Page 1
ΙΑΝΚΑ
GUAR
Vol. 18 No. 27 June 1, 1995 Price Rs... 1C
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EXTRADITIN
REG
NOAMN OCEANN C
U. S. S -
 
 
 
 
 

DA
).OO Registered at GPO, Sri Lanka QD/33/NEWS/94
AND PEACE
CCn
WIN
- S.D. Muni
OR ER VIETNAMI?
5 - Anirudh Despande
S OF HISTORY
ind LTTE's response
-K.M. De Silva
NG PRABHAKARAN
-Vijay Satokar
IONALISM :
DOPORATION - Gareth Evans
A. - S. Venkat Narayan

Page 2
tSyOUF
 

t

Page 3
Back to the killing fiel
Merwyn de Silva
ELAM WAR 3 takes US Eack to the
killing fields but with a difference. The Weapon Tyas WG|| as the ki || Tati Olof both Combatants haWE ir trodu Ced a The Wintensity into this 13 year separatist "low intensity' conflict. At the same time, the "internal" conflictattracts more external interest and a growing foreign Criterational IF TWO WETTE Ft
The death to exceeds 600, the arried forces probably taking Tore Casualtic State LTTE in the first few Weeks - certainly in the surface-toair missile (SAM) attacks OntWOSLAF AW FROS, THE TIL TELF that the LTTE HES bought six microlight aircraft in France doubtless prompted the government to buy anti-aircraft in France doubtless prompted the government to buy antiaircraft guns, a new feature of the Colombo skyline that attracts the attention of motorists and the pedestrian alike.
The death ofmorethan90 ServiCeTen in the Tissile attackson the AVRO's Was Certainly the most shattering blow, to the arried forces, and to mass norale. Where did the missiles Come from? Were the Weapons of Russian Or American make? The finger pointed anyWay to Afghanistan, the last proxy War of the Cold Warrivals, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R, it was too close for Comfort-certainly for the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Narasimha Rao Who described this development as "frightening" ... for the Whole region. Indian analysts say that it has "added a new dimension to the security Scenario since this is the first time that heat-seeking missiles have been used by a militant or guerrilla group againstaircraft in the StuDCOftirleift."
For Sri Lanka and the P.A. government it had more direct and immediate Consequences, equally disturbing. It meant goodbye to the "peace dividend", a key factor in the Kumaratunga government's strategy. Defence expenditure, Well over a million dollars a day, Would be diverted to development, employment-oriented projects most of a II, to meet What the P.A. think-tanks
had identified as the ---- yÜLuthi tremplo Willi Cha CCC Lited f. the J.W.P., albeit is parlamentaristfC) that problem COLld Sinhala Glitto HF = disciplined and a group in the North Steady fise of Doli South led probab type yՃաth grouբ: WOuld becaught in "a state of siege".
Orl Jurie B, De ter P. G.L. Pie
TEVE FLIE ITESLE mounting defence
1) Defence levyu imposed Dր im factures and would flet 1.9 ||
2) The privatisati be expeditedt Lält Eestili
3) Transferring
EFTER C.E.B.'S the Treasury.
4). A 10% cutback Pee-funded pr
5) POStponing me!
"We are quite ple of this Country a Lite to the War effort ble We are Stre knowledge"Said Di Lanka spent 27 bil fence, about 540 After the ceasefire, Idently cLutthe woter budget. On April 19 and TWO "Sea Tigre la del CamOe:SElew
Lanka na Wy patrol E
LTTE 100-day trL NEWSWEEK repC ha We What the L. G. || WAR 3.

ds
a mainsecurity threat yment in the South Or the steady rise of TaleWol-Wident, T. A fail LI retoj tack Catch the governing է բinder I a tough, FITECH SECESSICOTIESE (the LTTE) and the tical Violete in the y by апплвd J.WP, - S. The Liling Class apin Cer, Il Could be
puty Finance MinisriS TOLITIČed leg W S feeded it meet
CCStէ :
pfrom 3.5% to 4.5% ports, local manuirla Cia! SE TWİCES, it Dillion rupees more,
On program Would յ rigլ է Էյ||tյրi raվիթր
ited 4 EJ||||İCTI.
1 5 Ei ||OII frOT Cumulated profits to
K.. Oni n0n-priority | ru
jects.
W projects.
ertain that the peore Willing to contribNobody WillgrumIng the ned by this ". Pieris. In 1994, Sri |son rupees on deTi||İCT US dollars.
the minister confihis 1995 February th, two "Sea Tigers" SSé5" in WO. El Obihemselves, two Sri Cats and the PAICe to pieces, as rted. So OW We TāStarTed EELAM
Can We win this one? Prof. S.D. Muni of the Nehru Univ., one of India's best known "Sri Lanka experts" thinks We Carl. See SRI LANKA CAN WIN THE EELAM WAR.)
TES OFC to
India is no dispassionate observer of the escalating hostilities in Sri Lanka's north and east. The Palk straits, no more than 20 miles, has separated Sovereign Sri Lanka from India, the World's largest democracy. With a population second only to China. Its SOLIthernmost State is Kr10WT as TAMILNADUbecause Prie Minister
(Continued on page B
= ܐ
LANKA
GUARDILAN
WCJI. 17 No. 27 Junie 1, 1995
Pric Rs. O.O.
Published fortnightly by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd. Իվd, 24Ճ, Լlrlitյri Place COLITEIT - 2.
Editor : Meirw yn de Silwa Telephorie : 447554
Printed by Sara sawi Printers No. 9, Sir Henry De Mel Street,
Cg|tյIIլԷյԼյ-ք, Telephone: 436266, 320365
CONTENTS
HOW Sri Lanka can Wirtle El lĤri War India. Intermediary as Actor 3 TADA repBali may help extradite Päbi kär
Indian Ocean and U.S. Policy 7 FrOFT "SAARC" to "United Statas of SC-Luth Asia"?
Regionalism a New Tompo: 12 The Sri Lankan talks: a tragedy? 15 A SurpriSB de Clarati CF 1日
LBSSons of Military. History
|n SFİLE İık: 1Ց

Page 4
HOW Sri Lanka
By S.D. MUNI
S Rl Lankais Caughtin its third Eelam War. The responsibility for disrupting the four month old peace process and initiating armed conflict Chandrika Kumaraturiga Was serious about a peaceful Solution to the ethnic strife. She relaxed the political atmosphere between Colombo and the LTTE by releasing essential Supplies and fuel to the LTTE held north and by accommodating the LTTE's demand on the LHHLHtLCaLaaLLLL LLL LSLLaLaL SaaaLLLLLLLaLLLLSS S LLaL Was done at the cost of displeasing strong wested interests in the Sri Lankan se Curity establish rtment and Sinhala Cha L!Vinist strongholds.
The only demand that Colombo was Unwilling to concede was the dismantling of the Poore rym military Campo of the Sri Lankan security forces. The LTTE's dead for the rewal of this Camp is unjustistified having agreed With the UNP government to shift it only by 500 meters. President Kumaratunga was even Willing to shift the camp by 800 meters but is prepared to remove it to facilitate LTTE's military move
TEtS.
Three Reasons
THE TE are three TG2|| TESTIS Eēhind the LTTE's call to War. The peace process had started hurting the LTTE leader, Western governments put pressure on the LTTE to consider the peace process seriously and imposed LLaLLLLL LHH LL L LLaaLaLLaHLHHH LHHL transfer of funds from the Tamil expatriot Community to the LTTE. And the Westeringo Wern menis Eisegantaking Ms Ku Taratunga's peace initiatives sēriOusly.
aris in it and east of Sri Lanka wers, aբpy::ith the peaceproc
essas supples essential commodo ties began gradually reaching them.
can Wir
The Common peopl ing admirers of Pres Tmaking Prabhakar: less. The peасер Prabhakaran's Opti апшпfamiliar, proc gotiations and barg initiative, the borde a guerrilla leader t. gotiator Would haw ble for the LTTES he started the "W TE TEET" HE F garier CCCaSiOSi
JLIE 1990. I til SESS Credible.
Mr Prabhakara rupt the fragile pea fragile peace in tw acquisition of antithe LTTE's a Sen. heat Seeking Tissil O Filia We Tea CF9Djithig by the beginning TOUT t || 3 til Te KLImaraturiga WCF| With the LTTE. The cease-fire perhaps the LISE Çf SLIChı ITE"
The Sri Lank: cussion during her 1995, With the Ind subject of Raji'W G tion and possib PTFEF-karar to III. Supremo insecuFe. diwergence betwee girle in Madras a Rao-led governme.
- Madras Conflict ar.
Nadu as a possible and sanctuary in F
War.
The outbreako gates the Ver)

in the Eelam War
EWE Taifa StEG COTTident Kшпaгalшпga an uneasy and restO:SSWOlit Ons tying Hilirl Lupo ir ess of political meain. Hawing lost the
of transition from a democratic ree EJECOFTë Uribear= upremo. Therefore, T - Cf || EETEtiol för di dCTE SO O EWC October 1987 and Sed hi5 2XCLS63 i Sfar
'S de Cider TC ElisCe into disrupt the No Ways, One, the ircraft Weaponry in | Surface tC) air, es Were SL/Spected LTTE fTjTT LUKTäig of 1995, roughly WH en President Kad Co Lt Cease-fire LTTE accepted the t:0 ffair1. Its CärdfES Im
WWEaբՃrl5.
in president's disWisit to India, March jaf leaders Of The aldi'S aSSaSSina1e extrad It Of" Of lia, made the LTTE In this context, the AIADMKind Mr Narasia It TI NEW Delhi - id ELIl GT Tä Fili
| SCUrce Of SuppOrt is re|The Weald Eglair Tîm
FEglāTi Wa T-|||| Te= asis of MS
Kurlaratunga's approach to the ethnic issue. Sri Lanka's security forces have been taken boy Surprise and the Peoples Alliance governments agenda for political and constitutional reforms has been put in jeopardy. In order to regain its list Confidence and initiative, the Kumaratunga regine has to Work simultaneously on three fronts. Militarily, the LTTE last be show that it CE. It win a war. The Sri Lankan security forces have to I MOWë fast, SC, als EC neutralise their anti-aircraft Weapon advantage and defeat their plans of Overrunning the isolated military camps in the northeast region.
Continued Commitment
Ms Kumaratunga has to avoid falling into the trap of becoming a Sinhala War goddess. Instead she should mGbili.Se3 - || SECLOS COf the ST LE Tkal nation: the Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims and other minorities in her fight against the LT TE. Het COntinued COrr mitrilent With the peace process and to a devolution package to meet the basic asprations of Tamils and Muslims will be of considerable help in this regard.
President Kumaratunga has Considerable international support in this third Eelam War. She has to Cautiously nUTSe and COnSolidate this SupportaS an effective source of strength. Prabhakara's irritation. With the international community was clearly evident in his broadside against the A Tericans. India cannot afford to let Ms. Kumaraturnga fail in its own vital security interests. The form and extent of LF1 dia's SLJpop Ort in Wi|| hawe to be carefully worked Within the parameters of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement of July 1987.

Page 5
L L L L L LS LL LL L L L L S L L L L L L S S L T L T L
India:
The Herscris artid drar Tas Of the Early days of June were followed by Weeks LL LLaLLLL K LLLLLLCLaa LLLCaaL S aa two Countries. On the diplomatic 5.Cema Stademate and Iri:Trmobility replaced the frenetic activity of May and early June. Yet in the first two weeks of July an exchange of political signals set the two governments or the road to serious negotiations to aLLLL LLLLLS LLLL KLLLLaLLLLSS LLLL S S LLLLLLK CE FT E froni dia With the Coffer to LinderWrite the implementation of a political programme that would ensure thịg C'F1C]. Qf the CUFFEFlt Eth[]|[[] [[][]fIICl in the island. Both governments had a clear understanding of What this LLL 0KLS a K S S L L K KL K S aL accept the settlement negotiated by the two governments, and the Indian government Would use all the rEstյլrces at Its cքmmand to Egmբe! LaL aaa a LLL SL LLL L 0SL L LLLLLL government was urged to consent forTally to implement the substance of the agreements reached on devolution and related subjects in the
aaaL LLLLL a00S S SS LL S S aL00 S a L L K LK a Secorīd proviso: the Sri Lankan authorities were asked to agree to a LLLL S LLLLL L LL S SLLL LLL LLLL L LLLL S S LLLLLL eastern provinces, the large Tamil ethno-region or which the Tamil poLLLLLL LLLaLLLLSS S S LLLLLL aLLLL LLLL LLL00 LLLLLLLLS This was the final step in the adoption of the devolution package which the TULF as well as the armed separatist groups had demanded since 1983, arid Which the Sri Larikan gOWĘfni Terlt had refLISE di to Corsider, m Li Ch | Bass to accept, A loophole Was left to Take the Offer Thore palatable to the government; the link would be a të Tiporary one, and its fatë Would eventually be decided by a referenLLaLLLLL S LL S LL S LLLLS LSLS S LSSLL S SYL LLLLL LL LL province. Ewen So, there Was ng mistaking the enormity of the political risks inherent in its acceptance by President Jayewarderi E. Once this was agre Ed up ton, the negotiations բroceeded beyond the devolution issue to foreign policy matters relating to
India's security concerns and interests.
Thi mg that an accord
Intermed
was about to be despite all the eff Ing tea T1 S = t0 kee confidential a SpO tion parties and th Iational|SL JVP agglurately than t public mood of h merl With India s miliation inflicted Juul E. THC a CCC| protests in the COL of July, the Wor
ence History. T partly a reflection to Indian prassцT If the COTE COTT
HE accord SLIC
Cat FET ad DLJIt ITLICH TO TE E : thly if not anti GET 1 for III]]|a': Lankam air Spa C3 List six Weeks ei.
President Jayew Bra WE LE | FOTCE S ård W. preparations for COTTOW ETSI a II a ITC 29 July Rajiv (, Colombo to sign
The main points
a Comp: hostilities, and
weapons held by activists, Within S the in Implementati
the prowisi assistance to he \ Bחם וח) חםtati troops were draft
HE EStäbli Of Pro Winicial COLI ba Sed OLESla units:
the joining Other and it. One
With an elected there (to be e months)

iary as Actor
signed leaked Oul Orts of the negolialp the discussions as ssible, The opp OSIlle Marxist a Tid Ulträ Sensed || LG || ITTOTE El government thĒ ostility to an agreeD 5.001. HFLBI the ITUon Sri Lanka in early rdignited massive Intry in the last Week st anti-government Ty's post-independThe opposition was of an innate hostility вe, partly a rejection Versia || feat LITES DT as the link bgtWg Gn
Bastern provinces -cause of the antipaagonis T to Rajiv 5 rip|tipm Cof Eri Which had occurred Hrlier,
Erdene decided to lity of the opposition et lead With
the signing of this | fat of Lu || FCCOT, OTI Sandhi arrived in it behalf of India.
O| ||TE FCCCFd Were :
: le CESS ELIOF1 01 til SLUTTET - Cf the Tarmil separa tist eventy-two hours of ltյm tյf the accord:
on of Indian military p with its implemenE här 7 0C0 C0 | rd in ed in A Ligust):
sh ment of a System ncils in the island, nd's nine pro Winicial
together of the 2aStern provinces Tinistrati WE LITET
Fisic i visitial Council lECte[] Wilhim ThTE =
K. M. de Siva
the holding of a referendum in the Gasterni province to determine whether the mixed population of Tamis, Simha a Sgand MuslirTS The TE would support its merger with the northern provirice in to a single TäITill dorTminated poro WinCB:.
a general amnesty for all Tamil separatist activists in custody, imprisoned or facing charges, after the general Surrer der Cf arms;
TE repatriatior of abOut 100,000 Tami refugees in India to
SfI LE Tk.
the resumption of the Repatriation of Indian citizens from Sri Lanka, under the terms of agreelerts reached between the governTierits of
Sri Lanka and India in 1964 and 1 .
the prevention of the use of
Indian territory by Tamil militants for military o propaganda purposes; the prevention of the military use of Sri Lankan ports, Trincomalee in particular, by any Country in a manner prejLIdicial to Indian interESIS and
a provision thal Tamil and English have equal status with Sinhala
as Official languages.
Although the Cabinet eventually apբrքwed the signing of the accord, the divisions among Cabinet members It is issue Could rigt BE Concealed. Lalith Athulatih muda II, as Minister of National Security, was L0 S LL0aL S aLLLLLLLaL LL S S SLLSS SLLLLK Minister R. Premada sa Was scarcely less hostile, Much of the opposition Was based or personal antagonism to Rajiv Gandhi; some of it reflected a sense of despair at the political risks incurred by the government; the higher priority given to India's over Sri Lanka's security interests; as Well as he use of Indian troops to Superwise and enforce the ceasefire. The Sri Lankan negotiators had opted for an Indian army presence for this atter purposes for tW o reas com S; the need for Speedy i Ti plementation of the
3.

Page 6
accord, two weeks to a month being the optimistic title-table spoken of at this stage by their Indian counterparts; and because such an Indian contingent Would be more acceptKaLK S S L S SSLL LLLSS HHaaH HOaaLa S S aLK readily surrender their arms to them rather than to the Sri Lankar Security forces, With whorl they had been in conflict for so long, or to a CommonWealth / UN peace-keeping force. The attempt to restrict if not bar the employment by Sri Lanka of foreign military and intelligence personnel directly imponged om Sri Lanka''S OWN security interestis and Was S80 ni as Žal constrait or its choices in Security, The references related to an Israeli presence in Sri Lanka, and to British пегсепатуgroups engagediпtraiпіпg Sri Lankar forces. The FESOrt to these had been forced upon Sri Lanka by Indian pressure on Great Britain and other countries, likely to be of as sista TC: E LO Sri Lanka, t0) desisl frori e stablishing training facilitiВs for Sri LankaП forces in the island. The Indian offer to provide training facilities and military supplies for Sri Lankan security forces was regarded as one-sided when the threat to Sri Lankan security was, and still is, segi L Gorme from India EDITE.
The signing of the :: Td lead to violent protests and Wide spread CIW || url Tesl am Cng the Sinhalese majority in and around Colombo and in the south-West of the country. These demonstrations had the support of the SLFP, of sections of the sangha, and of a revived JVP. Rajiv Gandhi himself narrowly escaped serious injury, if not death itself, when an enraged sailor SW Ling his rifle but at him at the guard of honour ceremony prior to the Indian Prime Minister's departure from ՇլյltiTTiԷյն,
Although many risks Were expected in may progress towards the stabilization of the accord (given the Opposition of the SLFP, the Prime Minister äIld Several Other TemberS of the Cabinet), the early indications Se erri ed encouraging. Sri Lankan security forces in the northern and eastern provinces returned to their barracks and the paramilitary forces
there WCre dışarm Lankan governm LIE : CCIT | | symbolic handing: ever, it is in the peace accords Selc
the Wishes. It them. The early 5 proved to be de Ce
If a swift pacifica and Gast Was Erivi: rīdī Šri Lākā were Lickly disill Peace-Keeping Fo Sri Lanka Ludart| they would be well TEST TE TOTt IEē at TS and tha forces would quick Feder thair FTG, t pened was that it Wey SOCI reSeT WHO da Cid Llo bagan With atta rivals of whom nea Tho mã55ãGTE: Of B
il the Ca5t 52 TT
thereafter (in Se toughaning of th
Urgent discussion dant Jayewardene Gandhi brought in hidder agenda of Lihat Indiam troc) F be Used against th 2 August 1987 Pr Gandhi had giver President Jayewa "...... i Prabhaka TE Word in any m organize SILITTend; dian army will mit LTTE by Torce. World-Wide CodET and SEWE TG | Criti its failurg to ITiäi Indian army at disar the LTTE, efforil t0 de Stry not political force.
Accordingly the
into disarm the
Ed il |attET, Ia LJI nCh13 {
O LHE LITTE Jaff lä to WII EIII C SECO rad W EK:

Ed as part of the Sri Ent's obliga titors The LTTE began a WT OF FITT 5. HOWature of things thal Iom Work a CCording OS e Who Ti Egoitiate signs of progress բtive.
li li ta' rioriti saged by the Indian governments, they sided. The India rce (IPKF) entered na assumption that Tajd i T the Tär Ti | ald the East a S the separatist ly and Willingly suro therm... What hapS presence Was ited by the LTTE, dafy therm. They :35 Of Fife Ti Ti arly 150 were killed. tout 2 OC) Sihal E35 province shortly ptember) led to a di Indian attitude.
5 g WEEl PTESEl PriTC Milster to force part of the the peace accord, s would EWEnt LFally e LTTE. As early as Ime Minister Rajiv | El SS LITETIC TO ride that in goes back of his alle orfai ISO I of ETITIS, the |- ựE ti diSarm the P. With practically ration of the LTTE, is of F1 for itain the peace, the |S L E Cid to är tā Take Er it as a military if
םם עים וח היוםךן ה-FFWF| LTTE and When sistance from thg a major attack strong holds in peninsula in the 5 of October.
Despite stiff resistance from the LTTE Whigh ng CBS Sita tEd tig dE, pOl'OlymË TIL Öf ELS ands Of reinforcements, the LTTE's hold or Jaffir a airid the p Eri in sula Was eventually broken. Both parties, the Indian army and the LTTE suffered heavy casualties, but those Who Suffo Ted Tost Were the Tai Tii|| բeՃբla
The Indian government which had intarven Ed Carlier in the year to pre y Erit the destruction of the LTTE by the Sri Lankan army were doing it themselves the Indian government which objected to the Sri Lankan army taking Jaffna city was doing it themselves, and in that process inficting mLIch heavier casualties and far greater hardship than anything done up to that time by the Sri Lankan Human rights in their confrontation with the Tamil separatist groups, now found itself defending its own forces facing sir Tilar charges and With a Wan greater frequency.
The Indian army mầde a nLImhär of tactical mistakes which helped the battered LTTE forces to regroup. The latter Wa.5 a O'Neil -- OT-able -- tÓ EScape from the Jaffna peninsula to precisely those areas of the northern province from which the small Sri Lankan army had driven the IT out earlier in the year. They were also permitted to establish themselves in the Trico Talee district of the East Ern province In Which - up to that time -- they had not Tluch more than foothold. Above all, if the LTTE had beer able to survive in the jungles of the northern province against the Tassive presence of the India rarily, that Had as much TC di With TF1 E TEILICEECE
aLaLa LLLLLLLC LL a C SaaLLLL LL LLLLL L SS coup grace to the LTTE -- for political purpose linked to the Byzantine politics of Tamil Nadu -- as With the LTTE's far superior knowledge of the terrain they were operating in relative to that of the Indians. The LTTE was permittEd LO TI air ta irla Siria || E. Lt Cor SpicuOus presencein Madras through Which it channelled its official "messages" to various parts of India, and from there to the rest of the World. This Contradiction in Indian policy, was regarded in Sri Lari ka as a ComCES5Sion EO. Tad Tii||

Page 7
Nad LSE.Intimerit;
Although the IPKF was never se en outside the 10th and east of the COL1try (except in the North Central province on their way to theast Coast) its Shadow ay across the Country's political landscape. Its presence was Exploited politically against the government, by the SLFP and the JVP acting together Cor. separately.
5. Implementation of the Accord - the Sri Lankan Aspect
The opprobrium attached to the IndoSri Lanka Accord Was focused on its architects within the government and especially the President himself. The JWP, the most vocal, Violent and LLLLaLLLLLL S LLLL S LL K LLLLL0LLS called for his assassination through posters and inflammatory pamphlets and speeches (transmitted through tapes). On 18 August 1987 the JWP
Very nearly suci, |ng him within complex When tad Ty gTO Up W di5u55 e 10hada Tira Culous Minister was kill a I d - Se wara l (including Lalith
SEET for NFLICTE injured. Earlier killed on 31 July Vience it bri of the signing of
O E T L E Éxit 1 assassinated on and long District the Chairman ar. LUMI P. Se wara escaped death JWP, It is estima UNP Cadrgs Wer parind alone. Thị Violence irl. Elle GE
TADA repeal may help extradite Prabhakaran"
By Wijay Satokar
T he Indian government's decision to repeat the controversial Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (pre Vention) AC obstacle in the extradition, if sought, of the LTTE leader W Prabhakaran, acCording to legal opinion here.
The issue of extradition of the LTTE leader Wanted in Connection. With the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 has again become atopic of discussion here folloWing recentremarks by Externali affairs minister Pranab Mukherjee in the New Delhi, Mr. Mukherjee said relevent aspects of extradition of Prabhakaran and other accomplices remained under the Consideration of the relevant agencies of the government.
Some legal experts felt that the draconian provisions of TADA might have provided a justification for the refusal of extradition since the act alleged to C05 titute the extraditable offen Ceg TLS be on that has its equivalent in Sri Lanka.
Prabhakaran and his intelligence chief, Pottu Amman, the two Wanted LTTE leaders, in addition to the general Criminal la W, ha We also belēm char
Lunder the TADA 拂 臀 ĉesignated
+ + ғ, г -
inlnā
COLOMBO, May 21
Legal cігcles al though extradition o beSubject to his arri authorities, the cap Tequirement for C0| extradition proceed of a lengthy legal p
Thargo Wa 5 50IT here when the Inter year issued two " calling for the extrac and Pott LA Tian
The Colombo ing that it was unat TWO Offerders CaS Controlled areas in
Evenas legala tion of Prabhakara continue to be newspapa er Column marks by Sri Lank Stock developme Thorda Tari, ir || || Li TE leader with Bhagat Singh have Criticism in some q
 

ded in EasSaSSinathe parliamentary a whole parliamenre gathered to ri Lanka Accord. He scape, One District to that CCS i OIT a birlet Milli Sters hulath mu dali, MinSecurity) seriously e MP had bēEn by the JVP in the E. L. E. Wake
accord.
TOn this the WP Cabinet Minister
inister, as Well as Secretary of the
MPs narrowly the lands of the d that over al 1, 000
killed during this
objective of this rly stages Was to
m
S0 point out that alPrabhakara Would bstbythe Sri Lankan ture itself is no preThe CElert Of the ings which consists OCESS
2. Confusion caused Coffice in India last ed COrle" ritica.5 tion of Prabhakaran Omany Country.
terpol replied state to apprehend the ley Were in LTTE he North.
jects of the extradand Pottu ĀTiria debated in the is, the recent reS. Minister of LiveSawm ya morth y a Comparing the h、martyr ote in for SEWere rters,
prevent the implementation of the legislative program envisaged in the Indo-Sri Lankar accord. That this program was implemented at all was due in the main to the political Skills and Personal courage of President Jayewardene. When Parliament debated the 13th armendment to the Constitution ( in November 1987) making provision for the establishTnefnt of a systerTn of provincia || COUncits, by far the most controversial part of this program, the security precautions taken within and outside Parliament Were un paralleled in the history of the national legislature.
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Page 8
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Page 9
PAFT3
INDIAN OCEAN AND U
Humayun Kabir
A. s the 'Northern Tier was in disa Iray by the late 1970s, the Ameri: can policy was devoted to the twin objectives of preventing a projection of Soviet power southwards towards Pakistan and the Persian Gulf area, and to maintaininga nawal presence in the Indian Ocean in the interest of American global deterrent strategy as Well as for the purpose of countering an IndoSoviet build-up of naval forces in the South Asian region." This policy called for a revision of the "Vietnam Syndro" and it Was reflected in the "Cqter DCtri1e"" JTh the LISEe of Thilitary force in the Persian Gulf as an "inviolable sphere of U.S. interest" and LL aaa LLLLLLL LL LLLLLLaLL LLLS confidence and a resumed policy in American global responsibilities under the Reagan administration which took detente as a fundamentally mistaken Concept and was bent On-reestablishing the po Wert position of the United States through a policy of strength, including military. The United States, therefore, concentrated its policy mostly LL S a SLLLLL S LL LLLKLL SLLLaLLLLLL SLLLLLLL area with a view to Upgrading the facilities at Diego Garcia and with an eye on Pakista ad Sri Lanka.
India found its strategic environ
ment seriously threatening its security.
intere:S tS. Prime Minister, Indira Gand Fili Stated in Parliament that "the focus of the Cold War has shifted from Europe LLaLLL LaLLLLLLL0LLLLLLaLLLLSSSLLLLaaLLLLSSS West aTiCd SC Luth-east ASia flak S a Te flash points. New armaments are being բiled up in Eur region, not unly LLLLLLL LLLLLL 0LaL00LLaLLLLSS LLLLLLL uL LLH u 0LLLHYLK00S LLaCLK LL K KLK LLLLLS LLLLLLaLLLKu SLSL L SaL LLLLLa LLLSaaLS look been as grin as it is today". LLLLLaa S aLK SLaL LLLLKS SYaaLSK S LaLSL Pariament (Lok Sabha), While debating on the Defence Ministry Demands for Grants, also painted a grim picture
Ճf the seturity ir
interests. They si
Freak Of arred C and Iraq... and d ghanistan and the powers for making the dial Ocean ing issues of Wil Earlig Tjili in 19 Morarji Desai, П Millister Atal Be several other MPS Concern at the pres if the Indial O'Cea of the U.S. streng Diego Garcia."
Clearly, the OC greater significan began to Orientil strategic fra TTIEWC of the 1970s, WE established its por South Asia by TE tory Gwer Pakista clear explosion, SCEFlario CaTIE 3: "at Luft| StatLJS ET nerable, in its OWI its vast and expos front. India, there tive about It Snelg their foreign polic tures, particularly
OE E DEEEFH President Jaye Wa West foreign po deed, a pronour in his policy. Wh Orientation Was C. the views in the SLICH a COLUFSE W representing they Lanka's power government and and the academ CClegg tillett" in the foreign pol

S. POLICY
ոբinging on India's lated that "t LtOfic: EETWEET I FET evelopments in Af3 Competition of big their presence felt in are additional LIIal importance..."." 78, Prime Minister IS Externa | Affair:S hari Vajpayee and ihad expressed their ience of Superpowers In, particularly at that thening of its base at
earlic frofit assumed CefOrdia, AS Il dia Self in an extended rk from the later half an India had already e dominariit StatLIS ir äTS COf the 1971 WİCri and the 1974 րաthe altered strategic S a challenge to her drole" making it Wuperceptions, through led Southern Oceanic Ffore to £20 a The Sem5= hbours' stability and By and Security posof those if itSSC Luth.
land, Sri Lanka Lunder rdene folloWeda porOlicy. There Was, inced pro-American tilt |ile this pro-Weste Frni ār to ā SLE likā, :ā LSS ātri Litātēt a ried. Scriile people, 'whole spectrLJITT Of Sri elite, including the opposition, Officials, IC and ITmedia WOIrld, e determining factor iCy OrientaliOrl Of the
post-1977 UNP administration Wasits economic Compulsions: these appaently pushed the country to the doors of the Western nations which are capable of releasing the much-needed inflow of foreign capital to Colombo. But in reality Jayewardene's new open-door eCOnomic policy, Which of course strengthened his foreign policy, Was a mere Coincidental priority. At a later stage, President Jayewardene himself made a clear Welle Stated: "The Tai purpose of any foreign policy of a COUntry is the preservation of its independel Ce and thịLIS its defen CE. The Second important factor would be the preserVation of its food supplies. Thirdly, its trade, both export and import. Even the ideological friendships and attachments depend mainly on these factors".'" Clearly, the principal objective of Sri Lanka's foreign policy was to ensure its security, But security against What?
Obviously it Was against India, EECa LISe of its ir Creased POWEer Capabilities consciously built up over the years. Jayewardene Was apprehensive of the potential threat from a more powerful India for his country's Security, despite his Indo-phile past. Even before becoming Sri Lanka's leader, he Once asked: "... how are the people WOlive in the Small COuntries arould the dia CJCE at defeldt HEITSE WES against a huge and mighty nation (India) of five hundred million people..." Sri Lanka's Security strategy, therefore, continued to be the building of counterbalance against India. It may be mentioned that While linda's Janatha Party government Wasattitudinallysofterand bilatera|y more accommodative and its leaders personally not being imperiOLIS and domineering towards the neighbouring Countries and their leaders, the Congress (I) administration Was much less so," leading respecti Vely to a Warmer and m:OTe tense

Page 10
atmosphere in the South Asian regional relationship. However, on the question of India's security, there was no let-up in its eternal vigilance irrespective of the Complexion of the party in power in NgW Dei.
Jayewardene's UNP government a popoarently fÕLUT dit HiS COLIITTÉGrballar CE in the United States, Pakistamand, TOa lesser Extent, in China, But it Was EsSentially more of astrong pro-American bias than anything else. As mentioned earlier, the UNP has always been an advocate of a West-oriented foreign policy, and Jayewardene himself was known as "Yankee Dickie". NonalignThe fit the Secord of Sri Lanka's Security, "tripod", was downgraded and pursued in favour of the West, while the UNP go WerIn Fent Was practically not interested in vigorously pursuing the efforts to implement the UN reso
Utill CF ||OZOP.
In Sri Lanka, it is a commonly held wiew that President Jayawardenes foreign policy was essentially prejudicial to India as it appeared to do oblivious to India's security sensitivities and ignored the regional geo-strategic fundamentals intrinsic in a Situation of proximate and asymmetric power balGLLL0S aaaLH S LLLLLLLLS S LLaL LLLLLL0 H 0 Lanka's foreign policy was observed in her nonaligned policy, in her attitudes towards the concept of OZOP and U.S. bases in Diego Garcia, in its position oncertain important international issues, and in the nature of relationships With the U.K., Chira, Pakista ni and the ASEAN
Jayewardene government's Nопаligned Policy.
The UNP government of President Jaye Wardene Officially professed adherence to nomaligned policy. In his inaugural address to the Colombo Ministerial Meeting of the Coordination Bureau of Normaligned Countriesin June 1979, President Jayewardene stated: "Non-alignment runs like a golden thread through the fabric of Our Country's foreign policy. At no stage has Our Country deviated from that policy. At no stage will make bold to say, will it do so in the future".' But in his policy
B
Stāte Flert Filiādē. CF the National State. A Tio Fig TIO 35 lj
WEarE:SNA, M. WLJ|
Clared that the pi Alignment which w. the Afro-Asian Colf in 1955 Will be supp Was aid of 'striot i tensibly to 'correct"N With a "Ejiet til Ward:
Although Presi OrhCe State0] tO tFle пnore поп-aligг Bandaranaike Wild tUWHTdS SOFTIG State his assurance of p genШпе поп-align: rightly told by Nave plicit promise to be U.S. Eald oteFWe: stead of being more Socialist states".2 The FNELOFC Of LHBS did rot aCCGrd Wit† the country's foreig position MP aptly p in Parallet that " only mean non-alig CCle. Og Cat E the other. You can non-aligned". * V Western Strand in aligned policy Was TiC, fact PS3 JF || many as a harking policy of the UNPre with its overtones Kodikara aptly putit "the UNPand the gi While adopting Inc general principle of always been moi reins Uranice agains Fiat is Britai adt While India's Janat fOLUTI SOTI SO Tt JayeWardene'sbrar MS Galli Wa5 C This Was evident resented Jayewart the NAM Summit in for a non-aligned if Contries of the N plight Of the Sםnomi en Wisaged Wisits b'

14 August 1977 in ssembly, there was What its policy toble, li stead File derinciples of Nom= ere first adopted at eren Ceat Bandung Drted. In fact, stress non-alignment, osMS Bārdārālāks S Orle Side".'
dent Jayewardene press that he was led tha MTS
ladele Ore sthan the others, LTS uirg a Strict Of 2d policy Was, as ed Arad, "alliTThore friendly to the Stern Countries, inpartial towards the As a Tatter of fact, Sri Laikal HeadēTS i the Substance of n policy. One Optit Wilee Stated Non-alignпment can ned. A circle is a De ITTOrg TOUldthal of truly say you are Whether this pro
Si Lārikas - governed by ecoпоt, It appeared to back to the foreign gimes of the 1950s of anti-Indiaris. Welle Wrote that overnment led by it, in-alignment as a foreign policy, hawe e prone to seek India in the West, | Uited State 25 na government had of similarity with dof nOil-aligINTEent, early irritated by it. from the Way she dere's por Cpocosial at 1983 in New Delhi litiative to acquaint Crt Witi le eCCSouth. The proposal y a rowing team of
Heads of Government led by the Indian prime Minister to important World capitals, Indira Gandhi Sharply reacted by Saying that she would not line to go abroad With a begging bowl in hand. She betrayed het resentment again When replying to a query at a press CC ātē ir
Jayewardene government's Indian Ocean Policy.
Although Sri Lanka Continued to support the IOP2 in principle," the LLLK LLLLLLLLHH LLLLLLLK LLLLL sharply after 1977. President Jayewardene was apprehensive of India's filling the power vacuum that WOLld Eje Created in the Indial O’Cear Frithe EWE TE OF Withdra WaCf the exter| powers from the area. He, therefore, favoured a balance of power in the
Indian Ocean that would safeguard his
Country's Security. In practice, however, Sri Lanka exhibited an explicit pro-U.S. tilt. This was manifested in the following:
First, Sri Lanka's position on the U.S. military build-up at Diego Garcia was favourable to Washington. India Was Opposed to it as it resented the naval Competition between the superpowers in its immediate neighbourhood. SECOrd, in 1982, Sri Lafka abstaired from a U.N. Tesolution Calling on all nuclear states to refrain from stationing nuclear Weapons on the territories of other states. India supported the resolution. Third, Pakistan presented at aLSLLKLLLLLLLLaLHH LLLLLLLKa in 1983 a proposal wanting the entire LLLLLL LLLLLLa0aLLL LLaaLa a LLL aaaLLLLLLLaL S t Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ), including the littoral and hinterland states. Sri Lanka, along with Bangladesh and Nepal, supported it. India rejected it as she thought that it was aimed at bringing in the old Pakistant proposal to make South Asia a NWFZ, and also including within the scope of the proposal the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Earlier, India had also rejected a Pakista ni Proposal for a regional Collective Security in the Indian Ocean in 1979.3
Fourth, in 1981.Sri Lanka Withdrew its candidate, Ambassador Christopher Pinto, for the post of Chairman of the

Page 11
Third Law of the Sea Conference to pave the Way for Singapore's Ambassador Tommy Kohl. One eminent Sri Lankan commentator was of the View that the U.S. Would be happy to note that Sri Lanka was not lobbying to hard for OZOP.' And fifth, Sri Lanka Was the Chairma II of the UN Special Committee on the Indian Ocean. But Presiderat Jaye Wardene Was not keer On the Convening a Conference of this COT. Tittee. He tried to avoid responsibility by Saying "What Carl We do if one or both of the Superpowers do not agree to corne to the conference. I am afraid We cannot do much. It is up to the LaLLLLLLLL a LLLL LLLLaLL LaLSK
The developments in the Indian ՕՇՅan area and the changedբerSpeCtil We of Sri Lanka regarding the ICOZOF were perceived by India as having deleterious effection hersecurity. After all, the IOZOP is the maritime corollary of India's regional strategic policy, which is to dely or neutralise any extra-re
gional role, to main in the South Asian to Taintainstability Was COTICEarī Eid = b bgigWEti attle Asian region EECarl of Cold War Cliffor also Lindercut her
macy in the area. |ndian Oceam polic India's Security CC tradisi CColliñTibO SO 5tH|| FTFg. If1Cdi EEEITTCSt COrlearT alleged offer of b: U.S. Navy at the
Over the grant of CO O | Tank, Farm (TTF a U.S.-affiliated CC LFB WCice Of ATTE IgE EJETWEET W |յrրից,
The Tricomalee
They were s. Jaye Wa Tidenleg OWE
Notes
TD), EEE for i LT 1al F.E. Jayararu, India's National Security and Foreign Policy, ABC Publishing HELSE, NEW DEIHI, TI 987, pp. 95-99.
11. Sheila Harden, Small is Dangerous:
MiCTO. States III E MIG TO WOJTI Fran, CBS Pinter, Londoni, 1985), p. 6.
12. Time magazine, 3 January 1979, p. 4.
13, Hedley Bull, "The Greatirresponsibles? The United States, the Soviet Union. äid World Order". International Jour
nal, Wol, XXXW, No. 3, Summer 1980, p.
.
14. Philip Windsor, "Superpower Intervention"in Hedley Bull (ed.), Intervention in World Politics, Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 58.
5. Sīglī J. Kādkārā, "Ierātigrā DGHHGLCLLaaLLL LLaLaaLaLLLLLLLaLL aLLLLLLLS An inpublished research paper, CoGmbo, Linefaled, p. 30; Paul X Kellay, "Putting "Let Fia Teen" in U.S. Foreign Policy", The Christian Science Monitor, 20 August 1980, D. 22.
16, SEEPresident Carter's Satant the Unior MESSaga, 23 Janiary 1980 in Current Policy, No. 132, U.S. Department of aLLS LLLL LLLL LLLLLL YL LLLLLS LLLHLKLS |ngtun, D.C.
17, Lok Sabha Debates. Seventh Series, Wol. X'W, No.39, 9 April 1981, Cols, 365
366, Iri, 1980 - 5shi We find it (India danger. The frt: If IIHFiSH til maçES tha 3,5 TILTE LITETE: FICT IT IT CCEEIT Tit LJE HETT. AI I НВЕНЦЈЕН Пf |TE I the TES. It tre With || || ES : Speeches an I. Gadi, W.W. Her 1981, Publir
if | Tiffiti
TTE of Illi 513-14.
18 iEalid. Coil, 264 a 25, 25 Mai T:til 1:
| LDK 5:HHE DEH X. No. 6, 27 Fe: 28, 1982, Sabha that "By basa at Diego GI in the gate of: FICK THE SC nEation. No patric Sabi Debates. XXWI, Nicoll: 25, 25
20. The Sunday O.
Otter 19B,
21. Report of FrocE
El COITIO
 

tain the status quo power balance and in the region, India ut its security as it idian Ocean SOLIth mea possiblearena tation. Which Would politi CO-military priSri Lanka's revised y just compounded Cens. The other 's foreign policy did appeared to a We led Ower Sri Lanka's Se facilities to the TriCoralee Port Intract regarding the at Trincomalee to InSOrti UTT, and QWer rica (WOA) agreeAshington and CO
base controversy.
JE ČLlt CJT5 TIL LE
TITTE Ft Ed Coffered
facilities to the American Navy at Trincomalee. These were given rise to by two factors. The first was Colombo's lifting in 1981 of nine-year old ban. On foreign Warships using facilities at the TriCoralee harbour, following which the U.S. Navy sent a number of Warships to this Sri Lankan port on Various ESSEIGF1594. And the SeCIJTid WaSa 1981 report that America had nawal aCCESS to this port. General David Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, reportedly referred to the possibility of Trincomialee being. COnsidered as a potential U.S. base in the Indian Ocean. It was also reported in the Indian Capital in 1980 that some U.S. Congressmen, reportedly with the blessing of the State Departinent, had approached officials at the Sri Lankan Embassy in Washington for "rest and recreation facilities at TrinCOThalee for U.S. sailors serving in the Indian Ocean region.
a stated that "...today, Ocean) chiurning With ritically incrEHSirgfäCe
i Edi OCE Ortlis C. L. COE st ... Any big power Con1 or neighbourhood will his tension has built up colapse Of de tante and lew El Of THE CLJ i WEF Severity". Selected d Writings of Indira Jarl Luary 1980-DE-Camilltation Division, Ministry ind Broadcasting, GCWI, NEW Delhi, 1985, papa,
nd ihId. Wol XXVI. No. 1B2, Cols. 339-410,
ates, Sixth Series, Wol. ruary 1978, Cols. 260IE M Fl-Istat Edit a Lbk
establishing artilitary af CIA, AT PITCH HELS, ES Tess, puta chess, puta Vereignty of the Indian It CEIT till: TETTITES, ILOk. E, Sgije rith Series, Wol, March 1982, Col. 410.
јSErwar, CEHUTTELJ, 25
#Eding5 Ճf the Twentirealth Parliamentary
Conference, Held in Colüftlbe in September 1974, Commonwealt Parliamentary Association, London, nl. d. p.
.
22, Report of Proceedings of the TwentiEthi COTT TI onwealth Parlia Tentary Conference, held in Colombo in SEpter Tiber 1974. Cormmonwealth ParliaTentary Association, Londom, n, d.i. p. 4.
Ք3. Under the Jariatha government "India ga'ya top Priority to improving its relations with its imitediate neighbours Hrnting its foreign policy Objectives, These relations, developed on the basis of equality, goodwill and mutual trust, helped towards creating a climate of TITTEISĘation and Friendship, thus pro= moting the cause of peace in the regiữT1"| SE=MĩnÎstry Gf External Affairs Report, 1977-78, New Delhi, 1979, p. 1. By Gontrast, the Central therne of the neighbourhoodpolicy of the Indira Gardhlig Owa Triniment was "India's de Siretto promote the establishment of peace in the region to enable individual Countries to pursue their efforts for Economic and Social armelioration of their peoples, free TOT OLI ES id inte TfeTence.... RECīPOTOCity...WOLuld...for TT the Ebasis of good neighbourly relations" (em phasis added). Seeibid., 1980-81, p. v.
(Continued on pagՃ11 9.

Page 12
REGION
From "SAARC" to "United
S. Venkat Narayan
HE SEWEN CICLUtria S. that a TE LL LLaaLLLL LS SLa LSK aaaL LLLLLLaLLLL LSLSeS sociation for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Wil|| ratify the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) by November this year, one month before the regional grouping celebrates its tenth anniversary. This was decided during the eighth suntnr Tiit of SAARC's heads of states of governments, which Concluded here ön May 4.
SAPTA's ratication W| enable Bangladesh Bhutan, India, Maldíves, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka to promote intra-SAARC trade. ACCOrding to arlestimate made by the United Statesbased Centre Global Trade Development (CGTD), loW custorms tariffs and LaLLHLLLLLLL LLLLLLLaa a L LaaLLLLL aL goods and services from One Country to anotherin the Tegion Wil||helpin Crease intra-SAARC trädde fiWei-fold fTOT THE present US dollars 3 billion to Over dollars 15 billion by the year 2000 AD.
South Asia, where 1,200 Tilliol people (a fifth of humankind) live "is poised to become an important economic force With the preferential trade agreement (SAPTA) and Could Change LLHL LL LLL LLLLLL aLLaLaLLLLTO HL LaL LLLLL LLLLLS cient Tarketplace of the World", predicts CGTD report.
The Seven geographical y Contiguous countries were considered the backbone of the British Empire. Throughout recorded history, this area Was coveted by every empire-builder W Orth his salt, ircILIGding Alexar der the Great, Until the British left the SubCOroltiment in 1947, British India was considered a Jewel in the British) Crown.
However, ever five decades later, the legacy left behind by the British Continues to haunt South Asia. The political and economic amalgamation of the Seven Countries in the region into a formidable entity by the turn of the
O
century appeared ity Luntil the other di
Molonger. Quit had gathered to W SAARC I DggeTi Werte Sceptical ab) C off in the first place, is the only countr EDOrder:S With fio Lur Coll tries. While a TOW Fate it ffOT the reT
Inevitablyer 0U tend to have prOble SOme probleIT1 Cor l stan, Bangladesh
SAARC may in C countries may shared history, are available in tomorroIWS ASi: Countries Sticki affairs.
Fuly, Indian Pri Narasimha Rao, W SAARC: Clairāfi SLJITI I Thit, does not lr Erns Of Titärt5 b cies left behind by they Gan besalved and perswerance.
Hawling COWETE Held S0 fair, and Hq: Wicissitudes throug passed, prospects SAARC Have rlútb pointing as prof WOLI|t} Walt LIS | 0
Yes, its progri fully Slow, The Cic
EEVidia"Sel FOTE WET-treater til organisation Outos ening downpour, B EWEr W|| WOR.

States of South Asia?
O Ele an impossibilEY. 3 a few of those Who
tēš tā ir gr. 1985 i Dhāka ut the outfit taking As it happens, India y which shares its * the TETE ET COLIITstrips of sea sepaIaining two. gh, Only heighbours eIS. Iridia has had he other With Pakiand Nepal. Merci
yet happen, and SAARC may eventually help the quarrelling neighbours to sort Dut their problems in the flot ton distant fut LITe?
SAARC may indeed be a pOQT Ther's club. Individually, its sternber countries may not wield much cloutin the comity of nations. But shared history, Culture, heritage, natural resources LLLLLL LLL LLL LLLLK aLaLLLLL L S LLLL region may Verily make South Asia the lion of töHorroWS Asia. Thestrength of South Asia lies in the Savel Countries sticking together and demanding to be counted in global affairs.
feed be a poor men's club. Individually, its member not wield much clout in the comity of nations. But culture, heritage, natural, resources and talent that the region may verily make South Asia the lion of a. The strength of South Asia lies in the seven ng together and demanding to be counted in global
Ime MinjstЕГ РМ. who took charge as
at the New Deli Jokat them) as probut only as the legahistory, Hebelie Ves if you hawe Patience
gd || the SLIFTIT ITS awing Witnessed the Il Wichi SAARC has of the SUCCESS Of een sobad Ordisapassignal DESSimists EJElle WC.
ess has been painLlds of di St TLStt lät at OS. With Pakistan Wash the fledgling existence in a frightut it hasn't happened, nOWs, armiracle may
It is true that roughly every Second person in South Asia lives below the poverty line. But it is equally true that it is horne to over 425 million People in the middle-class bracket-the biggest anywhere in the World, NOW that India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are que Luing Lup to get into the region, But, right now, intra-SAARC trade amounts to a pitiable 3.5 percent of the region's total trade. The just-released "SAARC Survey of Development and Cooperation 1995' notes. The interregional trade bet Ween South Asian Countries is very small and there is significant potential for its increase"
In 1993, the total exports of nonSAARC developig COLI ritrje:S amounted toastaggering dollars 1,125 billion. Of this intra regional trade beLWeenthose COLIntries Was as high as 40 percent (dollars 450 billion). Therefore, the potential for increased trade

Page 13
Within SAARC Countries is obviously בשם החם וחבו
THSISWhereSAPTA dan tangin to Take this happen. The New Delilbased Research and Information System (RIS) for the non-aligned and Other developing Countries, which prepared The SAARC Survey, recommendis that "reduction in trade barriers should be Steeper tharll that provided usides the WOTld Trade Organisation (WTO) AgreëTherit". ItalSOSLuggests that the CLII Frent "product-by-product" approach should be replaced by "across-theboard COCESSIOS".
At the first press conference. Mr. R23 23:Ser', 'i', k's capacity as SAARC 's new chairman here on May
4 IdSkEdFil: " emergance of S, Stattյs tյf StյլItiլ , Tal IET of the Uri (USA) and the Eu. a decade. Or TWOf
The 74-years over the question Birld Said: "YOLU 5 trologer. But I thi The di TECti. S tl SUre that We'll try in Let's ref The ITE) er i (Association of Si tions 25 years intra regional polit Come a region Of
MTREC ad
(Cor. Ir LPGad sredirTi page g}
24, Text of Speech in Sri Lanka Foreign Affairs Record, Wol, T. July 1978-June 1979, Coleil,
25, H.S.S. Nissanka, Sri Lanka's FØreign Policy: A Study in Non-Alignment, Op. cit., F. 34.5 T.D.S.A. DİSSalamlayaka, J.R. Jaye Wardane of Sri Lanka, SWEāSlika Press, Colombo, 1977, pp. 70-72 President Jayewardene said interview: To me both sides are equal. I would like to be friendly. With all CCLIntries". Dawn, Karachi, 9 September 1977.
26. Sunday Observer, Colombo, 11 Sep.
EFTEDET TIFF
27. Na WEErdi Ahmad, "FRECCant DevelopITIEntS in Sri Lanka", Pakistan Horizon, Wol. XXXII, No. 3, Third Quarter, 1979, p. 42.
2B. See for Dharmalingam's statement, National Stato Assembly Debates, Official Record, Colombo, Vol. 25(1), No. 2, 6 December 1977, Cols, 35936D.
29. Karunada sa is of the opinion that Sri Lanka's interest in non-aligned politics Wa SgOVErrl-EdToird by EACHTIÖT iCi fa CtOTS rather than political Sea Ph.D. Thesis of Wadu Mastrige Karunadasa, NonAlignment: A Case Study of Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy. With Special Reference to 1970-1982, Lake House Investment Ltd, Book House, Colombo. 1EEE, p. 12.
30, For example see Shelton U. Kadikara, Keynote Address: Geo-strategic Perspectives of Indo-Sri Lanka Relations"
- in his (ed.), L Laikā Rāti
31. Shieltari U. Kj. at the Marga ln: CEE|DIFETIET EFE, F-FICT
1.
32. The Hindu, ME
33. Foreign Ministe terial Meetingo BLIFE a Llyfr | HRH Wia EוחםEחd Uחsta Elimination ofg Епив апа. Наss, ץ 5חaם וח חוEEHH CrFIEL I thig 21 ;boוחםCol Fernando, De Staat Bad ir PETITE ment was fully c. of OF SEP (Hansard), Off Wol. 24 No. 5, 1
34, SEE PES
dress at C. Barda fa räikE SELES CIT 2 S մagewartiքոբ, ի Collection of: tional Affairs, S Singapore; 19E
35. UNGA, 37th :
WOrbati FeCO іпg, 13DEсвплb 37 BSA,
36. TiT ES of Ildi
1983, Indian ant

"Do you foresee the A ARC ES a "Lited Asia" (USSA) in the ed State SOfAmerica ropean Union (EU) i'r rtյրll ritյի "?
-old leader pondered for a Tolent OrtWC. Et, I am ript Hn asnk the trend is right. iE DOrrect tյրE | Hrm 10 reas We goal Cong". that it took ASEAN JLIf East Asian Nato get Over their ical problems to beeconomic tigers.
aclared in his inaugu
ral address: "Inour quest for this future. We Cantake encouragement from the perceived Historical Shift LHEat We are TOWing towards what is predicted Will be the Asian Century. We have to ent sure through our visionary actions that South Asiais part of this resurgence and dosa not bēCŪThe a backWater Of the New Asia. By strength of numbers, talent and ability, we should, as we did fifty years ago at the dawn of the postColonial era, bein the Wanguard of the revival of Asia. This is the challenge of history before LuS Which We hawe to address and master".
ArēE SOLuth Asia's de CİSİ Om makers
ready and Willing to Cope With this challenge?
eas of Indo-Sri OTS, op. cit, p. 26.
Ikara, Paper preserted GILLE SETTITETICIPE| - пSouth Asian Coорегаոber 1EE7, Colombo, բ,
A83
Halle Misthe NAM Coordinating na in May 1978 that "We romisingly for a total eal power Tilitary pros525, as being the only fremoving tension and агеа", See Weekтепd, May 1978. Tyronne Juty Foreign Minister, Tiant that his governDmmitted to the concept arliamentary Debates, icial Report, Colombo, | C. Juni 1983, Col. 49 E.
R. Jayewardene's AdJ Il W3 Ca Tirri T 1 D Entra for InterTatītā poter Tibar 1987, inli JLR, My Quest for Peace: A Speeches on InternaStanford Press Pvt Ltd., B, F. 204.
Session, Provisional rd Df the D15t MgetBFS.
New Delhi, 10 March Foreign Review, New
Delhi, Wol. 16, No. 10, 1 March 1979.
37. Mervyn Da Silva, "Operation ASEAN", India Today, New Delhi, 16-31 May 1ՅB1, ք. 1:15,
3B. Far Eastern Economic Review.
Hongkong, TB JLune 19B2, p. 38.
39. On kar MariWahl, "India's StrategiC PETSpectiĪVES Orithe Indiam COCEarl" in William LL DOWdy and RL5Sol B, TFOOd (eds.), The Indian Ocean Perspectives on a Strategic Arena, Himalayar books, New Deathill, 1987, p. 301.
40. Times of India, New Delhi, 6 May 1981.
41. See Annual U.S. Military Posture, Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 7 February 1981, USICA, New Delhi, p. 7, The "fam||äflsation []LIr" of Wice-\dfilEd C.A.H. Trost of the U.S. Seventh FIEEE and the wist of a taa TI frörill the Manila-based U.S. Naval Intelligence Service Resident Agency (NISRA) to ColorTEC in 1980 were construed as missions to press hard for base facilities in Trincorralee for Arnerican Navy. See Tribune, Chandigarh, 8 July 1980.
42, Times of India, New Delhi, 5 January
1981 and 5 January 1982.
43. Reportedly, the U.S. State Department infarwErled and the taks WETE ab Dresd. Sea Tribune, Chandigarh, BJuly 1980. See also Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Colombo,

Page 14
INDIAN OCEAN Regionalism a New Tempo:
The emergence of regionalism in the Indian Ocean would certainly not be be for E ti TE. NOT WOLuld it be in arly
SEns, E LIITILISILJE I de Velopments
a OLId he World.
||| FH. Er
|udged agains! regions Many states ha We
come to recognise how effective a
dew it a regt Grial be for advancing
lational Tite IESES. he ecolor
Coope Fation Carl H Էյroad rangք բl They ha Welfo Lund Complementa riti ES,
and ways of expanding trade and
investmErt With
their neighbըurs.
They have found mutual advantage in discussing policy Problems like
refugee IOWS,
E11. FFC ||ITIE TEE|
polution, terrorism and narcotics trafficking, which cross multiple
borders. They hawa
developed
the Tears of di SC LUISSing and defL Sing Liensions and disputes Whichth. Teater)
the Security of the
The tempo of reig
1r region,
IT-5-IT ES DEST)
increasing rapidly since the end of the
Cold War. New reg are emerging
ional är TangĒTIE nt S and existing
arrangements are growing stronger as
regional interests fшllег expression. - Europeaп
| | I | C II
SBBk and acquire Europe has the Il di | E
Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Africa has the Organisation of African Unity and the Southern Africa Develop Tent Com
munity. The Asia
Pacific region has
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regicna || FOUT1. And, O COLITS e South Asia has SAARC, and South East Asia the Association of South East Asian Na
tions (ASEAN). Australia itself
E.
W
its C|SeT arrangement
FELS si | ti | T | tl: R = || 3 || (-) || is |EF NEW TEE|Ed.
Thig, 5 g. Creation 15 - EU and OSCE COAU
and SADC., NAFTA Hind'APEC, SAABC,
ET E FETS SAWE || -
ASEAN
LKKLY S SY LLLLL LL LLLLL S La L L0LLLLLL00 L LaLLS
Ton, quite apart SO UPO AP POËSI TE TICE
from the alphabet tյք լիբTr t|t|ts, TՒլը
Flave USLI allybegun in quite modest ways, and With limited aims the EU, for example, currently the World's TCS1 developed regional grouping, started
|ft |ր Լիլը 1BED His
a relatively si Tiple
agreement on coal and steel. Beyond
SLI CH
12
beginnin
ETE f
cooperation and gathered strength hawa gained Confil processes and in opportunities for suggested the ITsely relationships het We Liverse layors. Til regionalism - the in Eric Thin TSECTIE || F en C25 Workshops, Hըրs Hրքl other lir panded and de Welt. the growing in Wolve aconomies in regic | 5 || SC Eilee Ewolwing regional Sil esses that they ha emargence, at a le: Of a SESE Of COTTI respective popula a feeling of identifi gion and its consti peoples - grOWS fr Contrict and KCW mal arrangements LSiss WE |TITEti TI LECHTIC increasing Cross-li WEST EE || diri WÉ: A E O aspects of Tegiga and Co Ti Tilurity res and help. Each Oth:
SE VETE FELLE regional a Trangen recognised. They ii r ILSIE 1 E membership, with |imits of the StTË El 25 WG WHICH EDIT tog Ether. They ft in Wariably, to be he a accum IT Udatin CES in Size, ECC TOT El CLUTE EL TIO Thc3 y. Operate t0 ; COSSLISECC2) portance Of BTISUI mant proceeds director Stata
IEEE W.A. variably multi-tri: through the efforts Tents, but of a far as well,

dialogue ha Ve als participants den Ca il regional e EC Other NEW cooperation have Յs and the regional a developed ICW, le machinery of חוחetwork of sum meetings, conferE Lusiness, aSSOCiakages - has exped as a result of It of States and inaarrangements. a characteristic of Eructures and procWe Clarated the ss tangible level, 1Lurnit y am ong th Bir TOTS. Thält 53n5 = tal|tյր Կալիի իt re| Light CLI|t LIFE 5 and It creased ledge that the forbring. Touri ST, | Education, ni E. W. ilogy and tha EVETnking of trade And * along this growth. and the informal |||SIT - architect LIFE pectively - interact er de wel op Further.
s of Successful lents ought to be Y Gare, by in at Lure, ir approach to E. Wils angth of the basic |S taj alter: Briti, tյfign if rigt LerogeneOLIS, often J wide differenic sirength, religion ng their members. a large degree by ting the critical iming that developat a paCE, and in ITETTE E F E E F E COITIhaya real Tost inicked, a dwa Ticing
mցt only of goverriIgE of Caitlī ar player:S
= Gare E War 75
including business associations, and LLaLLLLL LL LHa S L L S L a LLLLL S LLLLLLaaLaSS
Norie of this is to s Luggest tha ! regionalism's growth will be at the expense of global Cooperation - Úr, Worse, WI || result in the Emergence in à World-Wide Tribalism EI-15Ed Jr. Ti Litually-antagerli StİC TEgil Cina | grՃւյբings. For One thing different regional groupings are not mutually exclusive; rather they are linked together by the O VET tapping remberships of their constituent States, in rathor the sa Tie Way that the five Olympic rings overlap.
MÖSEL rati) Fil- Tailt i Ti 壬 LLLL L LLS LLLL L L L L L L L L L S L L L L L L LL focus, reflecting such basic factors as history, the nature of the e Corn Cinny, geographic location, and ethnic, religious and linguistic make up. They are usually engaged With different groups of states simultaneously, allowing them to identify. With more than Orne region of sub-regiom. The link= ages produced in this way should be seеп as a source of strengthandoрепless in each respective regional grouping - En Suring that these do not be = come in Ward-Looking, as each memb) Er has regard for the other regional associations of Which they are simultaneously The Tibers.
We in Australia Identify" prismarily these days With the Asia Pacific, but we certainly don't identify only with that gro Luping. Australia, like Tost countries, has multiple other group Interests and loyalties to which We can and should give weight. We are members (with 184 others) of the United Nations, and (with 50 others) L L K LLLLLL LLH HHHLKYSLL LLS aa LLLLL aLLS With in hB UN systerT WE ha Ye been part of the Western Europe and Other Group (WECG) for electoral and policy discussion purposes, We a Te TETHErs and In SEWErä| CASES initiators, of a пшПher of special interest Coalitions formed for particular purposes, like the Cairns Group of fair-trading agricultural producers and the Australia Group' of responsible chemica Export EFS. WE HÊ We bila tara

Page 15
CT pa||LIFI latera defence alları CE35, With the United States, New Zealand and PqpLa New GLinea and - In the context of the FIVE POWer Def ECE AFangements - With Malaysia, Singapore and the UK as Well.
Geographically, We hava a strong regonal and institutional attachment to the South Pacific groups of nations. Within The South Pacific, We are afl "ALJ Stralasiam" COLI Intry, bound intimately to New Zealand through the comprehensive CER Free Trade Agreement. In the context of the countries to our north. With whom We are becoming ever Tore strongly integrated, We are coming to see ourSalves, and be seen, as a country of the "East Asian Hemisphere". And, of сошгse, wе аге incгеasingly поwпо! just looking north and east in defining our geographical identity, but West as Well, to the Indian Ocean region. Australia can give weight and value and Commitment to all of these group relationships, old and new, and to others as Well, without in any way prejudicing or undermining our sense of identification with any single one of them. And our experience in this respect should be no different in kind from anyone else's.
The Way Ahead for Indian Ocean Regional Cooperation
So how might We go about progressing regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean region? While It is trLIB to Say that regional relationships around the Pacific rim, particularly in the private sector, had reached a high degree of intensity before PAEC came into being, and there is no Comparable intensity in the Indian Ocean rim, none of this is to say that the Indian Ocean region is condemned to be forever Without for Ursis for Consultation and dialogue on matters of mutual InterESt.
One dynamic driving greater regional economic cooperation will be the Progressive reduction in developed country tariffs - resulting from LinflatGral measu TE5 and SUCCESSIVE TOUdS of multilateral trade negotiations - which is eroding the value and reevance of preferential arrangerments
- TF1 CTE
SLClI as thE LOIT: foret C | Die
preferential a colonies), Incr
economics Will tage of the more
EWOTEL quire changes it ärld a reduction II of dependency. proaches will incr CITIT EST LI Tthe di ket opening DCCLII of the World EL in Ward-looking, 5 cies will inevitab enormous growth action With othe In Australia, We F that path for 12, regional dialogue
eration can both :
ture such de Welo
It is a ISO easi ET LE than in isolation greater the more Specifically, a economic coope Ocean region Cou rhan Thi C am dacta5 = regional integrati Such a process Operative model early years of AP sis in the first Compilation , mfø tion and policy di: erative projects economic activity infrastructura ar tions, and particl. like human resour 5 Ta || and TE development.
is a le. thinking, new ide t0 || 0 Ok at IE W Wa We are to de Welo proach Which is : Indial Ocean Te. We need to a FOU.S. AECVG - up a dialogue an cepts and directic sarily making a

conventions where powers extended Cass O.T. fOTIEF hasingly, regional |eed to take adwaniberal global trading rays which will reECCATIOTIC CLI It LUTE traditional patterns Out Ward=|looking apBasingly become the a regulation andmarS. The globalisation onomy means that Glf-Sufficiency polifail to capture the potential that interecolonies offers. ave been solidly on Ears. A program of and practical coopztengthen and nurpments.
reform Collectively and the gains are the participants, process of regional
|ld capture this dya Catalyst for greater on and prosperity. Could fo || OW thig - ESta Elish I HE EC, with an empha
instance or data maio dissemina1logue and on coopn specific sectors of such as transport, Id telecommunicala tematic area5 :e development and dium eriterprise
fOT SOTI E CITEāti WE as and a Willingness s of doing things, if }а соорегative apppropriate to the յlon. In the process a lot of ideas to |, We nead to open think through connS - Without necesSumptions, at this
stage, about what the end product
Tnight ook like. The negd at this stage is not SOFTI Luchi for a decision – making process as an exploratory process
That read is in fact, the rationale for the rite Tinational Forum cor the India Ocean Region (IFOR), to be hosted by Australia in Perth next month. This for Lim Will act not as an inter-governmental meeting but as a "second track" пneans of exploring the scope for regional cooperation. It will be. Well-Suited to do so, by the nature of its membership, agenda and philosophy, The Forum will be inclusive in its attendance, with participants invited from all-around the region, Participation Will bEl on a tripartite basis, cosisting of government officials (in their personal capacity), business leaders and academics. It Will operate In a deliberataly constructive and forWard-looking fashion; no encouragement will be given to, or opportunity all o Wlad for , the Counter-productiwgal airing of bilateral disputes or Confrontational attitudes surrounding them. There will not be any negotiated declarrations or communiques - simply a Chairman's Statement summarising the la VOur of the di SCLISSIOS and perhaps suggesting some Ways fTWa, Td.
We have adopted a broad agenda for the meeting, Embracing first, economic issues, including existing trade and investment linkages, existing economic cooperation, obstacles and opportunities for enhancing trade and investment and Ways of moving economic cooperation forward; and secondly, other issues, including education, environment, marltime cooperation and security. While I don't Want to in any Way pre-empt the Forum's deliberations, let The say just a litt la more about two of these areas the Central agenda item, economic cooperation, and What SElems to be the most Sensitive iter, security Cooperation.
The B C DTD ITI C: agenda for FOR is expected to focus on the regional impact of the emergence of the global marketplace, the need to be equipped

Page 16
COMF
WIS
TES
VASA OF
2O7. 2nd C
Color
 
 

PUTER
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DTICANS
ross Street,
mbo, 11.

Page 17
The Sri Lankan talks: a trag
By G.G. Ponnambalam
M Ich was expected from the Scheduled May 17talks between the Sri Lankam President. MS. Chandrika KLIIMIma ratunga and some Tamil political parties in the island illation. This euphoria was evidenced not only in Sri Lanka but also internationalty. This Wasto be expected, natu rally, in the light of the breakdown of all Communication between the Government and the LTTE after April 1995,
When Tamil Ealam War III is said to hawe COFImmenced.
With the announcement of Ms. Kumaratunga's invitation to "the TaTTiil political parties represented in Parliament" fortakson May 17, it Was Widely diSCUSSed that the Government, perhaps, Wanted to gG Over the leads of the LTTE to the Tamil people with its much-awaited proposals for a solution to the Tamil problem.
The announcement of the May 17 talks was made a year after Ms. Kumaratunga's exclusive interview to a Tamil newspaper, wherein she stated Categorically that her party's proposal fora political solution to the Tamil problem "Was being prepared." It is more than one year now and, to that extent, the proposals are imuch-awaited", more so because Ms. Kullaratunga Went through two major elections - the general elections of August 1994 a Tid the presidential elections of November gg4 without so much as tWO Seni tences in each of the election manifestos about the Tamil problem – the only crisis that the island has been confronting for so many years nOW!
Bad enough that the two election manifestos did not have any proposals on the Tamil problem, Which Was a clear indication of Ms. Kumaratunga's own ideas about her political priorities, but the unkindest cut of all is the canard that has been let loose that she even received wide support from that Tamils especially those living on the eastern board. If this is indeed true, then the only conclusion one could come to ät this moment of time is that the Tamils have, once again, been taken for granted. For this situation the Tallis
have only themsely cause some of US fell wanting to recognise "as the only Sinhala peace and Who Wan letus standby for a
ΕΓΕ ΠΟΕ,
Another day of must be because M Ele absolutely dam more ways than Orı
A responsible F tially announced an political parties rep ment," irresponsibl clusion of a Tamil represented in Parli On what basis this rationale for it, only can say. But What it is that the other TE sal through that whimper, accept comes along, whic the pitiable positio because their fE working on anythi stand.
WCJ Were thes parties" that sat do Kumāratungaärld” The CWC, the U PLOTE and the Ë |gցk for the lՃWest could only recogn simple "collabora and her Govern File:UPF, are OT g: representing thei of recent Indian office in the Gove ng EPDP the an the Curse of SEWE Succe SSiWē GOW mercenaries forta Army, described Tamils, (with the being no exceptic - Ostensibly to he but actually for Etter ad for til

jedy?
res to bola rime bO2Ow er each otherin MS. Ku Tarat Lliga eader who wanted teda Solution." SO other day of deliv
dell'VeraCetere ay 17 turned out to 3 squib in Inore in
E.
President, who iniinvitation to "Tamil räsented in Parllay permitted the In
political party not arent the EPRLF. was done and the r MS, KLJ Ilia rat LIF ġa sequally significant mil political parties meeting Without a ing anything that nagain emphasises in the Tamils are in presentatives are ng but a principled
he "the Tamil political wn for talks with MS. the President's men? PF, the EPDP, the PRLF. If One Were to Comm01 factor, Orle sethermas plainand ors" of the President ent. The CWC and Janisations primarily interests of the Tamils origin and also hold rnment. The cadre Of d PLOTE hawe, OWer Talyears, and through arminents Worked as Witte Sri Larkan by and large by the EPDPand the PLOTE om), as a Sinhalala TTTy pferret out the Tigers their own bread and air own security.
The TULF, a Tamil political party represented in Parliament, did not aCcept Ms. Kumaratunga's Witatic F1 TC, these taks. No reasons hawe ԷյքՅր given.
Did the TULF feel that the "package" that is being offered is not up to Tamil expectations orisit that this SOt the most opportune time to make public the proposals? This question is raised because on May 7 a Tamil daily carried an interview of Dr. Neelan Tiruchewan, TULF MP, where he has said that the Government proposals must not be made public now. Whereas Mr. A. Thangathurai, another TULF MP, another interview on the same day to an English sister daily, states that էիt GOVernment must make public its proposals immediately.
Was what was released on May 17 all that the Government is prepared to give the Tamils? This cannot gecause it was the intention of the GOV ernment to show its proposals "to the LTTE first. If the May 17 proposals were all that the Government had to show the LTTE, the LTTE would, almost surely, have laughed it off What was made public does not state whether the North and parts of the East WOLL lici be a contiguous unit or With a COrrido in between. The proposals are silenton the subjects of land, law and Grader, ports, the ability to raise funds idpendent of the Centre, Which a se all sensitive issues and on one or more of which a settlement can stumble. So if the May 17 meeting did not come out with the whole of the Government's proposals, What Was te use of that meeting except to Whet one'sapp Stité
There is a school of thought that the Tamil problem should not besolved per se but that it must be Contaished in a broad democratic exercise such as the complete overhaul of the ConstitLtion because otherwise only more problems are going to be created by a polarisation of the Tamils and SirialESE.
(Cori:TimŁJedan pagal 73)
15

Page 18
IMEAN KHAN
A surprise
Tran Khan had left not a sci tilla of doubt. One of the World's most Eligible bachelors, Whose hal| Wedd feats on the Crickët field and in nightclubs set female pulses racing, he was absolutely adamant. He repeated tha message to any journalist Who Would record it he would never marry a foreign Woman. Only an arranged marriage to a pure Pakistani Eoride Would mee his de WOLIT MuslipT) principles, he decreed.
Yesterday the sound of necks cracking in an incredulous doubletake was deafening as the London family of Sir James Goldsmith, the millionaire financier, dropped a bombshell. He and his wife Lady Annabel Goldsmith announced their delight at the Eero that of the former Pakistan Cricket Capta in and their 21 year old daughter Jemima
The shock was compounded later yesterday. When Imran's father said that the couple Were in fact already married in London - a claim he later withdrew after speaking to his son by telephone. It was an engagement that had taken place, he said.
The couple are expected to go through a civil ceremony in June, perhaps at Richmond register office in So Luth WESt London.
In a statement last night Imran said: "I'm extremely happy to an: nouncé thät Hawa found SomEon B who shares Tiy ideals in life. Having studied the religion, Jemima has converted to Islam through hef own convicios.
He added: "Both our failies approve and are extremely happy about the Thatch".
The London social scene was stunned by these developments. It was not just that Jemima's golden hair and fair looks required a leap of
13
imagination to fit mould decreed by had Converted to
M"FLat E. StOThi the glitgerati Was Were thought to hav Tonths ago - an Jenninna, a Stu University, had nE |linked to IrTn ran, W her age. They nothing in common girl's aunt, Kat Saying Contentedly some time. The to not a flash in the p.
| F test Wa: LOnd On ther E. W. Pakistan, Where si from sport, the for re-in Werted hii T1 SE2|| pop u list, dressed ir and apparently the jet-setting was lame GoldSrTith. Si expressed disbeli While colleagues astonishment.
Tele WSO has shocked Laho beca USe Jemima 5 young, but becau: is Jewish. Paki recognise Israel feeling has always country.
|MFAN hä5 bCW. googly that could There are already the like of Which Se en Sin Cla his admission that a Cricket ball in a 1981. His reputa ther, but in P. his engagement charges of hype profound implic. new high profile rol

declaration
to the Pakista Trai 1. Orthia 51a
T.
hed and outragad hat the couple ! become engaged nobody knew, En al Bristo Ver been po Lublicly 10 al 42 is Wice Pope är to hawe Yet era Was the arine Goldsmith, "We've known for nance is certainly
Th"
COTS LETTEt il as a poplexy in TCC. his retife ITTent ner playboy has f as an Islamic | homasршn cloth contemptuous of ys typified by the DIThe of his friends
at the Tatch eact. With
iSite de Cid Tatch e, not so much English, rich and e her fath gr F1 CCIE S 10 t and anti-Israeli run high in the
ed a devish fEabound on him. igns of a storm ha5 I10t been "light-hearted"
tampered with ошntгу game in on plum meted istan ng WS of likely to bring Eris y and hawe ions for his 2 in public life.
There will be many broken hearts. The List of his romantic liaisons includes the actresses Stephanie Beacппе апа Goldie Hawn, Lady Liza Campbell and such high-flyers as Caroline Kellett, Sarah Gil Es and Susannah Constantine. The only Woman with whom he has admitted conternplating matrimony was the painter Emma Sergeant, who turned him down.
Until recently, his girlfriend of three years had been Kristiane Backer, as MTV presenter. Even when they broke up she remained impressed by his religious convictions, "He's a very important man-- for mankind," she declared. : A II this crap about him being a playboy, it's all in the past; he's a Wery de Wout Tian".
While championing in Pakistan as the saviour of the Sick -- for Who The has built a cancer hospital - and castigating the "brown sahibs" who mimic Western habits in his own society, Imran was keen to amplify his thoughts on Tarriage to The Sunday Times Magazine recently: "I sa Wall my friends get divorced - all my friends With out exception -- and that disi || Lusion Ed Thai," he Said.
"But then I realised that they didn't tackle marriage in the right Way.
Lo We and IrOntar CE is mot Teally the way to tackle it. It's not how marriage works: clearly your
objectives in life must be the same as well. Most people don't know their objectives in life."
To avoid any misunderstanding, he emphasised: "That's Why an arranged marriage works. And this year I want to get married".
Last night Imran was reported by his family to be on his way to London from Pakistan as the details of his Secret romance began to emerge.
It is said that six months ago Imran

Page 19
Had gone dancing at Annabe's nightuLLL S LSLLLLL S S L L L L LLLK FE || into a Cng philosophical discusKLa SS K S LLLLL LL S S aSSSLLLL LL LLL Lady АппаБеl.
|пnгап hadjust "соппе ошt" as a born-again Muslim and was fond of actu ring his fallow Country Tien an the merits of Islam as a political and social system. Sitting beside Lady Annab El Washer impressionable young daughter, JerThima. According Laa aLaa0L0 LaaLLLLLLLS LLaC LHHLLLL LLLLLLLC aaCLL Tad it so obvious that Backer Egcame angry with Imran for flirting When thay returned homa that night.
"Despite all his proclamations about leading the goodness in life and Tarrying a pLIre Pakistani girl Who Would stay at home, it is pretly typical L a LC L aS S L L LaLL L L LLLLL LL LLLK HKL S LL S LH LLLLLL LL SS S LL LL 0 LLLaL and industrialist, who has donated lavishly to his cancer hospital.
Backer, a leggy German aaaaLLLLL HLHaH LLK KLLL LL LLLLLLLLSK HaaLHCLa town of Lahore many tirTES, IiVed fOT long periods in his London flat and COWErted to sat EISE.
"Imran had a Ways made it wery clear that is wife had to be a ML5 | Tl an dit SEETS, tha LEWE TW SDX y, loaded member of the glitigrati who wanted to marry him quickly be corne a Muslim," said a friend.
Jemima began the conversion LL S S LLLLL LLLLL S LLLLL L LLLLL LLLL LLLLLL months ago, according to friends. But sources say the real matchmaker WäS Fler Tother, who Was Cléärly taker Wilh F1 far and gen Lily liked him. It is beginning to look like an arranged marriage after all
"Apparently the mother is very LLaLLLLL a LLL S SKLLLHHHH S S LaaH SLLLHHL Wh Ether Imran is madly in Iowwith Jernima, but being so young ha kr10WS het Gän Thould hiër." El Friend Säildi.
Backer was reported to be "shocked and shaken" by the latest LLKK KLL S S L SLLLLLS SLa HH aaKKKK S She refused to Cõmẽ tũ hET phone III
London yes--tard her for a hour ;
It say friends.
LA HORE WES
1ra"5 COgeri trying to establis Was a clear di wisi who thought the ri WESLUTTLE II i Ti Most WETE, a TI TID mot informing the
TS 5 he was to marry WfL WE FTi kW at Text We going to Peshawa a very pretty Pat family want him ranged Tarriage, : Oi TE.
Many Lah SITE Of FCT hospital campaigr til Fist Six TT TIL to attacks by IT TË Ti S' of Pakist: Cultura a Tid forge | heritage. Now he Sahib himself, si |Til Ist.
"Sp. Th. Lu Chi LEIE SLETS
"He as El Child TeT , ET he is going to m: S- Eclér irdL
Many friends ar. the filla fria gę budding political
EI - 135 | E FII support for him to were is . TSEE - SETEL El Wants I dC).
Right-Wing hä\re supportE WETEITBSS CET organisars are
ETEST W FC W. FC hero martying t բrominent suբբը

y. Im Tam spoke tC) Est WEE. T. F. El cir als getting (TBFried,
Jzzing y esterday as grlds faced aroLInd
to facts. To Ln betwggrl Th.055 aws of his marriage pse who accepted it. ed With Imran for ST
IS LIET OTSETESE. | El C-Plk51. El Ed KristiВПЕ. ДПС | ek Imran's family is ttLICE EC har girl, Who his
to rT"I2-ärry I r 1 l a r1 Ea T--
said a close friend
og bo Lusim ESSITETI
added II's "I Were fri OL 5. "FOT is Weave listened . OLHE DO SEin Who ape Western I - DOL thler MLSIIIII FlaSb), E COTTE E EDITÓW aid a leading indus
for his critique on
ial Wollan 5hould Stay al 1ome, NOW, arry this nymphet,"
5Lri: list.
d businessmen Say WOL dCO i5 Carger. LJ Titi 10W Widespread public to head a Politi CE | become prime ning he has de nied
fundar Tentalists.
15 SOCIE paign. His main Students, the Jamaat-8-Islami, act badly to their le daughter of a TitiT of STEE|
LL SS S S SKLL S LL S L
En Es:Elly HC ya I, PODimit Eng CLit thail բrt mirrient in tal fig LITES haw = Tia Tried foTeign ETS before. But sorme a K SSK S S S S S S S H HH L S S S LLL KK LL L S S L LLLL L L L LS
"He is Tarrying a girl who is
extremely rich, connected to the European royal families and major business groups around the World,
and She Will take hiT pola CEOS," Said tյրB,
Imran Was last sighted at a friend's house on Thursday, where he had a lorg Conversation With Frank Wisner the American ambassador LO | India, whic is wis iting Pakistan to try to calm Indian-Pakistän to try to Calm Indian-Pakistä rii tensions over Kashmir, "Imran gawa His line UT1 islam and AmericaП double standards," said a friend.
THE Gliss Erg Wig SCILI Frilus Tun Tjurs suggesting that the couple are marrying so quickly because Jemi ma is pregnant, "SOTëone put it to Lady Annabel and she greated the very idea with mirth," said a Tri ET d.
Lady Annabel yesterday We|- comed the news of the Wedding, "I just want to say that Tly husband and I a TE: absolutely thrilled," shĒ said: "We are very happy, but we feel
S S SKLL LC S HaHHS KaLaL SLS LLaaaL it.
Close friends of the family said last night, however, that some family members, particularly Sir James, WerE apprehensivë ab OLlt the prospect of Jam İrma Tiarrying a Musli II and having to spend So ПLJCI I TE JE PRIKStaП.
S LLLLLLaL LLLL LLLL LHaLLaLL LLL L LLLLa LLLLL do what mothers do and Stand by her," said a close family friend. "But Jemima Was Worried about lelling her father. She eventually di - just days ago - and he is going along
With it.
"But everyone is Worried by LL LLLLL S KLLLLLaLaLaaLS LLLLL S LLLL going to take her away and
17

Page 20
effectively lock her up somewhere in Pakistan. Jemima is a delightful fairy and everyone İS VEEfy COICGTTEC fOT Fer".
The friend said that the couple Wara plani ming a party in London at the end of the Toth.
Jane Procter, editor Of TEat LIGr said she had known for a month, through a friend, of the plans for a marriage and she shared the family's concern for JerTina's future. "It has the awful feel of the arranged Tai Triaga. He has everything to gain and she has nothing to gain."
Procter played down the age difference and potential cultural or religious conflicts. "Jemima is mixing with older people all the
time through her SO age difference | " HI PE main base. It may York Of Where Wer.
My Train W she to gain out . gla Till Of ÖLJS and til other girls failed not sure he is a :
WCHI WED 05 | T. fOTTE SLIT zine, expressed f. riage. "I don't thin HOTOLIralle regG Women," she said
"| F tg | fOLIdad I LEOT Shackled to II
(Continued from pagց 15)
To approach it in this Way is to sweep the dirt under the carpet. The
only issue facing the country is the Tamil
problem. It has been festering for close up to half a century. The Sri Lankan psyche has been ingrained to think, see KaaL aaaLS LLS S aaLLaaH aa aL S LLLLLL problem. To try to STuggle a purported LLLLLLLHHLLLLHLLLLLLL LLLaLLLLLCLLLLL LLaaLLLS first and forertnost, be a dishor Est approach and for that reason may be suicidal. There is a War going on as a result of the Tamil problem. We Cannot wait for niceties. The bull must be taken by the FOTIS.
If it is true that Ms. Kurillaratunga has obtained repeated mandates for peace, that she has the goodwill of the two-thirds of the voting population of the country, that the Sinhala psyche is now ready for a solution to the Tamil proben, that she has the support of the Tamil people and that the Govern Tient is committed to "transparency" (Whatever that means), What are We Waiting ftյր?
The President has committent to abolish the Executive Presidential system by the July 1, 1995 by Tears of a new Constitution. The deadline for the People's AHiance to Taka publicits new Constitution, therefore, is July 1, - just 40 days more, is the Tamil problem to lose its priority and urgency and OCCUpy a position like other matters to be tackled by the new Constitution? If that is the idea, it lacks honesty.
8
MSIKLITartu tion1, taunt Béd the la rigthave a billePrin! Tamil proble T1. Caf be said of her GWe of Was, the Govern |ts prop OS als W|||n. that Way but Woul. OVerhaul of the pre COLuld Fla We Engel 5 Words, in the first ir Fa We been honesty
To postpone GOVEITInent's prop the evil day. One anything. To expec Cole better, Willa the least, foolhardy lay is Worsening the ssare notgoingto With this kind of po
Ever the LTTE ally saying that it is What the Gowerm: LTTE is not prepa Government's proGCWETIT EIt TOW IF from any or Every ComTEITEnt, sincer by making public t ilegiately? To sa propOSals that Wer May 17 meeting tragedy
Tਡ Congrg55.

father's friends, s isn't a problem. Stal y EE FE bDe Lord (31 OT, M|Ee",
orry is What has i il' He is WBry E FTT || || CSS O SITTE. BU || || Jä T1 2rize: Worth having.
I V10 in ECWCW. Ed iday Times Magaaars for the lark Imran has a Very "di With Tegard to
ospital he has a continues, he is lo Keep producing
ented. He has
قليل Chlaifitable if CGT e for it, That T1 Ea T'S lay Woran he marries Would Have to IVE Irl Lahore and LIsidor Pakistani traditions, which is Wirtually POLITIda F1.
Nigel De Tıp Ster, the Fleet Street gossip - co l LI IT nist who hlas kro Wr Jemima als Er life said the announcement that they were to Tarry had tak En hii FT LCU tally by surprise. He also expressed concern for her future happi rileSS. "Imran is obviously wery Muslim Ofi
clearly captivated Jemima and she is infatuated by LL KLLLLL LLLLL S LL S LLCaaLLaLLL LaaLaLLL she has though everything through.
SKSL S 0KK KLLS KSLL L aaLLLLL LLK L Y aLLLL LSLS L L L L L S S S SK S K K S D H S L pantaloons Sit next door discussing fundamentalism. It certainly Will no be SWT".
ga, Whilst in Opposist regime that it did for E SEIUCI C F 15 nnot the sarile thing Timent today? If it is, ment's position that it be made public in ELEC ill stirit CքristitutiՃm, it aid So, in SO many Stan Ce, Tial WOLld
making public the ցsals is to postpone is not going to gain the Situation to beWarraging, is to Say Every minute's desituation. Chau Wirchange their attitude St|JOriëThënt
- la 5 EEEH CJIt|ILrepared to Consider ft läS to coffer. If the rigt "gCW" te 1ցsais, does not the lave a duy, wie Wed quarter, to show its ity and transparency Hose propas als imthat it Was those 2 finalde public at the Wtյլյlt Intitgti bit a
:relary, All-Clay's in Tairilis
(CGTitiTILHEId frČITI Plaget)
Nehru recognised the force of linguistic Tiationalis Tard Cal TWEE OLUtTAMI L-ITTādL by re-drawing borders in Order to preempt Tarnil seccessionism. It is that post-independence Indian experience WIIC, Tade. Prime Minister Narasila Rao, the first prime Tinister from the Indian South, assure our President that a negotiated settlement of the TamilisSue in Sri Lanka "would be one problem
ESS TT || Ti",
It is IL LF Ba Pri The Minister's SO Luthl= ern political base alone that prompts him to study Sri Lankan political developments keenly. That fact was quite clear LL LLLL KLLaLLL LaLLaH aL La SDDDLLaaLL aL LHaLLL aL L aLS L S LK SLL S a00S The War in the north Flakes Fiews in the Indian South, Con the front Pages of the TäITIII däilies,
The Congress party has suffered SOThe electoral defeats in State polls recently and the anti-Rao caucus in the ruling Congress has been strengthened. Apart from all this however there is the dynastic factor, an extraordinarily powerful force in South Asia -- India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. And he most importa t, regionally ar dilterrationally, is the Nehru dynasty, meaning right now Rajiv Gandhi's children and therefore Rajy's widow, Scania. Besides, the Congress is faction-ridden. | Til such Conditions, Rajiw's Widow, Thay be able to Write the next chapter of Congress history ina fine Italian hand,

Page 21
Lessons of Military Hi
ANIRUDH DESHPANDE
La Ca aaa aaa aaa LLLLLLGGmLG LG HH L KaaaaLLaaL SS L S aaS LLLLL LLL S
LHHLLaa aaaa 0LtmLLL LLLLLL a LLLL LaaL L LH Laa GC aLaammLL SaaaaaaL
regarding its will, and is credibility-into which Wicini was sucked.
LLLLaLaLL aLLS LLL LLL LLLLLLLLS LLL LLLLL LHKaaLLLLLLLa LLL
L LL KL LL LLaL LLLLLLLLa S LLLuuuuuuLLLLLLDLL LS LLLLL LLLLLL HLLL H HLLS
W ith the LTTE preparing a battle of
ĒTI Circle Tellt är där Tihi lati Ol Of the Sri Lankan troops trapped in Jaffna,
Trī Vā ir Srī Lākā 55 have entered a decisive stage Animportant ewent is unfolding in Sri Lanka and Tiilitary historians, politicians and Other COri Cermed people should a Wake to this fact. Having said this We make WC) Eolid aSSertij FS ir Lillis article EEfore looking at Some of the issues arising from the Current phase of the civil War in Sri Lanka. These assertions may appear unpopular considering the flak the LTTE is attracting in the press these days. However they stem from an objective observation of the military situat Corpore Walest im Northe Tri Sri Larika today.
1. Every War Reaches its Decisive
Stage.
My first assertion is that probably the LTTE has won its War against CoJTibO for all practical purposes. The "second assertion is that the LTTE, led by an extraordinary military leader, has already passed into history as one of the most efficient military organisations eVer Created by a resolute people striving for political autonomy. PerČėptive Tiilitary historians Will explain that this has happened because the LTTE has seized the strategic initiative against Colombo by Intelligently keeping the military Option Open evenas the latter talked peace. Recent events also prove that by the use of heat seeking SAMS End other modern Weapons the LTTE has effectively neutralised the Sri Lankan-airforce and nawy. There are lessions in the audacity of the LTTE for other governments and their adverSErie:S t|Jearn in the Indian SLubCOFlti
-AN, I Tiilitairy El nEalyst i
2t. Ad il tha: || lasting economic SLECOntinent thes be ignored.
The LTTE is
able POSition Od: in Wective directed tact frtis is litical victory is a Candidad This SiOF President ECC Prabaka Tari COIT Lārikā ārld vLus not forget that island country a leaves поt very | majority. More til troops lie besiege Jaffna peninsula: of Surrender or W StateTestS i SSLJE Conlanders corr inspire little Confic gers. In these cir TDTales bOUTidt0 day, Press repor Colombo might
mQWe to relieve it: | Suspect that is e. Wants. In short, b ning and executin the Jafna garris բL/shed the Sri ! into a 'no Win' StLI: Hobson's choice left With Color to meaning of Warar Sri Lanka in its lig
2. The Meaning
The great phil the ancient SLI Cla. EJS e Witz hawe i

story in Sri Lanka
Vict Tiit Tese: quidigt Tiiriti FILO Tie Ĉifo de LIIIIIIIIIIII of Ligiloj
1c Wict min im Wairo, L0ndon. 1989, p.25).
Il Colombo, May 7, 1995.
Interest of peace and development in the elessons can hardly
placed in a comfort ly and no amount of
at it-S leader Cari, deOrical fact. Tamilipinalso reflected if the of the new Lankan ording to whom Trois Orig-third of Sri irds of its Coast. Let
S Lakai ās ПU SLJСП fraПkПЕGE TILIch för its Sirheila "1arn 20,000 Larıkar1 d and ISOated in the ind face the prospect OrSe, TaSSacre. The by the Lankan field Irmanding these Ten jenice against the TiCLITT StarCES LEAT kan fall With each passing ts al SC ildiča te that initiate a desperate Snorthern garrisons xactly what the LTTE у пеficulously plang the encirclement of CF-5 tille LTTE Hlas Lankan GoverIIIIIEnt tion, Faced With this What are the options Let LS Exaile the id the predicament of
it.
of War
osophers of War from Тzш L = "-ET described War as the
pursuit of policy by other means. The Objective of War is not to get caught in attrition butto a ChileVEVictory O'Ver the enemy. However the There annihilation of the enemy's armed forces does not result in complete victory. The political objective of waging Waris realised when the Victor successfully imposes his will Over the Vanquished. Ultimately Victory in War depends upon correct strategy Which emerges from a superior understanding of all the elements constituting aparticular War. Following this is another principle of War according to Which War must be directed and exeCuted by statesmen and Commanders Pando We dWith exceptional political a fid military qualities. In contemporary his tory the Wietcong Victory against the French, Americans and So Luth Wietnamese illustrates the meaning of War İT TES CIESSİC Serse, IF CCT Trast the failures Of The Sri Lankar GOVerriment in the light of this historically received military Wisdom become only too apparent. Many governments, including the Soviet, have failed to stand up to LLaL L L L L L L L L KLLaLaLL LLL L LLLLL S SSLLLLLLaLLLL yourself and youгепепny, fight a hшпdred battles and Win a hundred Victories".
But having lost the War can the Sri Lankan political leadership and general staff, led as they are by a realistic and peace loving new President, Win the peace? Many questions related to War and peace in the Indian subcontiLLLLLL LLL L L S S SK LL 0SLLSLLLaaLLLL LL aL problem. Let us now confine this argument to the realm of possibilities confronting Colombo at the moment.
3. Options for Colombo
In my opinion, and Considering the totality of the contemporary Sri Lankan Scenario, the Lanka Government has three options before it. Let us exarine them briefly,
(а) The mїіїалу орfipлs: To inCreasingly desperate governments the military seems the ultimate solution to

Page 22
apparently intractable domestic and foreign problems. Often by Whipping up nationalist hysterial governments also try to popularise a resort to arried force LL Laa LLLLLaLLL LatLL0 S S D L LLLL LLLS tion. But nothingis further frGrinthētr Luth, A careful look at the prevalent situation in northern Sri Lanka straightaway precludes the obvious. If the Lankar army launches a gallant looking offensive to Save its trapped garrisons Without adequate air and nawal Support it is Tore than likely that more of its divisions Will be cut off in the north.
| an afraid Tigretroops poured into the pocket of LTTE control, provided they manage to break the Tamil strarglehold in the first place, will only Create the Stalingrad of the Sri Lanka army. Going by past experience, including the failures of the Indian Army against the LTTE, it can be said without doubt that the Sri Lankan arrily is incapable of SLStaining a major offensive Qrargutflanking manoeuvre againstits agile adversary. The LTTE has demonstrated the ability to disperse and Concentrate highly mobile formations at the right time and place On Sewera li CCCaSiOrS irn the past. While the exact strength of the LL S L SLL LLLL LLLLL LL LLL LLLLLL Y LLL rarely failed to exploitin full the element of Surprise which is essential to the type of War it has ruthlessly Waged against Colombo. Analysts will easily conclude LLLLLL LL LLLCLLL LL LLLLaataLLLLL 0LL L LLLLL LLLLLS tary history that the Sri Lankan armed LL0L KLL L LLLLa aLLL LaaL a HGuCCaaLaLHLLLL LLLLLL mastery of mobile War which has be: come the preserve of the LTTE. In short, the preservation of the Lanka nga rrisons trapped in the Jaffna region depends upon the political wisdom of their leaders more than anything else.
(b) ForeignarfTeclassistarlCessarwer) fior). At present || Cannot think of any country but India which can possibly send an expeditionary force to Sri Lanka. Though this Would plea SE SOMME shortsighted Indian politicians, in the EWertit Will flot, a Find should flot, happĒTI. First of all the Indian policymakers must remember the LTTE, which is only partly their creation, with great bitterness. Secondly the Indian Arny Will always rememberitis polor recordinJaffna With nothing but regret. Thirdly the Indian arried forces with Kashmir on their hands can hardly think of getting inwolved in Sri Lanka or anywhere else for that matter.
From the past the example of Wiet
2)
nam and Afghanista
ā Hē iā. Ar LISedtopUFSue SOFT: tic political policies other countries CE and Ware to Color aller Hasalready sig I thig iritër Filatifa events suggest that Wirt tilt the Strate lobo's favour. FLI say that the Tigers disrupt the SUpply ESSE ali de TOT; arITIEj forcës, The C''Est fUFC 5 FCT1 | ment, deep Earl Lan and por Colong the WaT LTTE. Most probab bling on this,
(с). Те реace irport of arms and W||| pLush ColorTıbbi the military option til ership Would do Wel Political desperatio at the FTTOPT"left|Wi||J| Creating dorlestic in KLI rimara tLI riga Carli li fortunately the Situ Lankar gowler TIFTlier tĪJIS. ELITE WEI With Carl LTIO Sri La Firstly the La SH ČLd TGV Sethea promised to the LT FJ - T | Gjiroj || Country should be a lationally publicise ble. Secondly the L Should perse Were ir lomatically isolate til Sri Lankan na Wyo : patrolling of the S disrupt the Supply c. Some people WOL suggest that Colom WT|| LHELT TE OPTT CITET WOTUS COTICEI and the See, arc whetheran organis Ca II TEH 13 gep) BaCE Above all, pea SaWB ting Lankan G SēTWE the Sri LaF1 towards the military the process of dem ciety in Sri Lanka, C Losing the War in JE Government might peace in the rest of krllow Whether Qrhı

n Shine and dictate y should never be DIE EISE'S CdCl2S| ||Fidiä ard SCOTTE , rl SLIppolly Friilita rW and in fact the arted placing orders FIT15 Tarkgt. Et imported Weapons agic balar. Ceirll COI= the ITOre, who car | WI|| bg Luna Ele EU if assifig to the haisBig Sri Lankar import of arms Will le task of de Velopka's debt probleT only in favour of the ly the LTTE isgam
option. Since the Foreign Interwention Prevocably towards leg Sri Lakar lead| tg sՒ1LIIլ էիլերի Էյtյլի, nand Inilitary panic inly help the LTTE by 1stability. President II afford all this. Utirgā Westle Sfi It With Very Tew opthese Some peace
kl. kg (GCWETTI Ft genda of autor CITTy TE, A new policy for ed regions of the FOLF CEāja Fīldilt Erdas Soon as possiElkar (GO WETTI TE TIL stsatternpts to diple LTTE. Thirdlythe should intensify its Ti La Tika PT COAST TO fails to the LTTE, digo la enough to bO should negotiate File:||atter's tEDITS. de the Tamil Eala Ti It the World See, aliaj trairiaj for WaT
CE ELITIC FC't WaT WI|| gwerrimarı tard preKarl Tätiöfl. THG tt option will Weaken |co Cracy and CiWII SCOOn the other handby fffla the Sri Lankari
Tanage to win the the country. I do not ow this will happen.
Only time Will te|| Whether the LaFlkan leadership is capable of steering its ship OUL Of LHBSE tTO LIESled WätérS,
So Tie good Sri Lankan friends of mine Were extremely hopeful of peace ffria||ỵrg{[[[Tĩng to thẽift:øuntrya. CCLIple of months ago but recent developments have put paid to these hopes. Latest reports confirm that the Sri Lankan air LLLLLaL LLLL LL L LLLL aLLLLLLLa LL aLLLLLLLaaLaLLLLL aL some LTTE camps but the results of this, from Colombo's point of View, Will become clear only in the long run. For the Toment, and With the LTTE beginning to evolve its air power, Our Souther neighbour is drifting towards arother protracted Conflict Which Will flot yield peace. I have in Weighed against the military option in this article not only because of the objective factors. Thentioned in the following lines of a song sung by American soldiers in Vietnars which highlights the horror of War for everyone involved in it
LOLSKLKLKS S KK S S SSLLCLCH K aK S LLL S a aKHKS HHH uL uHH H Y uLLCC S L LLLL aaL LGHmLL u umuS Sy Airly
|Cբրtirլքd frr:T page 13)
to compete in it and implications of LL a S S Laa L S L S S S SaLLLH HH LLL L S SLLLKL L Lusef LI !!!!y | 50,155 EH1 Eg |Tiբatt Ճrl regional growth Ճf raginnal CDuntries" uruguay Found GamnikLL L LL S SLSL aK LLLK SL K LLLLLLS LLLLLL Organisation (WTO) carı play, İn further encouraging trade and stirTulating grawth in the regian. With thE quickening place of growth in key Markets around the region, business is pola Cinig a high Priority on tracia and HLHLLLLHHHHH SaaaLLLLLLLLHH LLLLLL LLLLLLLLS tion, of änd om business met Working - är Es w har E LI FI COPA With it 5: Ergaid business. Ta presentation and inclusive approach to participation, can play a
| key Tole in identifying areas where
GCI W EFFT ELS Supportive role.
Lo Play an early
| FIOR could also help to identify the SIĘÇtCDFS and a reas of goverri Tlent a Ctivity where regional business could Benefit most from a region-wide cooprative approach and go on to suggest options for productive regional colaborative activity. The early indicaS a S L LCL aS L aaaLaLLaS aL S LSL Ligion Could benefit particularly from LL SLLLaLLLLLLLaLK SYaL S LS aL SLLLLLLL0L L LLL Customs cooperation, telecommuniCiti Carl S, LOUri ST and HILI Tai resources
de velopment.

Page 23
s
Why there's sc in this rustici
There is laughter and light baiter Titlist the:
LLLLLL LLLLLLLlLM gLLLLm GmmL LLLLLL 0LLLLLLLLD LLL LLrrClLL leaf in a bir TI, IT IS, CITIE: If the hundreds of such
barns spread tytut in thị: Tid artici Lipmuntry LLLLLLLLH KLLK HuuLLLLLL LlL aBLaLlL uLLLLL LLLLHa LS dallimi, di Iring the Coff 5:2:15 Cor.
Here, with careful nurturing, tobacco grows Fis a LLLLeOLL LLL LLLLCHC HLL LHLHL uuuLGLCL LtgtLLLLLaL LLLLLLLHHL L gold, to the value of Jir Rs. 250 million or more annually, for perhaps 143,000 rural folk.
 

ENRCHING FRURAL LIFESTYLE
und oflaughter tobacco barn.
Tobaccan is the industry that brings er TıployTIEmil tra
hic scienci highest numbe T uf people. Artici ThE:52 people are the colbarra barr, IowTiers, thia' trab.: CCC growers and those who work for the IT, on the land ariri irl, the barms.
For thern, the tobacco leaf means rearingful work,
a carnfortable hife àTird a ocure futura. s. FC
rough reason for laught ET,
CeylonTobacco Co. Ltd.
Sharing and caring for our land and her people,

Page 24
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