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VIJAYA LIVES !
Mervyn de Silva



**KARU
JAYASURIYA**



THE NEW OPPOSITION

TWIN CRITIQUES **DLO Mendis** on JR
Stanley Jayaweera on SWRD

MANAGING CHAOS **Lakshman Jayatileke**

ZERO SUM CULTURES **Maqsudul Hasan Nuri**

THE REAL SITUATION **Sunil Situnayake**

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DID JANASAVIYA FAIL ?

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VIJAYA STORY

Mervyn de Silva

Its a Woman's world.

Yes, Sri Lanka was the fashion leader when it produced the world's first woman Prime Minister, Sirima Bandaranaike, widow of Prime Minister Solomon Bandaranaike, assassinated by a demented monk nearly half a century ago. She is Prime Minister right now too, but with a difference. Her daughter, also a widow - of Vijaya Kumaratunga - President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, is boss. And candidate Chandrika's opponent at the Presidential polls, was Srma Dissanayake, widow of the slain UNP minister, Gamini Dissanayake.

Flash

As we go to press, the local government polls campaign has got off to a bloody start with a gunfight in Kuruwita Town, Ratnapura, between PA and UNP supporters, in which PA M.P.Nalanda Ellawela has been shot dead. The Lanka Guardian deplores the violence and calls for the substantial presence of international observers at the polls campaign, the polling day and the immediate post-polls period.

President Kumaratunga's Peoples Alliance (PA) cabinet has another widow, Transport Minister Srimani Athulathmudali, leader of the DUNLF. The "L" stands for Lalith (Athulathmudali) the founder of the party.

Enter Dulanjalee Jayakody, no widow this time, but the daughter of President Ranasinghe Premadasa, slain by a Tamil Tiger suicide-bomber. She reads newspaper reports of what President Chandrika Kumaratunga had evidently told a press conference attended by local and foreign media personnel. "President Releases Assassination Commission Report. Evidence Implicates Premadasa, Wijeratne in Vijaya's killing, say Report" was the five-column headline right across the front-page of the state-owned Daily News (1/2/97).

Premadasa, Ranjan Wijeratne Directly Involved in Vijaya's Killing read the Island front-page headline under President Tells Local and Foreign Media (1/2/97). On 5/2/97 Dulanjalee Jayakody did such a stunning demolition job on the "Premadasa-Wijeratne dunit" thesis that the next contribution came NOT from the President's office or from the PA but from the UNP. One of the more interesting points made by Dulanjalee Jayakody was "When Mr. Vijaya Kumaratunga was assassinated, President J.R.Jayewardene was the President and my late father was only the Prime Minister devoid of any executive powers. Mr. Premadasa was not even thought of as the UNP candidate" A little known fact involving money clinches the claim

about a "special relationship" between Mr.Kumaratunga and Mr.Premadasa. Ms.Jayakody claims that "when Vijaya needed financial assistance to purchase his residence at Polhengoda it was President Premadasa he turned to. President Premadasa arranged for Mr.Kumaratunga to get the assistance he needed".

While the temptation to involve the UNP may be strong, the stark fact that the Commission has explicitly mentioned Lionel Ranasinghe, a hard core member of the JVP, should have

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Editor : Dayan Jayatilleka

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THE IDEAS MAGAZINE

AN OFFICER AND BUSINESSMAN

KARU JAYASURIYA: THE PRIVATE SECTOR APPROACH

A Volunteer army officer, who was in active service in the 60's and 70's, Karu Jayasuriya is a successful export-oriented industrialist and has diplomatic experience serving as Ambassador to Germany, during which stint he excelled at investment promotion. Appointed Chairman of the UNP by Ranil Wickremasinghe, he is the most high profile candidate on the UNP's list at the upcoming Municipal polls. He fielded questions posed by the editorial staffs of the Lanka Guardian and its Sinhala monthly counterpart, Vikalpa.

Q. *Why did you come into politics? You were ambassador to Germany. You are also a successful businessman. How come you entered politics, first as the Chairman of the United National Party and now as the UNP mayoral Candidate for the city of Colombo?*

A. I was never keen on having a political career. It was President Premadasa who first invited me to enter politics; that was soon after the assassination of Minister Ranjan Wijeratne. I worked closely with President Premadasa in projects involving the private sector particularly in the efforts to set up a SAARC Chamber of Commerce. He also wanted me to play a prominent role in developing the export sector and specially organising the Expo '92 exhibition. I remember that we were able to attract more than 3,500 participants for that fair and this success was largely due to President Premadasa's efficient way of working. When I was appointed the ambassador to Germany I was entrusted with the task of attracting German investors to

Sri Lanka. This was not an appointment I sought; I was the first non career diplomat sent to Germany and I was chosen because of my private sector back ground which enabled me to make a contribution towards furthering the development aims and objectives of the government.

I didn't know the present leader of the UNP personally but I admired the way he functioned, particularly his decision to vacate the Temple Trees after the 1994 election defeat. That showed that he is not greedy for power. When I decided to enter politics I didn't think that I would be entrusted with so much responsibility. I do not have any political ambitions but I also think that we should do whatever possible to help the party and the country. That is why I decided to accede to party's request to contest the upcoming municipal elections.

Q. *Why do you want to be the mayor of Colombo?*

A. Because I think I should be able to solve the pressing problems of the citizens of Colombo through the adoption of what I would call the private sector approach. What I mean by this is efficient decision making resulting in an efficient administration.

Q. *What is your vision for Colombo? If you are elected the mayor what would you do for Colombo?*

A. I'm not talking about an individual effort but a team effort in order to find solutions to the problems of the Colombo city - we plan to harness the energies and the expertise of various

segments such as the youth, the poor, the professionals, women etc. Our objective is to provide efficient services to the people of Colombo be it in education, health, transport or garbage disposal.

Q. *The UNP has held power in the Colombo municipality since 1979. Though it is undeniable that the city of Colombo changed from a sleepy backwater into what it is today, precisely under the UNP, it is also true that the quality of public services deteriorated drastically, particularly in the last few years. The best example is the problem of garbage. Why do you think that you would be able to do better? And why should the voters of Colombo give the UNP another chance?*

A. I do not deny that there were many problems and inefficiencies in the previous administration. Having said that I do not want to dwell on the past; I would rather look to and plan for the future. And I'm confident that we will be able to solve many of the current problems because of our new approach. We will attempt to deal with not only the major problems like garbage disposal but also minor issues like pavements, clean walls.

Q. *What is your favourite city? What is the city that you want Colombo to be like?*

A. I rather like London the way it was twenty years ago. Certainly we should also look at the cities in the region like Kuala Lumpur. But of course our first priority is to make the city cleaner and healthier by cleaning up the garbage

and taking care of the mosquito menace.

Q. *Over 50% of the people of Colombo are slum and shanty dwellers. What do you have to offer to these people? It may be argued that there is very little that you have in common with these people.*

A. The wellbeing of the poor is one of the major concerns of the UNP. Efforts will be made to improve the quality of life of this segment through the provision of better facilities such as water, sanitation and even housing. We can get aid and assistance from overseas to carry out some of these programmes.

Q. *You talked about a private sector approach. Though the private sector may be more efficient, it is also profit motivated. Therefore, often, only the well off people will benefit from this efficiency. The poor people who cannot pay the price, will not benefit in anyway. How do you ensure that your private sector approach does not result in the marginalisation of the poor?*

A. I fully appreciate that profit is the bottom line of the private sector, at the end of the day. What I meant by the private sector approach is utilising the resources of the CMC more efficiently in order to bring in more revenue which will in turn be used to provide better services to the poor and the havenots. What I have in mind is a partnership with the private sector which is aimed at helping all the citizens of Colombo including the poor.

Q. *Colombo is a multi ethnic city. What would you do to build bridges between the various ethnic and religious groups who live in Colombo?*

A. I do not believe in racial differences. We are all human beings. The future UNP administration will be committed to serving all the citizens of Colombo irrespective of racial, religious, class and caste differences.

Q. *You talked about the need to clean the city. In many countries this has meant the forced relocation of slum and shanty dwellers. We saw this happening in Sri Lanka in the run up to*

the Non Aligned conference in 1976. How do you ensure that your attempts to clean up and beautify the Colombo city do not adversely affect its slum and shanty dwellers?

A. Whatever we do we will adopt a humane approach. We care about the people and we are concerned about the poor. We will never try to beautify the city at the expense of its poorer inhabitants. In order to handle this problem as well as that of increased migration into the city in the future we will adopt the same policy as Mr.Premadasa - that of building more houses and in this case, multi-storeyed buildings. We will work out a programme to provide adequate housing facilities to the non privileged people of Colombo, maybe with foreign assistance.

Q. *What about the problem of traffic congestion, which is getting increasingly worse?*

A. What is needed is an efficient train or bus service within the city limits of Colombo. This will make it possible for more people to use public transport instead of private vehicles within the Colombo city. This will reduce both the traffic problem and the problem of parking.

Q. *The employees of the CMC are not provided with adequate facilities to carry out their duties. For example the garbage collectors are not provided with any kind of protective gear, not even a cake of soap. What would you do to alleviate this situation if you are elected mayor?*

A. The employees of an institution constitute the most important asset of that institution. Without their full cooperation no institution (be it the CMC or a private company) can develop and prosper. Therefore it is our responsibility to look after these employees and ensure their well being. I will discharge this responsibility to the best of my ability if I am elected mayor.

Q. *Normally the duties of the CMC are limited to the provision of services such as water, electricity, and similar facility to the people. Does the CMC have to*

be limited within these narrow confines or can it go beyond this limits and provide extra services to the people?

A. This is an area I'm paying attention to. We are making plans to provide services such as day care centres and recreation facilities to the Colombo citizens. This will include the building of more parks and entertainment centres. We will also work towards providing more facilities to our children.

Q. *In the last couple of years the CMC was accused of imposing exorbitant taxes on tax payers. What are you going to do about this problem?*

A. We have no plans to increase taxes in the immediate future. What is important is to upgrade the quality of the services provided by the CMC. Tax increases which are not preceded by improved services are unjust and should not be resorted to.

Q. *In your plans to develop the Colombo city what are the major obstacles you foresee?*

A. The excessive politicisation of the Sri Lankan society. Such societies are rare in today's world. I think this polarisation based on politics is the main reason for the problems we are faced with today. This politicisation has affected every institution in our society be it the work place, family, school, hospital or the police. If this polarisation continued we will never be able to develop our country. We will have to learn to put the country first. The way I see it an election is like a cricket match; neither the victor nor the defeated should attack the other party. We must learn to accept the verdict of the people with a good grace.

Q. *You as the President of the UNP have to contest the man who was your party treasurer for many years. How will this affect you psychologically?*

A. I have known Mr.Ganeshalingam for many years. I do not have a personal problem with him. This is not a personal fight but a struggle based on principles.

Q. *The UNP is today talking about creating a new political culture. We do*

not think that so far this has been extended to cover the area of development policy. Take the CMC for an example. Ask any former member of the CMC or any of the candidates whether they know the number of school aged children in the Colombo city who do not go to school. Or the number of garbage trucks currently available and the number that will be needed in the year 2000. There is lot of talk about the year 2000 but are there any plans or preparations for this? Ask any of the mayoral candidates whether they know what the annual income of the CMC is. All they say is that they will make all this plans, preparations and calculations when they come in to office. The CMC is not sensitive or responsive to the needs and concerns of the citizens of Colombo and this is a major weakness.

A. I agree with what you are saying. We have looked into these problems and we will make our plans public in the coming weeks during the election campaign.

Q. What are you going to do about the transport problem? After 8 p.m. there is no bus service worth talking about in Colombo. This is extremely inconvenient particularly for people (including women) who have to work till late.

A. We are looking into the possibility of commencing a new inner city public transport service, covering various areas of Colombo, rather like the old 'Circle Line'.

Q. The PA is using the various presidential commissions extensively

in its propaganda campaign against your party. The UNP is accused of various crimes including murder and torture. How do you plan to respond to these accusations?

A. Our Secretary has already issued a statement countering the report of the presidential commission on the assassination of Vijaya Kumaratunga. We will meet the other charges during the election campaign. People do not believe these stories anymore. As for human rights, they know that there was an insurgency and certain excesses may have been committed in the attempt to meet this challenge. People don't believe in these lies anymore.

Contd from page 1

stopped the over enthusiastic PA leadership from trying to implicate its traditional enemy. Among Lionel Ranasinghe's victims were UNP stalwarts like Harsha Abeywardene, and Nandalal Fernando. Another target was Prof. Stanley Wijesundara, a disciplinarian that campus agitator intensely disliked. Besides, the Government analyst testified that bullets found in these investigations matched the bullets used in Vijaya Kumaratunga's killing.

UNP MOVE

Here was a wide open "window of opportunity". No political party would have neglected such a crucial fact unless, of course, it decided to ignore any recorded information that did not suit its purpose. To be charitable, the PA's most glaring weakness seems a crude, amateurish approach to propaganda. It is no surprise then to find Sri Kotha using the word "absurdity" in its press communiqué (ISLAND 7/2/97). "The absurdity of this observation by the Commission is established by the fact that the late President Premadasa was not nominated by the UNP as its Presidential candidate

No wonder the UNP dismisses the PA agit-prop contemptuously. "Cheap propaganda" Sri Kotha sneers.

NDUNLF REBUFF

Explaining why the NDUNLF (Lalith Front) decided after many "discussions", NOT to participate in the local government polls, the party spokesman, Mr.Ravi Karunanayake told the press that the main reason was *not* disappointment over the number of seats allocated to the NDUNLF but "the question of unkept polls pledges: Item No. 1 in the Lalith Front's agenda is "the abolition of the Executive Presidency". While one appreciates the Lalith Front's principled stance on this vital issue, it is useful to remind readers the wise words of the architect of the Presidential system, J.R.Jayewardene. He told this correspondent - and anybody who was "foolish" enough to raise the issue - "who is the fool who will give up all that power ..." In JRJ's book, Ms.Chandrika Kumaratunga was no fool.

CWC - LTTE

The CWC boss Mr.S.Thondaman is *rara avis*, a rare or queer bird. He has yet to abrogate his pact with the UNP which gave him a place in the UNP cabinet. Despite this, he is Livestock Development Minister in Ms.Kumaratunga's Peoples Alliance

Cabinet. He does not submit his resignation nor is it demanded. And the PA does not press the point despite Mr.Thondaman's persistent demand that the PA should re-open negotiations with the LTTE.

Last week, Mr.Thondaman told the Sunday Leader that the "other Tamil political parties are nothing but nameboards!"

Nameboards they may well be, but at the division bell in Parliament they do give the 8 party Peoples Alliance a comfortable majority. Has the UNP lost Tamil support in the city of Colombo by NOT nominating the former Mayor K.Ganeshalingam? The UNP has fielded party Chairman (former Ambassador to Germany) Karu Jayasuriya. He heads the party's city list. But party leader Ranil Wickremasinghe has made it clear that this is no anti-Tamil or anti-minority move.

The pressures on the 7-8-9 party Peoples Alliance are such that the unravelling of the PA or a sudden crack-up may come sooner than we think. Rising living costs make the trade unions restive. Perhaps the PA watcher will have to keep an alert eye after the election, on the likes of Mr.Batty Weerakoon, rather than on his leader, Mr. Bernard Soysa.

FORUM ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (SRI LANKA) ON ISSUES IN RELATION TO GATT AGREEMENT & WTO.

The Forum of Parliamentarians on Intellectual Property and National Working Group on Patent Laws (New Delhi) convened an International Conference on the New Patent System and Investment Regime and emergency issues in relation to GATT agreement and WTO on November 14th and 15th, 1996 in the Parliamentary annex in New Delhi. The convenors of this Conference were veteran leaders from India like Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, Dr.Ashok Mitra, M.P., Dr.Murli Manohar Joshi, M.P., and Mr.George Fernandes, M.P.

The Sri Lankan Delegation consisted of Hon'ble K.N.Douglas Devananda, M.P., Mr.S.Thavarajah of EPDP and Mr.Suresh Premachandran of EPRLF and was led by Hon'ble Vasudeva Nanayakara, Member of Parliament. Large number of Parliamentarians, Academics, Scientists, Industrialists and Legal Experts from all over the world participated in this Conference.

A Country Report on 'Code of Intellectual Property' was presented by the Sri Lankan Delegation. The two days' seminar was convened in order to enlighten the Third World Countries against the background of the Ministerial meeting of the WTO that was to be held in Singapore in December 1996.

A systematic analysis of the background of the GATT agreement was presented by Justice V.R.Krishna Iyer and almost all the speakers expressed the view that it is the Industrial and rich nations that would benefit out of the GATT agreement and WTO and that poor nations of the South would become more and more dependent on foreign companies for their supply of inputs. The sessions were concluded with a joint declaration. Some of the main features of the declaration are as follows:-

1. The developed countries were seeking to enlarge opportunities, privileges and prerogatives of their business corporations to exploit the market and natural resources to enlarge the exports and exploit cheap labour of the developing countries.
2. The TRIPS agreement (which is part of GATT) seek to strike at the roots of Human Rights especially in the area of Health Care, Employment opportunities and of minimum level of living in the developing countries which are essential ingredients of the very right to live.
- 11 Call upon the Governments of the developing world to oppose any move to enlarge the scope of WTO through the introduction of new issues in the forthcoming Ministerial meeting at Singapore.

The Sri Lankan Delegation invites concerned individuals and organisation to indicate their interest in setting up and joining in similar Forum in Sri Lanka on or before 28th February 1997 to:

Forum on Intellectual Property (Sri Lanka)
on issues in relation to GATT Agreement & WTO,
No.103C, Summit Flats,
Keppitipola Mawatha,
Colombo 05.

Vasudeva Nanayakara M.P.
K.N.Douglas Devababba MP
Suresh Premachandran
S.Thavarajah.

SUNIL ON MANIK

I write to correct several inaccuracies appearing in articles in the Lanka Guardian of 15 January 1997, under the title "The Making of Sirimavo Bandaranaike" by Manik Sandrasagra and the Film Review by Historicus.

I should like to state that I am the producer and director of the documentary "Sirimavo Bandaranaike" and had full artistic control of the entire production. The cameramen were M D Mahindapala and Channa Deshapriya.

I am also the Managing Director of the Asia Information Channel, the company that produced the documentary, and wish to state further that all parties involved in the production have been paid in full. This is on record.

I trust you will publish this letter in your next edition.

Yours faithfully,
Sgd. SUNIL SITUNAYAKE
Managing Director

MANIK ON SUNIL

At long last the oracle has spoken. Sunil Situnayake has come out of the closet. Let the memory of Sol.Banders be praised! Producer, Director, Managing Director and Accountant with total artistic and financial control to disburse Rs.3 million which was the cost of the documentary programme "Sirimavo Bandaranaike!" *According to Sunil 'all parties involved in the production have been paid in full'. I suppose he is referring to himself since he claims to be Producer, director and Managing Director. Besides myself being denied a credit as well as my fee, a 5 star hotel Business Bureau is yet to be paid Rs. 6,700/- for transcribing the taped interviews with President Chandrika and prime Minister Bandaranaike.* What is on record is that the Producer received Rs.200,000/-, the Director Rs.200,000/-, AIC production fee Rs.226,575/- General Expenses/Overhead Rs.229,233/- Living Expenses Rs.375,000/- I am sure this has been paid.



The above illustrates my experience with the city.

Manik Sandrasagra

PS. Having worked with the likes of Lester James Pieris and Gamini Fonseka, among others, I have great respect for the credit title "Director". An organiser is not a Director. I cannot buy the modern interpretation.

SINS OF COMMISSION

LOCAL POLLS AND THE BIG LIE

Tisarane Gunasekara

"... In the big lie there is a certain force of credibility's because the broad masses of a nation are always more easily corrupted in the deeper strata of their emotional nature than consciously or voluntarily, and thus in the primitive simplicity of their minds they more readily fall victims to the big lie than the small lie, since they themselves often tell small lies in little matters but would be ashamed to resort to large scale falsehoods. It would never come into their heads to fabricate colossal untruths and they would not believe that others could have the impudence to distort the truth so infamously The grossly impudent lie always leaves traces behind it, even after it has been nailed down" Adolf Hitler (Mein Kampf)

When President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga claimed at a recent conference, that Ranasinghe Premadasa and Ranjan Wijeratne have been implicated in the assassination of Vijaya Kumaratunga, she was firing the first salvo in the politico propaganda battle for the local government institutions. There is no other explanation for her timing - after all the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Assassination of Mr. Vijaya Kumaratunga was presented to the President several months ago and copies were available to the public at least from late November. (This enabled the Lanka Guardian to publish a comprehensive analysis of the Report in its December 01st issue). Contrary to the general expectations, the President kept mum about the Report, the only exception being an interview given to the International Herald Tribune during her trip to France. This silence was so unexpected that there was even

speculation that this was because the President was actually unhappy with the Report for not making a stronger and a more unequivocal indictment of Ranasinghe Premadasa and Ranjan Wijeratne. With hindsight it is easy to understand the silence of the President. She was biding her time, waiting to hurl her 'thunderbolt' in such a way as to cause maximum political damage to her rival, the UNP.

When the Report was presented to the President *in the first half of 1996*, those segments of the Report which made references to Messrs Premadasa and Wijeratne were made available to the press. (The state owned press published this as the lead story with banner headlines, the next day). This caused an immediate reaction in the form of a strongly worded press statement issued by Sirisena Cooray in his capacity as the Chairman of the Premadasa Centre. Neither the government nor the President replied this statement.

When she made the decision to use the Vijaya Commission Report as the launching pad of the PA's local government election campaign, the President may have thought that she will be able to do so with impunity - because Cooray, who defended President Premadasa and Minister Wijeratne from the charges levelled against them by one Commission, has himself today become the victim of yet another Presidential Commission. However, things worked out rather differently. President Chandrika's gauntlet was picked up by both the UNP and President Premadasa's daughter, Dulanjalee and the UNP itself. The ball therefore is back in the President's court

and whether she will resort to tactics of evasion once again or whether she will charge back into the fray remains to be seen. Minister Dharmasiri Senanayake's lame performance on T.V. Monday (Feb.10th) night was hardly a substitute.

A credible Presidential counter attack can be a somewhat difficult task - particularly considering the flimsy foundation on which the findings of the Report rests. According to the Report the evidence against President Premadasa and Minister Ranjan Wijeratne consists of the testimonies of three people: a JVP suspect who claims that he was arrested by the CID in connection with the assassination of SP Terence Perera and the Digane Peoples Bank robbery; a junior police officer involved in the investigation into the assassination of Vijaya Kumaratunga and a PA parliamentarian from the Gampaha district. The evidence by the first two consist solely of statements made to them by two dead people - the main accomplice of Vijaya's assassin and another police officer involved in the Vijaya investigation; the evidence of the third witness consists of the disclosure that the Rupavahini carried a false news item concerning Vijaya and the JVP the day before the assassination - but even according to the Report the paper containing the order to the TV crew was missing and "therefore we do not know the source of the order" (P.64).

The other evidence included the testimonies of the sister and a family friend of Tarzan Weerasinghe (the main accomplice of Vijaya's assassin) and two suspected criminals detained by the CID plus an anonymous letter sent to one of the witnesses. It was based on this conclusive evidence that the Report made its non specific findings against President Premadasa and Mr. Wijeratne.

Like an individual, an institution or a publication too can be judged both by what it believes in and what it doesn't. The evidence the Report refused to believe in makes as much interesting reading as the evidence the Report did believe in. The list of witnesses the Report didn't believe in include the Director CID, and the Additional Government Analyst as well as a former Director of CID and a former IGP.

The Report followed a similar logic in discovering the motives for the assassination. Not only does it ignore all the evidence of Vijaya's struggle against the JVP since 1987 and the JVP's hatred and enmity towards Vijaya; it also bends over backwards to give the JVP a clean bill of health. Further, according to the Report there was a 'conspiracy' to undermine the investigation into the Vijaya's assassination. The participants in this conspiracy which was the result of a "guiding hand included" all the police officers involved in the investigation in general and PC Sangara Rajendran and senior police officers Sheriffdeen and Thuraisingham in particular.

Going by the Report, the assassination was committed by two JVP activists but the JVP was not involved in it! The assassin had the support of several hundred police officers who, acting according to the order of this 'guiding hand', allowed the assassins to get away after the murder. What we are left with is a scenario in which several hundred police officers (big and small) were informed by the "guiding hand" before or immediately after the assassination that they must not act diligently in catching the assassins of Vijaya Kumaratunga. A mind boggling scenario indeed! One wonders how it was done? Through word of mouth? Or through Circulars? What was the chain of command? And all this without a word of it getting out! Not a mean feat especially in Sri Lanka. *Even now, with a different government in office, not a single officer has come forward to confess* as to how this wholesale 'errancy' was orchestrated.

Now we come to the all important question of the "guiding hand". Whose was it? According to the (non specific) findings of the Commission, the "guiding hand" would have been either Mr.Premadasa's or Mr.Wijeratne's. But Mr.Premadasa was only the Prime Minister at that time, (a Prime Minister without any executive powers); he was not even the Presidential candidate. *Therefore, the police department could not and did not take orders from him. It is impossible that he could have deliberately misguided the entire investigation (a process requiring the complicity of hundreds of police officers from top to bottom) under the very noses of the President cum defence*

Minister J.R.Jayewardene and the State Minister for Defence Mr.Lalith Athulathmudali - without them knowing anything about it. As for Mr.Wijeratne, he was not even a Cabinet Minister and the possibility that his would have been the 'guiding hand' is even more far fetched.

The Report gives rise to a number of questions. Why was the evidence which proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the relationship between Vijaya and the JVP was a hostile, one not taken into account? The Report says that an artificial attempt was made (ostensibly by Mr.Premadasa) to "create a public impression that Vijaya was on a collision course with the JVP" (P.64). The truth was that Vijaya was on a collision course with the JVP. During the last few months of his life Vijaya took an increasingly strident anti JVP stand; in fact he was probably the only Left leader who dared to criticise the JVP and often by name, in public. Some cases in point:

- a) Vijaya's final public speech (88.1.28 - Campbell Park)
- b) Speech made at an educational camp at Doraweruwa, Kurunegala (Jan. 1988).
- c) Speech made at the meeting organised by the Independent Students Union of Colombo University to commemorate the first death anniversary of it's leader, Daya Pathirana - Jan.1988 New Town Hall.
- d) Speech made at the funeral of Nandana Marasinghe, killed by the JVP (Nov.1988 Anuradhapura cemetery)

The question cannot but arise why steps were not taken to listen to tapes of Vijaya's last few speeches or obtain copies of news paper reports. The JVP also issued a number of leaflets and tapes in which they threatened Vijaya before his assassination and condoned his killing afterwards. Foremost among this was a tape of the JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera in which he heaped invective on Vijaya, as Mr.D.E.W.Gunasekara former MP and currently Chairman Rupavahini said in Parliament soon after Vijaya's death : "Listen to the last cassette of the JVP, Rohana Wijeweera. The name is mentioned in the last cassette. It says that Vijaya Kumaratunga, Colvin R de Silva, Vasudeva Nanayakkara and

K.P.Silva are traitors who should be punished. I told Mr.Vijaya Kumaratunga and Mrs. Chandrika Kumaratunga about the situation 9 months ago Why was this person killed? Because his face was beautiful and the other person's face is ugly? Or was it because he was a prominent youth leader? No. Because of the accord which was going to be signed on the 21st" (i.e. the formation of the USA).

It is an open secret that Mr.Kumaratunga received a number of death threats from the JVP. This was stated by his mother, Mrs.Clara Beatrice Kumaratunga in her first letter to the Vijaya Commission. Mrs. Kumaratunga said "I know full well that there were JVP death threats against my son when he was alive. He also got letters threatening to kill him". (It should be borne in mind that Vijaya was extremely close to his mother and that his mother sometimes used to open letters sent to Vijaya). The fact that Vijaya had received death threats was revealed in the investigation into the assassination (under the Presidency of Mr.Jayewardene): (Police) "Sources added that the late Mr. Kumaratunga had been receiving a series of threatening letters. The Counter Subversive Unit too was aware of these letter, sources added". (The Island 18.2.88).

One cannot but wonder why this angle was ignored. Why were all the above mentioned pieces of evidence implicating the JVP in the Vijaya assassination ignored - particularly various anti JVP statements by Vijaya and anti Vijaya statements by the JVP? Why was the leaflet issued by the JVP's military wing, the DJV, proudly claiming responsibility for Vijaya's assassination and justifying it, ignored?

If the President continues to use the Vijaya Commission Report as a weapon against the UNP in the upcoming local government election campaign, the country will expect her to give reasons for these many sins of omission and Commission.



POLITICISING POVERTY ALLEVIATION, 'STAMPING' OUT POVERTY

S.H.A.Mohamed

"We will ensure that the Janasaviya recipients will immediately receive the entire sum of Rs. 2500/- which the government claims to have deposited in banks on behalf of each Janasaviya beneficiary". Source - Election Manifesto of the Peoples Alliance August 1994 - Page 19.

Poverty has played an important role in the Lankan elections since 1948. However the understanding of poverty was a facile one. When one political party thought a free measure of rice will root out the causes of poverty, the others hoped that either two measures of rice or some free ration system will do the needful. But nothing happened, except for the rich becoming richer and the poor becoming poorer. These incorrect calculations, approaches and perceptions were to have serious political, social and economic repercussions.

In the late 80's it was revealed that one half of the population still lived below the poverty line. No constructive effort has been taken either to study the root cause of this cycle of poverty or to implement a viable programme to uplift the living standards of the poor and to enable them to stand on their own feet instead of depending on others. The various development programmes of successive governments rarely catered to the basic needs of the poor. Concepts and projects, micro credit programmes and social empowerment of the poor did not occupy significant positions in the

country's development strategies.

The Janasaviya Programme (JSP) was launched in this context. It was a programme designed to address the root causes of poverty. The JSP contained a compulsory saving component of Rs.1042/- each making up a total of Rs.25,000/- over the two year grant period. Instead of paying this lump sum the then government decided to convert the Rs. 25,000/- into a saving which cannot be withdrawn. The beneficiaries were given savings books to the value of Rs.25,000/- legally issued by the National Savings Bank and the JSP families were to be - and in fact were - paid a monthly interest of Rs. 250/- per month. The participants were given the option of using the savings book as a valid guarantee to obtain loans through all recognised government lending institutions.

The PA which was then in the opposition cried foul over this and pledged that they will grant this Rs. 25,000/- *as a lump sum* to all entitled families. *This pledge was contained in the official PA election manifesto.*

What is the PA doing today? How is it honouring its election pledge to more than 400,000 JSP families? By deciding to terminate the Rs. 250/- monthly interest payment as of 01st of January 1997. This implementation has been postponed till May - i.e. until the local government elections are over - obviously because the numerous demonstrations and meetings

organised by Janasaviya families clearly indicate how extremely unpopular this decision is.

RATION STAMPS

As a result the PA regime has started issuing a ration stamp valid for five months in place of the monthly interest payments, until the heat of the polls are over. *The JSP recipients were chosen through a process in which there was very little political intervention. The 250/- monthly interest payments were made through government post offices. But today in obtaining the ration stamp these JSP families are at the mercy of the Samurdhi Niyamakas : henchman appointed by the local ruling party member of Parliament.*

Earlier the savings book issued by the National Savings Bank was an acceptable and valid piece of document which could be used as a guarantee in order to obtain loans. The present system of ration stamps issued for the first five months of the year has no such value. This clearly proves that the entire exercise of the government is an outright farce.

The government which has imposed no restrictions on importing luxury vehicles for ministers and parliamentarians, is out to get the Rs. 250/- monthly payment of more than Rs. 400,000 JSP families. It is very clear as to which people's interest the 'Peoples Alliance Government' is representing.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SOUTH ASIA'S ZERO SUM CULTURE

Dr. Maqsoodul Hasan Nuri

(The author, who is Senior Research Scholar at the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, is Visiting Professor, Dept of Defence and Strategic Studies, Cuiid-E-Azam University. He has also been a Visiting Fellow at the Henry L. Stimson centre, Washington D.C.).

Are attempts towards Conflict Resolution (CR) in South Asia like chasing shadows? Are techniques and mechanisms learnt from Western experiences and some other successful cases mere alien transplant? Do conflict resolution measures hold any relevance at all for South Asia or they are an exercise in sheer cosmetics? Today, some of these questions agitate the minds of many concerned and well-meaning South Asians.

Conflict resolution, as a concept, arrived rather late in South Asia. While the former superpowers and Western European nations started practising it in the early 1970s, in the case of South Asia it was only in the mid-to-late 1980s that the gravity of the idea was realised. Part of the reason were the two military crises (1987-88 and early 1990) which India and Pakistan as two arch rivals had to face. Fortunately, these crises were defused due to the timely conflict prevention measures. These entailed essentially Conflict Avoidance Measures (CAMs) and later some Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). Taken together and if pursued to their logical end, in good earnest, they could meaningfully contribute towards conflict settlement/resolution in South Asia.

Following the end of the Cold War and the traditional super power rivalry, there is a need to reconceptualise the concept of security and development¹. Presently, inter-state conflicts over resource, environment, human rights and ethno-linguistic issues are becoming more pressing concerns. Yet it would be too premature to celebrate the demise of the national state in the international system - an institution that still exists.

Hence, it needs solution of the above problems or else they could escalate into shooting wars if sufficient prophylactic measures are not taken well in time. Prior experience from other nations' search for conflict mitigation and conflict resolution serves as distilled wisdom. Preliminary efforts towards conflict resolution during 1995-96 in such areas of the globe as the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, Central America and some countries in Asia-Pacific have brought home certain lessons. Admittedly, these have not received much attention in South Asia but it could gain momentum as South Asia moves ahead with economic and political modernisation.

Paradoxically, both India and Pakistan today provide nearly half of the size of international peacekeeping forces in different parts of the world, trying to douse the fires of international conflict. But it is an irony that they are still visceral foes and remain locked in historical hatreds and paranoias. The winds of change that have blown across some countries in Asia (Southeast Asia and Middle East) have barely touched the Subcontinent. What to talk of conflict resolution when even attempts at conflict containment/management are at best fitful and half-hearted.

PAST ATTEMPTS AT CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Realistically speaking, since their independence, both India and Pakistan, despite their outstanding conflicts, have entered into some embryonic forms of *confidence generation* measures that may act as a prelude towards conflict resolution. These included the Liaqat-Nehru Pact (1951); Indus Water Treaty (1960); Tashkent Agreement (1966); Rann of Kutch Agreement (1968); Simla Accord (1972); Sallal Dam Agreement (1978) and the formation of the Indo-Pak Joint Commission (1983).

Yet any progress towards resolution of some disputes has remained stalled. These include the core issue of Kashmir.

Other issues that need final settlement are Siachen, the nuclear issue, Wullar barrage and demarcation of Sir Creek. In fact, *according to most observers the main stumbling block is Kashmir and when and if resolved it could pave the way for the resolution of other disputes too.*

As part of this desire for conflict resolution both countries have taken some initiatives since independence by proposing No-War Pacts/Peace Treaties/No War Declarations with each other. While India was the first to propose the No-War Pact, Pakistan's stand was that its signing would be meaningless unless the bone of contention, namely the Kashmir issue was first resolved. Moreover, it was thought that by signing the No-War Pact Pakistan would forfeit its right on Kashmir and lull Pakistan into a false sense of security. In truth, both countries wanted to build peace with their neighbour on their own terms - India wanting normalisation by putting the Kashmir dispute on the back burner while Pakistan was urging India to first talk about Kashmir and settle the issue before taking up other things. This ultimately reduced the offers and counter-offers of No-War Pacts to almost a "ritual" and "ping pong diplomacy"².

In the late 1980s, both India and Pakistan started seriously considering some confidence building measures in order to reduce the threat of war, especially nuclear. Consequently, measures such as hot line, notification on military exercise, non-attack on each other's nuclear facilities and border security were signed. To date, both countries have proposed a number of measures in the nuclear field. Any agreement is difficult to come by because of the diverging perspectives between the two countries - with India aspiring for a global power status and Pakistan relying on its nuclear shield for security and survival. "Mutual security" or "common security" is still not on the agenda of the two feuding principals in South Asia. Here each wants to impose

its own version of peace and security on the other - that is often tantamount to striving for one's own security at the cost of the other³.

The time has come when both India and Pakistan cannot afford to remain at the preliminary stage of CAMs and CBMs. There is a need to go beyond the conflict resolution attempts, with courage, will and imagination. One fact however is inescapable and a harsh reality: like it or not, both countries will one day have to be sit down to resolve their mutual conflicts either through compulsion of another war or socio-economic reasons. Instead of being waylaid by time and history, it is timely and prudent that they should put behind their deadly animosities and foster reconciliation and compromise. Forces of sanity, vision and statesmanship have to prevail over the inertia of fanaticism, rigidity and myopia. Talking about and preparing for war takes a lot of physical and mental energy that could be put to better use in the task of national development. Both countries, despite their many failing and foibles in their system, are functioning democracies. As such, they should be mature enough to sort out their problems through debate, dialogue and deliberations - keeping in view of course their enlightened national interests.

While dialogue and debate are essential, *it is very important that both countries should draw proper lessons from earlier conflict resolution attempts made in other parts of the world. These lessons may be of a generic type but they could be tailored to the South Asian conditions. Following are some of the cardinal lessons derived from other cases:*

LESSON 1: TIME FACTOR

As an institutional process, conflict resolution requires patience, perseverance and persistence. In the case of the European Union, the once-arch enemies, France and Germany, had to traverse a period of nearly 50 years to arrive at the present level of harmony and trust - which only proves that sworn enemies are not destined to remain at loggerheads with each for eternity. Today, both these nations are thriving democracies and form the core of the European Union⁴ after having transcended their bitter and bloody past. It took 35 nations of the CSCE as many as *eleven* years for agreement on discretionary measures to crystallise into

robust CBMs and another *four* years for the antagonists to carry out force reduction. In the Middle East, it took nearly 25 years for Egypt and Israel to arrive at an agreement; in central America the 1986 Contadora Act or the recent Honduran treaty laid the basis for agreement. In Latin America, Argentina and Brazil, with a century-old rivalry, signed a historic agreement in November 1985 to share nuclear technologies and expertise;⁵ and the step-by-step normalisation process between India and China came about in September 1993.⁶ It may be mentioned here that lengthy and interminable nature of negotiations is neither endemic to the Middle East nor a yardstick by which to measure the potential success of negotiations.

LESSON 2: TRANSPARENCY AND COMMUNICATIONS.

Transparency and easy flow of communications are a sine qua non for building trust and act as a stepping stone to conflict resolution. However, the flow of information has to be voluntary and mutual so as not to give any party undue advantage. Lack of information and needless accent on security leads to distortion of the cognition process - leading to misperceptions and risky behaviours. Security assessment should be based on healthy and preventive aspect of threat while over-security can lead to over-reaction and morbidity - thus creating worst case scenarios. While the Western experience has brought out some lessons (e.g. SALT) where troop dispositions and movements, induction of new weapons and balance in forces allayed mutual fears by sharing of information, in South Asia extreme secrecy and misinformation breed insecurity. All these act as disincentives for creating conditions for conflict reduction and then conflict resolution. Of course, asymmetric level in geographic size, resources and the armed forces of India and Pakistan act as great disincentives in fostering any transparency measures.⁷ For the latter, this is often seen as giving an added advantage to its bigger adversary.

Whereas the East-West normalisation process was catalysed by the Dedicated Communication Links (DCLs) such as the hot line between Washington and Moscow, in case of India and Pakistan the hot line needs to be modernised through fax or satellite communications, especially on the Line of Control in

Kashmir. Further, there is the need for another hot line between the political leaderships of both countries. Likewise, defence and foreign secretaries need to be in touch to exchange views, information and seek clarifications if and when required. Only when these communication procedures are routinised/institutionalised that proper transparency can result. This will impart predictability to each other's behaviour, act as preventives against any surprise attack and prove conducive towards taking further steps in conflict resolution.

As Western experience has shown, mere setting up of hot lines is not enough. Strong backup efforts like encouragement of transparency such as opening up for scrutiny, hidden defence budgets (infrastructure, arms acquisition, new raising of troops, research and development and publicly declaring their strategic doctrines) are also important. This is to prevent in both countries not only the military commanders from overreacting in a crisis situation but also to prevent certain politicians and press from cynically exploiting the insecurity syndrome. Conflict resolution, therefore needs conducive CBMs in place - or else the whole process may get subverted or bogged down.

LESSON 3: INCREMENTAL PROGRESS

The East-West experience demonstrates that conflict resolution does not come into effect by a quantum jump or a mere leap of faith. They follow a step by step, brick by brick and block by block approach. Mutual confidence has to be generated in stages with negotiations tackling simple problems followed by more complicated ones. In Europe, it took the CBM process nearly fifteen years of negotiations. The Stockholm Accords (1975) and the Stockholm Agreements (1986) set the tone and tempo for further agreements to be negotiated.

Needless to say that the process of negotiations leading to compromise or settlement involves time and patience while recourse to conflict or violence is only a shortcut to peace. Besides, mankind's experience through the ages has been that conflict resolution techniques/mechanisms/skills have lagged far behind than war-making techniques and technologies. In other words, while man has learnt to fight more efficiently and lethally he remains still a novice on how to negotiate and settle

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'A HISTORIAN CAN DO WHAT GOD HIMSELF CANNOT'...

D. L. O. Mendis

The article in the Lanka Guardian of December 15, 1996, titled "From '77 to the Last Political Thoughts" by KM de Silva, merits a response, if only to expose some of its more fanciful interpretation of past events, and present alternative interpretations. The title of this response is adapted from a saying "God can do anything except change the past - but a historian can do that". Your readers may judge for themselves whether this title is well chosen or otherwise.

The author of the article under review, the distinguished historian Professor KM de Silva is the biographer of JR Jayewardena, together with Professor Howard Wriggins. As such, alternative interpretations of some events discussed by him in his article under reference must be undertaken by others like this author, who however cannot lay claim to be a historian and cannot therefore attempt to do what God himself cannot do. Some statements made by Professor KM de Silva to describe factual historical events will be quoted in this article, and alternative interpretations of the facts will given with some comments in respect of each of them.

'During the whole period when he was head of government, JR did not have any rivals within his party, no challengers to his authority within his government and, till the late 1980's, no effective challenge from the opposition either.'

What is not mentioned in this statement is the removal from the party, at the very beginning of the new regime, of Rukman Senanayake and his following, thus eliminating the possible potential challenge within his party, from that source. Similarly, suspension of Mrs Bandaranaike's civic rights for a period of seven years, effectively removed the rallying point of the Sinhala electoral opposition, the SLFP. Further details of how the SLFP was reduced to disarray, by carefully thought out steps to "recognize" rival factions within that party, cannot be dealt with in this brief account of events. Seven governments that were in power in this country after the demise of DS Senanayake in 1952, had held free and fair general elections; the latter six of these seven governments, starting with Sir John Kotalawala's in 1956, and ending with Mrs. Bandaranaike's in 1977 **had all been defeated at the polls.** This was well known, and that was probably what JR wanted to prevent happening to his party when general elections would become due in 1982 after five years. Many of his subsequent actions may be understood when seen in this light.

'The institutional framework essential for the success or failure of presidentialism - a powerful presidential secretariat for instance, was never established. Nevertheless, the new system freed the President from worry about losing office whenever he - as

head of government - should lose a majority, the kind of political defeat he had arranged for Mrs Bandaranaike in 1964.'

This statement glosses over a number of things, and is misleading in regard to the workings of the new executive Presidential system of government set up by JR, using the five-sixths majority of seats of the UNP in parliament. The President was not answerable to parliament, and to all intents and purposes he was above the law of the land. He himself had announced that he could do anything except "make a man a woman or a woman a man". In utter contrast, Mrs. Bandaranaike's political defeat in 1964, (which Professor KM de Silva says was "arranged" by JR), involved the crossing over to the UNP of a handful of SLFP MPs in parliament, and an electoral defeat of the SLFP government by just one vote. How can these two situations, the SLFP's precarious situation in parliament in December 1964, and the UNP's colossal majority in 1977, be compared?

Further, there were Presidential appointments to top positions in the police force and the armed services, involving subtle and not so subtle nepotism. In the police force, the claims of the two most senior Deputy Inspector Generals (who incidentally were Tamils), were overlooked when

a nephew was appointed as Inspector General. In the army too, a nephew was appointed Commander, and he in turn re-appointed several friends and old schoolmates, with back pay and seniority, who had left the army or had been retired for various reasons under the previous regime. Another of these close relatives who had been away from the army for three years was re-appointed without loss of seniority, and later also became army commander. On the other hand, some service personnel who were not in favour with the new high command, were also retired prematurely. The effect of all these appointments by an all powerful President, as could be seen in the light of future events, makes the non-establishment of a "powerful Presidential secretariat" quite irrelevant.

'His victory in 1977 brought to an end the duopoly in political leadership that the two family compacts of the Senanayakes and Bandaranaiques had established since independence, a change that gave him great satisfaction. He believed that Sri Lanka's multi-party democracy deserved something better than that and he set about opening the doors to the leadership of his own party, quite deliberately, to men who did not belong to founding family or to elite families in general. In doing so he believed that the example he set would have its influence and repercussions on the hold of the Bandaranaike family on the SLFP. But he reckoned without the tenacity of Mrs Bandaranaike in her single-minded determination to keep the family in control of that party despite the succession of electoral defeats she suffered in 1977 and after.'

Of those "who did not belong to founding family or to elite families" Ranasinghe Premadasa had proved himself as a Minister for a short period in the later stages of the 1965 Dudley Senanayake government, and he had a strong following within the UNP. **There was no way JR could have kept him out of the Premiership, after he himself became President, without causing serious disruptions within the UNP.**

But, JR had seen to it that the Prime Minister's executive power was circumscribed under the new constitution. Total power was with the President, and he himself made no

bones about it on several occasions. For example, as President he made a famous pronouncement from the historic *pattirippuwa* in the Dalada Maligawa, as the kings of yore used to do; and during an official visit to Washington, he announced that he was in the direct line of succession from the ancient Kings in Sri Lanka.

The reference to "the tenacity of Mrs Bandaranaike in her singleminded determination to keep the family in control" of the SLFP, sounds very much like a cry of frustration from JR's biographer. Objective analysis would show that many attempts to disrupt the SLFP, both within the electoral process, and outside it, were supported if not actually master-minded by JR. Disenfranchisement of Mrs Bandaranaike was the most glaring example, but it was her "tenacity" that ultimately saved her late husband's party from disintegration. Even without such a collapse, JR's government, without an effective opposition in Parliament, was able to impose many difficulties on its opponents outside parliament.

'Indeed by the early 1980s the UNP had consolidated its hold on the electorate and had defeated its opponents on four consecutive elections held on a national level between July 1977 and October 1982. the opposition SLFP was reeling in the face of self-inflicted wounds stemming from internal division, and others contrived for it by him.'

These references to "successive electoral defeats she suffered in 1977 and after" and to "four consecutive elections held between July 1977 and October 1982 at a national level" are extremely misleading, for two reasons. Firstly, Mrs Bandaranaike was deprived of her civic rights for a 7 year period starting in 1978, and kept out of politics till that restriction was unexpectedly removed in 1984, probably under pressure from the Prime Minister of India, when Indo-Sri Lanka relations had sunk to an all time low. Secondly, general elections as well as several by elections were not held after 1977, by resorting to various devices including a Referendum to postpone general elections in 1982, causing a great deal of frustration, especially among millions of disgruntled youth who had never had a chance to

exercise their franchise in their lifetime.

The Kalawana fiasco merits special mention since it showed up the authoritarian nature of the new constitution in no uncertain terms. The President re-appointed to Parliament a member who had been disqualified by the Supreme court on an election petition, and a by-election had been won by an opposition member. For a short period there seemed to be two members representing a single electorate. The farce was only resolved when the disqualified member agreed to "resign". This incident too will go down in the constitutional history books to the eternal shame of JR and his government, despite all the efforts of his historians to prevent it.

The four elections referred to were held under emergency regulations, and were boycotted by opposition parties, or were threatened with boycott, making a mockery of the whole electoral process. The most glaring example perhaps were the Jaffna Development Council elections held in 1981, the 50th anniversary year of the achievement of universal adult franchise in 1931. Those elections were disrupted, allegedly by progovernment forces including the police and military, and in the ensuing civil commotion many lives were lost, and the Jaffna library was burned to the ground. That barbaric act ensured that there would be no forgiving and forgetting across the ethnic divide for a long, long time, if ever.

By the time elections were held in other parts of the country, large numbers of frustrated youth had taken to extra-parliamentary activity. Some of them were later made to pay for it with their lives in the crudest and cruelest manner, as is now being disclosed in various ongoing Commissions of Inquiry. Incidentally, these Commissions are bringing to light some internal conflicts in the UNP that had been settled with help from and by methods of the underworld, not by attempted impeachment. For example, allegations have been made of a well known criminal holding office in the UNP and wielding great power and authority in the executive, including the Police force. Following these disclosures, several very high ranking police officers have gone into hiding, some even seeking asylum in foreign

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EMANCIPATING THE SLFP

SWRD REEVALUATED

Stanley Jayaweera

(A former senior foreign service officer, the author served as Ambassador to Germany.)

"Psychic Insight" seem to me to be the only appropriate words I could use to refer to the method by which Miss Tisaranee Gunasekara has obtained such an accurate understanding of the role played by the Bandaranaike family in the history of contemporary Sri Lanka - unless, of course, she has gathered that knowledge from a close personal association with members of that feudal breed.

T.G. writes that the "S.L.F.P.'s only authentic commitment is to the family. Neither the S.L.F.P. nor the Family has any real commitment either to the country or to the democratic system".

I think that statement needs to be modified. True enough S.W.R.D. broke away from the U.N.P. and formed his own party which he called the S.L.F.P. only when he realised that he would not be D.S. Senanayake's logical and legitimate successor. The S.L.F.P. was therefore to be the vehicle in which he expected to and did ultimately ride to power. There was no question that he was very uncomfortable in the U.N.P., although he helped to found it, by agreeing to merge his Sinhala Maha Sabha with the other right-wing political groupings in the country at the time. Obviously he took this step in the hope that when D.S. did ultimately pass away, the leadership of the U.N.P. would necessarily fall into his lap, as it certainly should have. But he 'conquered himself' only when it dawned on him that he would never achieve his obsessional ambition of being the top dog in the country via the U.N.P. From even before the day some fool in England had remarked "there goes a future Prime

Minister of Ceylon", merely because S.W.R.D. was a good debater and had succeeded in being elected as Secretary of the Oxford Union, the future People's Prime Minister thought he had a divine right to rule. As T.G. states, very correctly, the Senanayakes were considered upstarts and D.S.'s period of office as Head of Government was to be a brief interlude, after which the Bandaranaiques would come into their own.

Premakumara Eritawala, the well-known Shantiniketan trained dancer of yesteryear, and now the Founder/Director of the Tambapanni Institute of Culture in Peradeniya who is a dear friend of mine, has often related to me incidents when, even as a small schoolboy in Ratnapura, he came to know who the real Bandaranaike was. One such occasion was when S.W.R.D. was campaigning for an old crony of his from Kirindiwela whom he had put forward for the Ruwanwella seat at the State Council elections when N.M. Perera stormed the Waluwa bastion of the Molamures; S.W.R.D. used, in his usual contemptuous style, to lift his forefinger when speaking, and harangue the crowd, telling them that when "a Bandaranaike" lifts his forefinger, there is not a single man in the country who could lift his own forefinger above that of the Bandaranaiques.

Premakumara and his friends used to get on their bicycles and go from meeting to meeting to listen to S.W.R.D.'s oratory and at every meeting that was the argument the future Prime Minister used to put forward as to why the people should vote for his loyalist. Another argument he used at Ruwanwella as to why the old crony should be elected to the State Council was because he was a ripened old man, full of wisdom, and therefore the type who could

make a useful contribution in the State Council. Premakumara says that in the adjoining electorate, Ratnapura, where S.W.R.D. was supporting the young Jayaweera Kuruppu, his argument was that it was of no use to send old cronies to the legislation and that only young men like Kuruppu should be elected because his youth was the most desirable qualification! Even as a school boy, Premakumara says he was astounded at how unprincipled politicians could be, when the occasion demanded it. Being one of the original founder members of the Swabasha movement, Premakumara does not deny that S.W.R.D. hi-jacked that movement for his own political gain - more of that later.

Be that as it may, I am convinced that S.W.R.D. never wanted to set up a family dynasty in the manner his wife has done. I don't consider that he, feudal as he was, ever contemplated that the leadership of the party he founded should pass on to his wife or any other member of his family, after his demise.

Not only was he too intellectually deep for that; he had such a conceited notion of himself that he did not think anyone of his progeny or other member of his family could ever measure up to his level. It is one thing for a father to say of any one of his children that he or she is a highly political animal like himself; it is an entirely different story to say of such a child that he/she has the same qualities of head and heart that go to make a true leader of men!

For one thing, S.W.R.D. was not superficial unless, of course, you consider personal ambitions to be the hall-mark of an empty and vacuous man. But now many of those in political life in this country will measure up to that standard? No, given that falling i.e. his inordinate ambition and conceit,

S.W.R.D. was not given to sensate living. He led an austere life. He cared two hoots for property, money and tinsel. He often used to refer to the "boru shoke" style of life which was characteristic of the Kotalawala regime and of the U.N.P. in general. In fact, his significant contribution to the political life of that period in our country is that he placed his undoubted talents at the disposal of those who looked for a charismatic leader to be at the vanguard of a movement that sought to overthrow a culturally degenerate regime.

S.W.R.D. was not cheap and vulgar. Not even in his wildest dreams would he have authorised the shooting of a documentary on his life, as happened recently, at tremendous cost, in the case of his wife! He disliked stooging and treated with utter contempt those, especially bureaucrats, who attempted to be lickspittles.

He liked the neutral public servant who was committed to serving the people. He did not ask for loyalty from the public servant either to himself personally or to his political party.

And in the framing of his policy S.W.R.D. did not permit his family members to intervene. The late Phillip Gunawardena once told me of an interesting incident.

After the right-wing gang in his Cabinet led by the late Wimala Wijewardena had succeeded in watering down much of the original Paddy Lands Act, the left-wingers thought they should make a last-ditch effort to restore the Bill to its original form. So the few of them, Phillip, William Silva, T.B. Subasinghe, T.B. Illangaratne and a couple of others had gathered round the dining table of the old man one night and succeeded in convincing him, clause by clause, that the Bill should be restored to its original form. Sensitive and intelligent man that S.W.R.D. was, he had come round to accepting the arguments of Phillip and company. But unknown to them and unseen by them, a female relative of the Prime Minister had been eaves-dropping from behind a curtain, and when S.W.R.D. had agreed to everything proposed by Phillip, had barged in, without even so much as a by-your-leave, and started to castigate the Prime Minister for not realising what would happen to his own lands and those of his feudal kith and kin, if the amended Bill was passed.

Phillip told me that he had never seen S.W.R.D. in such a rage. He had gnashed his teeth, put on his withering scornful

look and shouted "Gani, kussiata, kussiata" (To the kitchen my lady, to the kitchen.) Beckoning with his two fingers to her to get out of his sight at once!

On the other hand, however, Phillip told me how indifferent S.W.R.D. was to known bribe-takers in his own Cabinet. I was told that he used to talk into Cabinet meetings every Wednesday, look straight at a certain Minister and quite jokingly ask him "Say _____, tell me how much have you made this last week," and Phillip added "Stanley, how long do you think I could have worked with such a man as Head of Government?"

As T.G. point out many of the progressive measures passed during the years, S.W.R.D. was Prime Minister should actually be credited to Phillip Gunewardena and his party men in the M.E.P. government.

The fact of the matter as that S.W.R.D. was never uncompromisingly committed to a cause in the manner men like Gandhi, Nehru, Subhas Bose and their like were committed to the cause of India's liberation from British rule. In the struggle, they formulated the policies which they considered were essential for the welfare of their people after freedom was won.

Here in Sri Lanka (then Ceylon), men like S.W.R.D. had no such vision. So, ultimately, when power came their way, all that our politicians, including S.W.R.D. (I am, of course, excluding the then Marxists like N.M., S.A. Wicks, Leslie and Vivienne Gunewardena, Pieter Kauneman and their like) looked for was to take charge of the ladle (a la President Wijetunge) so that they could serve themselves liberally with it.

S.W.R.D.'s much acclaimed speech at the Independence Hall on Freedom Day was really a sop to Cerberus. If he was so concerned about making Freedom meaningful for the common man, he would not have, in the first instance, opposed universal franchise, as T.G. rightly points out.

I also venture to think that in the late twenties, S.W.R.D. should, instead of pitting himself against the acknowledged Labour Leader of the day, A.E. Goonesinghe and defeating him at the Colombo Municipal elections, joined hands with A.E.G. and transformed the Labour Party into a truly Social Democratic organisation. His Himalayan conceit and

contempt for a man of A.E. Goonesinghe's origins, coupled with his feudal upbringing, possibly prevented S.W.R.D. from taking such a step.

What is more, when Mahatma Gandhi visited this country in 1927, it was not S.W.R.D. who played a lead role in welcoming India's future liberator. It was George E de Silva, then President of the Ceylon National Congress, and A.E. Goonesinghe who welcomed the Indian rebel at the jetty. In fact it was the red shirts of Goonesinghe's Labour Party who provided the guard-of-honour at Colombo. And it was left to then Mayor of Colombo, W.T. Stace (later to become a Professor of Philosophy) who delivered an admirable welcoming address at the civic reception.

Since the Donoughmore Commissioners were expected any time then, S.W.R.D. probably thought he should be on his best behaviour to convince them that he had nothing in common with India's half naked fakir! He always avoided a head-on confrontation with authority, because power, even at the cost of his self-respect, was his ultimate goal.

Within the framework of the pleasure loving, comfort-seeking, shallow Sri Lankan psyche, S.W.R.D. certainly did much. What I liked most about him was his rejection of sensate, superficial and insensitive living. He did speak to his fellow-men from an altitude on which he alone stood at the time of the electoral upheaval of 1956. But that altitude was not of the kind born from profound philosophical and spiritual depth. He lacked the serenity and detachment that generally go with such knowledge. Hence he has often been referred to as a rabble rouser.

His impact on the people of the country, despite the annual commemorative meetings and the reams that are written by those who seek to trade on his name, have not been strong enough to prevent his wife and daughter from taking us back to the Kotalawala era. It is this gap that a Third Force has to fill. Put differently, the S.L.F.P. has to be emancipated from the Bandaranaiques, otherwise the chosen ones will continue to play havoc.

- To be continued -

EVALUATING JANASAVIYA :

THE JURY IS NO LONGER OUT

Part I

CONTEXT

The JSP was the main axis of the Premadasa's search for an alternative development strategy. By the time he assumed office in 1989, the almost purely growth oriented strategy of the post '77 period was nearing the point of organic exhaustion ; it was becoming dysfunctional, politically, economically and socially - and therefore systemically. It was clear that a continuation of this strategy would not ensure high growth, let alone equity. However, going back to the pre '77 state capitalist closed economy era of economic and social stagnation, queues and shortages was also a non option. The only viable solution was making an effort to chart a new course, a third path¹⁸. This was what Premadasa was striving to do with his election manifesto : 'New Vision ; New Deal'.

The search could not have take place in a more unfavourable context. Sri Lanka is a totally trade and aid dependent country. When Premadasa assumed the Presidency in 1989, the country was facing a hitherto unprecedented crisis - military, politically, economically and socially. In the South, the Polpotist JVP insurgency was raging while in the North and East the Indian Peace Keeping Force was engaged in an increasingly protracted 'no win' war with the separatist LTTE. With an extremely low growth rate of 1.6% in

'87 and 2.6% in '88 and a rate of unemployment as high as 19.5% in '85/'86, the economy was slowing down drastically. The JVP was following a conscious policy of economic sabotage with the objective of weakening, slowing down and eventually destroying the economy. As the President, Premadasa was confronted with the daunting task of rebuilding a war torn country and an almost stagnant economy.

The exorbitant economic costs of the war in the North and East and the rebellion in the South forced Sri Lanka to seek a Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) in 1987 and an enhanced SAF subsequently (under Premadasa). The IMF granted the request but the facility came with the usual harsh conditionalities attached. Premadasa was therefore more dependent on external sources of funding than any of his predecessors and consequently more vulnerable to external pressures regarding the kind of economic strategy he should adopt. The collapse of 'really existing' socialism and the triumph of economic neo-liberalism globally, severely limited his room for manoeuvre. Internally too the situation was far from conducive. The fact that Premadasa came from a subaltern class-caste background meant that he was never able to achieve complete hegemony¹⁹.

The anti-Premadasa campaign launched by his political opponents within and outside the Parliament reached its zenith with the attempt by

the UNP old guard (led by Lalith Athulathmudali and Gamini Dissanayake) to impeach Premadasa. Though the attempt itself failed, the state of siege lasted till Premadasa's death in May 1993. It was in this extremely unfavourable political and economic context that Premadasa endeavoured to chart a radically new course for the economy. And this is the backdrop against which any objective evaluation of the JSP should take place.

In evaluating the JSP we, tried to keep in mind as much as possible the multi-faceted nature of the programme. As was mentioned earlier, the objective of the JSP was to improve the conditions of the poorest of the poor economically, socially and psychologically. This was the basis on which the following yardsticks used to evaluate the performance of the JSP were formulated.

1. SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE JSP.

The objective was to evaluate how successful the JSP has been in improving the socio-economic conditions of the poor. Five key areas were chosen for the purpose : *income levels, nutrition levels, health, education and training and housing.*

i) Income levels

Though the JSP's consumption allowance of Rs.1000/- per month (with Rs.453/- as compulsory

savings) was not granted in monetary form but in kind, it nevertheless resulted in an improvement of the real income of the families²⁰. This explains the fact that 82% felt that the JSP caused an improvement in their income levels. (Deterioration - 1%; No change - 16%).

ii) Nutrition Levels

The consumption allowance was granted to the families in the form of a basket of goods worth Rs.1000/- a month. This method gave rise to the criticism that the choices available to the families were limited to the not very extensive range of goods in the co-operative shops. However it had the undeniable advantage of preventing the money from being spent on liquor, cigarettes, gambling or some other wasteful pursuit. Therefore, at least for the duration of the JSP, the families were guaranteed access to basic consumer goods which seems to have resulted in a considerable improvement in the nutrition levels. This explains why an extremely high figure of 95.7% felt that their nutrition levels improved as a result of the JSP (Deterioration 8% ; No change - 2.5%).

iii) Health

The availability of basic consumer goods and the resultant improvement in nutrition levels seemed to have led to the improvement of the health of the families as well. The other main contributory factor was that a large number of these families used bank loans/compulsory savings to improve their access to clean water and adequate sanitary facilities. Thus 93% of the families felt that their health improved as a result of the JSP (Deterioration 0.2% ; No change 3.1%).

iv) Education and Training

As it was conceived, the JSP was supposed to contain a very strong component of education and training. It was also assumed that the lessening of the economic burden on the families would enable the school going members to

pursue their studies better. However, only 23.9% of the families felt that their education and training levels improved because of the JSP (Deteriorated 31.2% ; No change 28.7%). This shows an extremely wide gap between the conception and the reality, as the target families experienced it. This undoubtedly had an impact on the ability of the JSP families to start an income generating venture (only 13.4% managed to do so) and the relatively high rate of failure of those income generating ventures (30%).

v) Housing

58.1% of the JSP families felt that their housing conditions improved as a result of the JSP. This is mostly because the JSP enabled them to save (the compulsory savings of Rs.453/- per month) and to have access to housing loans from state and community banks. As a result they were able to build or renovate a house (often to replace a thatched roof with a tiled/asbestos roof, add a room, improve the kitchen, improve sanitary facilities, obtain electricity, buy some consumer durables, etc.) (Deterioration - 3.1% ; No change - 33.3%)

70.5% of the families felt that their overall socio-economic conditions/living standards improved because of the JSP. (7.26% of the families felt that their socio economic conditions/living standards deteriorated, while 16.7% felt that there was no change in their living conditions).

A significant point is that while benefiting the poor directly, the JSP seem to have benefited the non-poor and the less poor indirectly. The increase in income levels and living standards of the JSP families resulted in a corresponding increase in their purchasing power. This benefited certain segments of the less poor and the non-poor such as boutique owners, carpenters and other workers in the building trade and electricians, etc. Perhaps this can be termed the "creep up effect" of the JSP²¹.

2. SOCIO - PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF THE JSP

As we mentioned before, Premadasa's conception of poverty went beyond economic destitution and embraced both social marginalisation and psychological debilitation. Therefore the JSP was structured in such a way to enable it to address these issues as well. The objective was to improve the socio-psychological conditions of the JSP families thereby making it possible for them to take their rightful place in society as equal citizens.

Since we are dealing with intangibles here, such as marginalisation, self confidence and self esteem, the question presented certain difficulties and often had to be phrased in an indirect, roundabout way. Still a large segment of the families questioned found it difficult to comprehend the question and therefore left it unanswered - thus the relatively higher rate of 'no response' figures.

i) Marginalisation

Marginalisation and poverty are two sides of the same coin. In South Asian societies this is often exacerbated by caste divisions and oppression (open as in India or hidden as in Sri Lanka). The poorest of the poor often exist on the margins of society, looked down upon and ostracised by the relatively well off. The testimonies of some of the JSP recipients (see Appendix I) bear ample witness to this marginalisation and alienation.

35% of the families felt that they became less marginalised in society as a result of the JSP, while 0.6% of the families felt that their marginalisation increased and 17.9% of the families felt the JSP did not cause any changes in their place in society. 46.5% of the families did not respond, to this question.

ii) Psychological Impact

The poor are the wretched of the earth. In a society where money reigns supreme, the poor are not only social and economic outcasts

; they are almost non persons, ignored and despised at the same time. Since ignorance is often a sibling of poverty, the belief that poverty is fate and destiny is widespread. It is for the most part a life without hope. Forced to depend on someone's handouts (either the State, other institutions or private individuals) in order to survive, sentiments such as self confidence and dignity are often denied to them. This existence of despair and servitude inevitably results in psychological debilitation. Premadasa understood the importance of giving the poor a sense of self confidence and self worth, a sense of hope, without which they can never escape the trap of poverty. Therefore making the poor feel important, feel good about themselves, helping them feel that they can make it, (if not now, at least in the not so distant future) was an important and objective of the JSP.

According to the study, 76.7% of the families (i.e. an absolute majority) felt that their sense of self confidence and self esteem increased because of the JSP (1.4% of the JSP families felt that their self confidence and self esteem improved marginally because of the JSP while 11.1% felt that there was no change. Only 0.4% felt that their self confidence and self esteem deteriorated due the JSP). This is a remarkable achievement by any criteria. The JSP didn't manage to eliminate poverty ; but it certainly has managed to go a long way in eradicating the poorest of the poor's sense of apathy and despair. It would therefore, be no exaggeration to say the that the JSP has acted as a clarion call. Because of the JSP, the poorest of the poor will never feel the same again ; they will never be the same way again. In a sense this was the most remarkable and lasting achievement of the JSP.

- TO BE CONTINUED -

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IN DEFENCE OF SARACHCHANDRA

Shelagh Goonewardene

I have read Dr. A.J.Gunawardana's article "Maname Forty Years After" (ref. Lanka Guardian of 31st October and 15th November '96) and the response to it, "Is Maname One Of The Finest Things On Any Stage?" by Douglas Amarasekera and Hemantha Warnakulasuriya in the Lanka Guardian of 15th December '96, with more than great interest. As a committed observer of Sri Lankan theatre since 1956, I am concerned that people will actually begin to take the view expressed by Messrs. Amarasekera and Warnakulasuriya seriously. A careful reading of Dr.Gunawardana's article which is closely and cogently argued, answers all the major objections to *Maname* and Dr.Sarachchandra's approach to drama enunciated by all critics to date, not only Messrs. Amarasekera and Warnakulasuriya.

In my opinion, having read Dr.Gunawardana's article, it is remarkable that Messrs.Amarasekera and Warnakulasuriya should persist in such an insensitive and misinformed attack which serves very little purpose and will rebound on them. The main premise of their argument is that judged by a supposed "world view" (represented rather questionably, again in my opinion, of lumping together an assortment of cultural artefacts such as Shakespeare's "Hamlet", Verdi's "La Traviata" and the classical ballet "Swan Lake") they find *Maname* severely wanting. Does it not strike them that these are ludicrous and irrelevant comparisons? No work of art can be judged in such a haphazard and arbitrary manner, where it is isolated from the national and cultural context in which it had its genesis and the *genre* of the particular branch of the arts to which it belongs.

I find it truly amazing that Messrs. Amarasekera and Warnakulasuriya are so alienated from their own culture, that only mention of its "cultural jewels" in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, The New Standard Encyclopaedia, and Time International (this last choice makes me blush with embarrassment on their behalf), will make them valid or worthy of acceptance according to their concept of a "world view". Dr. Gunawardana, in his article, quotes the following from "25 Years After Maname"

which was jointly written by Amarasekera and Warnakulasuriya: "Professor Sarachchandra and his friends ... may succeed in fooling SOME of the people (the barbarous and vulgar) ALL of the time. But they simply cannot fool ALL of the people ALL of the time". The implication is clear that the authors of this statement consider themselves as the "civilised". In discussing this quotation, Dr.Gunawardana point to the continuing popularity with audiences of *Maname* after forty years, and comments: "Which goes to prove that the barbarous and the vulgar by far outstrip the civilised in our society". I think Dr. Amarasekera and Warnakulasuriya, identify them as what a contemporary political scientist has called "Orientalised Orientals". To elucidate for readers who have not heard of the term, let me quote Nevzat Soguk:

"The 'Orientalised Oriental' is one who physically resides in the "East" and sometimes in the West, yet spiritually feeds on the West... S/he is a practising member of the 'orientalising' praxis in its daily operations in the interpenetrating realms of arts, aesthetics, folklore, media, education and so on. S/he is the non-Western subject who makes her/himself largely in the image of the West, its experiences, designs, and its expectations. In spite of endless assurances to her/himself to the contrary, for her/him the "West" is always more intelligible and fulfilling, and thus more attractive than the East".

In this context, it is understandable that the only play of Henry Jayasena's that is mentioned as evidence of his talent, is an adaptation of Tennessee William's "The Glass Menagerie", not the original plays he wrote such as *Janelaya* and *Apata Putha Magak Netha*. As every theatregoer knows, Jayasena's finest and most successful adaptation *Hunuwataya Kathava*, was of Bertolt Brecht's "The Caucasian Chalk Circle". In fact, rather than being interrupted in his development as a playwright by the prominence given to *Maname* as Amarasekera and Warnakulasuriya claim, it was the very magnitude of the success of *Hunuwataya Kathava*, which precluded Jayasena's further development as an original playwright. It is also worth noting that the story of

Hunuwataya Kathava, the characters, the presence of the *Pothe Gura*, the use of mime and other stylised qualities, must have struck an instant rapport with audiences for the play to have become such a perennial favourite. Which should lead us to conclude that Dr.Sarachchandra had already demonstrated a sure grasp of what appealed to the Sinhala psyche when he shaped *Maname* and *Sinhabahu* in the way he did.

This is not to say that contemporary playwrights should not find modes of writing for the theatre which will accord with the experiences and consciousness of people as they live in the everyday world. This is a given in any form of art, that it should keep pace with contemporary needs, and is particularly true of the theatre which depends for its very existence on an audience that is actually and physically present at the time of performance.

No one knew this better than Dr.Sarachchandra who believed that "there is no other form of art that is more powerful than drama in its ability to enrich reality with what is created by the imagination". New playwrights have to search for true directions that are relevant to their times, but they can always benefit from studying the classics of their theatre and *Maname* and *Sinhabahu* are now of that standing.

A final word about the accuracy of Dr.Sarachchandra's perception of what appeals to the Sinhala psyche. Sinhala audiences abroad display a particular appreciation for *Maname* and *Sinhabahu* even though the difficulties of amateurs producing these plays results in scenes from them being performed, rather than the whole play.

I have been in the audience at such performances and the response is moving. One can sense the intentness with which the audience follows every word and movement and there is no doubt that the music and singing are vital to their enjoyment. I have watched the little group of musicians on stage very carefully and marvelled at how closely they resemble their counterparts in performances I have seen at the Lionel Wendt and the Lumbini. They are immersed in what they are doing heart and soul. In my mind's eye, I can see Dr.Sarachchandra in their midst, an absorbed figure bending over his musical instrument which he seems almost to caress, a familiar figure at countless past performances. It is an image that is now both endearing and enduring, forever embedded in the theatrical imagination of Sri Lanka.

MANAGEMENT BY CHAOS

Lakshman Jayatilleke

(The author, who is Professor of Mechanical Engineering at Peradeniya University, is currently Chairman of the National Education Commission. He was the Chairman of the Youth Commission appointed by President Premadasa. Prof. G.L.Pieris was his Deputy).

OTHER HUMAN CAPABILITIES

Members of a society have two other capabilities which can effect the course of history significantly. These are the spirit of tolerance and the ability to show indifference. Of these, the former reflects a high level of mental and spiritual development. It cannot be expected from most persons under usual circumstances. The latter is often a symptom of insensitivity and lethargy which can be found in less developed societies in abundance. It also can arise out of a lack of resourcefulness and a feeling of abject helplessness. This last condition existed in feudal societies and enabled a few people who were privileged through birth to dominate and exploit entire communities.

A BASIC LIMITATION

In the preceding paragraphs we attempted to identify some of the social devices and mechanisms that help to change the course of societies and organizations in unpredictable ways. Their use may even be meticulously planned. How the plan unfolds is as good or bad as the competence and motivation of those who ultimately carry it out. In our country these two most important aspects of plan implementation get the least attention of the planners and top managers. They are usually left to chance every team member finally ends up chasing which he or she can comprehend and with the devices at his command. The resulting situation is what we deal with next.

CHAOS

There also exists in society a very basic feature referred to as Chaos. Although its dictionary definition is utter confusion and the formless matter that existed before the creation of the universe, mathematicians tell us that it is a common feature of systems. According to them it spreads according to a rule. Through the use of computers they generate beautiful illustrations of mathematical models of fractals which are said to resemble the spread of Chaos. This simple conceptualization and the model itself implies that there is its opposite polarization and a lot we do not know about it. Just as much there is chaos that spreads outwards on the computer screen there must be some aspect that is beyond our modeling, and which probably spreads inwards.

WHAT YOU AND I KNOW

Nevertheless, human beings know Chaos not only as a process of inanimate matter but also as mental state. This state can be created essentially by giving us particular arrangements of information and sense impressions. This can be done either chaotically or by design. A person can also get the necessary information also from one's own memory. The stuff in the memory can itself be chaotic. This internal chaos may very well be one of the features of mind-stuff. The natural inclination to enjoy gambling and speculating may be symptomatic of this internal chaos.

In large organizations the degeneration of any well planned and systematically arranged scheme into chaos happens eventually and inevitably. Chaos is not simply the running down of a system and the leveling or erosion of high spots. It also is growth and, seemingly, a productive activity. Every one in a chaotic organization seems to work very hard and to use up resources at a high rate. Individual activity levels may even be

higher than when things are less chaotic. There could also be high levels of satisfaction and a high sense of achievement all round.

What may be noticeable, however, is that the external productivity is low. This low productivity need not necessarily be a result of chaos as such. On the other hand, times of external chaos when things are not

happening regularly like clockwork, there is opportunity for creativity. Chance events and unusual diversions enable persons with awareness and keen powers of observation to see new possibilities. Serendipity is most likely under chaotic conditions when there is freedom to move around and also to pick up an interesting object or idea and investigate it further.

DEALING WITH CHAOS

The effects of chaos itself can be contained and used creatively by better management. In China the yin-yang cycle is deliberately put into effect so that everyone has a hand in either bringing about change or is deeply affected by it. In Japan there is participatory management which enable ideas that are latent in an organization to be reinforced and brought out into active form to replace those which are already in operation. The initial stages such a process can be quite chaotic. In other countries where corporate planning is done, activities are given up and new ones introduced deliberately to bring about chaos and to keep it in control

The management strategies referred to above are based on the view that human beings devise the world they live according to a vision which they themselves create. These also take into account that there are constraints and influences which are beyond our control and are often unpredictable. There is also the inescapable condition that in the contemporary world there is much communication with other countries and groups who do not share our vision and ideology, which results in conflicts and hostile actions across borders. Even within countries and large organizations there could be influential and powerful factions which can work counter to the common good and overall goals.

THE MAJORITY VIEW

In large societies it is possible that the majority is unable to think in terms of long term interests, broader perspectives, transcending goals, common good, and

deeper implications of both actions and inaction; but are interested only in short term gains. It is also possible that hair-splitting by interested individuals and minorities is seen by many as an unnecessary exercise. Eventually, society is created and the effects of actions are judged by the majority who, ostensibly, have a right to their own opinions and personal criteria regarding what is proper. Furthermore, it is inevitable that the opinions of both the majority and minority in any issue are coloured by considerations such as hatred, greed and lack of information. These opinions are all subject to the limitations of concept based thinking; and will therefore eventually show up the inherent contradictions. Hence both sets of opinions would really be on the same frail footing, and we cannot make a choice between the two. One would be unsatisfactory as the other.

CHAOS AS A MANAGEMENT STRATEGY

Under such conditions the concept Management by Chaos has a high degree of validity. It is based on the premise that all plans of action and strategies are initiated due to personal motivations and sustained through self-interest. They are all limited and constrained by the conditionalities imposed by human nature and by a common resource base which ultimately sustains them. Hence it is not possible to choose between one set of plans and strategies and the next. They will be unsatisfactory and will have to be given up or significantly changed when they run into their respective contradictions.

This line of thinking leads us to the idea that the best approach for the top management would be to use the creation and promotion of overt chaos the-rough what they say and do. The British as colonial masters used this in- the management of their colonies, through the practice of divide and rule Through this they sowed the seeds for chaos and created the preconditions for chaos. They did not use pure chaos. As a management device in their extraction of wealth from the colonies. This process had to be clear one way flow; and strict controls had to be in place to ensure this.

WAITING - 33 NINETEEN FIFTY SIX - PART 2

The second spell of duty, that election week
Was a tea estate town
Steep cross road in a mountain bazaar
Deafened by waterfalls.

This time love, we went together
No children yet, but a black cat
Purred on your lap in the old Ford
While I followed election rules and sought the Police
From alien tongues, from muffler hidden faces
Did I catch resentment in the chill twilight
Why were these plantation people so unfriendly
To my polite Sinhala queries?

I tried English, and a brisk sports type in a chequered blazer
Answered in Tea factory English
Drive over the stone bridge, that is the Police
As you enter the Flatton road,
The Inspector detailed a constable
With his torch and his baton
To guide us to our nights lodgings
Was it your luck love, or the black cat's
That found us that night in a cosy estate bungalow
Magically empty.

The sad South Indian type who cooked our dinner
Appeared lonely and wanted to talk
We asked him about tomorrows poll
And found out the reason for his sadness
He had voted, he said, with all the lusty joy of voting
In every election since Independence
But couldn't vote on the morrow
He was no more a citizen
For him the future had suddenly ended
He was a stranger in the mountains that bore him.
Next day's poll, once again, was uneventful
Instead of mountain villagers and sunburnt tea folk
There were only Southern Shopkeepers and furtive bazaar types
And the three candidates who sought election
Were a Southern bazaar lawyer
Pitted against a son of the old gentry
And an Estate Union man

Polls over, we headed into the high hills
You love, and the black cat
Dozing in the early dusk
Until we reached Boralanda
And walked over the wind gap under the stars
To my parents home.

We saw them in the lamplight as we entered
Harking for our footsteps in spite of the election announcements
By strange chance it was our polls result.
It brought a pang of sadness for our previous evenings caretaker
The name over radio was that of that bazaar lawyer.

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
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
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for peace. This is especially true in case of South Asia where a peculiar but pervasive socio-cultural aberration in the form of feudalism still revives⁹.

Internally in South Asia, there exist deadly quarrels between political adversaries such as India and Pakistan. Some writers are of the opinion that both these countries need to sort out their inter-nation conflicts before they are successfully able to deal with conflict-resolution efforts at the inter-state level. This argument proceeds along these lines: both states (India and Pakistan) are "imperial" or "overblown" states; are excessively centralised and do not permit alternative point of view, especially in foreign affairs. Operating on the assumption that the state knows best about statecraft and its nuances, the state monopolises for itself the notion of "national interest" and sits in absolute judgement over others' loyalty to the nation state⁹.

In fact, the future of India-Pak relations or any such hope for conflict resolution depends on an "inside out" process - i.e., internal changes in the role and structure of the state and societies that would lead to corresponding changes in external relations. Neither change in governments nor cosmetic societies changes are of any solution. A new gestalt or paradigm shift will only come about if drastic internal structural alterations are made in the system.

If any meaningful conflict resolution has to be brought about between India and Pakistan, it is essential to curb vitriolic propaganda and campaigns of disinformation against each other. In addition, there is need to revise historical text books and promote learning through exchange of information and visits to each other's countries. In order to circumvent the vested groups/interests that pose a hurdle for conflict resolution, it is imperative also to fortify Track II, and if need be, Track III channels of communication. Student, Labour, women, anti-nuclear, environmental and human right groups also need to assert themselves in order to bring pressure on their respective governments for emergence of civil societies. Of course, this is not going to be an easy task given the fragility of the above institutions in South Asia; yet, given political will and commitment, the task should not be insurmountable. Kashmir is no doubt a

stumbling block and both parties will have to relent from their rigid stands and settle for a compromise formula that involves give and take. Meanwhile, both parties have to do the necessary homework: stringent implementation of the already signed agreements, establishing proper monitoring mechanism of the CBMs in place, freezing or reduction of defence budget at the present level of forces, re-examination of deferred measures, re-demarcation of disputed areas, measures on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, maintaining a balance between military and non-military CBMs and energising of SAARC¹⁰.

All these measures should not await the time when the issue of Kashmir is taken up for a solution. In fact, as experience has shown, piecemeal dealing with issues (smaller to bigger) clears the way by creating congenial atmospherics. If peripheral issues do not get out of the way, the bigger issues tend to seem very daunting or become a handy excuse to scuttle efforts at conflict resolution, thus paralysing the whole peace process.

This is however not to underrate the peculiar problems that bedevil conflict resolution in the South Asian setting. Major territorial disputes like Kashmir and disparity in size and power between the two countries act as real impediments. Further, lack of any precedence exists in so far as there are no institutionalised cadres working on conflict mitigation or reduction/resolution. In fact, a *zero-sum culture* exists which views with disfavour in South Asia any negotiated settlement that entails compromise - especially on questions like Kashmir. Put more bluntly, the word "peace" evokes connotations of betrayal, appeasement and cowardice. Today, the national political scene in South Asia is charged with jingoistic rhetoric that ill serves the cause of conflict resolution. Perhaps, this is a handy ploy for vested interests on both sides of the border to deflect attention of their own people from international problems of ineptitude, corruption and sloppy governance, towards outside targets.

Endnotes

1 On this see M.H.Nuri, "New Concept of Security", *Dawn*, Karachi, 16 December 1992, P.11. Also read "Critical Commentary on Kolodziej's Analysis," *Arms Control*, Frank Cass

@ Co., Ltd., London, Vol.13, No.3, December 1992, pp.513-517.

2. The term is used by Citha D.Maass, "An Analysis of India's and Pakistan's Rejection of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)", - Paper on Seminar on Nuclear Non-Proliferation Issues in South Asia - Islamabad Council of World Affairs (ICWA), and Hanns Seidal Foundation, Islamabad, 3-6 April 1995, P.6.
3. M.H.Nuri, "Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in South Asia: Practice, Problems and Prospects", *Regional Studies, Quarterly Journal of Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, Vol.XIV, No.2 (Spring 1996)*, pp. 42-44.
4. Claus D.Grupp, *Europe 2000: The Road to European Union*, edition 1991, Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, Public Relations Department, Bonn.
5. Jeo Goldman, "Argentina, Brazil Open to Inspections", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol.47, No.4, May 1991, pp.8-10.
6. On chronology see "Sino-Indian Confidence Building Measures", in Micheal Krepon, *A Handbook of Confidence Building Measures* (Washington DC.: The Henry Stimson Centre, 1993), p.49.
7. "Transparency: Where have we been? Where should we be headed?", Workshop held at SAIC, Maryland, 24 February 1995.
8. Suroosh Irfani, "Accountability Crisis", *The News*, Islamabad, 24 November 1996, P.5.
9. Kanti Bajpal, "India-Pakistan Dialogue", "New Delhi, RGICS Proceedings No.11 (New Delhi, 5-6 February 199), pp. 47-50.
10. For suggestions on how to promote the atmospherics for conflict resolution see M.H.Nuri, "Confidence Building Measures", op.cit., pp. 57-55.

TO BE CONTINUED

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countries, and this must have some connection with some of these extraordinary reports. Again, recently, a former high-ranking UNP Cabinet Minister (who too is believed to have fled abroad) had failed to respond to summons to appear before a Commission of Inquiry into the assassination of another former UNP Cabinet Minister, and a warrant has been issued for his arrest. All this must reflect on JR, although some events actually took place during the regime of his immediate successor.

'His many accomplishments have to be balanced by his misjudgements and failures. One such was his benign neglect of necessary action when evidence of corruption among his ministers and senior officials closely associated with him was brought before him.'

This sounds very nice, but it is really only a brave if misguided attempt at whitewash. *"Evidence of corruption.....brought before him"* must be seen in conjunction with JR's unprecedented act of obtaining undated letters of resignation from all the members of his party in parliament. No comparable precedent in the history of parliamentary democracy is known for this act, which greatly reinforced the President's executive power over his ministers and officials. Professor KM de Silva's naive description *"benign neglect of necessary action"* is utterly unconvincing when read in conjunction with that action, and the other wellknown statement made by JR himself at the very start of his regime: *"Let the robber barons come"*. However, Professor KM de Silva has given a somewhat different view on the undated letters of resignation. He says:

'He talked movingly of democracy and open debate, but in the aftermath of the presidential election of December 1982, with encouragement from his Prime Minister and sections of his Cabinet, he obtained undated letters of resignations from all his party MP's to be called in if necessary.'

Professor KM de Silva thus passes part of the responsibility for JR's extraordinary act of obtaining undated letters of resignation from all the 159 MPs of the UNP, to *"the Prime Minister and sections of his Cabinet"*. This is

not at all convincing" especially when taken in the context of *"evidence of corruption"*. However, Professor de Silva continues:

'Hailing from a family well-known for its legal professionalism and with a father and uncle as Puisne Justices of the Supreme Court, he was only slightly less disdainful of the higher judiciary than Felix Dias - who came from an even more distinguished legal and judiciary background - had been in the early 1970s.....'

Although the constitutional structure he introduced did recognize a separation of powers unlike that of 1972, JR was as prone to asserting the primacy of the executive and legislative over the judiciary as his predecessors on the UF government were.'

Here again Professor KM de Silva tries to soften an action of JR as President by comparison with some previous actions of other. The flaw in this argument of course, is that under JR's Presidential system the President is above the law, and his actions can never be questioned under the law of the land. Felix Dias Bandaranaike on the other hand was tried summarily and punished for excess of power, and deprived of his civic rights for 7 years, when JR came to power. It is tempting to start a discussion on the comparative excesses of power of JR and Felix Dias Bandaranaike, now that Professor KM de Silva had started the comparison.

'Then, there was his ambigulous attitude to political violence JR and the UNP while in opposition faced unprecedented violence and intimidation directed against its leaders and supporters alike. But as a man who often spoke of ahimsa and non-violence, praised Gandhi and admired Asoka, he was expected to do better. In fact he was as ready to tolerate the use of violence in trade union organization and agitation as had the left parties and the SLFP who already set the pace before.'

This surely is not historical commentary, but an awkward attempt to lay blame on the left parties and the SLFP for provoking the violence that marked JR's regime. Such a tit-for-tat attitude is not a

characteristic of great statesman, and we need not look to Nelson Mandela as an example - Mrs. Bandaranaike is closer to us. The violence that was sustained and grew throughout the JR period and after, has to be studied and documented by historians who have neither an axe to grind, nor any debts to settle.


'In the aftermath of the riots in August 1977, he hesitated to vigorously negotiate some form of regional devolution from the over centralized structure of Sri Lanka's government - a long standing Tamil demand.'

Although mention is made of the riots of August 1977, no mention is made of JR's action as the new Prime Minister after the unprecedented July 1977 electoral victory, in sending police personnel on leave, and permitting his supporters to run riot. Those riots though directed mainly at political opponents of his party, also affected Tamils in many areas.

'The greatest disappointment - his, as well as many of those who voted for the UNP in 1977-came from the harsh fact that on his watch the country suffered its worst post-independence domestic crisis, the violent conflict between Tamil secessionists and the Sri Lanka government, a conflict that dragged on from at least 1983 until long after he left office.'

This statement belies the harsh fact that the *"Tamil problem"* was to put it mildly, mishandled by JR. He cannot be exculpated on account of any personal *"disappointment"*, because, at the time he came to office he had tremendous goodwill from the minorities as well as willingness to negotiate a settlement. The paragraph under reference continues.

To be continued





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How will the interests
of my members be
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
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