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LANKA ་་་་་་་་་་་་་་་་་་་་་་་ O 8TH ANN
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ICES PUB
JUST RE
“ “SRI LANKA: THE DE
Attices:
Аррепdices:
ICES, 199
Introduction by Regi Si Towards Effective Devo Some Thoughts on the Lakshnan Marasinghe Devolution and Power Development, by Bertra DeWolution of PoWeIr, T] Neelan Tiruchelwan Towards A Compromise Breakthrough in Sri La Control of State Land - Sunil Bastian The Structure and COIl Choices and Problems Context of Devolution I
President Charı dirika Kı August 3, 1995 Text of Government's Di Text of Government's D January 16, 1996 A Commentary on the ] Government January l The Bandalalaike-Che. The Senanayake-Chelva AIICXure C Text of the Indo-Sri Lal The Interim Report of t Parliamentary Select C. Excerpts form Gainini Centuгу”
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EVOLUTION DEBATE' '
ᎯᏮ , 232pp .
riwardena lution, by G. L. Peiris Devolution Package, by
Sharing, The Means to Peace and am Bastiam pillai he Problems and Challenges by
: Solution, by Sumanasiri Liyanage „Inka, by S. Gluhan - The Devolution Debate, by
tent of Education: Policy of Implementation in the Proposals, by Sasanka Perera
lunaratunga's Address to the Nation,
2volution Proposals of August 3, 1995 )evolution Proposals of
Devolution Proposals of the 6, 1996, by G. L. Peiris lvanayakan Pact anayakaIIl Pact
nka Agreement of July 29, 1987 he Mangala Moonesinghe
Omilittee, 1992
Dissanayake's "Wision for the 21st
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Page 3
WEWG EACKGAOL/W7
THE LIBERATIO
Mervyn de Silva
eputy Defence Minister General
Anuruddha Ratwatte has kept his promise. By the Sinhala-Tamil New Year 1996, he said, Jaffna will be "liberated". Thus, OPERATION RIWIRESA 2. Has the steady advance of the army into L.T.T.E.-held areas forced the "Tiger" units to abandon several heavily fortified positions? More significantly, the official spokesman also claimed that "a safe passage" had already been established for Tamil civilians displaced fro T Walikanam to return to their homes from Thenmaarachichi and Madamaarachi, their present locations. If this is indeed the common response of these displaced Tamil families, OPERATION RIWIRESA 2 has lade gains on the ground that could represent a significant Victory, more important psychologically perhaps than militarily. After all the L.T.T.E. does clair that it is a "liberation Towerment". This is "peoples war" in that sense. NoW
BRIEFLY. . .
the army has "free of families that left to leave). Jaffna, traditioral hor Telah and - foreign observo sceptical. Perhaps sources of informat
Meanwhile tha V TERS SANS FRO nationally known m mitted to press fre Sri Lanka's CenSOTS
But this is a polit Both Wictories andre from that perspect "liberated' t'OLISHI! but the Tai Tatil - the Tamil Uil (formerly Federal P. wing statement:
The Russel Affair
While the British High Commission has discu: with the relevant authorities, WOMEN FOR PE a statement released to the media that it was " appalled to witness the arbitrary arrest, detentional forceful deportation of Dr. Jane Russell on April government was celebrating the birthday of the Prin We, at WOMEN AND PEACE, therefore urge th to redress the wrong done to Jane Russell and en: return to Sri Lanka to continue her academic wor
Tawakkal Inquiry
How many full moons must pass before the Pe decides to appoint an Independent Commission (). the Tawakkal transactions? The Opposition Lead Wickremasinghe and others in the opposition ha government which stands for "Transparency, Accol Good Governance" to prove that it takes its own cI And that can only mean an independent investigati
 

N OF
d" those thousands (or were compelled the capital of "the d". Some diplomats ars however remain they hawe their own io.
wellknown REPORNTIERES, an interonitoring body, Comedon, has criticised ship regulations.
ical-military problem. WETSES TUStbUE SEET iwe. The army has ds of Tamil families
parliamentary party gdi LiberatO FOt arty) issued the follo
ssed the issue ACE said in outraged and ld subsequent
17 when the he Minister..... e govегпment
gure her early ik. ೫
oples Alliance f Inquiry into er, Mr. Ranil ive urged the untability and *edo seriously. on and report.
JAFFNA
"The TULF wig WS With alarm änd With the LutrTiOSt COrlCerte COTTE CETEnt of a new military offensive in the north. RIWIRESA 2 is apparently aimed at THENMAARACHI and WADAMAARACHI, which hawe i a high concentration of civilians. The TULF strongly objects to RIWIRESA operation conducted with heavy weaponry in an area with a high civilian concentration...... We urge both partiesto de-escalate the armed COnfrontation and help bring an end to human suffering".
Creddy Page 2
LANKA
Wol. 19 No. 1 May 1, 1996
Price, Rs. 10.00
Published fortnightly by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd. No. 246, Union Place ClOTO-2.
Editor Mervyn de Silva Telephone: 447584
Printed by Ananda Press 825, Sir Ratnajothi Saravanamuttu Mawatha, Colombo 13. Telephone: 435975
CONTENTS
MrS.B. al 80 3
di Pol 4
Relebrace of
Folitis Fast 7
Crisis of Marxism (3)
Making of a Revolutionary 5
SAARC B

Page 4
News in Brief
The Liberation of Jaffna
தோர்பக ரீரா தரச )
The TULF. Was Once KOW as the Federal Party. When the F.P. led by S.J.V. Chelwanayakarn Q.C. could not succeed in persuading the S.L.F.P. or the U.N.P. to implement the Bandaranaike-Chelwanayakam pact or the Senanayake-Chelwanayakar, the credibility of Tamil parliamentary parties dropped steadily-certainly in the estimation
of a new generation. That generation
formed new groups, all challenging and denouncing the F.P. (T.U.L.F.) and waving the flag of "liberation", word Tade fashionable by Third World liberation movements. Soon they were trained and armed - by a big neighbour that deplored the manner in which Jayawardene abadored Sri Lalka’s traditional non-alignment, certainly the foreign policy of Mrs. Bandaranaike. Sad to say, SOThe Of thESE baSiC facts Of reCBrit history are ignored.
And IIOW the T.U. L.F. "lirle" ha5 resulted in an immediate response from five of the smaller organisations, all fomer militant groups - TELO, PLOTE. EPRLF, EPDP, and EROS. Representatives from these groups have met diplomats (including ambassadors) from the E.U. The diplomats were evidently pleased that these parties were Committed to a political Settlement.
2
President Chandrika Kumaratunga Was told by President Jiang Zemin that the Peoples' Republic of China appreciated the P.A. gowernment's proposals to resolve the island's ethnic conflict. The Chinese leader described the PA's devolution proposals as "tinely, prudent and just". The P.R.C. leader noted that Ms. Kumarat Lunga had visited China in 1974, and had chosen China for her first State visit. Sri Lanka will receive a billion rupees, about 20 million dollars as a grant and loan.
K
Yes, I Luck The LUCLÉer L I dippled Tų This is the
WILSLEČ COL Fог плу һап,
The Oya roc Or sat ble That the ffili
Parl Listes FTOITIl the ril
Therl, fille le Arld, CIS LLE Of the Jurg And the LLJC1 As if gLLgle
Ναιμ, αι απ
Sa Lu the sk Arld Fle i le. I closed or le. Falling arid And I thoLig ThéSe: LeCIL'e
BLIE LUIII C.III

P No Sri Lankan has been killed or injured
in the recent Israeli blitz in Lebanon. A few
Sri Lankans living close to the Israeli border have been moved to safer parts of Lebanon. The Sri Lankan authorities have imposed a "temporary ban on housemaids" leaving for Ichрапоп or Jordап.
P A Defence Ministry communique claimed that "lakhs of people" in the LTTE. controlled areas have been "liberated from the clutches of the Tigers' Displaced families are returning to their hones, the communique added.
Waiting - 21
1mbukkana Channel
2d alone along the channel Las Tliltea broLUn Luth the raíl olfar hills J hard in the Later, thinking, ray be brol Lerm earth Lyol i frod i orll L'irl (I TILyd LLPĒrlding Lalleys dSore e Lee Ce.
arts Lufth rail fell your Luay
slopes, so far Light of disfrance is pain. ; rt 1e LUhtere the charunel leads auvaU der down to the Ueir Lohere LUe uoalked last May.
alJes Screerled LIS from the Sky
CCGLG GLT CL STTCC CG LGGGCTTT LL CLC
E.
fer Cor Spored fO SELLİ OLLİ Other SOLIrlds
Li te LLJE.
years fill circle I lay alone y through the leaves
Uyes kept salling do Ur. : eye and Luatched the floating past
floating like the leaves of Time ut, loLwe, if LUe , eLVer Corne here folgefluer agair S μυill bε αlliπg απα Ιοαίίπg eS2 E02 Lf2 = SCLITTLE?
J. Kaunatake

Page 5
MRS. B. AT 8O
Neelan Tiruchelvam
his House is today endeavouring
to correct a resolution of Parliament which deprived a Member of this House of her civil rights, which included the right to vote, the right to contest an election, and the right to hold public office including Membership of Parliament. As a consequence Mrs Bandaranaike was deprived of her seat in Parliament from October 1980, until her pardon on the 1st of January 1986. She could not Contest the Presidential Elections held in 1982 i mor any other elective office until she received an executive pardon. No political leader could suffer a crueler fate which sought to obliterate her very identity as a political person.
Mrs Bandaranaike was no ordinary Member of Parliament. She had twice become Prime Minister of this country from 1960-65 and again from 1970-77. She was the leader of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, and as the Head of Non-Aligned Movement she had an international visibility and recognition which no other Sri Lankar of Our time has been able to riwal.
Sri Lanka has been described as One of the few countries in South Asia which has had an effective two party system Where political power alternated periodically between the United National Party and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party. This two system was critical to Sri Lankan deпосгасу іп preseпliпg a geпшine alternative to the electors through a clash of ideologies, programmers and political ideas. This two party system came under a cloud particularly during the period 1977 to 1988, when the Sri Lankan Freedom Party's Parliamentary strength had been reduced to a mere eight seats. In my wiew Mrs Bandaranaike's enduring contribution to the political history of this country is that she had she alone ensured the surival of the two party system when every effort was made to demoralise and even to Coopt political opponents. Her stubborn refusal to copromise even she was subjected to political humiliation and intrigue, her fierce loyalty to her party, and her refusal
CKS C CTLLHHLHHLTOLOCS LLLLL LLLLLL K CLLOLCLkCeL T LLLHL C COOMLSS LWYNGYLWEBYG Faw7 AFYYYYY7 LVLF).
to be coopted has and the revival of th Party. This inurne Party system woul
In recalling Mrs E record I do not W was entirely withol would be to falsify this House would on a day When We principles of truth a ties for ethnic accor Tissed. recall as panying my mothe to WiSit MT. M. Til Federal Party lear unjustly incarceral democratic agitatic charges were ever political prisoners. S ties there was a ConSensual ConSti genuinely address equality, fundame sharing of power. without any bittern the pain and discC was mirisicular Cor quent sufferings of feed to COThe to of Our troubled his strength to frame;
We are here tos поt merely beca important and enT country. This Hous that a legislative : to subvert the de Attanagala elector Was duly elected majority of elector of representative d legitimate expectat their representativ term without impe
The first step in was the Special sions of Inquiry La ir 1978. HuJI Tar сопсеппеd lawyег: ral features of this
First the law e Presidential CorTT

ensured the survival
Sri Lanka Freedom
sured that the two Surwiwe.
andaranaike political ish to imply that it blennish. To do so history and none in want to deny history seek to uphold the ld justice. OpportuniTodation Were Sadly a schoolboy accortin the early sixties Uchewan and other ETS Who had been di in Panagoda for ns for equality. No framed against these similarly in the sevenfailure to frame a ution Which Would i te der Tlands for tali rights and the Teca theSe gVents less or acrimony as mfiture of our family mpared to the subseothers. HOWe Wet We grips with the reality tory if are to find the an ennobling future.
upport this Resolution use it concerns an linent citize of this e WieWS with Concern scheme was devised stocratic Will of the ate. Mrs Banaranaike by an overwhelming s, and in our system emocracy it is will and ion of the electors that 'e will Sewe her full diet.
the legislative scheme Presidential COITImiSLW which Was enacted
rights activists and 3 Were Critical Of SeweS. law.
mpowers the Special Tission to inquire into
"any act of victimization, misuse or abuse of power, corruption or any fraudulent act, in relation to any court or tribunal or any public body, or in relation to the administration of any law or the administration of justice. There was concern that tems such as abuse of power had no precise legal meaning and were vague and nebulous.
Second the law was made retrospectiwe and the Corrission was not a mere fact finding body, but one that could make recommendations which had punitiwa consequences.
Third the law provided no procedural guidelines and the Commission was free to devise its own procedures.
Fourth section 7 (1) of the law permitted the Commission to ignore the rules of evidence. It was considered particular rly disturbing that there was no right of appeal and that the seal of finality Would be Conferred om a recornmendation based on testimony which could be in contravention of the evidentiary Safeguards applicable to ordinary cases,
Fifth even though the Commission Was composed of sitting judges, this provided no safeguard as their judicial outlook was often transfor Ted when they sat as COTissioners.
In evaluating the fairness of the proceedings that were instituted against Mrs Bandaranaike it is important to recall the Words of Lord Diplock in Reg WS Commission for Racial Equality, Exp. Hillingdon LB.C. (1982), A.C. 779 at p787F-G, that a Commission which is a public authority must exercise its powers in accordance with Well known principles of legality, rationality, and procedural propriety. We do mot believe as Amnesty International pointed out in its statement on the Criminal Justices Commission, that these principles are safeguarded where the judicial process is "diluted to serve political purposes. As the Civil Rights Monement pointed out, "The Tiere fact that judges of a superior court are appointed to a tribunal is no guarantee that its functioning will be fair and correct or command public Confidence."

Page 6
There were other aspects of this matter which offened are sense of fairness and of procedural justice. The Court of Appeal issued a writ of prohibition on the Commission on the ground that it had поt been expressly confепеd power to investigate matters relating to the period prior to 10th February 1978. On 20th November 78, the government introduCedanarnendTent to the Costtution which retrospectively negated the effect of the Court of Appeal, and transferred its Writ jurisdiction in respect of these matters to the Supreme Court. Further the day after Mrs Bandaranaike had been expelled from the House amendments were introduced to the Parliamentary Elections and Presidential Elections laws prohibiting persons depriVed of Civic rights from speaking or Canvassing at elections. The Civil Rights Movement again protested against these bills on the ground that they sought to limit an effective Opposition campaign at the next Parliamentary and Presidential elections.
Much as alrea eloquent speeches Mrs Bandaranaike of the Opposition by Mr M. Sivasith: Wote - there were i the motio di included 14 membo within three years to : SLuffer a Similat Amendiment WaS ir math of the July 8 Amendment by re Parliament to subs of allegiance effect the North-east and region of its Parliɛ tion. No doubt the the Referendum a Parliament, butth Was a supervenir immediate impact tion. Many political: On the disastrous p of the Sixth Armen briefly recall the te dies that followe
MDAMV POLIS
The Cassandras are p
Mark Tully
he Cassandras are uttering
their dismal prophecies again, so it must be election time in India. This time they have plenty to be dismal about. All the parties are in a shambles, there Seens to be no chance of a clear-cut result, there is no leader in sight with the charisma to carry the country with him, the World Bank/IMF-inspired econonic reforms, almost universally accepted as essential for India to achieve a high growth rate, hawe ground to a halt, share prices are down, and so is the rupee, But Cassandras have been very good at prophesying India's future.
There were those who warned that Indira Gandhi's first election in 1967 Would be India's last. The results were
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4.
indeed alarming. T generally Considere party able to provi parliamentary electi ge With control of a ment in the Gangt gress Split, but Ind did democracy. W State of Emergen Commentators agai gravely, saying: "We cracy Wouldn't in In years, Indira Gard election and accept Went against her.
More recently, wh assasinated just be of polling in the la the Congress party and without am ab last two short-lived show that the Jara

ly been said: of the made in defence of
by the then Leader Mr. Amithalingam and armbaram. During the 39 Wotes in favor of Votes against. This ers of the ITULF Who ; III of this gwert Were fate when the Sixth troduced in the after3 pogrom. The Sixth quiring Members of Scribe to a new oath tively disenfranchised deprived most of this a Tentary representa
TULF had opposed nd the Extension of e Sixth Amendent Ig event which had on their representaScientists hawe Written olitical consequences dment, but I wish to rrible personal traged. Of the fourteen
Members who forfeited their Partiamentary seats four were brutally murdered, while two others died in exile in Canada. Two faded out of politics and had more peaceful deaths, while a third died of a heart attack on the eve of a visit abroad. I recall these sad developments to make the point that no act of regret or apology for past Wrongs can help us recover the lost lives or regain the Wasted years. Similarly neither the pardon of January 1st 1986 mor this Resolution can give back to Mrs Bandaranaike those painful and wasted years. In pacing this Resolution we do not confer any benefit on Mrs Bandaranaike but in humility acknowledge the fallibility of this representative body.
If this debate has any meaning we must do everything within our power to restore public confidence in the judicial process. If the Government introduces a Bill to abolish the Special Presidential Commissions Billi and the related prowisions in the Constitution, we will support Such a measure.
rophesying again
he Congress party, dat that time the only destability, won the on but did not emer
single state governetic plain. The Conira Survived, and so hen she declared a сy in 1975, папу In shook their heads a Warned you demodia." In less than two hi called a general led the result, which
em Rajiv Gandhi was fore the final rould 1st general election,
WaSleft leaderless solute majority. The i governmeritshad la Daland its spl'inter
groups were so torn by internal strife that they could not rule the country. There was a political vacuum which only the right-wing Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) seemed poised to fill. The BJP was at its most strident then, and many feared that India was heading for Hindu fascism.
In fact, since Rajiv Gandhi's assassination India has enjoyed five years of stable government under Congress. It has been led by the 75-year-old Narasimha Rao, who was not given a chance of seeing out his ten of office when he was elected simply because he was the least controwerslal candiate to succeed Rajiv Gandhi. Narasimha Rao had not even contested the general election because he had just recovered from an operation and thought his undistingulshed political career was over. He had never been more than a faithful lackey of Indira Gandhi and her son.

Page 7
The edifice Crumbles
So is India going to prove the Cassandras wrong again? The politics do not look hopeful. Whatever Narasimha Rao's successes have been, nurturing the Congress саппоt be сопsideгеd опе. Well before the end of his term in office it had become clear that Rajiv Gandhi had become an electoral liability, yet When I asked a Congress Weteran Why they did not get rid of him, he replied: The Nehru-Gandhi family is the keystone of the Congress party. Take them away and the whole edifice will come tumbling dOWn'.
That is what has happened - the edifice has not tumbled down, but it has crumbled away. Narasimha Rao has presided over a series of disastrous State Assembly elections, leaving only two major states in the hands of Congress. He has Thade no effort to rebuild the party in the states where it has been
Liliate.
His failure to prevent Hindu fanatics from pulling down the mosque in Ayodhya means the Muslim vote is lost to him too. He himself is not a charismatic campaigner, and he has no national image to pull the crowds. It is difficult, therefore, to see how he is going to fight the campaign with a demoralised Congress or with leaders inside the party whose loyalty is Suspect and Sortle of whom have already deserted him.
The magic of the name
Those Congress politicians who hawe been hoping that Rajiv Gandhi's widow Sonia will emerge as their Saviour Seem destined to be disappointed. Although she rust fear that a non-Congress government might order her to move Out of her official residence, renowether security and take away the other privileges the Narasimha Rao administration has given her, she has so far rejected all suggestions that she or one of her children should lend the magic of the Nehru-Gandhi name to the party's Campaign.
There is, of course, in theory no reason why it should be the Congress party which govems India - indeed, Indian democracy would be healthier if there was an alternative national party. The BJP believed it was emerging as a national alternative because of its reputation for discipline and cohesiveness. But
the BJP has paid expansion and - пс different fror11 3II tI fissiparOUS partiëS. and self-seeking pi its band-Wagon, a discipline has bee Unseemily Wranglin chief ministership V down its governm Indian state.
The top BJP lead whether to soft-ped or give the Voter responsible nationa another strident can president, L.K., Ady charges. Recent foi either. State electic the BJP has been base beyond the and there it carris to come anywher majority.
There is Uchtal By this is meant a parties With a basé deprived Castes, r Communists. It w; Which for led the government after defeated in 1989. that T10 cảm ye! | parties in the so-c up in this election.
I have managed Indiam general ele sed, That goes ba — but I am Tot be elections hawe all of Wether the C tha iSSLue Of Wheth Wirl Cor 11. At universal Wisdoni Һas по hope of " majority in this elec any other party, M the final line-up, Wh in the different st: Élection Which has state. That is what 5. dificult.
The final OutCOr government cobble between different Wil|- almost i Certair defections — hardly stability. Yet this

a high price for its JW looks very little he other flabby and It has allowed corrupt oliticians to jump om nd its reputation for in shattered by the gover the Gujarat which almost brought ent in that Western
ership is divided Ower al Hindu nationalism, the impression of a alternative, or mount npaign. Now the party 'ani, faces corruption mis mot encouraging or results show that unable to extend its North and the West, it win enough seats e lear an absolute
K ft "TiT FOC".
ragged collection of e among traditionally egional parties, and as this combination
UrlStable Jarlata )
Rajiv Gandhi was It is still so unstable ell OW the Warious alled "Force' Will line
to read all previous ctions have witnesck nearly thirty years tting this time. Earlier Lirīd or the SSL ongress Will Win om Ier the Congress Will present the almost is that the Congress winning an absolute tiom, but neither does Much will depend om at alliances are Tade ates, making this an
to be read state by Takes any predictions
TE COLuld Well be a 2d together by deals party leaders. There lly be schisms and y a receipe for political Would seem to be a
time. When India needs a very stable government. When he became Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao foude had inherited a bankrupt India and realised h3 WOLuld hawe to SGWallow the Tradicire prescribed by the World Bank and the |ME U JE IT ČJU.
The license-permit Raj
The regime they ordered was an end to more than forty years of socialism, and an economy open to international competition. Rapid progress was made at first Western diplomats in Delhi talked of a revolution, as the Finance Minister, the economist Manmohan Singh, started to unravel the red tape tied around the economy. It looked as though India was at last seeing the end of what had become known as "the license-permit Raj'.
Indian industrialists were allowed to make investment decisions Without SeeКіпg govеппппепt clearance, and foreign investors Were actively encouraged for the first time. The rupee was partially freed and the share markets were opened to international investment funds. Foreign businessmen filled the five-star hotels of Delhi, Bombay, Madras and Bangalore. Even Calcutta, with its cornmunist govertinent, started to attract interest from abroad.
But the process gradually slowed down. The comparatively easy decisions were taker, but the Printe Minister balked at the changes which required real political courage. The result is that India's politicians, its bureaucrals, its army of governmenterTiployees, and its pampered industrial labour force still have a lot Tore of that bitter redicine to Swallow before the course prescribed by the IMF and the World Bank is complete. If it is not completed, burearucracy Willcreep back.
The politicians and bureaucrats will have to surrender the patronage which the government's involvement in almost every activity provides. Organised labour, and in particular government employees, сап по Іопgeг enjoy the absolute right of job security. The grossly overmanned government-owned industries will have to be privatised, or at least allowed to operate without ministerial and bureaucratic interference. Tax payers Will hawe to accept that they must
Take realistic returns.

Page 8
Discipline has to be restored in the services the government must continue to supply - doctors will have to attend the health centres they are paid to attend, and teachers their Schools. In a recent book, the two distinguished economists, AT:artya Sen and Jean Dreze, produced copious statistical evidence to show that there Was a direct Connection between India's economic back Wardness and its failure to provide education and health Sevices.
These and many other reforms will need a very firm government. But a convincing majority in India does not necessarily mean firm or good governLLLLLLLLS 0LL0S S LLLLL LLLLLL LLLL LL overwhelming victory. By 1975 her back Was to the Wall and she had to declare a State of Emergency, without any notable achievements to her Credit beyond the — Bangladesh War foLuryears earlier.
Her son, Rajiv Gandhi, had an even bigger majority. He promised to bring India into the twenty-first century and to end the influence of the power-brokers in his own party. India's administration, a legacy of the Raj remained unreformed. The economy stayed tied up in red tape. The Congress continued to be a party of self-seeking opportunists, Although Narasimha Rao's reforms still have a long way to go, he has done more to alter India than any prime minister since Nehru, without even an absolute majority when he started.
A clear game-plan
So a Weak Narasitha Rao does not necessarily mean no more liberalisation. His game-plan is clear. He calculates he can win enough seats to be in the running to be printerminister, even Without anything near an absolute majority. He will therefore demand absolute Control Over the distribution of the Cogress party nominations for the general election, so that MPs elected on the Congress ticket will owe their loyalty entirely to him and will not be tempted to offer their support to any other leader. They will form a solid base for his post-electoral manoeuwring. It is a dangerous game Which couldend in disaster before the race for the prime ministership even starts, but Narasimha Rao has no alternative. Luckily for him, no other leader of his own or any other party is playing a stronger game yet.
ES
tiS difficult to aSS chances of success known as the "Old skill he has demonst Wring his rivals over he has ever sho planning and Winni fore there must be Congress under his win even enoughs base he needs t government, or lead
Waiting for othe mistakes
Om the other ha is a man of great survived by Waiting Thistakes. He allowe to destroy them knowing that they w that laid the golde Which breathed life Hindu campaign. H the only leader in the challenge him, a V Sure enough, his rii il theed.
In the run-up to Once again Waited
Tistakes. He know question of how W how badly the oth beginning to look a game may produce
The Supreme CC very active Watchd. stration, has insist charge Some of th names have appee а пап пInning a exchange racket.
Fliticials KLW735, and nO l oni the AWG ha Wabe Some argue it is ar plot by the Prime he had to offer up the Supreme Court But whatever the tru resulted in the unp tiÖrı of three Cabir has conveniently q incipient rewolt Withir and removed ther as an alternative pr
At the same time always Clairneditist

SSSNarasimha Rao's Although he is often Fox' because of the rated in out-manoeuthe past five years, wn any aptitude for ng elections. Therea possibility, that the sleadership will not eats to give him the o form a minority da Coalition.
Sto Take
nd, Narasir Tha Ra.O
patience who has for his rivals to make d the BJP supporters Osque in Ayodhya, "еге killiпgthe goose negg - the issue into their strident egaWe Arjun Singh, Congress to openly tery long rope, and Val did hang himself
this élection he has for others to Take WS that it is lot a el he does, but of er parties do, It is S though the Waiting the winner again.
Iurt, which is now a og OWēr the adminied that the police epoliticians whose ared in the diary of Hawaa, or foreign
a haWE Worm teflon equite knows how er Stained this time. other Machia Welliar Minister. Others say some wictims when insisted on action. th, the charges have recedented resignaet ministers, which Jasned yet another the Congress party Than ThOSt talked of ime minister. :
the BJP, which has he only honest party,
has found its president charged with receiving a very large sum of money illegally. This has not exactly helped its campaign to make government corruption the major electoral issue. The other opponents of the Congress are still arguing about alliances and the sharing of seats, and show no sign yet of forming an effective. Third Front".
The beneficiary of disarray
There is only one slight problem for the Prime Minister. He has Hees måned by the accused illegal foreign-exchange dealer in a statement he gave to the police. This is mot as serious as appearing in that diary, but the Supreme Court has ordered the police not to spare anyone. It is therefore possible that Narasimha Rao could find himself charged t00, in Which Case the Would hawe no alternative but to resign,
Provided het is not charged with corruption. Narasimha Rao will be the beneficiary of the disarray in both his opponents' camps. He may also win more Seats than expected by forming strategic alliances with different parties in different states.
So it is possible that, in spite of all the uncertainties of this election, India Will emerge with a prime minister who knowing that age is against a third term, will want to go down in history as the Great Reformer. He would then be prepared to take the political risks involved in removing more of the hurdles In the way of economic growth. He might even take advantage of the fear the Supreme Court has created to start cleaning the Augean stables that India's public life has become. That would truly be the task of a Hercules, not a natural role for the elderly, indecisive Narasimha REU.
lf Narasir Tha Rao does not retur to power, the general election will be another - and perhaps the last-nail in the coffin of the Congress, and there Will almost certainly be an unstable government. Then the Cassandras might at last be prowed right, because there will be no Congress party to pick up the pieces as it did when the previous non-Congress governments collapsed. It is sobering to remember that ali nonCongress governments in Delhi hawe collapsed.

Page 9
Remembrance of Po The LSSP Documents of the Thirties
Regi Siriwardena
he subject of this paper is
the collection of documents relating to the Lanka Sama Samaja Party in the pre-war and wartime years down to 1942, edited by Wesley S. Muthiah and Sydney Wanasinghe, and recently published'. The greater part of this collection has been transcribed from the hitherto confidential documents in the Public Record Office, London, which have become open to the public after 50 years. These include communications between the Governor in Ceylon and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, internal documents of the Colonial Office, as well as police reports from Colombo. The editors appear to hawe made am effort to supplement the documents available in London with party documents obtained front local Sources.
We must be grateful to the editors for the labour they have devoted to the collection and editing of these documents, thus making generally accessible a mass of valuable and interesting material. It's, however, a pity that the editing and presentation of the documents fall short of the importance of their subject-matter. What might have been adequate if the book was merely a party souvenir for its sixtieth anniversary is not good enough for a compilation which will naturally be consulted by students of colonial policy and administration and of the political history of that era. Even though the editors are not professional historians, some effort should have been made by them to meet the norms generally maintained in the publication of such documentary material. The book doesn't distinguish systematically between the documents derived from the Public Record Office in London and others; nor, in the case of the former, are file numbers given: this customary practice in quoting such SOUrce material WOLuld hawa assisted future researchers. It is not stated whether the documents bearing on the LSSP in the London records have been reproduced comprehensively or selectively. I shall refer later to one document that I hawe been told exists in the Colorial records but isn's there in the book. Many
of the documents a in some cases the Record Office may date either, there ar. should hawe been E done owing to edit instance, Dr, Colvir dential address to party conference is and day, but his such conference do year, though this i page - 22 of the edi the saпераge tr they have reprinted presidential addre: Document No. 2 E However, on turnir document, We find titled "What is COT Silva, reprinted fro Was, in whichth editor for the opp COTT]umist i OT, SOC public. This articl though this deficier eliminated by a se of the paper. At t (pages 257-259) What Seens to b in Sinhala, but this nor identified.
Another editorial tory matter is so parentheses into instead of being Erldnotes, or at square brackets, Convention in res matter failing this left in momentary explanation is par Apart from the one introduction and te noted, there is and cy in the editors' the reference on tion moved by G the State Council the detention of foll The introduction Was worded as fc of this Council, present detained
al
 

litics
ܐ ܝ ܛ ܚ .
undated, and while riginals in the Public Tot hawe Carried a others where dating asy, but hasn't been iria indifferer CE. FOT R, de Silva's presithe second annual lated by year, month address to the third вsen't carry even the s given as 1938 on Ors' introduction. Om e editors State that three of Dr. de Silva's sses, and refer to is the first of these. Ig to the text of that that it is an article munism?" by Dr. de m the Ceylon Daily e author thanks the Drtunity to place the alist view before the e, too, is undated, cy could hawe been arch in the back files he end of the book there is reproduced a a party docurrent is neither numbered
fault is that explanametimes inserted in the body of a text iven in footnotes or east marked off by as is the scholarly pect of interpolated
the reader may be onfusion Whether the of the original text. Contradiction between xt that have already ther serious inaccuraintroduction. This is age 31 to the resolu*orge E. de Silva in May 1941 regarding readers of the LSSP. iays: The resolution lows, "In the opinion he four detenus at in Kandy should be
Past
and Early Forties
forthwith released". However, on tuming
to the text of the debate included in the body of the book, we find that while the form in which the resolution stood on the order paper was indeed as stated in the introduction, George E. de Silva, on rising to move it, asked for and obtained leave to amend it. In its a Tended for the resolution read: "That this Council requests. His Excellency the Governor to release the four detenus at present detained in Kandy under the Defence (Miscellaneous No. 3) Regulations dated June 3, 1940. This represented a watering-down of the original Wording of the resolution, perhaps due to political pressures, and the editors should have taken note of this, Although the introduction states on page 32, that "the entire debate has been included. a reading of the text suggests that there are on pages 243 and 244 breaks and omissions, maybe of less important matter, interTuptions and Crosstalk, perhaps, but these i hiatuses should hawe been explained. A further point regarding the shortcomings of the book concerns the incompleteness of the collection. It doesn't contain a single party programme - neither the one which the party issued at the time of its inauguration and which bore a reformist character, nor the later one, adopted, I believe, in 1941, which was based on a Marxist analysis and commitment to Socialist revolution. The absence of these documents Would seem to indicate that the party hasn't been as successful in keeping its records intact as the former imperial rulers
In his preface to the book Mr. Bernard Soysa says: A general reader cannot be expected to see a living pattern of history in these documents. However, the sponsors in their narrative do to a Small extent enable the reader to glimpse the living reality. "In spite of the qualifica: tion,' to a small extent, I think the editors' introduction in inadequate to perform this
functior.
Their narration of the history of the LSSP gives the impression that, with the exception of the expulsion of the Stalinists in 1940, that history was a seamless whole, while actually it was
7

Page 10
marked by several breaks and transfornations, some of which fell within the period covered by the book. I should therefore like to trace What I see as four phases in the history of the LSSP, so as to provide a context in which the documents can be placed.
The significance of the pre-war LSSP was that it represented the first attempt, indeed, the only one, to build a militant anti-imperialist mass movement on a national scale in Ceylon. A.E. Goonesinha's Labour Party had preceded it in rousing Working-class consciousness and leading major strike actions. Goonesinha's role in almost singlehandedly agitating for and securing universal franchise at the time of the Donoughmore Commission has scarcely been given the recognition that it deserves. But Goonesinha lacked a coherent political perspective, and by the time of the foundation of the LSSP, he had declined into racist politics. In Jaffna the Gandhian agitation for Swaraj found its response in the politics of the Youth League and the boycott it organised in 1931 of the Donoughmore Constitution, on the ground that nothing short of independence was acceptable. The Jaffna Youth League was more radical than any political grouping in the South at that point of time; its leader, Handy Perimpanayagam, Was later to Work. With the LSSP. But the national leadership which occupied front stage at the time the LSSP entered the political arena - the Ceylon National Congress - had not even a faint echo of the anti-imperialist commitment of their Indian counterparts. As the Ceylon National Congress avowed in its memorandum to the Donoughmore Commission:
Ceylon is one of the few British possessions in which the demand for political reform has never passed from constitutional agitation to hostile de
TOTStration.
But the gentlemen leaders of the Congress, some of whom are still ritually Celebrated every year as national hêroes, were not only incapable of leading a popular movement againstimperialism; they were against even universal franchise, which they opposed, to a man, at the time of the Donoughmore Commission. Marxists, in analysing the failure of the Ceylonese political leadership to promote a militant anti-imperialist novement, hawe emphasised the absence of an industrial bourgeoisie and the depen
B
det rol of their and Tercantile cla imperialism. But it
Ora should also ta total Cultural Colois ses and their politi It was left to the BW political intellectual LSSP, themselves English-educatedle from the West tet di MarxisT1. Which a new political deve
think We should to Messrs. Muthiah reprinting from the tFlå 1941 StålE: CCII LSSP deterus to W referred. It's a docu glaringly the politi leadership of the movement. Clearly, of the membership was more frightene politics of the LSSP of civil liberties by
The it. Indeed, the Affairs and his Ex composed of Stal approved of the WIC) Butr|Sècl persons without tria had concurred in
dettic Of the foi During the debate, nearly a year after were made, G.G. P. ar1 aITIET1[JT1ent Wh{ make the Tequest f deter US Conditional "поl to engage in the : SUCCESSful pro: to subversive of the This amendment, W by A.E. Goonesinha a few Tertibers, like himself and Siripala had a brother Urldt eWe take the Tiberi disagreed with the but Would defeldt detained Without t resolution, in the f: been adulterated by Squeaked through Single Wote, With nir
The LSSP had g Surya Mal movern amorphOUS aSSOCİa nationalist elements and articles are in th written by Doreen

igenous landoWring SSSR ir relatior to seems to me that ke: into account the altio1 of these Clasical representatives. generation of young S Who formed the
by origin of the -lite, to bring back heories of socialist
Were to stitulate alорпепt in Ceylon.
be especially thankful and Wanasinghe for pages of Напsard uncil debate of the rhich I hawe already Ternt that illufrir late:S cal temper of the so-called nationalist a large proportion of the State Council of the 'subversive' than of any violation the colonial governMinister of Hole secutive Committee, e Councillors, had defence regulations e Gowermorto dettäin al, and the Minister
the Order for Lur Sarma; Samajists. which took place the detention orders ornabalal Towed se purpose was to or the release of the on their undertaking activities initical to secution of the War stability of the State'. hich Was seconded , Was lost. But only George E. de Silva Samarakkody (who ær detention), Would all position that they politics of the LSSP heir right not to be rial. Ultimately, the jrTT ir - Which i it - hilad the Tower hit Self, by a majority of a he ab)SteľntiOľ1S.
Jerminated from the erit, which WaS ar tion of progressive (two of its leaflets Le book, One of thern roung, later Doreen
Wickramasinghe). The party's public propaganda and agitation Were originally on abroadly populist radical platform. It had from its beginnings a firm commitment to full national independence, but its popular base was also built up by its opposition to the headman system, its stand against police repression and Wiolence, its advocacy of Welfare measures and the leadership it gawe to Workers struggles. However, there was apparently an inner group within the leadership whose airn Was to propel the party in the direction of a Marxist revolutionary organisation. But the LSSP's development from the condition of an Copen, radical populist movement to a Leniniststyle revolutionary party wasn't consummated until Wartime arrests and restrictions drove it underground. This second phase of the party's life was marked by the expulsion of its Stalinist wing, the adoption of a new, explicitly Marxist programThe and the reconstitution of its membership on the basis of selected cadres. The period documented by the book falls within these two phases that | hawe oLutlined. I should like, for purposes of comprehensiveness, to indicate briefly Whall regard as the two subsequent phases of the party's history. The third phase began with the resumption of open public life by the party. after the end of the War. During that thrid period there was a gradual shift in the centre of gravity of the party from revolutionary to partiamentary activity, bringing it closer, in practice though not yet in theory, to the character of a social-democratic political organisation. That shift is, in itself, not to be regretted, since the earlier goal of proletarian revolution was a chimera, If nothing else had changed, the LSSP might have emerged as the effective social-destocratic alternative to the UNP BUut the dominar C of Sirihälä 30-TEtiOrali Srl irm the rrid-fifties and the a.SCEerldancy of the SLFP presented the party with new challenges. Once class was overshadowed by ethnicity as the main
basis of political mobilisation, the LSSP
Went into decline as an independent political force. This was the marker of the fourth phase of the party's life, as is evidenced by its twists and turns on the ethnic question in the last three decades, in response to external pressures. In 1955-56 the party had stood Waliantly against 'Sinhala only; it surrendered to that policy on entering the first coalition with the SLFP in 1964, and in 1965-66, it made a 180-degree tum from its position a decade earlier,

Page 11
lining up behind the SLFP to oppose Dudley Senanayakes language regulations. In 1972. Dr. Colvin R. de Silva, on behalf of the United Front government, Wrote. Sinhala as the only official language into the Constitution. This meant that where the legal validity of 'Sinhala only' had until then rested on an Act of Parliament, which could have been arTended by a simple majority, it TOW had a Status that Could be alterĒd only by a two-thirds majority. The 1972 Constitution also gawe Buddhism primacy of place, and made no concessions to Tamil, der Tards.
To lament these shifts on the part of the LSSP is not just to make a fetish of consistency. In the 'fifties and early sixties the Tamil people could still look on the left movement as the significant political force in the south which defended their rights. In abandoning thern, the LSSP (and CP with it) accentuated the ethnic polarisation of our politics, and thus contributed to the triumph of extreTe nationalism and of separatis T1 in the north. The 1972 Constitution, it may be recalled, was the precursor to the Waddukodai resolution im which a leading Tamil party for the first time put separatism om the political agenda.
In recent years several people have quoted approwingly the dictum attributed to Dr. Colvin R. de Silva in 1956, "Two languages, One Country; one language, two countries'. Well, I suppose prophets should be honoured even when they have gone back later on their own prophetic insights. But if it has now become respectable to quote that dictum, it's baca Luse the two major Sinhala-based parties have themselves shifted from their original uncompromising positions: the Jayewardene government in 1987 enacting the 13th and 16th Amendments and the Provincial Councils Act, and the present President making since 1994 more extensive Towes towards devolutОП. ОП both thЕЗЕ ОССasiопs the LSSP supported the new initiatives, but one can hardly say that their political agitation or activity made a big difference in bringing about the changes. In the first case, it was Indian pressure that Was decisive in the Secondit Was the outlook Of the new leader of the SLFP.
Having brought the history of the LSSP up to date - from my own point of view, of course - I wish to go back now in time to the year 1940 and discuss the first major transformation in the
orientation of the-p Executive COTitt a majority of 29 the following resolu
in Wiew of the
International to
reeds of the inter Working class m Sama Samaja Pa its support for lar Soviet Union, the declares that it it
Cite 3rd
That resolution of the Stalinist gro became the nucle mmunist Party.
In his great thre of Trotsky, Isaac failure of Trotsky's : ly to build mass pa the peculiar except a personal convers in London in 1952, his curiosity about could be explaine suggest that the tr inside the LSSP fortuitous ÇirçĻmıştE and Trotskyism i ha: the perspective of of today no longer to. Trotskyism, whi adTier of Stalini Mr. Dayan Jaya tillel that the question StalinisIT, Was in had very direct practical politics of
The gravitation of away from the T Comintern, had it Context of the PC which the internati all Communist pa towards an Europe ter's efforts had b. building up broad a parties which Woul national arena, an da TOCratiCJ West Soviet Union again Fascist Italy. This ted the defensive Union, had, it is tr submerged by the t its anti-COI intern starled the World, E munist parties the the non-aggressio

arty. In that year the ae of the LSSP, by Potes to 5, adopted til:
failure of the Third guide itself by the national revolutionary ovement, the Lanka rty, while re-affirming ld solidarity with the 3 first Workers state, ) longer has confideternational.
ed to the expulsion Ip in the LSSP, who S . Ofte futurē -CO
e-Wolume biography Deutscher roted the adherents successfurties anywhere, "with ion of Ceylon'. I had to With Deutscher which he expressed how that 'exception' d. I || Should like :: tÓ iumph of Trotskyism Was TiDre thar a ince: Both Stalinism We now receded in history. The LSSP pays even lipservice le the last surviwing Sri Lanka is probably ke, But I wish to argue of Trotskyism vs. 940 a question that implications for the a left party in Ceylon.
the LSSP leadership hird International, or aken place in the pular Front policies pnal had imposed on ties. Witt drift an War, the CortinE COCEetrte. O Iliances of anti-fascist dfavour in the interalliance between the гп powers and the st Nazi Germany and line, which reflecneeds of the Soviet ue, been temporarily ite the LSSPTOWed resolution. Stalin had and indeed the COTTselves, by signing npact with Hitler's
Germany on the lewe of the war. But the Popular. Front line would be revived two years later once Germany attacked the Soviet Union.
What were the implications of this line for Socialist parties in Colonial Counlries like India and Ceylon? Once Britain became a wartine ally of the Soviet Union, the line involved suspension of the anti-imperialist Struggle ard Support of the War effort in the interests of the "defeCg of the Sowiet Unio". Thė Communist parties of India and Ceylon proved this by changing their attitude: to the War, proclaiming that the imperialist War had been transforIned into a people's War, and, in India, opposing the "Out II" TOWEt af 1942.
The LSSP's dissociation of itself from the Comintern was, therefore, farsighted in the context of the international situation and its possible repercussions on Ceylon politics. But there was another factor, more directly related to the character of class forces in Ceylon, which must have contributed to the LSSP's repudiation of the Corintern.
In the Popular Front periods, the Comintern's policy for colonial countries Was that Communist parties should support the national bourgeosis in their Courtries in furtherance of the strategy of building broad national fronts. Against both Stalinists and Trotskyists, I would hold today that the question of the character of the national bourgeoisie, its role in relation to imperialism and the degrees of its progressive or reactionary nature, is one to which the answers had to wary from country to country, and even perhaps between one period and another. India, for instance, there was indeed at this time a national bourgeoisie playing an oppositional role to imperialism. But in Ceylon, where the bourgeoi-. sie and its political leadership Were interested only in bargaining for favours from the imperial rulers, the Comintern line was politically stultifying. This was fully demonstrated in 1947 when the Communist Party, docilely looking round for a national bourgeois leadership to support, cold find one only in the United National Partyl
(7a bag Carfir Lea)
Notes
1. Wesley S, Muthiah and Sydney Wanasinghe (eds.), Eilair, Mării Margard fie 5afia Saffisis (1995: A young Socialist publication), Rs.300.

Page 12


Page 13
CASS OF WAAXISM AA7 (3)
Waiting for Zyuga
Dayan Jayatilleka
“Sapaisri 17 SI dhe dhe raa saday of LLLLLL LLLLLLLCCLCS LkL LCLO LCCCLOHH LLTLLLLLLLLH on which is inscribed Warly equality
faller77 ify" - Karl Kautsky. “Die Blutige
Revolution' p. 361 (1933).
tall seemed to come together, for
the first time, at the inception of the French Revolution. The main emancipatory yearnings of the oppressed were summed up in the slogan Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. There has been nothing before or since which encompassed so fully, the wishes and strivings of humanity for a different and better World.
The three key terms of this slogan correspond, to my mind, to three great psychological impulses of human beings. The tragedy of all revolutions from the American to date, has been the absence of one or the other, or the splitting up, the divergence, of these three noble impulses. The subsequent evolution of the French Revolution itself is stark testimony to this.
The 20th-century has been an ideological Century par excellence. True, there have been centuries in which Wars have been fought between those who had different ideas, but these were often not fought over those ideas; the exception being of course, religious wars. The Napoleonic wars were examples of conflicts between those who had very different governing ideas and philosophies. However, no century has been as dominated as ours by conflicts driven by Secular ideas and belief systems. Furthermore, innocentury have there been such elaborately worked out and powerful ideologies. Thus, the 20th century can be best defined as the century of ideological contestation, the ideological Century.
What were the main ideologies at play in our century? Democracy, National
Independence, SE cialism, Communi: minism. Of these
Determination Col been the most Socialism and C interpreted as em economic democr form, as distinct f opposed to politic sense, the struggl upheld political di who championeds Cracy, can be sai of the mai — if
- ideological con
National indeper ration, sovereignty Could be Said to ste se the right to seli
The dominance
cracy is demonstra Se fashion in tha strong ideology of reaction to and th all forms of denot socio-economicmovements based of democracy.
Democracy and thus, arguably the this ideological cer
I Would advance firstly the main Cor this century - D. Communism, Selfscism, correspond gical aspects, cha ses of humanity. of ideas of the 20 a psychohistory
Secondly, these when the psychol face With unever

OM
f Determination, Som, Fascism and FeDemocracy and Self ld be Said to hawe owerful, Since ewe ommunism may be phasizing social and acy, in a radicalised som and Thost oftern, al democracy. In this * betWgen th05e Wh0 эпосгасу апd those Ocio-BConomic derlod to have been one not in deed the main lict of this century.
ndence, national libeand even feminism rt from and emphasi-determination,
of the idea of demoble in negative, Te Wert fascism, the other the century was a le polar opposite of cracy - political and and to those political On these two variants
Self Determination are parent ideologies of
|tuгу.
the hypotheses that tending ideologies of mocracy, Socialism, Deter Tination & Fao different psycholoacteristics and impulTherefore, a history h century has to be if the 20th century.
ideologies are formed gical impulses interevelopment.
Thirdly, the ebb andfall of the psychological impulses themselves are rooted in uneven development.
The Paris Commune, the Russian revolution of 1917 up until the dissolution in early 1918 of the Constituent Assembly, the Allende years in Chile, the Nicaraguan revolution until it changed its economic strategy - all these were moments when the troika of slogans held together, But these moments were few and far between. The norm was that some continued to uphold Were while cracking down on those who stood for egalie, while in other cases, the egalitarian or social radical thrust was at the expense of individual liberty. In order for social justice to be realized, it was felt that individual rights and democratic liberties had to be jettisoned - not only those of the old oppressors but also of those who were opposed to the implementation of a more radical programme. Either of these two outComes meant that the fase 77ife Within the revolutionary ranks was also a Casualty.
Most explanations of the unfreedom under the Socialism that "really existed", source it in scarcity, itself due to the ghettoization of the revolution in backWard Russia. Nomadic — pastoral societies are hOWewer a démonstration that unfreedom does notinevitably result from scarcity. The unfreedom under socialism stems perhaps from two other factors being present together with that of scarcity, or more correctly, two other factors operating upon that of scarcity. These were the attempt to achieve rapid development of the forces of production i.e. rapid growth to eliminate backwardness, while simultaneously eradicating inequality and the old class structure, There was no way to achieve both these objectives, in a context of backwardness and post-war chaos-Lenin expressed
1.

Page 14
more than orice, in 1917, his fear of amarchy — other than through i dictatorship.
A factor that is SOTletires acknowledged, but never attributed anything akin to its true importance, is the impact that the defeat of the Paris Cortinue had on the Bolsheviks. True, the Commune was upheld as a model and true, the Соппmшпе operated oп the elective principle, but it was crushed. Its crushing was attributed by Marx and Lenin, to its excessive democratist, to its excessive moderation ("they should have Tiarched on the Bourse"). Lenin and the Bolsheviks were haunted by the possibility of the same fate befalling the Russian Revolution and they were determined, for the sake of the World proletariat, that this Would not be alloWed to happen again, whatever the cost. Though there are no explicit references that prove it, it is also highly probable that the Bolsheviks considered the direct democracy of the Commune to have been unwieldy when it came to decisionmaking in the context of bloody warfare.
Marx: Seemed to haWe bee of this view too when he said, in a letter dated April 1871, that the Central Committee of the National Guard 'surrendered its power too soon to make way for the Commune". (K. Marx to L Kugelmann, 12th April 1871 S.C. p. 319 cited to Ralph Miliband "Marxism & Politics' OUP. p. 135). Centralisation was necessary. Hence, even the Soviets Were not fetishized or absolutised - and indeed were considered secondary and expendable. Still, it does not answer our question as to why the abandonment of political and individual liberty was not regretted as a retreat. Surely the explanations, regrets, debates and ambivalence that attended the NEP Would have been as Tuch Warranted as COCerns democracy?
Apart from the class analyses of these revolutionary processes, which hawe explained these trade-offs in terms of class or fractional struggles, there seems to have been psychological factors at work, which made the political actors heirarchise these emancipatory causes; which made them downgrade some and
12
e Wen. See ther Thas C sum game. Why
sacrifice One cause
that this sacrifice W it somehow made
one's cause? Whyt the three great c pendent, indeed as What psychologic; mes into play here?
In other Words WF logical factors whic split between those democracy and the socio-ecolor nic de those Who Walued a and those who ad for equality and frat
For the politica dual liberty was the extended to private into private proper greater equality Was ning of despolism" advocated it Were dangerous to civiliz: egalitarians, politica it did not address social and econor seen aS a sharTn, and economic issue dual liberty and polit not.
These cate to be Worse - a device fic a diversiоп, a trap. misperceptions, pol the proponents of th of democracy beca On the left flank gathered those who progress in tackling material injustice a list, extentism. W indicator of purity. material, its effects quences of the SOC res affected large n ther, that this di TE more real. Especiall First World War, a and values of plural Were, understandab delay.

hoices - as a Zer0 the readiness to for the other, to feel was necessary; that Corne purer, truer to he incapacity to see a Luses i a S interde
a symbiotic trinity?
a mechanism co
lat were the psycho1 CGIltTibUlEd l0 thE who upheld political se who privileged поcracy, between Lnd defended liberty vocated and fought ernity?
democrats, indiwiCorrestone and this roperty. Any inroads ty for the sake of seen as the beginand those who perceived as highly ition. For the radical democracy, since he issues of unjust nic structures, Was a hypocгisу. Social as Were "real', indiwitical democracy was
seen as something or delay and dilution; Duet the SermLuLa ärzätiÖr SEl In äld etWOWings Orfaces me deadly enemies, (even of the Left) valued speed, rapid the "real" issues of nd poverty, Radicaas felt to be an Powerty was visible, tangible; the conseio economic structulumbers. No WOrder insion Was seen as y in the Wake of the dheTBCE: tÓ OTTIS lism and Consensus, ly, seen as a criminal
The two ideologies that promised to adhere to all three tenets have failed. These are Anarchism and Social Democracy. (A third, Libertarian Communism, never really developed as a serious Current). They hawe both broken on the rock of ensuring economic progress. Humanity's impulse for the new and for more, together with the far more mundane necessities of providing employment, for instance, have placed economic growth and modernisation ineScapably on the political agenda. The Communists were able, for many decades, not only to meet the challenge but to credibly claim that they could do it better. The Amarchists hawe been manifestly and chronically unable to. This, together with their inability to forge an efficient disciplined fighting force in those situations where warfare had become necessary, de Tolstrated that the Anarchist synthe: sis of liberty, equality and fratermity had little practical utility, Indeed this failure reinforced the sense that the three slogans were incompatible. The Social Democrats merely managed the existing Capitalist System, adapting to it and introducing reforms that were cosmetic or at least made no qualitative strides in the direction of equality and fratermity. Those Social Democrats who strowe to do tēvis - te Left|SociāDērīcrats - either met with such fierce resistance as to cause their ouster or nellowing, or mismanaged the economy so badly as to Wind up with one of the same outcomes. The critiques of Left Social Democracy made by those to the Right and Left of them, failed to address the problem of holding together the concerns of liberty, equality and fraternity. For instance the Chilean CPs critique of the leftwing of Allende's party, held that a more Toderate economic course, which would have Tade possible alliances. With a sector of Christian Democracy and the bourgeoisie, could hawe sawed the regime. Whether true Ormot, this - WOuld hawe placed on the backburner, the quest for greater social justice and equality. The converse is true of the Chileaп МIRs critique aпd proposals. Suffice to say, they strowe - unsuccessfully and perhaps unconsciously - to be the Jacobins of the Chilean experiment. Quite the same set of

Page 15
choices can be seen to have been in operation in the (often violently) contending lines during the Spanish Republic Of the 1930S.
Perhaps the lesson then is that a synthesis is not possible when in power, or at War. Since it is usually the case that genuinely progressive and radical experiments meet with attempts at armed counter revolution and blockades i.e. finds itself under seige, the trade-off between the slogans is also usual, while in the case of a peaceful assumption of power, the economic stakeholders are so entrenched that the dice is loaded against any attempt that goes beyond welfarism in the direction of equality and fraternity. Thus, the readiness With which the Warious currents of a liberatory movement diverge, each privileging one or the other of the three great slogans, is perhaps simply a recognition of recessity, of inevitability - and cannot be faulted. Nor can one fault the social radicals for contempt and hostility towards the liberals (bourgeoisie or the intelligentsia) and the latter's hypocrisy. This does not fully explain the disregard for liberty. The absence of any regret overthese choices, the lack of any public recognition of a retreat from the ideal, the assertion that what is taking place is an advance, the zeal with which the new course is prosecuted - all these point beyond structural inevitability, or, beyond that alone, to the existence of a psychological mechanism at Work.
Is it possible to Sustain the Combination of these three macro-values, for any significant period of time, be it out of power? I would submit that the answer lies in a study of the 1960's which Witnessed in the Counterculture, the longest Sustained upholding of these three commitments. Individual freedom, a sense of fraternity and a Social egalitarianism; a high degree of indiwidualism, a high premium on individual expression, Went hand in hand with a certain collectivism, a sense of brotherhood and generational solidarity for over a decade, in what Charles A Reich called Consciousness III - and provided the best description of in his book "The Greening of America'. The "Woodstock Nation' of 1969 was the highwater mark
and most shinings sciousness. An imp. is that the '60S - Cor! internationalism tha matic. It was trans even created in large In the wanguard of th lism Were musicians dours who, this title This internationalist nly generational, but as the strong anti-Wi and the invocation O Mao) showed. The protests - which the USA Wherete di - proves that their mot simply musical, ! political. It was as i new intermationalist oppressed peoples
The domint fOf the vanguard forms, not trade uniors a guerrilla band and l
But, Cof COLITSE, сапne, stayed and W incapability to affect tures of iniquity, shC into being due to, or E of, certain circumsts deal with State viol SCOOTiC -- StrLJCLL the emergence fros пnent, of папу har Were no longer con major values of liber - and, it must be ad ly unsuccessful at blems that brought though they did pC and symbolic challe SOThe points.
A number of dissi Tents, or Tower then early) dissident Soci SolidarinOSC, uphel. but at a later stag Rightwing positions mo movement but a was once upheld incarnating the Value Socialist, but of C fairly low premium political liberty Went

ymbol of this Con
a tilt towards the West in World affairs,
rtant point to note which hardly constituted testimony of
sciousness had an It Was-almOSt) axiohitted and perhaps measure, by music. e new internationa, travelling trouba2, used jet planes, 's identity Was mai
not exclusively so, eta Ti War protests f Ho Chi Minh (and
anti-Vietnam War were mot limited to raft was in operation Tiernationalism Was but also wery much f the slogan. of the WES - "Youth and of the World, unite!"
ms of organization, of the 1960's Were
nd parties, but the
he rock band.
this COinSCiOuSnCSS Went. Ils ending, Its the economic strucWits limits. It care against the backdrop inces. It's failure to leC and t0, effect ral change caused the broad MOVEd Left groups, who litted to the three y, equality, fraternity ded, were cort pletetackling those prothem into existence, se a psychological nge to the State at
dent socialist Tower is in their (invariably alist phase, such as the three Values, e, embraced quite - Tito's Yugoslavia, fully fledged state,
by Trotskyists as is of democracy and Ouse it did not. A
on individual and
di and With
fealty to Social equality and the fraternity of the oppressed
Does all this near that it is impossible to sustain the three great slogans of liberty, equality and fraternity if taken together? It seems so, atleast in pOWBr. Also in conditions of warfare, though the Sandinistas and the Zapatistas of Mexico
in the 1990s may be exceptions that
do not prove the rule but rather provide a glimmer that possibilities exist for a synthesis. The youth movement of the 1960's deserves serious study since it constitutes perhaps the longest persistence of this synthesis at the level of consciousness, though its limitations, failures and eventual repercussions provide ample material for a "Critique of Pure Consciousness'.
What then are We left with? The ex-Communist parties coming back to power in Eastern Europe and the former Baltic Republics seem to be following the path of the Western Social Democrats or the British Labour Party, With some of them (e.g. Poland) Wishing to join NATO. For the first time in Russia though, we are facing the possibility of a Communist Party, one which has mot renounced Marx and Lenin, democratically assuming power in a major independent country, either om its own or at the head of a coalition. (In India of course, CPS hawe been in power in non-independent States). We shall see whether the party will go the old way of downgrading political and individual liberties in favour of 'real' issues of social equality, or place social coпсеппs oп the backburner while attempting to manage the fledgling capitalism or whether it will be able to avoid the Great Trade-off and hold up, equally high, the banners of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. Perhaps for the first time, there is a real structural possibility and pressures for doing so, and structural constraints against doing otherwise. Everything hinges on whether there is an economic embargo (a la Cuba) ar armed Counter revolution (a la Chile, Spain) or more simply, a return to the Cold War.
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Page 17
MMA AKIMWG OFA AREFMOLLV7NOMMAA7Y
Philip the Exile
Lakmali Gunawardema
early years.
culture of our country.
The Young Anandian
Ceylon, before and after the first World Wat had been Lunder British Colonial rule for over a century. Although governed by an English governor and administered by the British civil Service, with a plantation economy that fed the Raj, there was a conscientious and militant group of educated Ceylonese, for ning theiselves into a national TowerTent. Among its leaders were F.R., and D.S. Semanayake, Arthur W. Dias, D.B. Jayatillekë, Ponnambalam Arumachalam, Ponnambalamis Ramanathan, Wictor : Corea, and writers Rev. S. Mahinda and Piyadasa Sirisena. Several, BLJddhist Schools, including Ananda and Nalanda College for boys, and Visakha Widyalaya and Museaus College for girls, had been founded in the nationalist Cultural revival. Popular plays Written on themes based on Buddhism and Ceylonese history, such as John de Silva's Sinsangao and Vassaniara, began to be staged at Tower Hall theatre. The Mahabodhi Society founded by a breakaway group of the Buddhist Theosophical Society, was
I am pleased to have got an opportunity to add a
When I was busy writing "The History of Buddhis as the guest of Capt. D.S.Gunasekera. At that time hi obvious to me that uncle Gunasekara thought very highly
When Philip returned from USA. I met him at In political and social activities we were together. I can in prison when we were detained there for the "sake of law
One of Philip's important contributions to the politi
།
During my close association with Philip I saw that
enlarging its men direction of the Ari
The British adm tolerated all this quelling any distur with ruthless militz evident in the riots in protest against c in the imprisonmer nationalists, which thered the zeal of for Self-rule.
The year was p Ananda College h dents who had b. frequenting Tower around the Corter, the musicians they a variety entertain had continued into drummer lived too late hour, the questi he could be hous oplnilon arose abot the might at the hos! permission Was Sc

few words to this short biography of Philip Gunawardena's
in in Ceylon' I spent a good deal of time at Samanabedda s nephew Philip was a student in America. It was quite
of his nephew Philip.
Samanabedda and we became at once intimate friends. ever forget the three days I enjoyed with him at Welikada
and order" during a strike.
cal life may be his adapting Marxism to suite the traditional
he was really a leader.
Prof. Dr. Walpola Sri Rahula Chancellor, University of Kelaniya.
hbership under the agarika Dharmapala.
inistration SeeThingly but was prompt in bance of the peace ary force. This Was that erupted in 1915, olonial rule, resulting it of several leading undoubtedly streng
the their OWeet
erhaps 1917. In the 0Stel, the older Slueen In the habit of Hall music plays had invited some of had befriended, to Tent. As the event the night, and the far to return at that ion came up of where ed, A difference Of ut putting him up for el, and the principal's Jught. He ruled that
the drummer should find sleeping accommodation outside for the night. Two young students sneaked him in and allowed him to sleep in their dorm. Some irate hostellers, piqued by a "low caste' being lodged in their dorm, reported the two brothers, Harry and Philip Gunawardena to the principal.
The principal of Ananda College, Mr. P. de S Kularatne, a strict disciplinarian, incensed at the defiance of the GunaWardena brothers, called up their guardian and uncle, Captain D.S.Gunasekera who was teaching at Nalanda College, and informed him that the boys would hawe to be TerTOWE frOT the hOst immediately, and found lodging elsewhere.
It was arranged that they room at the residence of a friend of Captain Gunasekera, Mr. T.B. Jayah, them a teacher at Ananda College, who was in the nationalist struggle for self rule and later became a cabinet minister in the governments of independent Ceylon, Recounting this incident in later years to Rev.
15

Page 18
Walpola Rahula, i Captain Gunesekere had said that young Philip, the fiery of the two brothers had accused the principal of insincerity.
Living at Mr.T.B. Jayah's, young Philip Gunawardena along with his brother Harry, came in contact with a group of intellectuals involved in the cultural reWiwal of colonial Ceylon, who used to meet at Sravasti, the residence of Dr. W.A. de Silva, to discuss matters pertaining to the revival of a national identity. Among them were Wictor Corea, Angarika Dharmapala and John de Silva. This was young Philip Gunawardena's first exposure to Ceylonese nationalist politiCS.
The eldest of the Gua Wardea bTOthers, entered Law College in Ceylon after matriculation, and Philip the University College soon after, to study economics. After an year's study there, he expressed a wish to go overseas, to pursue his studies in a Wester Country. Breaking With a tradition Where Sors of the Ceylonese elite were sent to British universities, Philip decided to pursue his studies in economics in the United States.
This decision was probably due to the antipathy towards the British in the family. Philip's father, D.J. R. Gunawardena, or Boralugoda Ralahamy as he was more popularly known, a wealthy planter from Hewagam Korale, who had also been imprisoned for a brief period during the riots of 1915, possibly told his som to choose to go elsewhere. In fact, even discussing his younger brother Robert's future studies after matriculation, Philip wrote to his brother Harry in 1924 from America.
"I hope he will do well in his matriculation exam, then he may go to Denmark and study agriculture",
never mentioning England.
The fact that the school they attended, Ananda College, had been founded by the Americantheosophist Colonel Olcott, who had contributed greatly to the revival of Buddhism in colonial Ceylon would have Contributed to this decision.
16
So in 1922, Phi University of Illinois, gne to further his and ecolor Tics.
In America
Young Philip Gun ArTBridCa ir - 1922 at the Country Was er TWerties". It was a and excess in Ameri was thriving and bus As President Calvi office for the larger said, "The chief bu: can people is busir tion gawe rise to bo a roaring business Chicago. Henry Foi producing the mo mobility to the ped
and Randofph Hurs
empire out of Calific and telegraph servi developed communi impelus t0 aC.Celera arts, the silent TOW of Charlie Chaplin
TOCcked the dWE industry in his films. in the Suffragettem "bobbing" their h Edwardian norris.
Coming into Ame dynamic age, the S Don GLIrlawardena Would hawe had t shock, when he fir B.A. at the Univ. Urbana-Champagn brothers Harty and he Corresponded owerSeas, he de SCr sions of Winter, of
"FOT the last tWO sub-zero Weather ture is nothing; it degrees below. Ze What it would be freezing. You ha ears and noses side Walks are C you caп justiпаg can Walk on a pol
After two years

lip headed for the in Urbana-Champastudies in business
awardema arrived irn the age of 21, when itering the "Roaring ime of extravagance can society. Industry sínB55 Wa5 boOrning. Coolidge who held
part of the decade siness of the Aeri33". EWB Prohibiotlegging, made into i by Al Capone in rid Thade Fils fortune tor Car, that gawe ple as never before it built his publishing Jrnia. The telephone Ces popularised and ication to give further ited business. In the ie made a megastar a radical actor Who rse effects of big WomEl Were active OVerment and started air in defiance of
rican society in this student from Ceylon,
as he was called, o buffer it's culture st registered for his ersity of Illinois at 2. In a letter to his
Robert, with whom throughout his stay ibes the first impresa son of the tropics.
WakS We hawe had . A freezing temperaout when it goes 20 2ro, you can imagine - 58 degrees below We to COWer-up your lest they freeze. The }Wered With Rice, and yine how steadly One ished glass Surface".
:here, following Cour
Ses in philosophy, économics and bUsiness, he transferred to the University of Wisconsin in Madisom, which hig described years later as
"a beautiful university situated on the banks of three lakes called Mendota, Menona and Wingra, one of the most beautiful campuses in America".
Teaching at Madison in the twenties was the distinguished political scientist Thorstein Weblem under whose guidance Philip formed a keen awareness of Current events, as We see in a letter to his brothers in 1924, commenting on the political scene in the US and Europe.
"The country is about to have a very exciting period due to the Presidential nominations. Mr. Henry Ford has wery wisely retired from his campaign in favour of Coolidge. President Coolidge who succeeded Harding is sure of his victory. Ford quietly traded his candidacy with the "Muscle-Shoals" water power plant. The monent Ford heard this he declined the invitation to rur for Presidency, and began to negotiate for getting this hydroelectric plantone of the largest in the country. So you can see that even democratic America is not free from graft and the influence of greed".
"I think even Europe is settling down to nor Talcy. But no longer is England the master of the house. France dominates the Scene, as atro other time in her history, except the two Napoleons".
then on England,
"England is about to enter into a new experiment on Monday, 21st. I can not say what a Labour government WiII do Luder MacDonald ard Sr10Wdon; especially when it is Liberal that Takas a LaboLIT GDWBT1rfléft EWE possible, Asquith has supported Labour with all his strength, unlike the opportunist Lloyd George"
and obserWeS
"But we can be sure that Ceylon will not get self government even at the hands of Labour".

Page 19
Young Don as he was called in Madison threw himself into student life and seemed to thrive in it. He moved from the University YMCA to a typical early American house with a wooden front porch overlooking Michigan Bouleward, that he would recall forty years later from the Weranda of his house on Kirilepona Avenue. He bought an old Ford With a friend. In the SuITrTlers he would go swimming in the lakes with his friends among whom were two Ceylonese, Don William and Chandra Gooneratne. He took lessons in Karate and Worked himself up to a blackbelt a skill he used in Self defence on John Kotelawala in later years in the State Council. A photograph in the college magazine of 1924 of the International Club shows an intensely built, wiry, dark Asian with Wavy hair, sporting a Chaplin moustache and a heavy overcoat, right fist clenched in posing
Recounting the days in Wisconsin to hi5 Children, he reTeITibered that orice he had swum out far into lake Menona, When he felt a cramp twist in his right calf. Slowly he had turned on his back, and shouted for help to his friends who were closer to the shore. He had kept afloat, a dark figure in the immense Waters of the lake, till they reached him and pulled hir T1 : BShore.
Among the friends he made in the international community were three Indians with whom he kept the bonds of friendship throughout his life - Jayaprakash Narayan who like Philip Gunawardena entered politics on his return to India, Sitaramaiah who qualified as a Scientist and went to work for the Soviet government, and Vishnu Nimbkar who returned to Bombay to take up his father’s business. In 1964 Philip GunaWardena remembered his friendship with Jayaprakash Narayan thus in a parliamentary speech,
"I still remember the days spent with Jayaprakash . Narayam In the campus at Madison, Wisconsin, in 1924 and 1925. We discussed whether Ghandian non-violence would be effective in securing independence for India. At that time I held the view
- because had Marx - that Gh Would be effect Jayaprakash Na Chemistry at Wis that it was not g face of India - -- in the way tha:
Another strong fr WaS With SCOt Neari Writer who deeply. i of the three Asiar recalled their first Philip's third son W the U.S. in the Vegetarian Thanksg house in Greenwich
It was perhaps 1 had been in Madisc of Midwestern Univ his book "How to b nary'. During the students had asked that he had found it his speech. So he stop and let him cor gladly answer their Wound up. The two DOп Gunawardena Narayan. When he lecture, Scott took enthusiastic student them to dinner at a they had discussed spoken on ti| thė || then left them, afte of his books, which high in the back o he realise then, that irn yOL Ing Gunawar that Would blaze into ten years herce in India. Philip recall meeting with Scott M him, forty years late
“I remember discu kash Narayan, ant into the night, i Madison..... and by Sions Tade both Socialist".
Despite an active: SOT, Don GUrawa

not started reading ndian, non-Violence ve; but my friend ayan, who studied sonsin, held the view oing to change the the social structure t Ghandi Wanted'.
endship he formed, ng, a young Socialist npressed the minds
students. Nearing eeting with Dinesh, ho was studying in arly 70's, over a living dinner, in his
| Willage, New York.
924. Scott Nearing Kr, On a lecture9 tour ersities, to promote eCotea Revolutiolecture, tWO Asian S0 many questions hard to go on with had asked them to tinue, that he would queries after he had young Asians were and Jayaprakash met-thern after his a liking to the two Si and had in Wited nearby cafe, where ...the issues he had late hours. He had г. giving them поте he had had piled f his car. Little did the had it a spark ilena and Narayan political movements far off Ceylon and ad the effect the learing had had on
.
Issing with Jayapraseveral others, far n the campus at 1925 these discusof us convinced of
Studert life in Madiridena decided to
Rs. 250/- for l year
transfer once more, to continue his undergraduate studies, this time to Columbia University, in New York. The harsh mid-Wester Winters had not been kind to his health, and he began to suffer from acute sinusitis. So, after three years of study in business and economics with plans of completing his degree and setting up an office in the rubber trade for his father's business agency in Ceylon, he moved in 1925 to New York City.
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Page 20
SAAAFC
Managing Strategic
John Gooneratine (Regional Centre for Strategic Studies)
"77"Lwsif W7A/WAI/ - Burf flag your Carew"
Bedouin saying
IntrOduction
This paper is concerned with the area of strategic relations. A dictionary definition of 'strategic speaks of the military aspect of the origin of the Word. From this, the idea of strategy in international relations Comes to comprise concepts such as power, Security, national security, the application and exploitation of force in inter-state relations, intelligence, bargaining and negotiating among states, geopolitics etc. For purposes of a "Sri Lanka perspective", one can Work on the basis of the following description-how are Sri Lanka's interests furthered, and its national security preserved andsor strengthened through the mechanism of SAARC. And national security is mot Used hörde in thig a TOW · Sense of military Security alone, but is taken to Comprise other elements such as economic and social attributes also.
Archaeology of SAARC
A very brief look at the archaeology of SAARC can help illuminate aspects of its personality. In terms of its age, it is a lateCorner on to the scene of such institutions, having been set up only in 1985. The Countries that comprise SAARC, however, are not all recent states: Nepal was already an independent state by 1923; India (1947); Pakistan (1947); Sri Lanka (1948); Maldives (1965); Bangladesh (1971); and Bhutan (joins UN in 1971).
SAARC was Setup even by 1985, largely due to the determined push of Bangladesh. At its preparatory stages there was a Considerable annount of Suspicion and resistance to the formation of such a grouping for South Asia, on the part of India, who saw the whole scheme as an attempt by the Lilliputs to tie down Gulliver. When Indian suspicions were allayed, it resurrected Pakistani suspicions that anything that India agrees to must conceal an anti-Pakistant trap. A considerable arTnOLJnt of time Was spēnt om trying to allay the different apprehensions of coun
T TuOH OLuCC LLLOO0L Hk LLLLLL LLLLTee OOkL LLkLH CLOLOk FACESSAYSAY FEWAY Ye Yves Y F5F5
18
tries. There Were cer Countries considere eventually agreed to denOminalor of Subj
These suspicions: for real, and Werer Of SAARC that was Heads of State O DBCEmber 1985 at D. SAARC was design
The "Objectives' "to promote the Wel South Asia", "lo growth, social progre pTnent in the regio strengthen collectiv strengthen cooperati ping Countries", "toc tional and regional o lar: airTns and pLurpOS
While the "Princip: ritualistic reference t lity, territorial integrity Ce, non-interf9rence of other States and ISO Stat itt - ti "desirous of promic anity and progress recognize the need fic tion" to this end, it is
"Such (SAARC) cc a Substitute for bila C0operation bLut shal and "Such cooperatic stent with bilateral a iւյր":
Among the "Gene that "Decisions at all on the basis of L "bilatéral and Coller excludêd froT deliba
SAARC and Strai
Basically, it was describing what SAA an exercise in circur should do.
There was strong to include What one issues, and bilateral

C SSues
tain subjects that some d taboo, What was Was a lowest Common ect areas for SAARC.
and apprehensions are eflected in the Charter signed by the seven r Government on 8 haka, and Sgtout What ed to O.
" Of SAARC included fare of the peoples of accelerate economic SS and Cultural develon", "to promote and e - Self reliance", "lo on with other develocooperate with internarganizations with simiE5' E.
bleS" Of SAARC Tlakg O "S0Werelgrmly, equa', political independenin the internal affairs
mutual benefit", and 3 S9Wel States are iting peace, stability, in the region'..... and r" ir CreaSēd Cooperaalso mentioned that
»Operati Om Shall rot bB teral and Tultilateral complement them"; rshall 1otbg in Cor5nd multilateral obliga
!ral Principles" were
levels shall be taken Iranimity", and that itious isSLJES Shåll be Titi DS".
egic issues
no an Exercissg - ir RC was to do, rather Scribing what SAARC
opposition from India Would call 'strategic political subjects. The
choice was between hawing a SAARC with a limited agenda or no SAARC at all. In the event, accommodating the "realities" of the situation, the emphasis of SAARC was to be on economic and social subjects. Excluded were political subjects, all bilateral matters, and any "contentious" bilateral SLlbjects.
So the short answer is that strategic relations did not figure on the formal agenda of SAARC in the first ten years of its businesS. But at the same time, It musi be Tientioned that it was not for Want of trying. The need to discuss political subjects, especially Contentious bilateral subjects, has always been brought up by warious SAARC members. Pakistan has wanted to bring up the subject of Kashmir; Bangladesh has wanted to discuss the subject of its water-sharing problems with India; and Nepal has Wanted to discuss Some of the problems it has with India, and Sri Lanka, raised the issue of the invasion of Sri Lanka by India on 4 June 1987. There were also occasions when private discussions between Heads of Stales or Government led to fruitsul ouloomes, as for example when discussions (at the New Delhi Summit) between President Zia-ul-Haq and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi led to the subsequent agreement between the two Countries not to strike against each other's nuclear installations. Discussions among the Heads of States at the 1985 Dhaka Summit gave the impetus to the formation of Working groups and study groups to examine the questions of Terroris. In and Narcotics, and which culminated in the adoption of two SAARC Regional Conventions on Suppression of Terrorism, and on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.
A Theoretical Perspective
In order to analyze the subject of the possibility of managing strategic issues Wilhin a SAARC frameWork, it is useful to examine in more depth the institution of SAARC. In this respect SAARC can be observed from two viewpoints: liberal institutionalism and realism.
Institutionalists believe that institutions can independently change state behaviour.

Page 21
Institutions can promote peace, as their argument goes, by convincing states to reject power-maximizing behaviour, and to accept outcomes that might weaken their relative power position. They argue that institutions can alter state preferences and therefore change state behaviour. Institutions can discourage states from calculating self-interest on the basis of howevery Towe affects their relative power position. Liberal institutionalism does not directly address the question of whether institutions cause peace, but instead focuses on the less ambitious goal of explaining cooperation in Cases i Where State interests i årė mot fundamentally opposed. The theory becomes more problematic Where states interests are fundamentally conflictual and neither side thinks it has much to gain from Cooperation. Therefore, the theory largely ignores security issues and ConCentrates instead on economic and allied issues. In fact, the theory appears to be bLuilt On the aSSumption that interational politics can be divided into two realms - security and political economy, and that liberal institutionalism mainly applies to the latter, but mot the foTTier.
The realists believe that institutions cannot get states to stop behaving as short-term power maximizers. For realists, institutions reflect state Calculations of self interest based primarily on concerns about relative power, as a result, institutional outcomes invariably reflect the capabilities of states and balance of power. Institutions, realists maintain, do not have significant and independent effects on state behaviour, Institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the World. They are based on the Self-interested Calculations of the great powerS, and they hawe no independent effect on state behaviour. Realists therefore believe that institutions are not an important cause of peace. They matter only on the margins. Institutions are essentially "arenas for acting out power relationships". For realists, the causes of war and peace are mainly a function of the balance of power, and institutions largely mirror the distribution of power in the system. In short, the balance of power is the independent variable that explains war and peace, and institutions are merely än intervening wariable in the process.
The difference between realism and liberal institutionalism lies in contrasting understandings on why institutions are created and how they exert their effects.
South Asia - It's Strategic Configuration:
Bearing these two approaches in mind, one could draw the following picture of
South Asia, wieWing 'realist' |ErlSES. DCIIli South Asla is What, o (Stephen Cohen) call serisus" between ind Weën Partft|On aft consensus develope Pakistan around the i other. Flowing from
dBas Dr. What ShÖl "natural" or propers a result, India and F other's major threat. I that affects all the S. And there is no agre in Which the smallel can coexist. With a developed India. Bal Sri Lanka haWB tried power in WarloUS Way Bach, at differert til protection via close outside powers ardh supporters of a (SAARC) that might And India, in turn, de Cormilitary linkages W
Another way of loo Asiår CÖLJitriēS WiêW 1 is through the concep xes" (Barry Buzan). is defined aS “'a . gri prinTary Security Co sufficiently closelytha ties callot realistical from One another". At Asia security complex India and Pakistan. Th two large states, in are so deeply intertwi securilies, both politic be separated. Buzar "tragic case of struc - the Way each co, A number of less Bangladesh, Bhutan, are bould into the Cor reasons. For nearly major exterTal SECUri India. The principal foreign policy has be Or, at least Cope with presence in Ways tha direct la B: binds the South As together is the domini and relations defining priorities in it. In add threat" that di ar as posing to each oth ti Orla di Istori across state boundai domestic problems relations arno Ig the

the scene through nating the politics of he South Asia analyst ed the "hostility Cori ad Pakista. BBthe mid-1950s a di in both India and idea of hostility to the his are very different ul. De SOUuth ASiS trategic structure. As 'akistan rEITiain éach t is a structural fissure Outh Asian Countries, enterto a structure South Asian States more powerful and gladesh, Nepal and } 8CCOTT 00:dalerdian S, although they hawe mes, Sought political relations with Tajor ave bem enthusiastic regional association tarte Indian power. Welops its own politiith Outside pOWCrS.
king at how the South heir security concerns st of "security comple
A security complex oup of states whose ncerns link together It their national Securiy be considered apart the heart of the South : is the rivalry between he insecurities of these the security complex ned that their national all and military, cannot describes this as a :ltural politi Call threat" Intry views the other.
powerful states - Nepal ard Sri Lanka тпplex for geographical all these states, the ity probler T1 has been
Conundrum of their 3em 0W tO neutralize India's overwhelming tWould not precipitate against them. What iam security Complex antrolė ČoflČocal isSLJ9S the rational security ition to the "Structural di Pakistar are See er, here are religious, Callik,5 WC UT ies (overlap), making interCollected Will
states. These local
rivalries, linked to the consequent inter-state disputes define the principal insecurities of the complex as a whole.
JLIst to give ona" rmore Way the " strategic configuration of South Asia is seen (Howard Wriggins), it is described as "a nearly ideal type of a sharply asymmetrical system with one power claiming hegemony". And given the anarchic self-help of the international systern, countries attempt to offset these ambitions by pursuing a policy of extermal balancing, appealing to external powers from beyond the region e.g. US and China. This evoked a similar overture on the part
of India to the - SOWiet UiO.
Related to the Security Concerns mentioned above, and emanating from the power configurations in the South Asian region, are aspirations for leadership or hegemony among the States. The South Asian subSystern has been described by One Writer (Shaheen Akhtar) as revolving around the "core' power India, the "bargainer Pakistan, and the "periphery powers, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Maldives. This also reflects the geographical configuration where India is the only country which has LHLHHLLLL LLaLLLLL LL LLL LLOL LLLL LLLLLL other regional states land frontiers with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan, and maritime boundaries with Sri Lanka and Maldives, which Take India the central state of South Asia. India, by Wirtue af its size and location, its erorITGLIS economic and military strength, aspires to regional leadership, or hegertory, and its policies are directed to achieving this central status. The view of things from India may not IECESSarily be Couched in thOSE SarThe tETTS.
Among the strategies that India has adopted to achieve hege Tory in South Asia was the politics of "bilateralism" in her relations. With her South Asian reghbours. This enables her to maximize the advantages both of its size, and the fact that the neighbours all border India, but not each other. It helps India avoid internationalization of contentious issues. With Pakistan constantly attempting to surface the Kashmir Issue at UN fora, at regional fora like the Organization of Islamic countries (OIC), at the UN Commission of Human Rights, India has accused Pakistan of trying to intertationalize the issues, and cites the Simla Agreement of 1972, under which India and Pakistan agreed to negotiate bilaterally any subjects that are in dispute. While this strategy of "bilateralism" is not Completely successful where Pakistan is Concerned, India has been Tore successful in imposing this strategy on Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh and Bhutan.
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Thus the following provisions incorporatied in the SAARC Charter, and referTed to above, are designed to take care of India's concerns: "Such (SAARC) cooperation Shall mot be a Substitute for billåteral and multilateral cooperation but shall complement thern"; and "Such cooperation shall not be inconsistent with bilateral and multilateral obligation". "Decisions at all levels shall be taken on the basis of Unanimity", and "Bilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded from deliberatioLJS". Further, the activities of SAARC are Concentrated only on the economic and Social areas. There is no provision for states to discuss political and Security issues. The above interpretation of the formation, structLITE and fOle Of SAARC, in hergälist IIIode of analysis, shows that institutions are shaped by the interest and resources of its members, and the more powerful are COinSistently privileged ower the Others, The stronger States in an institution seek to maintain a maximum degree of flexibility arld autoromy.
Institutionalists, while not necessarily rejecting such a description of the South Asian political Scene, believe that one car take a different tack, as it were, to the larger issues of avoiding confrontation and War, reducing tension and promoting cooperation among states. Following are some of the reasons adduced by institutionalists in Support of their position. (Mearsheimer) The rLulĒS Člf är institutio Carl increasa the number of transactions between participating States over time. And this "institutional iteration"-creates the prospect of future gains through Cooperation. Secondly, rules can tie together interactions between states in different issue areas, creating an "issue linkage" promoting greater interdependence between states. Thirdly, a structure of rules can increase the amount of information available to participants in Cooperative arrangements so that close monitoring of member states in such areas of Cooperation is possible, And fourtly, rules can reduce the "transaction costs" of individual agreements, when states can devote less effort to negotiating and monitoring Cooperative agreements. Liberal Institutionalism is generally thought to be of limited utility in the Security realm, because of the greater obstacles to cooperation when Tilitary issues are at stake.
These, in brief, are the twin forces Working on SAARC as it begins the second decade of its existence. One can best peer into future developments by posing some questions:
Looking into the next decade:
(a) What is the global environment, as
20
SAARC starts i of its existence
(b) What is the SOL
aSSAARC St its existence?
(c) Is SAARC ge
changes?
(d) Strategic cont Todels to follo
(e) What are some giC ComCETT157. looked after th of SAARC7
(a) What is the glo SAARC StartsGo | of its existence
The changes hawe drastic, causing funda changes in the inter implosion of the So disintegration of the Eastern Europe radic the post-World War II configured, with the keading two blocs of each other in a bipolar
The World is still in to figure out what the system is: Unipolar (U Centric. The aftersho still occurring. The i afè institutions likB † its economic counterp republics of the Sowie off to form separate their rnationalilies. Rus what is possible throug as the Commonwei States (CIS), and to further fissiparOUS beri
At the Säg ting gConOThic factors ha. and into high salie relations. There is, a marked tendency tow in both areas of econd security. The creation Free Trade Agreen example.
(b) What is the So ment, as SAARC St of its existence?
In the Cold War pe splits among the coul especially between lng area has been vulner, wention by the superp and the Soviet Union

on the second decade ፥?'
thAsian environment, |rts on the decada of
ared to cope with
CerS. S. The Other
W
Of Sri Laka's StrateAnd how can they be rough the framework
bal environment, as the Second decade
2 indeed been quite urmental ard Structural national system. The Wiat Unio, and tha 3 Soviet empire in ally changed the way | system Carme to be
US and the USSR countries confronting structured Cold War.
the process of trying nature of the present S)? Multipolar? Westcks of the quake are ITIT1ediatë CaSUalties he Warsaw Pact and art Comecon. Former at Urion hawe broker
states, according to sia is trying to salvage harrangements such alth of Independent draw the line against Idencies (Chechnya).
the importance of e COTeto the fore, ce in international at the same time, a Wards regionalization Tics and international of the North AmeriCarl ent (NAFTA) is an
Luth Asian environarts on the decade
Iri00d, bĒCaLSE of thig tries in South Asia, dia and Pakistar, the able to outside interowers (United States ) റd China. But, in
the South Asian region itself, there were no super-power interests directly involved. It was somewhat out of the line of fire of East-West hostilities. The region was always an area of peripheral and derivative interest to United States. There is little by Way of resources that America obtained from the region which was crucial to its economy. Neither American investments nor the volume of trade with the region was substantial enough to make the area an important partner. The area's importance fluctuated in rhythm with the shifts in América's g|gba policies. In South Asia, there were no vital interests involved for either the United States or the Soviet Union. Pakistan and India seeking support from outside the region from one super-power of the other, brought in the super-power competition into the region. And China, the neighbour to the East gets drawn in, in the Wake of the Superpower Interwention into the region. The super-power presence in the region, its extent and depth, had no roots of its own in the region, but was determined by the global US-Soviet politics El Sewhere.
In the post-Cold War period also the strategic significance of South Asia remains marginal. The only area, however, which draws increasing attention by the US and the West, is the area of nuclear non-proliferation. Apart from this, South Asia often appears to be more endowed With "nuisance value" to the rest of the world, as one of the most conflict-prone regions with the full gamut of problems: ethnic violence, refugee problems, over-population, terrorist Violence etc.
So the immediate effect of the post-Cold War changes is to leave the essentials of the South Asia region intact - a region With no sense of being a "security community" and with countries with "security dilemmas"; a "hostility consensus" holding India and Pakistan together; a region with a "coercive hegemon" in India, preferring a policy of "bilateralism" than cooperative action. Whether these will change are stil|| in the future - whether India will become a "consensual hegemon" preferring cooperative action in the region.
And as far as Sri Lanka is concerTed, the period of the first ten years of SAARC saw the ethnics bringing in India in an interventionist role, and resulting in the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in July 1987, which had far-reaching conditions on the future conduct of Sri Lanka's foreign policy.
(То Ве Солдлџad)

Page 23
My family has been working on these estates ట్రో for generations.
what future do my Children hawe Wii: privatization
Estate Worker
 

If they choose to remain on the estates, they can
look forward to a variety of interesting prospects. With
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Estate schools and health services can improve, With
privatization, your children will have Tiany more choices
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It is important to realize privatization is a means to
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achieve these aims, privatization has to be executed in the
appropriate manner,
That is the task of the Public Enterprise Reform
Commission (PERC). Its mandate is to make privatization
work for Sri Lankans today, and for generations to come,
Every privatization is a carefully considered decision
that takes into account the interests of all sectors of society;
the general public, the state employees, the consumers, the
Suppliers, as Well as the Country's overall economic vision.
PERC's mission is to see that privatization works.
In doing so, your interests are always being well looked
after,
With privatization everybody has a stake.
PE Rc WATCH FULIN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
PUBLIC ENTERPRISE REFORM COMMISSION,
Bank of Ceylon. 30th Floor, MoA, FC. Box 2001, Bink of Ceylon Mawatha, Club. I. Sri Lanka Telephçm: 54-|-3337565, Fax:94-|-326||3

Page 24
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