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T H E I D E A S M A G A Z N
 

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NVS Bic
UNP, both leadersh are convinced tha makers regard til parlamentary'enem
A British Minister Dr. Liam Fox told Parliament recently that Britain had offered to "play a facilitating role" in talks between President Chandrika kumaratungas People's Alliance the separtist (P. A.) administration and the LTTE. secessionist Liberation Tigers (L.T.T.E.). 蔷、 Dr. Fox who wisited Sri Lanka in Meanಳ್ಲಿ. të P. September will probably make another several other fronts trip to Colombo soon. Meanwhile some ..., 驚 American generals who have . L’Affaire Bandarar sinched a private organisation to selli .ليجيين ، counter insurgency expertise were 蠶 蠶 IΠ Whi approached in connection with the residency ITB: North-and-East war, wrote the Sunday. institutions - the Times Columnist, lobal Athas. Since the national pT855 pri government strategy is to hammer the Opposition protest. Tigers hard and force.Prabhakaranto Qp pbÖSitIO I Wa:SSL|| negotiate a political settlement, these Rights groups, ard is taken as a new P.A. NGO. In that battle initiative in conflict resolution: 59". President Kumaratunga's visit to Played ar importa France where she met President Chirac, was MR. is part of the diplomatic arm this now a President's C strategy. Already, LTTE organisations Mr. Goonesekera. in the West, European capitals in dge Bench of the particular, are finding the security behalf of the peti agencies in those countries less. challenged the tolerant than before. Diplomatic Professor Shirani E pressure on the LTTE abroad, military- Judge of the SU Filitical pressure at home. respondents a
Bandaranayake, Since ending the war through Minister of Justice negotiated settlement based on. affairs, the Secreta devolution is the P.A'a policy, Mr.K.Balapatapend successful exercise would mean a Genera. The Curtai gradual reduction of the mounting drama tBtiS likely defence vote, what we are watching political analysts a thenis President Kumaratunga's grand SE landmark lega strategy on the operational side, Prof. consists of Justic spiris, constitutional Affairs PABA as Minister, is the key figure, His task is S.W. B.Wadugo dË to mobilise multi-party : support (the Perera, A.S.W UNP most of all) for the devolution S.Anandacoomara package. The history of the ethnic problem, and particularly of if, Mr.R.K.W.Ggoriest at a negotiated resolution, proves that conscious ofhe bipartisan (strip. UNP) support for such Pegs" an exercise is a "must". Right now, the Supporg
application bLut I amr
 
 
 
 
 
 

kground
le Silva
ірі апci mass base, t the PA's policy TE COWEtiÕTB || hy" a greater threat
insurgent foe, the
A haG, battles Cor.
ayaka
ch, the all powerful ated two important judiciary and the ovoked sustained Arit; rightly SOTI pported by Human many an influential
he legal profession, eous journalists,
it role. One such K.W. Goonesekara, counsel. Last week, addressed än i The Supreme Courton til S. WHO FEWE appointment of landaranayake as a preme Court. The re. Prof. Shirani Prof. G. L. PiВгis, aid Costitutional Tyto the President, i and the Attorneyir haS:g0 Fhe Lup :OTh" a
to be regarded by:
nd futurë historians battle. The Bench es: Mark Fernando, ghe, P. Ramanathan, I politiya, Priyantha
Vijetu nga and Swamy.
skera was certainly significance of the conscious that at
u precedented also conscious that
what sat stake is the independence of the judiciary as a practical reality. The several petitioners stated that the power of the Executive to appoint the first respondent under Article 107 ( ) of the Constitution was not absolute and was aimed at el Suring the independence of the judiciary. That had Tot been Corpolied with in this ista 1 CE. The said appointment was therefore arbitrary and capricious and was a wiolation of the fundamental rights of the petitioners to practice their profession, righteously and freely, and also the rights to equality" (Daily News).
SēriOTE COLSER, K.WW.GOOneSekera
cited Justice Kuldip Singh who had
stated: "The Powers and functions of
fЛe thгеe w/лдs of:gyovагплтелf ћad
been precisely defined and demarcated
LLLT LCCCCLLaLCS LLLLLCCCCLCCCLCL
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of the judiciary is basic feature of the parliamentarist ра Cunstitution * = Mr. Goonese keras the ENDLF, a form observed. "The judiciary is separate is one of the large and the Executive has no concern with ENDLF has held the day to day functions of the jшdiciaгү".
While no one would deny that the President has the absolute right to make certain appointments, the government's ultilate judge and jury are the people of this country. In the end, the electorate decides. It is on that fact that President Chandrika Kumaratunga's self assurance is ultinately based -- the 63% factor, So to say, as against the PA's modest perCentage of the lational Wote at the 1994 Parliamentary election, two minths before the Presidential contest.
エ True, the FA knows that it must stand together or it will sink together. No party is likely to quit unless (a) the issue is of such fundamental importance to its own constituency that staying in the PA will be seen as a grossbetrayal by its traditional supportbase or (b) it is convinced that membership in the PA has become a liability, Meanwhile we watch divisive tendencies, sudden eruptions of protest over PA policy pronouncements or ministerial decisions. Here is a clear instance - Wasudewa Nanayakkara:
E. "There are many government MP's who entertained suspicions about the sale of the Steel Corporation. These suspicions are compounded by the government's refusal to allow a debate called by me and some members of the UNP and the TULF"
Tamil Reaction
The TULF saw the Attorney General last week. A delegation which included party chief M. Sivasithamparam and MP's Neelan Tiruchelwam, Joseph Para rajasingham ad K. Thurarajasingham took up the question of detained Tamil youths. Some have been detained for five years without being charged. While the A.G said there had been significant progress in clearing the backlog, a Ellicial Unit of his dept. is speeding up inquiries. There has been un rest in the prisons and several hunger strikes. While the TULF - the di Tami I
 
 

rty controls 8 votes, representatives, "at an undisclosed
her insurgent group, location" reported the ISLAND'S }r Tamil Parties. The R. Satyapatan.
-talks with LTTE
ici Hegelaard Jerici 莒
:

Page 5
In July 1977 at the moment of his triumph, JR was 71 years old, by far th a odest Prime Minister in the country's history, seven years older than D.S.Senanayake had been in 1947 fifteen and sixteen-years-older tha S.W. R. D. Bandaranaikeard Sir John Kotelawala in 1956 and 1952 respectively, twenty eight years older than Mrs. Bardaranaike had been in 1960, and a full-thirty years older than Dudley Senanayake in 1952. Despite histowering political presence as one of the outstanding politicians of the day, he had been the leader of the party for only four years before and yet he led thern to an electoral victory on a scale that had eluded the
Senanayakes, father and Son, Who
were presumed to have had much more of the contion touchi than he, His
winning the Prime Ministership had
been the culmination of a career just short of four decades ir politi CS. HiS way to the top had been to use Bacon's words, a winding stair. While his political opponents spoke of him as a Sri Lankar R.A. Butler, the enlightened Tory who never succeeded in gaining his party's nomination as Prime MMiris fer of Briffair desaffe being artinently suited for the post by virtue ofabrikify experience and seriority.JF?'s aries, папталуу references for aп en/ightепеd"Tory ofал еarІїer vїлfage, Benjamin Disrael who had become the leader of the Conservative Party of his day and given it a new and more дrogress/ve frтаga bулоvїпgу її fо гfте centra of the polftica/ spectruгт and r... thing out to sections of the working class.
It is surprising that he did not think of
that other- and more appropriate
analogy among British statesmen in the
process of modernising the Tory party,
Sir Robert Peel. J. R. Jayewardene in
ל7רי M1
faCt, li had little ir - flamboyant Disraeli or his witriolic; he .rith FBBlתו וחסוחחוחםם
the survival of the decade of their ec sint are than any othe ranks of their respec day, to modernise up its spirits, and preferred moderate a constructive poli
Therg Wä5 alSO 0FE comparison will encouragement giw the Cabinet. He has exaппple of D.S.:Se the younger andney first Cabinet after found århunderstani who gawe them igri for demonstrating political leaders an thãm they may, hã" self-confident leade for instance, never encouragement the gawe him in his fC which the choice o' delegate from the C Colference at San Was an example - This memory of the old chief, combir sympathetical attitude to youthfu Once Fle hirthself W, leadership in the li them opportunities they may never ha\, insecure leader. Yo Ath Lula thuda | i Dissanayake sa Wt under his belign:t creërs of oldgri TE
di Romie di MĖ given 10 years or Cabinët post, implement their
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

-
in his personality ad Loch Thorais Thay both ensured ir parties during a ipse; and both did r person within the :tive parties, in their its appeal to keep
Offer those who
to radical change, ical Creed,
other point in the th Peel - the er to young men in di also had the local nanayake in whom wer members of the independence had ding leader, and one eater opportunities their own skills as das administrators
We had from a less
r. J. R.Jayewarderle, forgot the generous elder Semārā yake rrnative years - of FJR as the principal ountry to the peace Frisiti 1:51 itle Cabinet, and example set by his di With hi5 OW1 d“ und Erstanding Cabinet Ministers, as in a position of ter 1970s, to give for initiatives which ve had under a mora ilung mer like Lalith
Капd GTi
I CareÈSfUri5 utelage, as did the |kER. PTTISE I, a II of Whom Were more in the SaTTE time enought to plans. Unlike his
AL THOUGHTS
KM2 de Sil Wa
immediate successor, JR Was nota "hands-on" head of government. He preferred to leave the initiative in the making of decisions with this Cabinet Ministers, orice he and the Cabinet had given formal approval for their policies and plans. It could be said of him, as Harold Wilson said of Peel, that is greatness lay in bridging two epochs and carrying the traditions of his youth into the patterns of the future, through these younger colleagues. The present leader of the UNP, Rani WickerTesing he, a kinsman of Jayewardene's, was elevated to the Cabirlբt iI1, 1 BBC),
The general election of 1977 was as much of a landmark in Sri Lanka's recent history as that of 1956. In both instances the outcome of the electoral struggle was a change of regimes as much as a change of government. The 1977 election marked a setback for
the populism of the SLFP as well as for Sri Lanka's traditional Marxist
movement, which began what was Certainly a terminiral decline, BeCa uSe his victory in 1977 was beyond anything seen before, many in his party and in the country expected dramatic changes. Looking back at the last time hisдагту had been fлgoverгігтвлі, ї.ё. frr:7.955 757C, V75 far: fiat of Was doormed Eyts leader's lack of vision; LL HHHLCYLLLL LLLLLLLLe 0L CCCC LLLL LHCL їmagїпаѓїоп fлto a seгїes of new policies that would modernise the Country in avery way, especially is ёсоглогтү His first-periodias head of
government (1977-82) was one of the
kGCHLHHLLLLLLL LLLLLLLTGGGTGG CCGLmLOGO TT HaL CGLCCCLL Firstory of the island, with a succession of radical changes of policy introduced in virtually every sphere of activity Thatдгоgгалтгrте алd fїs prforїїѓes had bean décided Lip of Fr) fois-frief-3 year periodas Weālder of the LVWP before Frë becarme shead of goverr7ri77 erat; the gāCe
at which change was introduced Was

Page 6
also deter fired by irr. In the first six
years as head of government as Prime Minister and executive President, he had a record of accomplishments that none of his predecessors as head of governments could match: these included the five principal dams on the Mahaweli and its tributaries, the new Parliament building at Kotte, the new administrative capital of the island, the re-building and modernisation of the | port of Colombo and the international | airport at Katunayake, and the transformation of the run-down Echelor barracks in the heart of Colombo into a site for high-rise buildings and five-star hotels. None of these WĊ Luld hawe been possible without the radical changes in the economy which he introduced in association with his Finance Minister, ROrie de Me. -
.
Change Agent
These reforms aimed at reducing state E. controls and restrictions in the e Con ony, and providing greater incentives to private enterprise, a set
of reforms devised to liberalise the
economy, after almost 20 years of a Sri Lankan Wersion of India's control Ră. Nevertheless the autoane of the LCLLCLCLCMTL LLCCLL LLHLHGLLLLLCLLL LL LYLLL sare 7970s and continued thereafter
ܕ ܗ .
EWas not a reduction in the scope or
Scale of the government's role in the ёсополту but a defiberate алd distinct shiff in Spriorities. Thus there was a
Tlassive investment of Torley, men and
9owегппепtal
were laid in the ea tertas head of Work on Randenig began somewhat satisfaction of is completed before the Mahawgli progr and re-affirmation honoured position irrigation Civilisatic and in many oth political policies as the heir of D.S.S the accomplis governments, esp and dam-building tha D.S.SEE: Comparison With t the-greatest Sinh; - pastin their role oi builders", to borro the Economist use JR and his princip enterprise, Gamini
One of his 7 dChie Werrierifig Wag ; transition fror a to a тоге орел political skill than r in similar circumsta of the world. By major reformis Simul rather than in stage easily. o'WerCorThe bLuI Unio resistance an to soften the impac on the poorer C0mmunity, WF necessary to do sc
energies on the E social justice or p
accelerated development of the sense, adjustments
irrigation and power resources of the Mahaweli-river basin, the most complex irrigation enterprise in a country with along history of fostering the development of irrigation as an essential feature of the state's responsibilities to the people. It would be true to say that without his historical vision and energetic Committent the Scale of the venture Would hawe bee Smaller and the process of implementation of the plans much slower. As it was JR set out to complete the construction of the
principal dams of Mahaweli project in
6 years instead of 30, and wery nearly succeeded in keeping that self-imposed deadline. The foundations for the darts at Kotmale, Wictoria and Maduru Oya
ཟླ
Were irmāde, to s stri safety.net at the W number of peopl security was redu those whose econ
Tot Wärrit SLC S fOOd SLIJSidias W transports side gO Werf7 Te77 frotr i'r rhagina fi wellard ei public housing fort argas partícular y a Well, Under the Wr Pri'r de. MWiri:5fer. Pref.
gOWernments Wasid Which introduced adjustment prog politicalbenefīts arī
Ethan discomfiture c
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

ty years of his first
government, while head of government, JR did not have ala and Rantambe -
later. He had the
being all of them government and, till the late-1980s, no
le left office. To JR, imme was a revival of Sri Lanka Stimeas one of the great is of Asia. In this ar features of his
a regarded himself erlarları yake. Ideed ments of his acially in ігrigation were much greater yake’s and=bore he achievements of alese rulers of the "compulsive damw a phrase which di With reference to hal minister in this Dissanayake.
ܥܪ.
7 osf. significar7 to have handled the 'ontrolled economy one with greater many other leaders, rices, in other parts implementing the Itaneously, in 1978, is, he provoked and "eaucratic and trade digawe himself-time ct of the se reforms Sections of the 1епеver it was , in the interest of lain good political
i and modifications :
angthen the social erytime when the e entitled to its
most matters, and especially in the
changes he had been thinking of longs
conflict, for instance, he moved more
I cautiously and more deliberately, and it
and occasionally, as in the violent
三エ - During the whole period when he was a
any rivals within his party, no challengers to his authority within his
萎
effective challenge from the opposition either. Thus, at most times, and on
early phases of his administration, he was able to set the priorities as well
is as the pace at which change would
be-administered. On such occasions he acted with a speed and decisiveness which his critics asserted were those of an old man in a hurry to introduce
این
before he assurned the leadership of his party. On other matters, the management of the country's ethnic
善
there the pace was set for him by:
powerful political forces whose strength he understood and perhaps feared as well, but even with regard to those he could act on-occasions with remarkable decisiveness and is Courage irn introdi cing changes which is neither an influential section of his cabinet nor the people at large would appreciate - such as the District Councils scheme of 1980-1, and the Provincial Councils established in 1987-88. He strowe to control events
三
aftermath of the Indo-Sri Lanka treaty E. of July 1987, was early overwhelmed 萎 by the street demonstrations organised by the SLFP in association with the Jariatha Wimukthi Pera muna. courageous refusal to be intimidated by the wialent publici der77 or strations organised by this combination of forces
provides a stark contrast to
Bandaranaike's repudiation of his pact
Iced by excluding with C. Chelwana ya kamms when the omic situation did opposition to it was a rare trife
upport. Just when 'grip': 'Errrrrrrred Hidrid
!s eliminated, his
o ďLrceď a T1 o 5ť factive systern of "he доог. in therшга/ indir) the wri75. â5 'amic leadership of rnatifa5a.Thu S JR"S
ire of the wery few 萎 consistent economic development
a structural reram and reaped dwindication rather |r Dbloզաy:
Presidential authority was grafted to
compared to that organised by the LLLLLLL LLLL LLLLL OLLL LLLL LaL SL0LLLLSKS
In 1977 his government made the establishment of a Presidential system
one of its highest priorities. While this
system better ensured a continuity of government policy which, he argued, was ..necessary for sustained and
policy, it was sin fact a hybrid
change the metaphor - on to a prime
Thinisterial trunk. The institutional
Contal, оп даде 17
ܝܬܐ -
 ݂ܕ ܼ ܝܘ .

Page 7
spondent
cial Corre
= ی = |
niversar
represented the Sl When the JWP decided to terminate e Jayaratne and Dharm Daya Pathirana, the leader of the JVP studentactivist stridently anti-JWP:Independent University of Sri J Students Union-ISU- of the University approached Dharma of Colombo, 10 years ago, there was a discussion with th only one flaw in their otherwise a meeting with flawless plan of action. The-D day scheduled for thene chosen for the abduction and murder, at 4 p.m. at the Univ the 15th of December 1986 happened. The discussion was to be the Unduwap poya (full moon) and a second roundt day. At first everything went off-like day (Dec 15th) at th clockwork: Pathirana i and felloW ISU -- the evening apprc activist PW-Sornasiri were abducted JWPers invited Pathi and taken to a lonely stretch near the them to their lodgin Bolgoda Lake; the torturing of the two continue the disc students began in Barnest, Then Carne - Pathirana and Son the unexpected: the arrival on the participated in that scene of some Buddhist devotees on agreed and all four their Way to a nearby temple, Prevented 120 (Piliyandala) bi from completing their gruesome task Police Park grounds. of decapitating their two victims and
disposing of the bodies, the JVP. As they were passi assassins ran away. Pathirana. Was Wihar, a white HiAce dead; but thanks to this almost them and several p miraculous intervention, Somasiri, brandishing pistols al though severely injured, survived to tell from the CID, get i. the tale, this time twilightwa
a p0 ya day the road The End Zone Not sensing anything than an uncomfortat
And what was that tale? A meeting of sleepless night in se the Inter University. Students an experience tOW Federation (USF - an umbrella Strangers -Pathirana crganisation of all major student not make an attempt unions; at that time dominated by the were bundled into the JWP) was held at the University of JVP students were Kelaniya on the 13th of December vehicle at two differ 1986. Pathirana's Secondin Command, the way. The abd K.L. Dharma Siri (a la W student) assa ulting Pathirani
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

y Restropective of the
Assassination
at this meeting. questioning them about the ISU and le, two well known asking why they didn't join the JVP. srepresenting the By now it was clear that the abductors ayawardenapura, were not CID officers, but a gang of siri and requested JWP "heavies". elSU. As a result, - ܒ --
Pathirana was The journey ended in alonely wooded xt day (Dec 14th) stretch near the Bolgoda lake. Three ersity of Colombo. of the abductors dragged Pathiranai held as planned away while the remaining ones ook place the next (including the driver of the wan) started e same venue. As working on Somasiri. Held prone on ached, the two the ground, a knife slicing his throat rana to come with bit by bit, the agonised Screams of his gat Piliyandala to leader and friend ringing in his ears. tussion further. Somasiri was asked various questions, nasiri who also particularly the whereabouts of the day's discussion) leading activists of both the ISU and proceeded to the the "Wikalpa Karda ya ma' 1, SOTlasiri us stop near the was also told what the abductors is intended to do with them once the sessions of torture cum interrogation ng Hotal Shanthi Werg Over - he and Pathira na warg to wan stopped near be killed and their bodies dumped in ersons got down the Crocodile infested Bolgoda lake. nd saying "weares. That was when fate intervened. There all of you". By was the Sound of oars, the sounds of sfalling and being Thany Voices and then the light of a Si Were di5 ted:
more dangerous victims had attracted the attention of tle and probably a a party of pilgrims. Interrupted in their më police cell, - i gruesorine endeavours, the abductors ich they were no slashed a knife several times across and Somasiri did Sollasiri's throatland believing hinto to escape. They be dead, ran away. Somasiri escaped van forcibly. The death - but Pathirana didn't. He was let out of the discovered a few yards away, stripped ent places along to his underpants, his throat cut and luctors started the back of his head bashed in.
aard Soria:Siri,

Page 8
Backdrop to the Killing:The University Student Movement in the '80s.
Why did the JVP decide to kill Daya Pathirana? What did they hope to achieve through this brutal murder? What did they actually achieve i.e. what were the results of this act? What was its relevance to the macropolitical picture, and the way the country's extrema political crisis was played out?
In order to answer these questions it is necessary to consider the history of tit ISU. The ISU Was formed in the early eighties in the Colombo Campus as an alterative to the JWP's Student Union, the Samajawadhi Sishya Sargamaya. Apart from being anti-JWP the ISU was also firmly, antil UNP and anti SLFP. The ISU was a hotch potch of various strands of radicalism; it's leading members waried from independent socialists to Trotskyites and confirmed Stalinists, from dogmatic Marxists to Fidelists) Guevarists.
At one level, the ISU was an attempt at forming a student organisation
unaffiliated to any established political
party and devoted exclusively to student issues and : interests. At arruther level it was an attempt to form a non-racist revolutionary student nucleus which would one day be a part of an "internationalist revolutionary movement'. Therefore, from the inception two distinctly contradictory Impulses and characteristics were in operation within the ISU: on the one hand, the desire to be free of all political parties and organisations and on the others the persistent Search by Some of the Tore 'advanced' elements for a 'revolutionary alternative' to existing left parties and organisations. With the assumption of the leadership by Daya Pathirana, this second tendency became increasingly dominant. This process was accelerated by the belief of the leading cadres of the ISU that a pre-revolutionary situation existed
Within the country following the
closure of the parliamentary option for regime change with the fraudulent Referendum of 82. In their view therefore, the building of an armed revolutionary organisation was the Thost urgent task on the agenda.
Throughout 1982 were held with a parties and grou Organisation With line'. The two de this regard Were stand on the ethi rejection of the p, the Tainstrategy ISU's : unofficial
"Wikalpa Kandaya result of this pers
The inabilit anti-JWP ef unique opp presented b exposure of identity of E assassis, e. JVP to regai initiative (b nationally a the student
after an inte mere few in
As ffe politicis affic of the ISU inter contradictions wit, July 83 riots, increasingly racist
and all attempts
branding all anti. gro Lips (including "Eelatists". The
opposition to the the Tamil strugglet WPSi5 t Of E Stude towell
The JWP Onslaugh
By mid '85 this
Violet Cebet Ween Colorbo campus. the Left's attenda Paties Conference on the ethnic iss со пvened by t|
li li fi Strati) suggestion of Wijay JWP started its sus wiolence directedag

and '83, discussions existent Warious left sin -- Search for an the correct political Trade Union Action Committee, held in
erminant factors in an internationalist ic- question and the |rliamentary path as of the revolution. The affiliation with the ma'. W.K.) was the stent search.
y of the non/ to seize the prtunity y Somasiri's
the real Pathirana:’S nabled the in the lost ữth ind within movements) :rval of a - on this.
Клапагаdcalisatfол sified, so did its f fff WWP. After the the JWP took an
āt - dew Col Lution ad racist parties and the leftist ones) ISU With it's Wocal war and support for herefore headed the emies, within the
It On The Left
had led to physical the two groups, on Iп пmid 1986, afteг nce at the Political (PPC) - aroundtable que and devolution ne Jaye war dene at the Written a Kumaratunga, the tained campaign of gainst the anti racist
the unconditionally, (He had become quite
the wiolent disruption by JWP activists of an important convention of the Joint
early 1986 at the Sugathada sa Stadium.) A number of SLMP meetings as well as the residences of some of the left leaders (such as Wijaya -- Kumaratunga) were bombed. In the Universities, pitched physical battles were raging between the JWP and the anti racist left Student groups. Nowhere was this more in evidence than in the University of Colombo. where the struggle for Supremacy.' between the ISU and the JWP was at= its peak. The JVP even abducted a militant ISU activist, held him captive for several hours in their stronghold the University of Sri Jayawardanapura and used torture to elicit infortation from him about the ISU and its leaders. The Pathirana assassination took place in this context.
In mid-'86. Pathirana started to drift away from the WK, mainly because of his disagreement with the latter's support, following the LTTE massacre of TELO in Mayo88: and converging with the conclusions of the PPC), for an intermediate political solution fors= the ethnic problem short of both is secession and federalism. By this time, of the 7 member unofficial leadership is of the ISU, two had become inactive; three stayed with the WK; Dharmasiritook an intermediate position while
- Pathira na recommenced his search for Stand, Coppo Osing any :
a revolutionary group which supported Tani national struggle
sympathetic to the ultra Trotskyite" Kamkaru Mawath a group and, in Northern politics, to the EROS rather thiar the EPRLF). However all five active members of the ISU leadership . were united in their simpla cable opposition to the racist JVP and SLFP and in their struggle against the repression by the UNP and the NBI CID, which at that time was directed primarily at the three non-JWP Southern revolutionary groups: the Wikalpa Kandayama, the Samajawadhi Janatha Wiyapara ya 2 and the Nava Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna3, it should be emphasised that from 1984, the JWP was providing the State with information about these rival groups in the same way it was sneaking to

Page 9
the University authorities on the ISU.
The universities were not only the JWP's main support base; they were also its most fertile recruiting ground. Achieving total domination - actually, a totalitarian monopoly - Over thig Universities Wastherefore a important objective of the JWP The ISU and Pathirana were perhaps the most 530 S obstacles to achiewing this goal. The removal of Pathirana and the destruction of the ISU were increasingly considered by the JWP as necessary preconditions for its further growth. The JWP's plan was simple and deadly: Kill Pathirana and gefrid of his body. Suspicion would naturally fall on the UNP regime. While the other leading cadres of the ISU (and the WK) were fully occupied with blaming the state and trying to protect themselves from the state repression, the JWP could take them out systematically, one by one. With each new killing the attention would be focused tore and Thore on the State, leaving the ISU and the WK wide open for the JVP's insidious campaign of cuid blooded murder. By the time thë |SU - ad WKi reālised that thiS WäS
nothing but a red herring and the real
culprits were the JVP it would be too late. That was the gastle-plan.
The Days. After: The Road Not Taken
somasti 's sшrvїva! пласІва// fһвsв carefully aid paris go awry. By the evening of November 16th (1986), the ISU Wasaware of the real identity of the killers. A meeting was held at the University of Colombo the same evening and a decision was taken to launch a massive propaganda battle against the JWP. It was also decided to alert the other left parties and groups to this new danger and bring them all together in arianti-JWP united front. The first leaflet Was issued on the 17th of December 1996 and 50,000 copies were distributed in Matara (where Pathirana's funeral was held with K.L.Dharmasiri as the chief speaker) LL L LLaaLa0S LLLLLLS LLLLLLLHLHLH LLLLLL giving the complete details of the crime was issued on the 2nd of January
A series of Theetings of all anti-racist
- +5:15 left political parties, trade unions, and
sectoral organisat discuss the JV formulate some kir Tha Lurg fir17 ost of prїvаfе!y agreed i respor 5bMe forfass cшгious rg/шcrалса Many reasons wer that attacking the
"help the UNP by 't Struggle'. The tra (the CPSL and the
Whole issue as a among various ultra the JVP they felt,
It is of ex political
importan StrTeSS tha Chandrik Bandaran Vijaya’s w tle SLMIP
President
present O.
Ei mOmentO occasion
a treat to the DT. C|Wri"R." S correspondent - a representatiwe - WF after Pitirala's di JVP may kill radica 1e Wer. OUGl the st implication was: t not o UTS; a prob League, not the B Wa5 Tallicitant to because it had high the JWP leadershi the rank and file, ir futurel Because o the ISU's appeal f united campaign. stop it in its track Only a few who
WijleWeera intimat
JWP leader Nand Anuradhapura (wh later, became thes UWP) Jder:Stood
 
 

7
ions were held to killing meant: that the JWP had become P threat and to a Polpotist entity which presented a ld of united action, mortal danger to all left and democratic the participants forces. But this correct assessment did that the WWP was not reach any receptive ears; this cirre, fare was a writer recalls that Marasinghe himself to say this publicly. was reduced to Watching the whole E given. Some felt charade from the back of the meeting JWP directly would hall, standing near a window. iluting the antiUNP ditional left parties. Somasiri's survival and the resultant LSSP) regarded the exposure of the real identity of nternecine struggle Pathirana's killers presented the anti left student groups; racist and democratic left with an tould newer become opportunity to strategically Weake the JWP through the la un ching of a пmassive politico - pгораgапda treme campaign: If this opporfyriffy was HCLGTLGLSS CCCCCC S LLLLL LLLLLL L0LGLLaCCL fragedies, fra Cluding i fshe murder of C6 tO Vijaya Kurtlaraturga Could have been t preverted. But this opportunity was lost; the only concrete result of the series of joint meetings was a stater Ternt (which the four leading left parties didn't sigri, deputising that task to their student organisations) which didn't criticise the JWP by name, but referred to it in Aesopian laпgшаge as "racist fascist forces'.
를
This strategic error on the part of the left parties was further compounded by the subjectiwis T1 and lack of unity among the anti JWPStudent elerTents. After its involvement in the Pathirana assassination became known, the The LSSP leader reading JWP cadras went into hiding. Siwa informed this. As a resu/f the USF which was t the time the ISU hitherto dominated by the JWP became Io methimitWO days - seaderess. This presentad another Bath that though the unique opportunity: a chance for the students but it will anti-VWP, anti tracist is rudent raditional left. The organisations to capture power in the his is Your problems. USF and thereby effectively lem of the Junior marginalse the VWP within the student ig Boys. The NSSP movement. Several initial discussions
criticise the JWP were held in December 1986 and hopes of dislodging January 1987 at the office of the CPSL D and winning over Students Union - the Lanka Jathika 1 the not too distant Shishya Sangamaya - attended by the fall these reasons student organisations of the four major or a concerted and left parties, the ISU, the independent against the JWP to Student Group of the University of s, fell om deaf ears. Moratuwa and several anti JWP student knew the JWP and Factivists from other Universities. A ely, like the former statement was drafted signed by all ana Marasinghe of participant organisations, condemning D, less than one year the JWP for assassinating Pathirana second victim of the and assuming the leadership of the what the Pathirana USF. However due to tack of

Page 10
YSS SSSSSSSA
consensus, this statement was never issued to the newspapers. No further I steps were taken to dislodge the JVP and take over the leadership of the USF. The second battle against the
JWP too was tПLJE USt.
The period following the assassination of Pathira na was a "diabolically confused era" (to borrow a phrase from Fatio Neruda). The inability of the non/ arti JWP left:to seize-the Unique opportшлѓїудгеѕелfed by Somasiri's exposure of the real identity of : Pathirana's assassins, enabled the JWP foi rega ir7 = Iffi G Most fri fra five (Ébofh. CCLLCCCS CC CTaHT LC aLLLCCL тоvements, after an interval ofа mere
few months. During the next year, While thВ-ПОr/arti JVP eft was debating whether criticising the JVP by name would help the UNP or whether the rank and file of the JVP could be won over eventually, the JWP busied itself with the serious business of planning and organising the next stage of its bloody campaign of eliminating its rivals. This correnced with the attack on the LSSP headquarters in October 1987 and the
killing of Nandana Marasinghe at the
Sunday fair in Anuradhapuratown in = November 1987- and continued till the military defeat of the JWP at the end of '89. The assassination of Wijaya by the JWP in February 1988 effectively decapitated the United Socialist Alliance. This was compounded by the killing of several thousand left activists, also by the JVP. This bloodletting Weakened the left to such a degree that an independent existence as a third fortation became
practically impossible. The break-up of .
-Wijaya ta address
the USA and the reversion to coalition politics on the part of its component
stråtegic errors made in the aftermath If the Pathirala 55a SSiTati).
The Way We Were And What Might Have Been
In the new conjuncture which came into being after the assassination of
Fathirara, the nor-JVP der Tocraticleft had two urgent tasks to fulfil: the
formation of a broad united front which was not only anti-UNP and anti-SLFP but also anti-JWP; and the launching of a politico-propaganda battle to
ܕ ¬ܒܸ.
ܠܨ .
ffig.
fragments (with both the SLFP and the UNP) were the final outcomes of those
defeat the Polpotis all the WP IT 3 publications made
physical destructi left was one of it most in Trimediate ta of Wiese fulwir fask ability of the left: fie o truisrris
political thinking. T Was doing fr7 ffe
TW. Waters led mentioned in this Wijaya's unexpecte extrermely explicit
the funeral of Na Anura dhapura in With this, Vijaya cle assurned the leader Struggle. This soli relationship betwe ISU, the seeds of V the immedia të : Pathirana assassir Witness to the ide assassins, prote Sortasiri from the concern of the IS approached Wijaya he offered to keep
house for as long a Used to nothing opporturism, lartë բhrasemongering fr War II and fraterr Wijaya, Was like an of fresh air- and the beleaguered S lost. During the ne relationship based and admiration grf and the ISU. WHE
CFThrmerThoratiorn rm
NeWW Hall in postролёd'адrevio foi fel Mad-Eif Shirayd Wr order Occasion too, her indictment of the
The second event of 71 politica|| partis sectoral organisati Town Hall on 26th and the founding December 26th Mo Wijaya's brainchild. unprecedented in

世 JWP threat. After
its speeches and amply clear that the Olof the non-UWP
Sprima Y goal and
sks.) The fulfilm gnt 's depended on the fo discardi rimary of dri dadlau farie W. Whis Was Whaf Wijaya asfjorts of his
events should be
regard. First was di presence and his anti-JWP speech at dana Marasinghe in No Web. 1987. Early and definitively 'ship of the anti-JWP dified the fraternal en Wijaya and the which were sown in after (Taith of title}} lation. As the key ntity of Pathirana's citing the life of IWP became a major U, When thé. ISU with this problen, SOTā siri in HiS OWm isit W351ęCesSary. Out Cowardice and excuses and empty orn left leaders, this hal response from unexpected breath gawe some hopė to
LJ thatia|| Was not E.
хt oпе уear a close con mutual respect aw between Wijaya In the ISU invited the 2nd Pathirana eeting held at the апцагу 1988). Vijaya шs/y scheduled trр sto film Saharawe to be there. On this made a dgwastating VP
Was the gathering 2s, trade unions and
Sheld at the New
1 December 1987, of a new bloc, the Wermelt, which was This was something the history of the
二 三、 Lankani left and would have been impossible if not for the correct and dynamic leadership of Wijaya Kumara tunga. The two important aspects of this gathering should be emphasised: it deliberately excluded and attacked the SLFP banishing it from the progressive fold and strategy didit brought together in a single bloc, папу Неft non-party organisations which the traditional left regarded eitheras upstarts of nonentities. Thus Wijaya's initiative SUCCEeded in bridging the gap between the established and new Left(s). For Wijaya it was the necessary first step in the path WES determined to take towards the Creation of an anti-fascist, anti-racist, anti-feudal, anti capitalist Third Force i.e., an anti WP anti-SLFP at UNP Democratic Left which could one day make a successful bid for governmental power. It is of extrarne political importance to stress that Chandrika Bandaranaike, Vijaya's wife and the SLMP President, was not present Dл this mort7entous occasion - at:whigh Wijaya Was declared amd endorsed (by Dr. Colvin R. de Silva as i-the: Presidential candidate of the united
Left at the upcoming election:
The formation of the USA was te the Second step in this project. It is necessary to mention here that Wijaya Clearly indicated that he waited to I broaden the USA in the near future to
include other left formations including; the Tamil Left, an not keep it as an exclusive club as the traditional left Was Wont to. He had also informed the SLMP's Centra Cīrittee fis certitude that leading elements of the WKISU and the SJV would join his party shortly, thereby strengthening him. politically.) This scenario was what the JVP detested, politically and ideologically, more than anything else. SrTall Wonder that Wijaya Was killed by the JWP: less than two months later,
If the forming of a broad front of all democratic left forces and the launching of the anti JWP politicopropaganda struggle took place in the immediate aftermath of the Pathirana assassination, many of the eventual tragedies would have been prevented. As it was, these twin developments came too late either to save Wijaya's life or to save the independent left
Corsa 27 277 e 24

Page 11
se to ProfA.J.Guna
ARAMAER C)
TEES OF ANY
క్లే 三 1.0. Sun-God and
of the Sky.
"4 years after Manama" by Prof.
- GiWe LuS all you
A.J.Gunawardana published in the Lanka Guardian of October 31, and
November 15, Prof.Gunawardana -2. Princess: The
begins his article with some sarcastic f remarks about our booklet 25 years My after Maname'; but he has not replied ဒြို{ to a siпgle опе of Our criticisms. AbOWE als the has not been ableto quote a They
single line from Maname that has They
anything of value to say: anything
يت .
comparable, for example, with the 3. At the erugia following:- when the Pri
ki|Ed
ܕ ܒ
1. Call-noman happy till he is dead.
(From the oedipus of Sophocles). Princess Wyd
husban وية تيتيت : 2. It was my tongue, and not my mind |t WąS
that swore...(from the Hyppolytus 5: of Euripides) Weddah King. He
= " ki|| 3 thine own self be true. ny El fau
= ---
Compare this with Shakespeare's Jul
髻盡 4.- What's in a name? That which we - Brutus lftherebe 52 call a rose, any dearf By any other name would smell as him say sweet. (From Shakespeare's Romeo for Caesa and Juliet). is...fter Why Bru 5. The last temptation was the Caesart
tםח Was
greatest treason, To do the fight thing for the wrong reason (From T.S.Eliot's Murder in
less, but
Töre, Hai
E - the Cathedral was living " tlf tät
The reader can easily find literally to life all
- Dywed The hundreds of similar lines in any f
ܬܹܐܬܹܐ : dictionary of quotations. Se ¥¥: Instead of these, we find in Maname 體 twoical lines like the following:- it him. Butt үрlcall Islew hi
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

r blessing,
night is near
fearest dear. s are gгоvvliпg, s агергоwwling, 're drawing near. r"|ESOOT-E)ë here.
point of the play, ıce has j
idyl kill my dear dit was your fault.
Our fault.
tried to kill me, so I 2d him. It was not
it.
the following from
lius Caesar:--
any in this assembly, "riend of Caesar's, to
"I that BrutUS"Slowe :
Ir Was Oiless thar
that friend demand Itus rose against his is my answer: It tt || LOVECESär that lowed ROThe you rather Caesar g and die all slaves, Caesar. Were dead, ree re. As Caesar Weep for hir Th. As rtunate, rejoice at Was Walliant, li honour as he was ambitious, Who is here so
fault. It was not my
base, that he would be a slave? If Hry, speak, for him hawe I offended. Who is here so rude, that would not be a Roman? If any, speak, for him hawe | Coffdfd. Who is heTE 50, Wille, that Willinot lowe hi5 country? If any speak, for him hawe offerded. Ippa U5 e for å герiу.
Citizens: Nome, Brutus, none,
Brutus: Then norë hawe | offended.
Surely the wast difference should be
obvious to any
intelligent person.
Prof. Gunawardana goes on: "The first issues relates to the substance and quality of the play itself. This has been comprehensively dealt with over the years. However Regi Siriwardene's original review in the Daily News has, like the play itself, stood the test of time. Mr. Siriwardena wrote in 1956: "Maname is not only unquestionably the firmest thing om the Sinhalese stage, it is also Come of the firest things | hawe Seen On any stage',
It is absolutely untrue to say that Maname and Mr. Siriwardena's original review have stood the test of time, as is clearly shown by the following facts,
1. Mr.Siriwardena himself, in an article published in the Daily News about 25 years after Maname wrote:-
"Wеппаү have to revise ouгоріпіоп
about Maname "AFTER ALL WHAT
妻
DOES IT HAWE TO SAY?"
--
This is exactly what we have been asking from the wery beginning).
-

Page 12
菲
書
About 14 years after Maname, another Well known critic, in an article published in the Daily News, Wrote:-
The opposition to Maname seems to be growing, We TTlay have to rewise Cur
opinion about it some years from now'.
23 years after Malate, Prof. Sarachchandra himself, reviewing another play, wrote in the Daily News:
"Although most of the plays now done follow the conventions of the naturalistic theatre, the acting still bears the pernicious influence of stylisation. Lucien Bullathsinghala still declaims as he does in the stylised theatre, and Leonie Kotelawala walks about the stage in a pose that could indicate that she has a permanent back ache. IF ANYS ONE TELLIWIE NOW THAT I HAWE DOME MORE HAR MITO THE SIN HALA THEATRE THAN GOOD, I WILL MOT DENY IT” (Ceylon Daily News, Nov 20, 1979 Page 10).
4. The Encyclopaedia Britannica contains articles of considerable length mot only con English, French, other European and A Tierican Literatures, but also on Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Arabic, and other literatures. It also contains articles on individual writers - not only Sophocles, Shakesреаге, Milton, Voltaire, Shaw, Eliot and others, but also on Indian, Chinese, and Japanese writerSlike Kalidasa Tu Fu, Li Po, Matsui Bash0 , and Eothers.
3.
However, the 1962 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, published 6 years after Maname, does not
- conta i norte single Word either
about Sinhalese Literature, including
Maname, or about the author of
- Mamame.
and a few Sinhalese writers.
included in a song article on South
Easf A5far7 Liferature. Burf they do not contair - separata articles of солSiderable Гепуth, either оп Sinhales efferature including
Later editions contain a short reference foi Sinhalese Literaturg i
Мїалалтте, ог Малате.
--
Evidently, th Encyclopaedia regard Maname things on any;
The New Stani a modern Art though smaller Contains excell of Warious field
It gives accounts several languages, and American, Chinese, Japanes: lcelăndic,
The 1981 edition, after Maname, do single word about including Maname, of Maname,
Evidently, the ec Standard Encyclo ге9ard Maпаппета: things on any stag
6. Time Internatio prestigious wee read all over-t published a Gc erth titled 'Asia', Review (Over 1C 50 years of de including Politic Cultu TE,
The section... O referGICBS to th Of Asiä Write Japanese etc.
Kawabata, the " a Warded a Nobel
However it do
single word ab author,
Evidently, the International Māname as "ori
on any stage'.
In the Second inst Prof. Gurā vārdānā singing and
Prof.5ärächchand
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

in the author of 5 seems that the music, singing and dancing are as primitive as the Words.
For example, in Maname, all the 2 editors of the characters go round and round in the Britannica do not same circle for 2 hours on end. Is this as "one of the finest really comparable with the Bolshoi tage" Ballet? We found it extremely boring, and almost intolerable to Watch after
lard Encyclopaedia, the first ten or fifteen minutes. 3rican publication 睾
. - than the E. To us it seems that Maname is not nt concise accounts comparable with 1 Hamlet (words), i of knowledge, (2) La Traviata (music and song), or (3) Swan Lake. Thusic and dancing), of the literature of and a host of similar productions.
not only European but also Indian, it would seem that our opinion is Persian, and even shared by the editors of (1) The Encyclopaedia Britannica, (2) The New Standard Encyclopaedia of America, published 25 years (3) Time International; so that from the as not contain one World point of view, we do not seem
Sinhalese literature to be in a "microscopic and negligible or about the author minority" as Prof. Gunawardana imagines. Indeed it would seem that from the Wordpoint of view, it is the litors of the New admirers of Maname who are in a
aedia also do not 菲 "microscopic and negligible minority's
"One of the finest 'e'. Maname rendered a useful service to Sinhalese Drama by reviving interest hal, one of the most in it at a time. When it was at a very kly journals, widely low ebb. For this we are grateful. But El he World, recently now we should try to rise above that 韃 lden Jubilee issue level and develop more modern forms. - A Comprehensive There is dramatic talent in our country, O pages) of the last some of it of very good quality. Young velopment in Asia, i dramatists like Sugathapala de Silva, S = :s, Economics, ad Dharma Siri Wickrama rata, #:
Jaya sena and others were : just - beginning to produce plays of some Culture includes walue. For example, in Sugathapala de S. works of a number Silva's "Thattu Gewal", a woman has s-Indian, Chinese, come to hate her husband. She stands 'including Yasunari on a balcony and watches him walking irst Japanese to be along a busy road, far below. She turns Prize for literature). to a friend and says "There he goes Do you know, I often stand om this s not contain one balcony and watch him walking along but Maname or its that road, and I keep on hoping that he will be run over by a car. Do you think I am a very bad woman? The editors of Time friend replies "I don't think of human so do not regard beings as good or bad, think of them of the finest things as just human beings". There is depth of thought and feeling in those lines. They offer food for thought. In Tant of his article, i DharmāSiri Wickramara trna" s "Ran refers to the music, Thodu", the principal character is a
 ܼ ܒ .
dan Cing in Woman who has had an unfortunate a's plays. To us it sexual experience when young. But the Сопfd ол раge 24

Page 13
AAN
RURAL woME C
(A respected sociologist, the writer has lived, taugh and peasant movements, for many years. She is a Concerned Asian Scholars.)
fi 酥 File:Tiரது Paper preparedfor Farla FoodS
Food security and particularly the Wommen - i developing countrie
丐、 to food Security.
The "four horsemen" of the Apocalypse still ride in the World, and But Watisfy while famine and hunger seen gentle poor Countries dow Compared to the modern incarnations people will haWester of war death and plague, still their cruel day, and not only pangs and slow destruction affect far abundant, diverse a too many people in the world. In spite The idea that ever of considerable agricultural progress, to eat abundantly in spite of foodgrain production per revolutionary Co. capital continuing to rise, and inspite history, which has of overflowing surpluses in Some: life spans and all regions, too many people in the world and still it is not g go hungry and some continue to starve. We find that togri to death. Increasingly we feel that this food security forth LLCLLL LLL LLLLaLC SS LLLLLL LLL LLLL LL LS LLLLLCLLLK aLLHCS LL millions of women and men should not foodgrains. Clea be cutshort and sapped of vitality, that should mean more t children should not go on suffering minimum-so some malnutrition. And so the concern for sufficiency" (Gopli food security". "food abundance | . security". But it There is also an increasing awareness TETTISELUtil WT that women are not only major victims is it to beachieved
tյf հungar and farmine, but their connection with food is of vital Food Security can importance. Women arg the inwestors of production ofen
of agriculture and are still and areas that peo disproportionately involved in through control of agricultural production seë Table 1) = pOWefit does F7)
and with increasing market integration food grains rather and Emigration for work, often the distinction is a becoming more so, to the point where since people eatm
many social scientists now speak of since grain itself is the “feminization of agriculture" in the market: ht doe: many regions and Countries. Women the ability to prod are more likely than men to be att än individual Orr concerned with providing food and than acquiring frost nutrition to their families. Women, though the lattern
 
 
 

D FOOD SECURITY URE PROSPECTS FOR ASIA
臀 = Gail Omwedt
it and worked in India. mainly with oppressed caste member of the editorial board of the Bulletin for
HiFப்ேேஆேராரிேசரகராசிரித்சர்
、
rural women of elevant. This definition does nor as are vitally linked prejudge the question of "how much
-- is enough." - because human beings
శ్లో redefine their "needs" in the process security". How in of development, as we see in particular we really insure that in the developing countries of Asia пошgh to вat evегу which are eating at increasingly rich
sufficient food but Elevels. ld UtritõSföõd?:
yone has the right. A simple indicator t measure this is after all almost a concept of food security" would be ni Capit irah Ermlar the number of calories pBoplв gat pпа seen a too short regular basis- LimitՒ1E grounds Fif too many famines, Women, men and children are getting uite accepted stil|- fti Sufficient զuantity 'normal any people identify itings and if they have some power in le poor of the third modern denocratic Society, the Fms of providing temporary crises that may hit them ry food security stay lead to cutbacks but not to hunger hän simply the bare and stariation. would talk of "food an 1996) or even FOODFIRSTOR GROWTH FIRST
and only "food
he question stili HOW is food Security to be achievěd? such marg and how For a long time there have been two
(see table 1) contending trends in thinking about this, which we might call the "food be defined in terms first" model and the "growth first" ough food inways model. The food first model ple have access to emphasises providing cheap food, ΠΕΡΙΠΤΕ property or basically foodgrains, grown locally by mean producing landholding farmers hence it is than "cash" crops; sometimesidentified with subsistence nyway a false one production); historically it has been Brethan grain_and_linked to Statist development pollcies normally grown for that emphasised building up aheavy 5 not mean simply industrial base financed in part by ce oneself either cheap labour and cheap food Fow ational level rather prices for agricultural products were external sources justified by the necessity of providing ay be considered r cheap food for the poorthrough public

Page 14
able 1: Women and the Labour Force in Agriculture in Asia
Country Women's Share of 'a of Labour
AdLlt LäblIFle Force in Agriculture (1990) 19, 990
Bangladesh S. 5 BhLLEIN 39 95 4 Carribadi 54 E. 74 China 5 E3 T DPR. KUrca 45 38 India. 구 4. Indonesia 75 55 39 S2 78 Malaysia 3. 27 MMHildiyc5 42 και 7) 3. MingLilia 4) 51 3. Myanmar 81 73 Nepal 39 95 9. Pakistan 23 Gl 53 Philippines 37 54 Republic of Korea 39 Silik 표4 57 4: Thailand 47 (4 Wietnal 50 8.
Source: Human Developicnt Report, 1996, table 16 and 24, New Yo Qxford University Press, 1996.
The GTJW titles:
GDP Agriculture Populati
Wըrlլ:
1970-80 3. 19 I9 98-9) 3. 2. 17 1999.4 IS NAWA. 1.5
Wild Millcoc Countries 1970-8) 52 22 ל-נ 1989) 3. 3. 1991-94 19 |. Ei:15t Asia Fflint, Pāli Caifft 197)-() . 3. 1980-9) 구g 199[]-Ա: ). 3. |..
South Asia
C-E) 3.5 8 2.4 Iկ:U-Ալ) 5. 고. 2.2
99-9 3.9 2.7 19
N
Source: World De cm. Report. 1993. Tablc 2 and
LLLLaaaLLL LaLLLHaaaaLLLLLLLaHHLL0L0000S LLLLLLaL S
 
 

N- ר
/
ΕΠ
Agriculture as % of GDP
1993
C
4교
19
31 I9 교
5.
3. 43 5 ??
규
교5 | 29
GDP per capita
1.7 |.. O3
5.
distribution systems. Today, many of
those using the discourse of "food first argue that state interwention is the primary means for providing food to the poor and that a focus on market production and cash crops (especially for agriculture) endangers food security (for a current example with regard to India, see Swaminathan, 1996; for the growth first model, see Rao, 1996).
S LLLLLLaLLLLLLLS LLaL L LLLLLLLHLLLLLLL LL LLLLLLLK emphasises the necessity for economic growth to provide people with the incometo procure food and has been linked with developmental policies stressing technological advances in agriculture and giving higher prices to farmers growing the food. These themes gained dorminance in the 1980s with the liberalisation process (often with significant state guidance), and have emphasised market based growth and export-oriented industrialisation. Agricultural growth and exports, most ofter of fruits. Vegetablesand platation COp5,blt Sometimes also of foodgrains for example the successful case of rice in Thailand and most recently Vietnam hawe been stressed in these policies as a source of foreign exchange
earnings especially but not only in the
early stages of development. Here "food security Wabundance" is mot sa much something the state does as sort ething that people provide for themselves out of growth-generated irCOTE.
In the last decade two more themes hawe been added. First, are the "e" words of today; entitlement and
empowerment, both linked to the
concern for social justice, Entitlement,
a term deriving largely from the famine
studies of Amartya Sen, stresses the ability of a person to cotland food due to her his position in the Overal social relations that govern possession and use in a society (Sen, 1991: 1545) - it suggests that income to buy food, or political rights to demand provision from the state inities of drought Tayba as important as actual food availability in the society. Empowerment stresses the ability of the po o Cor ad depriwed to hawe entitlements and participate in decision-making, a capacity gained through access to and control over

Page 15
Th: Agricultural Growth and food Production in A 虽
GrUWEh, ELLC Oss Agriculture Р 1970-8) 1980-90, 1990-94
El Al
C 2. 5. 4.1 Mongolia g 4. Rep.of Krea 구 ፯.8 18 9.
Southeast Asia
Illinsia 4.|| 3. 3. Malaysia NWA. 3.8 2. I. Philippines 4上 1. R Thailaրitl 4.9 4.) 3. Wietnam 4.5
South Asia
Bangladesh 06 29 1.9 9. IIldi: 8 3. g Myanmar 5 5. 1. Nepal 5 4) Pakistan 2.3 4. NK Sri Lanka ፰.8 8 Source: Human development report, 1992 Tables 13 and Table 25; Hu
13 and 47; World Development Report, 1993, Table 2: World Developm * Southeast Asia includes the Pacific: Region for the su mlı mery figuri
"Daily calories supply per capita is defined as the calorie equivalen
divided by the population, per day."
money, resources, and power. These are usually associated with efforts to transcend the sometimes ideological dichotomies of state and market see for instance the Hunan Development Report, 1993). On the one hand, safety nets" are looked to both to tide sections of the population over crises and to be part of a developing Welfare system public responsibility) for members of Society who can't work because they are aged, young, or sick. []m thg []thET hang, it is Widelỵ recognised that a healthy and educated population is Crucial for any rational economic development, and that the PČ OrtherTSE WES - Play a Crucia productive role in the developmental process. Women and gender issues are increasingly admitted to be central to both concerns (UNDP 1993).
LLLLHHLHL LLLL LLLLHHLTLLHHHHHLLLLLLL LLLLLLLLHHLHH the theme of sustainability (sustainable development, sustainable agriculture)
stresses that While it muSt not bE enwironmental d'E іпcгеasв the pгоt land de gradatior dispola Cemet ad preselt Dr. Bt S Deforestation an Crisis li fis Cat: land degradationi once flourishing,
hawe led to : quE industry-centred. Ап а/fеглаfїve par Je EC et 5 frÉ55) இgriculture andஅர deg C7 frāW55 ffor C07 frol raffer f Ferga FCrafic Centr согрогаїїолs. Agrї is now unders efffcfелt/у алої s! ξrriaΜια της ξηla example Netting, and Ruttan, 1992
 

.
er capita find Daily calorics supply
Ioduci բer capita of North
1979-81=100)
፵87-89 ) 1ቧቧ3 000S0LL S S 000KS S S aa00 S SKLKLLLKLaaS S 0a0
26 2 芭芭芭 2,751.7 ଧ୍ରୁ
교 45 2,640 2.99 器马 88.
2,350 899 - 85 87 Ճ1
의 2.830 3,29877 O DIOOH
|판 23 2. l II 관 31
|45 EO 2,7555 JI} SS
42 {) 27C) 2.884 83 89 87
88 2.34) 2,258 66 73
4 O 2.280 2.443 77 77 ፕ$ ... "
133 2,220 2.250 7 7.
109 한 교
97. 2.4 201g 73 65.
23 2,230 2.395 72 7마 77
교() 7 2,45t) 2.598 72 SR S3
D7 || 2.220 95.77) 구{I} 3.
R 2.2() 2,81661. 구
S. 2.250 2,275.81. 79. 73 آير
Inan Development Report 1996. Tables 7.
EL REICHEL, 1996, Tablic Il
es of per capita food production. t of the netfood supplies in a Country,
growth is necessary It the cost of struction that will ability of drought, , marginalisation, destitutio- in the 0 Teff Lt Lu Testi Te, ongoing drought, hвs iп папу агеas, regions that were industrial pollution, stions about the development Todel. of development is :IBrsםIםa/I hחg Srף o-based production, ar 7 di corT7ri77 Lurr ffy талд roductiол by assed states or huge culture in particular "fiers Istainable done by farers (see for
1993) and Nandy
Neither "food first" or simple "growth first", ther, is sufficient; rather growth With sustainability and social justice is the key to food security.
Women are central to "food security" by whatever definition or model we may use. However the life-and-death importance of issues of food. environmental and development makes it necessary to have a rational - Tot simply emotional- understanding of the Causes of impowerishment and hunger.
This theme of women's centrality to food production and sustainable development has been argued most Wigorously by those who call thĒṁSÉlWES' "COfTmii:StS". HOWEWE the analysis often used is not rational or realistic - to the point of being Harmful to Wörme the T15 IWES. FOI instance, fie extreile pasitior that the cash ёсоглогтлуis absolutey harгтfл/

Page 16
and women are inherently subsistence drot marketproducers, i.e. they are
interested in food crops and not cash
crops has little basis in fact aside from
the fact that the fogdi cash crop. distinctions arraneous. It also leads SLL aGLCCCS LCHCCHCLLCLLaLLL LaLLLLSLLLLLL
Wasback fodd ffo CLC fforl7 a 17 ёсолбгліс growth, and bind women evёл логg to the poverty ofwharгтоist subsistence EÇorl77777řES CÉLayarė. On the Ecofelinist debate, See Mies and Shiva, 1993; Molyneux and Steinberg, 1995, and Jackson 1993; also Nandy and Laughlin, 1996.
MISSINGWOMEN
But we don't have to accept the LLLLLLLL S LLLLLLaLaaaLLS HtLSKLaaaLLLLLLLaLLLL0 production" to Seeworlen's Centrality to food production and distribution. This mean that they can be crucial producers and innovators for a small producer-based de centralised, agroindustriayi oriented form of development - if they are guaranteed the rights (including land rights) and fesourcesto make this possible. E. Women's production often is marketoriented and should be more effectively SO.: At the Sametime, wormen's concerns for household welfare and nutrition it crucial to base any real needs-öriëntëd Wëlfare systemontheir informed participation implementation and decision-making.
In spite of this centrality of Women, they continue to be deprived in sometimes deadly ways instany Asian Societies. Tiña 35t 5tark Teasures of
this is Amatya Sen's concept of
"missing Women". Seri points löjt that the low fertia Female-sex ratio in countries such as China and India representa total of nearly 100 million worn in the region who would be
alive today if women truly had equal
chancës with men (Sen, 1990: Klasen, 1994). But there are variations in Asian patriarchy, Southeast Asian societies.
with their matrilinealandmatricentric
traditions, have more equalitarian social structures, while the patrilineal and patrilocal clan caste structures of China and most of the South Asian subcontinent make these regions more
орpressive to women: -
Economic deprivation adds to social
sion. The rur Who are the maji countries work muc time Lise Studies rep showed that, inclu and manmarket Wor of total Workin indus 53% in developing c
EEFFEEEE Countriesthet surveyed, women.w Work time in Nepal Philippines. Since to lUch higher in the greatest gap in terrT
Wis Lustri Sed 408 minutes a day, in developing count är awErage of 61.7 m asignificantly grea women's time is sp activīties, Stīvorīt the total "market"
OurSt. As (HDR 1995,88-93)
For achieving "socii sustainable humand rural WOT er a feth security is a crucial grg at traf: development policy econd Ties to economies with ani 1+5:14
for environment development actua welfare, With the WLTE Sttle CBltrt E. the perforace Coultries in the As
Food Production an
Overall Changes in
Test twdge dË wiërgeri titrends developing and dew Asia, relatively spea story of econòmic g to other regions, th 1980s saw rising : rates and declines inequality in most A Some Cases, ata
historically unprece Specta Cular. Agricult general growth, and and whatever data w
 
 
 
 

al Working wormen
orted by the UNDP ding both market women did 51% trialised countries, outries, and 55% s of developing 3-Asian rural areas Tike: 56982 frtuta and 73% in the til Wikti TE WES a rural areas, the is of awerage work t-Weie rrimerħi irn
。
incontrastito crisis and Slowdowns in
food security "particularly έροαμπεία エ rity in all Asian production per capita and calorie intakes hharder then men: - indicate that the rural women and
men of Asia also shared in this general overall growth in prosperity, see table
many regions in the world, the Countries of East Asia sawa rise throughout the period (though a slowdown from otherwise impressive growth rates in agriculture in the early 1990s) and even the poorer, slower growing countries of South Asia saw
a significant rise in the 1980s. While
is W. Worked 裘 an early 1990s decline in South Asia
and rural Women TE5. WHC Workad inutes a day. While tET proportion of ëFItin-Thol-Tharket Worked 36% of
income-earning) Courtrie:SSLJr Weyed
ial justice" and a evelopment, then, 18 k5y, Ard food
indicator of how fifts
lays a basis for concern, this has been over influenced by the case of India which saw a heavy decline (negative
growth rates) in the "crisis" year of
1991; aside from this 1990s growth rates have been similar to those of the
1980s.
It is on this background of overal
economic development marked by
individual years of crisis and continuing problems for individual countries that we can identify the
following trends in relation to food El security for Asian countries: from command
market-oriented 1) A good performance in agriculture
increasing concerns
II y susta inable Hyffect hlmar interest of e, then, let Luis Cook and prospects of апЕгеgiоп,
di Comis Linyption in
Food security to
is have seen quite in growth in eloped countries, king isa success rowth. In contrast EEEE-E of to conomic growth in poverty and Siar countriESt - ir |gwg | tt || Was dented and even Lural sharadin this sometiñeşfediit,
të have relating to
growth rates and per capita food production was achieved by most Asia countries between 1980 and
1990 Gand per capitafood production continued to improve between 1987.
89 and 1991, China, Malaysia, Indonesia andii Wietnam Were particularly good performers in raising
per Capitafood production; India, also achieved a good record, followed by
توقيت 11 لا
Thailandard Pakistar Philippines, Mongolia, Bangladesh and Sri Lankai were poor performers (See
Table 2. This was clearly related to
growth rates in agriculture as a whole,
While per capitafood production
figures are for 1991, the growth rates for 1990-94. Suggesta continuation of trends, except in the cases of Myanmar
(Which improved its growth rates
dramatically) and Nepal, whose agricultural growth rate worsened)."
sia, daily calore supply, our TOS
important "indicator of food security,
inproved in absolute terms for most
countries; it also improved between

Page 17
Incidence in Percentage of Population 1970 1980 99)
East Asia 35 China 33 Indonesia 50 - Republic of Korea 2 Malaysia 8 Philippines, 35
Thailand t
Source: Gupta, 1995: Table
Table 5: Poverty in Selected Asian Countries
1+5
% of Population Number of poor below poverty line (millions) below poverty 电影
1971
1978 - 28 1979 195 9.2 99) 8.5
1964-5 1972 54 50 77פן 1983 43
Indonesia 1970 58
1976 1984 28 1987 7
Malaysia 1959-E|
1973 37
98. 5 1987 4.
Pakistal 19 54
1969-7 43 1979 21 17. 1984-5 20(23) 18.7(2.1.3)
Sri Lanka i 1963 37
|969-70) 1982 1985-86
| Ան: 59 1975-76
1981 2O 1985 2
Source: World Development Report, 1990, Tables 3:2 (p41) and 33 Table 3.16 P45 for rural population below the poverty line.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Jumber of Por millions):
9 of rural
population -
we will see, also
1965 and 1992 ir relative ter ITS, ii.e. as a percentage of the North. Again, the East Asia performance was best, followed by Southeast Asia. At this level, the major generalisation we can make about food Security is that the best overall guarantee is a healthy economy
However, the average masked. Some important country variations; and we can also see that countries did not always improve daily calorie Supply by increasing their own food production - some did so by importing food, Table 3 shows that China, Indonesia and Malaysia achieved a high and growing daily calorie supply along with impressive growth in per capita food. Similarly, India and Pakistan achieved slower but still steady growth in food availability, though Pakistan did so by increasing food imports and India remains at a low level of nutrition. In contrast the Republic of Korea, by the 1980s had low agricultural growth and declining per capita food production but clearly had a strong enough economy to feed its people well on simported food. Imports in Korea's case they were 50% of food supply in 1988-90) did not compromise its people's "food security"; they were eating better than ever, and better than the average of the Northl (Korea, as showed a decline in poverty ratios). Korea, however, is a small country which can afford major imports. For large and primarily agricultural countries, increasing internal food production is the surest route to food security (See Table 3).
Not a II. Asian I countries Were - SO successful in that economic growth with improvements in food consumption. Thailand, in spite of good growth rates, seems to hawe had a stagnant daily calorie-Supply with low imports throughout the 1965-96 period, while in contrast Myanmar, a a poor growth economy in the 1980s, raised its relative daily calorie supply. The worst food situation was seen in Mongolia, which after a period of stagnancy in the 1980s showed a drastic decline similar to other ex"socialist". CIS countries in the late 1980s and early 1990.s. Wietnam, th:8

Page 18
F is other "socialist market economy" of 71 -
Asia, saw a good growth in per capita Table 6: Change food production but not in food supply, ratio of share of EP which was stagnant in absolute terms and declining relatively. It may be noted Ethat both Wietnam and Thailand Were — гice exрогteгs - һегеindeedexрогt(of Bangladesh
food-grains more than of vegetables Iridja E. and fruit products) may have been Pakistan : partly at the expense of local Sri Lanka consumption. Endonesia
Philippines " Bangladesh sawa declime in food Thailand si supply in the 1980's with some slight Malaysia
improvement in the early 1990s. Nepal saw a puzzling decline in the early 1990s inspite of increase in per capita food production. Sri Lanka has seen a steady decline in the 1980s and (4) Again, limited is 1990s, perhaps reflecting the traumas on income inequi E of its disastrous ongoing civil War, declines for mo
is countries covered 3) Overall="awerages" including and 1992-3. India average calorie-supply) clearly do not Philippines showed E tell us enough about effects on the while Banglade
poor and Vulnerable; however what showed a declineu available data. We have also suggest and than arise (bu Ethat there was an overall process of earlier years) to 19
poverty reduction in Asian countries, of this group sh Ši particularly ineast Asia andata slower E. between 1975-6 at
is and more halting rate in most South be noted that all
Source: World Devci |992. Table:3): Worli
Asian countries. - Countries pol LIS
翠、 significantly lower E. China, Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia than the U.S.
are the best performers in poverty "advanced industr is reduction, just as they were leaders in income inequality, increasing average food supply to their quintile ration ist population. Impressive reductions in (See Table 6) poverty have occurred between 1970 ຂຶກd 996 in the case of China the
largest reduction came in the 1980s (Table 4). India has, equally, seen a
much slower but still significant. The general patter reduction in poverty levels in the 1980s by the cases of Ind continuing into the 1990s after a had in the 1950s a decline following the "crisis year" of Estate-commandis' 1991 (2). completely "delink Filmarket. But while :Thailand saw significant powerty equality within reduction upto 1980, then a stagnation industrial empha in the 1980s (evidently an increase in between village the early 1980s and then a decline; of inability of peas: Phongpaichit and Table 5). Pakistan protest left them data also suggest a slight reversal in famine of 1960-61 poverty reduction in the 1980s, the 17-30 million died
Philippines has also seen a slow reforms bega reduction in poverty, though slow, enthusiastically 을 while poverty has clearly increased in peasants, who sei Sri Lanka. (See Table 4 and 5) crop production an of local "town
enterprises". With
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Early Years Mid-1980s
7.ύ (1976-7) 3.7 | 1985-É]
7.0 | 1975-6) 5.1 (1983)
5.8{1984-5) 58(1969-70) 8.9 [1985-É) 7.5 (1976) 4.7 (1987)
10.4(1970-7) 8.7 (1985)
8.9 (1975-6)
15.D (1973) II. 1 ( 987)
-
pricnt Report 1986. Table 24: World Development Report di development Repart 1995. Table 7.
ality show steady especially in the years 1978-85. China. st of the Asian saw the most significant reduction in between the 1970s poverty in its history and a rising
*、 Indonesia and the standard of food consumption - to the Continuous decline, point where experts like Lester Brown sh and Malaysia, now fearfully ask "who will feed pito the mid-1980s China?". Not because the Chinese are is = t not to the level of starving but because they want and 91-3; only Thailand can afford too much food! (Brown, owed a slight rise 1993; see also Riskin, 1990, and id-1992-3. It should Nolan, 1993). There has been a the South Asian slowdown since 1985 with a greater Indonesia hawe is er Inphasis on urban industrial growth, income inequality but China's success is evident. and some other ===== ial countries, whose India also had a heavily statist and as measured by the protectionist economy through the between 6 and 11, 1970s, only with much lower growth rates and though no rajor faminë deaths even in the Worst years, a high
and uncertain data return to individual farm production,
and stagia ntrate of poverty and hunger. Policies of providing "cheap food" through the public distribution n can be illustrated system hardly touched this. The lia and China. Chinai beginnings of liberalisations in the ind 1960s a heavily 1980s saw a rise in overall growth front teconomy.almost 3.5% to 5%, and declining powerty. Ed" frte WOr Liberalisation toolka "jump" in 1991 it achieved relative with the Narsimha Rao government, communes, the but in contrast to China it remained sis widened gaps industry-oriented; prices for crops rose and city, and the somewhat but otherwise restriction on ints to migrate or sales and production remained. Thus helpless before the agriculture in the 1980s and 1990s
When an estimated has seen only modest growth, and 蔷 . In 1978 economic powerty has declined not spectacularly ar Were as in China, and many St Lutheast Asian taken up by the countries, but slowly and haltingly. == zed land, increased E. 萱 dexpanded millions. The question is thus not whether ship and village liberalisation or producing for the rising prices and a market destroys food security; in cases
- 3 3 Contd олpage:223

Page 19
Солtd.fromдаge 4
framework essential for the success or failure of presidentialism- a powerful presidential secretariat, for instancewas rever established. Nevertheless, the new system freed the President from Worry about lo sing office I whenever he - as head of government - should lose a majority, the kind of political defeat he had arranged for Mrs. Bandaranaike in 1964. He made certain also that he would not lose his 54.6 majority in Parliament by requiring that MP's who crossed the floor from the government would lose their seats. Art long other innovations introduced was proportional representation on the list system in place of the conventional first-part-the-post Westminster System The bloated parlamentary majorities that Winning - parties or Coalitions häid SÉCU röd i 1970 ad 1977 would be a thing of the past. But is also ensured that the UNP as the party with the largest support-base in the country would be solidly represented in a future parliament
whenever it was in the opposition.
T CCCGGG KGLCLL LLLLCL LLLLLL LL LCCCLL LLLCLLL for befallir af)yrs??g SOLir, he srifsafed
a radical shift in the UWP's electoral rest of South Asia
of South East
Support systers, by brining in a larger non-goyigan a component into the party and the Capinef thar eyer before. is was more generous in this regard 3 fhan al his prediecessors in office, arrd = especially those of his own party. Orne – decisson above als esse ranks among the most significant ever taken by a
Sri Lar7 kar7-leader. Filis Éiringing to är влаf the goy/gата глолоро/y on the : position of head of goverплтеп атаy =
CCLL LLLC LGCCS SHLL LL LLLLLLLHCCCOL LGLSY Premadasa as Deputy Leader a the LL CCHMGGCCL OLLL LLLL LLGLLLLLLL LLLL гЈеиvgovвглгтелfїг7 ffse/fsүrribo//sgа!а
ES Tālib Misfied Sird.
G/7 a 7ge ťFla ť SΕτί5 faction. Hε La 7 kg 5 6 7 y Wlff, deserved sonneth and he ser about the leadership of deliberately torne
fo foL/r7ûdirog farr7ń ir 7 gerrera. Mr 7 d'oir, r/7 feßxarr7pJ/égs::/h ée influence and re. foscoffa Basa SLFR But here fgrary of Myr5. Single-rided de the family in c. αESμήτEiffια ξιναι defeats she suffer
His many accomp balanced by his
Efail Lres. One Su
reglect of neca eviderice of Cor ministers and sei associated with before him. It is in Sordid business Lankan politic perspective; iп с.
politicians wегв : in the accu Tull, Wealth. The exp; sector under his S the national lead politicians and offi opportunities ford bribes. It could bei regimes of the pa: Corruption and br reach of the con politi Ciar S and off |агgв Запdirapid tu Small bribes, forfa
sodia/revolutor. 7 ckg/rsiis Secured. When he
WO barriers - caste and class. Nothing of the Sort had happened anywhere else fr:SOL th:45ïa fil! fhere Cert
адроїлtптелfоѓDeve Gowria as /лd'a's =
PriТЕ МПSTE.
ܕ____________1
The End of Duopoly.
SUCCESSOY JR fhad delibarately breached
to POWÈT, JR. Waş
on higher standard Ministers and MPs he increased the
| perquisites (taxe instance), Sadly,
lmstead the expar
Sector of the ecc.
high-profile projec
His victory in 1977 brought to an end
Equipping ändrɛ
thց duopoly in political MeaderShip That :5 armed Services p. the two family compacts of the With greater oppo
Senanayakes and Bandaranaikes had
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

е поеpencience, а gaveć ћѓm:rgгеat believed thari Sri party - ёгтлосracy ing better thar fhiaf pening the doors ro his owr] party, quité r who did not along yor to elite far lilies g, so he believed that set would havers Der CLWSS för 75 or 7 fshe ranaike farrily on the :korlad. Withildur Ifja Barda Fāflaïke fr? : her terглілаffол fо ќеер Introl of that party ession of electoral Edif7 75977 ar Hafför.
lishments have to be misjudgements and ch Washis benign ssary action when ruptipfl:Hmong-his hior officials closely him was brought nportant to keep this of corruption in Sri S = in its a proper omparison with the and many Countries Asia, Sri Lankam and are small-timers ation of ill-gotten ansion of the state LFP predecessorsin
arship had provided
icials alike with more emanding and taking
argued that the SLFP
st häd democratiséd "ought it within the TīOrl Tarn : ÇOrrupt icials could rely on a Jrrower of relatively wours done, and jobs a led his party back ; expected to insist ls of probity from his especially because air. emolutions and xept Wehicles, for he failed to do so. ision of the private ICTY, the massive its undertaker, the 2-equipping of the Irovided politicians
rtunities for graft.
Once more he relied on the personal example he set of incorruptibility - he had a career of 40 years in politics, more than half of them in ministerial
office - to keep his ministers, parliamentarians and officials honest but that example was not followed by
many of them. Then again there was
the scrupulous care with which the
official gifts he received on his travels abroad as head of state were catalogued and retained, first at President's house, and ther at the Jayewardene Cultural Centre. How Thany of his predecessors as head of state and head of government had is done so in the past? Once Torean example had been set for the future.
リー Then, there was his ambiguous attitude to political violence. Here we speak not so much of Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict but to violence as an aspect of political rivalries between the government and its opponents. The factis that the terms of political competition had changed since the 1960s, and JR and the UNP while in oppositions faced unprecedепted violence and intimidation, directed againstits leaders and supporters alike But as a man who often spoke of a shfr?? Så and in Om-Wiolen CE, praised Gandhi and admired Asoka, he was expected to do better. In fact he was as ready to tolerate the use of violence in trade union organisation and agitation as had the left parties and the SLFP who had already set the pace before. He came to office intention curbing the left-wing and left of centre trade uniO15 and their Wel-known proclivity for irresponsible strike action: he would not allow a British-type trade union situation to develop, and cracked down on the strikes of July 1980. When a group of trade-union activists responded with violence in the city of Colombo on 8 August 1980, they is played into his hands. JR refused to allow such demonstrations in future on the grounds that they would lead to violence. ప్లొ There were other ambiguities in his TECOrd. Hata ked movingly of democracy and open debate, but in the aftermath of the presidential election of December 1982, with
--
encouragement from his Prime Minister 璽
and sections of his Cabinet, he

Page 20
obtained undated letters of resignation from all his party MP's, to be called in if necessary. Hailing from a family wellknown for its legal professionalism and with a father and uncle as Puisne Justices of the Supreme Court, he was only slightly less disdainful of the higher judiciary than Felix Dias - who came from an even more distinguished legal and judicial background - had been in the early 1970s. When the new constitution came into force in 1978 the judges of the Supreme Court Were appointed afresh, but some-a few-were sent on early retirement, while others were given appointments in the Court of Appeal, a lower court. The number of seats on the Supreme Court had been reduced. His relations with the Chief Justice, whom he appointed in 0L0SLLLLHHS S LLLL S SLLLaLLLLSS SLLLLS Overlooking the claims of the Supreme Court judges, soured in time, and the tensiOS between JFR Tad the latter often erupted to the surface in unseemly public controversy. Although LaL S L00CHLLLLLLLLHCLCLS LLLLLLMC aL їлfroduced dїї гесоgлfse a separatioп Of powerSunlike that of 7972. Rwas
.
as prone to asserting the primacy of the executive and legislature over the
judiciary as his predecessors in the UF government were. On one occasion, irked by an adverse decision of the
courts on a matter the government regarded as sensitive for security
Ši purposes, he turned a blind eye when
a boisterous crowd of party supporters shduted slogans outside the houses of the judges who had delivered that
In the opposition he championed the cause of a free press, and passionately opposed the take-ower of the national press, during along campaign that stretched from the early 1960s to the mid 1970s. His recordinoffice in regard to the press was far better than that of the UF government and during his years in office the press was livelier and more critical on matters of public concern than it was underhimore authoritarian successor. Nevertheless, he did not think it necessary to return the nationalised Lake House group to its original owners (who happened to be his relatives). He declined to do this, claiming that the owners themselves I had preferred to accept compensation for losses suffered rather than take on
¬ ¬¬- ܀
鳢
.
the responsibility rhewspapers onth was no doubt a dwa ntages of ПеWSpapers conve him as his and publicity organs: keeping them u control for that pu
ND ESSESSITEft D Would be comple referece to th DeceTiber 1982, device for postpon electio for six Tor to this, ha Wa S'yi from his Prime M, Cabinet colleague Wish Edito il Britt JR did not comple: In holding this re acting within constitution he intri such political advar from this hawe t0 t the Serio US: brea Lanka's Well esta direct election of and fair electio tarnished his repu his opponents to S from the genuinen at the presidential JR was the first a head of governme hawe. WOntWO : C0 OffGE THE tido Caf was flowing so mu that of his party; TOT COWEtOTE probably hawe giw same result b : controversy and
fo||oWed from this by the early 19: Consolidated its ho and had defeated it Consecutive elle national level betw. OCt:1982 TF was reeling in the WOLJd5 i St TT i divisio, ad Other him.
JR and the Ethnic
The greatest disap well as many of th the UNP in 1977
 
 

of running these eir own. But there Lihat he sa Withe having the se iniently available to the government's ard Was interitor nder government
гроse.
his overall record ote With Out T5 OTTE
9. Tf3 LT f a grossly partisan іпg a parliаппепtaгу e years. In resorting elding to pressures Minister and some s, some of whom паt majority in case ESSE COrldtETT. feredLIT he Was FE BW Öf †FE duced in 1978, ELIt tages a5 hederived Jebalanced against Chit ad in Sri lished tradition of legislators and free S. Ab OWE" allit tation and enabled hift attention away landate he had Won
election of 1982,
nod, so far, the only til Sri Lanka - to insecutive terms of electoral advantage CliniSfEVOUra at this title, that a l'approach WOLuld Brm the T1-ThUChl the
Ut"Wit FC Ut te recrimination that referendum. Ideed BOS the UNP ld on the electorate, ts opponents in four ctio15 hed Con a reen July 1977 and he opposition SLFP face of self inflicted ng from internal scontrived for it by
Conflict
pointment-his, as
ose Who voted for CarTle frOIT) the har:ST
- suffered its worst post-independence 妻
domestic crisis, the violent conflict between Tamil secessionist and the Sri Lanka government, a conflict that dragged on from at least 1983 until long after he left office. At the time he CFré fL (DWEr fS asso raf E
Fernotionalism of ethnic conflict had
periodically broken through the parliamentary garne. And If the had been done to furn the subjective areff. The populace frрт 5ё/Г- regarding ethnic rivalry But it was his frägSCsy fO fäVS Heer rolweräf a frns when these hostilities reached their CCCGSKLL HLHGTLLLCCCLL GLtCHH LCaL LGLLYLL misfortune of following seven years of rapid Wy. I det erfora ting сот типа: relations that flowed fror the UF gorwefrornerf 'sir'r MI5 guided policies ardd having to deal with Mrs. Gandhi who was in power in India from 1980 onwards. To be sure any Indian Prime Minister would have had to respond in some way to the excite Tent in South India that resulted from wiolent ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. but only someone lika her Would have givern RAW, India's Version of the CIA, the free rein it used to give direct assistance to the Tail separatist movement in Sri Lanka.
If his predecessor as head of governmērniť - Mrs Bandaran aika-5 had not been so short-sighted as to saws the whirlwind in the unthinking way she did in the 1970s, the outcome may We W. El diffTt. -THEUR" S political inheritance, so far as the Tamil minority was concerned, would not have been the poisoned chalice it turned out to be. The old political leadership of the Tamil community G
G , P on ni a m b a T a m, S.J. Chelwanayakam ad M.Tiruchel Wam had a||| diBd Within a few Ort5 of each Oteil, 1976an 1977: had they been alive, it might have been possible to devise a political settlement acceptable to both sides of the encounter as he was able to do With S.Thodaman the leader of the Indian Tamils, who joined his cabinet E. in 1978. Perhaps, more to the point, given Sri Lanka's geographical position if Morarji Desai and not Mrs. Gandhi had shaped Indian policy, in the early 1980s he would surely have restrained rather than encouraged Tamil separatist Citi Wii STS, WOU I d'OthW

Page 21
- encouraged the equipping and training
Of their cadres, nors would hawg
tolerated safe havens in India for Spārti Stāti vīt5 t urāfter attacks on state properties or indeed skilling of Security personnel, political rivals and opponents or just some un fortunate by-standers during internecine struggles.
To unsympathetic Tamil critics, it
appeared as if he was not prepared to
exert the full powers of his office to meet the most urgent and wery realgrievances of the minority. But the fact is that he refused to accept the status quo he inherited, and quickly sought to correct legal and constitutional LLLLLLLLLLL LCLLL aLLLLLLLLHHLLLLLLL LLaC minorities. When he took office as Prime Minister in July 1977 he promptly set about overturning the
sprincipal legal grievances and discriminatory regulations inherited frem the Bandaranalike period. Some of these were renowed through administrative decisions almost as soon as he came to power - such as the UF govern riment's Controversia policies or university education - while other changes - especially on language policy - Were effected through the new costitutio itfOdUCed il 1978: The leadership andra mikänd file of the Indian Tamils responded more positively to his initiatives that their counterparts in the TULF and others who claimed to represent the Sri Lanka Tamils, Indeed he did luch more for the Tamils than any of his predecessors in office, JR's efforts at aC Commodation Could hardly keep pace with the demands of the Sri Lanka T- 1il Community's most militant activists, not to mention its principal party, the Tamil United Liberation. Front. They regarded what was on offer as tt |t|E tData.
thërrisëlves off fr within the party opposed anyt independence.ar indulged in well. Wi OECE, E Whatever concess they generally: C public statements they obtained W: Tary to ConThe ti their principal obje frame of mind eTibarra SS3d JRin dealing with la SihleSelectOT
It was characteri: lived in that Sinha this against hit leadership newer for it. Thus JR d prudent, let: alon aliernating the , bu population by off diditOld Tii|| CONT7f7f7ffredifo a/W. He remembered to him and his p, the Sinha desem against his party; recall What an Un Bandaranaike had Wilderness for Moreover, there W had JR shown as issue as he dew
projects a way, wo
...to meet the requir |leaders, beset and then were by t increasingly violer
Caught in the nic
who argu edhe
greater boldnes:
Warned of politica
the party and its
seen to be conced
In the after math of the riots of August 1977, he hesitated to vigorously negotiate some form of regional dewolution from the ower Centrālised structure of Sri Lanka's government. a long standing Tamil demand. To be -SUP a number of key party rebes and SOTTE | EelterS fis Caoigt Werg sceptical about the political viability of LHCL0LLLLLLLLaa LLLL LLL LLLL LLLL C LLL when the new and untried leadership of the TULF seemed unwilling to cut
minority, JR move induce the Timi patient than they While he persuade large to accept the that he favoured themselves could a reasons, two years two parties becam negotiations. In 1 SChI - Cf I de WOII diStrict I'W COL
 
 
 

m youthful zealots and Outside it Who hing: Short of di who, moreover,
publicised acts-of
TULFA WêConned
that the Concession is only the first of they had secured tive, an attitude and which needlessly ind his government rge sections of the t
tic of the tirsles he lese hard-liners held while the Tamil ave him due credit id not think it was necessary, tO risk
Ik of the Sinhalese
ering more than he dership tafsegr77Gd зүs asking for тогв. what had happened arty in 1956 when asses had turned and he could wividly pleasant place Mrs. made the political lim and his party. as no guarantee that much zeal on this oted to his other uld have been found ements of the Tamil intimidated as they heir youthful and it followers.
ide between those should move with sänd those Who I retribution against leader if they were
ing too much to the .
di slowly, hoping to leaders to be more were inclined to be, d the electorate at form of devolution Which the Tail ccept. For whatever were lost before the з епgaged in serious :he early 1980s a ution of power to
cils (25 in all) was:
late 1950s, and Dudley Senanayake lors.JR-offered, but orbined this with
introduced as part of a political settlement with the Sri Lankan Tamils, a major political achievement considering the failure of nerve on the part of Bandaranaike in the mid and
in the late 1960s, when they had confronted this same problem.
A Secord tier of government had been recommended as early as 1928 by the
Donoughmore Commissioners; it had taken 52 years before such a scheme could be introduced. Yet these councils failed to give the restive Jaffna peninsula a durable peace. As a result of the violence of July 1983 the political support, from the Tamils, for these councils evaporated rapidly and they were abandoned in less tharr two
years of their establishment. Thereafter, in association with the
Indian government of the day the demandarose for larger units of devolution with a wider range of POWBΓS.
In the event, no resolution was found, wiolence increased, both on the
attlefield and in the city of Colombo.
ousands fled the country, and India
which was earlier actively involved, in support for the secessionists, the attempted mediation but in the end, no settlement was reached, either of the war or the issues that brought on the conflict. At a press conference held with Rajiv Gandhi after the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, JR Tade a remarkable admission. When asked why he had not moved more rapidly, he is reported to have said, ".... It is a Іack of courage оп гпy parї, а /ack of intelligence on турагt, a /ack of foresight on my part". It is perhaps unfair to make much of what an exhausted leader says when he was as hard pressed as JR had been during the preceding two weeks. But it was so rare that JR should admit to any weakness that the words took on an enhanced significance.
The opprobrium attached to the IndoSri Lanka Accord Was focused on its architects within the government, principally JR himself. The JWP the Tost Wocal, Wiolent and COinSistent
opponents of the accord called for his
assassination through hand-written
posterS and inflamngay 器数
on pa

Page 22
* : | | }}
 

Page 23
. . . . . . . . . .
Contd. from page 79 and speeches (transmitted through cassettes). The slogan "Kill JR" was painted or public highways throughout the island, and on walls in public place, in the universities for example. On 18th August 1987, the JVP. very nearly succeeded in assassinating him within the parliamentary complex. Reflecting on this incident, he kept thanking on -how the Whole government-cabinet ministgers and MPs alike - could hawe bëër elimitatEdithält fateful after TOOT if the exploding grenades Haddol their work as effectively as they could have. Thus when his 81st birthday came just a month later he savoured it all the Thore because it was one he was not expected to live to enjoy. The peace that prevailed in the north and east of the island and sustained by the IPKF in 1988 was wery fragile. The ஆ98 decision to bring in the IPKF owed a great deal to JR's political TLLCLCC CLCSLTLLLLLLL CCLH CCLCGC mind, but he knew as much as any of his critics that despite all the efforts of the IPKF, resolution of this problem was as elusive as if had hear before fhey carme in. Wher ffings begyar 7 to go wrong for the IPKF and the objectives assigned in support of that veriture were patently beyandaractical ассопр/їshптепѓ, тапy of Rajїv Gandhi's Indian critics argued that he had faller into a traplaid i far him by rhewi Wy, Sri Lankan President. JR himself wished this had beer so, but uuuS LLLLL LaLLLLL LLLL YLLLLS LLLL LLCCLLGGLuLLS La | disconiu. of an opponent through a complex scheme. Indeed JR paid the price for this botched Indian intervention in a steep drop in public esteem. Nowhere was this seen more dramatically than in the stark contrast between the euphoria and the segmingly un restrained'optimism of his accession to power in 1977 and the complete lack of ceremony and publicity in his departure from office at the end of 1988.
Nevertheless, as he got ready to step down from office, in itself a notable political rarity in a country where party leaders cling to office like limpets to a rock, he took consolation in the fact that his objective for the last and very difficult year in office had been achieved; the UNP had Won a third Consecutive term of power, something
苇
that no party had Lanka's political transition ito a new the party had beel 82 years old, butp enjoyed excelleth period in office Öccasional Coldehi had nothing at alt. that time. His mi that of many who
үеars үoungег. Н
notice a slowing d. the riots of 1983
를 idrott FS ET
full of adiation
the 'myriad problem his.last faW. Omt then Were - agre E nobody other th; SL Wi WEC pTewailed ower the S. difficulties that Co.
TFII Politi
The story of his da yet to be written. one would have to to iter Wene in the under his success When individuals sought his inter decided that retire and that under Oc hEilbe, per Suaded politica contro government of |EādETS of the UN public policy, and
a stop gap in the the situation seem a Tleasure. Ever, fїgшre, thaол/y һе: South Asia to a we without being d соWapse of адагМаг Ff7-ff9 - Case Of M disility Siared ganddi, as she cases of ofaa War
R.Pradassass Offfie LWP pod at east tarporari leader was choser шгтгтлоva by ffвsa he took pride in ty fe causes offe dealing with the f
on the death of an
More surprisingly,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

idone before in Sri
his party sought his help at moments
history; and the of difficulty. A very powerful figure in
weadership within출 the People's Alliance sought him out
n-effected. He was
hysically fit. He had ealth throughout his Apart from an
s medical advisors,
worry about during
td., was cleares thanta i
were a fulltwenty
is colleagues did
Wespecially after Litewenthose Who itti tat they were as he Stood up to is that beset him im HS in Offic8. A|gf Eldono ne = point - JR COL || dhawe I OCCd si One Wem;
during the parliamentary campaign of 1994 and urged him to influence the then head of state in his choice of a prime minister in the event of a hung parliament. The appeal, in this instance, was on behalf of a member of the People's Alliance. When the approach Wasmade helisteed With his customary patience and courtesy and Tiade no promises,
---
بینید In his retirement he devoted his time to the establish ment of the Jayewardene Cultural Centre to which he transferred his library of books and documents, the largest such collection ever accumulated by a Sri Lankan : political leader after independence. The
eemingly impossible is library also contains his personal nfronted him then. papers which land my colleague
Reflections
ys in retirement has
When it is written
refer to his refusal
affairs of his party orto its leadership and sections of it 'wention. JR had гт1епt is гetirвплвпt, ircumstances would to inter Welle i a versy within the Iis SC CeSS Cors as Por on matters of muchless serve
leadership even if
ed to Warrant Such this he was a unique
dofgovernment
rared fror office river of Eythe тетfагултајorїѓу (as
forarјї Desаf) or a +
sgramffled electorate = (ՔSingh Drrer ffyg Iafferir a ffr of assination, a section τα ΜΗ τα faΜε ανέτ, Yy, until a suitable i. But JR remained
TrES. 5 fed
effect Werless of 757.9 775 ffrifir їїng of a vасапсу axecutifurepresidалt. ewen Copportents of
1 ¬tsܒ -- .
gardens to the stat
Howard Wriggins used in the writing of our two volume biography of JR Jayewardene. He took enormous pride in what he was doing and as a token of total commitment to this new :
exercise in institution building he and his wife willed the house in which they had lived almost all of their married life, Braemar at Ward Place, to the Centre. In that he followed the example of Sir John Kotelawala, who left his
':1°: palatial house and its extensive
ܒܢ.
-
JR: Was a Silent spectator, watching with a melancholy sadness as the party leadership he had kept together all his 11 years-in-office, fall apārt through his successor's implacable hostility to the slightest dissent even within the Cabinet, and the impetuosity of two of the - a best Insfers in the govаглпвлtiл resorting foалтоtion of
impeachment when other measures
may we have serwad the sama purpose-in other words, of continuing to fight within the party. More sombre still, that leadership was eliminated by: assassination over a three year period, beginning in March 1991 when Ranjan Wijeratne who had served as party Secretary with great acceptance was killed by a car bomb. None of the wiolent deaths of former colleagues that care later on touched JR-so
personally as did the killing of Ranjani Wijerate by the LTTE. A few weeks 羲 later the LTTE had all even "ore :

Page 24
prominent victim, Rajiv Gandhi. That assassination came as a shock to JR. Despite their differences he had grown to like Rajiv Gandhi, and the latter and Soria Gandhi had reciprocated the warmth and affection JR had shown then with a courtesy and deference to his experience as a senior political leader that his intediate-successor and the latter's close associates had
mot shown him Once JR had left office. ::
Two years later came
aSSāSSirti 0 S,
Het Balised that the death Of Lalist Athlu lathrrhu dal ihad depriwed the country of the service of a major political talent, and the UNP of the
logical successor to Premada sa
Etno tio rn ä | IW dâired bw Athulath Tudali's assassination JR had
to cope with the shack of Prema dasa"5;
killing, the second head of government in Sri Lanka to meet with a violent
first of Lalith Athulathmudali and R.Prema dasa i himself. These killings left JR numb. E.
Baldāra laikā. Firā assassination in C Gamini Dissanayak days after that Tas leadership and foun a stood of deep desp. thirrk of another cot cargar of the Seco raffarnafi Igadgr's " гшthless/y e/їmїлагек сошldiолly turлto
* exampfе, гелпѓлd a 5555FraffOrgr. Of Alltwr
Winsfers of |goverптепt in 1194 the Meadership froлт never really recover characteristically shr was the resulf of a reges fewes |leadership, not the Mäder of Dré CDrrrr effrāfrfā ar7d potential head from the majority e Wyarrar situation
death at the lands of an assassin. on дага//effor Sгf Lа
this OCCISO te Well Of WiOCWS
bedw52 fe futur C
several notches higher than in 1959 have been strongen
We alone gunman skilled a series of shocks
H =
Corff frorri 15
Д858 and Tendulkar.Jain, 19 a cautious positiori irn
as disparate as India and China есопопnic reforms have aided it. The question is what type of liberalisation, and what types of
support for market Oriented production will best aid a growth in incomes and well being
of the rural poor. These general comparative data suggest than an agriculturally-oriented liberalisation, at least in the case of large countries, provides the best basis for increasing food
supplies to both rural and urban people.
Footnotes
1. It has to be remembered that agricultural exports as a major source of foreign exchange are important to a number of industrialised countries including the U.S. and Australia, and hawe been so through all their stages of development.
- 2 There has been a good daal of concerri
expressed in India regarding a claimed rise
in powerty after the beginning of "economic
reforms" in 1991. Supporting data for this appeared to come from SEWE rall articles ir the Well-known left journal, Economic and Political Weekly, in 1 995. While the authors
of these articles (especially Gupta, 1995
and Jain argued specif rural powerty in 1992 On the reforms), there of publicity to the effé In fact, while powerty ir and stagnant during it "Nehru model" Comma. to come dyn in the 1 again * according to ! 1995- to about 1987 easily have been predic a crisis year of negati this econolic growthr be expected to bring di data Were glven on p 1992. Obviously, data premature to gauge th Which-Were ann O'Lurce
of 1 SS1 di didit recent data (some Wha' CO STIET STES = figures - did in fact decline in rural power Economic and Political 1996, pp.184 and Sv At this pointIndia con Case (of slow and haltiri Ecolonists and intel sides of the politicald
 
 
 
 

y there was the ctober 1994. Of 3. Etiet-JR a few sacre of the party di hirm, for Corce, in שםW לW. (GarטחndBםנ frffy fra Lyhsch fhs ridger era for of ірі Mad" been so Mg asked me?. I Муалттлагfог ал fng hirn of the ig San and several Is brows fora 7, a slaughter of иwich Bшггтаас gd. His reply was awd- that be said, power struggleaf
E ELE case of a ferrors шлfty ordering the ad of government 's of goverптепt
r group. TE wa5 лоf а геа! Tka, Fig-Irsisted, JSOFIFA UWP ошgh to withstand flowe
95) themselves took particular Tendulkar ically that the rise in Could not be blad nas been a good deal act of rising powerty.
India remained high
he three decades. Of nd economy, it began 980s, and then rose he data reported in WEIS. This rise Could tEd 5iICE 1991 Wasi regrowth; following esumed, which could pwn powerty - but mt overty as such after Ifor 1992. We're too.) IEEffects of reforms d-only in the middle egin until later; More tertative and based
GWEITEt 1989 - show a subsequent y in 1934-94, (See Weekly, January 27, Waminatham, 1996). tinues to representa Ig liberalisation, with lectuals O'Warious wides arguing about
destroyed a less solidly built party. The LLLLLS ETC CLLLCLS CLLS LC CLLCLLLCLLLLLLL aďVantagg of F70ť being linked with bands of steel to a family group. Gladstone once described politics as "at once a game and a high art". JR's E long political career illustrated the truth of this aphorism. By any standard of assess Thermt he was a great mañ, orme of three outstanding figures in Sri Lanka's public life of the 20th century the others being D.S.Semana yake and S.W. R. D. Bandaranaike) and only the most prejudiced or irrationally hostile of his critics, would denyihirt that position. All three of them set the agenda for their day, and for those who succeeded them. J. R. Jayewardee was human enough to crawe the indulgent affection that was lawished on D.S.Senanayake; he did get some of this from his younger colleagues, but for the most part all he got was respect, Ewe his lost witulent critics were inclined to give him a grudging respect. As the years pass by that respect will increase as posterity takes a more discerning view of the man and is his achievements.
the significance of economic data.
In fact Indian has seen hot and heavy accusations not only about increasing power ty, but about environmental destructin and loss of food security following "SAPs" and the increased role of the market, with wery little Systematic reliance on data to back them up. For the most recent example, a conference on "food security" held by an NGO in Delhi saw self-proclaimed "experts' Tang ing from British and American intellectuals to India's Wandana Shiwa argue that food security was being endangered allower the world, and quoting one statistic from India to prove their point: that food consumption had declined from 510 griper day in 1991 to 466 in 1993 (Times of India, July 29, 1996); where these figures came fTDTT1, Cäf1 DT1l", bE_gUES5E đ, but thịB'y contradict the UMP data presented here. There are data to the effect that foodgrain availability defined as production plus net imports-minus government stocks) had declined temporarily in 1992-3 and since many supporters of the anti-market position often seem to assume that the poor eat only "foodgrains" and that producing fruits
and vegetables etc. can only be alion to
them, this may be the source of the "expert5" dire Warning5.

Page 25
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Page 26
Солtdon page 8project. However the fact these two developments did take place at all (under the leadership of Wijaya and largely due to his initiative) did make a E Contribution to the eventual defeat of the Polpotist JVP and the saving of the democratic system. 壹
-
Parallal Stripes : The LTTE The stark parallelism of the LTTE's onslaught on the Eelam Left, beginning with the abduction of Jaffna campus student leader Vijitharan, also in 1986, has to be noted here. Unlike in the
democratic forces were - and have remained - unable to prevail over their JVP the LTTE. The reasons for this necessitates a separate venture into the realm of political sociology and comparative politics. It is especially w:en we remennber what happened and is happening in the North and East that we can decidedly conclude that Pathirana's death, like the death of Wijaya and those of several thousand left activists including Pathirana's successor as the leader of the ISU. K.L.
Dharmasiri (who was shot in the back
I of the head by a young JVP killer, while riding on the pillion of a motorbike early one morning in Kotahena in late July '89) was not in warn. E.
Footnotes 1. A small revolutionary group led by Dayan Jaya tilleka, linked to Padmanabha's EPRLF
S2, SJW - led by Jayatilleka Silva, linked to
Maheswaran's PLOTE. E
ܘ ܐ ܢ ܘ ܐ
3.NJWP- an antiracist breakaway from the JVP also linked to Maheswaran's PLOTE.
Солtd from ஒ3 10"
character is treated with sympathy and compassion. She is not just a bad woman. Henry Jayasena produced some very good adaptations of internationally well known plays, notably "Ahas Maliga", an adaptation of Tennessee Willias "Glass Menagerie".
unfortunately Малате Inferrupted the developmanf of these young Wrifers,
We hope that Sinhalese Drama will now revive. Our Astronomers (and cricketers) have now caught up with the rest of is the world. We sincerely hope that our dismatists also will do the same in the not too
South though, the Eelam left and
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Page 27
Will privatization mean the end of the union represent How Will the interests of my members be protected
Trade Unionist
 

Privatization will in no way dilute or reduce the powers and rights of your union. British Airways was privatized in 1987, and the unions remain to protectworker interests just as before. Some of the world's largest most
powerful and vocal Unions exist in the private sector. For
example, the United Auto Workers (UAW) represent over
100,000 workers at the three biggest American car Companies, none of which are state owned. In fact, there is every likelihood that working conditions will actually improve in privatized companies, since there will be substantial investments made to upgrade facilities and training You can look forward to representing a considerably more
prosperous Union.
It is important to realize privatization is a means to an end. It is a means to improve our living standards, foster technological progress, create employment and take our nation into a more prosperous tomorrow, In order to achieve these aims, privatization has to be executed in the
appropriate manner.
That is the task of the Public Enterprise Reform Commission (PERC). Its Inandate is to make privatization
work for Sri Lankans today, and for generations to come.
Every privatization is a carefully considered decision that takes into account the interests of all sectors of society, the general public, the state employees, the consumers, the
Suppliers, as well as the country's overal economic vision.
PERC's mission is to see that privatization works. In doing so, your interests are always being well looked
after,
With privatization everybody has a stake,
p E R c WATCHFULIN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
PUBLICENTERPRISE REFORM COMMISSION,
Bank of Ceylon. 30th floor, No.4, PQ. Bax. 2001, Bark of Ceylon Mawatha, Colombo l, Sri Lanka. Telephone: 94-1-33875&8. Fax. 94-1326|| 6

Page 28
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CONVENIENT
Yes. Allar
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Contact the
CEYBANK (
Bank C
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CO
BE WISE CARD - WISE
BANK OF CE
GRanko's to the UNat
TELEPHONE: 447823 - Ex. 418O8.
 

REDIT?
REPAYMENT TERMS
LOWEST JOINING FEE?
ld many more : yours with the
VISA CARD.
| Centre Manager,
CARD CENTRE,
f Ceylon
- CEYLONMAWATHA,
LOMBO - 1.
4.185