be regarded as just another country'." In India's perception she has legitimate seasons to be concerned about what happens in Sri Lanka as "history records the closest ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural links"* between the two countries. Besides, an inevitable fall-out of the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka is the influx of a large number of Tamil refugees in India thereby Creating socio-political problems and imposing a heavy burden on her already overburdened economy.
Further, the geo-political realities of the South-Asian region envisaged a promiment role for India particularly after the dismemberment of Pakistan in the early sewenties. Her acknowledged pivotal role' made the regional security, in her perception, an Indian concern and she expected that the neighbouring countries should adjust their security concerns to the larger context of the security of the Indian subcontinent of which India Was practically the sole custodian.'This view, Which Carlt to be known as India's Monroe Doctrine, thus emphasized the con
B
cept of strategic unit CDISidered SriLank of India's defence perception was that is friendly or neutral Worry about but if th the islandfalling unt a power hostile to toleratē SUcha situa territorial integrity"."
Slē irnitiativēS t: ment of Sri Lanka signals to the policy Block about the inte Thus, in Iodification tild Sri Lankan GOVE to power following 1977, lifted the ban vessels calling at Trir an agreement to pro tion facilities to the U. there 7. India was co malee should not be of her adversaries. A of the big powers in the Indian Oceans action of the Gower a serious threat to rest. Again, in 1981 Sri Lanka decided to tarkSat Trini COrlalge tiLJITI. It af OuSed Sus American Warships v such facilities and getting increasingly Strategic initiatives in Moreover, when Sri existing broadcasting the Voice of Art Crica 1983, India appreher ties might be used for mitting strategic info COTTUniCation.S. Ot WETTITEt of Sri La Indian feelings inclug the services of the M gence Agency), hirir ries from the British C tion Keeny Meany S from Pakistan to train ce and purchasing m Pakistan, South Afric Korea in additio to W in the inte Tational a sing its resentment India declared, "We it and take a serious She dropped a hint Larka Wouldberiski if her arms shopping t0 deal With the Tam She did not Want th

of South Asia. Which tobeапогganicрагі alculations. India's as longas Sri Lanka India has nothing to rebe any danger of Er the dosnisation of India, India cannot ion endangering hear
ken by the Governalso Sent adverse Takers in the South tion of that country. of an earlier decision Imment, which came he election held in on the foreign naval comalee and signed ide rest and recreaSmilitary personnel Cerned that Trincoin the hands of any Ware of the interests having a foothold in he considered this ment of Sri Lanka as er Vitaliational intethe Government of lease Out oil storage to a Western COISOrpicions of India that would gain access to hat Sri Lanka Wäs fleshed in the US the Indian Ocean." lanka expanded the facilities enjoyed by by an agreement of dediathlese faciliacquiring and transTnation and military er maves of the GGka which had hurt ed the requisition of assad (Israeli Intellig out the mercenalommando organizaervices, taking help the special task-forlitary hardware from a China and South hat could be bought rms market. Expresthe GowerTiment of otally disapprove of iew of the matter".' lo the Effect that Sri a conflict with India pree was purported
insurgents. In fact, it any of her small
neighbours should buildup large arsenals or establish military relationships with other powers. Reacting to Sri Lanka's frantic effort to enrich Her arSenal India cautioned other states that "granting of Tilitary assistance Would be regarded by Delhi as an action unfriendly towards India".2
India's policy towards Sri Lanka offers an example of how domestic political cornpulsions influence the formulation and conduct of foreign policy, the phenomenon which had been identified as "linkage politics by James Rosenau. The Tamils of South India and those of Sri Lanka hawe close affinity among themselves. The eTotional attachment of the Tamils in India With their Sri Lankan brethren remains a reality which can hardly be ignored. It has added an internal compulsion for the Government of India to get involved in What is technically an internal problem of Sri Lanka, thus giving it an external dimension. Infact, different regional parties of Tails Nadu wied. With each other for championing the cause of the Sri Lankan Tartnils and "for acceptance in their own state as patrons of the TarTil cause in Sri Lanka". Naturally they would put pressure on the Governmen of India to come to the rescue of the Sri Lankan Tamils Whenever the latter Would Fall wigtim to the Sinhalese outrage. And, as has been aptly stated by Pervaiz liqbal Cheema, "with emotions running rather high in Tarnil Nadu ower alleged Sri Lanka's handling of ethnic crisis, it is not easy for any Indian decision maker to ignore the intensity of feelings in Tamil Nadu". "It became evident particularly after the holocaust of 1983. The Indian National Congress led by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had fared badly in the election of January 1983 in the Southern states of Andhra Prades and Karnataka.
One might perhaps mention another factor. After al relatiOS betWee1 COUntries, inspite of being based on objective perception of what is called national interest, have a subjective dimension where personal equations of elites possibly Come to play a role. This element can be more perceived than measured. It was sloticed til at Indo-Sri Lankan relations suffered a relative setback When Kotelawala and Nehru Were in the helm of affairs in their respective Countries. The intensity of their differences was attributed by some observers to their personal incompatibility With each other rather than to the Clash of interests between the two countries.

Page 11
The situation under Went a dramatic change when S.W.R.D. Bandarnaike, who had avery warm and friendly relationship with Nehru, came to power in 1956. Improved relations at the personal level betWear MfS. Siri Taw) Bandarnlaike and Mrs. Indira Gandhialso helped smoothen many rough edges of Indo-Sri Lankan relations. Similarly Mr. Morarji Desai and Mr. J.R. Jayawardene could build up a WärT personal rapport the reflection of Which was noticed in the improved bilaterā relatīS.
Anyway, India Willy nilly had to be entangled in the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. She had delicate task ahead of her. First, she had to ensure that the just demands of the Tamils were not ignored and that they could live in the island with dignity, equal rights and privileges with the Sinhalese community and that their cultural identity was not threatened. This was consistent with her traditional policy of supporting the cause of the oppressed піпогilies, democracy апd huпап righls. Secondly, India had to assure the Sinhalese community that she was not at all interested in the dismember IT ent of the country. Actually India had reasons not to be interested in the formation of a sovereign independent Tamil State in the island because further division of a Srilal country like Sri Lanka Would go against the spirit of times. There was also doubt about the viability of the Contemplated state for the Tamils, Geopolitically also it Was in India's interest to ensure that the unity, integrity and political independence of Sri Lanka was preserved and that she pursued a nomaligned foreign policy. Reiterating India's stand that she did not beliewe in separatis in Mr. Khurshid Alanin Khan, the Minister of State for External Affairs, stated in the Lok Sabha on 29th April 1985 that India has an abiding interestin Taintaining the Sowereignty, integrity and unity of Sri Lanka.'
Thirdly, the Government of India had a compulsionarising out of domestic politics to convince the Tails of India that it was not indifferent to the sufferings of the Tamils of Sri Lanka and that she was eager to see that they got their rightful place in the island Country, Finally, she had to satisfy herself that the strategic interests and her preeminlerce and pivotal position in the region were not threatened.
It is in the light of these objectives that India's role in solving the tick lish ethnic proble in of Sri Lanka has to be judged.
As it has already be did not directly en problem until 1983. the Governet of modation of legitim Within the frasilework ty and unity". She a political problema. ned pursuit of the Consultations and Could gäld to a COS her part also she and negotiated set and Sin Carė Tilerdial ferred to play ther catalyst
India's mediatory ally Well received by dered India's action ence in her internal accused of pursui Tediator and at the the ethnic trouble materials, shelter a the Tamil insurgent til GWEITET denied this allegatic Colorilbo. PartiCL ula | errent of Tail N Ramchandran ope|| tle TaTi | Seċessio the Union Gower Nelson's eye. India' ntial commodities f people of Jaffna pe Waka of Sri Lanka" dian flotilla With S. her territorial Sea W Lanka as a flagrant reignty and a nake power by the regio
HoWever, ultima acknowledge that stake and an inesc. tlat With10ulactive-C hope of Solving the be totally unrealis realise the imprac solution of the pro understanding that necessary to persi groupsto come to induGEd hef to WEls tor. Internatioralp) sed India's indispe ethnic COrflict al. adwissed Sri La fill India',' Perhaps t TTT-ert of Sri Lal exterial a SSİstanic compulsions also

en pointed out, India angle herself in the So she urged upon riLirika "fO"3CC0 T1te Tamil griewances of Sri Lanka's integriOntanded thätil Wäs ld that only a determipolitical process of Ituala CCOmmOdation ructive solution. On tempted a peaceful ement through quiet ory efforts. She preble of a broker and a
efforts were mot initiSri Larka.SB COSas an unjustinterferffair S. IT dia Wa SaSO ng a dual role of a same time for Tienting by providing money, ld training facilities to s or her sal, Though of India repeatedly m, it failed to Carl Wir CÉ fly the provincial gowladu led by Mr. M.G. nly sympathized with i SLS of Sri Lafı ka and let of India turned a sair dropping of esseDr the besieged Tamil insula ir 1986 li the S refusal to allow the Jch iter ThS to erhter i1to as Condemned by Sri Violation of her SOWedexhibition of Tuscle lal superpower.
tely Sri Lanka had to
India had a serious apable role to play and tooperation of India the
ethnic probler TI WOuld tic. Colombo had to ticability of a military Ellern and her belated Indian rediation was Jade the radical TarTil the table of negotiation Ortle India as a mediaublic opinion also stressability for solving the the Western powers a 'to work through c failure of the Goveka ta ellist Substantial B and HEr OWI internal lastered the Wolte face
in her policy towards India. It resulted in the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka AgreeTent to Establish Peace and Normalcy in Sri Lākābetwer Prsidayawardme and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in July 1987
The Accord brought about a fundamental change in the role of India in the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka from a mediator or catalyst to an active participant or a third party to the conflict. This kind of mediatory role was being played by India since 1983. The sending of Foreign Minister P.W. Narasir Tha Rao and tha Chairman of the Policy planning Committee of the Ministry of External Affairs, Mr. G. Parthasarathi, by Mrs. Indira Gandhi in 1983 to Sri Lanka, arranging a dialogue between the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) leader A. Amrithalingam and Hector Jaya Wardene, the entnissary and the brother of President J.R. Jayawardene, in 1983, playing a crucial role in organizing a meeting between the emissary of the Government of Sri Lanka and different Tamil radical groups in ThirTipu in 1985, the sending of the Minister of State for Externa läffairs Mr. K. NatWar Singh, Mimister of State for Home Mr. P. Childa Tibaram and the Foreign Secretary Mr. Romesh Bhandari by Mr. Rajiv Gandhi to Colombo for talks with the Governet of Sri Lanka in 1986 are just a few of many such attempts by India to promote a negotiated settlement of this vexed problem.
The new role in which India was cast interms of the Accord of 1987Wasanowal one in modern history in the sense that the government of a sovereign independent country invited an outside power to deal with the insurgency of a section of her own population. However, Br interwention-orll-imwitation, instead of Solwing the problem, made it more complicatad. It failed to win the approval of both the Sinhalese and the Tamils,
There was nothing to be surprised that change of government in Sri Lanka after tle electio in late 1988 Tiade the Eresence of the IPKF Tore difficult. The new President PremadaSa daglarad that "the doTestiC CÓflict With tha TaT || Citizials could be resolved...Without any Outside interference'. And if one relates the killing of Rajiv Gandhi with India's involvement in the Sri Larıkan imbroglio it would appear that the price she had to pay has
og CITOUS.
India ultimately had to withdraw her

Page 12
forces from Sri Lanka even before the implementation of all the provisions of the Accord (the withdrawal was completed on March 24, 1990), though a face saving announcement was made that the objectwes of sending the IPKF had been largely fulfilled. After her withdrawal things are back to a Square one. It is now a free-for-all situation, the LTTE continuing its protracted arried struggle for a separate homeand and the Goverrent of Sri Lanka equally determined to thwart such attempt and maintain the unity and integrity of the country.
Perhaps it would not be of place to Tiention here that the tragic assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 allegedly by the LTTE activists has caused considerable erosion of the support base of the Sri Lankan Tamil secessionist in South India. It has somewhat reduced the compulsion of NEW Delhi to be involved in the affairs of her southern neighbour. Prime Minister P.W. Narasimha Rao also assured the new government of Sri Lanka led by Ms. Chandrika Kumarlunga that India considers the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka as her domestic problem and that Indian good offices were available, if required."
Anyway, a close look at the balancesheet of India's in Wolvement in the ethnic Crisis of Sri Lanka Would reveal that India's participatory role was less successful than her mediatory role.
MIDLe 5 arld References
S KLLatLMLM LCCMMuS TeCHG S STLT CCCOOLOueS KLL0H LLLLLLLYYLLLLLL L aLLLLL LLLLLL aLeCCCLLLLSSS0SLS Publishing Corporation, Delhi, 1988, p.2.
2. The term plural society' to describa Sri Lanka was first used perhaps by J.S. Furnival in his 'Colonial Polic Farid Fructica in 1948. SSB Fairl Kearna, "Ethnic Conflict and the Tamil Separatist Movement ir in Sri Lanka, Asiaw SFAX. Wol. XX W., No. 9, September, 1935,
According to the Cersus of Population (1981), the CEal populatit of Sri Lanka Wa5 Eastmenlaced to bila 14.55 million, Thea percantage cd Bach ethnic community was as follow:
Sirhals 구.미. Sri Larika Tamthills 12. Sri Lika MICOS 7.1. Indian Tirts 5.6% Malayasi Ա: Burghes 3. Others 2. SOLITIKA
Religion-wise distribution of the population is as ItaliaWs.
LLLLLL LLL LLLLLLSS LLL LT LLLLLL LL LLLLLLLLS LLLLLL SLLLS LLLLLSSLL LLLL LLLL LLLLLLa LLLS LLLLuu 100% of the Moors and Malayas are Muslims. Tha Burghers and thin residue of the Sinhalese and Tamils have been predominarily Christians. Christianity
TI
12.
3.
1.
15.
appears to be tha Crill rcial boundărie5.
So farasthalinguisti is spoken by a segmer Moors speak Sinhales HľBal of thair, habitBtion Tarmilard Bawarag: Siril
See Unila Flanis, in South Asia, Sage P. 마. 43.
Lodhi assarts that it is conflicteteenth Larkii is a clash of fun 5T15 rOiO lO d in Eng II opposed political Cir nastionEalismo Wägi proTmc rests of the compating sions became 'social divisions.
Fordulissee A. Hun Chauvinisir Sri Lank Asia, Wol, 17, Flo. Et
A ECCOLTt Of thi di: may be found in Umi til Politics i Sri L. Malco TYapp (guds.), F Curzon Press, London,
C.F. Perull F. T
iTi Sri Lanka Causas Košir kirasto Po January-March 1939, p.
. WF, Waik, "Ethnike Cris
porista' in1 Sallish KLJI Tar FYR2ġwi Felicy, VSEJAS Dalhi, 1935, p. 81.
FCT ni içit Çal i
r Fre 31-32; S. L. Tarribliath, : GYN PYE Ečs 777F'ii:Wợ ÇAY Co. Ltd., London, 1986,
ATial Jaya WardanE, "Fir MisLise Cofan1 Arialcgy' ir 4537 5FFFFF;f&gie siste: Sage Publications, New
Seg: W.R., Krishima lygir," Brid Contradictor Strati Political Weekly, Wol, 9 and 16, 1988, pp. 141
See WP. Waldik ni Ep
SCHC Sri RaiTi Sharia, Kr. Survey, 1973, Sterling P p, E0, B. Sengupta (ed.) |Depakұмтасул! - деп SaыW Publishers, New Delhi, "ITO-SILEIlka Falali Crisis. The Tari Nad [ad), гт 5. p. 141
Cucted in A.Siwar:Ejah,
Gurbachan Singh, The and Iridian Alterpts at (ad], 'garДRаоѓот Wтї Sage Publications, New
India's special role in POWE" WäG TECD hizkid Sengupta, 7. 7, p. 47.
Shiller U Kċedika ra 'Ti of July 1987: Пегозре: &, pp. 150-G1. Also si
 

Egli rich Cl5rgs
Eprotila s Corcornad English ifadā II this communitias. Tie el or Tamildepending On the 1. The average Tamil speaks
alis, Simhäese.
EGYixiyand Wizar Euskiörg blications, New Delhi, gag,
ппізleadпg loагgша іhalhв Sinhalt:Esg. End Tariis of Sri darTheintially different natiomaog slarding amtagoniigring of TILJinitias. Ha is of opinicim that EdTO fluirthir fhig caigsingclass forces and class di WiChristidis Corting
Ciri Akra TT-LCid hi, "CH 535 and а", "АдилүүдлууСалмайтухаануу 3F, pp. ISO-58.
i'r ffinialism against the Tair mils a Philidris, "Ethnic Groups Eirika' in David Taylor and 38863 fir-riservi7, SALW, Issa, է 197ն, բբ, քո I-Ա5,
hara Wāri, "Ethic Willigtig
irid CIS-EqLjigriet Big TIT if Sariri, Wol. 5), No. 1, L莒、
isir n Sri Lirika: lriiia's Fis"{edo}, Poesiar Basilik daro formigos Sage Publications, New
fi la 55B Mihail Rain, :
sir Perguin, gag, pp.
E
"LEFT ILCYFEIFFT, II.B, ITALI Iris artid
PP. 22 T-33.
lard WS.Sri Larka Usaid S.J. Edikara (ed.), 5 Si l'oast ForspoÉlois, "Dalhi, 1Eցմ, բ, Iքց,
TarTil Tragdy in Sri Lankā !gy by India’, Economic End XIII, Nos. 28 and 29, July 구 1.
.
விசிட்ஜ்:P:-Aரது Elishers, New Delhi, 1977, F#୍ୟ୍ଯ code folor:#;fory Asia, Wol, 2, South Asia 9BE, p, 193; A. Siwarajah, 1: Hindi Sri Länkäs Ethnic
Fäcker“ in S.L. Kuhüra
『f p. 143.
Isinic Froblem in Sri Lanka Medaillion" in Satish Kurriär & AFFEE&Y) Fiske fil-f-č, Delil, 1987, p. 172,
Luth Asia. Es the 'piwalal Jy hI LISA. SA BHFEIzini
lm-Sti Linka Agreement in S.J. Khara (ed.), r. ! Ferwalz liqbal Cha Gimla,
B.
|구.
1E.
1.
2.
호.
23.
2.
2.
구.
다.
BT
"Security in South Asia: An Approach in S.U. Kodikara (ed.), E757, CTILsars: 345à Folos, Sigg FLibitalicisms, New Delhi, IgG3, 미미.
F-5.
R4yi Kaul, A former CoTi Ti Ender of the Indian Näy Cuglied in GaminiB, KBarawella, "Peace and Securiby Parceptions of a grnali Stata: Sri LEnkiri Resposses to Superpower Naval Rivalry in the Indian Ocean" in S.L. Kodikara (ed.), n. 3, p.180,
However, the veracity of this statement was denied by the USA as "ligrant of imagination, Wii p. 15.
Urt Inis Phalidris, 17, 28p. 223
Statement of the Minister of State for External Affaires, Quated in W.P. Waidik, n, Ep, H7.
Bhalibani Sergupta, III, II, p. 47.
darič-43 N Roseriālu, 7 FeS2&iriwwe sway WFrஜ் CTTkekT TTTTeLCCO00S CLL LCLLS CLLJSLAr 0L0LOMSSS0SLS
7 FAS FEICAGLIGA EY EYES presare af Tygr 5:7 fråWor) LeLLO OT LsssL CLeG tCH LtCCHuH CLLLL LLLLLLLLu CLCCCGLs CLGL LL LLLLLLLCCO LeGLLOL LSLGGLHuHO tGGEEGLGL HLL sLOeECLTTS sg, Exugo Figyckysiolfghangjūrāyant figiorno arapsychokage:y disposa Rosea; Fist Wi Fia CCCCCHLLS LeL OLOCCCLLCC GGLGLLGGkLCCCGGLGTS Sawy. Say Asia'i 5 kakara, Erlaria cărți să visa 5:.f4sări F.W.5, Saga Publica tions, New Delhi, 1993, pp. 258-69. Algo sele S.L. Tārtibiis, F7, 7, pp. 92-02.
B. Segupta (ed.), Regng CoceanneggorffēYTf7&diff Asië, Woli, Sculli Asia Publishers, New Delhi, 1935, p. 45; also sea S.L. Tin Tibi, FT,
p. 111.
B. Segupta (ed.), n.2, p. II.
SD. Muni, Fargs of Fairfiwy" Wiwi&#FFES“, „Graikās Earl Criss, Saga Publicatiors. NEW Delhi, Igg3, pp. 35-35, 73-74.
Sri RarTn Shamāk, t. y., p. 60.
For a full version of the slateTart of the Ministër 5efi Gurbachain Sinha, i'r f3, p. 123.
B. Segupta (ed.), r:2.p.135,
Minister of State for External Affairs Mr. Ram Niwas Miridha's Stalemenit in the Lok Sabhain August TE, 1984, Cited in Satish Kurlar (вd], 'ї ї3 р. 245.
The urgency of arriving at a political solution of the ethnic problem was advocated by sorris Sinhalese scholars as well. Sea, for example, Newton Gurlasirgha,"Ethic Comictin Sri Larka: Percoptions and Solutions' in Alaviard Harris5 (ed.), చేరడాడy ay Davaging Cannies. San Asia, Macrian, Licendom 1989, pp. 25-55.
See Bertrain ESJ Bastianpillai, "Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia and Inter-state Ralations Especially in relation to Sri Lanka in SU. Kodikara, so 5 Pl.
.
Kumar Rupesinghe, The Indo-Sri Lanka Aழாக ment 1987, ard Conflict Resolution in Sri Lanka". South Asi Murra; 2.3 (1989), p. 285.
See Bhabarii Sengupta, , , p. 251-52.
Finni allai! Dihar, ŵpaña, Ffair Wiggraffigwrs àಡ್ Fಳ್ತ? Powy, Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1991, p. 10.
Howawar, atruce betwaan The Sri Lankar President Ms. Chandrika Kumarlunga and the LTTESurferno Velupillai Prabhakaran has resulted in a ceasefire between lato contending parties on January 8, 1935. FE WNégyfarw, January 9, Igg5.
Page 5F3r337777, SepterTiberg, Tigg:.

Page 13
Human Rights Accord
The Western agenda for the 21st century is g political and civic rights, as these hawe eWolwed rights (which would infringe the fundamental tene cultural rights and collective rights.
Jeremy Seabrook
Tlocracy", e Wern in the West, D) become the Tanagement of organised impotence, the art of recorciling people to an unchosen destiny. Underlying a commitment to plurality, diversity and tolerance there is to be no other le CoriosTic systern thar that which already exists — a dista rintreflection of the Old Testartment injunction that thou shalt FaWée O. Other GodboLit, Tg..
The capacity for manipulation even of the most sophisticated electorates in the world was seen in Italy in 1994, when Berluscori's Forza ala, Conjured forth, a phantom of the media, could corne from nowhere to for a government of renewal. In the United States less tham half the people vote because a majority perceives democracy and politics as mere disputes between members of the possessing Classes. Wher this Todel, the a CITIE? Of human self-governance, is exported to the rest of the World, SOThe ever Stranger Tuttii05 är blourdit) OCCLJr.
When democracy becomes devoted to the Taintenance of the existing structures of power, the first casualty is, naturally, freedor Til: for Without freedom to imagine, a LLLL LLL LLLLHLHHLaaLtmLHa LLLLLLL SJS HLLLS ding also alternative Ways of answering human need - then what exactly is the nature of the freedom of which democracy is supposed to be defender and guarEldr'?
It is clear that something called "freedom of choice' has been offered to the people of the West as a consolation prize for their lost liberties: they can choose anything they like as long as it exists within the global supermarket to which their privilege grants them access. To have traded a Version of affluence against freedom is a barga in om Which the people of the West have themselves yet to declare their VEC.
The global market has become the cosmos: and outside of its stifling embra
LCCT CLCLTOT L L K GGCCOmOHCC CLOLOuLS HuLHuHu TuGLGGTkTk to diff} Wildly id]y.
ce, nothing exists,
Exist. TiSiS, LITES: of development. E barons, with their Se who paradoxically e Of the market lostt Of a thľEat to this TT than indigenous
forest-dwellers, fish WOnnes Who KITOW tf be bought and Sold to live in peace Wit thlg ľESOLUCÉ-ENSÉ
TO SEt'frëdddin ti of our culture, and of choosing any oth World is a denial "diversity to which devotidn: LildSG ar8 ments, de Corations increasingly show appearaпce-manipl
It is the Samle Wi that ha Wa bae a: I Flo FHEt fje, "E tance, means the C. Without the resource 'de Centrali Sati01'lik of lower ties of : whose capacity for the vast centralisin national companies trations Of WBalthar
Indeed, the Word: the opposite of Wha COTÉS t) ir di Cale, tä:SUITES COf the ea pendence' describe de Cg of LUFTI är tjäi Tarket; 'efficiency's Tīēl-down of natu 'maintaining Our Wa Conservation of pri Was Swiftly absorb GarTlB to mean, not l of the fruits of the E keeping intact the system. "Communit of strarigers, "parti gaining popular acq Läbi.

ing to the West
ping to be human rights - but that only means within Western society. Excluded are economic its of assez-faire political economy), social rights,
or may be allowed to Ser Ce Of the Violen Ce wen the global drug Cretive private armies, xemplify the Workings rari Sparry, a FESS Iodel of development peoples, tribal and ing Communities and at not everything can and Who Know how in the Coslräirls Of hey have.
5 Ch.005e" at tha heart O deny the possibility er Way of Being in the if the "pluralism' and ta 'WW2.StaiSSELS itS evidenly mere orпаOn the surface of an y, image-Conscious, ulating Culture.
It all the new Words similated effortlessly TipOWérménl', for insOnceding of autonomy as to make it effective; ewise is the Setting up diligtratiwa COltrCl action is cancelled by tendencies of multiand growing concer1d po Werin the World.
soften mean precisely they say: 'Resource'
Il'OL. L'El Exila LJStible th, but Money; 'indeis the growing depenngs on money and the meansanaccelerating re into Commodities: y of life' stands for the Wilege; 'Sustainability id, апdiпthe process, IC52gurehusbanding Iarth in perpetuity, but i present inequitable y' is a neighbourhood cipation' is the art of uiescence to the inevi
Before We can even begin to discuss the realities of the West within the global system of domination, We have to am ourselves with a dictionary of Bullshit that Wilhelp Us un pick the Fidden Teamings, to iпterpret a language whose meапіпg has all the clarity of the Kabbala.
It is clear that the Western agenda for the 21st century is going to be Human Rights. Here is another partial and onesided story. For it means political and civic rights, as these hawe ewolwed within Western Society, and which gives the Westa moral right to castigate al departures from their own high standards, which are, Of CQUISe, UniverSal.
This version of human rights cannot concede economic rights because this would infringe the fundamental tenets of assaz-faire political (i.e. the objections are ideological) Social rights Cannot be acknoWledged, mor the right to be a fully participating member of Society, not even the right to life; so that the children of those millions of Women each year who give birth best ride a grave, perish before their political and civic rights can ever be called into question.
Cultural rights do not exist for indigenous people to Whose land the market economy low lays prior clair; Collective rights are of little Worth in a system that prizēS “the indiwidual' So highly, an indiwidual Who FTLJst act Out har or his lanely destiny for ever in the guise of customer, Consumer, client of punter in the jungle Of COTOCities in Which Wę must rów filake (OLur horne.
The first task, then, is to strip away the hypocrisy and confusicorn that r Imakes political argument so opaque and impenetrable, and drives the will to change into a tangle of contradiction and impotence.
Once this has been done, it is possible to Seg more clearly how the institutions of dominance, Set up and controlled by the G-7, the most powerful industrial nations, actually function.
- ?????Apr
11

Page 14
G77 and NAM joint propo meets stiff north resistanc
A proposal by the South for a once-and-forthe developing countries has met with opposit
Martin KFOr
he Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),
the Group of 77 and China hawe produced a joint resolution in the United Nations calling for a once-and-for-all asrangement to settle the long-standing debt problem faced by developing countries.
The NAM-G77 resolution, which was tabled in November at the General Assembly's Second Committee, is facing resistance by many Northern govern
ELS.
The joint resolution, submitted by Algeria (on behalf of G77 member states and China) and Indonesia (on behalf of NAM member states), contains the most COTprehensive proposals Collectively put forward by countries of the South to resolve their on-going external debt crisis.
It calls for a once-and-for-all approach to resolving the debt problem, including (for the first time) a reduction in multilateral debt, and the cancellation of all bilateral debats of African and least de weloped Countries.
Tils resolution, erlitäd "Enhanced international cooperation towards a durable solution to the external debt problem of developing countries' (document AC.2/49/L12 dated 7 November), has a 20-point set of proposals and comments.
The boldest and most important of these appears to be point 15, proposing that the General Assembly'calls upon the international cor TImunity, including the interratiormal firmar Cial iristitutions to expolore Ways of implementing additional and innovative measures to apply onceand-for-all arrangement, including Sub
LHHSOH SHLHHLHHL LL LLLCLELEEe LLL LLLLHO C LHHLOLS0SLCLGLJLHCHCHLS
1
stantial debt-reducti gories of debt of the including nultilateral to achieve Sustain and development wit debt crisis'.
This resolution bag in the preamble, thal tance of allewia ting til debt-service burden types of debt, inclu. taking into account OC03-and-for-all arr; farework of an e approach".
The resolution (i. comes the Write-off a significant part o det of t3 last dE then "urges those CC yet done so to follo possible, to cancela Africal Countries an Countrigs'.
Other resolutions ral Assembly:
a Recognises the problem of multil ping countries
lanced conces Tultilateral firas
Calls upon prival :Commercial barı WĖS t) täcklē3 || problem of least middle-i CCTE
• Calls CT1 d'OrlOf C rali firmarcial ir:
W TESUTES relief of low-inct

Sa for debt Settlement
Ce
all arrangement to settle the debt problem of
On from the North.
on policies to all cateleveloping countries, debt, to enable the IT ld economic growth houtfalling intoaneW
cks up an earlierpoint 'stressed the imporOITETOLIS digbot ad is connected with all ling multilateral debt, he urgent need for a angement within the Juitable and durable
1 point 7) also Welby certain donors of the bilateral official Veloped Countries. It trie:S that håWÉ "10t W Suit and WignBWBr literal debts. Of the d the east developed
| lat the GE
med to tackla tha lateral debt of develowhile enabling ensional flows through Icial institutions;
e creditors, especially ks, to expand initiatila Commercial debt developed, low- and leveloping countries;
ountries and multilate
LOslo i CCTSider for Substätiäl dĠEOL
rile countries
o Calls upon donor countries, multilaterali financial iStitutions arid Cor Tirriercial banks to consider appropriate measures for Substantial debt relief of Tidid|E-COTT Countrie 5.
The Tesolution also Calls On the UN Secretary General to designate a highlevel body or personalities to follow up on the move towards a "comprehensive approach' to the debt problemand to give a progress report to the General Assembly in the first quarter of 1995.
The resolution solows Lup on the Ministerial Meeting of Non-Aligned Countries on Debt and Development, held in Jakarta in August, which had approved of a NAM expert gгошp герогt гесопппепdiпg a once-and-for-all approach to debt settlement. The report had also emphasised the need for action on all types of debt, that is, commercial, official, bilateral, and multilateral.
In particular, it noted that whilst there had been debt reliëf action On COT"|Thercial and bilateral debt, there had so far been none On Tultilateral delut. Ilhad therefore urged that multilateral financial institutions aL0 LLLLLL a LLLLLL LLLL LL LLCLLLLLLL0 LLL debts owing to them.
The draft G77-NAM resolution, which was formally introduced at the Second Committee on 6 November, is now being Considered in inforTTal ConsultatioTS under the chairmanship of the Netherlands, which is the Committee's wicechair.
At the first reading of the draft resolution, the representative of Germany, on behalf of the European Union and supported by

Page 15
the United States and Japan, presented a series of aleridents. These a Tieldments focused especially on the onceand-for-all arrangement for settling the debt of developing Countries, the reduction of all types of debt (including multilateral debt) and the cancellation of debt of the poorest countries and other least developed countries, particularly in Africa.
The Northern Countries made it clear they were notable to accept such proposals and asked that they be deleted from the draft resolution. Their representatives said that it Was flot Clear What Was Teart by a 'once-and-for-all arrangement'.
Moreover, the red debt would Orly JD OP thiness of the multila
OIS vis-a-vist1 tion ofialtypes ofd not was debt cance
Representatives ( were notable to acc ANAM delegate told "As We see it, the Cr Tultilateral final Cia necessarily be jeop: sed reduction of m
S a Uber of TĒ: arranged to avoid S.
COAFAFFESAPOWDEWCE
Praona karan’S Re
do not want to spoil the party
line you hawe presented that LTTE received a drubbing in the recent military offeisiwa in Jaffnia (AG, NOW, 15). Since og of Life missior Statearts of the LÓG is to present the 'other view', allow The to the devil's advocate. Why is it that when the Army hits Jaffna with missiles and bombs, the suffering of commoners is cast aside ascollateraldamage" in the international press release, but when the LTTE retaliates in the East Or in Colorib, lhe attack is called a "terror campaign' and Prabhakaran is projected as a "bloodthirsty" Dracula? (wide, your co-authored report with Tony Clifton in Wewsweek, Nov. 13). Is it because the definition of terTOT IS differnt for those Who hold Tolinal power and those who challenge the stallus quo?
The party line that the "LTTE and its senior Commandersfied Jaffna city" may definitely give a morale boost to the battered and accident-prone image of the Army. It will also probably "strengthen President Kumaratunga's case" in the political stage. Butas the oldadage Says, "Don't Countyour chicken before the eggs
lated.
Like CW' '''t H. G. Ar purSue its QW1 Strati as you have stated using the War On hi Tot foglish to SāCI frota Cribat, the defence purdits tha FS th13 MMadiS(or 1 AV, bhakaran gawe his "field experience": treated, by borrowir book on the Org next strategy. The C teld Their SuCCGSS forces later lived to
Since you haven Ali ini yOLIT COmmer Prabhakaran also TOUS OCCaSiOT1S hi War in the box butterfly and stini explains the Comri Kolonna Wa. Oil dept soft underbelly Col fOCÉS.
Nowa Collent "as Iny's resources specific about thes of cash? I hardly

Liction of ultilateral ardise the CreditWorteral financial instituiarker, and the reducabot was not feāSible, lation acceptable.
of NAM and the G77 ept these arguments, Third WorldNetWork:
editworthiness of the
Istitutions Will it ardised by the prop-O- ultilateral debt stock, SurgS Carl irl fact be Jch a possibility".
The report of NAM's Advisory Group LL LLLLLLaL LLLL LL LLL LLLLLLa CLL C LLLLLLLL of measures that could be taken by the multilateral financial institutions, should they agree to consider reducing the debt stock of developing countries, particularly the poorest and the LDCs.
The debate is continuing at the Second Committee. The key issue to be resolved is the need for reduction of all types of debut, especially multilateral debt. NAM sources say they will try to find alternative and more acceptable Wording to Convey the same concept of the proposal for a "once-and-for-all arrangement.
– WWWWùW MኅጏWWWዬoሰዪዪዃW ̊
treat
my has been able to egy onits own terms", Prabhakaran also is S OWI terris. He Was rifice resources in a jugh the spin of the tLTTE fled Jaffna city elUE radEITärk. PraGadre afgW WEEk5 of and then tactically reng a page from Mao's Marc, to choose his Generals Who Celebraower Mao's retreating |ick their WOLUldS.
Yentioned Muhammad itary, I would add that has proved on numeSadleece to Ali's king ring: "Float like a g like a bee'. This lando-style attack on its, which exposed the the national Security
about the much-touted "... Can you be more 53 rd SI) LurCES liri terrTMS
find any real figures
Tentioned about the defense expenditure related to military offensives in the pages of LG. Does the Army generate its own resources? Someone (not the 67% of the Survey sample Who favora military solution, but the international donors) is paying for the army's resources and everyone knows that Sri Lanka is not blessed With gold mines and oil fields. If you put a moderate guess, such as one million dollars per day as operational expenses in Jaffna, then one can easily guess that the Army's resources are not unlimited. There lies Prabhakaran's strategy.
You may be correct in stating, "Just as it administered Jaffna successfully enough to believe that it had established a government, the LTTE felt it could take on an army frontally". Now flip this point to arrive at an answer to the question you hawe posed in the Cower, "When Jaffna falls what next? Just as they hawe takel the LTTE frontally, can the Army and the President feel comfortable that they can establish a government in Jaffna? This will be akin to the mental peace of a guy who pretends to sleep in the tigers den.
Sal SÍTIKA Fukuro City, Јарап.
13

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Page 17
Nations in Glass H
On an international yardstick, it is difficul the charge of racism against the US
EdWard Mortirmer
he predictable effect of last T riots in Los Angeles has been an Outbreak of Smug Comments on the US in the rest of the World. Early Coff the mark WES - President Frar cois Mitterrand of France, "It's very nice," he said in a radio interview on Friday, "to promote capital, profits and investment in business, but these riots show that the social needs of any Country must not be neglected... George Bush is a generous man, who embodies an extremely conservative political ideology, and American Society is conservative and economically capitalist. Here are some of the results of that".
Well, I suppose that was just too tempting an opportunity for a Socialist president with his back to the Wall to pass up. But Americans are not likely to be much impressed by homilies from that quarter. "We haven't just had a 14 per cent Wote for a neo-fascist party," Was One Comment heard from an American conservative analyst. "You should see the riots they'd have in Paris if 35 per cent of the population belonged to minorities"Wasanother, frona Francophile riddle-of-the-road lawyer.
Nor will Americans be unduly Worried by the Egyptian newspaper, Al-Ahram, which asked whether the Libyan Lockerbie suspects could expect a fair trial in the US, in the light of the Rodney King Verdict.
But Mr Roger Wilkins, the distinguished black historian Who helped shape tha Johnson administration's resporlise
America S
the World
of Violenc disparity b and poor
to the Watts riots in is happy to endor Japanese official C ngton Post: "There really have nofutur ly left over..... The Was almost to forg a thoughtful politi Norrlanı (Ortstei C prise Institute fore of itself that Aleri will be seized on by who are the targe CIST. "There are potshots at the US Carls Williot take
Two main charg the US on the events. The first i: of racist, reflecte of a white jury t policemen whom seen sawa gely be prostrate black T1a repeatedly shown
The second is of being a callous violent Society, in W

Houses
it to uphold
adly leads in the leWel e, and the etween rich
Los Angeles in 1965, Sg the remark of a uoted in the Washiare black people who e, who are completetrend of US Society et about the". Ald cal analyst like Mr the Alerical Entersees that the image ca has just projected Third World dictators its of Americal Critigoing to be lot of "he said, "and AmeI kindly to that".
as can be levelled at asis of last Week's s а very specific oпе in the unwillingness convict four White the entire nation had aating and kicking a n, in an amateur wideo
on television.
a more general one, socially divisive and Wic. Such an incident
can set a whole city on fire, causing 55 deaths and billion 15 of dollars W Orth of
damage.
Both charges are true, but if an international yardstick is used, the charge of racism is the harder of the two to sustain. Most black Americans clearly believe, no doubt. With reason, that they are consistently targeted for harassment and maltreatment by the police. But so do lost members of racial minorities in Western Europe, and no doubt in Japan as well. What is striking to a British visitor is how many of the police, including police chiefs in many of the big cities, ärgtemSelves black – asideed are many of the mayors.
Of course the fact that Mayor Tom Bradley is black did not prevent What happened in Los Angeles, but much of the blame has been laid at the door of its white police chief, Mr Daryl Gates, both for the general atmosphere prevailing in the Los Angeles police department, and for the specific failures which OCCLUTTEd läst Week.
Mr Gates had in fact been fired froT his job before the acquittals were announced (he is to be replaced by a black from Philadelphia with a liberal reputation), and appears to hawe been wirtually on strike. Perhaps he was as surprised as everyone else by the trial Verdict, but surely contingency plans should hawe
Jder flade.
Some of the anger might hawe been blunted if all the accused had been
15

Page 18
from the force as soon as the Werdict Was arounced -- EWE if their conduct was not criminal, it has been repeatedly and officially declared a gross violation of proper professional procedures; and prompt deployment of police in the right places might have deterred many of the rioters. Instead, Mr Gates Went off to a fund-raising event for a movement to oppose police reform.
Anyway, it was striking that the riots did not spread to many other cities, and particularly not to New York and Washington where it might have been expected. Both cities have black mayors who issued firm and clear statements deploring the Verdicts but warning againstany Wicoler CB.
None of this implies, of course, that racism is not widespread or even endemicin American society. Mypoint is that, Unfortunately, this is true of almost all industrialised societies with large ethnic minorities, and that the US since the 1960s has done more than most to Combat it. Urban poverty and squalor are not Unique to America either. The problems of homelessness, drug addiction and chronic unemployment are all too familiar in Europe's large cities.
Where America sadly does lead the industrialised World is in the lawg of violence, and in the enormous disparity between rich and poor. No doubt the absence of gun control and President Reagan's tax policies respectively go far to explain those two points.
"Most Americans," Writes Prof Mohamed Rabie in a recently published book", "claim and honestly believe that they are living today in the most civilised
", "Лg WgиvИОrid'Orderта Perspecffие ол їїg
Post-Cesc' Far Era YMỸ7 faga, S VĞ95).
16
Society ewer. Wher, United States prob: Orle Of the ITIOSt Viol
Societies in Oder
Part of the expla of the Crime and Vic the inner cities, Ort them, from which the dingmiddleclassbla TēTOW’editSelf. Mr telling case of the di office of a big city, outside the city ju years' service had telephone call to the and Crime Were mo:
What Carl be di social programmes ter health care, bett school Head Start: advantaged childre led by Mr. Jack Kerr urban development package of tax break res to encourage cities and give ince poor to take jobs, sa, re their Own hortles.
Presidenti B Lush ir the former approach tried and failed in the and gives only lukey latter, which is bo general Wrangle with budget. Both remed US's political andf la St Week's Shock Ti to give either of thent ty to make much dif
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Colobo 15

Page 20
Leonard Woolf in
Growing, An Autobiography of the Years published with Stories from the East Villa
Jeane ThWaite:S
Onlard Woolf Was ir thia C.C.S.
for seven years. In 1911 he left the island for a year's holiday in England, I and then resigned to marry Wirginia Stephens. He felt his true calling was to be a Writer and in 1912, after his marriage hetirelessly pursued this career: Writing, editing and publishing serious literature. He was a tense intelligent man but an emotional casualty of the system into Whicle was bor. The three books he Wrote in or about Ceylon, and also his lette TS Writter in or about the Island, show a trembling Soul who was deeply irti SECLUTC.
WOOff"S COOfial Venture Started Out Well. On the Woyage to Ceylon, he became intensely concerned about the sobs of a little English girl in the next cabin who was beaten each morning for wetting her bed. He confronted her father Captain Larguing "my experience with dogs and other animals had taught me that corporal punishmentis neveragood instrument of education" (Growing 13). Fortunately, for the child, her father was won over and promised motto beather again. On the ship, Woolf was also repelled by the habitual cruelty, under the guise of humor, which he experienced from other English. He quotes Freud to explain their behavior:
By making our enemy Small, inferior, despicable or comic, We achieve in a round-about way the enjoyment of Overcoming him -to which the third person, who has made no efforts, bears Witness by his laughter (19)
But, almost immediately after arrival in Ceylon, Woolf changed and began to use the very tactics he had so recently deplored. He, who described himself as
a "very innocent, LII list" (25), began to." every person he e missed the local pe. dark, dour, stupid, u but the English dor Ili shirmharin: "short, foul-mouthed, old;" "E SEETEd to Haw hawe swollen. The pair of insects-Spi He thus takes the he Writes to each We
to Fe's "Fir
Witness by his lau pro Wide a Way to C Wrote Elt the tirTlg F to Wat BWrote Whi England. The exch a lack of inhibition friendship. Strache E77ў7ег7" |*/C/Cүѓа/75 Take in World fa Torsbjer ofte Eritis
ti and Flad irltľOd LJC Their politics were
they came to be kn bury Intellectuals,
To read Woolf, about hit, is to real to make his flights, Ved as danger, ar intelligence and/orf is imaginatiweit doe to the ITF CT II
Gaydoes Daniel, persuade his rea superior person appear pretenţious harsh on hir Tself, i ploy, he cannot le; a need to complete lecture on how Wor

Sri Lanka
1904-1911, Diaries ir7 CeJwfouz 1908-1911 ge in the Jungle, noWell
Ticonscious imperia'maka Small" almost lCountered. He disple: 'the Tamils are nable to learn, lazy," lot escape. An Engholeric, dictatorial, a married couple: 2. STLİlk drld Sihle tö0 y reminded me of a ders or Worms" (72). College School friend tek (Lytton Strachey) person" who bears ghter. These letters ompare what Woolf Le Was in Ceylon = enlooking back from ange of letters hawė that shows a deep y had not yet Written Which book Was to TOUS, bUthe Was a hmiddle classlitera
gd Wolf to HiS SEL. left-wing liberal, and OW a StEG BOOTS
ad Wlati5 Writte lize thlaithe COslitrived from What he perceipear to be acts of ate. While his Writing is not bring you close ke you like hin, as for Woolf's efforts to
grS tlatle WaS E merely makes him EWG W is an engaging literary awe it there; he has the passage with a derful he really was.
Perhaps the greatest disservice done Woolf has been by his earlier biographers who seen eager to either treat him a mere adjunct to his wife or describe him like a bad fictional character, as if he started out as an Ullowed Charles Dickers' Child, beca Tng a brillalt Colomiał administrator then Wirginia Woolfs nanny, and finally a grand old man of letters. Their descriptions of him in Ceylon Wacilate from Robinson Crusoe tij Gandhi: he lived in the jungle, had to kill deer to keep food on the table, and was thwarted on all sides by devilish fauna, flora and stupid natives whom he tenaciously tried to protect from an oppressive English imperialism. Apparently Woolf encouraged these beliefs, for the biographers speak of - Quentin Bell, Frederic Spotts, John Lehman, et al. Were his personal friends. Wirginia Woolf's recent biographers, however, llawe taker a Tre Critical Wig Wolf Hill. The facts are that he was in the highest paid profession on an Island dependent on its agriculture with a literary and sophisticated cultural tradition that is much older than England's. The Sigiriya frescoes and poems are over 2,000 years old, and older texts existin Ceylon than any part of India.
Woolf Cut himself off for this Culture by making himself a model British segregationist and was rapidly promoted.
When he got home, he lied to his friends. The fact is le did not need to shoot wild animals to eat: no one, with Some money, need be hungry in Ceylon; food has always been cheap and plentful. Daniel talks of visiting one village where "it was my first experience of not having any hospitality offered US by Willagers. Later, I got to know the reason for

Page 21
this-they Were Rodiyas, in those days an untouchable caste" (57). In Woolf's Diarias 7 Ceylor, he himself Wrote, "no people in Ceylon starve except a few Tamil coolies who are driver off or leave estates in Sinhalese Districts" (W.W. Diaries 117). The Civil Servants were not required to live "in the jungle"except When on circuits: trips to remote areas. Daniel found them fun and during World War II he began to take British military officers with him because they enjoyed the experience so much (162). Both men Were given a generous housing allowance and often government bungalows (which Were always among the most splendid in the area). The village people, it is true, were uneducated but not stupid. He once endangered his own life when he took a jungle short-cut against a villager's advice. Woolfsays, "We heard a tremendous trumpeting and squealing of elephants ahead and the man said it was not safe to go, So I told him he had better come with the and shoother off" (Diaries 186). The elephants charged; Woolfspoony bolte da Cross the river and he had to climb a tree until the herd had passed. The man also escaped but
Otharks to Woolf.
The reason for the White-Washing of Woolf could be because the literary World OWes much to him: there is no doubt that his devotign to his Wife for thirty years kept her Sane and Writing: Without him, she Would probably hawe destroyed herself much earlier and We Would hawe lost much of What she had to say. It is also possible that because most of his biographers Were affluent Englishmen, they actually saw his insufferable Colonial behawior as Commerndable. The met result, however, added to the simplistic view of Sri Lanka that is often held even today.
Woolf's writings on Ceylon are divided into What he wrote at the time he was there (diaries and letters) and What came later as he looked back at himself through a somewhat rose-colored glass.
Growing is the second of his five
autobiographical w his time Spent in til starts: "In October Tilbury Docks in t Ceylon," and er England."
Daržas w7 Сеуїс government diaries ar A55 iStart G (A.G.A.) in Hamba posted in his last many of Woolf's en information SLICas how many head of called rinderpest, intriguing example: Englishman set ab Wes" in order and him by resisting his With explosive irive nativeness althoug out, "one can hardly Zed Caribe sin Ilulta Wicked, lazy and bal also kept Such off 1941, When Fle Was of the Western Prow finally did away. With diaries were givent Oliver Goonetilleke spokesman to Sup England. From the
in 1911, Woolf beg
British imperialism
and the English new ted an exchange of
and members oft Ilent. Ole Collect in the University of A:Siaf. Archiwa. WF to Wards Self-rule foi he recommended a Ceylon. Away from tursed Out to be Orle
influential friends. A
for Flint to Visit the
this is described by. affair: "the goverr almost as a visiting further Coller TOT publishing the officia district governor" (S

lumes, and COwers e Island. The book 1904, sailed from ne P. & O.Syria for ds "I sailed for
7 are copies of the
required of him as overnment Agent tota Where Te WaS Wo years. Although tries containtedious the price of salt, and Cattle had a di SBaSe hey are also full of of how the young but getting the "natihow they frustrated efforts. He responds !ctives against their h as Memmi points Seg HOW the Coloni= neously inferior and ckward" (83). Daniel icial diaries and in : Government Agent ince the government them (125). Woolf's o him in 1960 by Sir
When he needed a port the country in time he left Ceylon an to Write against to both Parliament spapers which starletters between lirt he Ceylon governon of ther is held F Cambridge South er the TOWETēt India was initiated, similar treatment of
the Island, he had of its best and most A trip was arranged Island in 1968, and Spotts as a glorious ment treated him | chief of state and ated the event by al diaries he kept as Spotts 59). The dia
ries Were, in fact, not published by the Sri Lankan government but in London by Hogarth Press — that is by Woolf himself. Spott's statement is a good example of how little Woolf and Spotts understood the Ceylonese as a oncecolonized people and also is an example of the latter's inaccuracies. Such agreeting as Woolf received was not unique. The Sinhalese always treat dignitaries with extraordinary respect and kindness. Wolf had, by his own admission, received similar greetings when he was twenty-nine andan Office Assistant in Kandy: "Half a mille from the Village the headmen and willagers met me in procession and brought me in with tomtons and dancers." He Commented With considerable insight on the mind of a Colonizer so feted:
...I certainly, all through my time in Ceylon, enjoyed my position and the flattery of being a great man and the father of the people...as time wenton, became more and more ambivalent, politically schizophrenic, an antiimperialist who enjoyed the fleshpots of imperialism, loved the subject peoples and their way of life, and knew from the inside how evil the system was beneath the surface for ordinary men and Women (Growing 157).
All the biographers I mention ignore such insights when quoting from his Work, so determined do they seem to perpetrate the myth that the problems in the colonies came from the inability of the natives to straighten up and become like the English. When Woolf returned to Ceylon later the local people were also aware that the English had come to enjoy shows of servility and played to that. At this time too, Woolf Was är old Tian and in a Culture Where age is catered to; if Hinmler had shown up with graying hair he would have been as attentively received and he would have been Wrong to take such behavior as a sign of approval. Another Spotts' mistake in this particular passage is saying that the diaries were published to commemorate the occasion; they
19

Page 22
were not published until 1962 - that is, two years later (Diaries title page). The third erfOr is that WOOlf WäS The West a "district governor" of Harmbantota; he was an Assistant Government Agent.
Woolf’S SISI-5 s/77 fS ESCO|ECS three short stories published in the same Wolume as Hambantota Diaries and his only novel Wage 7 tie. Inge was first published in 1913. This book has at last become accepted by the Ceylonese as one of the better pieces of fiction set in rural Ceylon. He captures a physical sense of the Island in a way that few other Writers hawe been able to. He Writes With a sense of the movement of nature, and makes the reader aware of its smells, its moods, the Strangeness of jungles and the Wild creatures that abould in them.
Daniel and Woolf did not Tleet, for the latter left the C.C.S. just before World War I, and the younger man joined just after it. Occasionally they speak of the same people. One is a Tian called Englebrecht and the difference between how they see the man is Worth noting. Daniel:
The renowned Englebrecht, a prisoner taken by the British during the Boer War, and Who elected not to be repatriated to South Africa after it was over, Was appointed Game Sanctuary Warden at Yala, I Went out With him after a 'rogue' elephant that I had a license to shoot, but I had no luck. Having gone so far into the jungle, Was reluctant to return without Seeing an elephant at close quarters. So We went up to a small herd, one of which Was a 'she'elephant with a newly born offspring. She scented us, raised her trunk, trumpeted and charged straight at us. Englabrecht shouted "Run!" and we ran. While he ran he fired into the trees above and after a While, We found that she was no longer chasing after us. It was quite dark by then and by the time We got back to the town, | Was thoroughly exhausted and weary and also a wiser Ilan (11).
2O
Woolf is very Tuc and this is only a many pages which to his dislike of the
Englebrecht was ...Who Was living erty and squalor E
CESSOISTECOITTTE be appointed Ga ger on a small S ment agreed. He man, the only kroWl Who SEET pletely without
nerves - I saw Perfor Coldbl ble boravery an was tall, straight,
and beard redd very light blue every now and th He belayed to it Boers behave to
and mot unnatur; Hartlibantolta (46
It takes Woolk : tell the story of th physical descripti

hmore descriptive,
brief excerpt of the he devotes mostly
South Africal:
a Boer of the Boers in the greatest powandone ofmy predeended that he should me Sanctuary Ranalary. The GovernWas a Cold-blooded Tarl Whorf || Hawe led to the to be co
fear and Willout
hir T1, as I shall tell. OOdanact of incredifoollardiness. He and verythin, his hair sh, his eyes Small, with a glint in them en oficy malignancy. F3 SirhaleSBaS th1 3 the negroes in Africa ally, he was hated in
).
a full three pages to e Boer. His graphic on of Englebrecht,
unfortunately, does not tally with agroup picture on Page-193, for the Boerisquite short; he is standing in a row of SinhaleSe not a tall race - and six are as tall or taller he is. However, obviously Woolf accepts the Boer as a white man, admires him and overlooks his powerly whereas he does not speak of any the local colonial Dutch as equals. Daniel makes only the one reference to the Englebrecht, and I do not believe he was ever in our home, although heard his name mentioned occasionally.
Daniel Very much enjoyed Woolf's books, particularly the non-fiction, which he felt accurately portrayed the Island at that time. The sort of comments Woolf Takes, which feel are offensive, Daniel was used to in colonial Writing although he did not use them himself. It is still hard for me to hear of poor willagers arbitrarily dismissed as "cunning and stupid" (Growing 54) but my father alWays shrugged off objections to such comments explaining they carine front "outsiders".
Y77 Elie Carl WF7 LEE)
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They stoot me to Ehle Stars But stay, Space Girl Your radiance and Jour touch Is contact I still CICLE. Though Deat springs the Luhirl Iп Space, Іл Тїлпе.
So pledge me love, You LLÈll Lyé. Le TTLïrlé.
U. EKKaTiLInatilEike

Page 23
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