Problems of Communism

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1973

COMMUNISM IN SOUTH ASIA


India

Bhabani Sen Gupta

Donald S. Zagoria

Sri Lanka

Charles S. Blackton



NORTH KOREA

Economic Development

Ilpyong J. Kim

Foreign Policy

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Problems of Communism

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EDITOR: Paul A. Smith, Jr.
MANAGING EDITOR: Marie T. House
ASSOCIATE EDITORS: Clarke H. Kawakami
Wayne Hall, David E. Albright
DESIGNER: Joseph D. Hockersmith

Cover: Passers-by read a wall poster of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in Calcutta on the eve of the March 1971 general elections. Photo by Piedro Farrini for Gamma.

Communism in South Asia

1 India's Rival Communist Models
by Bhabani Sen Gupta

16 Kerala and West Bengal
by Donald S. Zagoria

28 Sri Lanka's Marxists
by Charles S. Blackton

Changing Perspectives in North Korea

44 Approach to Economic Development
by Ilpyong J. Kim

55 Foreign and Reunification Policies
by Rinn-sup Shinn

BOOKS

72 Read Marx Instead
by Richard T. De George

74 A Question of Science
by Rudolf L. Tőkés

78 Moscow and Asia
by Geoffrey E. Wheeler

81 Kremlinology or Behavioralism?
Karl W. Ryavec

NOTES & VIEWS

86 Correspondence

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Communism in South Asia

EDITORS' NOTE: In their quest for the optimal revolutionary strategy, competing Communist factions in India and in Ceylon (now the Republic of Sri Lanka) have generally committed themselves to some form of parliamentary political action—a course which has brought them both power and influence, including participation in coalition governments at the provincial and even national level. This gradualist and constitutional approach has, however, faced challenges from Marxist groups of more violent bent: most recently, in the case of India, from the Maoist Naxalite movement; and for the first time, in the case of Ceylon, from the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People's Liberation Front). The three articles below delve into the principal sources of support of the major Communist groups in the two countries and examine the evolving political strategies of these movements. Mr. Sen Gupta delineates the growing divergence between the strategies of the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) as both have sought to clarify the rationale for and the goals of their participation in Indian parliamentary politics. Mr. Zagoria, in turn, analyzes the differing social bases of communism in the two Indian states—Kerala and West Bengal—where Communist politicians have registered marked electoral successes. In the final contribution, Mr. Blackton traces the roots and prospects of the major Communist movements in Sri Lanka and the threat posed to their parliamentarianism by the youthful and insurrectionary JVP.

India's Rival Communist Models

By Bhabani Sen Gupta

Marxism is the first system of social science conceived primarily, indeed almost exclusively, in terms of models of development.[1] By relating development to social interests, Marxism —as Irving Horowitz has pointed out—fed the streams of both modern political ideology and modern sociological inquiry. Marx not only asked the question: what is development?; he also found his answer in the context of political ideology and tried to identify and stimulate specific agencies of economic, social, and political development. In Marxist social science, development became a class task. It could not be accomplished harmoniously through the reconciliation of conflicting interests, or mechanically by way of tested inputs. Development had to come through class struggle, through the revolutionary overthrow of bourgeois rule by the prole-

Mr. Sen Gupta is Professor of Disarmament and Strategic Studies and Head of the Center for Disarmament and Strategic Studies at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi). His writings include The Fulcrum of Asia, *1970, and* Communism in Indian Politics, *1972.*

[1] The term "development model" is used in this article to mean both political and economic development. The central problems of development, particularly of developing societies, are always political rather than economic. For Communists, there can be no economic development without resolving the principal political contradictions of a given society in favor of the proletariat.

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tariat led by its vanguard. Only when bourgeois society and bourgeois consciousness yielded to a proletarian society and proletarian consciousness could there be national—and even international—development as a general social phenomenon.[2]

In the 20th century, Marxism, as applied by the Communist leaders of the USSR, Yugoslavia, China, Cuba, and other socialist countries to their respective societies, has claimed to provide the motor force for the rapid development of relatively backward communities into modern industrial nations. One may accept or reject the proposition that communism promises a better civilization than capitalism in terms of the totality of man's relations to society. One has to recognize, however, that communism does provide development and growth.

In recent years, indeed, social scientists have begun to look at Communist models of development as viable alternatives to the gradualist, incremental models of growth based on private enterprise. This new and more objective approach to Marxist social science stems partly from the current international climate of détente and partly from the learning process generated by the experience of developing societies. Some scholars tend to regard Marxism as an integral part of the mainstream of western history and to view 20th-century Communist revolutions as a form of the westernization of eastern peasant societies.[3] At the same time, some recent studies of China treat Maoism essentially as a development model that is conspicuously different from the Soviet model of social engineering.[4] Indeed, the Sino-Soviet break has effectively laid to rest the myth of a single, monolithic communism. Instead of one communism there are now many, and at least each Communist country which has been through a "sovereign revolution" [5] has fashioned its own development model, using Marxist doctrine—in Leninist fashion—as a guide to action. Furthermore, the history of the international Communist movement has clearly demonstrated that just as no revolutionary model can be exported successfully except in the context of war, so also no Communist development model can be successfully transplanted from one society to another without serious distortions that often lead to stagnation and decay.[6] Studies of comparative communism therefore have to encompass several different models of development—a field that has hitherto been largely unexplored.

Competing Communist Models

The following pages offer a comparative study of Indian Communist models of development. Several factors make this study relevant to an understanding of contemporary Communist movements. India is the largest non-Communist developing society, and it is also the world's largest democracy, in which British concepts and institutions of parliamentary government have now become almost completely Indianized. At the same time, India for a quarter-century has adhered to the capitalist model of development, albeit with trappings of centralized planning and a great deal of socialist rhetoric;[7] yet, while the economy has undoubtedly made significant progress, India remains the poorest nation in the world, with 220 million, or nearly 40 percent, of its population living below the poverty line on earnings of less than four dollars a month at current prices.[8] The process

[2] Irving L. Horowitz, *Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 54–55.

[3] *E.g.*, see Robert L. Heilbroner, "The Revolution of Economic Development," *The American Scholar* (Washington, D.C.), Autumn 1962.

[4] *E.g.*, Mark Selden, *The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971; Richard H. Solomon, *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture*, Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1971.

[5] The author's *Communism in Indian Politics* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1972; see Introduction and chap. 1) uses the term "sovereign revolutions" to designate those Communist revolutions which were carried out without significant external assistance, such as the revolutions in Russia, Yugoslavia, China, Cuba, and North Vietnam. The Communist revolutions in Eastern Europe belong to a different category as they were imposed by the victorious Soviet army. Each "sovereign revolution" has employed its own methodology for gaining power and its own model of social engineering.

[6] The Polish Communists explicitly recognized this following the 1956 upheaval in Poland. See the Minutes of the Eighth Plenum of the Polish United Workers' Party in *The Polish Road*, translated and edited by A. Dressler, Leeds, 1957, pp. 43–55.

[7] Indian "socialism" has hardly been taken seriously outside India. In the Soviet Union, there was a brief attempt after the 20th CPSU Congress to regard India as a country that was taking a "non-capitalist" path of development, but this interpretation was quickly abandoned. Khrushchev, in his speech at the Romanian Party Congress in 1960, described India as a "capitalist country." Moscow, however, considered Indian capitalism to be pursuing, on the whole, a path of independent development, and at times has identified "certain socialist elements" in it. See the author's *The Fulcrum of Asia: Relations Among China, India, Pakistan and the USSR*, New York, Pegasus, 1970, esp, chap. 5.

[8] Speaking in the Lok Sabha on August 9, 1972, India's Minister of State for Planning, Mohan Daria, stated that "the absolute number of people below the poverty line today is just as large as it was two decades ago, and these people living in abject poverty constitute between two-fifths and one-half of the Indian population." *The Statesman* (New Delhi), Aug. 10, 1972. For an in-depth study of Indian poverty, see V.M. Dandekar and Nilakantha Rath, "Poverty in India: Policies and Programmes," *Economic and Political Weekly* (Bombay), Jan. 9 and 16, 1971.

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of development has, in fact, led to greater disparities of income and wealth. Thus, the political system, despite its apparent stability, rests on an explosive foundation of mass poverty and increasing stratification. As a consequence, the development model followed by the government is being continuously questioned and attacked from both the right and the left, but it is only the Communists who are putting forward more or less well-structured alternative models for the nation's political and economic development.

India's Communists, however, are split into three separate parties: the Moscow-oriented Communist Party of India, or CPI; the independent Communist Party of India (Marxist), or CPI(M); and the Peking-oriented Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), or CPI(M-L). There are, in addition, a number of minor Maoist groups outside the CPI(M-L).[9] India therefore provides a unique case study of *competitive* communism.[10] The rival Communist groups engage one another in debate not only over the ideological interpretation of the Indian state and the correlation of class forces, but also over strategy, tactics and techniques of mobilization. In other words, each of the three Communist factions has its own model of revolution, and the two larger groups —the CPI and CPI(M)—have their own conflicting models of development.[11]

The existence of these competing Communist models is more significant in the Indian context than outside observers might think, for one of the many paradoxes of the Indian scene is that while the Communist movement is split and still weak and ill-organized as an entity, its impact on politics is far from negligible. The original CPI is as old as the Chinese Communist Party, but unlike the latter it never succeeded in capturing leadership of the nationalist movement and remained outside the mainstream of the Congress-led freedom struggle.[12] It was only in the early 1950's that the CPI, by resolving to operate as a parliamentary party within the limits of the bourgeois constitution, earned legitimacy in the eyes of large sections of the politically aware Indian public.

Nevertheless, after only five years of experience in parliamentary politics, the CPI in 1957 was actually elected to power in the state of Kerala, where it ruled for a little over two years before being forced out by a massive, Congress-backed "liberation movement." By the time the fourth general elections took place in 1967, the Communists had split into the rival CPI and CPI(M). Even so, the CPI did well enough in the elections in Bihar and Punjab to necessitate its inclusion in non-Congress coalition governments in those two states, while the CPI(M) emerged as the strongest political force both in Kerala, where it organized a "left" coalition government, and in West Bengal, where it was the dominant element in a "leftist united front" state regime. In the "mid-term" elections of 1969 and 1971 in

[9] The united CPI split in 1964, when a minority rebelled against the Moscow-oriented leadership over the issue of the leadership's "nationalist" position on conflicts between India and China and established a separate party, the CPI(M). After the CPI(M) itself moved away from its pro-Peking orientation toward an "independent" line that accepted parliamentary methods, a Maoist splinter group broke away from the CPI(M) in 1967 and formally organized the CPI(M-L) in 1969. The CPI(M-L) shunned parliamentary politics and operated exclusively as a secret organization for a brief period. It broke up into a number of rival factions in 1970–71, and its leaders were either taken into custody or killed by the police. The party practically ceased functioning after the arrest and death of its chairman, Charu Mazumdar, in the summer of 1972. For details of the Maoist movements in India, see Mohan Ram, *Maoism in India*, Delhi, Vikas, 1971; the author's *Communism in Indian Politics*, *op. cit.*, chap. 9; and the author's "China and Indian Communism," *China Quarterly* (London), No. 50, April–June, 1972.

[10] The author has put forward the concept of "competitive communism" as a special field of study because the Soviet and Chinese models of revolution and development now are competitive models that not only operate, respectively, in the two largest Communist states, but also compete against each other in the world Communist movement and in individual developing countries.

[11] Because of its brief existence, the CPI(M-L) has no clear development model of its own. In general, the party's ideological documents echo the writings of Mao Tse-tung and call for an agrarian revolution in India with the rural proletariat as the main motive force. The main contradiction in the countryside is said to be between the feudal landlords and the peasants, and only by using peasant armed forces under working-class leadership to set up liberated zones can this contradiction be resolved. The Maoists of Andhra Pradesh, who "liberated" a large part of the hill areas of Srikakulam District between 1967 and 1969, tried to establish "base areas" on the Chinese model, but these were flushed out by the government's armed police in 1970–71.

[12] Indicative of the growth and maturity of Indian communism is the emergence in recent years of a growing body of Indian literature on the movement. This author's *Communism in Indian Politics* happens to be the first academic study of Indian communism in the larger context of Indian politics as a whole. Mohan Ram's *Indian Communism: Split Within a Split*, Delhi, Vikas, 1970, is an illuminating study of the issues and problems that led to the split in the CPI in 1964 and in the CPI(M) in 1967–69; and his *Maoism in India (op. cit.)* throws considerable light on the genesis and operations of the CPI(M-L) and the Maoist movement in Andhra Pradesh. A less objective study of Indian Maoism is J. C. Johari's *Naxalite Politics in India*, Delhi, Research Publications, 1972. Meanwhile, the CPI has undertaken the publication of documents relating to the history of Indian communism, and the first volume, *Documents of the History of the Communist Party of India, 1917–1922*, edited by G. Adhikari, was published by the People's Publishing House, New Delhi, in 1970. Also of historical value is Muzaffar Ahmad's *Myself and the Communist Party of India*, Calcutta, National Book Agency, 1970. The best overall historical study of the CPI, however, is still Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, *Communism in India*, Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1959.

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certain states, the CPI(M) retained its dominant position in the strategic state of West Bengal, while the CPI, by entering into electoral pacts with the Congress party, managed to increase its representation in several state legislatures as well as in the Lok Sabha (1971).[13]

In the most recent, March 1972 elections to the state assemblies in most of the states, the fortunes of both Communist parties suffered in varying degrees as the Congress, riding the wave of nationalist sentiment generated by India's victory in the war with Pakistan and the liberation of Bangla Desh, won sweeping majorities nearly everywhere that elections took place.[14] The setback to the CPI(M) was by far the more severe. In West Bengal, where the CPI joined the Congress party in a "democratic front" to fight the "united left front" led by the CPI(M), the Marxist party was reduced to only 14 seats in the state legislature as compared with the 114 it had won in 1971;[15] however, in terms of the popular vote, the party did better than this would seem to indicate, as its candidates polled an aggregate of nearly 28 percent of the total votes cast, or only 5 percent less than in the 1971 election. While the electoral fortunes of the CPI also suffered to some extent, the party nevertheless retains its position as a major partner of the Congress in a coalition government in Kerala, and it has been accorded the status of an influential ally in return for its "qualified" support of Congress-led governments in West Bengal, Bihar and Punjab.[16] Since the elections, moreover, Mrs. Gandhi has included several former CPI leaders in her Council of Ministers, entrusting some of them with strategic portfolios.

Thus, despite the existence of three competing



A CPI (M) election rally in Calcutta in February 1971.

—Piedro Farrini—Gamma.

Communist parties and the setbacks suffered in the March 1972 elections, Indian communism seems to have done better than communism anywhere else in Asia outside the Communist-ruled states. In the Philippines, Malayasia, Thailand and Burma, Communist-led insurgencies have been more or less contained, and in Indonesia the once-mighty PKI has been reduced to almost nothing. In India, however, the Communists, even though divided and still a regional rather than a national element, have nevertheless emerged as a political force second only to the Congress party.[17]

Actual Communist voting strength is obscured by the fact that India's "winner-takes-all" electoral system prevents the mass followings of the CPI and CPI(M) from being accurately reflected in the numbers of seats they capture in the Lok Sabha and the state legislatures.[18] However, election studies confirm that the Communists have the largest number of regular voters next to the Congress party, and that they alone, among the non-Congress groups, have a distinctly heterogeneous and differentiated support base. Although the bulk of their votes come from the working class and the poorer elements of the peasantry, they have managed to gain significant electoral support among the educated middle class and the youth, and even among the well-to-do and

[13] For a detailed account of the electoral fortunes of the CPI and CPI(M) between 1967 and 1971, see the author's *Communism in Indian Politics, op. cit.*, esp. chap. 3.

[14] Mrs. Gandhi's party regained the commanding position that the undivided Congress (which split in 1969) had held in the national and local legislatures from 1947 until 1967. As a result of its success, the Congress party now heads the government in all states except the following: (1) Tamilnadu, where a local party—*Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam*, or DMK— is in power; and (2) Kerala, where the CPI heads a coalition government in which, however, the Congress is the dominant element. In Orissa, the Congress failed to win an obsolute majority but is now in power with the support of a group of former dissidents.

[15] The CPI(M) charged the Congress party with the "wholesale rigging of an entire election" and resolved to boycott the state assembly as well as by-elections.

[16] The Congress party consulted the CPI in its selection of chief ministers for these and certain other states, and in West Bengal the CPI was included in a consultative committee that was set up to lay down policy guidelines for the government and keep watch over their implementation.

[17] This view is supported by Rajni Kothari, who calls it "significant that the two Communist parties have been the most successful [in Indian politics] of all the non-Congress parties." See his *Politics In India*, Delhi, Orient Longman, 1970, p. 15.

[18] Both the CPI and CPI(M) have been pressing for the adoption of a new electoral system providing for proportional representation in the national parliament as well as the state legislatures.

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the rich.[19] They also take second place only to the Congress party in having well-organized and disciplined front bodies at their command to mobilize and politicize urban workers, the middle classes, the peasants, the youth, and women. Even more significant, recent years have seen Communist moves to mobilize the poorer elements of the peasantry, who constitute the bulk of the population, in support of more militant tactical lines ranging from "armed defense against armed attack" (the CPI[M] line) to armed guerrilla insurgency from rural bases (the line of the CPI[M-L] in 1967–69, and of several Maoist groups in Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Bihar, Punjab and Kerala). These developments have imparted a new dimension to Indian politics.[20]

Rival Party Positions of 1964

In undertaking a comparative analysis of the alternative development models offered by the two Indian Communist parties, it may be well to start from a general understanding of how such models come into being. To put it in a nutshell, a Communist party's model of development grows out of the interaction between its theoretical formulations of strategic goals and its actual tactical operations to achieve those goals. In the first instance, there must be a "scientific" analysis and conceptualization of the balance of class forces in the given political universe, and these class forces must be related to those operating on the wider, global scale. There is generally a hierarchy of strategic goals, each one leading to the next higher objective until the final goal of socialism is reached. The model of political development derives from the economic model, which in turn is shaped by class ownership and control of the productive forces. Some Communist development models have been fashioned from actual experience in administering large liberated areas, as in China and Vietnam. Thus, Mao Tse-tung's strategic concept of "New Democracy" grew out of the actual experience of the CCP in fighting Japanese imperialism and administering the liberated base areas. In any case, the actual political experience of a Communist party is of paramount importance in shaping its strategic-tactical lines and therefore its overall model of development.

After the 1964 split, the rival CPI and CPI(M) held almost simultaneous national congresses in Bombay and Calcutta, respectively, and it was at these congresses that the two parties formulated their respective political lines. The following comparative analysis of these lines will be based on the resolutions and documents of the respective congresses, using as far as possible the actual language of the congress formulations.[21]

Class Analysis of the Indian State. In their differing interpretations of the Indian state, the CPI saw the state as the "organ of class rule of the national bourgeoisie as a whole," while the CPI(M) saw it as controlled by the big bourgeoisie in alliance with the big landowners. Both viewed India as overtaken by the crisis of capitalist development, which they saw reflected in the rising cost of living, food scarcity, hoarding and profiteering, corruption among politicians and civil servants, and the increasing misery of the masses.

The CPI, however, took a less negative view of the capitalist crisis than its rival. In the CPI's estimation, capitalist growth in India had strengthened the economic base of nationalism; in other words, India had by and large proceeded on a line of *independent* capitalist growth. According to the CPI(M) interpretation, on the contrary, capitalist development had led to a strengthening of the monopolists, to an increasing penetration of foreign—especially American—capital, and to a growing Indian dependence on foreign imperialist economic aid. For the CPI, the "ushering in of the bourgeois democratic state" constituted "a historic advance" from the former "imperialist-bureaucratic rule over our country." The CPI(M), on the other hand, saw the strategy of capitalist development being followed by the Indian monopolists, with the aid of foreign imperialist capital, as presenting a threat to the country's national independence.

The two parties differed just as sharply in their estimates of the national bourgeoisie and its relation to the landlord class. Picturing the big landowners

[19] *Party System and Election Studies*, Occasional Paper No. 1, Center for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi, Allied Publishers, 1967.

[20] See the author's "Indian Communism and the Peasantry," *Problems of Communism*, No. 1, January–February, 1972, pp. 1–17.

[21] For the CPI, see *Proceedings of the Seventh Congress*, Vols. 1 and 2, Delhi, People's Publishing House, 1965. For the CPI(M), see *Programme of the Communist Party of India*, Calcutta, National Book Agency, 1965; *Fight Against Revisionism*, Calcutta, 1965; and *Statement of Policy*, Calcutta, 1965. See also the CPI weekly *New Age* (New Delhi), Jan. 5 and 12, 1965; and the CPI(M) weekly *People's Democracy* (Calcutta), Nov. 8, 15 and 24, 1964.

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as joint class-owners of the Indian state, the CPI(M) laid the blame for this at the door of the national bourgeoisie, which "compromises with the landlords [and] admits them in the ministries and governmental compositions especially at the state levels," thus enabling them "to hamper the adoption and implementation of laws and measures of land reform and . . . to secure concessions at the cost of the peasantry." The CPI(M) further held that the national bourgeoisie was compromising with imperialism in both domestic and foreign policy. The CPI, on the other hand, took a less monolithic view of the national bourgeoisie, contending that the upper bourgeoisie was becoming more and more differentiated from the rest, and that only the monopolist groups and feudal circles continued to constitute the main anti-democratic and reactionary forces.

Political Strategies. These differing analyses of the balance of class forces resulted in divergent strategies for advancing the revolution in India. As the CPI saw it, before embarking on the socialist road, India must first complete the stage of anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, national democratic revolution. Since, however, this task was beyond the capability of the existing government, what was necessary to begin with was the creation of a national democratic front "bringing together all the patriotic forces of the country: namely, the working class, the entire peasantry including the rich peasants and agricultural laborers, the intelligentsia, and the non-monopolist bourgeoisie." The national democratic state in the hands of the national democratic front would be a transitional stage in which power would be jointly exercised by all classes interested in eradicating imperialist interests, routing the semi-feudal elements, and breaking the power of monopolies. In this class alliance, according to the CPI, leadership would no longer belong exclusively to the bourgeoisie, but neither would exclusive leadership yet be in the hands of the working class, though the latter would "increasingly come to occupy the leading position in the alliance."

The CPI(M), on the other hand, viewed the Indian revolution as presently in an agrarian stage "which is directed not only against the landlords and imperialists but also against the Indian bourgeoisie." The immediate objective was to "replace the present anti-democratic and anti-popular government by a new government of 'people's democracy'," which would be a "coalition of all democratic, anti-feudal, and anti-capitalist forces in the country." Such a government, according to the CPI(M), must be

capable of effectively guaranteeing the rights of the people, of giving land to the peasants gratis, of protecting our national industries against the competition of foreign goods and of ensuring the industriali-



A scene from the 1964 breakaway "Seventh Congress" of the Communist Party of India in Calcutta, where the Communist Party of India (Marxist) was established.

—Wide World Photos.

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zation of the country, of securing a higher standard of living for the working class, of ridding the people of unemployment and thus placing the country on the wide road of progress, cultural development, and independence.

In order to wage the struggle for "people's democracy," the CPI(M) envisaged the construction of a "people's democratic front" composed essentially of the "democratic classes" and the political parties and organizations reflecting these classes. The front was to be built through the staging of mass struggles of the trade union, peasant, and other mass organizations, which would have the objective of heightening the people's political consciousness, exposing "the futility of the capitalist path of development," and placing "the alternative path of people's democratic development . . . clearly . . . before the people, so that more and more they come to accept the program of people's democracy."

To recapitulate the two parties' conflicting interpretations of the current situation and what needed to be done to further the revolution, the CPI recognized the national-bourgeois state of India to constitute a solid achievement toward independence and maintained that the next step should be its conversion into a "national democratic state" through a "national democratic front" *from above.* The CPI(M), on the other hand, considered the state, under the joint control of the big bourgeosie and landlords, to be "anti-people" and aimed at replacing it with a "people's democracy" to be brought about through a "people's democratic front" built *from below* on the basis of mass struggles against the existing ruling forces. Neither party promised socialism in the immediate future, and both assured sections of the bourgeoisie and landlords a secure position in the new society they contemplated. The CPI excluded only the big bourgeoisie—*i.e.,* the monopolists—from its contemplated "national democratic front," whereas both the upper bourgeoisie and big landholders were to be excluded from the CPI(M)'s "people's democratic front."

The Issue of Parliamentarism. There also were differences between the respective parties with regard to the usefulness of working through parliamentary institutions. Taking the basic position that a "national democratic state" could be achieved through parliamentary processes, the CPI argued that the Indian parliament had provided a forum whereby the people could, to a degree, influence the affairs of the state, voice their aspirations for peace, national freedom and democracy, oppose "imperialist conspiracies," and demand social transformations such as land reforms, guarantees of working-class rights, and curbs on monopolies. The party acknowledged, however, that the class tendencies of the bourgeoisie as a whole imposed limitations on the utility of parliament. It saw a growing struggle among the various sections of the national bourgeoisie "to get hold of the parliamentary machine" in order to shape the budget and other economic measures and policies in their own group interests, as well as an attempt by "monopolist groups and feudal circles" to shift parliamentary and government policies to the right and "undermine the parliamentary system . . . by making it an instrument of their narrow class interests." Under these circumstances, the CPI maintained that "the democratic and socialist forces" should back parliamentary democracy and the strengthening, under democratic control, of the state sector of the economy. Thus, the party

defends the parliamentary and democratic institutions and strives to preserve and develop them further, to make democracy full and real for all.

The CPI further recognized that extraparliamentary mass struggles could be an "effective vehicle for influencing and changing the course of parliamentary policies in favor of the masses and against the monopolists." Such struggles, it declared, would mean, in effect, "the defense of democracy and of parliament itself." In essence, then, the CPI elevated the parliamentary way to the level of a full-fledged strategy for advancing the revolution in India.

The CPI(M), on the other hand, saw little if any hope of bringing about fundamental structural changes in Indian society via the parliamentary process. This skepticism, it claimed, was based on the Indian experience itself:

There are a large number of people who think that this government can be replaced by a people's democratic government by utilizing the parliament ushered in by the new Constitution. . . . Even a liberal, let alone the Communist party and other democrats and revolutionaries, would now feel ashamed to maintain that this government and the classes that keep it in power will ever allow us to carry out a fundamental democratic transformation in the country by parliamentary methods alone. Hence, the road

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that will lead us to freedom and peace, land and bread . . . has to be found elsewhere.

Nevertheless, the party considered it useful, on the tactical level, to contest parliamentary as well as state assembly elections, and with this in view it envisaged efforts to forge electoral alliances with socialist and leftist democratic parties, groups, and progressive individuals on the basis of a common program. Without compromising its political principles, the CPI(M) stated, the party must adopt flexible tactics designed to enhance its representation in both the state legislatures and the national parliament. In justification of this line, the party argued that certain limited tactical objectives could be attained if it were successful in gaining control of governments at the state level:

While it will be a dangerous illusion to imagine that a state government formed by the Communist Party together with its allies can transform the economic and political setup in the state, nonetheless the formation of such a government will be of great importance in today's conditions. It can play a positive role. . . . Apart from enabling the solution of a limited number of local problems, its existence and functioning will bring greater morale to the democratic masses everywhere and thus strengthen the democratic movement. It can become a weapon in the hands of the masses in the struggle against the "anti-people" policies of the central government. It will at the same time further intensify the struggle between the forces of progress and reaction inside the ruling party itself.

Peaceful vs. Armed Struggle. On the question of using violence to attain Communist objectives, neither the CPI nor the CPI(M) took a clear-cut and unequivocal position. The CPI did not raise the issue in any of the resolutions and documents adopted at its 1964 Bombay congress, presumably because the party's explicit adherence to the parliamentary road to power ruled out any admission of the deliberate use of violence as a tactical weapon. However, the party's attitude on the subject was clarified to some extent by G. Adhikari in an article published after the congress in the *World Marxist Review*.[22] The CPI, Adhikari wrote, did not set forth the objective of the "immediate" overthrow of the existing government; however, it had to "develop struggle against the government" in order to prevent a reversal of progressive policies and to "isolate and eliminate the reactionary forces." This fight was to be waged on the basis of an alternative, non-capitalist path of Indian development which the party would put across to the people by making maximum use of bourgeois freedoms as well as by conducting mass mobilization struggles. The CPI hoped that the masses, once they were confronted with the dire consequences of capitalist policies and became activized through participation in these struggles, would progressively be brought to vote for the party and its alternative program of national democracy. However, if this did not happen, if capitalism grew stronger and erosion of the progressive policies of the national bourgeois government continued, Adhikari warned, the party might be forced to reconsider its strategy and tactics, including the question of using non-peaceful methods:

Everything would depend on whether the force of peaceful mass struggle, isolating the ruling class, compels them to surrender or whether they hit back with their armed might at one stage or another. The proletariat and its party must never lose sight of this possibility, and it should be prepared for it. Given such a basic preparation, a switchover to non-peaceful methods, when required, should not be difficult.

The CPI(M)'s position on the use of non-peaceful methods, as laid down at the Calcutta congress, was not explicitly different from that set forth by Adhikari for the CPI. It stressed the party's intention to strive for a peaceful transformation of Indian society, but intimated that the "revolutionary forces" must be prepared for any contingency if the ruling classes resisted such change:

The Communist Party of India (Marxist) strives to achieve the establishment of people's democracy and socialist transformation through peaceful means. By developing a powerful mass revolutionary movement, by combining parliamentary and extraparliamentary forms of struggle, the working class and its allies will try their utmost to overcome the resistance of the reactionary forces and to bring about the

[22] G. Adhikari, "The Problem of the Non-Capitalist Path of Development of India and the State of National Democracy," *World Marxist Review* (English-language version of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, Prague), November 1964, pp. 43–48. Basing his article on the Statement of the 1960 Moscow Conference of 81 Communist Parties, Adhikari virtually echoed the formulations of the CPSU on the "national democratic front" and the "state of national democracy," as well as on such other crucial issues as the parliamentary path and peaceful transition to socialism.

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transformation through peaceful means. However, it needs to be borne in mind that the ruling classes never relinquish their power voluntarily. They seek to defy the will of the people and seek to reverse it by lawlessness and violence. It is, therefore, necessary for the revolutionary forces to be vigilant and so orientate their work that they can face up to all circumstances, to all twists and turns in the political life of the country.

One can discern little deviation here from the CPI position. If, however, this affirmation of the Calcutta congress is read in conjunction with the somewhat obscure stand on violence which the unified CPI had adopted in 1951, and which the Calcutta gathering now invoked, the CPI(M) in 1964 would at least seem to have been less sanguine than its rival party about the possibility of a peaceful transformation of India's capitalist-semifeudal society. In citing the 1951 document, the Calcutta congress approvingly described the position taken in it as "Leninist." The document had called upon Indian Communists to cultivate a "Leninist understanding" of the Indian situation and declared that such an understanding would persuade them that the "main question" was not whether the revolution in India would be violent or peaceful or whether or not there should be armed struggle. The document added:

It is the reactionary ruling classes who resort to force and violence against the people and who create the issue of whether our creed is violence or non-violence. Such an issue is an issue of Gandhian ideology, which, in practice, misleads the masses, and is an issue of which we must steer clear. Marxism and history have once and for all decided the question for the party and for the people of every country in the world long ago. All actions of the masses in defense of their interests and to achieve their liberation are sacrosanct. History sanctions all that the people decide to do to clear the debris of decadence and reaction that blocks their path to progress and freedom.[23]

Views of the Ruling Party. The main difference between the two parties' 1964 evaluations of the Indian situation lay in their conflicting perspectives of the ruling party of the national bourgeoisie, the Indian National Congress. Taking a much kindlier view than that of the CPI(M), the CPI acknowledged that the role played by the Congress party under Nehru's leadership had consolidated India's independence and given it a mass base extending "to all classes, including large sections of the working class, peasantry, artisans, intellectuals, and others," and it recognized that the influence of the Congress, though much reduced from what it had been in the days of the freedom struggle, was "still a very important factor in the political life of the country." While pointing to the existence of contradictions within the Congress between the "anti-people" forces dominating the government and the party's mass base, the CPI saw the division between "the masses that follow the Congress party" and the "masses that follow the democratic opposition" as the "most important division in our democratic forces today." To heal this division, the CPI proposed to strive for programmatic cooperation with "progressive" leaders of the Congress mass base.

On the other hand, the CPI(M) rejected the view that the Congress party could any longer be regarded as a progressive force. "Despite the relatively progressive policy declarations of the Congress party, and despite the subjective good intentions of some of its leaders," the CPI(M) declared, "the fact remains that the Congress party as a whole is dominated by reactionary elements, the bulk of whom are in it." The Marxists agreed, however, with the CPI's assessment of the tensions present in the mass base of the ruling party and noted that certain sections of the Congress membership were interested in bringing about "a leftward shift in government policies." The CPI(M) estimated that the bulk of the masses who could be won over to democratic policies and to cooperation in a democratic front were "more or less equally divided" between those who presently followed the Congress party and those who rallied around the non-Communist opposition parties. On the basis of this evaluation, the CPI(M) ruled out any kind of "united front from above" with the Congress party, whereas the CPI had seemingly regarded at least a limited form of such a front as possible.

Toward the right-wing Swatantra and Jan Sangh parties and the smaller parties of the left, the CPI and CPI(M) took almost identical attitudes. Cooperation with the rightist parties was ruled out, but the smaller socialist parties and groups were considered eligible to participate in either the national or the

[23] *Political Resolution* (1951), as reprinted by the CPI(M), Calcutta, 1965, p. 22. CPI(M) leaders have always denied the party's adoption of a line of armed violence or armed struggle. See *Reply from Prison*, Calcutta, CPI(M), 1965; and *Communism in Indian Politics*, *op. cit.*, chaps. 6, 8, 11.

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people's democratic front, as the case might be, even though their leaders were seen as sometimes pursuing reactionary and opportunistic policies.

Foreign and Defense Policies. Disagreement between the two Communist parties was also sharp in their assessments of current Indian foreign and defense policies. The CPI affirmed that the Congress government's foreign policy was "in the main, a policy of peace, nonalignment, and anticolonialism" which "conforms to the interests of the national bourgeoisie, meets the needs of India's economic development, and reflects the sentiments of the mass of people." The party acknowledged that there sometimes were "lapses and compromises," but it declared that "the main character of the policy has been generally preserved." For most of the lapses and compromises, the CPI blamed Peking.

The Marxists, on the other hand, took the position that the "pro-monopolist" and "pro-imperialist" policies of the government were influencing its foreign and defense policies as well. They saw the government as steadily surrendering the rights and prerogatives of an independent India to the advancing interests of the imperialists, particularly of "US imperialism." In the judgment of the CPI(M), the government had gone back substantially on its anti-imperialism and was paying only lip service to nonalignment.

Post-1964 Adjustments

Such, then, were the differing strategic and tactical lines of the two major Indian Communist parties as laid down at their initial post-split national congresses in 1964. Over the intervening eight years, both have generally adhered to the essentials of their 1964 lines while adjusting them to the currents and rapids of Indian politics. The CPI has in the main tried to hew to the strategic-tactical line of the 20th CPSU Congress or, more precisely, the statement of the 1960 Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties. The CPI(M), on the other hand, has differed on major issues with both the Soviet and Chinese Communist Parties; more specifically, during 1967–71, it sought to fashion what it called a "Leninist method of parliamentary politics" and, more important, a non-Chinese way of mobilizing the poorer elements of the peasantry.

The latter initiative, in particular, introduced an entirely new element into Indian politics. The CPI(M), by encouraging poor landless peasants and agricultural workers to seize land "owned" by landlords in excess of the ceilings prescribed by existing land "reform" laws, strove to activize the peasant masses and establish large rural "bases" of party strength.[24] This effort threatened to alter radically the prevailing balance of forces in the countryside, and hence the principal support base of all other political factions, including the Congress party. It consequently brought the CPI(M) into sharp conflict with the ruling party, as well as with the CPI and—even more important—with the newly founded Maoist Communist party, the CPI(M-L).


The conflict reached its greatest intensity in West Bengal and, in its initial stages, principally involved the CPI(M) and the CPI(M-L). The latter, after a brief attempt to organize Chinese-style peasant guerrilla bases in the West Bengal countryside, transferred its activities to the urban complex of greater Calcutta, where it launched urban guerrilla operations directed in large part against the CPI(M)—then dominating a coalition West Bengal government—and individual "class enemies." The often bloody violence caused a general breakdown of law and order in Calcutta as well as other parts of West Bengal and thus provided the central Congress government with enough grounds to oust the coalition government from power in March 1970 and substitute direct "presidential rule."

During 1970–71, when West Bengal was ruled either directly by the central government or by short-lived Congress-led coalitions, the CPI(M) rural bases became the main target of the government's "cleansing operations," which involved the large-scale deployment of Indian Army units and the armed Central Reserve Police. Although in some cases the operations were ostensibly designed to flush out the Maoist peasant guerrilla bases, it was actually the peasant bases of the CPI(M) that bore the brunt of the government drive.[25] The government's action, moreover, won substantial popular support because broad elements of the urban middle classes had become alienated from the CPI(M) as a consequence of government charges, echoed by the

[24] See *Communism in Indian Politics, op. cit.*, chap. 6. Writing in the CPI(M) weekly *People's Democracy* (July 30, 1972), P. Sundarayya stated: "It is only by developing a powerful mass movement culminating in land seizure that we will ultimately get 'the land to the tiller'."

[25] Sunanda K. Dutt-Ray, "Steeplechase in Birbhum," *The Statesman*, Aug. 24, 1971; Dilip Mukherji, "Danger in the Rear," *The Times of India* (Bombay), May 25, 1971. See also the author's "Indian Communism and the Peasantry," *loc. cit. supra.*

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The terrorist Marxist-Leninist faction among India's Communists leaves its message on the wall of a Calcutta factory.

—Sydney Schanberg of *The New York Times*.

mass media as well as by the CPI, laying primary responsibility for the "politics of murder" at the door of the Marxist party. Another factor that strengthened the government's hand was the feeling among the public that the "flushing out" operations were necessary before India could effectively support the Bangla Desh liberation movement in East Pakistan. Thus, the ethos of nationalism once again worked to the serious disadvantage of an Indian Communist party.

These events undoubtedly contributed to the sharp setback that the CPI(M) suffered in the March 1972 elections in West Bengal. Despite its reduction to an insignificant minority of seats in the state assembly, however, the party could take some solace from the fact that—as noted earlier—it had received an aggregate popular vote only five percent below that of March 1971. The bulk of these votes, moreover, came from the rural areas—an indication that the party's new strategy of building strong "rural bases" had not been without effect.

The CPI Perspective Today

In any event, it is clear the CPI and CPI(M) now have very different perspectives of the Indian political system and of the ruling party of the national bourgeoisie. Encouraged by the leftward drift of the Indira Gandhi Congress, by the forging of closer relations with the USSR as exemplified by the August 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship,[26] and by the parallel estrangement between India and the United States, the CPI has become more hopeful of leading the country toward its immediate goal—a "national democratic" state—through tactics of mobilizing "left and democratic" elements both within and outside the ruling party. The CPI(M), on the other hand, appears convinced that India is moving toward "one-party dictatorship", that the ruling classes are already using "semi-fascist" methods to destroy their class enemies, and that nothing short of the replacement of the present government by a government of "people's democracy" can place the country firmly on the road of political and economic development.

In simpler terms, the CPI's political line makes it a partner of the present political system. The party maintains, in accordance with its theory of "national democracy," that the system can be radically transformed *from above* through the agency of parliament in conjunction with the mobilization of mass support for radical policies. It therefore takes an incremental view of development, raising the banner of "rapid social change"—a slogan coined by CPSU leaders to conceptualize the politics of peaceful transition.[27] For the party, each "socialistic" measure taken by the Indian Government represents a step in the direction of its own strategic goal; thus it regards such measures as the nationalization of 14 banks and of general (non-life) insurance companies, abolition of the privileges given to the former Indian princes at the time their principalities were

[26] The CPI and CPI(M) positions with regard to the Indo-Soviet treaty present an interesting contrast. CPI spokesman Bhupesh Gupta, writing in *New Age* (Feb. 13, 1972), referred to "the great Indo-Soviet treaty, which not only makes our freedom safer and security more invincible but also offers comprehensive, expanded opportunity for economic, scientific and technological cooperation between India and the Soviet Union. This gives a new dimension to India's struggle for self-reliance both in political and economic terms. It broadens the road of cooperation with the world socialist system, in which the Soviet Union occupies the pivotal position." On the other hand, writing in the CPI(M) organ *People's Democracy* (Sept. 26, 1971), M. Basavapunnaiah denied that the Indian government's conclusion of the treaty attested to the "non-monopolist" character of the Indian national bourgeoisie. "The Indo-Soviet pact," he wrote, "is not, [and] can never be the touchstone [of] whether the class character of the state in question [i.e., the Indian state] is monopolist or anti-monopolist . . . it would be stupid for one to prove from it [the treaty] that the present Indian state is led by the non-monopolist bourgeoisie."

[27] See, *e.g.*, R. Ulyanovsky, "The 'Third World'—Problems of Socialist Orientation," *Soviet Review* (Moscow), Sept. 28, 1971; V. Tyagunenko, "Paramount Task Before Developing Countries," *Pravda* (Moscow), Dec. 28, 1971; and V. Solodovnikov, "Some Features of the African Countries' Non-Capitalist Development," *Social Science* (Moscow), April–June 1971.

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integrated into the Indian Union, and the constitutional amendment removing from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court certain legislation restricting, or taking over, private property with or without compensation, as concrete fruits of its political line.[28] But the factor which the CPI considers most propitious of all to the realization of its goal of national democracy for India is the Indo-Soviet treaty. It sees the treaty as having "radically altered the balance of forces" within the country and as an instrument which it can effectively utilize to usher the country steadily in the direction of socialism. The party's task is perceived to be the mobilization of leftist and democratic forces so as to maintain sufficient pressure on the government to prevent any "slideback" from its publicly-committed course.[29]

In spite of its disappointment with the results of the 1971 and 1972 elections, in which it had hoped to gain enough parliamentary and state assembly seats to force the ruling Congress to include it in "left coalition" governments, the CPI continues to take an optimistic view of its political prospects—especially in view of the earlier-mentioned concessions made by Mrs. Gandhi and the ruling party after the 1972 elections. These concessions, coupled with the leftward trend in the government's domestic and foreign policies,[30] have enabled the CPI leaders to differentiate between the character of the sweeping majorities the Congress enjoyed in the national and state legislatures before 1967 and that of the equally large majorities won by Mrs. Gandhi's party in 1971 and 1972. A CPI spokesman put it this way:

The truth is that despite the big majorities the Congress won in the two general elections of 1971 and 1972, what we experienced after the general elections of 1957 or 1962, when also Congress won practically all the states and secured a big majority in the Lok Sabha, has not been reproduced. This history here is not repeating itself. The last two general elections [1971 and 1972] have brought in their wake greater positive response to the democratic urges and demands of the people, and this is partially reflected at the policymaking levels too. One should not of course have any illusions about the governments that have come into existence. But at the same time the unprecedented new opportunity for the democratic movement to go forward should also not be overlooked.[31]

Indeed, the CPI has not been remiss in its efforts to take advantage of the favorable popular trends it has discerned since 1971. Already at its Ninth Congress at Cochin in 1971, the party resolved to press on with its political line while placing increased stress on mass mobilization efforts to prevent any retreat by the Congress from "democratic" policies. In 1972 a crisis in the Indian economy presented the party with an opportunity to step up these efforts. An unprecedented rise in prices, coupled with stagnation in industrial output and a sharp shortfall in food production, led to widespread unrest among both the urban and the rural population, especially among unionized labor. The CPI National Council promptly laid the blame for the crisis at the door of "Indian monopoly capital" and its control over basic consumer industries, charging the "monopolists" with deliberate sabotage of production and the consequent creation of an artificial scarcity of essential consumer goods, as well as with "manipulation of speculative activities and of black money."[32] As the Council saw it, the national bourgeoisie was trying to "capitalize on its new prestige and power" in order to bring about a "slideback" in policy, and the government was about to succumb and make important concessions to the monopolies and big landlords. To prevent this from happening, the CPI Council resolved to organize mass struggles in collaboration with other left and democratic forces, including the "progressive" elements in the ruling party. Accordingly, protest demonstrations

[28] Writing in the CPI weekly *New Age*, Nov. 28, 1971, N. K. Krishnan referred to these and other government measures, as well as to the Indo-Soviet treaty, and asked rhetorically whether they could all be regarded as "measures taken by a government 'led by the big bourgeoisie increasingly collaborating with foreign finance capital'."

[29] See "Fight Against Slideback," *ibid.*, Sept. 2, 1972.

[30] In addition to the Indo-Soviet treaty, such recent Indian government actions as the upgrading of diplomatic relations with Hanoi, the adoption of a stiffer anti-US line on the Vietnam war, and recognition of the German Democratic Republic are seen by the CPI as further evidences of the leftward trend in Indian foreign policy.

[31] Bhupesh Gupta, "Masterpiece of Left Opportunism," *New Age*, May 14, 1972. Gupta wrote further: "It is for all to see that the state governments are now far more tangibly under the impact of the left and democratic pressures than at any time in the past . . . The country's political life is certainly not drifting in the direction of dictatorship or semi-fascism . . . The present period is marked by the advance of the broad democratic forces and by the growth of democratic trends on a national scale."

[32] *National Council Resolution*, Supplement to *New Age*, Sept. 3, 1972. ("Black money" is money that circulates alongside the printed currency officially accounted for. The owners use it in various kinds of transactions and pay no income tax on the profits.)

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and rallies were mounted in several states in the autumn of 1972. The CPI also threatened to withdraw its support from the Congress government in the state of Bihar, which was gripped by urban unrest, and thereby forced the local government to make certain concessions.

At the time of writing, the CPI remains convinced that a government "slideback" can be prevented, and the turn toward the left maintained and accelerated. It is therefore pressing forward aggressively with an economic program which calls for the nationalization of 75 "monopoly [*i.e.*, big business] houses" as well as of foreign-owned concerns such as the three American oil companies, the expansion and strengthening of the public sector of the economy, radical agrarian reforms providing for the distribution of land to the landless and tenant farmers, the gradual integration of the Indian economy with those of the socialist countries, severe restrictions on economic relations with the United States and other capitalist countries, and a moratorium on foreign debts.

Current Outlook of the CPI (M)

The CPI(M), on the contrary, rejects the main premise of CPI's strategy, namely, that the Congress party of Indira Gandhi reflects a leftward shift of the balance of social forces in India. In a resolution adopted by the party's Ninth Congress, held at Cochin in 1972,[33] the Marxists insist that the Congress party is still the party of the big bourgeoisie and big landlords, and that the "progressive" measures it has taken since 1969 are deceptive in nature, hollow in content, and actually designed to serve the class interests of the "bourgeois-landlord" state better and more efficiently. For instance, the party claims that the nationalization of banks was, in the main, "intended to centralize banking resources in the hands of the government in the interests of the capitalist class as a whole, without at the same time injuring the interests of the monopolists," and that nationalization, in the hands of the "bourgeois-landlord" government, can never be an effective instrument to control capitalist industry and meet the needs of the common people. In the view of the CPI(M), the ruling party has now secured a virtual "monopoly of power," and its "impatience and intolerance" toward all opposition indicate that it will not surrender that power easily, thus foreshadowing "a likely trend toward one-party dictatorship."



An estimated 50,000 farmers from the environs of Calcutta demonstrate in September 1970 under leadership of the Communist Party of India to protest shortages of land, homes and jobs.

—Keystone.

The Ninth CPI(M) Congress resolution points to the conduct of the 1971–72 elections—particularly the tactics employed by the ruling party in West Bengal—as clear-cut evidence of the Congress leaders' readiness to cast parliamentary democracy aside whenever "it ceases to serve their purpose." As the Marxists see it, the Congress party was able to overwhelm its right-wing adversaries and win big electoral majorities in most of the states by virtue of its adoption of a progressive and socialist "pose." On the other hand, in West Bengal, where it faced a serious challenge from the "united left forces," it did not hesitate to resort to "fraudulent means" and "semi-fascist terror" in order to assure its electoral success. The Marxists therefore contend that what the Congress leaders fear most—and hence the main target of their offensive—is really the "genuinely democratic forces" led by the CPI(M).

However, the CPI(M) does not regard the big Congress majorities in the Lok Sabha and state legislatures as indicative of stability and believes that the ruling party's hold on the masses is actually declining. Moreover, it foresees the inability of the government to resolve India's pressing economic and social problems and the re-eruption of factional squabbles in the Congress leadership. Under these conditions, the party maintains that the main task of the revo-

[33] *Political Resolution*, Ninth CPI(M) Congress, Calcutta, National Book Agency, 1972.

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lutionary movement is to forge the broadest possible unity of left and democratic forces from below by means of patient mass struggle based on a common program responsive to the needs and demands of the people.

The CPI(M)'s interpretation of the "present situation" in India stems mainly from its own political experience of the last several years. The Marxists learned in the course of that period, particularly during 1969–71, that only by politicizing the rural poor could they build up a strong and effective base of support. But they also realized that the party's effort to accomplish this must necessarily arouse intense resistance because the creation of a militant agrarian movement under CPI(M) leadership would unleash a revolutionary force of tremendous power that would drastically alter the balance of political forces and hence undermine the foundations of the existing order. The Marxists further learned from the events in West Bengal that the uneven, localized pattern of the radical peasant movement had made it relatively easy for the government to flush out the party's rural bases in that state, and that the CPI(M) could hardly expect to stage a successful comeback via the parliamentary process unless it could build up sizable support bases in several states—preferably contiguous to each other. Nevertheless, the party appears as yet unprepared to resort to non-parliamentary methods as its main tactical line, although there is apparently a strong minority in the leadership and among the party cadres who are highly skeptical of the relevance of the parliamentary path to the realization of the party's revolutionary goals. The CPI(M) thus finds itself subjected to two contrary pulls—a rightward pull toward adherence to the parliamentary path, and a leftward pull toward a resort to non-parliamentary methods of militant struggle.



A February 1971 election rally of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in a West Bengal village.

—Piedro Farrini—Gamma.

Meanwhile, the party has formulated a new position on the "nationalities question" that completely reverses the Communists' traditional attitude on this issue. The united CPI championed and often stood at the forefront of movements of the various ethnic-linguistic groups to redraw India's state boundaries largely on the basis of language. Thus, the Communists spearheaded the movements for separate states for the Telugus, Maharashtrians, and Gujaratis, and they thereby gained considerable popular support among these groups. However, as soon as a particular movement succeeded in attaining its objective, the Communists found that their supporters deserted them to go over to the party of the national bourgeoisie. In light of this experience, the Ninth Congress of the CPI(M) resolved not to support "bourgeois movements" for linguistic states, on the ground that the real question at issue was "not one oppressor nation dominating, economically and politically, one or several oppressed nations, but a question of the big-bourgeois-landlord classes of different big and small nationalities of the Indian Union holding political power and pursuing the capitalist path of development in collaboration with foreign finance capital." The resolution stated:

What we find is more in the nature of class exploitation and oppression by the big bourgeoisie, landlords, and foreign monopolists rather than political oppression *of the Indian people by the foreign imperialists or the oppression of different Indian nationalities at the hands of one or the other oppressor nations of India. . . . A clear and careful study would reveal that most of the demands raised and voiced by several bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties, though they assume national trappings, are really class demands born out of the class rule and exploitation of the bourgeois-landlord regime and its bankrupt path of capitalist development. While the proletariat and its genuine Communist Party shall have to unequivocally champion the real equality and autonomy of the states in the Indian Union and oppose any and every manifestation of national oppression, it cannot but take serious note of the alarming developments that seriously threaten the unity of the working class and the toiling people of*

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India at the hands of narrow nationalists and chauvinists of the different nationalities.[34]

In line with the party's rejection of the CPI thesis that the present Indian state can be transformed into a state of "national democracy," the Ninth Congress also drew up the outlines of a new Indian constitution embodying the CPI(M)'s own concept of an alternative state of "people's democracy." This document, which in effect represents the party's model for India's political and economic development, calls for the Indian Union to be a federation "based on democratic centralism," with all the states enjoying "real autonomy and equal power." It further provides that the "supreme authority in exercising state power shall be the people's representatives elected on the basis of adult franchise and the principle of proportional representation and subject to recall"; and that elections to parliament, the state assemblies, and local bodies shall all be held on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage and the secret ballot. "Full civil liberties" will be guaranteed, including freedom of conscience, of religious belief and worship, of speech, press, and assembly, of strike and combination, and of movement and choice of occupation"; and all national languages will have an equal status in parliament and the central administration.[35]

[34] *National Question in India*, Calcutta, National Book Agency, 1972.
[35] *Ninth Congress Resolutions*, Calcutta, National Book Agency, 1972.

Should the Marxists ever succeed in setting up their "people's democratic" state in India, it is quite likely that many of these promised constitutional rights and freedoms will be denied to the people in actual practice. The main point of interest here, however, is that neither Indian Communist group articulates a preference for any form of proletarian dictatorship—that both continue to speak in terms of representative institutions. Thus, India's political experience as a parliamentary democracy casts a visible influence on the alternative models of development sketched out by both parties.

The crucial question is whether the Communists can successfully acquire a share in governing power, and ultimately perhaps even capture power entirely, by working mainly through the parliamentary process. For the present, both Communist groups evidently remain convinced that parliamentary institutions can effectively be used to advance their goals, and while there is a growing emphasis on extraparliamentary tactics of mass mobilization, these tactics are primarily intended to radicalize the parliamentary process rather than to replace it with a proletarian dictatorship. If, however, India's Communists should come to feel that they are being denied the gains they can justifiably expect to make via the electoral route, then it is conceivable that they may be tempted to revise their political strategy as well as their basic position with respect to representative institutions.

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Kerala and West Bengal

By Donald S. Zagoria

Over a 20-year period the Communist movement has managed to put down substantial roots in two states of India—Kerala and West Bengal. Data from two recent sets of polls taken by the very reputable, New Delhi-based Indian Institute of Public Opinion provide some illuminating insights and contrasts concerning the character of communism in these areas.

Much has been written about the split in the Indian Communist movement in 1964 and the subsequent emergence of two major contending factions —the "left-wing" Communist Party of India (Marxist), or CPI(M), and the "right-wing" Communist Party of India, or CPI.[1] Over the years these parties have developed dramatically different patterns of strategy, organization and leadership, a subject to be treated in detail in a companion piece by Bhabani Sen Gupta. To add a brief word so as to set the context here, the split in Indian communism has to some degree resulted from factional disputes sparked by the Sino-Soviet rift; but to a much greater extent it has reflected an internal debate that has gone on ever since India achieved independence, centering on differing conceptions of the class character of the dominant Congress party and differing revolutionary strategies which follow from those conceptions. The "left-wing" CPI(M) has consistently viewed the Congress party and government as a tool of the reactionary "bourgeois-landlord" class coalition, while the "right-wing" CPI has viewed the Congress as representing in part, at least, the "progressive" sections of the national bourgeoisie who need to be supported in their struggle against more reactionary groups. In more practical terms, the debate has centered on whether the Indian Communists could better win state power—or at least exercise influence—by cooperating with the "left wing" of the Congress or by seeking to replace the Congress with a coalition of anti-Congress parties.[2] Whatever one's view of these strategic conceptions, the fact is that the CPI(M) has been more successful than the CPI in developing a mass following because it has maintained an identity separate from that of the Congress and because it has, far more than the CPI, grasped the importance of the peasantry as a potential revolutionary force.

This much said and done, the intriguing fact is that the polls in question strongly suggest there are greater differences between the character of communism in Kerala and in West Bengal than there are differences between the followers of the CPI and the CPI(M) in each state. In analyzing the information that has emerged, the author's intention is not to minimize the crucial divergences between the two parties in terms of strategy, organization and leadership, but rather to assert the *greater* importance of long-range factors which have shaped the nature of communism and its appeal in the two states.

[1] A third faction split away from the CPI(M) in 1969 after disavowing electoral politics and embracing a strategy of guerrilla warfare. This group, called the "Naxalites," formed the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), or CPI (M-L). It was rather quickly reduced to insignificance as a political force as a result of a government crackdown on its activities and its own counterproductive tactics.

[2] For a more detailed discussion, see Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Indian Communism and the Peasantry," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1972, as well as his article in this issue. Also see Mohan Ram, *Indian Communism*, New Delhi, Vikas Publications, 1969. For a good history of communism in West Bengal, see Marcus S. Franda, *Radical Politics in West Bengal*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1971; for a history of communism in Kerala, see Robert Hardgrave, "The Origins of the Communist Party in Kerala," in Paul R. Brass and Marcus Franda, *Radical Movements in South Asia*, MIT Press, 1972.

Mr. Zagoria is Professor of Government at Hunter College of the City University of New York. He is now at work on a study of peasant radicalism in Asia.

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Among other things, data from the polls confirm that communism in West Bengal is essentially a middle- and lower-middle-class phenomenon of the towns and cities, while communism in Kerala has succeeded to a much greater extent in establishing a base among the low-caste, low-income groups who actually till the soil.[3] Moreover, the typical Communist voter in Kerala, although a lower-caste peasant, is more politically conscious than the typical middle-class Communist voter in West Bengal.

It has long been recognized among students of Indian communism that the social base of communism in West Bengal differs from the social base of communism in Kerala. In this respect, the writer may simply be reaffirming what is generally known. At the same time, the data available from the polls allow three lines of investigation that to the writer's knowledge have not been pursued before. First, it is now possible to specify fairly precisely the backgrounds of the Communist voters in both states in terms of education, income and occupation. Second, since the polls were taken in 1971 and 1972, it is possible to test the hypothesis advanced by some observers that the Communists in West Bengal, although previously confined largely to the cities and towns, have made big inroads into the countryside as a result of the "land-grab" movement they sanctioned while in power in 1969-70. Third, it is possible to compare the political attitudes of the Communist voters in the two states on a whole spectrum of issues ranging from their attitudes toward the Congress and Indira Gandhi to their views on bringing about social change.

[3] There is a considerable, if not precise, relationship between caste and class in India, particularly in the countryside. About 50 percent of the landless laborers are "untouchables," and the remainder are disproportionately from low-caste groups. Conversely, most of the landowners, particularly the wealthier ones, belong to upper castes. For example, in the villages in the southern part of Kerala (where the writer conducted a first-hand investigation of rural politics in the spring of 1972), the landowners were almost exclusively from the Nair caste, the "dominant" caste in Kerala, and the poor peasants were largely "untouchables" or Christians who had converted to Christianity to escape "untouchable" status. As Barrington Moore, Jr. has suggested, caste has been a convenient tool which the upper classes in the Indian countryside have used to preserve their privileges; it has also been an obstacle to any radical movement seeking to unify the poor peasants on the basis of their low-class status. Unfortunately, only a few anthropologists and political scientists have studied class, as opposed to caste, relations in rural India. This gap has helped to obscure enormous class differences and considerable class exploitation in the countryside and has indirectly helped to provide misleading conclusions about the problem of "modernization." Only quite recently has the Indian government begun to turn serious attention to the need for radical land reform.

The first of the two polls was conducted by the Indian Institute of Public Opinion (hereafter IIPO) prior to the national parliamentary elections of March 1971, the second prior to state assembly elections in March 1972. The polls were run on a state-to-state basis and of course reflected all shades of Indian political opinion. To enable the present writer to undertake this analysis, the IIPO was kind enough to rerun the coded responses so as to single out the samples of those who indicated an advance intention to vote for candidates of one of the two Communist parties in the two sets of elections. The terms "Communist voters" and "Communist following," used throughout this paper, refer to these samples (and do not necessarily denote party membership). The data on Communist voters in West Bengal are taken wherever possible from the 1972 poll since the sample of such voters was considerably greater for that year than in the 1971 poll. The data on Communist voters in Kerala are extracted from the 1971 poll, since assembly elections were not held in Kerala in 1972 and therefore no poll was taken in that state.

A word must be said about the reliability of the samples. Let us consider first the two polls in West Bengal. The total number of respondents to the 1971 poll was 500, of whom 164, or 32.8 percent, indicated an intention to vote for the CPI(M) and 44, or 9 percent, indicated an intention to vote for the CPI. These figures compare with actual shares of 32.4 percent of the March 1971 vote for the CPI(M) and 8.7 percent for the CPI. The closeness of the percentages suggests that the random sample of 500 voters in West Bengal did in fact include a representative proportion of CPI(M) and CPI voters. Since the Communist voters were selected on a random basis, the samples of the CPI(M) and CPI voters also would appear to be representative within the normal statistical limits of their sizes. The total number of respondents to the 1972 poll in West Bengal was 1,000, of whom there were 339 CPI(M) voters and 80 CPI voters. Thus, 33.9 percent of the sample expressed an intention to vote for the CPI(M) and 8 percent for the CPI. These figures compare with actual shares of 27.5 percent of the March 1972 vote for the CPI(M) and 8.4 percent for the CPI. The discrepancy in the case of the CPI(M) may be attributable to what its leaders have called—not without some justification—a "reign of unbridled terror and physical attacks" against CPI(M) candidates and supporters, particularly in areas where the party has traditionally been strong. While this is not the place

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Table 1: Occupational Breakdown of CPI(M) and CPI Voters in West Bengal

	CPI(M) Urban	CPI Urban	CPI(M) Rural	CPI Rural	CPI(M) Total	CPI Total	CPI(M) Percentage	CPI Percentage
Professionals, including salaried and self-employed professionals	4	4	—	—	4	4	1	5
Business and retail traders	23	3	19	2	42	5	12	6
Govt. officials and business executives	12	1	—	—	12	1	4	1
White-collar workers, including clerks, assistants and school teachers	64	11	30	8	94	19	28	25
Skilled workers and foremen	15	4	17	1	32	5	10	5
Unskilled workers and farm laborers	13	3	20	3	33	6	10	8
Owner cultivators	—	—	4	2	4	2	1	2
Non-owner cultivators (sharecroppers and tenants)	—	—	24	4	24	4	7	5
Unemployed	12	6	6	1	18	7	5	9
Housewives	30	8	37	15	67	23	20	29
Students	6	1	2	3	8	4	2	5
Others	—	—	1	—	1	—	—	—
TOTAL	179	41	160	39	339	80	100	100

SOURCE: Indian Institute of Public Opinion poll taken in January–February 1972 on the eve of the State Assembly elections.

to examine charges of election irregularities which are now being investigated in India, the tremendous losses suffered by the CPI(M) in 1972 in constituencies of traditional strength lends credence to its complaints.[4]

The total number of respondents to the 1971 Kerala poll was 350, of whom there were 106 CPI(M) voters and 34 CPI voters. Thus, about 33 percent of those queried said that they intended to vote for the CPI(M), and almost 10 percent of the total indicated that they planned to vote for the CPI. In reality, 22.5 percent of the electorate voted for the CPI(M) in March 1971, and 9.2 percent voted for the CPI. The discrepancy with respect to the percentage of CPI(M) voters could be the result of two basic factors. A number of those polled may ultimately have changed their minds about how they would cast their ballots or did not answer the investigator truthfully, or the situation may have been due to statistical chance. In view both of the random character of the sample and of the commitment involved in expressing a preference for the non-ruling CPI(M), the latter factor would seem the more likely explanation. Such a situation does not, however, undermine the representativeness of the sample of the CPI(M) voters; it merely affords a larger sample of the total. As the Communist voters were picked on a random basis, the samples of the CPI(M) and the CPI appear to be representative within the normal statistic limits of their sizes.[5]

[4] With a sample of 164, the results of the 1971 poll of CPI(M) voters could have differed from those obtained in an investigation of all CPI(M) voters by more than plus or minus 5 percent two times out of ten; with a sample of 44, the outcome of the poll of CPI voters could have differed from that obtained in an investigation of all CPI voters by more than plus or minus 10 percent two times out of ten. The margin for error in the 1971 poll is therefore fairly high.

The margin for error in the 1972 poll is much less, particularly in the case of the CPI(M). With a sample of 339, the results of the poll of CPI(M) voters could have differed from those obtained in an investigation of all CPI(M) voters by more than plus or minus 5 percent only 7 times out of 100; with a sample of 80, the outcome of the poll of CPI voters in 1972 could have differed from that obtained in an investigation of all CPI voters by more than plus or minus 9 percent one time out of ten. For a complete discussion of sampling techniques, and the table on which these and subsequent calculations are based, see E. Terrence Jones, *Conducting Political Research*, New York, Harper and Row, 1971, p. 65.

[5] With a sample of 106, the results of the poll of CPI(M) voters could have differed from those obtained in questioning all CPI(M) voters by more than plus or minus 8 percent one time out of 10; with a sample of 34, the outcome of the poll of CPI voters could have differed from that obtained in querying all CPI voters by more than plus or minus 15 percent one time in 10.

Despite the statistically high margins for error because of the relatively small number of respondents in the polls (though this is less true in the case of the 1972 poll in West Bengal), several factors justify some degree of confidence in the various results. These factors include the very close relationship between the proportion of respondents indicating an intention to vote for the CPI(M) and the CPI and the actual outcome of the elections; the fact that these were random samples; and the fact that all the income groups in the state were more or less well represented in the samples. Moreover, the general findings do not conflict with what is generally known about the social bases of the Communist movement in West Bengal and Kerala.

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Let us turn now to an examination in detail of information yielded by the polls—first, with respect to the bases of Communist support in the two states, and then with respect to the attitudes of the voters.

The Communist Base in West Bengal

The first fact to be noted from Table I is that 55 percent of the CPI(M) voters and 42 percent of the CPI voters in West Bengal are white-collar workers, business and retail traders, skilled workers, professionals, and government officials—*i.e.*, those in the first five categories of the table, listed roughly in order of their respective strength. Together, these groups fall solidly in the urban and rural middle classes. To them must be added a significant portion of voters listing themselves as "housewives," who, it appears likely, are largely from middle-class homes. Thus it seems fair to estimate that about two-thirds of the voters for both the CPI(M) and the CPI in West Bengal come from the urban and rural middle class.

A slight majority of the CPI(M) and CPI voters in West Bengal are from urban areas. Of those who come from rural areas, most are non-cultivators; they are retail traders, white-collar workers, skilled workers or housewives. Only about one-third of the CPI(M)'s rural constituency and about one-fourth of the CPI's rural constituency in West Bengal are cultivators, sharecroppers, farm laborers or rural unemployed.

Table 2: Income of Communist Voters in West Bengal

	CPI		CPI(M)	
Income (Monthly in rupees*)	No.	%	No.	%
Up to 150	22	28	121	35
151 to 300	27	34	84	25
301 to 500	10	12	81	24
501 to 750	8	10	25	7
751 to 1000	—	—	9	3
Above 1000	3	4	3	1
Refused [to report]	10	12	16	5
TOTAL	80	100	339	100

* 1 rupee = $.14 at the official exchange rate.

SOURCE: IIPO 1972 poll.

Table 3: Education of Communist Voters in West Bengal

	CPI		CPI(M)	
Amount of Education	No.	%	No.	%
Illiterate	5	6	52	15
Primary or less	29	36	76	23
Some secondary	15	19	72	21
Secondary completed	17	21	95	28
University degree or some university	14	18	44	13
TOTAL	80	100	339	100

SOURCE: IIPO 1972 poll.

That communism in West Bengal remains largely a middle-class phenomenon can be demonstrated by examining the incomes of the Bengal Communist voters. As Table 2 shows, only 35 percent of the CPI(M) voters, and 28 percent of the CPI voters, come from the lowest income group. Some 49 percent of the CPI(M) voters in West Bengal earn between 151 and 500 rupees a month, or 1,800-6,000 rupees a year, an appreciable income in India. While no detailed analyses have been made of rural or urban income in India as a whole, one recent study concludes that most urban workers earn less than 100 rupees per month and few more than 200.[6] Rural incomes are unquestionably lower.

In terms of education, too, Table 3 shows that the typical West Bengal Communist voter does not come from the lowest rung of society. While the proportion of illiterates is substantially higher than in Kerala (as we shall see), it can nevertheless be seen that 62 percent of the CPI(M) voters and 58 percent of the CPI voters have had more than primary education, and about 40 percent of each party's voters have completed secondary education, have had some university education, or have earned a university degree.

In sum, a preponderant majority of the Communist voters in West Bengal, come from middle- and lower middle-class occupations, from middle-income groups, and from the relatively well-educated. On the basis of poll results, it also seems clear that neither the CPI(M) nor the CPI in West Bengal has yet established a significant following among the

[6] George Rosen, *Democracy and Economic Change in India*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1966, p. 47.

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rural poor—potentially the most revolutionary class in India. This situation contrasts markedly with the social base of the Communist parties in the state of Kerala.

The Kerala Communist Base Compared

Whether examined in terms of rural *vs.* urban support, occupation, income, or education, the social base of both the CPI(M) and the CPI in Kerala is quite different from that of the same parties in West Bengal. First, as Table 4 shows, some 90 percent of the CPI(M) following and some 80 percent of the CPI following in Kerala is rural, compared to about half of the CPI(M) and CPI following in West Bengal (as shown in Table I). Even if we allow for definitional problems as to what constitutes "rural," the data make unmistakably clear that the strength of communism in Kerala is not in the large cities and urban areas, as it is in West Bengal.

The occupational breakdown in Table 4 also shows that 45-47 percent, or close to half, of the total CPI(M) and CPI base in Kerala comes from farm laborers, cultivators (most of whom, we shall see later, own less than three acres), sharecroppers or rural unemployed. Both Communist parties in Kerala also have a sizable base among the rural middle classes—*i.e.,* rural teachers, government servants in rural areas, etc. This contrasts with the largely urban middle-class Communist base in West Bengal.

In terms of income, as Table 5 shows, 59 percent of the CPI voters and 51 percent of the CPI(M) voters in Kerala come from the lowest income groups. This compares to 28 percent of the CPI base and 35 percent of the CPI(M) base in West Bengal. With respect to voters earning more than 301 rupees per month, the CPI in Kerala has only 9 percent of its following in the higher income categories, in contrast to 26 percent of its following in West Bengal. In the same income categories the CPI(M) in Kerala has only 7 percent of its following, in contrast to 35 percent of its following in West Bengal.

In terms of education, too, there is a marked difference between the Communist voters in the two states. The West Bengal Communist electorate has a much higher percentage of illiterate voters, amounting to 15 percent of the CPI(M) and 6 percent of the CPI. In Kerala, illiterate voters represent a virtually insignificant 1 percent of the CPI(M) and a nil percentage of the CPI. By contrast, at the other end of the educational scale, West Bengal Communist voters have completed more higher education than their counterparts in Kerala. Thus, only 4 percent of the CPI voters in Kerala have a university degree or some university schooling, while the equivalent figure in West Bengal is 13 percent. Similarly, only 3 percent of the CPI voters in Kerala have a university education, compared to 18 percent of the CPI voters in West Bengal.

Table 4: Occupational Breakdown of CPI(M) and CPI Voters in Kerala

	CPI(M) Urban	CPI Urban	CPI(M) Rural	CPI Rural	CPI(M) Total	CPI Total	CPI(M) Percentage	CPI Percentage
Professionals, including salaried and self-employed professionals	—	—	5	2	5	2	5	6
Business and retail traders	2	1	13	2	15	3	14	9
Government officials and business executives	—	—	1	—	1	—	1	—
White-collar workers, including clerks, assistants and school teachers	3	—	14	4	17	4	16	12
Skilled workers and foremen	2	2	11	4	13	6	12	17
Unskilled workers and farm laborers	1	1	19	7	20	8	19	23
Owner cultivators	—	—	9	2	9	2	8	6
Non-owner cultivators (share-croppers and tenants)	—	—	2	—	2	—	2	—
Unemployed	1	1	16	5	17	6	16	18
Housewives	2	1	5	2	7	3	7	9
Students	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	11	6	95	28	106	34	100	100

SOURCE: Indian Institute of Public Opinion poll taken in January–February 1971, on the eve of the national parliamentary election.

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Table 5: Income of Communist Voters in Kerala

Income (Monthly in rupees)	CPI		CPI(M)	
	No.	%	No.	%
Up to 150	20	59	54	51
151 to 300	10	29	25	23
301 to 500	3	9	5	5
501 to 750	—	—	1	1
751 to 1000	—	—	1	1
Above 1000	—	—	—	—
Unspecified	1	3	20	19
TOTAL	34	100	106	100

SOURCE: IIPO 1971 poll.

Table 6: Education of Communist Voters in Kerala

Amount of Education	CPI		CPI(M)	
	No.	%	No.	%
Illiterate	—	—	1	1
Primary or less	16	47	45	42
Some secondary	11	32	23	22
Secondary completed	6	18	33	31
University degree or some university	1	3	4	4
TOTAL	34	100	106	100

SOURCE: IIPO 1971 poll.

To sum up thus far, the Kerala Communist voters, as compared to the West Bengal Communist voters, are more overwhelmingly rural, more likely to come from the lowest classes in the countryside who are landless or land-poor, more likely to come from the lowest income groups, but at the same time much more likely to be literate though not highly educated. In other words, communism in Kerala is much more of a mass phenomenon, particularly in the countryside, than communism in West Bengal, which remains top-heavy in terms of the class, caste, and education of its supporters, and which has not established a statewide mass base among the rural poor.

These findings raise an interesting question. Several analysts (including Bhabani Sen Gupta [7]) have suggested that there was the beginning of a breakthrough by the Communists among the rural poor in West Bengal as a result of the "land-grab" movement sanctioned by the CPI(M) when it was in power for several months in 1969-70. It has been alleged that the 1971 elections in West Bengal demonstrated much greater CPI(M) strength in the countryside than did previous elections. Still, of a total 1972 sample of 339 CPI(M) voters in West Bengal, almost half of whom are rural, only a maximum of 54 voters —or 16 percent—are agricultural laborers, poor cultivators, sharecroppers or rural unemployed (see Table 1). It may well be that this 16 percent of the total CPI(M) constituency is larger now than ever before; the writer has not analyzed earlier polls in order to test the proposition. But even allowing for the likelihood that the party has begun to make inroads among the rural poor, one must conclude from the poll data that on a statewide basis the CPI(M) in West Bengal remains overwhelmingly a party with a middle-class following. The same is true of the CPI in West Bengal. What seems likely is that the land-grab movement helped the CPI(M) spread its influence among the rural poor in a few districts where the party was already strong in nearby urban areas—but not in the rural areas of the state in general. This in turn reflects another important difference between communism in Kerala and West Bengal. In Kerala, Communist influence is more evenly spread throughout and within all nine districts of the state. In West Bengal, Communist influence is still very weak and even non-existent in some of the 16 districts of the state, particularly in the north, and it also has an uneven impact in those districts where communism is strong.[8]

[7] Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Indian Communism and the Peasantry," *loc. cit.*

[8] In the nine districts of Kerala, the percent of the vote won by the CPI(M) and CPI combined, averaging returns for the elections of 1957, 1962 and 1967, was: Trivandrum, 38.1; Quilon, 38.1; Kottayam, 36.3; Alleppey, 38.2; Ernakulam, 34.0; Trichur, 38.2; Kozhikode, 19.9; Cannanore, 38.5; Palghat, 46.0. The writer has not incorporated averages since 1967, but the percentage of the Communist vote in each district has remained quite stable ever since 1957. In sum, in eight of nine districts, the combined Communist vote is higher than 30 percent, and in the remaining district it is about 20 percent.

Of 16 districts in West Bengal, the combined average percent of the vote won by the CPI(M) and CPI in 1957, 1962 and 1967 was: Cooch Behar, 13.8; Jaipalguri, 14.2; Darjeeling, 21.1; West Dinjapur, 14.9; Malda, 17.3; Murshidabad, 3.9; Nadia, 20.8; 24 Parganas, 29.7; Calcutta, 34.2; Howrah, 23.6; Hooghly, 27.6; Midnapore, 21.1; Purulia, 5.1; Bankura, 18.7; Burdwan, 50.3; Birbhum, 12.0. Thus, in two districts the Communist vote was 30 percent or higher, in six districts it was between 20 and 30 percent, in six districts it was between 10 and 20 percent, and in two districts it was below 10 percent.

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Table 7: Landholdings of Communist Voters in Kerala and West Bengal

	CPI				CPI(M)			
	W. Bengal		Kerala		W. Bengal		Kerala	
Size of Landholding	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
One acre or below	—	—	3	9	3	2	16	15
Two acres	2	5	1	3	2	1	11	10
Three acres	—	—	1	3	—	—	7	7
Four acres	1	2	—	—	1	1	2	2
Five acres	1	2	—	—	4	2	2	2
Six to ten acres	—	—	2	6	2	1	3	3
11 to 15 acres	1	2	—	—	1	1	—	—
More than 15 acres	1	2	—	—	1	1	—	—
Unspecified	—	—	—	—	5	3	1	1
Nil	38	87	27	79	145	88	64	60
TOTAL	44	100	34	100	164	100	106	100

SOURCE: The data for Kerala are taken from the same sample used elsewhere. The data from West Bengal are taken from the 1971 poll in that state because the 1972 West Bengal poll did not include a question on the size of landholdings. See explanation of samples on pp. 17-18. The "nil" category includes both urban dwellers without land and landless laborers in the countryside.

Another difference between communism in West Bengal and Kerala is revealed in Table 7. The Kerala landholders who support the Communists are mainly those with three acres or less of land; the West Bengal landholders who support the Communists are as likely to have more than five acres as to have less. This suggests that class polarization has gone further in Kerala than in West Bengal, where many relatively large landowners probably continue to support the Communists as a means of exercising pressure on the nationally-dominant Congress party. It can be presumed that support of this sort is more typical of those districts in West Bengal where the Communists have not yet begun to mobilize the poor against the larger owners. Wherever they have commenced to do so—as they have in most of Kerala—it seems unlikely that relatively large owners would continue to support them.

Political Attitudes

Paralleling divergences in the respective social bases of communism in Kerala and West Bengal, the attitudes of Communist voters in the two states also reveal a wide range of differences. On many questions, the Kerala Communist voters repeatedly exhibit a higher degree of "political consciousness" than their counterparts in West Bengal. This fact is underscored by the consistently large number of "don't know" responses from Communist voters in West Bengal to questions on which the Communist parties have clearly articulated views—and on which the Communist voters in Kerala profess sharp preferences which follow party lines. Some examples are given in Tables 8 and 9 (both of which are based on the 1971 poll, as are the remaining tables in this article).

It seems remarkable that 52 percent of the CPI and CPI(M) voters in West Bengal indicated they did not know whether the Old Congress represented the rich or the poor, despite years of anti-Congress propaganda in Communist media stressing that the Old Congress was the tool of big business. An additional 7 or 8 percent of the West Bengal Communist voters said they thought the Old Congress represented all classes or the poor. The overwhelming majority of Kerala Communist voters, on the other hand, had few doubts that the Old Congress represented the rich. It is similarly remarkable that the Communist voters in West Bengal were consistently unable or unwilling to state whether well-known Congress leaders represented the rich, or the poor, or all classes. Morarji Desai, in particular, has been a *bête noire* of Communist propaganda for the past two decades. While a bit of confusion on some lesser known Congress leaders might be understandable, one would scarcely expect a Communist voter to have any doubts at all about the political position of Desai. Yet 36 percent of the CPI voters and 60 percent of the CPI(M) voters in West Bengal indicated they did not know whether Desai represented

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the poor, the rich, or all classes. Altogether more than 50 percent of the CPI(M) voters in West Bengal responded "don't know" to the queries on Mrs. Gandhi, Chavan, Jagjivan Ram, and Desai. By contrast, the highest proportion of "don't know" responses from CPI(M) voters in Kerala on the politics of any of these leaders was 17 percent.

The West Bengal Communist voters were also less willing or able to generalize from their own experiences than the Kerala Communist voters. For example, one question asked how the individual voter would be treated if he had to talk about a problem with a government official. The responses are indicated in Table 10. Besides the larger number of "don't knows" from West Bengal voters, the table shows a greater degree of alienation from government in Kerala than in West Bengal. A large number of Kerala Communist voters were convinced that they would be treated in a hostile way by the government official, while a large percentage of West Bengal Communist voters were convinced that they would be treated politely.

The typical Communist supporter in Kerala appears to be not only more decisive and more alienated from government, but also more loyal to his party, more aware of the importance of voting, and generally more politicized than his counterpart in West Bengal. This is reflected in Tables 11, 12, and 13. Table 11 shows that Communist voters in Kerala are more likely to go to the polls for their party than Communist voters in West Bengal. Loyalty to party is strong in both states but extraordinarily strong in Kerala, where more than 90 percent of CPI and CPI(M) voters think it is important to vote.

Table 12 shows the reaction to a question asking respondents what they felt could be done to prevent the government from taking a decision they regarded as unjust or harmful. Kerala Communist supporters, to a much greater degree than those in West Bengal, thought they could get results by working through a party (meaning, presumably, their own Communist organization). The West Bengal Communist voters chose other ways first, such as working with friends or neighbors or working through *any*

Table 8: Political Opinions of Communist Voters

	CPI				CPI(M)			
	W. Bengal		Kerala		W. Bengal		Kerala	
Questions	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
New Congress represents—								
The poor	6	14	20	59	8	5	11	10
The rich	8	18	2	6	54	33	49	46
All classes	8	18	10	29	21	13	26	25
Don't Know	22	50	2	6	81	49	20	19
TOTAL	44	100	34	100	164	100	106	100
Old Congress represents—								
The poor	1	2	1	3	4	2	1	1
The rich	18	41	30	88	66	40	84	79
All classes	2	5	—	—	9	6	5	5
Don't know	23	52	3	9	85	52	16	15
TOTAL	44	100	34	100	164	100	106	100
Do you agree that, with the split in the Congress, the Government at the Center cannot be stable unless a National Government of like-minded parties is formed?								
Agree	22	50	27	79	58	35	90	85
Disagree	4	9	2	6	10	6	2	2
Can't say	18	41	5	15	96	59	14	13
TOTAL	44	100	34	100	164	100	106	100

SOURCE: IIPO 1971 poll.

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Table 9: Political Opinions of Communist Voters

Question	CPI				CPI(M)			
Which of the following in your opinion apply to these leaders?	W. Bengal No.	%	Kerala No.	%	W. Bengal No.	%	Kerala No.	%
Mrs. Gandhi represents—								
The poor	7	16	25	71	8	5	26	25
The rich	8	18	1	3	41	25	39	37
All classes	13	30	4	12	24	15	29	27
Don't know	16	36	—	—	88	54	8	8
Y. B. Chavan represents—								
The poor	2	5	3	9	3	2	1	1
The rich	11	25	8	24	48	29	49	46
All classes	11	25	4	12	12	7	3	3
Don't know	17	39	5	15	97	59	17	16
Jagjivan Ram represents—								
The poor	4	9	12	35	2	1	13	12
The rich	12	27	2	6	49	30	37	35
All classes	8	18	5	15	11	7	6	6
Don't know	17	39	5	15	96	58	18	17
Morarji Desai represents—								
The poor	1	2	1	3	—	—	—	—
The rich	23	52	25	74	59	36	73	69
All classes	2	5	2	6	3	2	2	2
Don't know	16	36	5	15	98	60	14	13

SOURCE: IIPO 1971 poll. (Percentage columns do not add up to 100 because some people did not answer all questions. There were, incidentally, other questions which the writer has not felt it necessary to list here. These alternatives permitted further identification of the leaders named as "rightist," "leftist," or "centrist," and as "a person of strong convictions" or "an opportunist." Responses to the rightist, leftist, or centrist identification generally paralleled the answers to the alternatives listed in the table.)

organization. The Kerala Communist voters were also much more willing than their West Bengal counterparts to entertain the notion of a demonstration.[9]

Table 13 again attests to the greater alienation as well as politicization of the Kerala Communist voters, as shown in their responses to the question whether people should always obey the laws of the country. In West Bengal, the largest number of voters responded either with an unqualified "yes" or with a "not sure." In Kerala, the most common responses were either "yes, conditionally" or "no, conditionally."

To sum up the findings on attitudes, the Kerala voters for both the CPI and CPI(M) are more militant, more decisive, more hostile to—and alienated from—government, more willing to generalize from their own experience, and more loyal to the Communist cause than their counterparts in West Bengal.

Explanatory Factors

There are several possible explanations for the various findings outlined above. First is the aforementioned higher level of literacy in Kerala than in West Bengal—a literacy, moreover, which is more broadly diffused throughout the electorate.[10] In West Bengal there is a large educated and semi-educated urban class on the one hand, and a large class of

[9] It is worth noting that the only option which received more than 50 percent support from any one of the four groups of Communist voters was the option chosen by the CPI(M) followers in Kerala to work through a political party, presumably meaning their own. This is a good indication of the strong degree of attachment of CPI(M) voters in Kerala to the party organization.

[10] The importance of literacy as a factor increasing the political consciousness of the peasantry is analyzed by the present writer in an article entitled "Landlessness, Literacy and Agrarian Communism in India," *European Journal of Sociology* (Paris, semi-annual journal, published in French, German and English), Vol. 13, No. 2, 1972.

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illiterates on the other. In Kerala, many of the landless laborers are literate and very much aware of the outside world. This high rate of literacy has gone hand in hand with a receptivity to new and alien ideas, both of which phenomena can be attributed in part to Kerala's unusual geography and history. Over a 2,000-year period, the Kerala coast has been subjected to a series of intrusions by sea from the Middle East and from Europe more varied and more numerous than those experienced by any other people in India and perhaps in the whole Far East. The impact of these successive exposures has made the population aware of and receptive to change—a fact that was evident long before the Communists arrived on the scene.

Second, the lower classes in Kerala—particularly the Ezhava caste of agricultural laborers and poor peasants, who provide the largest single element of support for the Kerala Communists—are not only literate but have been oriented toward political struggle throughout most of this century. They were first politicized by Hindu reformers campaigning against caste discrimination in the 1920's and 1930's, and then by the Kerala Communists in the 1940's and 1950's. By contrast, the untouchable landless laborers in West Bengal are mainly illiterate and politically ignorant. There is no large, homogeneous, literate, low-caste group in West Bengal which could serve as the functional equivalent of the Ezhavas in Kerala.[11]

Third, the Ezhava community, in the process of struggling for social and political rights, produced leaders from its own ranks, many of whom were converted to Marxism and went over to the Communists. As a result, the gap between leaders and led is much smaller in Kerala than in West Bengal or indeed in most Asian societies. In West Bengal, the Communists, like most other parties, are headed by Brahmins or upper-caste Hindus from urban backgrounds who have few organic ties to the masses of the people in the countryside. It is true that many upper-caste Brahmins also occupy leading positions in the Kerala Communist movement, but they are more often than not people with close ties to the countryside. In part this is explained by the fact that there is relatively little separation between town and country in Kerala. Some 85 percent of the Keralans are still villagers. Their villages are not, however, concentrated around urban nuclei; rather, there is a broad ribbon of settlement that runs almost continuously for 300 miles up the Kerala coast.

To a significant extent, then, the Kerala Communist leaders speak the language of the peasant masses and have a long history of involvement with them—in this respect more closely resembling the Chinese Communist leadership of the 1930's and 1940's than any other state-level Communist leadership in India. The Kerala leaders were the first Communists in India to attempt to mobilize the landless laborers and poor peasants, starting in the 1940's. Notwithstanding occasional lapses, they have since

[11] For this insight the writer is indebted to Shri Tridib Chaudhuri, a member of the Indian parliament representing the Radical Socialist Party (RSP), which is allied with the CPI(M) in West Bengal and which has pockets of influence in Kerala as well; thus he has first-hand knowledge of the Communist impact in both states.

Table 10: Attitudes toward Governmental Authority

Question	CPI				CPI(M)			
If you had some problem that you had to talk about with a government official, how do you think that you would be treated?	W. Bengal No.	%	Kerala No.	%	W. Bengal No.	%	Kerala No.	%
Politely and with interest for your problem	11	25	5	15	63	38	13	12
Politely—with little or no interest	7	16	1	3	16	10	10	9
No interest	4	9	5	15	11	7	11	10
Rudely, in a hostile way	3	7	7	20	3	2	24	23
It depends	5	11	9	26	7	4	8	8
Politely, if I gave money	6	14	5	15	15	9	34	32
Do not know	8	18	2	6	49	30	6	6
TOTAL	44	100	34	100	164	100	106	100

SOURCE: IIPO 1971 poll.

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Table 11: Attitudes about Voting

Question	CPI				CPI(M)			
So many other people vote in the national elections that it doesn't matter much whether I vote or not.	W. Bengal		Kerala		W. Bengal		Kerala	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Agree	4	9	1	3	13	8	4	4
Depends	6	14	1	3	36	22	5	5
Disagree	34	77	32	94	115	70	97	91
TOTAL	44	100	34	100	164	100	106	100

SOURCE: IIPO 1971 poll.

Table 12: Opinions on Effective Political Activity

Question*	CPI				CPI(M)			
Suppose that some action or policy or law is being considered by the government which you disagree with, because it was unjust or harmful, or something like that. What are the possible things you think you could do about it?	W. Bengal		Kerala		W. Bengal		Kerala	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1. Work with local group of friends and neighbors	15	34	14	41	38	24	32	30
2. Work through a political party	3	7	13	38	19	12	60	57
3. Work through any organization	13	32	9	26	31	19	8	8
4. Work by yourself by writing letters	6	14	2	6	20	12	9	8
5. Work by yourself by talking to the government departments concerned	7	16	1	3	11	7	4	4
6. Take the matter to court	—	—	—	—	2	1	3	3
7. Vote	5	11	—	—	4	2	3	3
8. Do something very strongly such as, march in a demonstration, but not rebel or assassinate	4	9	13	38	20	12	40	38
9. Others	1	2	—	—	2	1	2	2
10. Don't know	5	11	4	12	31	19	8	8
11. Nothing	7	16	2	6	30	18	6	6
BASE	44		34		164		106	

* Multiple answers were allowed.
SOURCE: IIPO 1971 poll.

Table 13: Attitudes toward Law

Question	CPI				CPI(M)			
In your opinion, should people always obey all the laws of the country?	W. Bengal		Kerala		W. Bengal		Kerala	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Yes, unqualified	17	39	5	15	47	29	10	9
Yes, conditionally	8	18	17	50	22	13	44	41
Not sure, it depends	13	30	1	3	63	38	6	6
No, conditionally	5	11	11	32	19	12	41	39
No opinion	1	2	—	—	13	8	5	5
TOTAL	44	100	34	100	164	100	106	100

SOURCE: IIPO 1971 poll.

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paid far more consistent attention to the political importance of rural elements than Communist leaders elsewhere in India. To cite a significant example, only in Kerala have the Communists established a social science research institute one of whose express purposes is to study class configurations in the countryside.

This leads to the fourth, closely related and perhaps most obvious explanation for the greater degree of politicization among the Kerala Communist voters than among the West Bengal voters. Kerala is unique among Indian states in that for the past two decades it has been the scene of more or less continuous struggle for land reform led by the Communists. When the CPI (then representing all factions of the party) first came to power in Kerala in 1957, its leaders introduced agrarian reform legislation that would have set ceilings on holdings, given occupancy rights to tenants and sharecroppers, and confirmed the ownership rights of landless laborers to the huts in which they lived. These and other reforms were delayed after the party was removed from power in 1959, but the fact that the Communists were the first to introduce them greatly increased support for the CPI among the landless and semi-landless after 1957. This was apparent from a sizable increase in the Communist share of the vote in the elections of 1960, when the CPI was only prevented from regaining a share of state power by the formation of a coalition against it. Since then, whether the Communists have been in or out of power, they have continued to agitate for agrarian reform. This has ensured them a substantial, loyal, and growing base among the rural poor of all communities.

By contrast, the West Bengal Communist leadership has been much less oriented toward the countryside, a fact which reflects in part its own social background. As is the case with all political parties in West Bengal, the leadership of the Communist movement comes from the middle and upper-middle classes—the so-called *bhadralok,* who have no real ties with the rural masses. There has been little action on the part of the West Bengal Communist leaders that can compare with the 20-year effort of the Kerala leadership to study socio-economic conditions and class formations in the countryside, to outline a program of land reform, to recruit indigenous leaders from the peasantry, and in general to politicize the rural masses.

* * *

A concluding word about the broader implications of the findings reported here is in order. Elsewhere, the writer has argued that ecological conditions unique to the "hydraulic" societies of Monsoon Asia have led to the formation of a Malthusian landless and semi-landless rural proletariat which has provided the mass base for Communist movements in China, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, and India.[12] There appear, however, to be a variety of factors that can either enhance or inhibit the revolutionary potential of this Malthusian rural proletariat. The evidence accumulated in the foregoing pages suggests the importance of literacy, leadership, and land struggles as factors that enhance the growth of revolutionary attitudes. Despite broadly similar ecological conditions in Kerala and West Bengal, the Communist movement in Kerala has emerged as a more effective and more militant political phenomenon, with much stronger rural roots than its counterpart in West Bengal—or, for that matter, than most other Communist parties in Asia. Clearly, these differences are directly tied to the fact that the rural proletariat in Kerala is literate and politically aware, is led by Communist parties oriented toward the countryside, and has participated in land struggles for more than two decades.

[12] See "The Ecology of Peasant Communism in India," *American Political Science Review* (Menasha, Wis.), Vol. 45, No. 1, March 1971; "Landlessness, Literacy and Agrarian Communism in India," *loc. cit.;* and "The Peasant as a Communist Revolutionary in Asia," paper prepared for the Research Conference on Communist Revolutions, St. Croix, V.I., Jan. 24-28, 1973.

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Sri Lanka's Marxists

By Charles S. Blackton

The Marxist parties of Ceylon—now Sri Lanka—have had a long history of legal participation in parliamentary politics. The advantages of this approach were underscored by Doric de Souza, the Trotskyist Permanent Secretary for Plantation Industries in the Government of Ceylon, in his elated reaction to the convening of the lower house of the island's parliament in July 1970 as a Constituent Assembly: "Paint the lines of a tennis court on the floor of Navarangahala so we'll remember we're legislating a revolution."[1] Indeed, in ensuing months, this Assembly—dominated by the ruling United Front Coalition, which combines the majority Buddhist-based Sri Lanka Freedom Party, Ceylon's two major Marxist parties, and a handful of independents—did contrive a substantial revision of the nation's Constitution and adopted a number of legislative measures which moved the nation closer to socialism under its new name, the Republic of Sri Lanka. While this program of change was being debated, however, the ruling coalition sustained—and only with considerable difficulty suppressed—an armed insurgency of "Marxist-Leninist" youth organized in the *Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna* (People's Liberation Front—JVP). This terrorist insurrection not only aggravated the economic and social problems of the island, but specifically posed a serious challenge to the established Marxist leadership.

The insurgency had its roots in the rising alienation of unemployed Sinhalese, Buddhist-born villagers from the established political groups and from the Westernized leadership of Ceylonese society; in economic inequalities exacerbated by one of the highest birthrates in Asia, which had created an unemployed and frustrated element ranging from university graduates to redundant rural laborers; and in the persistence of the caste system. In an attempt to solve these social and economic problems, successive governments, of both Right and Left, have maintained a welfare state, free education, and an almost free supply of rice. Although such policies have generated perpetual foreign-exchange imbalance and fiscal crisis, no government has dared tamper with them for fear of public rejection at the polls. In this exploitable atmosphere Ceylon's Marxist parties—despite their continued minority status—have been able to exert considerable influence on Ceylonese politics and, in particular, on the thinking of the powerful SLFP. Even the conservative United National Party has come to acknowledge the establishment of "socialism" as one of its permanent objectives.

While the Marxists have thus made significant gains by participating in "bourgeois" politics, both Marxist parties—the Trotskyist Lanka Sama Samajist Party and the Ceylon Communist Party—have experienced periodic internal conflicts over the question of whether to use parliamentary or revolutionary strategies and, in particular, their practice in recent years of making a political alliance with the non-Marxist SLFP. The JVP insurgency has reopened these disputes about Marxist strategy. There is concern among established Marxists that the JVP may,

Professor of History at Colgate University (Hamilton, New York), Mr. Blackton was a Fulbright Lecturer at the Peradeniya campus of the University of Ceylon in 1963-64. His return to this campus in 1971 as a Visiting Research Scholar afforded him a unique opportunity to witness the JVP insurgency at first hand. His studies on Ceylonese and Australian history have appeared in such journals as The Pacific Historical Review, The Journal of Asian Studies, *and* The Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies.

[1] Mr. de Souza confirmed having made this comment during a subsequent (1971) interview with the author in Colombo. The term *Navarangahala* means "new performance auditorium" and refers to the Colombo theater in which the Constituent Assembly met.

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indeed, be speaking the language of the future. If the youth movement should resurface, the Trotskyist and Communist parties must either join in a second repression of the JVP or try to coopt its members—possibly by modifying or abandoning the long-term involvement in parliamentary and coalition politics. While such a move might be the only way for the old-guard Marxists to regain leadership of the revolutionary movement in Sri Lanka, it incurs the risk of alienating the majority of Ceylonese voters and diminishing Marxist hopes for the attainment of ultimate national power. The Marxists' dilemma is further complicated by the fact that while there is wide public support for some of the government's recent socialist legislation redistributing land and incomes, the public is also visibly concerned about the trend toward authoritarianism in recent security measures and press controls, which it tends to identify with influential Marxist ministers in the government. This alarm is particularly evident among leaders of the Buddhist *Sangha*,[2] even though the Buddhism of the majority Sinhalese has been given pride of place in the new Constitution.

The Origins of Ceylonese Marxism

In order to comprehend the acts and dilemmas of the major Marxist parties and movements in the politics of contemporary Sri Lanka, it is necessary first to trace their origins and political profiles.[3] A formal Marxist movement first appeared in Ceylon in 1932, when Colvin R. de Silva formed the Wellawatte Mill Workers' Union. The next year he joined with a number of other Western-educated intellectuals to organize the successful *Surija Mal* (Sunflower) protest, which combined peaceful resistance to the British with popular nationalism. These same groups were mobilized to help malaria victims during the disastrous epidemic of 1934–35. From these organizational beginnings there emerged in December 1935 the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP)—a pluralistic association ranging in ideology from social reformism to communism, but united in its opposition to imperialism.[4]

A decisive split in Ceylonese Marxism occurred five years later—a rift which has never been completely mended despite various subsequent alliances of expediency between the two resulting parties. In that year (1940), the LSSP expelled its Stalinist, Moscow-oriented minority and explicitly declared its own Trotskyist orientation. The expelled Stalinists immediately regrouped as the United Socialist Party, and one of its leaders, M. G. Mendis, organized the Ceylon Trade Union Federation. A series of strikes promoted by this organization led to a crackdown on the USP by the colonial administration in 1942, but the party resurfaced in 1943 as the Ceylon Communist Party (CCP). Unlike the LSSP, whose leaders had been imprisoned and which had been officially proscribed in 1942 for denouncing the Allied war effort against Germany and advocating "revolutionary defeatism," the CCP now embraced the war effort and abjured the use of strikes. It took over the "Anti-Fascist People's Front" in Ceylon and exploited the absence of active LSSP rivals to make some gains among the port and transport workers' unions.

The LSSP reappeared in 1945, only to be hit by several secession movements. First de Silva led away a group calling themselves the Bolshevik-Leninist Party. Dr. N. M. Perera succeeded in wooing them back to the LSSP in 1950, but only at the price of losing another group around Philip Gunawardena, which hoisted the rubric of the Viplavakari (Revolutionary) Lanka Sama Samaja Party (VLSSP). Between 1952 and 1956, the VLSSP formed and then broke a working pact with the Ceylon Communist Party.

While Ceylon's Marxists vainly sought to forge unity amidst endless factional and doctrinal struggles, a new political force emerged on the center stage of opposition to the conservative United Nationalist Party (UNP), which had monopolized power

[2] *Sangha* is a collective term for the Buddhist orders in Ceylon. The largest of the sects is the Siam, which is open only to the dominant Goigama (cultivator) caste. The Amarapura sect is dominated by the important but smaller Salagama, Karava and Durava castes. Members of all castes are accepted by the smallest and newest sect—the Ramanya.

[3] Among the best studies of Marxism in Ceylon are: Robert N. Kearney, "The Communist Parties of Ceylon: Rivalry and Alliance," in Robert A. Scalapino, Ed., *The Communist Revolution in Asia*, 2nd rev. ed., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1969, pp. 391–416; and "The Marxist Parties of Ceylon," in P. Brass and M. Franda, Eds., *Radical Politics in South Asia* (forthcoming); W. Howard Wriggins, *Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1960, chap. 5; Calvin A. Woodward, *Growth of a Party System in Ceylon*, Providence, R.I., Brown University Press, 1969; and Hector Abhayavardhana, "Categories of Left Thinking in Ceylon," *Community* (Colombo), No. 4, 1963, pp. 31–57.

[4] George J. Lerski's *Origins of Trotskyism in Ceylon: A Documentary History of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party, 1935–1942* (Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1968) examines the rise of the largest Marxist party in Ceylon. For a Sama Samajist view, see Leslie Goonewardene, *A Short History of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party*, Colombo, Gunaratna Co., 1961.

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since independence in 1948. This was S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike's Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), which won a massive election victory in 1956. The SLFP proclaimed a Buddhist welfare state and promised land for the peasants, justice for the workers, and "nonalignment" in international affairs—the latter underscored by a demand for withdrawal of British forces from the island. This program attracted the Sinhalese majority of Ceylon by its moderation and emphasis on nationalism and Buddhism, and its social goals also undermined the Marxists.

Toward Political Alliances

The SLFP triumph brought home to the Marxists the marginal character of their own influence on Ceylonese voters of the 1950's and confronted them with the choice of making alliances or no-contest pacts with the SLFP or of fading into the limbo reserved for politicians without live issues. Even prior to the 1956 election, Gunawardena's VLSSP had recognized this logic and had joined with the SLFP and the Sinhalese-language exclusivists of the Bhasa Peramuna to form the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) electoral coalition. For the first time since independence, Marxists were cooperating with non-Marxists, including even the communalist members of the BP, despite the long-standing tradition of opposition to communalism and racism among Ceylon's Marxists. Meanwhile, Dr. Perera and the regular LSSP continued to resist the logic of electorial politics and to remain aloof from the SLFP. However, by the start of the 1960's, the LSSP had accepted the principles of parliamentary governance in Ceylon and, in practice, cooperated with the Bandaranaike program even while still reserving the right to criticize it sharply.

An attempt to merge the political efforts of the LSSP and CCP was made in 1963—in the form of the unsuccessful United Left Front. But another period of dissension and disunity was close at hand. Among the sources of trouble were the left-wing members of both parties, who distrusted the ULF concept and the growing commitment to parliamentarianism. Younger Marxists in particular complained that leaders of the LSSP and the CCP had begun to falter in revolutionary ardor and to sacrifice doctrinal orthodoxy. Behind these ripples of unrest came the shock waves of the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, which washed over Ceylon in 1963. Amid scenes of violence widely publicized in the press, the CCP expelled a pro-China group led by N. S. Shanmugathasan, General Secretary of the Ceylon Trade Union Federation, who promptly formed the Ceylon Communist Party (Peking).

The LSSP experienced its own crisis in 1964 when Dr. Perera finally agreed to enter a coalition with the SLFP government, a step which marked the end of the United Left Front of 1963. In response to this step, purists within the LSSP—led by Edmund Samarakkody and Bala Tampoe (leader of the Ceylon Mercantile Union)—seceded from the party to form the LSSP (Revolutionary). The Fourth (Trotskyist) International recognized this new body and expelled the majority LSSP for its alliance with the "bourgeois" SLFP. (In a further step in 1968, Samarakkody, the "ideological purist" among the old Trotskyists, deserted the LSSP[R] and formed a minute Revolutionary Samasamajist Party.)

The CCP soon followed the LSSP in endorsing parliamentary means for achieving socialist ends, a posture signaled in deeds, if not in words. Shortly before the 1965 elections, the CCP signed a no-contest agreement with the SLFP-LSSP coalition. Although neither Marxist party fared well in the election (won by the UNP), they did survive, whereas the CCP (Peking), the LSSP(R) and other splinter groups failed to gain appreciable electoral support, forfeited their election deposits, and failed to reappear in the 1970 elections.[5]

During the 1960's the LSSP and CCP had some success in expanding their bases of support among university students, intellectuals and workers. Party leaders adopted a benign attitude towards Buddhism, and even attended religious festivals. Members of Buddhist groups were encouraged to visit Buddhist centers in the Soviet Union in an attempt to assuage Buddhist suspicion of Ceylon's Marxists.

While thus improving their public image, the LSSP and CCP moved toward an ever closer alliance with the powerful SLFP, now led by the widow of S.W R.D. Bandaranaike (who had been assassinated in 1959). The Marxists justified this tactic by pointing to the presence of "leftward-moving progressive elements" within the SLFP. Indeed, a secession of right-wing members from the latter party in 1965 did open the way for a number of ex-Marxists to

[5] It is interesting to note that in April 1972, while Shanmugathasan was on a visit to Albania, elements within the CCP (Peking), led by Watson Fernando, endorsed the United Front coalition. See *The Times of Ceylon* (Colombo), April 24, July 10 and 18, 1972.

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Members of the Kandy branch of the Ceylon Communist Party (identified in Sinhalese and Tamil on their banners) demonstrate on behalf of the United Front coalition government in Kandy in late March 1971—the last Marxist rally there before the insurgency of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna.

—Photo by Charles S. Blackton.

emerge as spokesmen and candidates of the party. The SLFP began to display a stronger commitment to socialism—evidenced by the frequent substitution of Marxian phrases for the lucid Oxfordian terms in which S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike had expressed the original political rationale for the party's existence. This progressive "radicalization" of the SLFP paved the way for the formal entry of the CCP into the SLFP-LSSP coalition, and in early 1967 Mrs. Bandaranaike, leader of Ceylon's Opposition, announced formation of a United Front comprising the SLFP, the LSSP and the CCP. Although the United Front experienced a serious internal rift in 1968, when the LSSP and SLFP clashed with the Moscow-oriented CCP over the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the coalition survived the crisis and was able to score a landslide victory in the May 27, 1970, general election.[6]

While the two major Marxist parties—the LSSP and the CCP—were moving closer to political cooperation with the SLFP in the second half of the 1960's, more radical elements despaired of the leadership of the two organizations and turned toward secret anti-establishmentarianism. Frustrated leftists attacked "imperialist enemies," the sins of the established Marxist leaders, and the slow pace of Ceylon's advance toward socialism in discussions among rural and middle-class youth at the universities and in study groups. It is likely that such disaffected elements were instrumental in bringing about the decision of impatient radical students to organize the JVP.[7] This movement apparently grew out of a branch of the CCP (Peking) after the secession of the Premala Kumarasiri group in the mid-1960's had permitted the elevation of young Communists to leadership of the pro-Peking party. One such leader, Patabendige Don Nandasiri Wijeweera—alias Rohana Wijeweera—an ex-student of Moscow's Lumumba University, advanced a plan for quick seizure of the government by force. This scheme was opposed by the professed Maoist, Wimal Ranasinghe, who advocated careful, long-range planning for a mass-based revolution. The dispute led to Wijeweera's expulsion from the CCP (Peking) and caused him to set up a new group allied with the followers of "Castro" Dharmasekera, which aimed at implementing a lightning "one-day revolution" to win power in Ceylon. The Senanayake (UNP) Government imprisoned Wijeweera as a security threat in the late 1960's but later released him in response to heavy pressure from the major Marxist parties. Wijeweera resumed his planning and reportedly intended to launch an uprising in April 1970 against the conservative UNP Government. His propaganda, aimed at an audience of rural Sinhalese, stressed the case against the Goigama caste, the Tamils, the Christians, the rich, and the privileged. However, weakened by the defection of Dharmasekera's group and faced with imminent general elections, Wijeweera evidently cancelled the attack order.

Although some members of the JVP advocated a vote for the UNP with the aim of increasing "corruption" and thereby generating an ideal climate for revolution, the majority (headed by men of Wijeweera's Karava caste) lent strong support to the 1970 election campaign of the United Front coali-

[6] This election brought the political demise of Philip Gunawardena, whose VLSSP had broken with the SLFP in 1959 and more recently had renounced Marxist principles in order to ally with the UNP on Buddhist communalist grounds.

[7] For materials on the origins of the JVP movement, see testimony before the Criminal Justice Commission, as reported in *The Times of Ceylon* from July to September 1972. See also Politicus, "The April Revolt in Ceylon," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley), March 1972, pp. 259–74, for an interesting report from the CCP viewpoint. The author's own on-the-scene evaluations, "The Ceylon Insurgency, 1971," from which some material (in revised form) has been incorporated in the present article, appeared in the July-August 1971 issue of *Australia's Neighbours*, published by the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Melbourne.

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tion. However, Wijeweera warned the UF that it had better produce real socialism in a year, or the JVP would do so by direct action. When the coalition's decisive election victory was confirmed on May 28, mobs (including many young activists) provided a preview of things to come in the form of violent and threatening victory demonstrations.[8]

Before examining the role of the LSSP and CCP in the coalition governments of Mrs. Bandaranaike and discussing the dramatic insurrection raised by the JVP in 1971, it would perhaps be useful to provide brief contemporary profiles of the three Marxist movements.

The LSSP: A Profile

The Lanka Sama Samaja Party is the oldest and strongest Marxist group in Sri Lanka. Although traditionally a small, elite party led by a formidable corps of dedicated and learned socialists noted for parliamentary wit and verve, the LSSP has seen its membership swell to over 4,000 since the 1970 victory of the United Front. Consistently the best-loved party among Ceylon intellectuals, the LSSP has until recently been the choice of activist university undergraduates as well.

It would be hard to find in any parliamentary society a party distinguished by more acute, articulate leaders than the LSSP.[9] As a group they are Low Country Sinhalese, from middle-class origins, and usually of Buddhist stock. Some of the founding members were trained in Harold Laski's famous seminar at the London School of Economics. In spite of recently acquired wealth, they retain links with the Sinhalese-speaking masses and enjoy a reputation for political integrity and—as elected officials—for devotion to their constituents. Three of the present leaders hold key posts in the United Front Cabinet—Dr. N. M. Perera is Finance Minister, Colvin R. de Silva holds the portfolios of Plantation Industries and Constitutional Affairs, and Leslie Goonewardene is Minister of Communications. They are familiarly known as "N. M.," "Colvin," and "Leslie" by UF and non-UF voters alike.





Leaders of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party prominent in the United Front coalition government of Sri Lanka: left, Dr. N. M. Perera, Minister of Finance; and right, Colvin R. de Silva, who—as Minister of Constitutional Affairs—drafted the Constitution of Sri Lanka promulgated on May 22, 1972.

—Photos by UPI and Charles S. Blackton.

Although the future of democracy in Sri Lanka may now hang in the balance, its survival for 25 years must in part be credited to the moderate wing of the LSSP. The spectrum of LSSP ideas extends from Marxism-Leninism at one extreme to a form of humanistic socialism or social reformism with strong elements of democracy and individualism at the other. The party's staunch anticolonialism links it to the Buddhist revival and the nationalism of Anagarika Dharmapala.[10] The LSSP remains basically Marxist, but it has adjusted its ideology to permit working with the non-Marxist majority in Ceylon. Hence, Dr. Perera has persistently advocated the expansion of socialism, usually through nonviolent methods. The goals have included the nationalization of plantations and of some industries, the establishment of collectives for peasant proprietors and of state collective farms, and the setting of ceilings on incomes and limits on landholdings. In the recent past, the LSSP has promised that if it gained control of the government it would guarantee the political rights of other parties and would yield office if legally voted out.

The continued existence of a wide range of political views within the LSSP has been fostered by

[8] Lake House, the office of the Associated Newspapers of Ceylon, Ltd., was sacked by young—possibly JVP— supporters and members of the United Front coalition parties. The JVP may have played a more significant role in marches of militant students, faculty and coalitionists in Kandy, during which the militants, in Red Guard style, harassed middle-class persons.

[9] See, for example, the Goonewardene book cited in fn. 5 above.

[10] The Anagarika (devotee) Dharmapala, born in 1864 as David Hewavitarane, wealthy and Western-educated, was an active promoter of Buddhism, Sinhalese nationalism, temperance, and anti-imperialism. The beliefs of this hero of modern Ceylon are stridently set forth in his book, *Return to Righteousness*, Colombo, Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs, 1965.

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democratic procedures whch have always allowed members a voice in party decisions. However, this lack of doctrinal rigidity has not preserved the LSSP from factionalism, which has emerged on both personal and doctrinal grounds. The moderate views of some members from academic and cultural circles tend to clash with the more doctrinaire Marxist attitudes of worker-members. As a consequence, the party has normally consisted of a majority of moderates employing democratic means to attain revolutionary objectives, and a smaller and more revolutionary wing, the extreme tip of which breaks away every few years.

The Sama Samajists hold only 19 seats in the 157-member National State Assembly of Sri Lanka, but as indicated, they hold three strategic cabinet posts. In the 1970 elections, they received 433,224 votes (8.8 percent of the total popular vote). The support was largely centered in the Low Country Sinhalese, Buddhist districts in urban coastal areas from Colombo to Galle, where there are concentrations of the important Karava, Salagama and Durava minority castes. They hold another pocket of strength east of Colombo running from the interior of Western Province to the western slopes of the mountains of Sarbaragumuwa Province. In this region the voters, predominantly members of the majority Goigama caste, appear to vote LSSP more on the public service records of N. M. Perera and others than because of Marxist affiliation.

Typically, the Sama Samajist power base is urban—in the trade unions,[11] among lower governmental officials, intellectuals, and students. This spotlights the party's special problem, an inability to win village and up-country votes. Support from the Tamils of the north—based on the LSSP's anti-communalist position—vanished when the LSSP yielded to political expediency and started to support the "Sinhalese Language Only" policy. The LSSP has found little support in the Sinhalese Christian belt north of Colombo or among Muslims (Moors or Malays). All these groups have tended to vote UNP, and when they shift, as many did in 1970, they vote for the non-Marxist SLFP.

Public service trade unionists of the Government Workers' Trade Union Federation and the Government Clerical Service Union are strongly Trotskyist, but the party's principal worker base lies in Dr. Perera's Ceylon Federation of Labor, among the port and transport men, and—at times—in Bala Tampoe's Ceylon Mercantile Union. The LSSP Young League has usually been highly active, and the party is backed by papers such as *The Nation.* Although the journal *Young Socialist* expressed the views of left-wing Sama Samajists for a time (1964–67), it has since supported the moderate majority of the LSSP.

[11] See Robert N. Kearney, *Trade Unions and Politics in Ceylon*, Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1971.

The CCP: A Profile

Turning to the Ceylon Communist Party, one finds a number of inconsistencies: the existence of a parliamentary and a revolutionary wing, the championing of civil rights in recent debates and the issuance of rabble-rousing slogans in party manifestos. For nearly a decade, the CCP has had a working pact with the SLFP, an admission of the fact that it cannot achieve power in Ceylon on its own.

Discipline is a distinctive characteristic of the CCP. Its Politburo rules over an obedient, pro-Soviet membership. Unlike the LSSP, the CCP is dominated by only three leading personalities, perennially in charge of party affairs. The CCP President, Dr. S. A. Wickremasinghe, is from a traditionally important family in Akuressa and brings his party the support of a voter bloc in far southern Ceylon. Pieter Keuneman, until a few months ago the General Secretary of the CCP and one of the few remaining Dutch





Leaders of the radical and moderate wings, respectively, of the Ceylon Communist Party: left, Sugiswara A. Wickremasinghe, Secretary General of the CCP since September 1972; and right, Pieter Keuneman, former Secretary General.

—Photos by Pan Asia and from *Horizont* (East Berlin), No. 23, June 1969.

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burghers in Ceylonese politics, contributes an elegance of figure and speech which recalls his distinguished career at Cambridge. As head of the Ceylon Trade Union Federation, M. G. Mendis brings in a substantial worker vote.

Although the CCP often adheres to the line of the Soviet Communist Party, it is, like the LSSP, essentially Ceylon-oriented, and few believe that it wishes to introduce a strong Soviet influence into Ceylon. Party goals include nationalization of all means of production, revolutionization of all trade unions and of the working class in general, and achievement of prosperity through meeting the needs of workers and peasants and thereby encouraging greater productivity.

In 1970, the CCP reached its highest popular vote (169,229) and placed six delegates in the House of Representatives (now the Sri Lanka National Assembly). Like the LSSP, the CCP has its main power base in the Low Country Sinhalese areas of the south. The 1970 vote reflected the tendency of both Marxists and traditionalists to back a "big man" from the local elite. Thus, there is a Colombo stronghold sustained by Mendis' workers and the Keuneman charisma. In addition to a substantial base of support among the workers, the party enjoys the suport of intellectuals, students and members of the urban middle class, although the Communists periodically seem embarrassed by the presence of such white-collar elements in their "proletarian" party. CCP attacks on "feudal landlordism" have not gained up-country support except among some estate workers, but the party's calls for public takeover of banks and large estates and the import-export trade have evoked some enthusiasm in coastal areas.[12] Tamil, Muslim and Sinhalese Christian voters are highly resistant to the CCP, and Buddhist Sinhalese focus their anti-Marxism on the Communists rather than on the LSSP.

The major channels of CCP recruitment are the Federation of Communist and Progressive Youth Leagues and, especially, the Ceylon Trade Union Federation. These bodies have constituted a force not only against right-wing coups, as in 1962, but also against the left-extremist uprising in 1971, in effect keeping the CCP on the side of law and order in Sri Lanka. Among Communist publications is the paper *Aththa* (Truth).

Both the LSSP and the CCP have tended to discount the revolutionary potential of rural Ceylon and therefore to ignore the progressive radicalization of unemployed rural graduates of the nation's universities which became manifest with the emergence of the JVP. From 1962 on, Marxists on the campuses have succeeded in staging increasingly violent annual student strikes, and those most receptive to this radical rhetoric have been students from rural areas who chose to take their studies in the so-called "Sinhala stream"—*i.e.*, in the Sinhalese language.[13] These young villagers, brought to the overcrowded universities in the early 1960's by the egalitarian SLFP Government, found that their degrees did not assure them employment because access to job security was largely reserved for youths from three influential Sinhalese castes or from Ceylon's Tamils, wealthy Muslims, and Dutch burghers. They therefore were receptive to Marxist denunciation of class exploitation and of bourgeois economics, but they came to regard the spokesmen of the major Marxist parties as mere rhetorical radicals and "cocktail Communists" who were drifting gradually toward social democratic positions.

The JVP rapidly took root in such fertile ground, particularly at the University of Ceylon's campus at Peradeniya and at Vidyodaya University during 1970. According to the subsequent testimony of a state's-evidence witness—the *Bhikkhu* Minipe Sobitha—both secular and religious undergraduate groups recruited for the JVP. Among the former were the All-Universities Undergraduate Movement (*Ekabadda Bala Mandalaya),* the Ceylon National Union of Students—later expelled from the CCP because of its JVP leanings—and the student-body officers of Vidyodaya, led, according to Sobitha, by the JVP's second-in-command, Mahinda Wijesekera. Student-*bhikkhu* bodies, such as the *Samajawada Sangamaya* and the *Deshapremi Bhikkhu Peramuna,* gave money, provided cover for JVP fugitives by reopening and manning abandoned temples as insurgent hideouts, and spread the word about the National Liberation Front program.[14] As noted above,

[12] See R. N. Kearney, "The Marxist Parties of Ceylon," *loc. cit. supra.*

[13] Courses at the University are offered in three "language streams"—Sinhalese, Tamil and English. Registration in the English "stream" fell off sharply by 1963–64, largely because of the heavy influx of rural students opting for Sinhalese. The author recalls that students from the rural areas never appeared comfortable on University campuses and moved in nervous groups which rarely mingled with the socially assured youths from Westernized elite backgrounds. The radicalization of the rural students is discussed in the testimony before the Criminal Justice Commission (see fn. 7).

[14] Reported in *The Times of Ceylon,* Aug. 17–18, 21, 23, and Sept. 5 and 9, 1972.

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the JVP's power among the educated youth of Ceylon was apparently demonstrated in the 1970 elections, in which newly-enfranchised 18-year-olds helped to give a landslide victory to the United Front coalition.

A United Front Government

As a result of the General Election, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike became Prime Minister of Ceylon in June 1970 at the head of a "broad-based government" which contained an unusually wide representation of the nation's castes, in addition to representatives of Muslim, Tamil, Catholic, and Protestant Christian elements. As noted previously, some very important posts went to Marxist members of the coalition. The United Front's election Manifesto had promised to take Ceylon out of the British Commonwealth, to establish a socialist state featuring mass popular participation in political action, to readjust foreign policy to identify closely with the socialist countries, to carry out extensive nationalization and expand the public sector of the economy, and to end inequality in incomes and landholdings. There was a general expectation that the left-of-center government would apply methods of social democracy in achieving these ends.[15]

Although the transfer of power to the coalition was peaceful like the four previous post-independence changes of government, the outbreak of violent post-election demonstrations indicated a potential for disruptive action from the left. However, the Ceylonese could find reassurance in the presence of many factors supporting the continuation of the rule of law in Ceylon. As noted by legal expert Dr. L. J. M. Cooray, these include: 1) the absence of a revolutionary tradition and the existence of a large educated elite versed in British parliamentary traditions; 2) the presence of a superior civil service, one of the most literate electorates in Asia, and free education; 3) the common cultural background of the leaders of all parties; 4) acceptance of the spirit of constitutionalism by leaders of the left; and 5) the obedience and unobtrusiveness of the numerically small armed forces.[16] In addition, a Public Security Ordinance invested the government with crisis powers which presumably could be used to assure survival of the British-type Constitution.[17]

Although committed to constitutionalism, the new government did move to effect major constitutional changes. This effort was centered in the person of Colvin R. de Silva, who served as Minister of Constitutional Affairs in the new government. In this capacity, the LSSP leader attacked many aspects of the existing constitutional order—"entrenched" legislation benefiting certain favored minorities, the practice of judicial review which negated the will of the legislature, obstruction of the popular will by Ceylon's Senate, the overrepresentation of conservative rural voters in electoral districts, and an outdated administrative system.[18] While the public was debating these issues in the fall of 1970, however, a much more ominous political development began to loom on the horizon. This was the rapidly growing strength of the JVP, with its call for revolutionary violence as the answer to footdragging by the government in the pursuit of socialism.

Shortages of food, the government's altered perception of issues once it was in power, and the need to convince and mollify the large non-Marxist majority had, in fact, slowed the progress of the United Front program, and thus spurred the JVP's inclination toward violent revolution. Despite reports of numerous JVP meetings of a seditious and insurrectionary nature, the public continued to hope that the "impossible"—armed insurgency—would not occur. Although Wijeweera denied it as late as February 1971, it now appears that the JVP had indeed decided in late 1970 to overthrow the government, to execute all officials and police, to capture or assassinate the Prime Minister, and to seize control of all administrative posts. Some conspirators allegedly advocated killing all persons over 45 to ease overpopulation and unemployment. The great tea estates were to be uprooted and planted with yam or manioc to symbolize the end of "feudalism," colonialism, and European "history" in Ceylon.[19]

[15] For an analysis of the United Front coalition and its program, see A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, "Ceylon, a New Government Takes Office, *Asian Survey*, February 1971, pp. 179–80.

[16] See Cooray's "Constitutional Government in Ceylon," *The Ceylon Daily News* (Colombo), Sept. 5, 1970.

[17] *Ibid.*, Sept. 4, 1970.

[18] A. J. Wilson, *op. cit.* De Silva and fellow Bolshevik Leninists picketed the 1948 independence ceremonies (presided over by the Duke of Gloucester) and shouted the slogan: "A Drunken Duke and a Fake Independence."

[19] See the Report to the Criminal Justice Commission by Inspector General of Police Stanley Senanayake, quoted in *The Times of Ceylon*, June 12, 1972. The hearings of the Commission revealed various other details of the insurgents' plans, training and objectives. They also connected Wijeweera with N. Shanmugathasan, then head of the CCP (Peking), although they did not implicate the latter group in the uprising of April 5, 1971. See *ibid.*, June 14; July 17, 18, 21, 23; Sept. 5 and 9, 1972.

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A striking aspect of JVP activities in late 1970 and early 1971 was the enticing of groups of 5–25 youths in the age-range from 16 to 20 to JVP mountain or jungle hideouts, where masked teams of activists presented a series of indoctrinational lectures.[20] Speaking on the topics of freedom, the economic crisis, the left movement in Ceylon, Indian expansionism, and the armed seizure of power, the lecturers appealed to the youths to renounce parental and Buddhist authority and join the JVP. Intimidation was used to silence doubters, and the meetings succeeded in recruiting thousands into cells, where they were instructed in the use of weapons, karate, and guerrilla tactics. Shotguns and homemade bombs were to be the main weapons of the insurgents. The movement simultaneously stepped up its efforts to infiltrate the ranks of younger college and school teachers and public service officials.

Although the government knew about the meetings and at least one police report labeled the JVP as seditious, there was a reluctance to recognize the writing on the wall. In November 1970 the UF government finally authorized arrests of some JVP members under the extended powers of the Public Security Ordinance.[21] Members of the Cabinet alternately warned and chided the JVP, and they even dropped unofficial hints that the movement was backed by capitalists, the UNP, and even the American CIA—all in an attempt to discredit the JVP. More and more citizens grew alarmed at the activities of the insurrectionaries, or "Che Guevarists" as they were described, and fears were expressed that "something is going on; something is going to happen."

On February 11, 1971, the Prime Minister ordered an armed forces alert. In early March some Army units were deployed, and police held an all-island alert. An explosion at Esalamulla, which killed several young bomb-makers, underscored police warnings of an arms buildup. A "Maoist" group of some 200 attacked the US Embassy in a move calculated more to embarrass the government than to attack the United States.[22] On March 12, the government arrested Wijeweera at Amparai. An explosion at Marrs Hall on the University of Ceylon's Peradeniya campus (near Kandy) forced the government to end its ban on police searches of the University and resulted in the discovery of stockpiles of explosives in several dormitories, previously kept secret by intimidation of students and faculty.[23] With such evidence of widespread subversion, the government rounded up known JVP leaders and prescribed the death penalty for offenses against life or public property.

The JVP Insurgency

However, these actions came too late. As later investigation revealed, the JVP originally planned to rise in rebellion on April 14, 1971 (when the country would be deeply involved in the travel and celebrations of the Sinhalese New Year), but they initiated action early, on April 5, presumably because of defections or information leaks. Within several days, some 90 police stations and substations were attacked by the insurrectionaries (some in uniforms). The police held on where they could, principally in the larger towns such as Polonnaruwa. The Army, shore parties of Navy bluejackets, reserve and volunteer units were ordered into action, but at first even they could barely contain the armed thrusts of the "terrorists." The Prime Minister gave the staff of the Embassy of North Korea (which country had reportedly encouraged the JVP guerrillas) 48 hours to leave Ceylon and called upon the world community for help.[24]

Exploiting their initiative, JVP fighters destroyed communications between Colombo and most provincial areas, wrecked rail lines, and cut telegraph wires. Road traffic was blocked by the wholesale felling of trees and the damaging of bridges (the JVP proved incapable of destroying them). Major efforts were concentrated, at the outset, on attempts

[20] It was reported in the spring of 1971 that these sessions were advertised by a code transmitted throughout Ceylon via the nightly obituary notices on the Ceylon Broadcasting Corporation program. See the reference to this report in *The New Statesman* (London), Oct. 8, 1971, p. 468.

[21] This was reported in a very useful summary of events published in *The Daily Mirror* (Colombo), May 27, 1971.

[22] This was indicated by the fact that while two old cars in front of the Embassy were burned, several newer ones went untouched. On the other hand, the stabbing to death of an off-duty Sinhalese police officer who attempted to restore order indicated the demonstrators' aim of violent confrontation with the government.

[23] The author was on the Peradeniya campus when the Marrs Hall explosion and subsequent police takeover occurred. By this time, according to *The Ceylon Daily News* of May 17, there had already been over 30 arrests for illegal possession of weapons in various parts of Ceylon.


[24] According to Politicus (*loc. cit. supra*), Mrs. Bandaranaike had advised the Embassy of North Korea prior to the outbreak of insurgency that certain of the Embassy's acts were giving encouragement to terrorists and that it should desist from such activity. *The Times of Ceylon* reported on July 11, 1972, that the Sri Lanka Ministry of External Affairs had rejected a request by the Government of North Korea to reopen the Embassy.

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to control the towns of Kegalle, Kurunegala, Maho and Monaragala, which control the roads leading from the main areas of the island to the port of Trincomalee, and the areas surrounding these towns remained among the most stubborn centers of terrorist activity.

However, as hoped-for external aid did not materialize, JVP fortunes declined. Governmental and army resolve, bolstered by large-scale military assistance from abroad[25] and the generally negative reaction of the public to the JVP action, ultimately doomed the insurgency, although the outcome remained in doubt until late April. No towns except the small town of Elpitiya actually remained under rebel control for any length of time, but the terrorists continued to dominate outstation regions of the South, the Kandy area (but not the high plantations), and the Dry Zone northward to the southern limit of Tamil settlement.

By the end of April, rebel offensive power was spent, food raids began, and rebel mistreatment of rural people—avoided by the JVP during the early stages—was reported. Village vigilance committees helped government forces, though some peasant families did give food and shelter to rebel sons, thereby keeping alive a rebellion they may have fundamentally abhorred. The complex pulls of civil war became manifest as the government threatened death to "terrorists" yet called for the rescue of Ceylon's "misguided youth." With the insurgents giving ground, the Prime Minister proclaimed (on Radio Ceylon and by leaflet air-drop) an open period for surrender, which began on May 1 and was kept open until June 10. The first few days saw some 4,000 come in—mostly the timid, the sick, and those kidnapped into the movement—while the tough incorrigibles fell back into the Sinharaja forest in the South, the Ritigala range near Kurunegala, the steep hills around Kegalle, and the vast jungles of Wilipattu National Park. By August 1971, about 15,000 rebels had surrendered or been captured, though combined operations by infantry and helicopter forces continued against rebel pockets through the fall of 1971. Rebels killed added up to 1,500–2,000. A few diehards, including escaped convicts and identified killers, continued to hole up in jungle or urban hideouts.



—Adapted from a map published in *The New York Times*, April 13, 1971.

The JVP insurgency might have had greater success if it had been staged against a UNP government. As it was, the mass of urban workers stood by the United Front. Unlucky timing, the basic opposition of Sinhalese villagers, and the rapid dispatch of military assistance by outside powers also contributed to the JVP's demise. In any case, the unsuccessful insurrection left the island nation with serious economic and psychological problems and also deeply troubled the membership of the established Marxist parties.

The revolt has exacerbated the economic crisis facing the United Front government, forcing it to set aside plans to dispense with aid from Western powers. As a result of the insurgency, moreover, the government has moved toward both tighter controls of political activity as well as toward socialism. While the latter may seem desirable to the Communist forces within the United Front coalition, the former may ultimately redound to the disadvantage of the parliamentary Marxists. Sri Lanka is uncertain

[25] Ceylon received helicopters from India, Pakistan, Britain (American-made) and the Soviet Union, while the US provided spare parts and ammunition. More spectacular, if less useful, were five MIG-17 fighter planes furnished by the USSR together with 60 maintenance personnel. Some of the Soviet aircraft were adapted for US-type ammunition. The United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia sent nonmilitary assistance. All of this was evidence of a broad international decision to sustain the government.

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how to deal with the 15,000 JVP prisoners. A body of 250 senior civil servants in 1971 interviewed and classified them, and some prisoners are being tried, while others have been permitted to work out their debt to society by repairing the damages they caused. The memory of the JVP violence will haunt the Sinhalese for many years, yet some politicians are already anticipating the recruitment of youthful ex-terrorists as future voters and deem it desirable to "blame someone else" for the rebellion.

In fact, the identity and degree of involvement of the JVP insurgents remain somewhat unclear and confusing. Members of the movement were popularly referred to by the Sinhalese as *Trastavadi* (literally, "those who subvert by ideas"), and the leaders appear to have come from the universities, from the CCP (Peking), and from among disaffected lower-level officials of the United Front government.[26] The rank-and-file recruits were mainly youthful villagers of depressed Sinhalese castes longing to escape from an unpromising life in a socially and economically unequal system. Many were discontented former members of the Land Army Program, which had been pursued with success by the UNP during its 1965–70 rule, but which the United Front unwisely liquidated shortly after taking office. Such youths presumably joined the JVP from frustration rather than ideological conviction.

The centers of bitterest revolt were areas such as Elpitiya, Kegalle and Kurunegala with large concentrations of depressed Sinhalese castes; yet caste was apparently not a factor in JVP recruitment in the North Central Province. Although the rebellion generally treated Buddhism with contempt, the rebels themselves were almost exclusively from Buddhist families. Some young Buddhist *bhikkhus* even took up arms, but those of the largest sect—the Siam—seemed strongly opposed to the insurgency.[27] Sinhalese Christians, Muslims and burghers kept clear of the movement, as did Tamils, who encountered considerable hostility from the terrorists.



Ceylonese government troops guard youthful members of the April 1971 insurgency after a battle in the jungles.

—Wide World Photos.

For the Marxists, the government's victory raised deep problems and concerns, for despite elements of fascism, Maoism and Guevarism, the insurgency was basically a revolution of radical Marxists against the established left. The Marxist parties in the United Front must therefore have been deeply troubled as they grimly supported the efforts of the government and army to smash the uprising, thus helping to erase a revolutionary opportunity and abetting the killing or imprisonment of young leftists who might have strengthened the LSSP or CCP.

Legislating Socialism

The Marxist members of the United Front nevertheless continue to renounce revolution in favor of attempting to influence future development from within the ruling coalition. The Marxists and their dominant partner, the SLFP, seemingly need to assure the country that the direction of change is still consonant with the old-style democracy which the Ceylonese people still seem to desire. In the process, the Marxists must continue to push social and political programs designed to neutralize the JVP and even to coopt its members. Hence the constitutional debates and proposed new legislation of 1971–72 have had an air of special urgency and

[26] Only one member of Parliament, Vasudeva Nanayakkara, a member of the LSSP who had been active in the Sama Samajist youth movement, was among those arrested. When he was released on April 25, 1972, he was greeted by leaders of his party. See *The Times of Ceylon*, April 26, 1972. However, according to U. Phaednis, "Trends in Ceylon Politics," *India Quarterly* (New Delhi), April–June 1971, there was a meeting of 13 United Front members of Parliament held at Ratnapura in midsummer 1970 to call for a speedy radicalization of Ceylon.

[27] Ceylonese are still puzzled by the mysterious appearance of red robes (rather than the traditional saffron) on a number of novices and young *bhikkhus* in the Kandy area in the years preceding the 1971 insurgency and the abrupt disappearance of such robes when the fighting broke out. No one knows whether or, if so, how this phenomenon was connected with the JVP movement.

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fatefulness not only for Sri Lanka as a whole, but for its Marxist parties in particular.

As noted above, the principal architect of the new Constitution has been Colvin R. de Silva. He shepherded the new document through 22 stormy months, from the planning stage through debate in the Constituent Assembly to final promulgation as the law of the land on May 22, 1972. To the dismay of the opposition, he pushed ahead with the process even during the 1971 insurgency of the JVP when, under emergency rules, any disagreement with the government was hazardous, and he used the large United Front majority to push through the basic draft with few amendments.[28]

Although the influence of the Marxist minority parties in the government was substantial in framing the new system, the changes in the political structure are not of themselves revolutionary. The Republic of Sri Lanka is now a unitary state with a unicameral legislature (the National State Assembly). The government is headed by a president appointed by and under the guidance of the premier. Renamed Sri Lanka, the nation is a self-styled "socialist" state which has made a "rightful place for Buddhism." The checks and balances of the old constitution have been weakened by the abolition of the Senate and of the practice of judicial review of legislation. On the other hand, popular participation in government is to be fostered by the creation of "Janatha (People's) Committees" at local and regional political levels, and of councils of workers and government employees. The functions of these bodies are to include informing the government of local views, combatting black marketeering, improving the efficiency of production and of governance, and encouraging support for the regime.[29] The principle of nonalignment in foreign affairs has been reaffirmed, although Sri Lanka retains Ceylon's membership in the British Commonwealth while persisting in its leftward-leaning foreign policy orientation.[30]

The Constitution itself is perhaps less controversial than other aspects of the United Front program, in particular the five-year economic plan, the Criminal Justice Commissions Act and associated interpretative Ordinance, and the Press Council Bill. As will be seen, on some of these measures the SLFP majority has faced opposition from Marxist members of the United Front coalition as well as from elements of the political opposition.

The coalition has remained essentially unified on the economic program, which seeks to achieve a 6-percent annual growth rate and to provide 80,000 new jobs by 1976. The program involves the training of workers, promotion of new exports, and reduction of the extent to which the government subsidizes the public rice supply—a move suggested by Professor Dudley Seers and the World Employment Program of the International Labor Organization.[31] Meanwhile, other measures are effecting a wide redistribution of wealth and land. A heavy wealth tax and other levies, forced savings, demonetization (*i.e.*, currency reforms aimed at ferreting out unreported wealth), stiffened exchange controls, and ceilings on incomes and landholdings are hitting hard at the 50,000 wealthy Ceylonese and undermining the large plantations, while presumably providing the government with funds to create new jobs and investment as well as with land for distribution to the poorer peasants. The LSSP is closely identified with this program through its leader, Dr. N. M. Perera, who is Finance Minister of Sri Lanka.[32] There also are plans to increase government participation in public and private industry and to establish a Charter of Workers' Rights.[33] Collectivization has been endorsed as a means to end private exploitation of economic resources.

Leaders of private industry have criticized the economic program. They insist that overtaxation, the establishment of land and income ceilings, and the threat of increased governmental control of companies (through the Business Undertaking Act) make it impossible to plan creatively or to invest with

[28] *The Daily Mirror* for May 12 and 21, 1972, carried reports of appeals by citizens to the Prime Minister to postpone the constitutional deliberations until normal conditions were restored.

[29] See A. J. Wilson, *loc. cit. supra.*; and *The Ceylon Daily News*, Oct. 4, 1970.

[30] Although Sri Lanka continues to lean leftward in its foreign policies, Mrs. Bandaranaike has rejected pressure from leftist colleagues to move still further left. She firmly put down Dr. Perera's attempt to link the JVP with "American imperialism." See her statement in *The Times of Ceylon*, May 4, 1972, in response to Dr. Perera's May Day comments (reported by UNP Member of Parliament R. Premadasa in *ibid.*, May 8, 1972).

[31] Professor Seers, Director of the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, England, led an ILO mission to Ceylon in the spring and summer of 1971, to advise the government on means of combatting the serious problem of unemployment there. See *The Ceylon Daily News*, May 1, 1971.

[32] According to *The Times of Ceylon*, June 19, 1972, the Finance Minister set a 50-acre maximum per person or per family. Excess land would revert to the state, and ex-owners would receive "a piece of paper" rather than an immediate financial settlement.

[33] A. J. Wilson presents a detailed report on this program in "Ceylon: A Time of Troubles," *Asian Survey*, February 1972, pp. 109–15.

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confidence. Some Chamber of Commerce critics have warned that under the new measures the government can acquire any property it wishes from any citizen. When queried on this issue by UNP Leader Senanayake, Colvin R. de Silva quipped, "This does not mean the collectivization of your toothbrushes." [34]

A Fissure in the Front

While the coalition is agreed on its economic program, the Criminal Justice Commission Bill has created some dissensions within the Front. Led by S. A. Wickremasinghe, the CCP Politburo decided to oppose this legislation, which it viewed as potentially threatening to the trade unions as well as to dissenters within the Front itself. The issue brought to the surface old differences between Wickremasinghe, who has favored establishing the CCP as a third force outside the Front, and Pieter Keuneman, who favors continued unity. When the bill came to a vote early in April 1972 and the government mobilized the United Front "steamroller majority" to get it through the Parliament, Keuneman was abroad, two other CCP MP's were absent, two abstained from voting, and only one—B. Y. Tudawe—voted for the bill. The four MP's from the CCP who did not vote were then suspended by the United Front's Parliamentary Group, while the CCP Politburo, on the other hand, asked Tudawe to explain why he should not be expelled from the party for defying its decision to vote against the bill.[35]

At the height of the quarrel, CCP leader Wickremasinghe was denied an exit permit to leave for Romania for medical treatment, though he was subsequently permitted to go, returning from Europe in mid-May. The Front leadership then turned down a CCP request for a conference to iron out CCP—Front differences. As this period (April–May 1972) also saw a stormy rift among the UNP Conservatives, it may be that moderates in the United Front hoped that the UNP leader J. R. Jayawardena might be persuaded by the downgrading of the CCP's role in the Front to bring his group over to the government in the spirit of his call to all parties to end "political party warfare for a specfied period." At the same time, a pro-China group within the United Front urged the expulsion of the Moscow-oriented CCP, but the champions of unity (including Keuneman) defeated the move, and the crisis blew over.[36]

Outside the government, it is not easy to find support for the Criminal Justice Commissions Bill. It has been denounced by the CCP-dominated Ceylon Federation of Trade Unions as well as by the LSSP's Ceylon Federation of Labor and Ceylon Mercantile Union as a measure which might be used against the workers. Inevitably the opposition parties—the UNP and the Federal Party—and their affiliated trade unions and youth groups have warned that the law would constitute a threat to democracy and the rights of citizens, and some UNP spokesmen have even likened it to Hitlerite totalitarianism.[37]

The *Ceylon Daily News* lead editorial for April 4, 1972, the eve of the parliamentary vote on the bill and of the first anniversary of the JVP insurgency, warned that to remove democratic rights, as the bill seemed to do, would undermine the loyalty which ordinary citizens had demonstrated during the 1971 insurgency. The newspaper observed that the measure would prevent the courts from pronouncing on the legality of any executive act performed under legislation that included the expression: "shall not be called in question in any court." It further urged that the principle of habeas corpus—"the cornerstone of individual liberty"—be protected under the terms of the new law. The Ceylon Bar Council warned that innocent persons might soon be convicted on unreliable evidence, while the Civil Rights Movement of Ceylon predicted the rise of unchallengeable bureaucratic "despots." [38] Even the pro-SLFP All-Ceylon Buddhist Congress, which in 1970 had approved the new Constitution because of its recognition of Buddhism, sensed in the proposed law a threat to freedom of worship, press, speech and expression, habeas corpus, and "Buddhist principles." [39] Nevertheless, as noted earlier, the meas-

[34] See *The Ceylon Daily News*, Jan. 22, 1971. For critiques of the program, see *ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1971, and *The Times of Ceylon*, June 2, 1972.

[35] *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), April 22, 1972, pp. 14–15.

[36] The CCP clash with the United Front leadership is reported in *The Ceylon Daily News*, April 7, 10, 11, 13, 19, 1972, and *The Times of Ceylon*, April 20–24, 1972. As will be noted below, the crisis and stresses within the CCP have continued to smoulder.

[37] The UNP statement is noted in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 22, 1972, pp. 14–15.

[38] *The Ceylon Daily News*, April 1 and 3, 1972. On the former date, Dr. Cooray also contributed an article on habeas corpus in which he was no longer as optimistic as he had been in 1970 concerning constitutional rights in Sri Lanka.

[39] On January 2, 1971, *The Ceylon Daily News* reported the ACBC's demand for an explanation of how the United Front would fulfill its pledge to preserve "a rightful place for Buddhism" in Sri Lanka, and a minority even demanded that Buddhism be declared the formal state religion.

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ure was "steamrollered" through the Parliament.

Still pending is the Press Council Bill, which would limit the right of the press to criticize the government and require newspapers to reveal their news sources. Opposed by most non-Marxist groups, the *Sangha*, and minorities, it also faces opposition from some LSSP elements and thereby constitutes still another threat to the unity of the government coalition. Although debate on the bill as originally proposed was suspended briefly, the government has since brought forward a substitute version which the Times of Ceylon considers "more vicious" than the original.[40]

The domination of the United Front coalition by the SLFP (which alone holds some 90 of the 157 seats in the National State Assembly), coupled with the fact that various prominent SLFP members and political *bhikkhus* have suggested that Ceylon should have a dictatorship,[41] has raised the possibility that democracy is threatened not only by the insurgent JVP. The decision of the government to defer new parliamentary elections and remain in office until 1978 to complete its programs rather than serve its normal five years (to 1975), the recent refusal by police—on "grounds of public security"—to permit a UNP rally, the possibility of arrests without warrant under the amended Exchange Control Act, and the issuance to all citizens of identity cards carrying a photograph of the bearer have all contributed to widespread public anxiety over the threat of totalitarianism. Press censorship, instituted during the insurgency, was ended on May 15, 1971, but the press is subject to "financial censorship" in the form of a nearly prohibitive 80-percent duty plus a 55-percent surcharge on imports of newsprint. Colvin R. de Silva and other members of the United Front government have attempted to give assurances to the public, but even some Marxists are wary of the direction of government policies.[42]

Thus, events since 1970 raise important questions about the future of meaningful democratic politics in Sri Lanka. Socialism seems inevitable whoever is in power, and—in the process of moving toward it—even some of the measures demanded by the JVP will probably be instituted by those who defeated the young insurgents. Meanwhile, the specter of threatening economic crisis and issues of caste, race and language at home and of preserving nonalignment in foreign policy remain the concern of all parties. In this complex political setting, the island's Marxist parties would seem to face four major, interrelated problems, the strands of which run through both the past and present of Ceylonese Marxism.

Marxist Dilemmas

The first problem facing Ceylon's Marxists has its origins in the very social and educational background of the established leftist leaders and their commitment to multiparty parliamentary politics. Raised in the traditions of Fabian socialism, these Marxists are moderate in deeds even while radical in language and ultimate political objectives. They are members of the bourgeois social establishment. In their view, the long coexistence of the parties they lead with parliamentary democracy has brought important benefits: respectability, a national podium and vast press coverage, and the opportunity to influence the course of Ceylonese democracy. On the other hand, they must question whether permanent subservience to the Sri Lanka Freedom Party will really advance the cause of communism in the island nation. Furthermore, the Marxist leaders have been alarmed by various elements of the United Front program which might be turned against them should the rural-based, Buddhist SLFP decide to eliminate the Marxists from the ruling coalition. Nevertheless, the Marxists have apparently decided to go along with constitutionalism and coalition politics for the present.

This decision gives rise to a second, related issue facing the Marxist movement in Sri Lanka. By opting to retain their ties with the ruling SLFP, the leaders of the LSSP and CCP have found themselves faced with major opposition from radical elements who have come to advocate violent social revolution. This doctrinal schism is further aggravated by social and generational cleavages. A decade ago most undergraduates carried the card of the LSSP, but young student activists today increasingly despair of the eventual triumph of socialism under present leftist leaders. Young radicals from the less-advantaged

[40] For comments on the latest Press Council Bill, see *The Times of Ceylon*, Aug. 25, 26, 31, and Sept. 1, 16, 21, and 23, 1972.

[41] UNP leader Dudley Senanayake has reminded the Minister of Public Administration, Felix Dias Bandaranaike, that the latter stated some years earlier that "a little bit of totalitarianism is sometimes necessary" (*The Ceylon Daily News*, April 6, 1972).

[42] See statements by de Silva in *The Times of Ceylon*, April 29 and May 11, 1972. Chandra Gunasekera, an LSSP member of the National State Assembly, subsequently expressed the view that socialism could not be achieved by use of the army or police (*ibid.*, July 5, 1972).

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rural areas and educated in Sinhalese rather than Western traditions are less committed to the existing social order and have turned to Marxist-Leninist doctrines of revolutionary violence as the answer to Sri Lanka's current needs. The Marxist leaders thus have a tiger by the tail. If the LSSP and CCP move leftward to preserve unity within the Marxist movement, they risk destroying their link with the SLFP, but if they stand pat, they confirm the suspicions of the young radicals. The dilemma was brought into sharp relief by the 1971 insurgency in which young Marxist-Leninists of the JVP staged Ceylon's first leftist revolution against an establishment supported by Ceylon's major Marxist parties. Its continuing presence is implicit in LSSP and CCP endorsement of new legislation which simultaneously advocates mass political participation and strong measures against subversion. It may be that the JVP does not speak for the youth of Sri Lanka and that there will not be another left-wing revolution. But should the JVP reemerge, it will view the established Marxists with great bitterness, further contributing to disunity within the Marxist left. There are signs of renewed conflict within both the LSSP and the CCP over the issue of constitutionalism and participation in the government on the one hand *vs.* more revolutionary approaches on the other.[43]

United or disunited, parliamentary or insurrectionary, Ceylon's Marxists have a third major problem—their limited success in gaining political support in the villages, where the majority of the population lives. The Marxist parties were outflanked in 1956 when the Sri Lanka Freedom Party captured the basic rural issues—the decay of village life, rural indebtedness, and land-hunger. The assassination of the SLFP's founder, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, in 1959 converted his influence into an almost religious force among the Buddhist Sinhalese, and few Marxists dare challenge his ideas or the leadership of his devoted widow, a quiet and aristocratic Kandyan lady.[44] With the major issues already preempted, the LSSP and CCP must either go along with the dominant SLFP or become a "third force" movement which might prove incapable of winning over the Buddhist Sinhalese.

As for the JVP, there was indeed heavy recruitment among radical students and other youths from rural areas. However, the basic rural population proved quite resistant to the JVP tactics of terrorism, and it would appear that many youths joined the movement either under duress or at least on a temporary, nonideological basis. In this context, it is interesting to note the growing strength of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party on some of the nation's campuses. The student council at Peradeniya—traditionally Marxist—has been captured by the SLFP, and an anti-leftist Progressive Front has appeared on the Colombo campus of the University of Ceylon.[45]

Buddhism—the Imponderable Element

The element of Buddhism, which is so evident in the SLFP program, presents the Marxists of Sri Lanka with perhaps their most complex questions of interpretation and strategy. They can view Buddhism as a major obstacle in the Communists' path to power, as a congruent philosophy with which Marxism can cooperate to the mutual advantage of both groups, or as an anti-materialist creed which is becoming obsolete and irrelevant in an age of technology and modernization.

Certainly the Buddhist revival, which began a century ago and borrowed forms from the Christians in order to revitalize the loose associations of monasteries and temples, has considerably strengthened Buddhist influence over the Sinhalese population. The recent interest in the *Kalama Sutta*—which stresses individual empirical investigation—and the growing feeling among Buddhists of the need for a new life-model suggest that Buddhism will indeed adapt itself to the requirements of modernization. There can be no question that Buddhism has become a great force in Sri Lanka politics. It was Buddhism—not Marxism—which produced the electoral revolution of 1956; in 1965 it was the conservative Buddhist *Sangha*, alarmed at the spread of Marxism, which helped return Dudley Senanayake and the UNP to power; and in 1970 it was Buddhist support which brought Mrs. Bandaranaike back to power.

When the conservative elements of the Buddhist *Sangha* sense a Marxist threat to traditional civil and

[43] Tensions within the CCP and between that party and the United Front have continued. As of September 1972, Dr. Wickremasinghe had replaced Pieter Keuneman, a standard defender of the coalition, as Secretary General of the CCP. The former and three other CCP members of the National State Assembly are still excluded from the United Front parliamentary group. See *The Times of Ceylon*, Aug. 8, 25, and Sept. 4, 1972.

[44] For various analyses of the LSSP–SLFP alliance, see Abhayavardhana, *op. cit.*; J. L. Fernando, *Bandaranaike Legacies*, Colombo, Times of Ceylon, Ltd. publishers, 1963; and Denzil Peiris, (author and publisher), *1956 and After*, Colombo, 1958.

[45] *The Times of Ceylon*, Sept. 12, 1972.

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religious rights, they have shown themselves to be a formidable force, as demonstrated in 1965. These powerful Buddhist groups are becoming critical of the United Front program, and particularly of the Marxist influence in the coalition.

On the other hand, Buddhism clearly has within it progressive forces. The fact that many of the most political and practical *bhikkhus* have been trained in Western universities and favor constitutional rather than revolutionary roads to progress may be disappointing to the more radical elements within the Marxist movement. However, there is less of a conflict between such Buddhists and many of the leading figures in both the LSSP and the CCP. The fact that such Marxist leaders still pay public homage to Buddhism at the Temple of the Tooth may be not hypocrisy but the manifestation of a residual cradle-love for the religion of their youth.[46] Furthermore, by joining forces with the Buddhist SLFP, the Marxist parties not only have helped Mrs. Bandaranaike return to power but also have advanced their own political fortunes. And in the United Front government, Marxists are at work alongside Buddhists of the SLFP legislating socialism for Sri Lanka.

The events of 1971 suggest yet a third perspective on the role of Buddhism in Sri Lanka and its implications for Marxist strategy. The resistance of rural Buddhism to the JVP was strong, and yet there do seem to have been important cracks in the armor. Many of the Marxist-Leninist rebels were of Buddhist stock. The fact that they ignored the nonviolent creed of Buddhism, that many novices and even some young *bhikkhus* took up arms against the Buddhist government,[47] suggests that the religion may be losing its dynamism and its appeal to contemporary youth. If this is so, the result may be the erection of an enormous vacuum which the Marxists might seek to occupy. The JVP represents an attempt in this direction, and elements within the two major Marxist parties (particularly the CCP) are also seeking to make their organizations a "third force" in Sri Lanka's political life. On the other hand, many Marxists are unwilling to abandon hard-won gains by breaking away from the United Front coalition.

On balance, the question of the proper response to Buddhism may pose the deepest dilemma for the Marxists of Sri Lanka.

[44] Reported in *ibid.*, May 30, 1972.

[47] For reports of Buddhist clerics held for suspected insurgent activities, including the manufacture of bombs, see *The Daily Mirror*, May 29, 1971, and *The Ceylon Daily News*, April 29, 1971. *Bhikkhu* Sobitha's testimony confirms the activity of Buddhists in the JVP at Vidyodaya University and in the Colombo area (see fn. 14).

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Changing Perspectives in North Korea

EDITORS' NOTE: Recent months have brought evidence of major new turns in North Korea's internal and external courses. Domestically, the goals and implementation of the Six-Year Plan for 1971-76 have shown decreased emphasis on defense expenditures and greater attention to broad-based development of the economy. In foreign affairs, Pyongyang not only has entered into an agreement with South Korea to work toward national unification but also has greatly expanded its intercourse with the non-Communist world. The two following articles seek to put these policy shifts in broad historical perspective. Mr. Kim examines North Korea's evolving approach to economic development, and Mr. Shinn analyzes the elements of continuity and change in Pyongyang's foreign policy over the years.

Approach to Economic Development

By Ilpyong J. Kim

North Korea today claims that it has effected the transition from an "agricultural-industrial" state to a "socialist-industrial" one. Official figures indicate that whereas in 1956, after post-Korean War reconstruction, industry accounted for only about 34 percent of the country's national income, by 1970 the industrial share had risen to more than 74 percent.[1] This shift entailed major economic transformations. For example, Pyongyang boasts that it now possesses one of the most developed machine-building industries in Asia. According to official reports, the production of machinery increased 100-fold between 1948 and 1967 alone, and the advance has been even more dramatic in specific categories. Tractors afford a good illustration. At the time of the Korean armistice in 1953, North Korea reportedly had just 500 tractors (of the 15-horsepower variety), but with the growth in local production, the number reached 8,053 by 1959; 15,000 in 1961; 20,000 in 1969; and more than 30,000 in 1970. The last figure means that there was about one tractor for every 169 acres of cultivated land in the country in 1970.[2]

In recent months, Pyongyang has for the first time

Mr. Kim, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut (Storrs), has contributed articles on North Korea to The China Quarterly *and* Pacific Affairs. *He is the author of a collection of essays on North Korean politics, to be published early in 1973; and also of a forthcoming book,* The Politics of Chinese Communism: Kiangsi Under Soviet Rule.

[1] See Kim Il Sung, "Summary Report of the Work of the Central Committee to the Fifth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea," *Nodong Sinmun* (Pyongyang), Nov. 3, 1970. Also see *Area Handbook for North Korea*, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969, ch. 17.

[2] Kim Il, "Concerning the Six-Year Plan (1971-76) for the Development of the People's Economy of the DPRK," *Nodong Sinmun*, Nov. 10, 1970.

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permitted several Western observers, including Harrison Salisbury of *The New York Times*, to visit North Korea, and while these observers have not been able to investigate the situation there sufficiently to verify Pyongyang's claims in minute detail, they have come away impressed with the nation's economic accomplishments.[3] Their judgments, in turn, suggest that North Korea's economic path merits more attention than it has thus far received from outside analysts.

The evidences of progress pose two questions of key importance. First, how have the North Koreans managed to achieve a fairly high rate of economic development since 1956 without the influx of massive aid from foreign sources? Second, precisely what kind of industrialization strategy have they employed? The present article will explore these two topics, and it will also attempt to assess what policies Pyongyang is likely to follow in its pursuit of economic development in the future.

Circumstances in the Mid-1950's

To understand North Korea's economic road during the last decade and a half, one must begin by looking at the situation in which the North Koreans found themselves in the mid-1950's. During the years immediately after the Korean armistice, reconstruction of the economy was Pyongyang's primary preoccupation. However, thanks to large-scale economic aid and technical assistance from the Soviet Union and the East European nations, the country's industrial output had, by 1956, already surpassed that of the pre-Korean War period;[4] hence, reconstruction had essentially been accomplished.

In early 1956, the North Korean regime drafted an ambitious Five-Year Economic Development Plan for 1957–61. The plan's twin goals were "to carry out socialist construction of industry and socialist collectivization of agriculture." In concrete terms, it contemplated a 260-percent increase in gross industrial output and a 350-percent increase in the total value of industrial output from the 1956 level. Production of steel was to grow 3–3.5 times, and the output of electric power would reach 9.5 billion kilowatt hours by 1961. During the plan period, the production of consumer goods would rise by 330 percent. For example, the annual production of fabrics by 1961 was to be 17 meters per capita.[5]

This draft plan clearly had been formulated on the assumption that the Soviet-bloc countries would continue to furnish aid and assistance at the same level as during the post-Korean War period. But such an assumption proved ill-founded—in large part because of Soviet-Korean tensions that arose in the wake of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956. Nikita Khrushchev's destalinization effort at the Congress upset North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung (as well as the Chinese leaders and others), for it constituted a potential threat to his own type of rule. Indeed, he evinced a distinct lack of enthusiasm about Khrushchev's initiative in his public reactions. Consequently, when he paid a special visit to Moscow and other capitals of Eastern Europe later in the year to obtain economic and technical aid to pay for the development projects envisioned under the draft Five-Year Plan, he came back almost empty-handed. Khrushchev himself evidently criticized the goals of the plan as overly ambitious.[6]

Despite the rebuff, Kim declined to revise the plan. Upon his return to Pyongyang, he set about launching a massive program to mobilize domestic resources to finance it.

The "Ch'ollima" Movement

At a plenum of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) in December 1956, the party leadership adopted a resolution which amounted to the first step in this direction. "In order

[3] A series of reports by Mr. Salisbury on North Korea appeared in *The New York Times* between May 15 and June 7, 1972. He subsequently presented his impressions of North Korean economic development to the Columbia University Seminar on Korea on Oct. 26, 1972.

[4] In 1953–56, North Korea received an equivalent of US $1.37 billion in the form of grants and credits. Foreign aid constituted 33.4 percent of the state revenues in 1954, but by 1957 the figure had dropped to 12.2 percent." See Yoon T. Kuark, "North Korea's Industrial Development During the Post-War Period," *The China Quarterly* (London), No. 14, April-June 1963, pp. 60–62.

[5] Kim Il Sung, "Report of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party to the Third Congress," in *Third Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea: Documents and Materials*, Pyongyang, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956, pp. 44–75.

[6] On Khrushchev's reaction to the plan, see "Let Us Protect the Socialist Camp!," editorial in *Nodong Sinmun*, Oct. 28, 1963, in which the Soviet leadership was alleged to have "challenged us, saying that our Five-Year Plan was an illusion, stressing that we did not need to construct the machine-building industry, and criticizing the speed of our agricultural collectivization as too fast although they did not know the realities of our country." By 1960, all foreign aid accounted for but 2.6 percent of North Korea's state revenues. See *Area Handbook for North Korea*, pp. 369–71.

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to overcome the difficulties which have arisen in the domestic and international spheres and also to reach a revolutionary high tide of socialist construction," the resolution stressed, the KWP must mobilize the working forces and organize them so as to increase production in industry and agriculture.[7]

It was not until several months later, however, that the actual implementation of the resolution got under way with the inauguration of the "ch'ollima" (flying horse) movement. In 1958, the party elevated this movement to the status of its "general line." [8]

Like the Stakhanovite movement of the 1930's in the Soviet Union, the "ch'ollima" movement embodied an element of socialist competition as a spur to production, but the overall character of the movement most closely resembled that of the Great Leap Forward in the People's Republic of China during 1958–59. Both undertakings were designed to elicit greater productive effort by means of a psychological transformation of the working masses brought about through ideological appeals and exhortations.

Kim Il Sung outlined the basic rationale or theory behind the movement in a speech commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Korean People's Democratic Republic on September 8, 1958. He listed two prerequisites for the successful construction of socialism in North Korea—a cultural revolution and a technological revolution. The former entailed the eradication from the thought and consciousness of the working masses of the remnants of certain traditional feudalistic and capitalistic notions rooted in the ideas of individualism, liberalism, and conservatism; its function was to produce dedicated, selfless, and patriotic members of a socialist society. The latter involved the improvement of working techniques and skills. In his remarks, Kim left no doubt about where the priorities lay with respect to these two revolutions at the moment: "At the present stage of socialist construction, the fundamental task before us is to realize the cultural revolution in order to advance the technological transformation of the people's economy in terms of socialist productivity,



Scene from a North Korean tractor factory.

—Novosti from Sovfoto.

and to consolidate further the material and productive basis of socialism," for "unless we realize the cultural revolution, we will not be able to carry out successfully the technological revolution in our people's economy." [9]

In keeping with this perspective, the North Korean government greatly intensified its propaganda activities aimed at the local populace. Premier Kim issued specific injunctions to this effect in a November 1958 speech to party activists on the subject of "education for communism." [10] Moreover, between October 6, 1958, and February 2, 1959, he reportedly attempted to create a model for the conduct of revolutionary work by taking part in the actual operation of steel plants in various parts of the country. These initiatives resulted in the popularization of such slogans as "work, study, and live in the spirit of communism." [11]

[7] *Chao-hsien shih-hui chu-i chien-she chung ti chien-li-ma tso-yueh pan yun-tung* (The Ch'ollima Work Team Movement in the Socialist Construction of Korea), Peking, Shih-che chih-shih ch'u-pan she, 1962, p. 21. (Hereafter, cited as *The Ch'ollima Work Team Movement.*) This booklet is a Chinese translation of the Korean version published by the Korean Workers' Party Publishing House in 1961. The citations throughout the present article are from the Chinese translation.

[8] Ha Ang-ch'on, "The Ch'ollima Movement Is the General Line of the Korean Workers' Party in Socialist Construction," *Kyo no Chosen* (Pyongyang), No. 55, May 1961. This publication is the Japanese-language edition of *Korea Today.*

[9] See *Kin Nichi Sei Chosaku-shu* (Collected works of Kim Il Sung), Tokyo, Mirai-sha, 1970, Vol. 1, especially pp. 297, 313, 320. (Hereafter cited as *Kim's Collected Works.*)

[10] Kim Il Sung, "On Education for Communism," in *ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 349–59.

[11] *The Ch'ollima Work Team Movement*, p. 21.

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As the movement unfolded, however, it took on more specific features affecting both the agricultural and industrial sectors. First, the government strove to ensure that the state received more output from the peasantry. Although about 80 percent of the peasantry had already been collectivized by the end of 1956, the process was completed in the course of 1958. Also, by the close of the latter year, the 16,032 existing agricultural cooperatives had been amalgamated into 3,842 enlarged basic production units at the village (*li*) level.[12] ('t is worth noting here that this amalgamation was far more modest than that which the Chinese tried to carry out in the initial stages of their efforts to set up communes. The Chinese sought to consolidate 740,000 agricultural producers' cooperatives into approximately 24,000 "people's communes" with an average of 5,000 households each.[13]) An agricultural tax-in-kind of 22–27 percent of total grain production was levied on the peasantry,[14] and the management committee of every cooperative farm was instructed to raise the value of its farm's public properties by increasing capital investment and considerably reducing the portion of the collective's income allocated to members. "The success or failure of each cooperative should be . . . evaluated," Premier Kim declared, "not only by the amount of income shared by each member but also by the amount of each member's contribution to the cooperative savings and the capital investment of the cooperative." [15]

Second, the government instituted a national program of socialist competition in production with which the term "cho'llima" has come to be most closely associated. Under this program, work teams were organized in each production unit, and those teams that exceeded their production quotas while maintaining a high quality of work received recognition as "ch'ollima work teams." Initially, the program was confined to the industrial sector. According to one report, there were only 1,368 teams composed of 11,097 managers and technicians in 1958.[16] But the movement quickly spread into other occupational areas such as commerce, education, public health, science, culture and the arts, etc. By March 1959, the country boasted 8,620 work teams with 178,406 members. In an industrial plant, each team normally consisted of 20–25 members; in educational, cultural, and public-health institutions, they often had 50 members.[17] Official claims indicate, too, that by mid-1959 or so the campaign had embraced more than 3,242 villages.[18]

Essentially, then, the North Korean leadership up to 1960 attempted to carry out economic development by inducing the population in general and the peasants in particular to increase their output. Some technological innovations—*e.g.*, the introduction of irrigation, electrification, and mechanization in the countryside—were employed, but these were limited in extent.

Furthermore, the regime relied fundamentally on moral as opposed to material incentives to inspire the popular masses. Within the general framework of the cultural revolution, the government did devote some effort to improving the intellectual and technical level of the workers, to strengthening public-health and medical-welfare programs, and to expanding the cultural activities of the working class, but such efforts did not weigh very heavily in the overall balance.

Modifications in Approach

This basic approach evidently worked to some extent, for despite the skepticism of Western observers as to whether or not all projected targets had been reached, Pyongyang announced the fulfillment of the Five-Year Development Plan at the end of 1960, a year ahead of schedule. However, the North Koreans discovered that pursuing economic development largely through mobilization of the populace on the basis of a cultural revolution had distinct drawbacks. To begin with, there was a limit to what could be achieved through mass mobilization without corresponding attention to technological matters, because the technological and cultural revolutions constituted integral elements of a single whole. That is, they formed two wheels of the same cart, and the cart could not move effectively without both

[12] Chong-Sik Lee, "Land Reform, Collectivization and the Peasants in North Korea," *The China Quarterly*, No. 14, April-June 1963, pp. 65–81.

[13] See "The Great Leap Forward, 1958–1960," in Jan S. Prybyla, *The Political Economy of Communist China*, Scranton, Pa., International Textbook Co., 1970, pp. 256–340.

[14] Kuark, *loc. cit.* pp. 82–93. See also *Area Handbook for North Korea*, pp. 311–12.

[15] Speech to the administrative cadres of the agricultural cooperatives in North Korea on Jan. 5, 1959, in *Choson Chung-Ang Yon-gam 1959* (Central Yearbook of North Korea), Pyongyang, Chung-Ang Tong-sin Sa, 1959, p. 15.

[16] *The Ch'ollima Work Team Movement*, p. 21.

[17] Statistics on the growing number of work teams may be found in *ibid.*, p. 35.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

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wheels. Furthermore, moral and ideological appeals, even bolstered by administrative measures of coercion, did not alone suffice to stimulate the masses to rise to lofty new heights of productivity.

Therefore, the regime altered its course fairly substantially during the first years of the Seven-Year Plan (1961–67). To be sure, certain aspects of the old emphasis on the "cultural revolution" persisted. For example, the campaign to organize work teams in production units continued apace. By December 1963, there were 17,057 teams with a membership of 586,403, including 213,376 workers and clerical personnel, 232,636 members of agricultural cooperatives, and 140,396 students. As of July 1965, the work teams embraced more than a million persons.[19]

But the leadership sought to provide the populace with greater material incentives and a greater sense of participation in decisions concerning national production. These efforts took several forms. One involved the adoption of the "Ch'ongsan-ni method" with respect to the operation of agricultural cooperatives. The campaign to introduce this method actually originated in February 1960 when Premier Kim personally went down to a rural and backward village, Ch'ongsan-ni, to demonstrate how the work of rural development should be carried out, and the method took its name from that of the village. In essence, the method amounted to an injunction to party officials and administrators to pay closer heed to the problems and needs of the peasants. As Premier Kim put things somewhat later,

You should learn from the masses. Without going among the masses, you cannot learn. All of you present here are masters of farming. The chairman should openmindedly learn farm work from the peasants, while passing on to them what he knows.[20]

A major result of the application of the "Ch'ongsan-ni method" was an attempt to synthesize ideological indoctrination and material incentives as a technique for achieving such goals as increased production of food grains, better planning for cooperative management, and improved organization of the labor force in the countryside. The material incentives consisted in part of prizes, paid vacations, and honorific titles for work teams that surpassed their production quotas. Most important, however, was the so-called "independent accounting system." Under this system, the members of the work team shared and took home the extra portion of their production above and beyond their established quota. Thus, the harder the work team labored and the more it produced, the greater its share of the profits after the set quota for the team had been met. As part of the general effort, too, the central government reduced its tax in kind on the peasantry from 22–27 percent of their output to 10–12 percent during 1960–63, and it finally abolished the tax altogether at the end of 1965.[21]

Another innovation occurred in industrial management. In December 1961, Kim Il Sung visited the Taean Electrical Appliance Plant and lauded it as an example of a well-managed enterprise; shortly thereafter, the system of management that it had recently instituted became the model for the entire country. During the 1957–61 period, the industrial management system in North Korea had been based on the principle of "one-man management." That



Kim Il Sung, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party, gives peasants on-the-spot guidance at Ch'ongsan-ni.

—China Pictorial (Peking), June 1972, p. 8.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 35.

[20] See Kim Il Sung, *For the Correct Management of the Socialist Rural Economy*, Pyongyang, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1969, p. 29.

[21] See Kim Il Sung's speech to the administrative cadres of the cooperative farms on Jan. 5, 1959, in *Choson Chung-Ang Yon-gam 1959*, p. 15.

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is, the manager of each factory had enjoyed full authority to make decisions and coordinate the quantity and quality of production; the industrial workers had had no voice whatsoever in these matters. The "Taean system," in contrast, involved the concept of collective leadership through the medium of the factory's party committee. In this new system, Premier Kim stressed,

the factory's party committee, as the supreme administrative organ of the plant, manages and runs the factory with direct participation of the party members, the workers, and the technicians. No single person should take the responsibility of managing the plant, but every party member, worker, and technician in the plant should take part in the operation of the factory's party committee, which is in turn responsible for the administration and management of the factory.[22]

The system, through the application of these principles, aimed at giving workers a feeling of participation in plant management.

Finally, the leadership commenced to emphasize "the mass line" as the key technique of leadership. The cadres of the central government were instructed to go down to the province and county (*kun*) levels, listen to the problems of the local administrators, and then discuss possible solutions to these problems with them. Local-level administrators, in turn, were asked to go among the masses and explain to them the government's policy line and to arouse their enthusiasm and stir them to positive action. Kim described the process as follows:

The mass line is to go to the masses and organize them to implement the party policy correctly by listening to their opinions and suggestions for the solution of local problems. And then the opinions of the masses should be projected back to the higher echelons so that the policymakers may take their suggestions into account in the formulation of developmental policies. After the formulation of policy on the basis of suggestions offered by the masses, the new directions and policy should be sent down to the masses for execution.[23]

According to the revised thinking, a true leader had to obtain the sincere, voluntary acceptance of "collective" leadership from the masses. Thus, the "mass line" did not mean a simple discussion between the administrators and the masses, but required the administrators to establish a willingness on the part of the masses to follow the guidance of the administrators. Unless the masses did so, the official view went, the "mass line" became an empty slogan.

In addition to revising its methods of dealing with the masses, Pyongyang also began to devote more and more attention to technological considerations. "During the seven-year period," Kim expounded in October 1962, "we must carry out the technological revolution and the cultural revolution throughout the country *by establishing a material and technological foundation of socialism* in order to raise the material and cultural standard of the people.[24] The specific goals were to step up the production of machinery for the continued development of heavy industry; to supply more tractors and farm machinery to carry out the mechanization of agriculture; to modernize local manufacture, particularly by expanding the food-processing industry; and to train more technical cadres by setting up more evening correspondence schools so as to provide each worker with at least one technical skill.[25]

Perhaps the strongest evidence of the growing concern with technological matters, however, came from the reorganization of agricultural administration in 1962 and the establishment of a new organ known as the county management committee of the cooperative farms.[26] To be sure, part of the rationale for setting up the management committee lay in a desire to maintain a close link between the property of "the entire people" (*i.e.*, public property) and the property of the cooperatives—a link intended to extend state control over the cooperatives. But equally if not more important was a wish to improve the efficiency of the operations of the cooperatives. The committee was supposed to close the vast gap between industrial management and agricultural administration by introducing the management tech-

[22] "On Further Developing the Taean Work System," a speech delivered on Nov. 9, 1962, in *Kim's Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 108.

[23] "On the Improvement of the Leadership Cadres' Attitudes Toward the Party, the Class and the People and of the Management Activities of the People's Economy," a speech delivered on Dec. 19, 1964, in *ibid.*, p. 323.

[24] "On the Current Tasks of the Korean Democratic People's Republic," a speech made on Oct. 23, 1962, in *ibid.*, pp. 61–62. Emphasis added.

[25] See Kim Il Sung, "On the Further Strengthening and Developing of the County Management Committee of the Cooperative Farms," a speech delivered on Nov. 13, 1962, in *Kim's Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 132.

[26] Ko Sakurai, "The Ch'ollima Movement in North Korea," *Chosen Kenkyu Geppo* (Korean Research Monthly—Tokyo), No. 16, April 1963.

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niques of business enterprises into the administration of the cooperatives. To do so, they had "absolute authority to supervise such administrative activities as drawing up plans, organizing the work force, improving technical skills, securing and supplying raw materials, and managing fiscal matters," [27] all of which had been handled by the central government in the past. In practice, the committee took over the operation of such state-run agencies as the farm-machine hiring-station and the irrigation management office, and it became responsible for drawing up a comprehensive plan for the entire county. Thus, the committees differed significantly from the state-operated, tractor-hiring stations once found in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—they not only provided technical assistance to individual cooperatives but also had the administrative leadership to direct and coordinate the productive activities of the cooperatives.

To try to ensure that these county committees would really bring about the infusion of better managerial techniques into the countryside, the national leadership transferred the function of supervision of the agricultural sector from the Ministry of Agriculture of the central government to provincial rural management committees. The Ministry then became the Central Agricultural Commission, whose role was to conduct research on such policy questions as how the state ought to improve its agricultural techniques; how to supply and transport raw materials and farm machines; and how the state should recruit and train the technical cadres to help with rural development.

Development Strategy

This revised approach to economic development has remained fundamentally unchanged over the intervening years, except for variations in the intensity of ideological appeals which have been connected with shifts in the country's development strategy. That strategy had been fairly constant in the years prior to the inauguration of the Seven-Year Plan. Though some elements within the hierarchy had urged a relative decrease in emphasis on investment in heavy industry and a corresponding increase in attention to consumer and light industry—particularly in the 1956–58 period[28]—the government had pursued a line of rapid expansion of heavy industry, especially the machine-building industry. During the 1957–60 period, moreover, it had devoted little attention to agricultural development. For those years, it had poured slightly more than 80 percent of its total investments into industry.[29]

Under the Seven-Year Plan, it was envisaged, however, that proportionately greater stress would be placed on building up consumer and light industry and improving the performance of the agricultural sector. For example, Premier Kim emphasized the intention to expand small-scale local industry and to construct large-scale industrial plants in order to raise the production of consumer goods. (By 1963, local industries were in fact turning out 59 percent of all consumer goods and accounting for one-third of total industrial output.) Kim also indicated that the productivity of the agricultural sector was to be improved by increased supplies of farm machinery and chemical fertilizer.[30]

During the 1961–63 period, this strategy was apparently implemented with considerable vigor. For instance, the government boosted the average annual share of the state's total capital investments going to the rural sector to close to 20 percent.[31] But during the ensuing years, the strategy shifted to a further expansion of heavy industry and a defense buildup, even at the expense of light industry and agriculture. Why did such an unexpected and drastic shift occur?

In part, the change probably had to do with shortfalls in production. Under the concept of the Seven-Year Plan, the 1961–67 period was to be divided into two stages—1961–63 and 1964–67. Planning authorities intended during the first stage to bring about dramatic improvements in the standard of living of the population and technical innovations in production, through special attention to consumer and light industry and to agriculture. Then they

[27] See Kim Il Sung's aforementioned speech of November 13, 1962 ("On the Further Strengthening and Developing of the County Management Committee of the Cooperative Farms"), in *Kim's Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 124.

[28] See Glenn D. Paige, "North Korea and the Emulation of Russian and Chinese Behavior," in A. Doak Barnett, Ed., *Communist Strategies in Asia*, New York, Praeger, 1963, pp. 236–42.

[29] See Joint Publications Research Service, *Development of the National Economy and Culture of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea (1946–1959)*, No. 4148, Oct. 31, 1960.

[30] See "The Report of the Work of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party to the Fourth Party Congress," in *Kim's Collected Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 239-41. Also see this writer's "North Korea's Fourth Party Congress," *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver), Vol. 35, No. 1, Spring 1962, pp. 37–50.

[31] *Area Handbook for North Korea*, pp. 326–27. See also Joseph S. Chung, "The Six-Year Plan (1971–1976) of North Korea," *Journal of Korean Affairs* (Silver Spring, Md.), Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 17.

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Chemical weed-killer is applied to fields in Ch'ongsan-ni Township.

—*China Pictorial* (Peking), September 1971, p. 34.

hoped to use this strengthened base in the second period to resume further expansion of heavy industry. Unfortunately, however, the economy performed more sluggishly than anticipated. While the Seven-Year Plan had set a target of an average annual growth rate of 18 percent, the reported figure for 1961–64 was only 14.3 percent.[32]

To some degree, this inadequate performance no doubt reflected deficiencies in execution of the plan, but it also mirrored the overly ambitious targets of the plan itself. That excessive ambitiousness, in turn, stemmed from an original expectation that the USSR would provide more aid than actually proved to be forthcoming. In 1960, Soviet aid deliveries had already dropped to less than 2.6 percent of state revenues, and while they did not totally cease during 1961–65, they constituted only a tiny fraction of state revenues.[33] This situation was, of course, the result of new Soviet-Korean tensions growing largely, but not exclusively, out of Pyongyang's support of the Chinese in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Yet the shift in strategy flowed at least in part from a policy dispute within the leadership and the victory of representatives of a "military-industrial" complex over advocates of more balanced economic growth. This dispute had begun to take shape at the Fifth Plenum of the KWP's Central Committee in December 1962. Such external factors as the escalation of the Sino-Soviet conflict (with the attendant rising competition between the two Communist powers for backing from smaller parties and regimes) and the Soviet backdown in the Cuban missile crisis (which tended to raise doubts about the USSR's resolve and reliability as an ally) provoked debates within the leadership over the proper foreign policy to follow, and attitudes on this question generated conflicting views on domestic economic strategy.[34]

One group wanted to give priority to a defense buildup—*i.e.*, to concentrate resources on expanding those sections of heavy industry oriented toward defense, especially the machine-building industry. Their chief argument was that there was danger of a possible attack from South Korea in the wake of the military takeover there in 1961, which they perceived as having been carried out with the support of the US military command in South Korea. This group was apparently led by such prominent military leaders as Kim Ch'ang-bong (Minister of Defense), Ch'oe Kuang (General Chief of Staff of the North Korean People's Army), and Ho Pong-hak

[32] See Pong S. Lee, "Overstatement of North Korean Industrial Growth: 1946–1963," *ibid.*, Vol. 1, No. 2, July 1971, pp. 3–14. Also see Chung, *loc. cit.*, pp. 20–22.

[33] On Soviet aid to North Korea, see V. V. Martynov, *Koreia*, Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Mysl," 1970, p. 69. Also see *Area Handbook for North Korea*, pp. 299–306.

[34] These and subsequent interpretations of the policy conflict are based on such sources as *Yongu Nonch'ong* (Research Forum) and *Kukche Munje* (International Questions), both publications of the Far Eastern Research Institute in Seoul, Republic of Korea.

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(General Political Commissar for the North Korean People's Army), all of them five-star generals in active service. Besides pressing for the construction of defensive fortifications throughout North Korea, it should be noted, these men favored a close alliance with the Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet conflict; they wanted to modernize and professionalize the North Korean Army with the assistance of the Soviet Union.

The other group opposed expansion of the country's defense forces and urged continued stress on broad-based economic development. Its leaders included Pak Kum-ch'ol (Organization Director of the KWP's Central Committee and a long-time associate of Premier Kim), Kim To-man (Director of the KWP's Propaganda and Agitation Department), and Yi Hyo-sun (Director of the KWP's Liaison Bureau).

Premier Kim Il Sung, as coordinator and manager of the policymaking process, seems to have assumed a neutral and independent posture in the policy dispute for a time (though he explicitly rejected proposals to back Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute). However, with the fall of Khrushchev in October 1964 (which paved the way for an easing of Soviet-Korean discord), the escalation of the war in Vietnam in 1965 and South Korea's decision to send troops there to support South Vietnam (which the North Koreans interpreted as indicative of Seoul's readiness to engage in military adventures beyond South Korea's borders), Kim appears to have shifted somewhat toward the position of the first group, eventually adopting a compromise policy. While he insisted on a "self-reliant" approach to North Korea's economic development, he endorsed a major strengthening of the national defense forces and a greater degree of cooperation with Moscow. In accordance with this decision, he announced in October 1966 that the time limit for the fulfillment of the Seven-Year Plan would be extended to 1970.[35]

During the 1967–69 period, then, the primary concern was with increasing output in the defense-related portions of heavy industry. One can get some notion of the efforts and resources expended to this end from the jump in military expenditures to 31.1 percent of the total national budget in the fiscal year 1967–68, as compared with only 19 percent in 1960–61.[36] (The years 1967–69, it should be recalled, witnessed North Korea's adoption of a highly militant posture toward the United States and South Korea. Not only did the North Koreans seize the US intelligence ship Pueblo, but they also sent agents into Seoul to try to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung Hee.)

But 1969 brought with it developments that foreshadowed a possible new stage in North Korean economic strategy. At the Fourth Party Conference of the North Korean People's Army in January of that year, Minister of Defense Kim Ch'ang-bong and other leading proponents of a military buildup during the mid-1960's were dismissed from their posts. According to Premier Kim's criticism of the group, they had pressed hard in the 1964–68 period for an alliance with the USSR in order to obtain equipment for the modernization of the North Korean military forces, but even though Pyongyang had bettered its relations with Moscow, it had not managed to secure the military and economic aid required from the Soviet Union to carry out the proposed modernization. Moreover, the group's insistence on attaching prime importance to modernization of the military forces had put them in conflict with Premier Kim's views on how best to prepare for conventional warfare. He held that it was vital that recruitment for the worker-peasant militia not be neglected and that



A North Korean stamping press with a slogan exhorting the workers to greater effort.

—Sovfoto.

[35] Kim Il Sung, "The Present Situation and the Task Confronting Our Party," report delivered at a conference of the Korean Workers' Party on Oct. 5, 1966, in *Kim's Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 103–85.

[36] Kim Il, "Concerning the Six-Year Plan (1971–76) for the Development of the People's Economy of the DPRK," *loc. cit.*

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the militia's strength must be maintained at one and a half million.[37]

As a result of the purge, Ch'oe Hyon (a member of the Politburo and a former Minister of Defense) once again became Minister of Defense; O Chin-u (General Chief of Staff of the North Korean ground forces) took over as General Chief of Staff of the North Korean People's Army; and Kim Yong-chu (previously Organization Director of the KWP and a member of the Politburo) became General Political Commissar of the North Korean People's Army. In the light of ensuing events, it would appear that this ascendant group had been counseling a return to a less militant line toward the external world and to a more balanced development strategy. At any rate, the North Korean government subsequently announced that whereas defense expenditures had amounted to 31.3 percent of its total budget in 1969–70, such expenditures would total only 17 percent in 1972.[38]

The downgrading of defense considerations, however, did not settle all matters of controversy with respect to a revamped strategy of development. A group of developmental theorists including Yi Chong-ok (Vice Premier and Chairman of the State Planning Commission), Kim Kuang-hyop (Vice Premier and a former Minister of Defense), Sok San (Vice Premier and Minister of Social Security), and Han Sang-tu (a former Minister of Finance) advanced the "revisionist" proposition that the regime should in the future set more modest targets for growth than it had in the past.[39] They argued that the expansion of consumer and light industry and the improvement of performance in the agricultural sector would necessitate acceptance of lower rates of growth than had prevailed in earlier years.

Premier Kim rejected this line of argument, although he endorsed the desirability of paying increased attention to consumer and light industry and to agriculture. He held that North Korea could sustain a high rate of growth through continuing efforts to mobilize the revolutionary zeal and enthusiasm of the population and through programs to develop local small-scale industry.[40] His position clearly carried the day. All the top "revisionists" just mentioned lost their jobs when the North Korean cabinet was restructured in July 1970. Moreover, the new plan for 1971–76 established a highly ambitious target of 14 percent as the average annual growth rate for the period.[41]

Prospects

In turning now to a brief assessment of the likely course of North Korea's economic development in the near future, we must recognize that the regime's current approach to effecting economic development will probably not change so long as Kim Il Sung remains on the political scene. Kim continues to believe that the ideological commitment and moral dedication of human beings can play a major part in the achievement of rapid economic progress; consequently, he places great stress on "the ideological and cultural revolution to remold the consciousness of the people and enhance their technical and cultural level." [42] Thus, a blend of moral and material incentives and of elements of both a cultural and a technological revolution appear to be inevitable. The concrete features of such a blend have been laid down in present policies, and these methods have been described as Kim's original contribution to Marxism-Leninism.

As for the strategy of development, the new Six-Year Plan charts a course which aims primarily, according to Vice Premier Kim Il, to "consolidate further the material and technical foundation of socialism and free the working people from arduous labor." [43] While the development of heavy industry still plays an important role in the overall picture, consumer and light industry and agriculture are to get a greater proportion of total investments than

[37] Kim Il Sung's speech to the Fourth Party Conference of the North Korean People's Army in January 1969 was made available to this writer by the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency in Seoul, Korea. The author is particularly grateful to General S. K. Yoon, one of the directors of the Agency's Bureau, for his assistance.

[38] See Kim Kyong-yon, "The Execution of the Budget of 1972 of the Korean Democratic People's Republic," report of the Finance Minister to the Supreme People's Assembly on April 29, 1972, in *Gekkan Chosen Shiryo* (Monthly of Korean Materials—Tokyo, Chosen Mondai Kenkyujo), July 1972, pp. 64–92.

[39] See Takehiko Hayashi, *Kita Chosen to Minami Chosen* (North Korea and South Korea), Tokyo, Saimaru Publishing Society, 1971, pp. 205–08.

[40] Kim Il Sung, "On Some Theoretical Problems of the Socialist Economy," answers to questions raised by scientific and educational workers on March 1, 1969, in *Juche: The Speeches and Writings of Kim Il Sung*, New York, Grossman Publishers, 1972, pp. 127–47.

[41] Kim Il Sung, "Summary Report of the Work of the Central Committee to the Fifth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea," *loc. cit.*

[42] "On Some Theoretical Problems of the Socialist Economy," *loc cit.*

[43] See his report on "The Six-Year Economic Development Plan (1971–1976)," in *Nodong Sinmun*, Nov. 10, 1970.

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Actual and Planned Output for Certain Industries, 1961–76

	1961 Output	1967 (1970) Target*	1970 Output	1976 Target
Electricity (in 1,000,000 kwh)	9,700	16,000-17,000	16,500	28,000-30,000
Coal (in 1,000 tons)	12,000	23,000-25,000	27,500	50,000-53,000
Steel (in 1,000 tons)	790	2,200-2,500	2,200	3,500-3,800
Chemical fertilizer (in 1,000 tons)	700	1,500-1,700	1,500	2,800-3,000
Cement (in 1,000 tons)	2,400	4,000-4,500	4,500	7,500-8,000

* In 1966, the government extended the date for the completion of the Seven-Year Plan from 1967 to 1970.

SOURCES: The figures for 1961 output and the Seven-Year Plan targets for 1967 output come from Kim Il Sung's report to the Fourth KWP Congress on Sept. 11, 1961. See *Kin Nichi Sei Chosaku-shu* (Collected Works of Kim Il Sung), Tokyo, Mirai-sha, 1970. Vol. 2, pp. 223-359. The 1970 output figures and the Six-Year Plan targets for 1976 output are from Kim Il's report, "Concerning the Six-Year Plan (1971-76) for the Development of the People's Economy of the DPRK," in *Nodong Sinmun* (Pyongyang), Nov. 10, 1970.

they have in the past. In line with this commitment, for example, investments in the latter sectors rose from 20 percent of the total state budget in 1970 to 22 percent in 1971–72. During the plan period, the value of consumer goods turned out is supposed to increase by 100 percent (compared with a target of 60–65 percent in the previous Seven-Year Plan). As a result of this growth, by 1976 the output of household refrigerators is to rise to 126,000 units, that of washing machines to 110,000 units, and that of television sets to 100,000 units. By 1976, too, the country's production of food grains is to reach 7–7.5 million metric tons. During the plan period, the differences between industrial workers and agricultural workers are supposed to be eliminated, and the income of the cooperative farmer is to increase by 50 percent.[44]

Whether the strategy set forth in the plan will continue to be operative until 1976 depends essentially upon two factors. The first has to do with the plan itself. As already noted, the document calls for an average annual rate of growth of 14 percent. This figure may prove difficult for the regime to attain. During the 1961–70 period, for instance, the reported average annual rate of growth was only 12.8 percent, against a planned figure of 18 percent.[45] The 1971–76 plan's targets for industrial output seem particularly high in light of the record during 1961–70. As the table above shows, the targets for 1976 entail at least as great a rise in output in six years as most industries registered in the previous 10 years. If shortfalls in production occur, particularly in heavy industry, the regime could well decide to revise its investment plans and cut down on inputs into consumer and light industry and agriculture.

The second factor is the international environment. Any drastic change in the degree of threat that Pyongyang perceives from the outside world could induce it to spend more money on defense. Such a decision would obviously necessitate a reallocation of available resources.

With the general easing of tensions in the Far East because of improved US-Chinese and Japanese-Chinese relations and the opening of dialogue between North and South Korea, the chances of the international environment interfering with the plan appear fairly remote at the moment. Whether or not the regime persists in the current strategy, then, will probably be determined by the ability of the North Korean economy to perform well enough to meet the plan's optimistic goals.

[44] *Ibid.*

[45] *Ibid.*

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Foreign and Reunification Policies

By Rinn-sup Shinn

On November 4, 1972, the government of North Korea signed an agreement with its counterpart in the South pledging the two regimes to cease aiming hostile propaganda at each other by radio, loudspeakers or leaflets, and spelling out in some detail the organization and objectives of a North-South Coordinating Committee.[1] This exercise in good-neighborly relations and the exploration of means to effect the peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula is remarkable by any standards. To the casual observer, such a venture may seem to signify a major departure in the foreign policy of the Communist regime in Pyongyang, and in fact, if the talks are to produce any meaningful outcome, they doubtless will entail dramatic adjustments in North Korea's foreign and domestic policies. Yet, the vaguely defined goal of *minjok t'ong il* (national unification) has long been professed by both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK—North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (ROK—South Korea)—indeed, if anything, Pyongyang has outdone Seoul in this rhetorical contest over the years.

It seems particularly appropriate at this point, when events on the Korean peninsula appear to be taking a dramatic turn, to undertake a critical reexamination of the record of Pyongyang's international and inter-Korean policies over the years. By concentrating on a chronological, situation-by-situation approach emphasizing events since the mid-1960's, one may hope to sharpen the reader's awareness of the causes and effects of the many shifts and turns in North Korean foreign policy, to provide a clearer picture of the elements of continuity and change, to determine what policy options Pyongyang has and will have available in light of its objective capabilities and limitations, and above all to dispel some unwarranted assumptions about North Korean foreign policy in general. Only then can one essay judgments concerning the sincerity of the North's commitment to the talks on unification, the prospects for their success, the potential gains to Pyongyang from an era of détente, and the changes which such a rapprochement might bring about in North Korea's long-term foreign policy objectives.

This analysis proceeds from the postulation that North Korea, like any other sovereign political entity, formulates and executes its foreign policies in order to achieve a set of rationally defined objectives. A cursory examination of the record of Pyongyang's foreign policy reveals the following, often intersecting, goals: to maximize North Korea's national security; to utilize where possible external resources—particularly those of the USSR and the People's Republic of China—to bolster its economy and enhance its military strength; to increase its domestic security and improve its international stature through unification of the Korean peninsula on its own terms—by forcing the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea and/or by eliminating the South Korean counterregime; and to seek international recognition, if not as the only lawful government on the Korean peninsula, then at minimum as a coequal to the regime in Seoul in laying claim to leadership of the Korean nation.

In pursuing these ends, Premier Kim Il Sung has religiously stressed the importance of self-help as epitomized in his concept of *chuch'e* (roughly translated as "national self-reliance"). However, he has had to confront the hard reality that his attempts

Mr. Shinn is a Senior Research Scientist with Foreign Area Studies, The American University (Washington, DC). He was project leader and co-author of Area Handbook for North Korea, *1969, and* Area Handbook for India, *1970, and contributed to* Area Handbook for the People's Republic of China, *1972.*

[1] *Nodong Sinmun* (Pyongyang), Nov. 5, 1972.

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to have North Korea go it alone have placed certain limitations on his freedom of action, and that, in fact, the practical needs of maintaining domestic and external security have necessitated a degree of dependence on other Communist countries. But in turning to such sources of economic and military assistance as the USSR and the People's Republic of China, North Korea has always insisted that such aid be given without any conditions impinging on its sovereignty. In this respect, Premier Kim Il Sung's doctrine of *chuch'e* has shielded his regime from unwelcome intrusions of Soviet and Chinese influence.

The Insecurity Factor

However, this emphasis also has its drawbacks. Exposed to the combined military might of US and ROK forces to the south, uncertain about the firmness of fraternal support from Moscow and Peking in the event of a major crisis, and dismayed by the deteriorating relations between his two Communist patrons, the North Korean leader has experienced a chronic feeling of insecurity. One of the burdens of the present study is to demonstrate that this insecurity stemming from inadequate economic and military strength has been at the root of the seemingly unpredictable foreign policy behavior of the North in recent years.

It is important that one not ignore this North Korean perspective in examining the current North-South search for reconciliation, for although the talks began in earnest in August 1971, about a month after President Nixon announced his intention to visit Peking, the recent developments in Korea can hardly be attributed solely to this change in US Asian policy. The post-1971 dialogue with the South is only the latest in a long series of efforts by North Korea to regulate its relations with the ROK—be it through negotiation or subversion—in such a manner as to achieve greater security for itself. In order to understand the present direction of Pyongyang's policies, therefore, one must examine the ways in which the DPRK pursued its foreign policy objectives prior to 1971.[2]

One can trace the evolution of North Korean foreign policy through a number of distinct stages. The first stage, from 1945 to 1950, was characterized by the primacy of a pro-Soviet orientation in Pyongyang's external posture, reflecting the fact that the

[2] The best study on the pre-1969 phase of North Korean external relations is Byung Chul Koh, *The Foreign Policy of North Korea*, New York, Praeger, 1969.



Once a "bridge of no return," this span connecting the Demilitarized Zone with North Korea has now become a channel for North-South communications. Here, North Korean guards admit negotiators from the South.

—Robert Lebeck of Stern via Black Star.

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USSR was the only source of essential economic and military assistance available to the fledgling North Korean polity. If Premier Kim Il Sung had any reservations about Moscow's politically domineering and economically exploitative policies toward his regime during this period, he remained silent.

Apart from cultivating the Soviet link by fervent public protestations of fidelity to Stalin, Kim's major concern in this period was to strengthen the relative position of his government by attempting to subvert the counterpart regime in the South through insurrectionary tactics carried out by Pyongyang's political arm there, the South Korean Labor Party. However, this party was outlawed in late 1948, and with the tactic of revolution from below bogged down, North Korea turned to the tactic of united front from above with a strong appeal to nationalist sentiments in the South. It repeatedly declared that the problem of Korean unification should be solved by the Korean people themselves, that US troops and the United Nations representatives should be withdrawn from the South, and that South Korea should consent to the establishment of a unified government through political negotiations.

A Costly Gamble

Frustrated in these efforts, North Korea launched an effort to solve the Korean question once and for all by direct military means. This costly and unsuccessful war effort—lasting from June 1950 to July 1953—all but sealed the fate of Korea as a permanently divided nation, particularly because of the legacy of mistrust and bitterness left by Pyongyang's invasion among the South Koreans, which has frustrated repeated subsequent North Korean proposals for peace and brotherhood. Moreover, North Korea has had to live down its negative image as the aggressor in the Korean War and hence an international outlaw—a factor that has hampered its efforts to make friends among non-Communist nations.

The war had other sobering effects. It resulted in the prolonged stationing of US troops in the South, which not only nourished North Korea's sense of insecurity but also put constraints on the realization of Pyongyang's reunification ambitions. Furthermore, the war taught Kim Il Sung an important lesson in international politics—never to take anything for granted even in relations with fraternal countries. Stalin's failure to provide all-out support during the crucial first two months of the war drove home to Kim the practical limitations of "proletarian internationalism" and appears to have bolstered his conviction that North Korea's own survival would be in peril if it did not achieve economic and military self-sufficiency. His heightened resolve to practice *chuch'e* in foreign policy, as in other areas, would soon take on the characteristics of national exclusiveness and would come to strain Pyongyang's relations with its major Communist allies.

The following stage in the foreign policy of the DPRK (1954-1960) featured a concerted peace offensive toward the ROK, which was designed primarily to ease tensions in Korea so that Pyongyang could concentrate on postwar economic reconstruction in relative security. In a scheme for peace and unification unveiled at Geneva in April-June 1954, North Korea called for the formation of an all-Korean commission which would adopt measures to initiate economic and cultural cooperation and exchanges and to terminate the garrison-state atmosphere in North-South relations as early as practicable. Pyongyang's scheme called not only for withdrawal of "all foreign troops" from Korea but also for reductions in the armed forces of the two sides to 100,000 men or less within a year.[3]

Not surprisingly, South Korea rejected the overture as propaganda; in the immediate postwar climate of mutual hatred, no amount of honeyed rhetoric from Pyongyang would have been palatable to the South. However, a critical examination of the circumstances under which the Geneva proposal was put forward (and elaborated through the remainder of the 1950's) suggests that North Korea may well have been sincere in its efforts to reduce tensions on the peninsula. For it was in 1954 that the Pyongyang regime was faced with the decision of Communist China—which had pulled North Korea from the jaws of certain total defeat in October 1950—to withdraw all of its troops from the peninsula by the end of 1955, without any assurances of a reciprocal withdrawal by the United States.[4] By October 1954, China already had withdrawn 87,900 men, and an additional 52,200 were pulled out between April and October 1955. China's military phase-out

[3] *Toitsu Chosen Nenkan, 1967-68*—One Korea Yearbook, 1967-68, Tokyo, Toitsu Chosen Shimbunsha, 1967, pp. 178-89. See also Han K. Kim, Ed., *Reunification of Korea; 50 Basic Documents*, Washington, DC, Institute for Asian Studies, 1972, pp. 30-31.

[4] *Pukhan Ch'onggam* (General Survey of North Korea), Seoul, Kongsankwon Munje Yonguso, 1968, pp. 842-43.

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was reportedly delayed until October 1958 in response to the urgent request of Kim Il Sung.[5] This unilateral withdrawal posed a grave potential threat to Pyongyang's security and was no doubt the reason why North Korea further offered in August 1955 to foreswear the use of force against the South in return for similar assurances from Seoul. The repeated proposals for peace and mutual force reductions also reflected Pyongyang's need to reduce defense spending and to divert scarce manpower to economic reconstruction. In May 1956, a unilateral demobilization of 80,000 men was announced in the North,[6] and six months later Pyongyang called for a North-South conference on disarmament.

The North continued to elaborate on these themes of accommodation and mutual force reduction until August 1960, when Kim Il Sung came forth with a new "confederation" scheme designed to promote cooperation and mutual understanding as the basis for reaching the distant goal of reunification. This proposal, which has served as the model for other subsequent North Korean proposals, was predicated on the assumption that both Koreas would retain their existing political systems and their respective "independent activities." The two sides would be linked by a joint intergovernmental Supreme National Commission, which would be responsible for regulating economic and cultural matters, but not political affairs. If the South would not consent to formation of such a commission, an alternative nongovernmental "purely economic commission" might be formed to facilitate mutual economic cooperation and assistance. Kim also proposed establishment of links in the fields of science, literature, the arts, and sports. As always, the issue of North Korea's security was also broached—in proposals for the immediate withdrawal of US troops from the South and a reciprocal North-South force reduction to 100,000 men or less on each side.[7]

This proposal not only was in keeping with the then-current Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence, but was also consonant with Pyongyang's own economic and security objectives. Another compelling reason for proposing a confederation was Kim's realization that his efforts to take over the South would continue to be fruitless so long as the South Korean people feared and distrusted his regime. That this was indeed the prevailing sentiment in the South had become glaringly clear during the first half of 1960. When student uprisings toppled Syngman Rhee's unpopular regime in April 1960, it seemed to North Korea that the opportunity had finally arrived when the anti-Communist ROK could be overthrown by a popular revolution which would create a government either neutral or friendly toward Pyongyang. However, despite the North's intensified exhortations to the people of the South, nothing of the sort occurred.

In the Shadow of Clashing Allies

To these problems there was soon added another, more serious matter—the growing Sino-Soviet dispute—reactions to which dominated the next stage of North Korean foreign policy. The opening of a rift between Peking and Moscow, two capitals on which North Korea still felt forced to rely for protection against a perceived threat from the South, introduced a new element of anxiety into Kim Il Sung's security calculations. He spent the next five years (1961-65) attempting to compensate for this adverse development by encouraging revolution in the South (albeit with minimum visible involvement of the North) and by trying to accelerate defense and economic construction at home despite his limited resources.

Initially, it seemed as if the widening Sino-Soviet split would have no adverse effects. When a military regime came to power in Seoul in May 1961, Kim Il Sung was able to extract prompt commitments of military support from the USSR and the People's Republic of China under separate mutual assistance treaties. But the North Korean leader soon found good cause to question the reliability of such pledges when the Soviet leadership decided not to support China in the Sino-Indian border conflict of October 1962 and Khruschchev apparently lost his nerve during the Cuban missile crisis of the same month. Almost immediately, Kim rushed a military delegation to Moscow, but it evidently failed to bring home anything to soothe his anxiety.

As a result of these jolts, the KWP in December 1962 announced its grim resolve to achieve a "self-reliant" defense posture through a new military line which sought to strengthen the ideological commitment of every soldier, to modernize the North's arms and equipment, to arm the entire population, and to transform the whole country into an impregnable

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 246.

[6] Broadcast of the Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, Oct. 8, 1969.

[7] For excerpts from this proposal, see Han K. Kim, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-44.

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fortress.[8] Viewed in the context of the events of 1962, Pyongyang's increased attention to military preparedness since December 1962 can be interpreted more as a defensive reaction to the perceived unreliability of the Soviet Union as an ally than as the start of preparations for yet another invasion of South Korea.

While attempting to strengthen the North against the potential threat to its security posed by the new military regime in the South, the North Korean leadership also intensified its efforts to unify the peninsula on its own terms. As outlined by Kim Il Sung at the September 1961 Fourth Congress of the KWP, the strategy adopted involved the organization in the South of a "revolutionary party which takes Marxism-Leninism as its guiding principle" and which would strive to form a broad anti-US "national-salvation united front" in the South. Kim envisaged a three-stage advance to unification: removal of US troops from the South under pressure of the united front, seizure of power in the South by the "people," and finally "peaceful unification" of the peninsula through negotiations between "the patriotic, democratic forces of South Korea and the patriotic, socialist forces of North Korea." [9] Although this three-stage unification formula contained no explicit reference to the use of violence, Premier Kim Il Sung was not so naive as to expect that the South Korean people could overthrow the military regime in Seoul without aid from North Korea or without resorting to a combination of armed insurrection, sabotage and terrorist tactics. Thus, "peaceful unification" related only to the negotiatory third phase which would follow establishment of a people's regime in the South, and it did not necessarily preclude violence in the earlier phase—as long as North Korea was not directly implicated.

The contradictory nature of North Korean objectives vis-à-vis the South was demonstrated in Kim's October 23, 1962, call for good-neighborly relations with the ROK. On the one hand, noting that "the Korean people do not want a fratricidal war, nor do they want to squander the precious fruits of their labor in a civil war," he disavowed any intention to impose communism on South Korea and claimed that the question of whether communism was appropriate in the South should be freely decided by the South Koreans themselves. He proposed a mutual nonaggression pact and mutual force reductions that would enable the North and South "to build the national economy and improve the living conditions of the people." But at the same time, he exhorted "people of all walks of life in South Korea—workers, peasants, soldiers, youth and students, intellectuals and others—" to rise up and "isolate the US imperialists and [forces of] internal reaction and prevent the reactionary rulers from relying upon outside forces."[10] If Kim was genuinely interested in resolving the division of Korea by peaceful means, such simultaneous appeals for goodwill and for struggle were mutually self-defeating.



North Korean troops on duty along the 38th parallel.

—*China Pictorial* (Peking), September 1971, p. 35.

As the months and years rolled by without any sign of the emergence of a revolutionary party in South Korea, Kim Il Sung became convinced that unification could not be achieved merely by propaganda and that more positive action was required. In February 1964 he outlined a blueprint for revolution in the South which stressed the need for "three revolutionary forces"—North Korean, South Korean, and international. According to the principle of *chuch'e*, the first two would have to become strong before they could seek international assistance. He once again called on South Koreans to

[8] *Nodong Sinmun*, Dec. 16 and 17, 1962.

[9] Kim Il Sung, *Selected Works*, Pyongyang, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1965, Vol. II, pp. 212, 219, 221-22.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 356-57, 360, 362.

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organize their own party and to initiate diverse struggles combining both peaceful and violent means based on their own strategic and tactical perceptions. Although Kim Il Sung stressed that actual revolutionary struggles should be carried out by the South Koreans themselves, he also made the significant admission that the North would extend assistance and suggested that the "nuclear leadership" in the South should be composed of "superior persons from among North and South Koreans."[11] According to a subsequent North Korean account, revolutionary forces in the South formed their first political instrument—the Revolutionary Party for Unification—shortly thereafter, in March 1964.[12]

In the meantime, North Korea's domestic and external situation had been deteriorating. At home, unrealistic planning, structural imbalances, scarcity of labor and resources, inadequate capital inflows from abroad, and stagnation of agricultural production were resulting in a slowdown of economic growth[13] at a time when the ROK showed no signs of internal collapse. Furthermore, North Korea could not very well turn to the USSR for aid inasmuch as the emergence of a number of political and ideological differences between the two countries had led many—including the Kremlin leaders—to believe that the DPRK was siding with China in the strife between the two Communist powers. Kim Il Sung, of course, denied this on the grounds that he had merely exercised his self-reliance in foreign policy on the basis of his own independent judgment of the issues involved. But such *chuch'e* posturing, however gratifying psychologically, was no substitute for much-needed economic goods, arms and materiel. Consequently, North Korea was finally constrained to set aside its ideological and political differences with Moscow. Although Pyongyang's adoption of a more tolerant attitude toward "revisionism" (read "the Soviet Union") clearly displeased Peking, it did serve to bring Soviet Premier Kosygin to the North Korean capital in February 1965 with promises of economic credits and arms assistance.

Thus, the stage seemed set for a period of consolidation during which the DPRK would concentrate its energies on economic development and defense preparations while maintaining a low profile in its relations with the South by relying mostly on low-key clandestine operations there. Indeed, this option was apparently advocated by some elements within the KWP leadership, notably by Im Ch'un-ch'u, then head of South Korean operations. However, by the end of 1966, North Korean foreign policy had launched into a period of extreme bellicosity, even recklessness. What caused this sudden, dramatic reversal of earlier trends?

A Shift to Militancy

The major new element in North Korean calculations was South Korea's widening military participation in the Vietnam conflict,[14] a development which could only have been viewed in Pyongyang as an indication of Seoul's military aggressiveness and hence as a threat to North Korea's national security. Pyongyang also saw it as a blow to North Korea's international standing, particularly since the South was contending that its role in Vietnam had "remarkably" increased Seoul's "international stature."[15] Even more important, the DPRK had reason to fear that the ROK would be strengthened militarily and economically as a result of the Vietnam involvement. Such anxieties were fueled by reports emanating from Seoul in early 1966 that the United States would not only assist the South's economic development but also provide considerable military assistance grants for the modernization of ROK armed forces.[16] Furthermore, South Korea stood to earn considerable sums of foreign exchange on its own right in Vietnam.[17]

Under these circumstances, Premier Kim Il Sung evidently sided with those elements in the KWP

[11] *Kim Il Sung Chojak Sonjip* (Selected Works of Kim Il Sung), Pyongyang, Inminch'ulp'ansa, 1969, Vol. IV, pp. 46-49, *passim.*

[12] Pyongyang, Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) broadcast in English, June 20, 1970.

[13] *Pukhan Ch'onggam*, pp. 322-23.

[14] For a comprehensive account of the circumstances leading to the ROK's involvement in Vietnam, see United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st Congress, *United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1971, Vol. II, Parts 5-11, pp. 1519-1768.

[15] Seoul Domestic Service in Korean, Feb. 7, 1966.

[16] *Korea Herald* (Seoul), Jan. 27, 1966, and Seoul Domestic Service in Korean, Feb. 23, 1966. The US military assistance grants to the ROK related to the Vietnam action totaled $1,453,900,000 from fiscal year 1966 through 1971. See US Agency for International Development, *US Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations (Obligations and Loan Authorizations July 1, 1945-June 30, 1971)*, Washington, DC, AID, 1972, p. 73.

[17] From September 1966 through September 1971, South Korea earned $764,195,000 in connection with commercial exports, military commodity procurement, war risk insurance premiums, contracts for services, construction contracts, and remittances of military and civilian personnel connected with the Vietnam action. See *Shin-A Ilbo* (Seoul), Nov. 10, 1971.

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Table 1. North Korean Subversive Activity (1965-72)

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972[a]
INCIDENTS								
Significant incidents south of the Military Demarcation Line in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)	42	37	445	486	87	66	37	0
Significant incidents inside the Republic of Korea (ROK)	17	13	121	143	24	47	10	0
Exchanges of fire in the DMZ	23	19	122	236	55	42	31	0
Exchanges of fire inside the ROK	6	11	96	120	22	26	6	0
Total of incidents	88	80	784	985	188	181	84	0
CASUALTIES								
North Koreans killed in the ROK	4	18	228	321	55	46	34	0
North Koreans captured in the ROK	51	21	57	13	6	3	2	0
United Nations Command (UNC) military personnel killed in the ROK	21	35	131	162	15	9	22	0
UNC military personnel wounded in the ROK	6	29	294	294	44	22	47	0
ROK National Police and civilians killed in the ROK	19	4	22	35	19	7	8	0
ROK National Police and other civilians wounded in the ROK	13	5	53	16	17	17	6	0
Total killed, wounded, and captured	114	112	785	841	156	104	119	0

[a] Through August 18, 1972.

SOURCE: *Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, General Assembly Official Records, 25th Session, Supplement No. 26 (A/8026)*, New York, 1970, p. 29, and *Report of UNCURK, General Assembly Records, 27th Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/8727)*, New York, 1972, pp. 16-17. The latter source noted that "no significant event was reported . . . after the end of October 1971. The absence of incidents coincided with favorable developments in the Red Cross talks and the secret negotiations leading to the announcement of the Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972. . . ."

leadership that argued that the North's interests would best be served by staging militant diversionary actions against South Korea. At an important conference of the KWP held in October 1966, he announced that the seven-year economic plan due to be completed in 1967 would be extended three more years in order to allow for a larger allocation of resources to the defense sector. Predictably, this victory of the hardliners led to the removal in March 1967 of more than 100 leading moderates (including Im Ch'un-ch'u) from the KWP hierarchy.[18]

The repercussions of this shift in North Korean foreign policy were soon felt. In 1967 and 1968, the level of Pyongyang's belligerent actions directed against the South rose sharply (see Table 1). The two regimes came perilously close to armed hostilities on January 21, 1968, when a 31-member commando team attempted to assassinate ROK President Park Chung Hee, a mission which Pyongyang has maintained was the work of South Korean guerrillas.[19] North Korea was also reported to have begun training would-be guerrillas and revolutionaries from national liberation movements and leftist extremist groups the world over, and even to have sent a small number of psychological warfare cadres to the jungles of South Vietnam to work on South Korean soldiers fighting there.[20]

Kim's regime simultaneously manifested increased bellicosity toward the United States. Two days after the commando attempt on Park Chung Hee, North Korea seized the USS Pueblo off Wonson, and on April 15, 1969—in a move apparently timed to coincide with Kim Il Sung's 57th birthday—the North Koreans downed a United States EC–121 reconnaissance plane over international waters. Although it is not clear whether these two incidents were planned at the highest echelons in Pyongyang or merely resulted from overzealousness on the part of local commanders in implementing militant statements originally designed primarily for their deterrent psychological impact on would-be "aggressors," they certainly imparted a cutting edge to Pyongyang's concurrent propaganda and diplomatic effort aimed at isolating and condemning the ROK as a lackey of American "imperialism" and at arous-

[18] Kim T'ae-so, "The Northern Puppet's Self-reliant Line as Seen from a Policy Point of View," *Kukche Munje* (Seoul), May 1971, p. 26.

[19] Pyongyang, KCNA in English, Dec. 28, 1968.

[20] *Dong-A Ilbo* (Seoul), Dec. 18, 1969, and Jan. 8, 1970. Also *Kyunghyang Sinmun* (Seoul), May 11, 1971.

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ing international opinion—particularly in the Third World—against the continued American military presence in South Korea.[21] The goal—as presented to Asian, African and Latin American countries in the words of Kim Il Sung—was for all small countries to pool their strength in order to "tear off the left and right arms of US imperialism, tear off its left and right legs, and behead it. . . ." [22]

In taking this militant line, North Korea sought to pose as the most reliable anticolonial, anti-imperialist friend of the small developing nations. To highlight this claim, Pyongyang was not above assailing the USSR for its "line of compromise with imperialism," and China for its "practice of fearing to fight against imperialism by deeds while only talking big of opposing imperialism." [23]

On balance, one may question whether North Korea profited from this militant policy line. For example, one cannot with any certainty credit Pyongyang's diversionary provocations with bringing about South Korea's decision not to send any additional combatants to South Vietnam after late 1967. To be sure, North Korea succeeded in attracting worldwide attention and in emerging from its former obscure position in the shadow of its better-known rival in the South. During 1966–68, Pyongyang did succeed in establishing diplomatic relations with Syria, Burundi, Somalia, Iraq, and South Yemen, in developing consular ties with Pakistan, and in opening trade missions in France, Kuwait and Lebanon (see Table 2). Yet North Korea's growing reputation for reckless, irrational behavior could, in the long run, only impede efforts to make new friends abroad.

Nor did Pyongyang's anti-ROK campaign appreciably weaken Seoul politically, economically or militarily. President Park Chung Hee was returned to power in the May 1967 elections, South Korea's economy continued to grow by leaps and bounds, and foreign confidence in the ROK was reflected in a steadily rising level of foreign investments in the South. The US military presence in the South remained credible, and the ROK's arms buildup continued apace—thanks in part to North Korea's belligerent posture. Pyongyang's tactics thus had the further ironic result of forcing the North to divert a still larger portion of its development resources to the defense sector in order to counteract the ROK's stepped-up defense preparations. Moreover, the North Korean campaign hardened the South Koreans' fear and distrust of the Communist government and provided fuel for the ROK government's argument that US troops must remain in the South at least until it had developed sufficient strength to counter the North on its own or until the northern threat became history. Under the circumstances, Kim Il Sung found it difficult to make any headway with the "people's democratic revolution" in South Korea.

Revival of Moderation

The counterproductive consequences of Pyongyang's hostile tactics toward the South made a shift in those tactics just a matter of time. Such a shift was, in fact, foreshadowed in December 1968 and January 1969 by the dismissal of a dozen or so high-ranking military officials (among them the Minister of Defense Kim Ch'ang-bong, and General Ho Pong-hak, head of South Korean operations).[24] On January 18, 1969, the Pyongyang Domestic Service broadcast a commentary which urged caution concerning tendencies toward "false leftism and rightism." Spotlighting the urgency of lowering Pyongyang's own risky "support" profile in the South, the broadcast stated:

All the facts indicate that the revolutionary forces in South Korea are required to make preparations more intensively than ever before.

In response to this call for greater self-help, the clandestine Revolutionary Party for Unification announced its first "manifesto" in August 1969 along with a 12-point action program and the establishment of a "central committee." [25]

[21] Despite the testimony of Pueblo Commander Bucher before a naval court of inquiry that his ship had been spotted by North Korean "fishing boats" the day before its seizure and that, therefore, "Pyongyang must have had enough time for deliberation" (cited in B. C. Koh, "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective," *Asian Survey* [Berkeley, Calif.], April 1969, p. 276), the crew of the North Korean vessel which seized the Pueblo stated that they had not been notified of "any foreign vessel" approaching Wonsan (Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, April 11, 1968). Thus, it would appear that zealous North Korean crewmen had merely seized a slow-footed, lightly-armed "sitting duck." As for the EC-121 incident, this author is inclined to accept the view that the downing of the plane was perhaps meant to be a birthday surprise (see *Dong-A Ilbo*, April 17, 1969, and *The New York Times*, April 19, 1969).

[22] Pyongyang, KCNA in English, Oct. 9, 1968.

[23] *Kim Il Sung Chojak Sonjip*, p. 309.

[24] Kim T'ae-so, *op cit.*, p. 26.

[25] As noted by Pyongyang, KCNA in English on June 20, 1970.

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In concrete terms, the shift in Pyongyang policy meant a sharp drop-off in the level of subversive activity aimed toward the South during 1969—a trend which continued in 1970 and 1971 (see Table 1). Pyongyang also resumed in 1969 its overtures for the peaceful unification of the peninsula. For example, in a memorandum prepared for the United Nations' General Assembly session of October 1969, the DPRK stressed the sincerity and reasonableness of its many previous unification proposals and claimed that it had refrained from making any further such proposals in recent years because of alleged provocative war maneuvers by the US and South Korea.[26]

Table 2: North Korea's Expanding Foreign Relations

Countries which have established diplomatic relations with the DPRK (listed chronologically):

1948	USSR	1967	Burundi
	Mongolia		Somalia
	Poland	1968	Iraq
	Czechoslovakia		South Yemen
	Hungary	1969	Zambia
	Romania		Sudan
	Bulgaria	1970	Central African Republic
1949	Albania		Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) [a]
	China (PRC)		Equatorial Guinea [b]
	East Germany	1971	Maldives
1950	North Vietnam		Yugoslavia
1958	Algeria		Sierra Leone
	Guinea		Malta
1960	Cuba	1972	Cameroon [c]
	Mali		Rwanda
1963	Yemen		Chile
	Egypt		Senegal
1964	Indonesia		Upper Volta
	Mauritania		Pakistan [d]
	Congo (Brazzaville)		Zaire [c]
1965	Tanzania		Malagasy Republic [b]
1966	Syria		

Countries which have established consular relations with the DPRK:

1961	India [d]	1969	Singapore [e]
	Burma [d]	1971	Mauritius [b]
1969	Nepal [d]		

Countries in which the DPRK has established trade missions:

1967	France [c]	1969	Finland
1968	Lebanon [e]		Austria [b]
	Kuwait		England [c]
1969	Switzerland		Libya

Countries in which the DPRK has opened an information office:

1970	Sweden [b]	1972	Norway [c]

[a] Diplomatic relations have since been suspended.
[b] Also has diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea (ROK) but no resident ROK diplomatic mission.
[c] Also has diplomatic relations with the ROK and a resident ROK mission.
[d] Also has consular relations with the ROK.
[e] Also has a resident ROK trade mission.

While North Korea was coming to its own conclusion that a less bellicose foreign posture would best serve its national interests, other international developments were prompting both Korean regimes to turn their attention at once inward and toward each other in a spirit of realistic accommodation. Of particular importance was the announcement by US President Nixon at Guam in July 1969 that he intended to reduce the American military presence in Asia. Although pleased at this evidence that US power had "reached the limit," Pyongyang suggested that the Nixon Doctrine was really a "crafty ruse" designed to revitalize the US military alliance system in Asia and even to arm "the Japanese militarists as a shock brigade in aggression against Asian countries." [27]

In fact, North Korea's long-cherished goal of obtaining the early withdrawal of US forces from South Korea began to seem less desirable to Pyongyang the more it became a real possibility. This was because South Korea began to intensify its own efforts to achieve self-sustaining economic growth and build a self-sufficient defense establishment in order to offset the adverse effects of an eventual reduction in the US military presence on its national security. In January 1970, South Korean President Park Chung Hee bluntly warned the North that it would have to renounce its aggressive designs because Seoul would soon far outweigh Pyongyang in economic and defensive strength.[28] In effect, Seoul was throwing down the gauntlet for competition with the North on the basis of the formula "construction first, unification later." [29]

This initiative became explicit on August 15, 1970, when President Park ended Pyongyang's long-standing monopoly on the rhetoric of "peace and unification" by calling upon the North to join in "a bona fide competition in development, in construction, and in creativity." Park declared his readiness

[26] For the text, see Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, Oct. 8, 1969.

[27] *Ibid.*, Jan. 26, 28, 1970. Interestingly, ROK President Park made a similar statement at this time about the US reaching the limits of its strength, but in the context of his regime's search for a new self-reliant means of survival and for strengthening regional collective security in Asia. See *Dong-A Ilbo*, Jan. 9, 1970.

[28] *Dong-A Ilbo*, Jan. 9, 1970.

[29] This formula was cited in *Hankook Ilbo* (Seoul), Jan. 1, 1970.

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"to suggest and implement epochal and more realistic measures" for the gradual removal of artificial North-South barriers and to support North Korea's right to participate in the United Nations debate on the Korean question. In return, he demanded that Pyongyang cease all provocations—including guerrilla infiltration—against the South, renounce its policy of communizing the South through violent revolution, and accept the competence and authority of the United Nations to deal with the Korean question.[30]

Kim Il Sung was hardly likely to accept these politically humiliating demands at any time, and certainly not in 1970 when North Korea was striving to complete its ambitious 1961–67 economic plan, already extended three years. Furthermore, Kim was about to stage the Fifth Congress of the KWP (the first such party gathering in nine years), at which a new long-term economic plan for North Korea would have to be approved. He therefore needed the continued specter of a threat from the South to tighten internal controls and to prevent party and government officials from becoming lax at this critical juncture.

Consequently, Pyongyang initially dismissed Park's proposal as an attempt to dupe the South Korean people, to hamstring their struggle for liberation and unification, and to mislead world opinion. The KWP called on Seoul to accept the North's peace proposals of the past, suggesting that the South should agree to "humanitarian" measures and set aside "political questions" for the moment.[31]

However, by the spring of 1971, North Korea's position had improved: the Seven-Year Plan had been concluded and the Fifth KWP Congress successfully staged; there were now firm indications that some American troops were indeed going to be withdrawn from the South; and the Sino-American "ping-pong diplomacy" of April 1971 was interpreted as a gain for Peking and, by extension, for Pyongyang. Therefore, North Korea felt secure enough to respond to Seoul with its own "eight-point unification formula." Although there was nothing new in the concrete measures proposed, North Korea's stated willingness "to accept anyone's suggestion helpful to the unification of the country" and to hold "heart-to-heart talks with South Korea at Panmunjom (in the Korean Demilitarized Zone) or in a third country "at any time" was a significant departure.[32]

As it edged closer to meaningful negotiations with Seoul, the regime in Pyongyang felt a clear need to protect its institutions and ideological foundations against potentially corrosive influences from the South and to guarantee that its defense forces were adequate to preserve national security. Thus, in February 1971, it proclaimed its firm resolve both to tighten control of the population and to prevent any "revisionist" or "bourgeois" tendencies from corrupting the spartan North Korean way of life.[33]

The 1971 budget, unveiled the day after the eight-point unification program, reflected the regime's continued "strategic line of carrying on economic construction parallel with defense building." [34] National defense expenditures were to amount to about $850 million, or roughly 30 percent of the 1971 budget expenditure. Though this was about the same percentage as in 1970, it represented an absolute increase of some $114 million. The stated objectives of the continued heavy defense outlays were: "to make perfect war preparations more perfect; to further strengthen self-reliant defense work; to produce adequate high-performance weapons and technical combat equipment suited to the peculiar conditions of our country; to secure reserves of war materials in all fields, and to guarantee wartime conditions." [35] It can be reasonably assumed that Pyongyang's concern over its defense capability had been heightened by reports in November 1970 that the US had pledged some $750 million for modernization of ROK forces.[36]

Like the Nixon Doctrine, the evolving Sino-

[30] *Dong-A Ilbo*, Aug. 15, 1970.

[31] See the *Nodong Sinmun* editorial broadcast from Pyongyang by KCNA in English, Aug. 22, 1970.

[32] The eight points were: 1) withdrawal of US troops; 2) reduction of armed forces of North and South Korea to 100,000 or less each after the US departure; 3) termination of the ROK-US mutual defense pact and the ROK-Japan treaty; 4) establishment of a unified central government by holding free North-South elections; 5) assurance of full freedom of political activity and release of all political prisoners in the South unconditionally; 6) establishment of a confederation of North and South Korea as a transitional step, leaving the differing social systems intact; 7) promotion of trade, economic cooperation, interchange and cooperation in science, culture, the arts and physical culture, establishment of mail exchanges, and permission for travel between the two sides; and 8) holding of a political consultative conference with all poltical parties and public organizations of both sides in attendance to negotiate the above-mentioned points. See Pyongyang broadcast by KCNA in English, April 12, 1971.

[33] *Ibid.*, Feb. 4, 1971.

[34] Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, April 13, 1971.

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] *Dong-A Ilbo*, Nov. 19, 1970, and *Chosun Ilbo* (Seoul), Nov. 20, 1970. On July 1, 1971, *The Washington Post* set the figure for US aid in 1971-75 at $1 billion to $1.5 billion.

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Huang Yung-sheng, Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army, welcomes O Chin-u, Chief of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army, to Peking in the summer of 1971.

—*China Pictorial* (Peking), July-August 1971, p. 9.

American détente injected new imponderables into North Korea's calculations concerning national security needs and policy toward the South. Kim Il Sung's uncertainty was evident in his slow reaction to President Nixon's dramatic disclosure, on July 15, 1971, that he would visit Peking. When Kim broke his silence on August 6, he sought to portray the Nixon visit as "a trip of the defeated . . . a great victory of the Chinese people and a victory of the world revolutionary people." The North Korean leader also apparently felt sufficiently assured to announce his readiness to talk with anyone in the South, including the ruling Democratic Republican Party, at any time.[37]

There is evidence that Kim had been reconciled to the shift in Sino-American relations by prior Chinese assurances. Indeed, on July 9—coincident with Dr. Henry Kissinger's secret trip to Peking—the PRC, for the first time in five years, sent a delegate to the Korean Military Armistice Commission meeting in Panmunjom.[38] The following day, a high-level North Korean delegation, headed by Kim Chung-nin (a member of the KWP Politburo and director of South Korean operations for the party), left for Peking, ostensibly to attend celebrations marking the 10th anniversary of the conclusion of the Sino-North Korean mutual assistance treaty.

Another clue to the emerging Sino-North Korean entente was the wide publicity accorded by Peking to Premier Kim's August 6 speech. According to a Pyongyang KCNA English-language broadcast of August 9, Peking's New China News Agency and Radio Peking reported the speech in full, and *People's Daily*, *Liberation Army Daily*, and *Kwangming Daily* likewise honored Kim's statement by "prominently" carrying the full text. (By contrast, Soviet sources maintained silence.) Furthermore, on August 18 a North Korean military mission led by General O Chin-u, Chief of the General Staff, left for Peking in order to discuss Pyongyang's security situation. On September 6, China agreed to provide military aid—of undisclosed amounts or types—to the North gratis under an accord signed that day.[39]

Heightened Diplomatic Activity

As indicated above, the increased tempo of international activity in the 1970's has presented Kim Il Sung with new opportunities and new challenges. In such a setting, inactivity and rigidity would result in isolation, a situation which could only benefit South Korea in the competition for international stature and recognition. Apparently aware of this reality, the North Korean leader has shown flexibility and agility in adjusting his policies to the rapidly changing situation both on the world scene and on the Korean peninsula.

Of particular importance have been the Red Cross negotiations between North and South Korea for the "humanitarian" purpose of reunifying families separated by the division of Korea in 1945 and the circumstances of the Korean War. This joint undertaking was proposed by South Korea on August 12, 1971, and accepted by the North two days later. Although the dialogue addressed only one small issue among the larger underlying problems confronting both Koreas, it marked the beginning of what will almost certainly be a difficult process of thawing relations on the peninsula. For the Red Cross negotiations, notwithstanding their professed purely "hu-

[37] *Nodong Sinmun*, Aug. 8, 1971.

[38] See *Chosun Ilbo*, July 10, 1971, and *The New York Times*, July 10, 1971.

[39] Peking, NCNA broadcast in English, Sept. 7, 1971.

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manitarian" character, must be viewed in the final analysis as a political exercise. From the perspective of Pyongyang, the dialogue could have a number of positive effects. Perhaps the most significant potential gain would be to remove the Korean question from the context of East-West ideological conflict and big-power politics and leave its solution to the Koreans themselves—a long-standing goal of North Korea.

Other potential benefits to the North include the projection of a new image of the North as a reformed and pragmatic entity, possibly leading to broader international recognition of the DPRK as an independent coequal of the government in Seoul entitled to be brought within the framework of the United Nations. (Even during the height of Pyongyang's aggressive posturing in 1967–68, North Korea continued to insist on its right to participate in any United Nations discussions on Korea on an equal footing with the ROK.[40])

Apart from these international ramifications, the Red Cross dialogue may in the long run benefit North Korea by moderating the South Korean people's staunch anti-communism. At the same time, Pyongyang—no less than Seoul—must be aware of the potential risks involved in opening direct contacts between North and South Koreans as envisaged by the Red Cross talks on family reunification. Will Northerners remain unquestioningly attached to their party and government after several weeks of family reunion in the relatively freer political climate of the South? What about the possibility of defections or espionage? Such searching questions doubtless commanded the attention of North Korean policymakers both before and after the start of Red Cross contacts on September 20, 1971. A sense of urgency in the face of the corrosive influences which Red Cross family exchanges might bring was implicit in a commentary published in *Nodong Sinmun* on September 25 under the title "Comrade Kim Il Sung's Creative Idea on the Revolutionization and Proletarianization of the Whole Society." It called upon North Koreans to rededicate themselves to the goal of "remolding themselves as resolute revolutionaries and as true Communists."

As the pace of events quickened on the Korean peninsula, Pyongyang redoubled its efforts to broaden its international contacts, in part to counteract similar initiatives by Seoul. Singling out Africa, the Middle East, and Asia for particular attention, North Korea relied heavily on people-to-people contacts and appeals for cultural and economic cooperation, but it did not cease to promote anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist struggle. The dangers of simultaneously pursuing such inconsistent goals were demonstrated in Ceylon, where the North Korean embassy was ordered closed and its personnel expelled in April 1971 for allegedly encouraging the widespread revolt which broke out that month in Ceylon.[41]

Attitudes toward Japan and the US

In its efforts to strengthen North Korea's international position, Pyongyang is placing increased importance on relations with Japan. Its major concern is to preclude the possibility that Japan might replace the United States as the military protector of South Korea. The North wishes to prevail upon Japan to adopt a more even-handed posture toward the DPRK and the ROK, and it has made clear that continued political and economic relations between Tokyo and Seoul—so long as they are not prejudicial to North Korean interests—need not stand in the way of rapprochement between Tokyo and Pyongyang.[42] Finally, Japan is the most significant single trading partner of North Korea among non-Communist states, and Pyongyang would like to enlist Tokyo's help in the future industrial development of the North.

To further these goals, North Korea has adopted a posture of reason and moderation toward Tokyo. This tendency was clear in a long interview granted by Kim Il Sung to Motoo Goto, managing editor of Tokyo's influential *Asahi Shimbun,* in September 1971. Kim offered to renounce military pacts with

[40] See "Memorandum of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Pyongyang, May 1967, p. 7; see also *Nodong Sinmun,* Sept. 24, 1968, and Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, Oct. 27, 1967.

[41] *Ceylon Observer* (Colombo), April 17, 1971; *Sun* (Colombo), April 18, 1971; *Ceylon Daily News* (Colombo), April 19, 1971; and *Daily Mirror* (Colombo), April 26, 1971. For selected foreign reactions to Pyongyang's use of diplomatic or consular missions for propaganda purposes, see *Indonesian Observer* (Djakarta), April 28, 1970, and *The Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), Feb. 18, 1971. For an account of North Korea's training of about 50 Mexican students in guerrilla warfare tactics, see "North Korea—An International Guerrilla Training Center," *Journal of Korean Affairs* (Silver Spring, Maryland), April 1971, pp. 35-36. In September 1972, Sri Lanka (Ceylon) refused to let North Korea reopen its embassy in Colombo.

[42] See *Dong-A Ilbo,* Sept. 8, 1972; Pyongyang, KCNA in English, Sept. 19, 1972; and *Asahi Shimbun,* Oct. 26, 1972.

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the USSR and China if the ROK terminated its military alliances with the US and Japan. He also announced his willingness to promote friendship with Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party and observed that trade, travel, cultural and journalistic exchanges could occur before establishment of formal diplomatic ties between Tokyo and Pyongyang.[43] (The decision to grant such a long interview to a non-Communist journalist was unprecedented and appears to have signaled a new awareness by Kim that reputable international media might serve more effectively than North Korean media to communicate his preferences and intentions.)

Four months later, Kim Il Sung granted an interview to another prominent Japanese newspaper, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, which published his comments on January 11 and 14, 1972. The North Korean leader showed his pleasure at the fact that the recent joint communiqué of President Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Sato (issued from San Clemente, California, on January 7, 1972) had omitted any reference to South Korea as "essential to Japan's own security"—a phrasing which had appeared in a November 1969 US-Japanese communiqué. Kim also expressed guarded optimism that North Korea could no longer be kept out of the United Nations in light of "some changes" taking place in the world organization (*i.e.*, the seating of the PRC). In a meeting with a Japanese Socialist Party official in the same month, Kim broached the possibility of a mutual nonaggression pact with Japan once diplomatic ties were established, although he claimed that he was concerned less with any threat to his own country than with the possibility that Japan might seize South Korea.[44]

On the economic front, North Korea can look forward to expanded trade with Japan under a five-year semi-official "memorandum trade agreement" signed during the visit of a Japanese parliamentary delegation to Pyongyang in January 1972. The agreement anticipates an expansion of total annual trade between the two countries from $59 million in 1971 to as much as $520 million in 1976.[45] However, the North has been unable to obtain long-term credits from Japan's Export-Import Bank for the purchase of capital goods, at least in part because of South Korean pressures on Tokyo.

[43] *Asahi Shimbun*, Sept. 27, 1971.

[44] *Shakai Shimpo* (Tokyo), Jan. 26, 1972.

[45] See *The Joong-ang Ilbo* (Seoul), Jan. 24 and 25, 1972; *Mainichi Shimbun* (Tokyo), Oct. 26, 1972; and *Asahi Shimbun*, Nov. 17, 1972, for discussion of the agreement and its potential.

January 1972 also brought a subtle but important hint of a shift in North Korea's position concerning the timing of the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea. In his interview with *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Kim intimated that US troops need not be withdrawn until *after* North and South Korea had signed a peace pact and had issued a formal declaration of mutual nonaggression. Unfortunately, a gross but apparently honest error on the part of North Korean translators obscured this important signal in the English text of Kim's message broadcast by Pyongyang, and the *volte face* was only publicly recognized in the West two months later.[46]

This gesture was soon followed by other signs of a thaw in North Korean relations with the United States. In separate interviews granted to Harrison E. Salisbury and John M. Lee of *The New York Times* in May and to Selig S. Harrison of *The Washington Post* in June, Kim emphasized his nation's peaceful intent and called for continued, if limited, people-to-people contacts between the DPRK and the US.[47] During July and August, Professor Jerome Alan Cohen of Harvard University became the first American scholar to visit Pyongyang on his own initiative —"to explore," as he put it, "the possibilities of establishing cultural contacts with North Korea and to learn about conditions there."[48]

Defense Outlook

Pyongyang's shift toward more moderate policies had the apparent objective of allaying South Korean fears of the possible consequences of a withdrawal of US support prior to achievement of a stable peace

[46] See *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Jan. 11 and 14, 1972; *Nodong Sinmun*, Jan. 15, 1972; and Pyongyang, KCNA in English, Jan. 15, 1972. The authoritative text carried in the party daily and correctly translated in the Tokyo newspaper read: "We hold that on the condition under which a peace agreement is signed between the North and the South and the US imperialist aggressor troops are withdrawn from South Korea, the armed forces of North and South Korea should be cut drastically." (Translation by the author.) The KCNA English-language version read: "We hold that a peace agreement should be concluded between the North and South and the armed forces of North and South Korea be cut drastically under the condition where the US imperialist aggressor troops are withdrawn from South Korea." This latter, incorrect formulation had been common before January 1972. The important shift was finally clarified by Selig S. Harrison in his article "North Korea Hints Shift on US Ties," *The Washington Post*, March 7, 1972.

[47] See *The New York Times*, May 15, 17, 19-22, 26, and 31, 1972, and *The Washington Post*, May 26, June 6, 12 and 26, July 2 and 3, 1972, for reports of these correspondents.

[48] See Professor Cohen's report, "A Window Half Opened on North Korea," *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Oct. 31, 1972.

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on the peninsula. Another, closely related objective may have been to bring about a further cooling-off of the arms race between North and South Korea. Ever since July 1970, when the US announced plans to remove some of its 60,000 troops stationed in South Korea, Seoul has sought to strengthen its military establishment with US help under the formula "military modernization first, withdrawal later." Increasing apprehension that the US seemed intent on "withdrawal first, modernization later" only intensified South Korea's desire to bolster its defense forces. Perhaps to weaken this resolve, Premier Kim Il Sung in September 1971 had announced that his government had "substantially" reduced projected defense outlays for the 1971–76 plan period.[49] In April 1972 he further disclosed a sharp reduction in 1972 defense appropriations: they were to amount to approximately $486 million, or 17 percent of the total state outlays for the year, as compared to actual expenditures of some $760 million, or 31.1 percent of total budget outlays, in 1971.[50]

The linkage between the new posture on American withdrawal and the policy of force reductions was made more explicit in June 1972, when Kim proposed that North and South make identical cutbacks of 150,000 to 200,000 military personnel so as "to avoid the danger of a possible war." According to Kim's scenario, this would be followed by the signing of a peace treaty, US withdrawal, and finally reduction of North and South forces to 100,000 men on each side.[51]

Taken at face value, Pyongyang's changing position on defense is open to several possible interpretations. One is that the Communist government may be satisfied with its current level of preparedness, as suggested by Chief of the General Staff General O Chin-u's statement on April 25, 1972, that "We can now confidently say that we have established a powerful all-people, all-country defense system capable of defeating any aggressors."[52] Another possible explanation may be Kim Il Sung's optimism that tensions will ease in view of increasing North-South contacts or—more cynically—his calculation that the best way to secure an early withdrawal of US forces is to lower his own military profile.

However, Kim's shift on defense may well be as much a result of economic constraints as of political prudence. At the November 1970 KWP Congress, he had acknowledged that North Korean defense expenditures had proved an economic burden,[53] and he told Harrison Salisbury of *The New York Times* in May 1972:

Frankly speaking, because we had to divert large sums of funds to defense construction, we ran into difficulties—to an extent—in raising the people's living standards.[54]

Thus, while the Kim regime's former policies of external militancy and increased military buildup at home may have been useful from the standpoint of tightening internal political control and mobilizing greater popular participation in the defense effort, it was now recognized that they had impeded economic growth.

The decision to curtail significantly the defense sector of the 1972 DPRK state budget thus appears to signal a new commitment to economic growth and improvement of the standard of living in the North. Such a commitment, of course, has wider political ramifications in view of the anticipated broadening of North-South contacts. Sooner or later, North and South Koreans will have an opportunity to see for themselves what the other half of the peninsula is like. Will the North compare favorably with the South in material and cultural terms? The competition that détente will inevitably bring seems likely to spur innovative efforts on the part of both North and South to improve living conditions, to tighten bureaucratic discipline and increase economic productivity, and to eliminate sources of popular grievance.

Success by the North and South in such efforts to prove the viability of their respective systems will likely evoke greater popular identification with the separate regimes and strengthen the hands of those with a vested interest in the political status quo. The legitimacy of the existing order would thereby be confirmed and could become a formidable obstacle to any scheme of unification. It would be the supreme irony for the Korean nation if the current politics of détente in Korea—extolled and rationalized in the name of national unification—actually

[49] *Asahi Shimbun*, Sept. 27, 1971.

[50] *Nodong Sinmun*, April 30, 1972. Cf., p. 64, *supra*.

[51] *The Washington Post*, June 26, 1972.

[52] Pyongyang, KCNA in English, April 26, 1972.

[53] *Kim Il Sung Tongji ui Chungyo Munhonjip* (Important Documents of Kim Il Sung), Pyongyang, Sahoekwahaksa, 1971, Vol. 3, p. 80.

[54] *The New York Times*, May 31, 1972. Cf., *Nodong Shinmun*, June 2, 1972.

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yielded the opposite effect of hardening the division of the peninsula.

Whether this irony is clearly recognized or not by the two Korean regimes, the negotiating process initiated in August 1971 has continued to move ahead.

Dialogue with the South

The North has contributed concretely to the atmosphere of détente by announcing cuts in defense appropriations and by refraining—since late October 1971—from provocative military actions against the South (see footnote to Table 2). More important, secret contacts between North and South Korea in November 1971 paved the way for talks of an explicitly political nature between the DPRK and the ROK.[55] On March 1, 1972, Seoul proposed a high-level political dialogue,[56] and two months later a South Korean delegation headed by intelligence chief Lee Hu Rak went to Pyongyang for talks that took place on May 3–4. The North reciprocated at the end of May by dispatching a delegation headed by Second Vice Premier Pak Song-ch'ol to Seoul, where talks were held during May 29-June 1. Although these exploratory contacts were held in secret, there were some signs in the press of a thaw in South Korea's attitudes toward the regime of Kim Il Sung.[57]

On July 4, 1972, these preliminaries bore their first visible fruit in the form of a North-South joint communiqué—the first inter-Korean "agreement to agree" since the country's liberation from Japan in 1945. The statement set forth certain general principles for mutual cooperation that were promptly identified in North Korea as the "Three Principles of National Reunification Set Forth By the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung." These were: (1) that



North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung hosts Lee Hu Rak, director of South Korea's Central Intelligence Agency, during talks in Pyongyang leading to the July 4, 1972, communiqué on North-South agreement to work toward reunification.

—Wide World Photos.

"reunification should be achieved independently, *without reliance upon outside force or its interference;*[58] (2) that unification should be achieved by peaceful means; and (3) that both parties should accentuate the cohesiveness of the Korean people despite differences of ideologies, ideas, and social systems. Both Koreas further agreed to initiate active measures aimed at easing tensions, creating a climate of mutual trust, and preventing inadvertent armed clashes; to undertake many-sided functional exchanges; to expedite the Red Cross talks on reuniting separated families; to install a "hot line" to expedite official communication between Pyongyang and Seoul; and to create a North-South Coordination Committee as the framework for further substantive negotiations between the two regimes.

[55] This early behind-the-scenes contact was disclosed by Pak Song-ch'ol (who has headed the North Korean negotiators during the illness of Kim Yong-chu—the brother of Premier Kim Il Sung) in a press conference on July 4, 1972. See Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean, July 4, 1972, or *The Pyongyang Times*, July 6, 1972. South Korea has so far neither confirmed nor denied this fact.

[56] This was disclosed July 4, 1972, in a press conference by Lee Hu Rak (See *Dong-A Ilbo* of that date). The North has not acknowledged Seoul's initiative of March 1972.

[57] For example, *Joong-ang Ilbo* had published on April 13, 1972, the first of what promised to be a 50-part series on the myth and reality of Kim Il Sung. No further installments have appeared. It was also an open secret in Seoul that in early May 1972 editors of all major dailies there were instructed by authorities not to make any editorial attacks on the person of Premier Kim Il Sung.

[58] Italics added. This passage represents the North Korean English-language text, which seems most faithful to the Korean-language original. See *The Pyongyang Times*, July 6, 1972, and *Choguk T'ong Il ui Kileso Yoksajok Sabyon* (Historic Event in the Path of Fatherland Unification), Pyongyang, Minjokchinhungsa, July 7, 1972, pp. 9-12. *Cf., Korean News*, No. 72, July 3, 1972, Korean Information Office, Embassy of Korea, Washington, DC, which contains the passage "unification shall be achieved through independent Korean efforts *without being subject to external imposition or interference*" (emphasis added). The differing wording "reliance upon outside force" and "subject to external imposition" presumably reflect efforts by the DPRK to forestall, and by the ROK to permit, the participation of the UN in a Korean settlement and the retention of US troops in the South until it is achieved.

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The most striking feature of the joint communiqué was the recognition by both sides of the strength of Korean national identity, as evidenced by their mutual agreement to make the goal of unification the basis for rearranging their relations. This is hardly to say that the opposing ideological concepts of communism and democracy or the differing structures of the two societies have become of secondary or minimal significance in the inter-Korean context. Rather it is an indication that, despite two decades of political separation, the two Koreas still find it possible to communicate with some measure of consensus on such matters as family reunion, national identity, and unification. Whether mutual awareness of a common historical, cultural, linguistic and racial heritage can lead to a blurring of political, social or ideological differences, of course, remains to be seen.

Pyongyang evidently hoped that the July 4 proclamation to the world that the Korean problem can and should be solved by the Koreans themselves—through negotiations on a mutually beneficial basis—would serve as the basis for ending United Nations involvement in Korean affairs. On behalf of North Korea, a draft resolution to this effect was presented by Algeria and other sympathetic states at the autumn 1972 session of the United Nations General Assembly. The measure failed to pass, with many nations apparently agreeing with South Korea's stand that unification should be achieved through UN-sponsored elections and that the United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) and the United Nations Command did not constitute an "external force" on the peninsula.[59]

Since late August, the North Korean regime has repeatedly accused the South of sabotaging the spirit of the communiqué, of selling out Korea, and of obstructing unification. Political and ideological differences between the two systems have continued to be a major divisive issue. Pyongyang has called on South Korean students and the people at large to shatter what it calls the "violent anti-Communist racket and fascistizing maneuvers of the South Korean reactionaries and [to] fight more staunchly to bring earlier the independent reunification of the country." [60] The Korean Workers' Party also continues to lend moral support to the clandestine activities of the Revolutionary Party for Unification aimed at promoting a "people's democratic revolution" in the South.[61]

Despite the continuing "war of words," tempers calmed enough for the two sides to reach a "mutual understanding through frank exchange of views" at a North-South Coordinating Committee meeting at Panmunjom on October 12, 1972.[62] This meeting apparently laid the basis for three days of political talks in Pyongyang, which brought forth the agreement of November 4 mentioned at the outset of this study. As constituted by this accord, the North-South Coordination Committee is co-chaired by North Korea's Kim Yong-chu, director of the KWP's Organizational Guidance Department, and by Lee Hu Rak, director of the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency. In addition to an Executive Council, there are five subcommittees in charge, respectively, of political, military, diplomatic, economic, and cultural affairs. The stated duties of this joint machinery include: finding ways to bring about unification; arranging visits between individuals of the two sides; facilitating economic, cultural and social exchanges and joint cooperative projects; easing tensions, preventing military clashes, and terminating the state of armed confrontation between the two Koreas; and devising procedures by which the two Koreas can take "joint steps" in activities abroad.[63]

The latest accord was warmly greeted by DPRK Second Vice Premier Pak Song-ch'ol as further evidence that

. . . if Koreans sit around at one table and make sincere efforts with a desire to shape the destiny of the nation by ourselves, we are surely able to solve all the problems existing before the nation.

Pak spoke enthusiastically of "joint development of resources, uniform mobilization and utilization of industrial potentials, rational division of labor between the North and the South, and exchange of various kinds of goods." He also foresaw measures to standardize usages in the Korean language; to facilitate scientific exchanges and joint research; to form a single all-Korean sports team for international competition; and to ease tension by reducing arms production, defense spending, and the num-

[59] See the UNCURK Report cited in Table 2, pp. 7–8.

[60] Pyongyang, KCNA in English, Aug. 24, 1972.

[61] *Nodong Sinmun*, Aug. 25, 1972.

[62] *Ibid.*, Oct. 13, 1972.

[63] *Ibid.*, Nov. 5, 1972. The North-South Coordination Committee held its first "regular session" on November 30, 1972, in Seoul (*Dong-A Ilbo*, Dec. 1, 1972).

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ber of troops on both sides "through mutual consultations." [64]

Only time, of course, will tell the extent to which these optimistic hopes will be realized. The negotiations initiated through the Red Cross talks and the July 4 communiqué may herald the beginning of a new era on the peninsula, but they really constitute only a symbolic beginning. Genuine progress in reunifying the peninsula will require mutual tolerance and the avoidance on both sides of impatience which begets frustration, irrationality, and aggressiveness. The situation calls not only for mutual understanding between North and South but also for circumspection on the part of interested foreign powers. Any actions by outsiders that tend to heighten tensions on the peninsula will almost certainly disturb the fragile Korean dialogue. Of course, Premier Kim Il Sung and President Park Chung Hee will probably continue to differ as to what sorts of outside actions constitute a source of tension in Korea. Such differences may be resolved or narrowed at the conference table if both sides truly adhere to the spirit of the July 4 communiqué.

Despite North Korea's confident statements about the new era of détente, it is not at all certain that the developments since mid-1971 have eased the deep sense of insecurity which has been at the root of Pyongyang's foreign policy from the outset (or for that matter that they have diminished South Koreans' distrust of the North). Conscious of its economic limitations, of the presence of US troops and growing ROK forces in the South, and of the apparent reluctance of its Soviet and Chinese associates to become involved in any military clash with the US on the Korean peninsula, the DPRK has been obliged to act defensively—although this basically defensive posture has at time manifested itself in a guise of aggressiveness.

Despite the limitations inherent in dependence on the USSR and the PRC, North Korea will continue to rely on these major socialist states for economic and defense support, particularly in light of the uncertainties of current great-power politics in East Asia and the newly-initiated contacts with South Korea. Pyongyang may be expected to double its efforts to bring about a more favorable Japanese policy toward the DPRK, both for reasons of security and in the hope of enlisting Japanese participation in North Korea's economic development. The United States is also likely to become a major target of North Korean diplomacy, at least of the people-to-people variety. In this case, the objective will be to assure the Americans that US troops are no longer needed in South Korea as a result of the North-South commitment to ease tensions, to trust each other, and ultimately to unite into a single nation.

The likelihood that the Korean nation will unite under a single political system admittedly appears remote at present. Although neither side has shown a willingness to admit publicly the necessity of an indefinite coexistence of two Koreas as separate, independent states, North Korea—amid indications that neither Pyongyang nor Seoul can impose its own will on the other, independently or otherwise, by peaceful or violent means—seems to have reconciled itself to that reality.[65] Significantly, North Korea's new "socialist constitution," adopted on December 27, 1972, names Pyongyang, not Seoul (as did the former constitution), as the capital of the DPRK.[66] This change would appear to suggest that the DPRK claims jurisdiction over just the northern half of the peninsula it now controls, thereby implicitly recognizing Seoul's authority over its half of the peninsula.

Like the South, moreover, North Korea seems eager to prove the advantages of its particular way of life. Indeed, there are preliminary though admittedly inconclusive signs that the DPRK is shifting its attention from defense-building to economic development. For example, Im Ch'un ch'u, who apparently lost his position as head of South Korean operations in 1967 for advocating such a course, has now been restored to high office as Secretary of the new Central People's Committee, a high-powered inner cabinet chaired by Kim Il Sung.[67]

To the extent that the present atmosphere of détente on the peninsula proves durable, North Korea may possibly consider it advisable to continue avoiding the aggressive posturing of the past, born of perceived insecurity, in favor of lowering defense costs and devoting more of its resources to economic development. Such moves would unquestionably benefit economic performance in the North. Furthermore, they could help Pyongyang to improve its international image, provided that its foreign-policy actions remain consistent with the current atmosphere of détente.

[64] *Nodong Sinmun*, Nov. 7, 1972.

[65] See Richard Halloran, *The New York Times*, Oct. 31, 1972.

[66] KCNA in English, Dec. 27, 1972.

[67] *Dong-A Ilbo*, Dec. 29, 1972.

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Read Marx Instead

By Richard T. De George

LOUIS ALTHUSSER and ETIENNE BALIBAR: *Reading Capital.* Translated from the French by Ben Brewster. New York, Pantheon Books, 1970.
DAVID FLAKSER: *Marxism, Ideology and Myths.* New York, Philosophical Library, 1971.
KARL MARX: *Early Texts.* Translated and edited by David McLellan. New York, Barnes & Noble, 1971.

MARXIST PHILOSOPHY has been in the midst of a revival for at least the past decade. The number of Marxist positions has been proliferating and sometimes seems almost as large as the number of Marxists. Yet with some justification we can divide contemporary Marxist philosophers into three broad groups: critical Marxists, humanist Marxists, and scientific Marxists.

Members of the first group turn to Marx primarily for his critique of capitalism, which they continue to use as the basis for their attacks on contemporary Western society and its various institutions. Herbert Marcuse is one of the foremost examples of this group, which also includes members of the Frankfurt school, such as Jürgen Habermas, and those members of the New Left who find some of their inspiration, method, or vocabulary in Marx. The humanist Marxists are less concerned with criticizing Western society than with building a new society based on humanistic principles. Many of these are non-Soviet East European philosophers, such as Leszek Kolakowski of Poland; Gajo Petrovic, Mihailo Markovic, and Svetozar Stojanovic of Yugoslavia; and Ivan Svitak and Karel Kosik of Czechoslovakia. The third group, the scientific Marxists, are for the most part Marxist-Leninists. The largest portion of the group is made up of philosophers in the Soviet Union, though it includes others who follow the Engels-Lenin line of Marxist thought.

In recent years the critical Marxists have been the most vocal and radical, the humanist Marxists the most creative and experimental, and the scientific Marxists the most dogmatic and dull.

All three groups can and do legitimately go to Marxian texts to support their positions. The writings of the young Marx are the major focus for the humanist Marxists, since it is in these texts that they find Marx's concern with man, alienation, and oppression most clearly spelled out; but the values embodied in communism lead them to Marx's later writings also, which they interpret not as scientific but as humanistic. The critical Marxists make equally good use of both the young and the old Marx. But whereas the humanists are interested in the positive aspects of Marx, the critics are interested in his negative critique and in his attacks on the status quo. The scientific Marxists are primarily concerned with the writings of the mature Marx, with the laws of social development, and with dialectical materialism as developed by Engels and Lenin. It is their interest in the operation and development of the various laws which Marx and Engels describe, as well as their insistence on the truth of these laws, that have led them to assume the label "scientific."

Members of all three groups have engaged in disputes about which is the real Marx, about how the early works of Marx (many of which were first published in 1932) are to be interpreted, and about how the importance of these works is to be assessed. These are internal Marxist disputes. To the outsider the debating often appears parochial, polemical, and ideological—representing an attempt by each group to garner the weight of Marx's authority for its own viewpoint in a quarrel among any who value that authority.

ANOTHER TYPE of dispute centers on whether Marx's works and findings are indeed scientific in any strict sense of the term; and

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here the non-scientific Marxists are joined in their criticism by many non-Marxist philosophers. Most of these critics quickly dismiss professions of Marxism's scientific validity, feeling that the case against such claims has been sufficiently well made; they read the claims as ideological, or as mythical, and interpret them sociologically, psychologically, or in some similar manner. This is true, for instance, of Sartre's critique of the Marxist-Leninists, as well as of Kolakowski's.

Unfortunately the book by Flakser here under review, despite its attractive title, adds nothing either to this perspective or to Marxist interpretation in general. He maintains that all social views are ideological and at best only partially true, and that since the human subject cannot be objectified, no social theory, including Marxism, can claim to be scientific. He deals very little with either Marxism or myths and says nothing that has not been said better by others.

The growth of interest in early Marx which characterizes the non-scientific Marxists is reflected in the appearance of McLellan's translations, which were in preparation in 1967 when the larger collection of Marx's early writings by Easton and Guddat[1] was published. The latter authors consider the writings of the young Marx to end with the publication of the *Communist Manifesto,* and so include portions of *The Holy Family* and *The German Ideology.* McLellan chooses to omit these two works, since they contain the beginnings of historical materialism —which to McLellan is Marxism— and since his interest, as in an earlier study, is in *Marx Before Marxism* (the latter's title).[2]

In the introduction to his volume of translations, McLellan sides with the humanist Marxists in arguing that there is no break between the young and the old Marx, *Capital* being a continuation of Marx's earlier works. McLellan bases his thesis not only on an analysis of the early and later writings; he puts special emphasis on Marx's *Grundrisse,* which was written in 1857–58, and which he claims is as Hegelian as the *Paris Manuscripts,* though it serves as the basis for *Capital.*

THIS POSITION is implicitly challenged by Louis Althusser—one of the coauthors of the third work under review—who uses the *Grundrisse* to argue precisely the opposite thesis. In an earlier study, *For Marx,*[3] Althusser had already attacked the humanistic interpretations of Marxism, argued for a radical break between the writings of the young and of the mature Marx, and defended the claims of Marxism to be scientific. In *Reading Capital,* he and Etienne Balibar each continue these themes in their separate essays, as they analyze the epistemology which underlies *Capital.* The reading they present is philosophical, not economic or sociological. They are interested in disclosing not only the logic or methodology underlying *Capital,* but the sense in which it represents a radical break with Marx's predecessors in the realm of political economy. Althusser insists that in making this break, Marx produced a theoretical revolution, modifying the very object of economic theory, and hence producing a new system, a new theoretical domain, with certain structures and an internally defined terminology. Althusser claims that Marx is therefore the founder of a new science, comparable in this respect to Galileo or Lavoisier. The thesis of the break from the young to the old Marx is hence crucial for Althusser, for it is the concept of the break that makes possible the claim that Marx founded a new science by opening up a new theoretical domain. If he merely continued what others had done before him, the claim would not stand.

The question of whether there really is a break between the young and the old Marx, however, remains moot. It may be true that Marx supplies us with a new problematic; but it is not at all clear that Althusser's attempt to draw an analogy between the impact of Marx's work and of Lavoisier's chemistry is apropos. We know that once Lavoisier's work was done, it was taken up by others with tangible results of a kind that later Marxists simply have not produced. The results we are to look for—according to Althusser—are theoretical, not practical. But the question which he raises and never satisfactorily settles is the question of just what constitutes theoretical scientific knowledge, and how we are to know when we have it in the domain Marx has delimited.

If Althusser has not made entirely good his claim to have escaped from the realm of ideology into the realm of scientific knowledge, he has at least shown that scientific Marxism need not be as dull as it has been for so long in the hands of its Soviet expositors. The close readings of *Capital* which

[1] *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society,* Garden City, N.Y., Anchor Books, 1967.

[2] London, Macmillan, 1970.

[3] London, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1969.

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Althusser and Balibar give us help clarify the function of Marx's concepts of surplus value, productive forces, social relations, law, and tendency, and indicate how complex and intricate the various levels of society which Marx mapped out but did not analyze actually are. The suggestion that each level of society has its own structure and its own historical time for development points to a vast region for potential future investigation along Marxist lines, an endeavor which promises to be more intrinsically interesting and useful for understanding society and ourselves than sterile quibbles over which is the real Marx.

WHAT BECOMES clear from both McLellan's discussion of the *Grundrisse* and from *Reading Capital* is the fact that Marx, despite his enormous labors, had really only begun the work of social analysis, that *Capital* was only the initial step. A reading of *Capital* indicates how difficult and painstaking Marxist theoretical analysis, and therefore Marxist philosophy, really is. The failure of many contemporary Marxists is that they have made Marxist analysis too facile, too superficial, and too easy. They have adopted Marx's results instead of following his example. The upshot is that both the early and the later works of Marx still make better reading than the writings of most of his followers.

Despite the presence of a few outstanding figures, the current Marxist revival has not yet become a Marxist Renaissance.

A Question of Science

By Rudolf L. Tőkés

ZHOREZ A. MEDVEDEV:
The Medvedev Papers, New York, Macmillan-St. Martin's Press, 1971.

(Editors' Note: Since this review was written, the Soviet government has given permission to Zhores A. Medvedev to spend one year in England for research purposes. He is now at Britain's National Institute for Medical Research.)

AS SOVIET IDEOLOGUES from Lenin on have repeatedly affirmed, one of the main objectives of the building of communism is the creation of a "new Soviet man" who will represent the pinnacle of human development under socialism. This new man is conceived as being a materialist, yet imbued with lofty moral values; an individual, yet endowed with an unlimited capacity to subordinate his interests to those of society; a person of scientific outlook, yet receptive to humanistic impulses; a patriot, yet having an empathy for the universal aspirations of mankind; and so on.

Judging from complaints in the Soviet press about the persistence of graft, alcoholism, and profligacy among Soviet youth, this ideal Soviet man still remains in the incubation period and seems likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. However, socio-political development in the USSR since Stalin *has* given birth to considerable numbers of a striking new type of individual whom, for want of a better term, we shall call *civis Sovieticus.*

What sort of person is he? In some respects, he does fulfill the requirements of the new Soviet man: he is at once a patriot who takes pride in the historical, cultural and spiritual traditions of his homeland and a socialist with a positive commitment to the ideological premises and institutional foundations of Soviet power and a belief in the eventual fulfillment of his nation's destiny under socialism. But, on the other hand, he is an individual who looks upon himself as a citizen rather than a subject of his country, as a person not only indisputably entitled to human dignity but also endowed with certain rights that he considers inalienable, universally valid, and protected by both the Soviet Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The *civis Sovieticus,* by definition, need not be a dissident. However, driven by the compelling logic of the continued denial of

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civil rights to the Soviet people by Stalin's successors, he is often presented with no other alternative but to become one of those courageous Soviet citizens who are openly challenging *the way* they are ruled and the very legitimacy of the system that has made official lawlessness possible.

The *civis Sovieticus,* as we know him, emerged during the second stage of Khrushchev's rise to power, that is, sometime in the late 1950's. At that time, destalinization was gathering momentum, and the surviving victims of Stalin's purges were beginning to rejoin the society from which they had been ostracized a generation before. These pitiful human reminders of the evils of Stalinism were subsequently joined by young Soviet intellectuals, by artists, writers, and members of the scientific elites, by religious believers and members of national minorities, to form the nucleus of a swelling movement asserting a common interest in the defense of civil rights, creative freedom, and other moral, political and economic rights guaranteed by the Constitution but routinely violated by the regime.

IT WAS IN THIS context that Zhorez Medvedev, a previously unknown biochemist, appeared on the scene with a *samizdat* manuscript on the history of Soviet agrobiology.[1] Originally conceived as an effort to evaluate the state of Soviet science in the early 1960's, Medvedev's treatise offered a documented and factually unimpeachable critique of the pseudo-scientific teachings and sinister activities of the notorious Trofim Lysenko during the rule of Stalin and later of Khrushchev. This politically explosive exposé became a *cause célèbre,* involving the author in a running battle with the state bureaucracy, conservative party scientists, his own institutional superiors, the postal authorities, and ultimately with the secret police and its infamous institution for the criminally insane.[2] As a result of this experience, Medvedev's disenchantment with the system reached the point where he felt compelled to concern himself with more than the immediate interests of his own professional community and to reexamine the values, institutions and ruling practices of the broader Soviet political world that made Lysenko possible and his own persecution inevitable.

The *Medvedev Papers* consist of two essays: "Fruitful Meetings Between Scientists of the World," and "Secrecy of Correspondence is Guaranteed by Law," both of which were written between July 1967 and April 1970. In these essays, Medvedev develops four related themes—all of them bearing on the basic problem of freedom of scientific inquiry in post-Stalin Russia. The first theme revolves around Medvedev's frustrated attempts to accept an invitation to deliver an important lecture in England; the second has to do with the difficulties encountered by Soviet scientists when they attempt to participate in the professional life of the international scientific community; the third is a case study of Soviet travel restrictions and passport regulations; and the last concerns the inside workings of the Soviet postal censorship as experienced by a hapless non-recipient of personal letters and scholarly papers sent to him by foreign friends and fellow scientists.

From these essays there emerges a set of lucid, rational and extremely persuasive arguments focusing on the age-old conflict between demands for ideological orthodoxy and the requirements of cultural-scientific progress. Medvedev astutely points to the dichotomy presented, on the one hand, by the regime's sense of insecurity in internal political and external military affairs and, on the other hand, by its inherent inability—because of ideological inhibitions—to meet these challenges by means of political reform, economic modernization and scientific innovation. He contends that even a policy of freely drawing upon Western scientific and technological innovations has not succeeded in narrowing the scientific-technological gap between the USSR and the advanced countries of the West:

The scientific and technological gap between the USSR and the world level gradually increased during the years from 1946 to 1955, and this happened in spite of the free copying and borrowing of any technical achievements from abroad, supported by the refusal of the USSR to take part in international conventions and discussions on patents, licenses and priority of inventions. . . . (p. 118)

. . . as 1955 approached, . . . those running the state, like Peter I in the past, began to go abroad and see what it was like, our scientific and technological gap

[1] The term *samizdat* (literally, self-publication) applies to works that cannot be officially published but are circulated, usually in a limited number of typed copies, in defiance of official censorship. Medvedev's manuscript found its way abroad and was eventually published in English under the title *The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1969.

[2] On this episode see, Zhorez A. Medvedev and Roy A. Medvedev, *A Question of Madness,* New York, Knopf, 1971.

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became clear. The slogan of using the scientific and technical experience of other countries was proclaimed. . . .

But, as it turned out, the practice of copying in the new conditions did not guarantee progress but only a permanent lag. The rates of technical progress in the world increased so rapidly, methods of construction and instruments changed so fast, that the process of copying turned into the copying of the obsolescent and the obsolete. (pp. 164–65)

After underlining the undesirable economic and military-technological consequences of Russia's long self-imposed intellectual isolation from the outside world, Medvedev presents the text of a memorandum which he addressed to the Ideological Commission of the CPSU Central Committee in an attempt to direct attention to the heart of the problem. In blunt language, the memorandum asserted that the criterion of ideological conformity is meaningless as an indicator of validity in the realm of the natural sciences. It went on to say:

If ideology is science, if communism is a science, if Marxism-Leninism is a science, then any criticism of any proposition in these sciences is also a science and not a "deviation." In any science, if it is not a collection of empty dogmas, certain propositions are continually going out of date and need to be replaced, new ideas, new propositions are always appearing in connection with new circumstances, new conditions, new relationships. . . . As a scientist accustomed to analyze facts, it is quite clear to me that there are no explicit criteria for demarcating the permissible forms of criticism. *(pp. 280–81; the emphasis is in original)*

The memorandum accused the regime itself of "deviationism":

The side in an argument which starts to break the law thereby adopts the method of deviation. And if a government which at a particular moment in time adopts a particular point of view uses illegal measures in its polemics against those who hold different views, encroaches upon the secrecy of correspondence, arbitrarily extends the legal functions of censorship, dismisses people from work, prosecutes them, breaking the standards of legal procedure, commits slander, restricts civil rights, and so on, then this means of ideological warfare is an ideological deviation from the ideology of communism as a whole. (p. 282)

As Marx told German readers of the first volume of *Das Kapital*, *"de te fabula narratur!"*

ONE OF THE MOST striking aspects of Medvedev's thinking is that it appears to embody widely-shared views—one might even say, a common ideological counterplatform—of the liberal Soviet scientific intelligentsia. Much as the writings of Oppenheimer, Szilard, Pauling, Szentgyorgyi, Lord Snow, Lord Zuckerman and Denis Gabor reflected the views of distinct segments of the intellectual communities in the United States and England, so Medvedev's views seem to reflect the stated beliefs of Kapitsa, Landau, Tamm, Sakharov, Chalidze, Pimenov, Tsukerman—and, very probably, the unspoken beliefs of many other members of the Soviet scientific community.

This phenomenon suggests the emergence among the Soviet scientific intelligentsia of a new sense of solidarity in quest of a moral authority and leadership that they find wanting in the professional politicians of the party apparatus. In his *Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom*, Sakharov looked to the "most progressive, internationalist and dedicated element" of the Soviet intelligentsia as symbolic representatives of such leadership.[3] Medvedev, in his *Papers*, looks beyond national frontiers to find in the world intellectual community the potential "motive force" of an order dedicated not to narrow class goals but to universal human progress:

There is only one social group of people in the world which, not only on account of its position in society but simply on account of the humane qualities inevitably inherent in it, on account of its selection of people for these qualities and on account of the character of its daily activity, is connected in a worldwide, mutually dependent, mutually advantageous, mutually respecting system in friendship independent of national frontiers, constantly sharing among itself all possible help and interested to the utmost in the progress of mankind, of which it is the standard-bearer and motive force. This group consists of scholars, the culturally creative intelligentsia, and not simply that class of people who have a secondary or higher education. (pp. 170–71)

Although some might regard this statement as smacking of techno-

[3] See *The New York Times*, July 22, 1968.

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cratic elitism and intellectual arrogance, Medvedev's emphasis on the need for "humane qualities" and "mutual respect" must strike a sympathetic chord in the minds of those who might be inclined to dismiss his plea as little more than a utopian flight from the realities of his still semi-Stalinist native land.

In his earlier-quoted letter to the Central Committee's Ideological Commission, Medvedev explained why the party bureaucracy would remain incapable of coping with the rising tide of public opinion and of controlling—at least as effectively as in Stalin's time—the various new channels of unauthorized communication exemplified by *samizdat*. Pointing to the inevitable social consequences of economic modernization, he argued that the provision of higher living standards, greater amounts of leisure time, and improved and expanded education had brought into being a "critical mass" of Soviet citizens increasingly concerned with public affairs, cultural-artistic development and scientific progress. He further predicted that the increasing availability of means of duplicating and disseminating *samizdat* materials (*e.g.*, typewriters, tape-recorders, and—for some people—even computer printouts) would make it impossible for the party to check the emergence of a body of well-informed and critical elite opinion—that is, short of a return to crude Stalinist methods of control.

At one point, Medvedev proffers the tongue-in-cheek suggestion that *samizdat* should be considered a perfectly legal leisure-time activity, a kind of "hobby" like "collecting stamps or matchbox labels, fishing or playing chess." No doubt, his irreverent humor is lost on the dour ideologues and KGB officials charged with curbing the circulation of uncensored materials. But certainly they should be the first to concede that the burgeoning of *samizdat* has confronted the regime with a policy problem of unprecedented magnitude the solution of which has thus far eluded them.

Chalmers Johnson, in speculating on the likely outcome of the confrontation between the specialized elite and the party over the issues of free communication and ideological purity, suggests that the logic of peaceful coexistence, involving the necessity of playing by the rules of the international market, has compelled the Soviet leadership to embark on the ideologically hazardous path of competing with the capitalist world in terms of "innovation, not just emulation." [4] Medvedev, too, suspects that the various components of East-West coexistence are inseparable and that, in the long run, the party will be forced to tolerate and accept a growing volume of ideological contraband—including *samizdat*—as part of a new *modus vivendi* with the scientists, whose full cooperation is indispensable to the regime if the Soviet Union is to survive as a global power in the decade of the 1970's.

Medvedev's *Papers* also help to shed light on many details of the daily lives of Soviet scientists, especially the lives of the handpicked elite that work in highly specialized research institutes in the Moscow area. Living in relative isolation from the rest of the society and protected—to a degree—from immediate political control, these men constitute perhaps the only group in the Soviet Union who have both the qualifications and the opportunity to observe the system from the inside, to judge it with intellectual objectivity, and to criticize its shortcomings from a well-informed national and international perspective. To be sure, the scientists' relatively greater immunity from political harassment did not prove inviolable in Medvedev's case, but the fact remains that without these specialists the regime could not long continue to function. While the scientists are aware of this, they endeavor on the whole—in their public acts—to stay within the "grey zone" between the officially prescribed norms and the kinds of activity that invite official persecution.

BECAUSE THIS REVIEW focuses specifically on the thinking of Medvedev and his fellow scientists, it must perforce omit discussion of the other segments of the Soviet dissident community—in literature and the arts, among the non-Russian nationalities of the USSR, and in the ranks of persecuted religious believers. It is probably true that the latter two groups include a good many who, in terms of commitment to the ideological and institutional foundations of the Soviet state, would not fit the description given at the outset of the *civis Sovieticus*. Nevertheless, it is important to note that members of all these groups do share common ground: whether as writers of *samizdat*, as editors or contributors to the clandestine *Chronicle of Current Events*, or as compilers of protest documents, they form the articulate vanguard of a growing democratic movement seeking to propagate a

[4] Chalmers Johnson, Ed., *Change In Communist Systems*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1970, p. 23.

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new spirit of modern Soviet citizenship and a redefined sense of democratic patriotism.

It is still too early to predict whether the dissident movement in the USSR will have any significant and lasting impact on the Soviet system. For one thing, the history of Russian revolutionary and reformist movements over the last hundred years suggests that it is a slow and difficult process to overcome the political apathy of the rural and urban working masses. For another, the dissident community is still a small minority, and its different segments are far from united in their outlooks and aspirations beyond their common opposition to neo-Stalinist lawlessness and the arbitrary practices of the party and state bureaucracy. It is therefore quite conceivable that the party, by astutely manipulating the conservative masses and setting them against the liberal elites, may succeed in isolating the latter and putting an end to their fledging program of democratic reeducation. Nevertheless, man's yearning for dignity and individual freedom is not easily extinguished, and one can only hope that the courage and humanism of those like Medvedev and other Soviet liberal intellectuals will in the end bear fruit to the benefit of all their countrymen.

Moscow and Asia

By Geoffrey E. Wheeler

NORTON T. DODGE, Ed.:
The Soviets in Asia.
Mechanicsville, Maryland,
Cremona Foundation, 1972.
HARISH KAPUR:
The Soviet Union and the Emerging Nations—A Case Study of Soviet Policy towards India.
Geneva and London,
Michael Joseph, Ltd., 1972.
J. A. NAIK:
India, Russia, China and Bangladesh
New Delhi, S. Chand & Co., 1972.

IT IS NOW more or less generally conceded that the aims of Soviet policy in Asia—be it Soviet Central Asia or the postcolonial nations of that great territory stretching from Asia Minor to the Far East—are national rather than ideological in nature and that they bear in some respects a marked resemblance to those pursued by prerevolutionary Russia. While the constant adjustments of the balance of power in various parts of Asia in recent years make it virtually impossible to define Soviet aims with any degree of precision, one may describe them as directed, in a general way, toward achieving the same kind of influence and control over Asian affairs as Britain exercised in the 19th and early 20th centuries, and toward containing the efforts of any other power—principally China—from attaining similar sway over the region. Particularly in its postwar efforts to expand Soviet national power in all parts of Asia, the USSR has been forced to reckon with the countervailing force of nationalism, a political factor which was essentially absent when Britain was gaining her ascendancy in South and Southeast Asia. Significantly, it was when this essentially European concept began to spread through Asia (often, ironically, with the encouragement of liberal elements in England), that Britain's hold over her empire became increasingly precarious and eventually impracticable, and her influence and prestige in Asia declined accordingly.

The Soviet Union, unlike Great Britain, is a landlocked continental empire and is, moreover, apparently quite impervious to the liberal considerations which contributed to the disintegration of the British Empire. Moscow has retained control over its own inherited Tsarist dominions in Central Asia by a combination of armed force and a novel system of colonial administration and exploitation. For a considerable time, the Soviet regime believed it could also extend its control to the rest of Asia, not by force of arms, but by a new method—the propagation of its own Communist ideology and the establishment of this doctrine as the guiding political and economic principle throughout this vast area.

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By the time of the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party (in early 1956), however, the Kremlin had decided that communism, at least for the foreseeable future, could not by itself serve as a substitute for conventional power politics. Moscow accordingly changed its tactics in dealing with the nationalist states of Asia. During the Suez crisis of 1956, the USSR proffered moral support to Nasser's Egypt in the manner of regular power politics. Moscow sought to supplement the political capital gained from this action by extending material and technical aid to Asian states—a technique readily copied from the West. At the same time, she made a public show of desisting from subversion, of encouraging left-wing elements in Third-World states to participate in national coalition politics, and of avoiding any semblance of the kind of direct military intervention that had brought the West into such disrepute among the nationalist Asian governments. However, such approaches—even while successful in securing port and ground facilities for Soviet warships and aircraft in some areas—have failed to gain Moscow the same degree of prescriptive and proscriptive control that it enjoys, thanks to the presence of large contingents of Soviet troops, in Eastern Europe and in one Asian state, the Mongolian People's Republic. Furthermore, the benefits gained in the Middle East and Asia by using such relatively mild methods may be ephemeral, as demonstrated recently in the case of Egypt.

The growth of nationalism in the Third World, the emergence of China as a world power, and the spectre of a Sino-Japanese axis in Asian affairs all constitute formidable obstacles to the achievement of paramount Soviet influence in Asia. Nevertheless, the prestige of the USSR in the region remains higher than that of the West or of China, and in its brief history the Soviet regime has shown great flexibility in abandoning out-worn tactics in favor of new ones.

In light of these observations, one approaches with considerable interest the volumes under review, which examine Soviet tactics in Asia from such diverse perspectives as, on the one hand, those of American academic and government specialists, and on the other hand, those of two scholars from India, itself a major target of Soviet Asian policies.

The Soviets in Asia presents the edited versions of papers presented at a symposium jointly sponsored by the Washington Chapter of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies and the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies at George Washington University, May 19-20, 1972. The contributions are organized according to four major areas: Soviet Asia, East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. Taken together they provide a most useful and up-to-date guide to American thinking on contemporary Soviet policies toward Asia. The studies all are based on expert academic research as well as official expertise, and they make full use of Soviet source materials, which have become increasingly discursive and revealing during the past fifteen years. Although the number of topics is necessarily limited, the range is wide, and there is little duplication.

The papers on Soviet policy in East Asia are the most lively and controversial of the whole collection. A fundamental difference of opinion apparently exists on the issue of whether the world is now multipolar—consisting of the United States, the USSR, China, and Japan—or still displays a basically bipolar configuration dominated by the US and the USSR. The complexities facing Soviet policy toward East Asia are highlighted by papers outlining the transformation of China from an ally into an adversary and speculating on Japan's attempts to achieve *rapprochement* with both the USSR and the People's Republic of China while continuing to give priority to cooperation with the United States.

Papers on Soviet policy in the Middle East review in detail the modifications which have occurred so far in Soviet political and economic approaches and consider the chances the USSR has of successfully projecting its influence where Britain and the US have failed. Significantly, the studies in this section dispense with the old definition of Soviet aims as the perpetuation of instability (with a view to eventual establishment of international communism in the Middle East) and replace it with the simple understanding of present Soviet objectives as the achievement of political and economic control of the region. The general conclusion drawn by the contributors seems to be that the Soviet Union has had no more success than the West in filling the power vacuum left by the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire, and that Moscow has proved successful in dealing with only a limited number of countries, particularly those of the so-called "Northern Tier"—Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.

Turning to Soviet policy toward South Asia, one notes that the contributors to the Washington symposium manifest commend-

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able caution in attempting to define Soviet aspirations in the region and in assessing their chances of realization. It is also noteworthy that in these studies little importance is attached to those local Communist parties formerly thought to be the spearhead of Soviet policies. Instead, the emphasis of these papers is on state-to-state relations and particularly on the Soviet Union's successes in cultivating such relations with India.

THESE AMERICAN appraisals provide an interesting comparison with the views expressed by two Indian observers of Soviet policies on the subcontinent. In *The Soviet Union and the Emerging Nations*, Harish Kapur (writing before the Indo-Pakistani confrontation of 1971) emphasized Indo-Soviet disagreement on economic matters since 1962 and India's tendency to resent Soviet interference in her internal affairs. In fact, at the time of writing, Professor Kapur believed that it was "unlikely that she [India] would ever reacquire the important position that she had [in Soviet eyes] during the Khrushchev period." Dr. J. A. Naik displays a markedly different attitude. Full of praise for Soviet adroitness and understanding of India's problems (as compared with the "miserable failure" of American "crisis management"), he performs a delicate balancing act between approval of the Soviet policy of "identifying their own interests with those of accountable regional powers" and an attempt to discount the danger of India becoming a Soviet satellite. One can only speculate on the extent to which the views of both Indian writers may have been affected by subsequent events.

In reading these two volumes, one is quite aware of the nationalism which informs Indian foreign policy and which complicates Soviet initiatives in the subcontinent. It is, indeed, surprising that the contributions on South Asia at the American symposium relegate the topic to a mere footnote which comments on "the strength of nationalism and the distaste for foreign involvement that pervades all of South Asia." Nor is this important political factor adequately addressed in the other panels on non-Soviet Asia.

When one turns to the discussion of Soviet Central Asia, however, one finds two long and well-documented studies of the persistence and growth of national consciousness in the Moslem territories of the USSR. Both conclude that increasing nationalist sentiment now offers a serious challenge to Soviet centralist policy. One also notes in these studies a tendency to deal with the emerging distinct national personality of the individual republics of Soviet Central Asia and thereby to discard the former unwarranted tendency in some circles to treat them collectively under the rubric of a hypothetical "Turkestanian" nation.

The national question has clearly not been "solved" inside Soviet Asia as Moscow claims. But it would be a mistake to regard the stirring of national consciousness there and the cultural and other concessions in which it seems to have resulted as the prelude to the same kind of nationalist movements which have elsewhere led to separation and independence. Indeed, a deliberate relaxation of Soviet centralist policy might, if skillfully handled, lead to the strengthening rather than to the deterioration of the Soviet position in Central Asia. The various shifts and ramifications of Moscow's policies here clearly require constant study of the kind focused on them by this symposium, for the experiment in the modernization of the Asian nationalities of the USSR, in spite of much misjudgment and mismanagement, remains the most remarkable and lasting of all the transformations and adjustments which have taken place in the former colonial territories of Asia during the last fifty years.

Whatever the specifics of future Soviet policy in Asia, it is safe to assume that it will continue to be oriented toward the extension and consolidation of Soviet political and economic influence. In pursuing these aims, the USSR has already exhibited significant flexibility, and in light of the obstacles so far encountered, further tactical changes will be required in the future. By far the most formidable of these obstacles is the phenomenon of nationalism, which is already firmly established in most of the countries of non-Soviet Asia and is now beginning to raise its head inside the Soviet Union itself. Interpreters of Soviet policy in Asia can ignore this important factor only at their own peril.

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Kremlinology or Behavioralism?

By Karl W. Ryavec

SIDNEY L. PLOSS, Ed.: *The Soviet Political Process: Aims, Techniques, and Examples of Analysis.* Boston, Ginn, 1971.

ROGER E. KANET, Ed.: *The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies: Applications of Behaviorally Oriented Research on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.* New York, Free Press, 1971.

WHILE BOTH BOOKS under review are similar in that they are collections of articles on Soviet politics, they also complement each other, for each contains studies of a different type: "kremlinological" in the case of Ploss's book, and "behavioral" in the case of Kanet's work.

The first of these "approaches" has come to be widely—and somewhat unfairly—regarded as a distinctive methodological approach employed exclusively by the scholastic soothsayers who probe the mysteries of Soviet politics. This prejudiced view, however, ignores the fact that the technique of intelligent speculation is quite commonly, if not universally, applied to the investigation of the inside workings of political elites—be it the British cabinet or any other leadership group.

The second, or "behavioral, approach—though originally, perhaps, a peculiarly American set of assumptions, methods and aims—is now widely accepted and applied by both American and non-American scholars to the analysis of politics and political systems generally. (Current political research in the countries of Western Europe provides an excellent example of contemporary behavioral techniques.) It is interesting to note, however, that the behavioral approach has also been subjected to much criticism: in the first instance, by scholars wedded to the more traditional legalistic and institutional approaches; and more recently by other scholars who claim that behavioral studies, particularly those which place heavy emphasis on quantitative data, fail to address themselves to crucial political questions or to provide basic theoretical solutions to political problems related to specific human needs. In any event, neither the "kremlinological" nor the "behavioral" approach, as well as the scholars and studies associated with either of them, can escape encountering serious questioning—and sometimes denunciations—of their basic precepts and conclusions. Some of these criticisms are of a patently ideological nature, but others do have substantive foundation.[1]

THE STATED PURPOSE of Ploss's study is to familiarize the beginning student of Soviet politics with the "craft" of investigating conflict within the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU). His book is divided into three parts: the first consisting of two articles on the aims of analysis; the second consisting of three articles on techniques of analysis; and the third and longest (eight articles) providing concrete examples of analysis. Each section of the book is prefaced by an introduction written by the editor. Almost all of the articles in the collection, including three by Ploss ("The Language of Conflict," "Deadlock and the Party Presidium," and "The Rise of Brezhnev"), were originally published between 1954 and 1970. Although some of them, in this reviewer's opinion, probably do not merit reprinting now, others still retain considerable interest.

For example, the thesis set forth in Ernst Kux's "Technicians of Power Versus Managers of Technique"—namely, that experts try to shape party policies—is

[1] For criticisms of the theoretical and political inadequacies of certain trends in American political science, much of which is now behavioral, see, for example: Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literatures," *American Political Science Review* (Menasha, Wisconsin), March 1965, pp. 39–51; William E. Connolly, *Political Science and Ideology*, New York, Atherton, 1967; Henry S. Kariel, *The Promise of Politics*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1965; and A. R. Louch, *Explanation and Human Action*, Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1969.

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even more applicable today than when his article was originally published in 1958. Another article that still merits attention is that of David Burg and Peter Wiles assessing Khrushchev's 1962 power position. Written two years prior to Khrushchev's removal, the article develops the thesis that Nikita Sergeevich was not the absolute ruler of the Soviet Union, adducing some convincing arguments for believing that there were limitations on his power. Two other articles worthy of reprinting are Peter Reddaway's analytical article (1965) on the fall of Khrushchev and Gordon Skilling's "Interest Groups and Communist Politics" (1966), a study that was instrumental in promoting the application of group theory to the study of Soviet politics.[2]

One writer, Michael Gehlen, is represented in both books under review; his article included in Ploss's collection first appeared in 1965 and, interestingly enough, also takes a group-theory approach, realistically calling for recognition of the CPSU as "a composite of various functional groups" (p. 53). The last selection in Ploss's book is an article of his own, "The Rise of Brezhnev," which briefly examines significant post–1964 developments relating to the major issues of Soviet politics.

In sum, Ploss's study can hardly be considered a novel contribution to the study of Soviet politics inasmuch as the kremlinological method of analysis is already familiar both to those engaged in Soviet studies and to the informed public. Nevertheless, it does provide a useful and fairly cohesive selection of articles which, though uneven in quality, apply similar or at least compatible approaches to a particularly complex problem area. The second part of the book, dealing with techniques of analysis, will be particularly useful to those who are about to undertake their first research in primary Soviet sources.[3]

WHILE THE PLOSS volume makes no particular effort to "sell" the kremlinological approach, Kanet's collection appears deliberately designed to bridge what the editor discerns as "the split between political science and Communist studies" by inducing specialists in the latter field to adopt the behavioral approach of modern political science. To accomplish this, the editor presents a series of articles (some five of them not previously published) which he labels as "behavioral." As defined by Kanet, this term denotes an orientation directed toward "the observable political actions of individuals and groups and the psychological processes which influence these actions—*e.g.*, perceptions, motivations, and attitudes" (p. 5). The objective of such research is to identify uniform patterns of political behavior that can be quantitatively measured, thus providing a basis for predictive theories which are themselves capable of being empirically verified.

It is quite clear from Kanet's Introduction to the volume (pp. 1–10) that he regards the attitudes of the traditional specialists in Communist studies as primarily responsible for the "split" with political science, and he sees these attitudes as the product of three factors: (1) the difficulty of obtaining adequate empirical data for behavioral studies; (2) the tendency of the specialists to emphasize the uniqueness of Communist systems and hence the need to take an "area" approach; and (3) an over-absorption on the part of these experts with top-level policy-making, coupled with a lack of interest in—or even, sometimes, an inability to handle—the new methodological tools of political science. Kanet, however, pitches his arguments in a low and ostensibly neutral key, avoiding any direct attacks on scholars not engaged in behavioral-type studies. Moreover, he notes elements of a behavioral approach in the work of some traditional Sovietologists, citing in particular Boris Nicolaevsky's attention to groupings within the Soviet Communist Party.

The main body of the book contains a total of thirteen articles grouped in four sections. The first section consists of a single article providing a general survey of empirically oriented literature on Communist politics; the second section, of six articles devoted to political elites; the third section, of three articles under the heading of policy implementation and bureaucracy; and the last section, of three articles dealing with aspects of the Soviet role in international affairs.

ONLY A FEW of these articles can be specifically commented on here. The first essay, by Paul Shoup ("Comparing Communist Nations: Prospects for an Empiri-

[2] See, for example, H. G. Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1971. Ploss's inclusion of Skillings' article in his collection is somewhat curious because the study of interest groups focuses on a level of politics below the level of the Politburo, which is characteristically the primary concern of kremlinologists.

[3] Also useful for this purpose is W. E. Griffith, "On Esoteric Communications," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles), No. 1, 1970, pp. 47–54.

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cal Approach"), is essentially a bibliographic survey, but it also points up certain problems and suggests directions for future research in comparative Communist studies. It is interesting to note that Shoup refers to Communist systems as a "distinct and unique response to the demands of contemporary society" (p. 29)—a description which would seem not only to be at variance with a fundamental assumption of the behavioralists, but also to accept one of the principal arguments for the "area" approach that Kanet criticizes.

Of the six articles dealing with political elites, all but one focus on the USSR, the single exception being a brief essay on Bulgaria. Three of the six, including the one on Bulgaria, are analyses of Central Committee membership and the career backgrounds of Committee members — a favorite subject of investigation for behavioralists, owing in part to the relative ease of gathering quantitative data. The two articles dealing with the Soviet Central Committee (one by Gehlen and McBride, the other by Fleron) examine the backgrounds of CC members with particular attention to the process of "cooptation" whereby members of the specialized elites are drawn into the policy-making machinery as a means of adapting it to changing needs. Gehlen and McBride realistically conclude that cooptation is becoming "rational" and meaningful as an informal process which gives the ruling elite "the advantage of increased stability and information," yet does not involve "a complementary loss of power" (p. 123). Fleron agrees with this position, arguing that while the Soviet leadership system remains essentially a non-pluralistic one in which Central Committee members represent only institutional rather than associational groups, it nonetheless satisfies some major conditions of system adaptability. He also makes the point that Communist polities can be studied more effectively if one avoids "the yardstick of the Anglo-American political culture" (p. 145).

One would not deny that detailed analysis of the individual backgrounds of Central Committee members can provide much material of interest; yet one can also legitimately question just how much such studies tell us about the actual political activities and collective goals of the body in question. It may also be noted that another article in this section—Milton Lodge's analysis of the attitudes of central party *apparatchiki* and four specialist elite groups (*i.e.*, the central economic bureaucracy, the military, the literary intelligentsia, and the legal profession)—seems to suffer from a fundamental methodological flaw in that it rests on the initial and highly questionable assumption that Soviet journals accurately reflect the attitudes of the groups they ostensibly serve. This reviewer's own personal experiences in the Soviet Union confirm that all Soviet journals have on their editorial staffs persons whose job it is to see that the contents of the publication conform to the prevailing ideological line.

The six articles in the latter two sections of the Kanet volume are more varied in topic and approach than those in the first two sections. In the section on policy implementation and bureaucracy, an article by Erik Hoffmann uses the methodology of content analysis to ascertain the Soviet leadership's perceptions of "role conflict" among ideologists and other categories of officials and shows that there have been wide variations in the definition of various important roles. In another article, Robert Sharlet employs a "systems-theory" approach to explore the role of law in Soviet political development, examining the specialized systemic functions performed by different types of law—criminal, economic, and family. The author concludes his analysis with the formulation of what this reviewer considers to be some rather obvious hypotheses regarding the uses of law in Communist societies and how certain types of law will be employed in these societies to achieve different "systemic goals."

In the final section, on the Soviet Union in world affairs, the opening article by Charles Gati provides a detailed analysis of *Pravda* and *Izvestia* coverage of international affairs with a view to ascertaining the Soviet foreign policy elite's perceptions of the relative importance of different regions of the world. The analysis concludes, on the basis of volume of coverage, that Western Europe, the Far East and Pacific, and Eastern Europe (in that order) have generally been regarded as the most important areas, although there have been significant fluctuations in different periods. Again, however, it may be questioned whether the number of words devoted to different regions in the Soviet press is, by itself, a reliable measure of their relative importance in the eyes of Soviet policymakers.

In the same section, Terrence Hoffman examines the impact of East-West conflict on cohesion within the Communist system and comes to the quite predictable conclusion that the greater the conflict, the greater the intrasys-

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tem cohesion. The concluding article, by Dan C. Heldman, is a far more complex "correlation analysis" of Soviet relations with 25 developing African countries, which endeavors to construct a three-cornered model of causal relationships between the level of internal activity of Communist-oriented African groups, Soviet perceptions of internal phenomena in the African states, and Soviet and African voting patterns in the United Nations. The author employs highly sophisticated analytical techniques, but some of these seem to require closer examination (for example, one of his scales, while purporting to show "intervals" or gradations, may in fact be nothing but an ordinal scale).

AS THE FIRST book-length collection of articles taking a behavioral-quantitative approach to Communist politics,[4] Kanet's volume contains a number of studies which can be read with profit by anyone interested in this field. Nevertheless, the reviewer has reservations regarding both the uniqueness of the findings produced by this approach and the extent to which it can succeed in providing a more definitive picture of Soviet politics. In regard to the latter, it may be pointed out that the behavioral approach applies to Soviet politics methods of research that were originally applied to American politics, and that it thus rests upon the assumption, whether explicit or implicit, that the two political systems are basically similar. But while there are, to be sure, certain similarities of structure and process, one should not overlook the very important differences in political culture, ideology, and goals that determine the uses of the respective systems. These differences, though sometimes deemphasized by those who seek to analyze a sphere of activity narrow enough to permit precise formulation and quantification, are of overriding importance to the actual participants in politics in either system—both those in power and those in opposition.

A further point to be made is that whereas "traditional" studies of Soviet politics generally deal with dynamic or "moving" political processes, the newer, behavioral-type studies tend to focus on static situations or environments and—rather oddly—to omit discussion of the political process itself. The analyses of the backgrounds of Central Committee members in the Kanet volume are a case in point. Such analyses present us only with the results of political processes without giving us a glimpse of the "action" (which is often hidden from all of us). The mere fact that quantitative data are available is no reason to assume that such data by themselves reveal much of real political significance. As A. R. Louch has observed, "statistics are not relevant just because they are mathematical, probabilistic findings, but because they relate to some particular political purpose." [5] Thus, while the adoption of behavioral assumptions and methods by students of Soviet politics might serve to make such studies more acceptable to some political scientists, it is not immediately likely—in the reviewer's opinion—to add a great deal to our knowledge of the substance of Soviet political processes.

One could also ask whether the behavioral approach is not as

[4] For a collection of a somewnat more disparate nature but showing some overlap with Kanet's study, see Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., Ed., *Communist Studies and the Social Sciences*, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1969. This book was reviewed by Frederick C. Barghoorn in *Slavic Review* (Seattle) No. 3, 1970, pp. 539–42.

[5] Louch, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

Reviewers in this Issue

RICHARD T. DE GEORGE—University Professor of Philosophy at The University of Kansas (Lawrence); author of *Patterns of Soviet Thought* (1966), *The New Marxism* (1968), and other works.

RUDOLF L. TŐKÉS—Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut; author of *Bela Kun and the Hungarian Soviet Republic* (1967) and editor of a forthcoming volume on the politics and ideologies of Soviet dissent.

GEOFFREY E. WHEELER—former Director of the Central Asian Research Center (London) until his retirement in 1968; author of *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia* (1966) and contributor to *Asian Affairs* and *Middle Eastern Studies*.

KARL W. RYAVEC—Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts (Amherst); contributor to *Soviet Studies, Slavic Review*, and *Western Political Quarterly*; author of a forthcoming book on Soviet economic reform.

Notice of Erratum

In identifying the author of the essay-review, "The Agricultural Base of China's Political Economy" (*Problems of Communism*, September-October 1972), the editors inadvertently introduced an erroneous initial E. in the name of Werner Klatt. Dr. Klatt has no middle initial.

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culture-bound as the older legal-institutional or traditional approach it is meant to supplant. Both are developments of the same Anglo-American society, though at different points in time. The behavioral approach may derive from and serve particular American needs just as the totalitarian approach to Communist politics once did. It may even "constitute a methodical formulation of an unstated faith," [6] *i.e.*, an ideology. It should at least try to be a "responsible ideology" which strives to avoid the "twin dangers of social irrelevance and unwarranted dogmatism." [7]

To sum up, then, the two collections reviewed here have limited value measured against the purposes of their editors. Ploss's collection is not a sufficient introduction to the study of Soviet politics, although it will undoubtedly be helpful to serious beginning students who need guidance in how to go about sifting Soviet published materials, particularly the press.[8] Kanet's compilation formulates questions and presents empirical data that add to and refine knowledge already provided on a tentative basis by earlier studies making lesser claims for their methodologies, and it represents a welcome contribution on both substantive and heuristic grounds. It is not, however, a contribution of revolutionary significance, nor does it provide us with the theories of predictive power that are the stated goal of the "behavioral revolution."

This is not to imply that behavioral approaches cannot prove useful in the study of Soviet politics. The initial studies of this type do not appear, however, to fulfill the claims of the exponents of these approaches, and we must await the appearance of a new generation of such studies before we can make a definitive judgment as to how much they can contribute to the attainment of a new level of knowledge concerning the major questions of Soviet political life. This new generation of behavioral studies will depend in part on the further development of conventional research and studies, since the latter must supply at least some of the questions, data and theories for the behavioralists to build upon. It therefore seems likely that only a combination of the traditional and behavioral approaches will enable us —to borrow a Chinese slogan—to "walk on two legs" in our further exploration of the fascinating political and social questions posed by the Soviet polity.

[6] Kariel, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

[7] See Connolly, *op. cit.*, pp. 137–38.

[8] Also useful for this purpose is Ploss's earlier study, *Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia: A Case Study of Agricultural Policy, 1953–1963*, Princeton, N.J.. Princeton University Press, 1965.

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Notes & Views
Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be adressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Washington, DC, 20547.*

The first two letters below were received in the spring of 1972. Publication has been delayed pending receipt of a response from Messrs. Brown and Neuberger.

PROBLEMS OF ECONOMICS

TO THE EDITORS: I would like to call your attention to a misquotation from my article in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Economic Developments in Countries of Eastern Europe—A Compendium of Papers* in the review of this work by Alan H. Brown and Egon Neuberger in the January-February 1972 issue of *Problems of Communism.* Further, I would like to reply to the review insofar as it concerns my article.

I am very sorry that the reviewers saw fit to introduce their word "short" into a part of a sentence they indicated to be a *direct* quotation from page 443 of my original article. The misquotation gives a different flavor to my sentence than I intended. Moreover, my statement on page 439, which the reviewers characterize as an acknowledgement "at one point," is in fact the summary conclusion and appears labeled as such in section "II. Summary." The reviewers' juxtaposition of the last two sentences of the paragraph on page 443 of my article also imparts a coloration I did not intend. The last sentence of my paragraph, "The declining productivities observed for Eastern Europe reflect these considerations," refers to a number of factors discussed in the same paragraph, not just the *one* element singled out by the reviewers. The considerations I listed were indeed comprehensive ". . . scientific, technological and managerial knowledge, economies and diseconomies of scale, and all other contributing influences. . . ." Regretfully, I must conclude that the reviewer was, to say the least, confused.

Obviously, some of the countries of Eastern Europe are having difficulties digesting their capital investments, but this does not mean that capital is no longer a constraint on growth, among other constraints. If some of the latter were corrected, there would be less trouble absorbing new investment, an elasticity of substitution that "has approached zero" in Hungary notwithstanding (cited as a "preliminary" calculation by A. A. Brown, in footnote 9 of the review; Brown's paper was unavailable to me). It is at least an open question as to whether Brown's finding for Hungary would apply to all countries of Eastern Europe. It remains to be seen what Brown's calculations will show on close examination, in what prices, and for what period.

I would also like to take this opportunity to call attention to an error in my Table 7, p. 443, which crept in during the rush to get my paper to the press. For all practical purposes, this Table should be replaced by Table 6, on page 438, of my paper.

LASZLO CZIRJAK
44 Shady Lane
Greenwich, Conn.

TO THE EDITORS: Alan A. Brown's and Egon Neuberger's review of US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Economic Developments in Countries of Eastern Europe—A Compendium of Papers* in your January-February 1972 issue contains inaccuracies and misconceptions concerning my paper that should be set straight. Brown has indicated to me his personal responsibility for the comments on my work, and my rejoinder is accordingly directed to him. But I regret that Egon Neuberger did not catch Brown's errors and misguided remarks before publication of the review.

The reviewer finds it "disturbing" that my reported growth for Hungarian GNP is relatively stable in the 1950's compared to the official statistics. He points out that the latter show absolute declines in 1952, 1954, and 1956, with a "particularly sharp drop" in 1956, whereas my GNP series shows only one "very mild" dip in 1956. I regret that the reviewer confuses GNP with the official Marxist so-called net material product (NMP) concept of national income; GNP and NMP are not directly comparable. Trends in housing, government services, and other services, as well as capital consumption, which are reflected in GNP but not in NMP, dampen the fluctuations in the net value added of agriculture. Accordingly, Brown's characterization of the decline in NMP (10.8 percent, see Central Statistical Office, *Statisztikai evknoyv, 1957* [Statistical Yearbook, 1957] Budapest, Statisztikai Kiado Vallalat, 1959, p. 51) as "particularly sharp" and the corresponding decline of GNP (4.5 percent, see *Compendium*, p. 46) as "very mild" is a regrettably misleading "comparison." A decline of 4.5 percent of real GNP is a sharp drop by most standards.

To pursue the confusion further, Brown points to the weights of agriculture in the

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two measures. In the first place, most students know that it is incorrect to compare the share of agriculture in GNP with its share in NMP. But let us follow the review anyway: Brown is "particularly puzzled" by the divergence between the GNP and NMP series "when he learns that Alton's recalculated index gives a much larger weight to agriculture than does the official Hungarian index." But, what are the facts? I allow 27.2 percent of GNP in 1955 (the weight-base year) as the weight for agriculture and forestry in my index (see my paper, *Compendium*, pp. 54; 67); official figures show a much larger 33.4 percent of NMP originating in agriculture in 1955 (see Central Statistical Office, *Statisztikai evkonyv, 1949-1955* [Statistical Yearbook, 1949-55], Budapest, Statisztikai Kiado Vallalat, 1957, p. 39). On the basis of this faulty reporting, Brown calls for further "thorough" analysis. The call is well taken, but not for the reasons he alleges. In work on comparisons of growth, a spirit of modesty is recommended. At various places in my short paper I have tried to alert the reader to the relativity of statistical comparisons to such factors as the bases of valuation or the selection of index numbers.

Brown states that "it is unfortunate" that no alternative series using different weighting specifications are presented." Obviously, a short article is not a book; still, I have presented official series at several points in my paper for perspective. Elsewhere, we have tested the effect of alternative weights upon economic structure and upon calculated trends in growth. Brown might have reflected that the 10 percent return on capital used at one point is about midway between the 8 and 13 percent which he cited.

Brown laments (p. 77) that the "only clue" to the specification of the average annual rates of growth is a *footnote* in my paper (*Compendium*, p. 63). This footnote is specific to the paragraph to which it refers; to transfer its application to other contexts is unwarranted. Fortunately, readers need not be taken unawares; there are indeed more than clues elsewhere. I have indicated in the very table to which he refers (Table 15, p. 62) and also on the following page (Table 16) "compound annual rates." If I had intended this to mean rates given by least squares fit to the compound rate formula, I would have said so. In any event, the ultimate specification is to be found in the relevant indexes; recourse to them should clarify any doubts and provide the basis for calculation of whatever additional measures the reader might seek. Obviously, no single method of calculating annual rates of growth will answer all questions; detail given by one method may be smoothed out by another. The competent reader will not suffer so long as the basic indexes are available.

Despite the reviewer's suggestion to the contrary, the work I summarize in my paper has benefited at earlier stages from the participation and advice of economists experienced in the Soviet and East European economies and in index-number work. Were I to emulate the tone of the review, I should say "it is a pity" that the reviewer did not allow for differences in national accounting concepts and did not show sufficient attention to detail. "Would that" it were otherwise.

THAD P. ALTON
425 Riverside Drive
New York, New York

PROFESSORS BROWN AND NEUBERGER REPLY: Our review article of the US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Economic Developments in Countries of Eastern Europe—A Compendium of Papers* was commented upon by two of the authors, Laszlo Czirjak and Thad P. Alton. Their comments call for a few remarks on our part.

The word "short" was inadvertently introduced in the quotation from page 443 of Czirjak's original article ("the real restraint of growth is likely to be the [short] supply of capital"), not by us, but by the editorial offices of *Problems of Communism*. However, the important question raised in our review is whether growth is likely to be restrained by "the supply of capital," as claimed by Czirjak, or whether the problem of growth is that capital is becoming an increasingly unsatisfactory substitute for labor. Since Czirjak's specifications of the production function do not even consider explicitly the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, his analysis cannot provide an answer to the question of whether factor substitution is a possible problem. The conclusion should be examined that "capital is becoming a less and less satisfactory substitute for labor as a spur to increase production" (our review, p. 76). M. Weitzman has presented strong evidence that the difficulty of substituting capital for labor was a key problem in the Soviet Union, whose development strategy was a prototype for East European countries (see his article "Soviet Postwar Economic Growth and Capital-Labor Substitution," in the *American Economic Review* [Menasha, Wisconsin], September 1970, pp. 676–92).

As for the confusion of the reviewers, this is hardly surprising since the reader is presented with two conflicting tables in Czirjak's article (tables 6 and 7 on pages 438 and 443, respectively). More important, however, is the fact that table 6 (which Czirjak tells us does not contain the arithmetical error of table 7 and therefore should replace the latter) implies an elasticity of factor substitution which is infinite. The reader is left wondering why the author did not consider at least some inelasticity of factor substitution. Surely, it is now accepted in the literature on productivity that the possibility of a degree of inelasticity in factor substitution is a matter which deserves serious thought in Eastern Europe.

Turning to Alton's aggregate output series, the paradox that his recalculated data make the Hungarian economy appear more stable in the 1950's than do the official series for the same period remains unresolved. This cannot be explained simply by the difference in weights accorded different sectors of the economy under the official category of net material product (NMP) and under the concept of gross national product (GNP) used by Alton. The explanation must lie elsewhere, perhaps in the statistical methodology of the author. One clue to this mystery may be seen in Alton's handling of the category of net agricultural product, which figures in both the NMP and GNP concepts.

As the accompanying table (derived from Alton *et al.*, Occasional Paper No. 14 of the Research Project on National Income, p. 42) shows, there is a marked divergence between the official and Alton's recalculated series for net agricultural output during the 1950's. Thus, unlike Alton's data, the official series

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Index of Hungarian Net Agricultural Product (1949 = 100)

Year	Official	Recalculated by Alton *et al.*	Official index as percent of recalculated index
1949	100	100	100
1950	112	98	114
1951	133	107	124
1952	83	97	85
1953	115	89	129
1954	110	97	113
1955	127	118	107
1956	106	112	94
1957	124	125	100
1958	129	130	99
1959	133	114	116
1960	119	100	119

shows drastic annual fluctuations in the early 1950's, particularly in 1952, for which the official data show a decline of nearly 40 percent. Conversely, Alton's recalculated series indicates an abrupt decline of agricultural output in 1959, whereas according to the official data output in fact increased.

Although the reasons for the divergence in data for the early 1950's remain unexplained, the apparent cause for the divergence in 1959 was the change in Hungarian official depreciation allowances and repair-and-maintenance charges between 1958 and 1959. Although such artificial measures reflect no genuine change in the output of Hungarian agriculture and were therefore ignored in the official data, Alton evidently chose to allow for them in his GNP calculations by increasing the total value of depreciation allowances from 194 to 434 million forints and by raising maintenance and repair charges from 475 to 1,062 million forints in the calculation for 1959 (see Occasional Paper No. 14, p. 115). Such arbitrary adjustments make it difficult to get an accurate picture of the fluctuations of the Hungarian economy.

As for Alton's calculation of the annual rate of growth, the reviewers remain puzzled as to why the author did not make better use of the GNP series he had so laboriously derived. In our essay-review (p. 76) we noted that Alton's use of terminal-year averaging indicated a sharp decline in the annual growth of Hungarian GNP in 1955–60 as compared with 1950–55 (3.9 percent *vs.* 5.4 percent), whereas fitting a least-squares estimate—the accepted practice in econometric analysis — to Alton's series would have indicated annual growth rates of 4.6 and 4.7 percent, respectively. Alton notes that "the competent reader will not suffer so long as the basic indexes are available," but is it not an imposition to expect the reader to calculate his own regression coefficients in order to get an accurate impression of trends in economic growth for the two five-year periods?

In sum, what one needs is a precise picture both of growth trends and of instability in the Hungarian economy during the 1950's. Without looking at the fluctuations—particularly the absolute declines of 1952, 1954 and 1956—it would hardly be possible to interpret meaningfully the story of Hungarian postwar economic development and systemic change.

ALAN A. BROWN
Professor of Economics
University of Windsor

EGON NEUBERGER
Professor of Economics
State University of
New York at Stony Brook

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Problems of Communism

MARCH-APRIL 1973

SOVIET ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

Growth Model
Abram Bergson


Consumers
Gertrude E. Schroeder

Comecon
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Dissent in a Complex Society
Walter D. Connor

Althusser's Ideology
Maurice Cranston

Book Reviews
Nicolas Spulber
Lincoln P. Bloomfield
Maurice Friedberg
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Problems of Communism

2

MARCH-APRIL 1973 VOL XXII

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EDITOR: Paul A. Smith, Jr.
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DESIGNER: Joseph D. Hockersmith

Cover: A Siberian mother and child return from shopping. Photo from Black Star.

Soviet Economic Perspectives

1 Toward a New Growth Model
by Abram Bergson

10 Consumer Problems and Prospects
by Gertrude E. Schroeder

25 Comecon Integration
by Z. M. Fallenbuchl

40 Dissent in a Complex Society: The Soviet Case
by Walter D. Connor

53 The Ideology of Althusser
by Maurice Cranston

BOOKS

61 The Comparative Economic Approach
by Nicolas Spulber

64 Moscow, Peking, and the UN
by Lincoln P. Bloomfield

68 The Alienation of Soviet Jews
by Maurice Friedberg

71 Culture under Lenin and Stalin
by Ludmilla B. Turkevich

NOTES & VIEWS

74 Correspondence

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Soviet Economic Perspectives

EDITORS' NOTE: Soviet leaders in recent years have shown signs of responding to mounting pressures for change in the configuration of the USSR economy and in its external relationships. The three articles below examine several critical dimensions of this metamorphosis, and articles in subsequent issues will examine other aspects. In the first contribution here, Mr. Bergson argues that the escalating economic costs of forced-draft growth are compelling the Soviet regime to shift from the traditional Stalinist model toward a more balanced approach to economic development. Mrs. Schroeder focuses on the dilemmas facing the Soviet leadership in the consumer sector as it attempts to overcome the results of decades of investment neglect and the inflexibility of the management system in order to satisfy increasingly sophisticated popular demand. In the final article, Mr. Fallenbuchl expands the perspective to the Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance; he traces the legacy of the Soviet command model in the East European economies and examines the economic forces tending to give the USSR a pivotal role in an increasingly integrated Comecon.

Toward a New Growth Model

By Abram Bergson

An attempt to peer into the long-term future of the Soviet economy is always timely, but it is especially so after the launching of a new five-year plan proclaiming rather novel priorities.[1] Such an attempt should properly rest on substantial statistical projections of a kind that still remain to be made for the USSR. Even on the basis of limited inquiry, however, it is clear that the Soviet economy has for some time been in a high degree of flux. The resulting change in structure may be more profound and enduring than many commentators on the new plan have supposed. Indeed, the famous Soviet model of economic growth that Stalin initiated with the five-year plans appears at long last to be passing from the Soviet scene.

Like any relatively modern economy, that of the USSR consists of a myriad of activities, but the results of all these are summarized in the country's real national income. Hence, the trends that are relevant to the present inquiry may be explored by focusing on movement in that cardinal indicator and particularly its best known variant, the gross national product (GNP).

Mr. Bergson is George F. Baker Professor of Economics at Harvard University (Cambridge, Mass.). His many books and articles on the Soviet economy include Planning and Productivity Under Soviet Socialism, *1968.*

[1] This article is a revised version of a concluding discussion presented at a symposium on Soviet economic prospects held in Brussels on April 14-16, 1971, and published in Y. Laulan, Ed., *Prospects for Soviet Economic Growth in the 1970's*, Brussels, NATO, 1971. The revision has provided an opportunity, among other things, to correct a transcription error affecting the estimated magnitude of Soviet capital stock in 1970 and to take account of a revision in Stanley H. Cohn's calculations of the Soviet gross national product. These modifications are reflected in Tables 1 and 2 in the ensuing discussion.

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Inquiry into the future must begin with an analysis of the past. Therefore, let us at the outset look at trends in Soviet national income since the completion of the initial postwar five-year plan in the year 1950.

Past Trends

After 1950, as is well-known, the national income at first increased rapidly, though probably not quite as rapidly as is often supposed. During 1950–58, according to Stanley H. Cohn's well-known calculations, it grew at an average rate of 6.4 percent a year (see Table 1.)* That is somewhat lower than the rates indicated by other Western data, but it must still be much nearer the mark than the official Soviet claim of 10.9 percent. (This figure relates only to "material output," and such Soviet data must for familiar reasons be treated very skeptically.[2])

Even according to Western calculations, the tempo of Soviet growth much exceeded that of the US (2.9 percent). But it is worth noting that the Soviet growth rate was nearly equaled or surpassed by the growth rates of Italy (5.6 percent) and Western Germany (7.6 percent). Moreover, it fell well shy of that for Japan. In these early years, Japan had not quite achieved the economic miracle that is now a hallmark there, but its rate of growth was already an impressive 8.0–9.0 percent.

Since 1958, as is well known too, Soviet growth has slowed. As Table 1 shows, the retardation is manifest in both Cohn's and the official Soviet data (curiously enough, it is more marked in the official figures than in Cohn's). Why the slowdown? The question has often been discussed, but there may still not be general understanding that no corresponding retardation occurred in the growth of inputs of the two principal productive factors generating output—capital and labor. According to both official Soviet and Western data, the available stock of capital increased during 1958–67 at about the same rate as during 1950–58 (Table 1), and the tempo was extraordinarily rapid (a matter to which we shall return later). Similarly, Murray Feshbach's calculations with regard to employment (Table 1) show that it also rose at much the same rate during 1958–67 as during 1950–58.

The slowdown in output growth, then, was due essentially to a decline in the rate of productivity increase. While that is already evident from the trends in output and factor inputs, it becomes even more obvious if we average the rates of growth of capital and labor in a way that has lately become a standard practice in economics. Using this method, we can calculate the rate of growth of output per composite unit of labor and capital together, or "factor productivity" as it has come to be called. During 1958–67, that rate was significantly below the corresponding one for 1950–58 (Table 1). A computation of factor productivity for a non-market economy such as that of the USSR, it is true, is almost inevitably rather arbitrary, but the results obtained are still illuminating.[3]

Why the decline in the growth of factor productivity? There are, perhaps, too many reasons. For

* Readers should be alerted to a very specific usage in the author's presentation of growth statistics. He always includes the base year as well as the years for which performance is being examined: *e.g.*, growth "during 1950-58" signifies output increases in the years 1951-58 from levels achieved in 1950.—Eds.

[2] For a recent appraisal of the official data, including the nature of the Soviet concept of national income, see Abraham S. Becker, "National Income Accounting in the USSR"; Stanley H. Cohn, "National Income Growth Statistics"; and Abram Bergson, "Soviet National Income Statistics: Summary and Assessment," in V. G. Treml and John P. Hardt, Eds., *Soviet Economic Statistics*, Durham, N.C. Duke University Press, 1972.

[3] The arbitrariness derives in part from the difficulty of obtaining for the USSR meaningful factor income shares, such as are generated in a market economy, to use as weights in averaging the rates of growth of labor and capital. This paper employs weights of 0.6 and 0.4, respectively, for the two factors—weights suggested by relevant Western experience.

At least for the technically initiated, it should be explained that I felt it appropriate, in the case of capital, to adopt an income share that is gross of depreciation even though what is in question here is the growth of net capital stock over time. Also, inputs have been averaged "logarithmically"; hence, I have in effect assumed a so-called Cobb-Douglas production function, in which the "elasticity of substitution" of inputs of capital and labor is taken to be unity. However, the elasticity of substitution in Soviet circumstances may be less than unity. Under such a condition, the growth of calculated total inputs would tend to slow down even though the rate of increase in inputs of individual factors remained unchanged, and the tempo of factor productivity growth would not decline as much as it does in the present calculations. But the problem of declining factor productivity, to which the text turns next, is then transformed, at least in part, into one of a declining rate of return on capital, and much of what is said, I believe, is still relevant.

Inasmuch as we shall later employ the Cobb-Douglas function in projecting future Soviet economic growth, a word or two about the impact that an elasticity of substitution less than unity would have on these projections seems in order as well. Since under such a circumstance the calculated tempo of factor-1 productivity growth rises for past years, one might well assume that higher rates would result for the future, too, but there are also indications that the rate of growth of total inputs of labor and capital will decrease. Therefore, trial calculations for projections of total GNP growth based on an assumption of an elasticity of substitution less than unity suggest that such projections might be less favorable to the USSR than those made here, which are based on an assumption of an elasticity of unity.

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Table 1: Selected Economic Indicators for the USSR, 1950–75

(average annual rates of growth, in percent)

	1950–58	1958–67	1967–70	1970–75 (Planned)
National income, Soviet official data [a]	10.9	7.2	7.3	6.7 [b]
GNP, Cohn calculations	6.4	5.3	3.4 [c]	n.a.[d]
Capital investment, Soviet official data [e]	12.9	7.6	7.5	6.7
Gross investment, fixed capital, Moorsteen-Powell calculations	11.4	6.9 [f]	n.a.	n.a.
Gross investment, Moorsteen-Powell calculations	12.2	6.1 [f]	n.a.	n.a.
Fixed capital stock including livestock, Soviet official data	8.3 [g]	8.3 [g]	7.5	n.a.
Net fixed capital stock, Moorsteen-Powell calculations	10.0	9.4	n.a.	n.a.
Net capital stock, Moorsteen-Powell calculations	9.0	9.0	n.a.	n.a.
Employment, Feshbach calculations	1.8	1.7	1.7	n.a.
Total input of capital and labor	4.6	4.6	n.a.	n.a.
Factor productivity (GNP per unit of labor and capital)	1.7	0.7	n.a.	n.a.

[a] National income "produced" unless otherwise indicated.

[b] National income "utilized for consumption and accumulation." For 1965-70, such income grew at an average annual rate of 7.1 per cent. The corresponding figure for national income "produced" was 7.7 per cent.

[c] This figure is for 1967-69.

[d] "n.a." means "not applicable" or "not available."

[e] Investment in fixed capital only; during 1950-58 exclusive of investment in private housing as well.

[f] These figures cover 1958-66.

[g] These figures are for 1950-59 and 1959-67.

SOURCES: Tsentralnoe statisticheskoe upravlenie, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1960 g.* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1960), Moscow, 1961, p. 85, and subsequent volumes in the same series for 1962, p. 535; for 1967, p. 613; for 1968, p. 49; and for 1970, pp. 60, 478, 533; Tsentralnoe statisticheskoe upravlenie, *Kapitalnoe stroitelstvo v SSSR* (Capital Construction in the USSR), Moscow, 1961, p. 40; *Gosudarstvennyi piatiletnii plan razvitiia narodnovo khoziaistvo SSSR na 1971-1975 gody* (The State Five-Year Plan of Development of the National Economy of the USSR for 1971-75), Moscow, 1972, pp. 62-75, 345, 352.

Stanley H. Cohn, "General Growth Performance in the Soviet Economy," in Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, *Economic Performance and the Military Burden in the Soviet Union*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1970, p. 17; Richard Moorsteen and Raymond P. Powell, *The Soviet Capital Stock, 1928-1962*, Homewood, Ill., 1966, pp. 323, 341, 360; *Two Supplements to Richard Moorsteen and Raymond P. Powell, The Soviet Capital Stock, 1928-1962*, New Haven, Conn., Economic Growth Center, Yale University, 1968, pp. 11, 18, 24; Murray Feshbach, "Estimates and Projections of the Labor Force and Civilian Employment in the USSR: 1950-1980," Bureau of the Census, US Department of Commerce, February 1970, processed.

one, in 1956 Nikita Khrushchev initiated a reduction in working hours which ultimately led to the establishment of an approximately 40-hour week in industry in place of the 48-hour week that had prevailed in the early 1950's. That reform had already had some impact before 1958, but its principal effect came in subsequent years. Thus, it would have tended to reduce productivity growth in the post-1958 period compared with the pre-1958 one.

Another cause lay in the proverbial vicissitudes in agriculture—most importantly, Khrushchev's heroic interventions, notably the great New Lands Program. This innovation had a favorable outcome at first, but progress became relatively slow and uncertain after the great crop of 1958.[4]

Still another element in the slowdown has been the well-known deficiencies of the Soviet system of central planning: the failure of enterprise managers to behave as desired because of ineffective incentives and the often fallible direction and coordination of superior agencies. These difficulties are by no means new. On the contrary, they date from virtually the earliest days of Soviet planning. But, as has often been argued, they may have become increasingly costly as Soviet central planning had to cope with the ever-growing complexities associated with continuing industrialization: the increasing number of plants that have to be coordinated, the increasing number and variety of products whose output has to be determined, etc.

Last but not least, there was the varying impact in the USSR of so-called "catch-up" phenomena in the wake of World War II. As is widely recognized, countries ravaged by the war for a time experienced a speedup of economic growth because of such factors as the restoration of partially-destroyed productive capacity at relatively limited investment cost, the acceleration of technological progress through application of innovations made in other countries less affected by the war, and so on. By

[4] Note, however, that chiefly as a consequence of the New Lands Program the cultivated land area increased sharply during the years 1950-58. If our calculation of productivity were extended to include agricultural land as an input (as might be proper), productivity growth during 1950-58 would be somewhat reduced as compared with 1958-67.

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the same token, the progressive exhaustion of such advantages necessarily proved a source of retardation in later years. By 1950, the USSR had already surpassed its prewar level of national income, but recovery from war damage remained to be completed in some areas. Thus, "catch-up" phenomena still exerted an appreciable influence on growth. By the 1960's, however, such factors no longer were as potent as they had been previously.

Some Alternative Projections

So much for past trends. What of the future? One possible answer may be found in the new five-year plan itself: during 1970–75 national income is to grow at nearly the same rate as it did in the 1960's (Table 1).[5] Interesting as a Gosplan projection is, however, we must seek somehow to arrive at an independent evaluation.

To that end, we ought to begin, I think, with Feshbach's forecast that employment will grow in the 1970's at a rate of 1.2 percent a year, or somewhat less rapidly than during the 1950's and 1960's. What of the other principal input, capital? Can Soviet capital stock still be expected to grow at such notably high rates as prevailed during the 1950's and 1960's?

A clue is already provided by available data on the rates of growth achieved in the volume of capital investment in those years. According to both official Soviet and Western data, the rate of growth of investment, while fully comparable to the rate of growth of capital stock during 1950–58, fell well below the tempo of the latter in later years (Table 1). During any year, investment represents new additions to total capital stock; thus, the rate of growth of investment is not at all the same thing as the rate of growth of the capital stock itself. Indeed, the two might temporarily tend to diverge widely. But in the course of time they must nevertheless tend to converge. Hence, if investment continues to increase at a reduced rate like that of the 1960's, the rate of growth of total capital stock will inevitably tend to drop also. In fact, if the official data are indicative (Table 1), the latter had already commenced to decline in the late 1960's. Moreover, the new plan apparently projects a tempo of investment growth actually somewhat below that of the 1960's.

Because the question at issue here is central, however, we must again strive to arrive at our own assessment. To do so, let us look at several alternative projections that I have made for the general Soviet economy (see Table 2). While these projections are quite hypothetical and might properly be viewed as exercises, they may help to clarify the implications, and thus facilitate appraisal, of alternative hypotheses regarding the future growth of the Soviet stock of capital. In this way, they may also serve to structure speculation about the future increase of national income.

The projections begin with estimates—sometimes rather crude—of the GNP and its disposition in terms of major uses in 1970, and of the capital stock in that same year,[6] and they assume that employment will grow subsequently at the rate already mentioned of 1.2 percent a year. As for the capital stock, two hypotheses are explored. The first postulates that it will continue to grow at a rate of 9.0 percent a year in the 1970's; the second, that the rate of growth will be only 6.0 percent. In effect, the former assumes that the decline in the rate of growth of investment in the 1960's will prove only transient, while the latter assumes that the decline will persist and indeed become more pronounced.

Under each hypothesis, three possible alternative rates of increase in factor productivity are explored. Specifically, it is assumed that factor productivity will increase at alternative rates of 3.0, 2.0, and 1.0 percent a year (these rates compare with actual growth rates in factor productivity of 1.7 percent in

[5] As noted in the table, official rates of growth cited for past periods relate to national income "produced," but that planned for 1970-75 relates to national income "utilized for consumption and accumulation." The growth rate for the latter is only 0.4 percentage point below the actual growth rate of national income "utilized for consumption and accumulation" during 1965-70. Therefore, the projected retardation of growth is even less than a comparison with the rates of growth for national income "produced" in past years might suggest.

[6] The absolute figures underlying the percentages in Table 2 are in 1964 adjusted rubles and are taken or estimated from data in a variety of Western sources, including principally the works of Cohn and of Moorsteen and Powell, cited in Table 1; Abram Bergson, "The Comparative National Income of the USSR and the United States," in Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, National Bureau of Economic Research, *International Comparisons of Prices and Output*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1972; and various RAND studies of Soviet national income. They also draw upon Stanley H. Cohn, "The Economic Burden of Soviet Defense Outlays," in the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, *Economic Performance and the Military Burden in the Soviet Union*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1970; but it should be noted that the correspondence between the tabulations of GNP by use in 1970 for this paper and those for 1967 in Cohn's essay is to some extent misleading. Cohn's data are in current adjusted rubles, while those for this article, as indicated, are in 1964 adjusted rubles.

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1950–58 and 0.7 percent in 1958–67). In conjunction with the average rate of growth of inputs of labor and capital combined (a figure calculated in the same manner as previously described), each of these hypothetical rates of factor productivity growth results in a particular rate of increase in GNP (Table 2).

It is also illuminating to carry the projections somewhat further. From the indicated rates of growth of GNP, we can calculate hypothetical levels of output for 1975 and 1980. The stock of capital in these years can also be determined once the rate of increase from that of 1970 is specified; so, too, can the annual net investment in 1975 and 1980 if the capital stock is to rise by the required amount each year.[7] Net investments, of course, must be

[7] See below, fn. 9.

Table 2: The Soviet Economy in 1970 and Alternative Projections for 1975 and 1980

(in percent)[a]

A. With the Capital Stock Growing at 9.0 Percent a Year

		λ = 3.0 percent[b]		λ = 2.0 percent		λ = 1.0 percent	
	1970	1975	1980	1975	1980	1975	1980
Consumption	56.5	71.1	96.5	65.8	80.0	60.2	65.2
Government and defense	13.3	19.0	27.1	18.1	24.6	17.2	22.3
Gross investment	30.2	52.1	80.2	52.1	80.2	52.1	80.2
Net investment	20.2	36.9	56.8	36.9	56.8	36.9	56.8
Depreciation	10.0	15.2	23.4	15.2	23.4	15.2	23.4
GNP	100.0	142.8	203.8	136.0	184.8	129.5	167.7
GNP, average yearly increase in percent from previous date		7.4	7.4	6.3	6.3	5.3	5.3
Net stock of capital, Dec. 31	290.4	446.9	687.7	446.9	687.7	446.9	687.7

B. With the Capital Stock Growing at 6.0 Percent a Year

		λ = 3.0 percent[b]		λ = 2.0 percent		λ = 1.0 percent	
	1970	1975	1980	1975	1980	1975	1980
Consumption	56.5	81.8	111.0	76.3	96.2	70.8	82.8
Government and defense	13.3	18.0	24.2	17.1	22.0	16.3	19.9
Gross investment	30.2	35.2	47.1	35.2	47.1	35.2	47.1
Net investment	20.2	22.2	29.4	22.0	29.4	22.0	29.4
Depreciation	10.0	13.2	17.7	13.2	17.7	13.2	17.7
GNP	100.0	135.0	182.3	128.6	165.3	122.3	149.8
GNP, average yearly increase in percent from previous date		6.2	6.2	5.2	5.2	4.1	4.1
Net stock of capital, Dec. 31	290.4	388.6	520.1	388.6	520.1	388.6	520.1


[a] All figures except those for average yearly increase in GNP from the previous date are in percent of total GNP of 1970—*i.e.*, total 1970 GNP=100.0 percent.

[b] λ is the projected rate of increase in factor productivity.

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financed, and in real terms such finance must come from the very output that the mounting capital stock makes possible. Hence, the volume of current output that must be allocated to net investment in 1975 and 1980 can be established. With depreciation allowed for at the 1970 average rate, gross investment can likewise be determined. To complete the tabulation of the GNP by use in 1975 and 1980, it remains merely to allow for dispositions to government administration and defense. It has been provisionally assumed here that these will absorb the same share of output as they did in 1970. The residual thus represents the volume of output available for consumption.

This residual is of particular interest here along with the growth rate of output. (Note that in Table 2 all data on output uses and on the capital stock, including those for 1975 and 1980, are expressed as percentages of total 1970 GNP. This may seem odd, but it facilitates comparisons of interest.) Under each of the two assumed rates of capital stock growth in Table 2, the rate of increase of both GNP and consumption varies depending on the rate of increase in productivity. For any particular rate of productivity increase, however, the rate of growth of output, logically, is always greater with the capital stock rising at 9.0 percent a year than with the capital stock rising at 6.0 percent a year. On the other hand, the increase in consumption when the capital stock grows at 6.0 percent is always greater than it is when the capital stock grows at 9.0 percent. Although, in the latter case, consumption still rises markedly when productivity grows by 3.0 percent, the gains in consumption are quite modest with lesser rates of productivity growth. For instance, with productivity increasing by only 1.0 percent,



A section of the turbogenerator shop of the Leningrad Electrosila Machine-Building Amalgamation where giant units for atomic power stations are assembled.

—Photo by V. Tselik, from Novosti, via Sovfoto.

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there is hardly any gain to speak of in per capita terms, for the indicated growth in consumption would barely exceed the rise in population, which is expected to amount to 3.9–6.1 percent over the period 1970–75 and 3.4–6.6 percent over the period 1975–80.[8]

In effect, then, the extra increments of output produced when the capital stock grows at 9.0 rather than 6.0 percent a year are, in every instance, more than totally offset by concomitant increases in requirements—chiefly those for investment to render possible the higher rate of growth of the capital stock in the first place. These additional requirements are always incongruously large, but they become more and more so the slower the rise in productivity and output.

The inordinate demand on output to meet current investment requirements is but a corollary of a cardinal feature of Soviet economic growth which is already evident but merits underlining: the capital stock has risen not only rapidly but distinctly more rapidly than output. This was already true in the 1950's when output increased at a relatively rapid pace, but it was even more the case in the 1960's when the growth of output had slowed. In any economy, such an incongruously rapid growth of the capital stock can be assured only through the allocation of an ever-increasing share of output to current investment. To be sure, this observation is simply an arithmetic truism, but it does help to explain the rising share of output which, as our data clearly imply (Table 1), investment was already absorbing in the 1950's and 1960's.

We must also see in this light the further projected increase in investment—*i.e.*, from 30.2 percent of 1970 GNP to between 39.4 and 47.8 percent of GNP in 1980—that is indicated when we extrapolate to the future on the basis of a 9.0-percent tempo of growth in the capital stock. At that rate, the capital stock rises more rapidly than output even with the most favorable hypothetical rate of productivity increase, and the disparity between the growth of the capital stock and the growth of output only widens if the rise in productivity is viewed less optimistically.

What about the alternative projection which assumes that the capital stock will increase at only 6.0 percent a year? In that case, the tempo of growth of the capital stock is only matched by that for the GNP when the rise in productivity is 3.0 percent; when the rise in productivity is just 2.0 or 1.0 percent, the rate of growth of GNP will be less than that of the capital stock. In neither of the last instances, however, is the difference nearly as marked as when the capital stock rises by 9.0 percent. Thus, though gross investment as a share of GNP may rise, its projected levels for 1980—25.8 to 31.4 percent, depending on the increase in productivity—turn out to be much lower than those required when the capital stock grows by 9.0 percent a year.[9]

Implications

The foregoing exercises are just that, but they still afford insights into why the Soviet government has lately been acquiescing to a retardation of the extraordinarily rapid expansion of the country's cap-

[8] Murray Feshbach, "Population," in *Ibid.*

[9] Note that for 1970-75 the differences between the two sets of projections given in Table 2 with respect to the growth rates of investment and, by implication, of consumption might be deemed to be somewhat understated because of the manner in which net investment in 1975 and 1980 has been arrived at. Thus, net investment in each of those years has been taken as simply equal to either 9.0 or 6.0 percent of the capital stock on January 1 of the given year, the particular figure depending on the rate of growth of the capital stock in question. In effect, then, under each hypothesis regarding the growth of the capital stock, net investment increases from 1975 to 1980 at the same tempo as that of the capital stock.

Such a correspondence of the rates of growth of net investment and the capital stock is to be expected over the long run, but inasmuch as we start with 1970—a year when, at the current rate of net investment, the capital stock rose by 7.5 percent—net investment at least for a time must increase at an even higher rate than 9.0 percent if the capital stock is to grow at an average annual rate of 9.0 percent from 1970 to 1975. Similarly, net investment could rise for a time at less than 6 percent and still assure a 6-percent rate of growth of the capital stock from 1970 to 1975.

While there is no logical bar to the achievement of the rates of investment listed in Table 2, it might perhaps be more reasonable to assume that investment will grow at a constant rate during 1970-75—*i.e.*, at a tempo which would produce the hypothesized rate of increase in the capital stock, on the average, over the five-year period. Under such an assumption, investment in 1975 would have to constitute 40.6 percent of GNP, instead of the 36.9 percent shown in Table 2, to guarantee a rise of 9.0 percent a year in the capital stock; but it would need to be only 19.2 percent of GNP, rather than the 22.0 shown in the table, to insure a growth of 6.0 percent a year in the capital stock.

According to the same reasoning, the calculations for 1975-80 contain an element of bias too, though of a contrary nature. Thus, if we alter investment's projected share of total GNP in 1975 as just indicated above and then apply to 1975-80 the same methodology for computing investment as we just did for the 1970-75 period, we come up with the following results: investment in 1980 would need to be only 53.7 percent of the GNP, instead of the 56.8 percent shown in Table 2, to assure an increase of 9.0 percent a year of the capital stock; however, it would have to be 31.9 percent of GNP, rather than the 29.4 percent shown in the table, to guarantee a rise of 6 percent a year in the capital stock.

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ital stock despite the fact that such expansion has been the primary means by which the government has over the years endeavored to achieve a rapid growth of output. More important, the projections suggest that the retardation will probably be allowed to continue.

To expand the capital stock by 9.0 percent a year has always been an onerous undertaking for the USSR, but it would become even more so should the government seek to maintain that tempo in the future. The chief costs, of course, have been and would continue to be borne by Soviet consumers. But while Stalin freely sanctioned such deprivations, soon after his death the Soviet government avowedly committed itself to a different policy, and that policy has now been reaffirmed in the five-year plan just promulgated for 1971–75. According to its own language, the "chief test" of the plan will be whether or not it assures "the rise of the material and cultural level of life of the population." [10]

The Soviet people, to be sure, have come to understand that improvements in consumption standards do not inexorably follow government commitments to provide them. Nevertheless, these standards have by all accounts tended to rise since Stalin, and sometimes markedly. It would be surprising if the government in the years ahead decided, except under great duress, to suspend such rewards for any length of time for a population which is now relatively educated as well as conscious of Western living standards, and which has elite groups who themselves have become increasingly materialistic. Such a governmental decision would be especially surprising in circumstances where a full reversion to the techniques of rule of the days of the "cult of personality" no longer appears to be a feasible alternative.

The implementation of the government's commitments to consumers obviously will not be made easier by the 1972 crop failures, still much in the news as these lines are written, but the government's reaction to these failures also underlines that at least a partial shift in priorities has occurred. Reportedly, nearly $2.0 billion of scarce foreign exchange has been allocated for the importation of some 28 million tons of grain. Under Stalin, needless to say, concern for alleviating the impact of harvest losses was hardly so intense.[11]

If the tempo of capital-stock growth is permitted to decrease, of course, the growth rate of output will likely do the same. Our projections only underline the evident at this point. But the government has already acquiesced in a retardation of output growth. Given its heightened concern for consumers, it may well find it expedient to continue to do so in the future.

But what about productivity? Do not our projections show that if productivity grows rapidly enough —say by 3.0 percent—the capital stock, and with it output, could continue to grow at high rates even while the needed improvement in consumption standards is realized? Theoretically, that is a possibility, and the Soviet government, always concerned about raising productivity, has understandably become even more so as the investment costs of sustaining the further growth of the capital stock have become ever greater. As the just concluded US-USSR economic accord underlines, the USSR, once so uneasy about economic relations with the West, is now actively seeking to promote them. It hopes that productivity growth will be helped by the increased exchanges, and especially by the more accelerated importation into the USSR of advanced Western technology that the agreement makes possible. The Soviet government has been trying to speed up productivity growth in other ways as well. Of late, it has placed increasing stress on domestic technological innovation, and at the same time it has sought, through the much-discussed planning reforms launched in the fall of 1965, to remedy the perennial deficiencies in economic administration, such as those to which we have already referred, and thereby to increase the efficiency of the system.

Thus far, however, the planning reforms do not appear to have been highly effective.[12] Moreover, the

[10] *Gosudarstvennyi piatiletnii plan razvitiia narodnovo khoziaistvo SSSR na 1971-1975 gody,* Moscow, 1972, p. 73.

[11] This, it will be recalled, is not the first occasion since Stalin's death that the government has imported grain on a large scale to offset harvest losses. However, the current imports much exceed even the purchases made in response to the exceedingly bad harvest of 1963 (16.8 million tons during 1963-65), and they apparently will suffice to make good all the 1972 losses.

In the aftermath of the recent harvest failures, the government is also reportedly revising its investment program in order to assure more funds for agriculture. This initiative should be taken into account when we come later to a consideration of the prospects for productivity growth in the economy generally, though its implications in that regard are perhaps not so evident as is sometimes assumed. Thus, while some analysts have argued that any substantial revision of investment allocations under the current five-year plan might in itself tend to impair efficiency, it is also possible that additional allocations to agriculture might be relatively productive in view of the chronic shortage of capital there.

[12] See Abram Bergson, "The Current Soviet Planning Reforms," in Alexander Balinky *et al., Planning and the Market in the USSR: the Sixties,* New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1967; Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Organization and Management as Factors in Soviet Economic Growth in the 1970's," Laulan, *op. cit.*

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Assembly of "Zhiguli" automobiles at the Togliatti plant.

—Photo by V. Budan, from TASS via Sovfoto.

acceleration of technological progress in any wholesale way in a complex, modern economy such as that of the USSR is not an easy task. While productivity may increase more rapidly in the future than it has recently, that is not saying a great deal. Certainly, the government would have difficulty achieving a tempo of productivity improvement much higher than the more buoyant rates of the 1950's. Should the government seek to sustain a superhigh rate of capital-stock growth at the expense of consumption, big gains in productivity would be all the harder to attain, inasmuch as frustration of consumer aspirations for rising standards of living could not help but affect labor incentives adversely.

Though the changes introduced in the wake of the planning reforms announced in the fall of 1965 were hardly revolutionary, the reforms themselves did represent something of a break with the past. Hence, we should not be too surprised if, in search of additional sources of productivity gains, the government should initiate still further reforms in planning. Perhaps it will at long last even make the kind of wholesale shift to "market socialism" that many thought was being initiated in 1965. But only time will tell just what further changes, if any, might be introduced, and how productivity might be affected thereby.

Our projections have assumed throughout that the Soviet government will devote to public administration and defense a constant share of output corresponding to that of 1970. Defense is by far the more important claimant here, and the USSR could obviously find additional resources for both investment and consumption, should it be prepared to limit allocations to that competing use. While the Soviet government has always seemed reluctant to restrict defense expenditures on purely economic grounds, it might in the future—political circumstances permitting—find such grounds more impelling than it has found them in the past. Indeed, we may wonder whether it has not already found them so in view of the apparently increased flexibility that it has manifested lately in, for example, arms-control negotiations.

To conclude, then, I have referred often to the extraordinarily high tempo of capital-stock growth that has prevailed hitherto in the USSR—a tempo which has surpassed that of output growth even when output was increasing relatively rapidly. I have also discussed a corollary of that incongruity: the rising share of output absorbed by the investments required to sustain such rapid growth of the capital stock. While the pattern of economic growth that emerged in the USSR under Stalin's five-year plans —and has come to be called the Soviet model— has many facets, a central characteristic has been the imbalance manifested in such disproportionately rapid growth of capital stock in combination with a rising share of output going into investment. (The latter phenomenon is perhaps even more familiar in the alternative guise of an inordinately high tempo of growth in "heavy" as compared with "light" industries.) As so characterized, however, the Soviet model has clearly been undergoing a process of erosion lately. Notably, unbalanced growth has apparently been giving way to relatively balanced growth in the very sphere—capital formation—where the imbalance had previously been most striking. The prospect is that this erosion will continue. In the USSR at least, the Soviet model may not survive its dictatorial originator much longer.

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Consumer Problems and Prospects

By Gertrude E. Schroeder

As the Soviet domestic press makes abundantly clear, happiness in the USSR is to be able to buy a new frying pan or a meat grinder or eyeglasses that fit or a bath towel. Shortages of hundreds of such everyday items seem to be epidemic, but also random, unpredictable and episodic. Alongside the shortages there are surpluses—of poor-quality clothing and shoes and outdated models of washing machines and television sets. Such imbalances between supply and demand, along with evidence of gross waste of resources, are nothing new. They have long been a familiar part of the Soviet scene, provoking continuous lament in the press and prompting official demands for their expeditious elimination.

Over the past several years, the Soviet government has focused particular attention on these longstanding problems and has initiated a number of actions aimed at "putting things right" in the consumer sector. The belatedly adopted Ninth Five-Year Plan, now in mid-course and behind schedule, has as its so-called "main task" a substantial increase in consumer welfare.[1] This seems an appropriate time, therefore, to review the current status of consumers in Soviet society, to assess the seriousness of the regime's commitment to accord higher priority to consumption in the allocation of resources, and to appraise the efficacy of the current measures selected to remedy the longstanding ills of the consumer sector. A broader question for consideration concerns the basic suitability of central planning for managing a consumer-oriented economy.

Traditionally, the consumer sector has been low man on the totem pole in the Soviet scheme of things. For long years the central planners stressed the development of heavy industry and armaments and provided little for the consumer beyond the bare necessities of life; popular aspirations for a modest expansion of the range of goods and services went unanswered. But eventually the Soviet economy—geared to the mass production of standardized goods and aided by an upgrading of priority for the consumer sector under Khrushchev—proved able to meet the minimum level of demands. Whereas per capita consumption of goods and personal services (private or household consumption) scarcely increased at all between 1928 (or, for that matter, 1913) and 1950, it rose by some 56 percent during the 1950's.[2] Most of this gain represented consumption of more and better food and clothing and of initial stocks of a few basic consumer durables.

These improvements were sufficient by the early 1960's to confront Soviet policy-makers with a totally new set of economic problems—those of embryonic consumer affluence. People became choosy about what they would buy, and inventories of goods produced at the expense of other priority sectors began to pile up. Steady increases in consumer money incomes and in real per capita consumption during the 1960's put growing pressures on a system ill-designed to satisfy a more sophisticated consumer demand. During that decade per capita disposable money income rose by more than nine-tenths, while per capita private consumption rose by less than half.[3] Relatively greater gains in

Mrs. Schroeder is Professor of Economics at the University of Virginia (Charlottesville). A well-known specialist on the Soviet economy, she has published many articles in Soviet Studies *and other journals.*

[1] See *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 14, 1971.

[2] See Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Consumption in the USSR: A Survey," *Studies on the Soviet Union* (Munich), Vol. X, No. 4, 1970, p. 33.

[3] Douglas B. Diamond, "Principal Targets and Central Themes of the Ninth Five-Year Plan," in Norton T. Dodge, Ed., *Analysis of the USSR's 24th Party Congress and 9th Five-Year Plan,* Mechanicsville, Md., Cremona Foundation, 1971, p. 52.

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money income were made by the rural population, as the government finally addressed itself to the gross imbalance between urban and rural living standards.

Despite these large advances, Soviet consumers may be regarded as affluent only in comparison with past levels. Relative to the industrial countries of the West, the USSR lags badly.[4] Soviet per capita consumption is only about one-third that of the US, about half that of England, France and West Germany, and somewhat below that of Italy. Among Communist countries, the Soviet level is well below that of East Germany and Czechoslovakia and more or less on the level of Hungary and Poland. Moreover, the "affluence" of Soviet consumers is of a peculiarly distorted character. The distribution of consumption expenditures among major categories and their relative rates of improvement were not dictated by consumer preferences but by those of the planners. It should also be noted that the data available for comparisons of Soviet and Western consumption do not take account of such elements of consumer welfare as the superior retail trade facilities and services and the much higher quality and greater variety of goods and services generally available in the West.

Major Current Problems

The Soviet Union's most serious consumption problems at present relate to (1) pervasive shortages of desired goods and services and of housing, (2) the poor quality of goods and services in general, and (3) continuing repressed inflation. Published accounts of the first kind of malfunctions are legion. Would-be buyers cannot find bath and face towels, even though they are allegedly supplied to stores in strict accord with government-set norms for the "rational linen closet."[5] For over two years there has been an acute shortage of screws for assembling furniture.[6] For three years meat grinders were not to be found even in large cities.[7] Enamel pots and pans and metal cutlery have not been available.[8] An "ebb and flow" is characteristic—first, acute shortages of an item, followed by bulging inventories—for irons, rolling pins and hangers.[9] Frames for eyeglasses are scarce, and customers often accept improper prescriptions for lenses, since the correct glasses are not available and no one knows when they will be.[10] Customers cannot find desired kinds of household glue, thermos jugs, cleansing powders and the like.[11] Men's summer shirts, women's bicycles, and clothing for stout women are hard to find.[12] The list of complaints could be continued *ad nauseum.*

Equally prolific are press complaints concerning quality. Examples with regard to footwear taken from a recent series of articles in *Pravda* typify the situation[13]—shoes where the color comes off the leather, where stains or roughnesses appear, where the straps are askew, and so on. Other evidence is provided by reports of large-scale rejections of manufactured goods by state inspectors. A typical account of this kind includes the following statistics and facts: in 1971 the USSR Ministry of Light Industry accepted complaints about 7.6 million pairs of shoes, 1.5 million pairs of hosiery, 1.7 million items of knitwear and 175,000 suits; during the first nine months of 1971 the wholesale trade inspectors returned 15 percent of the sewn goods they checked for correction; in the first half of 1971 Moscow's retail network rejected 33 million rubles' worth of industrial goods; for the USSR as a whole in 1971 official estimates of direct losses from rejected industrial output amounted to over 600 million rubles, but—according to the account—"such losses were actually much larger."[14] Two other sources, citing data compiled specifically on the RSFSR, report that in both 1970 and 1971 about half of the goods checked by the Inspectorate of the RSFSR Ministry of Trade did not meet state standards.[15] Along with shoddy manufacturing in the technical sense, there are other problems involving poor design and quality —fabrics that are not preshrunk, colors that are drab and that fade, uninteresting textile patterns, poor styles in clothing, obsolete models of household appliances, and so on.

Evidence also abounds on the inadequacy and

[4] For detailed supportive evidence of these generalizations see Gertrude E. Schroeder, *loc. cit.*, pp. 18-26.

[5] *Pravda*, Aug. 9, 1972.

[6] *Ibid.*, July 8, 1972.

[7] *Ibid.*, June 1, 1971.

[8] *Ibid.*, Sept. 15, 1970.

[9] *Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennovo proizvodstva* (Novosibirsk), No. 3, 1972, pp. 35-40.

[10] *Izvestia* (Moscow), Aug. 6, 1972.

[11] *Sotsialisticheskaia Industriia* (Moscow), May 6, 1972.

[12] *Sovetskaia torgovlia* (Moscow—daily), July 1, 1972; Aug. 17, 1972.

[13] *Pravda*, April 4, 17 and 27, 1972; May 6, 16 and 20, 1972; June 3, 1972.

[14] *Finansy SSSR* (Moscow), May 1972, pp. 7-12.

[15] *Sovetskaia torgovlia*, (Moscow—monthly), September 1972, p. 2; *Planovoe khoziaistvo* (Moscow), October 1972, p. 4.

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poor quality of all kinds of personal services.[16] There are numerous complaints about appliances that cannot be repaired because there are no parts, thus rendering guarantees meaningless. The poor quality of new housing is notorious. A building will be labeled "high quality" by inspectors; then: "Shortly thereafter the tenants move in, and their complaints start pouring in—dripping faucets, poorly hung doors that bang, window vents that will not shut, sprung floors, and cracks where walls join." Agreements with builders to repair the defects are of little avail, since the builders are busy putting up more housing of similar quality in order "to fulfill the quarterly plan, so that they will be entitled to a bonus for square meters of housing built." [17]

The mismatching of supply and demand and shortcomings with respect to the quality, assortment and style of goods first began to assume the dimensions of a serious problem in the early 1960's, manifested by sharply rising inventories of various items; these the government managed to work off through such measures as price reductions, installment sales, and reallocation of stocks to rural areas. Similar inventory pileups, in both urban and rural areas, have appeared again in recent years. In 1970, stocks in retail trade were 2.2 billion more than planned.[18] In the first seven months of 1971 sales of non-food goods rose 6 percent, while inventories rose 7 percent; comparable data are 7 and 17 for clothing and undergarments, 11 and 20 for knitwear, 2 and 15 for footwear and 2 and 26 for radios.[19] During 1968–71 sales of sewn garments rose 10 percent annually, while inventories increased 18 percent annually; comparable figures are 9 and 22 for knit outerwear, and 5 and 18 for leather shoes.[20] In early 1972, inventories of obsolete washing machines amounted to seven to eight months' sales, and stocks of unsalable clothing and shoes totalled 3.4 billion rubles in value.[21]

Besides indicating malfunction of the production-distribution system for consumer goods, mounting inventories of some goods, along with widespread shortages of others, reflect and contribute to another serious problem currently afflicting the economy—that of repressed inflation. During 1966–71, per capita disposable money income rose at an average annual rate of 6.6 percent, but savings bank deposits increased 19 percent annually.[22] In 1970 the Soviet people saved over four-fifths of each additional dollar of income on the average. Other evidence of repressed inflation is provided by the steady rise of prices of food on collective farm markets. During 1966–70 these prices increased 12 percent,[23] and the rise undoubtedly accelerated in 1971–72. In contrast, the level of prices in state-run retail stores was stable throughout the period, reflecting the government's extreme reluctance to raise consumer-goods prices, despite the obvious need to do so.

The failure of the production system to supply the mix of goods and services that people want and would buy at their income levels—notably, better housing, automobiles, good-quality and stylish clothing, and modern household appliances—manifests itself in a peculiarly distorted pattern of demand. Not only do people save most of each dollar of additional income, but they also spend an abnormally large share of the remainder on quality foods, on meat in particular, and evidently also on alcoholic beverages. Since the government seeks to curb consumption of the latter in order to reduce widespread drunkenness, it finds itself under severe pressure to increase meat supplies.

The Legacies of Past Neglect

In seeking to cope with problems in the production and distribution of consumer goods, the planners are severely handicapped by the effects of protracted neglect of investment in the consumer industries, by the low status traditionally accorded the consumer sector in the Soviet socio-economic scheme, and by the balky and inflexible apparatus of economic administration in the USSR. The overwhelming bulk of manufactured food products and soft goods (*i.e.*, perishable as opposed to durable items) are produced by enterprises in the Ministries

[16] *Komsomolskaia pravda* (Moscow), April 8 and 26, 1972; May 17, 1972; July 1, 1972; Aug. 22, 1972. *Pravda*, Aug. 13, 1971; Jan. 15, 1972; Feb. 2, 1972; April 13, 1972. *Literaturnaia gazeta* (Moscow), No. 31, Aug. 2, 1972, pp. 10-11.

[17] *Pravda*, June 21, 1972.

[18] *Sovetskaia torgovlia* (monthly), August 1971, p. 2.

[19] *Ibid.* (daily), Sept. 18, 1971.

[20] *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, October 1972, p. 5.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 6; *Pravda*, Feb. 16, 1972.

[22] Updated estimates based on data in Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, *Economic Performance and the Military Burden in the Soviet Union*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1970, p. 99.

[23] Calculated from data in *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1970 godu* (National Economy of the USSR in 1970), Moscow, Statistika, 1971, p. 576, 582.

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A collective farmers' market in Riga—one outlet for the Soviet consumers' rubles.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

of Food and of Light Industries. For decades these branches of industry have been allocated only about 10 percent of total industrial investment annually. Their projects have been accorded low priority by both construction organizations and equipment producers and have borne the brunt of plan shortfalls in the latter areas. By all accounts, the average level of technology in the consumer branches lags several decades behind comparable levels in the West. For example, a Soviet source stated in 1967 that only a third of the equipment of shoe factories could be considered modern.[24] Wages in the light and food industries are by far the lowest of any major branch of industry. These factors help to explain not only the lagging efficiency in the consumer-goods branches but also the difficulties their plants experience in trying to improve the quality and mix of products.

Consumer durables are produced in the main as secondary products in machinery plants. It is reported, for example, that of 38 plants producing washing machines only 11 are specialized for such production, and the latter account for only 27.7 percent of total output.[25] Refrigerators are produced in 33 plants under nine different ministries; of these plants only nine are specialized, and they account for just 20 percent of total output.[26] The thousands of everyday household items, such as pots and pans, tableware, tools, toys, pins and the like, are also produced as sidelines in enterprises of heavy industry, including such military-related industries as aviation and shipbuilding. The "stepchild" status of consumer-goods shops in machinery enterprises is frequently deplored in the press, as are the low quality and unsatisfactory mix of output that result.

The planners also are faced with a deplorably inadequate and backward personal services sector, which includes such establishments as barber and beauty shops, repair services, laundries, and dry cleaners. In 1960 there were only 12.6 such units per 10,000 urban residents; after a decade of considerable attention to developing this sector, the availability had risen to a mere 17.2 per 10,000 urban population.[27] To offer a comparison, in 1968 the USSR had 3.08 barber and beauty shops and 0.30 laundry and dry cleaning establishments per 10,000 urbanites; five years earlier, in 1963, the parallel figures for the US were already 13.58 and 4.17, respectively.[28]

Facilities in retail trade and public dining have suffered from similar neglect. According to a Soviet source, the Soviet retail trade network is quite back-

[24] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* (Moscow), No. 16, April 1967, p. 30.
[25] *Sovetskaia torgovlia* (monthly), April 1972, p. 29.
[26] *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, December 1969, p. 11.
[27] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1970 godu*, pp. 7, 621.
[28] *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1969, p. 768. *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1968 godu* (National Economy of the USSR in 1968), Moscow, Statistika, 1969, pp. 7, 663.

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ward even by East European standards. In 1971 the USSR had 128 square meters of retail floor space per 1,000 residents. This figure compared with 130 square meters in Bulgaria (1969 data), 139 in Hungary, 151 in Poland, 210 in Czechoslovakia and 290 in East Germany.[29] The US, with a population about a fifth smaller than the USSR, has roughly three times as many retail trade establishments and half again as many employees in the sector. Although the USSR has been expanding the number of self-service stores in recent years, their development is severely hampered by the lack of suitable premises, equipment, and, above all, packaging materials. The press reports, for example, that over 60 percent of food products must be weighed and wrapped in the stores,[30] and that in the Ukraine stores receive yeast in one-kilogram packages, jams and tomato paste in three- and ten-kilogram jars, and pickles in three-liter jars.[31] Shortages of refrigerating equipment and storage facilities are perennial. Low wages and a low socio-economic status, as well as poor customer relations, have long characterized the trade and service sector.



Liudmila Ivanovna takes advantage of a price markdown to purchase a television set in the Moscow Central Department Store in February 1972.

—Photo by I. Denisenko, from Novosti via Sovfoto.

Leadership Response

Although the difficulties in the consumer sector are not new, the scope of the government's recent efforts to deal with them has been unusually great, suggesting a serious if still conditional commitment to a more consumer-oriented economic policy. The principal initiatives that have been taken have involved allocation of additional resources to the consumer sector, reform of incentives and administrative arrangements in the production and distribution of consumer goods, and a variety of *ad hoc* measures adopted to cope with specific problems.

Resource Allocation. Reflecting a shift in recent years to be a more balanced and moderate pattern of economic growth, the Soviet government has been allocating an increasing share of annual increments in output to consumption. Western calculations indicate that the average annual rate of growth in the Soviet gross national product decelerated from 6.0 percent in the 1950's to 5.4 percent during 1961–70, while the growth rate of consumption slowed only 0.3 percentage points, from 4.7 to 4.4 percent.[32] In the years 1966 to 1970, consumption actually increased at a slightly faster rate than the gross national product. In the last three years of that period, the growth rate for the output of industrially-produced consumer goods was greater than that for the output of producer goods, a phenomenon which once would have been regarded as a heretical violation of ideological prescriptions. In addition, the consumer sector was allocated a larger share of total investment than in the past. For the first three years of the 1966–70 plan period, consumer-oriented investment (including that in agriculture) actually increased somewhat faster than producer-oriented investment, although the latter reasserted a small lead thereafter.[33] Partly as a result, the consumption goals of a five-year plan were fulfilled in 1966–70 for the first time in Soviet history. In the same period, the government began to use more of its scarce hard currency to import considerable amounts of consumer goods from the West. Annual imports of nonfood goods increased steadily during 1966–70—from $123 million in 1966 to over $290 million in 1970.[34]

The allocation of resources in the newest five-

[29] *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), December 1971, p. 29.
[30] *Pravda*, Dec. 15, 1971.
[31] *Izvestia*, Sept. 4, 1970.

[32] Based on data compiled by the author (largely from sources listed in fns. 23 and 53), to be included in a compendium of papers on the Soviet economy scheduled for publication in 1973 by the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress.
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] Calculated from data in *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR v 1970 godu* (Foreign Trade of the USSR in 1970), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenila, 1971, and comparable volumes for preceding years.

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year plan (for 1971–75) will be discussed shortly in the context of the overall objectives of the plan and its record of performance to date.

Reforms in the Consumer Sector. Radical improvements in the efficiency of the consumer sector, in the quality and assortment of consumer products, and in retail services were among the main objectives of the general economic reforms that were adopted in 1965 and are still being implemented. Indeed, experimental reforms were first tried out in a number of consumer-goods plants, before a revised variant was adopted for application to the general economy. The major provisions of the 1965 reforms seemed tailor-made for solving the chronic problems in the production of consumer goods. Replacement of "value of output" with "sales" as a success indicator for enterprises seemed to provide an inducement for managers to produce only goods that could be sold and thus to pay more attention to the quality and the assortment of output. Extension and enforcement of direct contracts between producers and retail stores again seemed aimed at orienting production plans toward meeting consumer demand. Adoption of profits as a second success indicator appeared to offer a prod to managers to economize on resources. Finally, new pricing arrangements seemed to encourage managers to produce new and higher-quality products.

The adoption of the economic reforms proceeded more slowly in the two major branches producing consumer goods (food and light industries) than elsewhere, allegedly because of the large number of small and low-profit enterprises in those branches. As of mid-1970, when all enterprises of most industrial ministries were operating under the new arrangements, 30 percent of the enterprises under the USSR Ministry of Light Industry and 6 percent of those under the USSR Ministry of the Food Industry still operated according to pre-reform rules.[35] The experience of those consumer-goods plants to which the reform was applied was similar to that of enterprises in general.[36] In practice, the sales-oriented performance indicators merely supplemented rather than supplanted gross-value-of-output assignments and specific quantitative targets; ministerial tutelage and proliferating regulations circumscribed the managers' freedom of action; direct contracting turned out to be largely a formality, and penalties for contract violations were largely ineffective; pursuit of profits led managers to turn out the products that an arbitrary pricing system made "profitable," irrespective of what customers wanted or contracts provided; the new success criteria, coupled with new pricing rules, led managers to "upgrade" and "renovate" product assortments in ways that in reality amounted to hidden price increases.[37]

The continuation of consumer complaints about quality and assortment in 1971–72 testifies to the ineffectiveness of the reforms in ameliorating, let alone solving, these longstanding problems. The failure of the economic reform to improve matters in the consumer sector is graphically illustrated by a recent article in *Izvestia,* which details the woes of the clothing firm "Bolshevichka."[38] This firm's experience under the experimental reforms in 1964–65 was a great success story. But in 1972, nobody seemed to want to buy Bolshevichka's suits any more; they began to pile up in warehouses, and even the firm's own retail stores pleaded for a halt in deliveries. Nonetheless, superior organs increased the production plan, which the plant could not fulfill because it could not obtain the higher-priced fabric required. As a result, the plant's workers were penalized by loss of bonuses, and more unsalable goods were produced.

The much-touted introduction of direct commercial ties between producers and retail stores has also failed to rationalize the manufacture and delivery of consumer goods to any significant degree. In the first place, only the relatively few retail stores that operate independently on a system of profit-and-loss accounting *(khozraschet)* and large firms like Bolshevichka are allowed to contract directly with producer enterprises and suppliers; the rest continue to be supported through wholesale outlets which in turn place orders with industrial producers. Even where direct ties have been established, a host of problems have developed: contracts are frequently violated by one or the other or both parties; financial sanctions have proved ineffective in preventing contract breaches; goods delivered according to contracts concluded at trade fairs turn out to be different from the original samples; and so on. Producing

[35] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta,* No. 29, July 1970, p. 7.

[36] For details of the experience under the reform in general, see Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Soviet Economic Reform at an Impasse," *Problems of Communism,* July-August 1971, pp. 36-46.

[37] A typical recital of these phenomena is contained in two recent articles in *Planovoe khoziaistvo,* October 1972, pp. 3-17.

[38] *Izvestia,* Aug. 10, 1972.

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enterprises fail to deliver promised consignments because production plans have been arbitrarily changed by higher authorities, because needed inputs do not arrive on time, because shipment of goods other than those specified in contracts is more profitable, or because there are transport failures. Retail units, in turn, refuse to accept goods because they find they have overestimated demand or because the goods do not meet specifications as to quality or mix. On the other hand, stores sometimes accept unordered goods because the alternative is not to receive anything and not to fulfill the plans for turnover. A kind of vicious circle thus prevails, where there are failures all along the line and everybody can blame somebody else. Nobody (or everybody) is at fault, and foul-ups are epidemic. A lengthy government decree (of early 1969) prescribing the rules and regulations governing the delivery of consumer goods apparently has been of little help.[39]

The government has also attempted to introduce various managerial reforms in the area of retail trade. In this sector the reforms have been adopted in two stages. The first stage, completed in 1969, essentially involved a simplification of planning procedures and was ostensibly designed to increase the leeway for managerial initiative. Instead of a long list of specific targets, only the volume of trade turnover and of profits for a given year were to be set in central agencies. However, in exercising their right to set all other plan indicators, managers of retail trade enterprises were required to remain within a host of centrally-determined parameters for such items as wage rates and prices.

The second stage entailed the adoption of a new system of incentives stressing sales and profits and resembling that in industry. Although this phase was started experimentally in 1966, only in 1971, following the issuance of a detailed set of instructions governing the new arrangements,[40] did the system begin to be broadly applied. By early 1972, this phase of the reform encompassed some 18,000 retail enterprises, accounting for about 28 percent of the total trade turnover in the USSR Ministry of Trade.[41] The extension of the incentive features of the reform to retail trade is severely handicapped by the low rate of profitability of the sector. In 1970 only 4 percent of retail trade enterprises were on profit-and-loss accounting, and even some of those units worked at a loss.[42] Retail trade markups are widely regarded as being too low. Also, the pricing system makes some goods very "profitable" to sell (*e.g.*, vodka), while others (*e.g.*, potatoes and vegetables) result in losses to the stores.[43] Although spectacular successes have been reported for some trade enterprises put under the new incentive arrangements, the problems in this sector appear to be unusually complicated. A major concern, for example, is how to devise a bonus system that will induce employees to cater to customers' wants with courtesy and efficiency.

Resort to Decrees and Campaigns. Mounting evidence of continuing malaise in the consumer sector, due in part to the inadequacy of the reform program, has led the government to try once again to cure its economic problems by administrative fiat, an approach used often in the past but with little effect. A decree adopted in late 1969 called for a broad range of actions to increase and upgrade consumer everyday services.[44] In late 1969 and 1970, two decrees were issued dealing with the intractable problem of product quality[45]; they applied to industry in general and provided various penalties for laxity. The press uproar in 1970 over shortages of dishes produced a resolution "On Increasing the Production, Widening the Assortment, and Improving the Quality of High-grade Dishware."[46]

Continuing signs of consumer frustration—given added impact, perhaps, by the eruption of discontent in Poland in December 1970—resulted in at least four more major decrees. Two of them were aimed at increasing output and facilities during 1971–75 in two consumer-related industries—chemical fibers and meat-and-dairy products. These measures were issued in September and December 1971 respectively and were typical of similar action-demanding documents issued in the past.[47]

A third decree, published on January 30, 1972, outlined measures to improve retail trade.[48] Like numerous predecessors, it relied mainly on an exhortation to the ministries and agencies concerned

[39] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 20, May 1969, pp. 11-14.

[40] *Ibid.*, No. 49, December 1970, pp. 10-14, and No. 18, April 1971, p. 15.

[41] *Sovetskaia torgovlia* (daily), May 9, 1972.

[42] *Voprosy ekonomiki*, May 1972, pp. 120-21.

[43] *Ibid.*, April 1972, pp. 99-100.

[44] *Izvestia*, Dec. 27, 1969.

[45] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 49, December 1968, pp. 1-8, and *Pravda*, Dec. 5, 1970.


[46] *Izvestia*, Dec. 19, 1970.

[47] *Pravda*, Sept. 12, 1971 and Dec. 3, 1971.

[48] *Ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1972.

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KROKODIL PINPOINTS CONSUMER PROBLEMS




Workers building a textile factory note that "Sometimes something falls our way," as the trucks speed on toward the construction site of a giant plant.—Krokodil *(Moscow)*, *No. 5, February 1972, p. 7.*



"This phonograph comes with two needles and this small list of possible, easily-remedied defects."—*No. 35, December 1971, p. 4.*



"We have worked out production of furniture sets made from compressed [unfilled] orders for furniture."—*No. 18, June 1971, p. 3.*



"Can't you get a move on? I've already invited guests for the housewarming."—*No. 14, May 1972, p. 6.*



"Time's short; we'll mend the minor flaws on the way," the official tells the driver of a load of "highest grade" suits.—*No. 21, July 1972, p. 12.*



A meeting in the Everyday Services Combines raises the question: "Who is in favor of having the dry cleaners stop snapping off buttons?" A customer replies, "I am!" —*No. 32, November 1971, p. 6.*

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to ensure the solution of all the problems in retail trade. It also specified targets and investment allocations for 1971–75. One innovation provided for the establishment of an Interdepartmental Council under the Ministry of Trade to study the demand for consumer goods. The membership of this Council was to comprise representatives of the Ministry of Trade, the ministries producing consumer goods, the trade unions, and the Central Union of Consumer Cooperatives—the agency responsible for retail trade in rural areas.

The fourth decree, entitled "On Measures for the Further Development of the Production of Goods in Mass Demand," was published under joint party-government imprimatur on October 29, 1971.[49] By far the strongest of the recent directives, this measure reflected the leadership's extreme frustration at the continuing shortages of a wide variety of ordinary household items, especially "odds and ends" ranging from meat grinders to wood screws, which the press refers to as "a thousand trifles." The decree specified output targets for 1971–75 for a long list of such goods, many of which (at least 67) had not previously been centrally planned.[50] Among other provisions was a demand for the full utilization of existing capacities for production of such goods and the expeditious creation of new ones. In a departure from past practice, the decree also provided that consumer goods output was to count toward plan fulfillment at plants in the heavy industrial sector manufacturing such goods as a secondary line of output. Enterprise performance in this regard was to affect the size of incentive funds, and bonuses for managerial and office employees were to depend on fulfillment of plans and contracts for delivery of consumer goods. "Personal responsibility" was assigned to the heads of ministries and departments for fulfilling the provisions of the decree and for "ensuring the production of high-quality goods in mass demand in accordance with the orders placed by trade organizations"; "personal responsibility" was also assigned to the all-union and union-republic ministers of trade for the "correctness of their stated needs for goods." The councils of ministers of the 15 union republics were instructed to "ensure systematic checkups on the state of affairs with respect to the production of consumer goods in every industrial enterprise, regardless of its departmental subordination, and to take steps for the utilization of emerging possibilities for increasing the production of goods in popular demand." These were unusual assignments of responsibility. In addition, party organs at all levels were instructed to "exercise daily supervision" over fulfillment of the tasks spelled out in the decree.

There has been an unusually large amount of follow-up on this edict and also on the decree concerning retail trade, suggesting that strong party pressure is being brought to bear to insure their implementation. As might be expected, the various bureaucracies concerned soon published detailed instructions on the new planning and incentive arrangements for ordering and producing consumer goods.[51] The new council to study demand was quickly set up, complete with republic and lower level sub-councils, and has begun publication of an information bulletin. The injunction to produce more consumer goods has assumed the status of a major "campaign," with heavy emphasis placed on publicity, pledges, socialist competition, and checkups on performance by party and control bodies at all levels. Producer-goods plants are being pressured to climb on the band wagon *en masse;* the leadership evidently is convinced that large "hidden reserves" exist in heavy industry that can be tapped for consumer-goods production. Short of direct imports, the mobilization of such reserves may appear to be the fastest way to meet the needs of impatient consumers.

Although there have been a number of "success" stories in the press concerning plants that have fulfilled consumer-goods pledges, increased the proportion of their consumption output, introduced new consumer products, and so forth, the problems created by this latest and most energetic campaign appear to be legion. The overall impression is one of utter confusion.[52] Nobody seems to know how much of what is needed where, so plants, under severe pressure to produce something, make whatever they can produce most easily. Usually they also have to make their own designs and parts. Long delays and red tape are involved in getting designs and prices approved by appropriate agencies. Several plants in a given city may begin making the same articles—say, trays or candlesticks—thus producing a glut on

[49] *Ibid.*, Oct. 29, 1971.

[50] *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, October 1972, p. 9.

[51] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 29, July 1972, p. 4, and *Sovetskaia torgovlia* (monthly), June 1972, pp. 61-63.

[52] Following is a partial citation of the evidence: *Izvestia*, June 12, 1972; Aug. 2, 16, 1972; Sept. 3, 15, and 30, 1972; Oct. 3, 1972. *Pravda*, June 24, 1972; Sept. 14, 1972. *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 40, October 1972, p. 17.

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the local market. Nobody knows if the surplus products are needed in other areas or how to organize their sale. Numerous local agencies are now involved in the endeavor to "force" greater consumer-goods output on enterprises of heavy industry, and conflicts arise between these agencies and the producer ministries. Meanwhile, press complaints of sporadic surpluses and shortages and of the poor quality of goods have continued at the same level of intensity as in the past.

The Ninth Five-Year Plan

Evidence bearing on the seriousness of the regime's stated intent to give priority to the consumer sector may be gleaned by a detailed examination of the goals set in the Five-Year Plan for 1971–75. At the time the plan was announced, much publicity was focused on the scheduling—for the first time in a Soviet five-year blueprint—of a faster growth rate for industrially-produced consumer goods than for producer goods and of a rise in the share of consumption in national income. The plan in fact provided for substantial increases in the production of consumer goods and services and for a broad range of increases in money incomes and social benefits.[53] A close look at the numerous published targets reveals, however, that the rate of improvement in per capita consumption was actually scheduled to be somewhat lower than that achieved during the preceding plan period, although considerably above the low rate recorded in 1961–65. The slowdown was particularly evident in such areas of state-provided communal (or social) consumption as health and education. On the other hand, a notable exception was a large planned increase in the provision of passenger automobiles for sale to the public. The table on this page offers some comparisons of the rates of growth achieved in 1966–70 with those planned for 1971–75.

With reference to the first category, *i.e.*, "Indicators," planned increases in wages and welfare benefits for 1971–75, although less than the rates of growth achieved in 1960–70, implied a rise in per capita disposable income that should significantly exceed the planned increase in per capita household consumption (consisting largely of purchases of goods and services by the population). Thus the problem of repressed inflation will persist. According to a Western estimate, per capita disposable money income should rise by 5.8 percent annually from 1971 to 1975, whereas total private and communal consumption will increase only 4.8 percent annually in the same period.[54] Various wage

Deceleration of Consumer Gains

	Growth, in percent 1966-70	1971-75 (Plan)
Indicators [a]		
Real income per capita	33	31
Average wages	26	22
Real income of collective farmers	54	40
Social consumption funds per capita	44	34
Retail trade per capita	37	35
Per Capita Consumption of Food		
Meat and meat products	17	23
Milk and milk products	22	11
Eggs	28	21
Fish	22	43
Vegetables	14	33
Per Capita Consumption of Non-food Goods		
Cloth	15	15
Knitwear	26	43
Leather shoes	25	20
Household Stocks of Consumer Durables [b]		
Television sets	112	41
Refrigerators	191	100
Washing machines	148	29
Radios	22	30
Sewing machines	8	9
Housing		
Urban living space per capita	10	8

[a] Calculated from Soviet data and based on Soviet definitions of these indicators.

[b] Derived from Soviet statistics on stocks per 100 families.

SOURCES: *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1970 godu* (National Economy of the USSR in 1970), Moscow, Statistika, 1971, pp. 576, 582; and N. K. Baibakov, Ed., *Gosudarstvennyi piatiletnyi plan razvitiia narodnovo khozaiaistva SSSR na 1971-75 gody* (State Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR in 1971-75), Moscow, Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1972.

[53] The most detailed information on plan goals is given in N.K. Baibakov, Ed., *Gosudarstvennyi piatiletnyi plan razvitiia narodnovo khoziaistva SSSR na 1971-75 gody* (State Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR in 1971-75), Moscow, Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1972. Baibakov is Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee.

[54] See Douglas B. Diamond, *loc. cit.*, p. 52.

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adjustments were scheduled to raise average wages in the state sector by 22.4 percent, while the pay of collective farmers was to increase by 30.6 percent. Reduction in income taxes and resumption of repayments of state loans (halted in 1958 but now slated to be resumed in 1974) should further augment disposable income. Furthermore, the plan called for a total of some 8.7 billion rubles in new pension benefits to be disbursed during 1971–75 and for a program of family allowances to be inaugurated in 1974.

With respect to per capita food consumption (the second grouping in the table), while the overall rate of increase was slowed down, the plan called for significant improvements in the quality of the Soviet citizen's diet. Notably, per capita consumption of meat, fish and vegetables was scheduled to grow much faster than during the 1960's, while the share of bread and potatoes in the diet was to continue to fall. Unhappily, the achievement of these projected gains was seriously jeopardized by the poor harvests in 1971–72.

In the category of soft goods, the plan provided for accelerated growth in the output of cloth, knitwear and stockings, and for decreased rates of growth but better quality and assortment of shoes and clothing. The latter decisions were probably related to the recent buildup of inventories of these items and to the fact that, with respect to leather footwear, per capita consumption by 1975 should exceed the "scientific consumption norm" (a Soviet index that estimates "reasonable need").[55]

For most consumer durables, the rates of increase in output were scheduled to slow down; actual decreases in output were planned for television sets and washing machines, likely as a response to mounting retail stocks. In part as a result of the difficulties experienced in selling many models of these and other household appliances, the plan called for sharp curtailments in the number of models and concentration on the production of more modern ones. For example, six models of refrigerators were to be produced instead of the former 26, and six models of washing machines were to be made instead of 32. Stocks of most durables in the possession of households were to continue to rise rapidly, although somewhat more slowly than in the past. (Even if the plan is met, however, the supply of such items will remain far below those now available in the Western industrial countries.)

[55] *Literaturnaia gazeta*, Feb. 17, 1971, p. 10.

The most grandiose plans for consumer production in 1971–75 concerned implementation of the decision to produce more passenger automobiles for sale to the ordinary citizen. The output of passenger cars was scheduled to increase by more than 300 percent during 1971–75, compared with a rise of about 75 percent in 1966–70; the number of cars sold to the general public was to rise from 124,000 in 1970 to 800,000 in 1975, putting a total of about 3.7 million cars in private hands, compared with 1.2 million in 1970.[56] The key manufacturing facility is the huge new Togliatti plant, which makes Fiat-designed small cars; as of this writing, it is behind in its production schedule. Plans also called for development of a network of large service centers and for close to a sixfold increase in employment in auto service and repairs.[57] Again, however, the implementation of these decisions has already fallen behind schedule, despite a government decree dealing with the subject.[58] Acute shortcomings in this area were illustrated by a press complaint at the end of 1971, when there were only 688 service stations and repair shops in the entire USSR, that repair facilities could fill only about 20 percent of their orders and that as of the previous spring, "about 25 percent of the private cars in Moscow were unable to move."[59] Moreover, as of 1970 the USSR had a mere 128,663 miles of paved roads (compared with 1.66 million in the US).

In the sectors of personal services, retail facilities and housing, the projected rates of improvement were substantial but again somewhat below the rates achieved during the preceding five-year period. The ruble value of a wide variety of personal services was scheduled to double, total retail floor space was to increase by one-fifth, and the number of seats in restaurants was to grow by two-fifths. The plan provided for the construction of 580 million square meters of new housing; fulfillment of this goal would raise living space per urban resident from about 7.5 square meters to about 8.1 square meters. This projection represented a slower rate of improvement in living space per capita than in the last plan period and reflected a reduced investment priority for housing, whose scheduled share in total capital investment was to drop from 17.1 percent in 1966–70

[56] M.I. Chistianov and P.T. Morozov, *Planirovanie v SSSR* (Planning in the USSR), Moscow, Ekonomika, 1971, p. 129.

[57] *Izvestia*, Dec. 7, 1971.

[58] *Ibid.*, Jan. 15, 1972.

[59] *Ibid.*, Dec. 7, 1971; see also *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 37, September 1972, p. 22.

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to 14.7 percent in 1971–75. Even if the plan for housing were met (and if so, it would be the first time that the Soviet government achieved its stated goals in this sector), per capita urban living space would still be well below the minimum standard for health and decency accepted by the government (9.0 square meters per capita). Clearly, only a token installment has been made toward fulfilling Khrushchev's promise to eliminate the housing shortage, and by 1975 the Soviet people should still have poorer housing by far than any major Western country.

Finally, government expenditures on health and education were scheduled to increase only 3.5 percent annually on a per capita basis, the slowest rate of increase in the postwar period.

As already mentioned, the Ninth Five-Year Plan got off to an unauspicious start, largely because of poor weather in agriculture and also because of unexpected difficulties encountered in getting new industrial plants into operation. According to Western estimates, the annual growth of GNP averaged considerably less than 3 percent during 1971–72, agricultural production declined in both years, and the rate of industrial growth was the lowest in the postwar period.[60] Consumer gains slowed significantly, with both per capita consumption and money incomes rising by less than 4 percent annually. The output of most consumer goods in 1972 was below the targets set in the Five-Year Plan, as was the number of square meters of housing completed.

As a result of the economic difficulties experienced in 1971–72, the government has approved a plan for 1973 that reduces the original goals for national income, industrial production and investment by substantial amounts. The goals for most consumer-related targets have been cut back, especially for the output of processed food and clothing. Goals for the growth of money incomes and of the money value of state-provided benefits have also been reduced. On the other hand, housing construction in 1973 is scheduled to increase faster than originally planned, and the plan's original priorities for investment in agriculture and in consumer goods

[60] Based on data to be included in the aforementioned compendium of papers scheduled for publication in 1973 by the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress.



A shipment of "Zhiguli" automobiles arrives in Stavropol in April 1971 from the Togliatti plant. The designation on the rail car reads "light automobiles."

—Photo by A. Shchekin, from Novosti via Sovfoto.

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Moscow's "Lebed" (Swan) residential district under construction. The first three stories of each building will be given over to service establishments, and a 320-car garage is included in the basement.

—Photo by V. Koshevoi, from TASS via Sovfoto.

industries have been retained.[61] With these large investments, the government hopes to regain some of the setback in the rate of improvement in consumer welfare that has occurred thus far in the plan period.

Systemic Dilemmas

The mix of consumer-related problems urgently in need of solution in the Soviet economy presents the system's administrators with their greatest challenge since the advent of central planning. These problems must be viewed in the context of the gradual ongoing shift to a balanced growth model that accords consumption equal status with investment as a claim on increments of output. With labor reserves largely utilized, future growth depends much more on productivity gains. Moreover, the current stage of development requires that production be oriented to the provision of quality goods and services instead of mere quantities and that the system of distribution be radically improved. Within limits, the present leadership has acknowledged these economic facts; indeed, it has little choice, but the inherent dilemma is painful. On the one hand, consumer wants must be heeded in order to provide the incentives for increased productivity and earnings. But, on the other hand, the system's present institutional arrangements are uniquely unsuited to managing the production and distribution of consumer goods and services for a populace whose basic subsistence needs have been more than met.

Clearly, the leadership is aware of the risks of widespread alienation of the work force, a social disease that could manifest itself in general lassitude and unwillingness to put forth effort, be it physical or mental, routine or creative. Signs of a low-grade current crisis in incentives include the high rate of savings out of current income, the apparently widespread indifference to doing a job well, high rates of absenteeism and labor turnover, and pervasive drunkenness. Up to now, the regime has responded in largely traditional ways—by emphasizing moral incentives, socialist competitions and emulations; by increasing the social pressures exerted by party and control bodies; and by taking measures to combat "parasites" and alcoholism. Such approaches have not been notably effective in the past.

The targets of the Ninth Five-Year Plan indicate that the regime is now seriously concerned about heeding consumer wishes but only partially ready to take the steps necessary to achieve a genuine measure of success. There is no great push to redress the legacies of past imbalances, and the traditional investment priorities have not, on the whole, been greatly altered, although agriculture and the consumer goods industries have been allocated larger shares. A number of measures to increase the quantities of consumer goods and services have been launched with great fanfare, the most spectacular being the effort to make more passenger automobiles available for purchase by the general public. An intensive effort is also being made to alleviate perennial shortages of consumer goods of the "odds and ends" variety by increased centralization of planning and by a campaign to force their production in enterprises of heavy industry. So far, however, the results of these efforts have been disappointing. With respect to the "odds and ends" drive, the regime's approach is palpably short-run and stop-gap in

[61] These findings were arrived at by a comparison of the data provided in the report of Gosplan Chairman N. K. Baibakov on the 1973 plan to the USSR Supreme Soviet on Dec. 18, 1972 (*Pravda*, Dec. 19) with the information in Baibakov's book on the 1971-75 Five-Year Plan (cited in fn. 53 above).

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nature; in view of the implicit cost and open confusion generated by this campaign, there is a fair chance it may simply peter out, leaving matters little improved.

Meantime the regime has resorted to increased imports from the West to alleviate shortages of consumer goods. As noted earlier, there is reason to suppose that the Polish riots at the end of 1970 were a sensitizing factor in this respect. Thus, in 1971 imports of non-food consumer goods from the West jumped sharply (by nearly $90 million in just one year).[62] Over the same period, consumption rose significantly faster than the GNP. Again, in response to the crop failure of 1972, the decision was made to import large quantities of grain rather than permit domestic food consumption to deteriorate. It will be interesting to see whether, and to what extent, consumer-oriented rather than producer-oriented imports are curtailed as a consequence of the need to finance these grain purchases.

Obviously, such stop-gap efforts do nothing to eradicate the underlying causes of the consumption crisis. The problem confronting the regime is not simply to provide more or better consumer goods, but to modernize the consumer sector all across the board—and to do so with reasonable dispatch. With by far the most unbalanced economy of any modern nation, the planners face a truly staggering task. In order to redress this imbalance in the short run, massive investments would be needed to provide more housing, retail and service facilities, and machinery for agriculture. Consequences for the rate of economic growth aside, a reorientation of traditional investment priorities on the scale required would meet with formidable resistance from the powerful bureaucracies in defense and heavy industry. Perhaps a really determined leadership with a sense of mission could accomplish the task. Its political prestige with the populace would be enhanced thereby, and the basic essentials of the existing *modus operandi*—of the centrally-administered economy—could be preserved. But there are as yet no signs of any such radical change in investment priorities.

Aside from the need for a major reallocation of resources to the consumer sector, the most critical task confronting the Soviet regime is to forge the economic organizations and design the incentives that would assure the matching of supply and demand in fine detail, and with efficiency and dispatch, over the whole range of consumer goods and services. The essence of this problem is to achieve micro-efficiency in a system in which the organizational structure and producer incentives are geared to producing gross quantities that do not necessarily reflect consumer demand.

A key aspect of this task is the radical upgrading of quality—not only of final products, but of the entire chain of material inputs into them. In market systems, competition and the profit motive do the job. Soviet planners are attacking this perennial problem with renewed vigor by imposing a host of norms and standards, by establishing mandatory quotas of "highest grade" products in output plans, and by tying bonuses to a variety of quality indicators. These latest attempts to substitute multiple and complex administrative rules and penalties for the discipline afforded by competition in other economic systems are not likely to be any more successful in the future than in the past.

Another major facet of the problem is to devise means of accurately forecasting current and shifting demand for consumer goods in fine detail—size, style, color, material, models, etc. This is no easy task in any system; for a centrally-administered economy, it is herculean. In market economies the tricky task of estimating demand and reacting to it is performed in a highly decentralized process involving numerous independent units, each looking after its own products and spurred to act speedily by competition. In the Soviet economy the forecasting of consumer demand is in its infancy. Market surveys are little used. The function is highly centralized, based on primitive methodologies and poor data, and obviously ineffective.[63] Forecasts are supplemented by the use of "scientific (rational) consumption norms"—calculations of "all that a reasonable man could want," to quote Khrushchev—but these are of little use in short-term planning. Currently, under the impetus of two party-government decrees, a mass assault is being made on the problem of forecasting consumer demand. Everybody is being enjoined to get into the act—individual stores, the Ministry of Trade, its research institutes and its regional subordinates, producer enterprises and

[62] Calculated from data in *Vneshniala torgovlia SSSR v 1971 godu.*

[63] *E.g.*, the underlying data on surveys of family budgets have been severely criticized. See: *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, February 1969, pp. 25-31. *Voprosy ekonomiki*, July 1969, pp. 37-44. *Ibid.*, April 1971, pp. 82-91. *Ibid.*, April 1972, pp. 96-106. For a general discussion of the quality of Soviet statistics on consumption and their utility for planning see Marshall I. Goldman, "Consumption Statistics," in Vladimir G. Treml and John P. Hardt, Eds., *Soviet Economic Statistics*, Durham, Duke University Press, 1972, pp. 318-46.

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their supervisory ministries, and local executive bodies. Party organs at all levels have been directed to assist in and monitor forecasting endeavors. A super-coordinator for all this effort—complete with counterparts at the regional level—has recently been set up.

Meanwhile, the agency created seven years ago with the explicit charter to study market demand is now engaged in coordinating a massive—and seemingly ineffective—demand-forecasting project involving 40 separate research institutes.[64] Bureaucracy seems to be running wild! Granted that the task of forecasting consumer demand without markets is nightmarish, the present approach can scarcely generate much more than frenetic activity and reams of reports by the multiple bureaus involved.

Even if demand could somehow be accurately forecast with the requisite detail and timeliness, there would remain the problem of how to generate incentives ensuring a rapid and precise response to forecasts on the part of producers and the distribution system. The leadership still seems to believe that, given more time, the ongoing economic reform will accomplish this tricky task. The reform's incentive rules are to be extended throughout the economy by the end of 1975. The experience thus far gives no ground for optimism. The reform's new incentive and administrative arrangements have not changed the essentials of the old system, but they have added greatly to the bureaucratization of economic life.

To sum up, the leadership seems committed to the gradual orientation of the economy to better satisfy consumer needs—a policy that is required, in any event, to provide work incentives and political stability. But up to now, the efforts to deal with the manifold problems in the consumer sector have been largely of the traditional variety—campaigns, moral suasion, tinkering with bureaucratic rules, and reorganizations and minor alterations in incentive arrangements. In short, a policy of acquiescing to a slower rate of economic growth and of muddling through seems to have been tacitly adopted. The present ways of tackling the malaise in the consumer sector hardly seem likely to bring about noticeable improvement. If popular unrest becomes widespread, the leadership may be forced to make more radical changes—possibly to permit more private activity and to introduce some degree of decentralization and marketization, at least in parts of the consumer sector. Such a reintroduction of markets and private activity, reminiscent of Lenin's "New Economic Policy" of the early 1920's, would modify the present system in major degree. It would probably take a bold leadership—or a really frightened one—and a real economic crisis to effect a major reform of this nature; but at least the authorities could cite the historical precedent of NEP, and Leninist scriptures could be invoked to lend such a course ideological legitimacy.

[64] *Voprosy ekonomiki*, July 1969, pp. 37-44.

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Comecon Integration

By Z. M. Fallenbuchl

Nearly two years have passed since the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon or CMEA) adopted a "Comprehensive Program for the Extension and Improvement of Collaboration and the Development of Socialist Economic Integration of the CMEA Countries." It is perhaps appropriate at this juncture to examine the economic forces at work in Eastern Europe which led to the adoption of this program in Bucharest in July 1971, to describe its salient features and their prospects for resolving existing problems in the East European economies, and to assess the likely trend of future development within Comecon.[1]

The Comprehensive Program has been grandiosely depicted in Eastern Europe as an important step toward Lenin's vision of "a single world economy which as a whole is regulated by the proletariat of all nations in accordance with one overall plan." [2] In somewhat more restrained terms, it is viewed as the beginning of a new stage in the development of Comecon, a period lasting 15–20 years in which there will be "a gradual switch from relatively simple forms of cooperation to socialist economic integration" of the Comecon member states. It is also represented as "a logical consequence of the past economic development of the member countries and the achievement by them of a high level of economic activity, as well as the result of a series of measures which have been taken over a period of time in order to increase the effectiveness of cooperation." [3] While one may question whether this process has been as logical or "scientific" as these statements seem to imply, the Program is clearly an outgrowth of, as well as a response to, the postwar patterns of economic development in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and of economic relations among themselves and with other parts of the world. It is to that history that we must now turn.

The Era of "Extensive" Development

For a brief period after World War II, the countries of Eastern Europe pursued diverse economic courses. But once the USSR had firmly established its dominance over the region (signified in the economic realm by the imposition of the Soviet system of planning and management and the Soviet development strategy on each of the East European states, with only minor variations), these countries adopted a more or less uniform "Communist pattern of industrialization." [4] This pattern was characterized by two related principal features: (1) reliance on what is known in Communist economic parlance as an "extensive pattern of development," and (2) strong autarkic elements in the economies of the individual states.

Under the "extensive" strategy, high rates of growth in national income were indeed attained in

Mr. Fallenbuchl is Professor of Economics and Chairman of the Department of Economics, University of Windsor (Canada). His studies of East European economic development and trade have appeared in such publications as Canadian Slavonic Papers, Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Soviet Studies, Jahrbuch der Wirtshaft Osteuropa, *and* Revue de l'Est.

[1] The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance includes various other members, most recently Cuba and Syria, but the basic analysis here is centered on the six East European members—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania—plus the Soviet Union.

[2] J. Ptaszek, "Progress in Cooperation," *Zycie gospodarcze* (Warsaw), No. 38, 1972, p. 5.

[3] L. Skibinski, "The Program of Socialist Economic Integration of the CMEA Countries," *Handel zagraniczny* (Warsaw), No. 9, 1971, p. 305.

[4] Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "The Communist Pattern of Industrialization," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), April 1970, pp. 458-84.

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Table 1: Average Annual Rates of Growth of Investment and National Income (NI)

(in percent)

	1951-55		1956-60		1961-65		1966-70		1971-75 (Plan)		1971		1972 (Plan)	
	Inv.	NI	Inv.	NI	Inv.	NI	Inv.	NI	Inv.	NI	Inv.	NI	Inv.	NI
Bulgaria	15.0	13.4	18.3	10.0	8.7	6.6	12.5	8.3	5.9-7.0	7.8-8.5	n.a.	9.4	6.4	6.1
Czechoslovakia	10.2	8.0	13.4	6.8	2.2	1.9	7.3	7.1	6.2-6.5	4.7-5.4	7.4	5.3	4.8	n.a.
GDR	20.4	11.8	14.3	5.0	4.7	3.4	9.8	5.3	5.2	4.9	0.0	4.5	2.0	5.0
Hungary	5.4	6.4	12.6	7.2	4.7	4.5	10.5	6.3	5.9-6.2	5.4-5.7	20.0	7.5	0.0	4.6
Poland	11.4	8.6	8.7	6.6	7.0	6.2	8.3	6.2	7.8	7.0	7.3	7.3	9.6	11-12
Rumania	20.4	14.6	13.5	7.2	11.3	9.6	10.8	7.6	8.7	11-12	10.8	12.5	n.a.	5-6
USSR	12.2	11.4	13.0	9.1	6.3	6.5	7.3	7.8	7.3	6.7	7.0	6.0	5.7	6.2

SOURCES: Statistical yearbooks of the above countries and M. Golebiowski and B. Zielinska, "Economic Development of Socialist and Capitalist Countries in 1971 and Plans and Forecasts for 1972," *Gospodarka planowa* (Warsaw), No. 5, 1972, pp. 264-65.

these economies during the 1950's by mobilizing huge amounts of manpower and investment and allocating them according to a system of rigid priorities to branches of industry producing capital equipment—a process for which the centralized Soviet-type administrative system was well geared.[5] At the outset, growth was generated by channeling excess rural manpower into nonagricultural sectors, particularly heavy industry, and by investing heavily in the construction or enlargement of industrial plants. What increases there were in labor productivity resulted primarily from increases in the ratio of capital to labor. When sources of new manpower began to grow scarce, even larger volumes of investment were needed to maintain high rates of growth. Examining the time span from 1951 through 1970, one notes that the officially reported rates of growth of national income (as defined in the East European states) were lower than the rates of growth of investment for all Comecon countries in each five-year period, with the exception of Hungary in 1951–55 and the USSR in 1966–70 (see Table 1).

The pattern of "extensive" development resulted in "growth for its own sake" or "barren growth," as a well-known Polish economist described it.[6] Even when working relatively smoothly to effect rapid growth of national income and of industrial production, the "extensive" strategy was unable to satisfy the aspirations of the respective populations. It required a high proportion of producer goods in the total output and hence a restricted production of consumer goods (see Table 2). Because the strategy relied on large-scale transfers of unskilled labor from agricultural to other occupations, growth in productivity, and thus of real wages, could not be high. Faced with a declining efficiency of capital and unable to borrow abroad, the East European economies were forced to increase the share of accumulation (*i.e.*, savings) in national income in order to sustain burgeoning investment programs. It is, however, impossible to increase the share of accumulation beyond a certain point without reducing work incentives and creating politically dangerous situations.[7] In some drastic cases this policy resulted in riots, as happened twice in postwar Poland.

The second striking feature of the Communist pattern of industrialization was the tendency toward autarky. The East European countries pursued what has come to be called a strategy of "import substitution," *i.e.*, the effort to develop domestic capacity to produce virtually everything which a given country previously imported. This quest for self-sufficiency even encompassed the "domestic raw materials base," which was to be expanded in every Comecon country whatever the cost. International trade performed only a supplementary role, serving to finance imports of investment goods and raw materials only where they were not available domestically at any price. Exports—mainly of temporary surpluses achieved at the expense of domestic consumption—were generated merely to finance such unavoidable imports.[8]

[5] Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "Some Structural Aspects of the Soviet-Type Investment Policy," *ibid.*, April 1965, pp. 432-47.

[6] K. Secomski, "Modernization of the Structure of the National Economy and the Dynamics of Its Development," *Gospodarka planowa* (Warsaw), April 1971, p. 199.

[7] See Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "Investment Policy for Economic Development: Some Lessons of the Communist Experience," *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* (Toronto), No. 1, 1963, pp. 26-39.

[8] J. Kleer, *Przez szesc krajow* (Across Six Countries), Warsaw, PWE (Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne), 1967, pp. 132-33.

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Such autarkic policies created very similar industrial structures in all the Comecon countries, and there was consequently little basis for trade among them. They all competed for the same raw material supplies and external export markets.[9] Moreover, the industries created at such enormous sacrifice on the part of the population proved to be highly inefficient, and their output enjoyed little demand on world markets.

Faced with these intractable realities, Marxist economists gradually "rediscovered" the principle of comparative advantage. But even when Comecon attempted to create a more rational international division of labor in the late 1950's and early 1960's, the measures taken had a strong autarkic flavor—the emphasis was on *intra*branch rather than *inter*branch specialization, because each member country still wished to develop its own comprehensive industrial structure comprising all branches of production.[10]

The disadvantages of the socialist pattern of industrialization and its autarkic tendencies manifested themselves in the late 1950's and early 1960's in a slowing of the rate of economic growth throughout the East European bloc (see Table 1 above). This occurred in spite of the fact that the share of accumulation in national income increased during the 1950's in every country except the USSR (which nevertheless continued to show the highest proportion of accumulation relative to national income—see Table 3). The problem was that investment proved to be of diminishing productivity (see Table 4). Furthermore, the rate of growth of labor productivity likewise proved lower in 1961–65 than in 1951–55 for every country except Hungary (see Table 5).

Ripe for Change

By the middle of the 1960's, it was clear that important steps would have to be taken not only to prevent further declines in the rates of growth of national income, industrial production and labor productivity, but also to reverse the accelerating demands which growth in national income were placing on capital investment and hence on accumulation or savings. Two essential measures were needed: (1) a shift from the "extensive" to an "intensive" pattern of growth, and (2) a considerable increase in the role of international trade in the development process.[11] Yet, these two changes in turn required modification both of the traditional Communist system of economic administration and planning and of the existing industrial structure. The nature of the structural change required in the shift to "intensive" growth has been described as follows:

A shift to the intensive phase of development requires a far-reaching modernization of productive

[9] S. Gora and Z. Knyzlak, *Miedzynarodowa specjalizacja produkcji krajow RWPG* (International Specialization of Production of the CMEA Countries), Warsaw, PWE, 1971, pp. 33, 37, 88-89.

[10] See Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "International Economic Relations in the Communist Policy of Economic Development," in P. E. Uren, Ed., *East-West Trade*, Toronto, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1966, pp. 67-86.

[11] On the question of the role of trade in the development of Comecon economies, see Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "Growth Through Trade in Socialist Economics," in W. D. C. Hunter, Ed., *Papers and Proceedings of the Conference on Current Problems of the Socialist Economies*, Hamilton, Ontario, McMaster University, 1970 (mimeographed); and P. Bozyk, "The Evolution of Economic Cooperation Among the Socialist Countries," *Handel zagraniczny*, No. 11, 1968, pp. 416-20.

Table 2: Share of the Output of Producer Goods in Total Industrial Output
(in percent)

	1950	1955	1960	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Bulgaria	38.2	45.5	47.2	52.3	52.6	53.0	53.2	53.4
Czechoslovakia	49.4	55.7	59.2	60.6	61.2	61.4	61.4	61.7
GDR	n.a.	66.6	66.5	68.1	67.9	68.1	68.6	70.1
Hungary	n.a.	65.0	66.0	65.4	65.7	65.2	65.3	64.6
Poland	52.6	57.2	59.4	63.0	63.3	64.4	65.3	66.0
Rumania	52.9	55.7	62.8	67.3	67.5	67.8	69.1	69.2
USSR	68.8	70.5	72.5	74.1	74.4	74.4	74.0	74.0

SOURCE: J. Kleer, *Wzrost intensywny w krajach socjalistycznych* (Intensive Growth in the Socialist Countries), Warsaw, CRZZ, 1972, pp. 104-5.

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Table 3: Share of Accumulation in National Income

(in percent)

	1950	1955	1960	1965	1967	1970	1971-75 (Plan)
Bulgaria	20	21	27	21	33	29	26
Czechoslovakia	17	20	18	20	22	27	n.a.
GDR	10[a]	12[a]	18[a]	12[a]	24	23	22-23
Hungary	23	22	25	23	26	24	23-25
Poland	21	23	24	23	27	28	28-30
Rumania	18	18	20	25	29	30	30-32
USSR	27	25	27	26	27	29	25

[a] "Productive accumulation" only.

SOURCES: GUS (Central Statistical Office), *Rozwoj gospodarczy krajow RWPG 1950-1968* (Economic Development of the CMEA Countries 1950-1968), Warsaw, 1969, p. 62; B. Zielinska, "The Five Year Plans of the CMEA Countries 1971-75," *Gospodarka planowa* (Warsaw), No. 9, 1971, p. 527; "CMEA: Economic Development in the Years 1971-75," *Zycie gospodarcze* (Warsaw), No. 23, 1972, p. 9.

capacity, including the necessity to effect considerable structural changes within the national economy. The changes consist of starting new lines of production, the expansion of the most effective production and restriction or complete elimination of inefficient lines of production which are based on obsolete technology or operate on an insufficient scale.[12]

Yet the countries of Eastern Europe faced a serious dilemma in attempting simultaneously to reform their economic system and to restructure the patterns of output of their industry. As Polish economist J. Kleer pointed out, these two changes make incompatible demands on the economies involved. On the one hand, the combined retooling of existing productive facilities and development of new leading sectors in order to increase the productivity of the economy and its competitiveness in foreign trade necessarily place heavy demands on investment. On the other hand, economic reforms—involving some decentralization of management, expanding the role of market forces in the allocation of resources, and relying increasingly on material incentives—require a certain "slack" in the economy. Reserves of foreign exchange, consumer goods, raw materials, and human resources needed for successful reform are incompatible with an investment drive, with its high degree of mobilization of resources and the attendant shortages and bottlenecks. Consequently, although there was some measure of economic reform in each of the Comecon countries in the second half of the 1960's, the degree of reform has tended to vary inversely to the scope of action to modify the structure of industrial production.[13]

With the exception of Hungary and (for a brief period) Czechoslovakia, the East European states eschewed major reforms in favor of a rapid restructuring of industrial production. In the absence of any significant increase in the role of market forces, this reconstruction was introduced "from above," *i.e.*, the central planners singled out certain branches of industry and certain products as "progressive" and likely to modernize the economy and find good export markets, and assigned them high priority in the allocation of resources. Thus, in the German Democratic Republic, the New Economic System was associated with "structural planning" aimed at developing "the most modern indus-

Table 4: Ratio of Increase in National Income to Gross "Productive Investment" in Previous Year[a]

	1950-55	1956-60	1961-65	1966-69
Bulgaria	0.62	0.61	0.29	0.24
Czechoslovakia	0.54	0.44	0.10	0.31
GDR [b]	0.78	0.37	0.17	0.24
Hungary	0.31	0.45	0.22	0.22
Poland	0.48	0.38	0.29	0.24
USSR	0.83	0.62	0.41	0.31

[a] Figures for national income and gross "productive investment" are in constant prices.

[b] Total Investment.

SOURCE: E. D. Lidwin-Piotrowska, "The Coefficient of Effectiveness of Investment in the CMEA Countries in the Years 1959-1969," *Problemy ekonomiczne* (Krakow), No. 3, 1971, p. 10.

[12] M. Guzek, *Miedzynarodowa integracja gospodarcza w socjalizmie* (International Economic Integration Under Socialism), Warsaw, PWE, 1971, p. 42.

[13] See the discussion in Kleer's article, "The Socialist Countries: Economic Change," *Polityka* (Warsaw), No. 12, 1967, pp. 1 and 9.

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tries," which, interestingly, remained highly centralized despite decentralization occurring in the rest of the economy. Likewise, the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party (held in 1968) stressed "selective development," particularly of some 100 enterprises specializing in production for export.[14]

There is an implicit danger in this approach to restructuring an economy. Lacking a realistic mechanism for setting prices and determining costs, and operating with fictitious exchange rates and with foreign trade activities virtually isolated from the rest of the domestic economy, the central planners can have no assurance that the new structure will prove more efficient than its predecessor. An alternative approach to the problem has been tried—to a certain extent—in Hungary, where it has been recognized that the industrial structure should be created "from below" in response to existing demand and that "the starting point for actual development priorities should be found in the micro-structure and not in the macro-structure." [15]

While the individual CMEA countries were grappling with the problems of economic reform and the restructuring of industry, they were also pursuing a complementary effort to increase the degree of specialization and cooperation within the bloc.[16] In 1962, at a "Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries," the CMEA states approved a set of "Basic Principles of the International Socialist Division of Labor," which were to set the main objectives and methods of economic cooperation among the member countries. This document envisaged an expansion in mutual trade based largely on coordination of the five-year economic plans of the member states, particularly the sections of such plans dealing with investment priorities.

To facilitate economic cooperation, Comecon also expanded its institutional structure. The 1962 conference created a Comecon Executive Committee, a Bureau on General Problems of Economic Plans, an Institute of Standardization, a Chartering Coordination Bureau, and a Central Administration of the Joint Power System, in addition to increasing the number of Comecon standing committees (dealing with such matters as statistics, scientific and technological research, and standardization). In 1963, a Joint Railway Rolling Stock System was also established.[17] In the same year, Comecon accepted the principles of multilateral clearing of trade ac-

[14] See "Improvements in the Structure and Organization of the National Economy in the Light of the Debate at the Party Congress," *Gospodarka planowa*, No. 1, 1969, pp. 1-6; and U. Plowiec, "Directions of Improvements in International Trade in the Light of the Theses for the Fifth Party Congress," *Handel zagraniczny*, No. 10, 1968, pp. 368-70.

[15] J. Bognar, "A Contemporary Approach to East-West Economic Relations," *The New Hungarian Quarterly* (Budapest), No. 34, 1969, p. 34.

[16] The need for such an approach was noted by S. Kuzinski in his *Czynniki wzrostu gospodarczego Polski Ludowej* (Factors of Economic Growth in People's Poland), Warsaw, KiW (Ksiazka i Wiedza), 1962, p. 178; see also, D. Fikus, *Rada Wzajemnej Pomocy Gospodarczej* (The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance), Warsaw, PWE, 1967, p. 19.

[17] L. Ciamaga, *Od wspolpracy do integracji* (From Cooperation to Integration), Warsaw, PWE, 1965, pp. 217-19; and CMEA Secretariat, *A Survey of Twenty Years of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance*, Moscow, 1969, pp. 21-24.

Table 5: Average Annual Rates of Growth of Labor Productivity in Industry

(in percent)

	1950–55	1956–60	1961–65	1966–70	Plan 1971–75	Actual 1971	Plan 1972
Bulgaria	8.0	5.3	6.8	6.9	8.1	6.0	—
Czechoslovakia	7.1	7.2	3.5	5.3	5.4–5.7	6.5	4.5
GDR	8.0	7.7	5.6	6.5	6.2	4.5	5.0
Hungary	3.4	4.0	4.9	3.5	4.1–4.7	5.3	—
Poland	9.7	7.4	5.1	4.9	5.4	4.9	5.7
Romania	9.9	8.2	7.8	7.3	6.8–7.6	5.9	—
USSR	8.3	6.5	4.6	5.8	6.7	6.3	6.1

SOURCES: KSH (Central Statistical Office), *A magyar ipar nemzetkosi osszehasonlitnsban* (Hungarian Industry in International Comparisons), Budapest, 1967, p. 36; M. Golebiowski and B. Zielinska, "Economic Development of Socialist and Capitalist Countries in 1969 and Projects for 1970," *Gospodarka planowa*, No. 4, 1960, p. 7, and "Economic Development of Socialist and Capitalist Countries in 1971 and Plans and Forecasts for 1972," *ibid.*, No. 5, 1972, p. 262.


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counts within the bloc on the basis of a so-called "transfer ruble," and in 1964 it established an International Bank for Economic Cooperation to handle such transactions.

Trailing Trade Growth

However, the extension of the activities of the Council failed to generate any dramatic increase in the role of international trade in the process of economic growth in the member countries. In the years 1964–69, the average annual rate of growth of exports was lower than the 1958–63 rate in all the East European countries except the German Democratic Republic.[18] An East European economist documented the unsatisfactory growth of exports during the late 1960's by comparing the share of Comecon's exports in total world exports to the share of its industrial production in total world industrial production. The ratio of the two declined from 0.37 in 1950 to 0.35 in 1968 and 0.33 in 1970 for Comecon as a whole; and from 0.81 to 0.72 and 0.71 in the same years for Comecon exclusive of the USSR. The ratios for individual countries in 1970 are also illuminating: Bulgaria, 1.00; Czechoslovakia, 0.75; the GDR, 0.63; Hungary, 1.33; Poland, 0.55; and Romania, 0.60. These ratios contrast to 1.23 for all developed non-socialist countries and 2.18 for members of the European Economic Community (Common Market).[19] In the period 1965–70, only Poland—of the CMEA states—was able to increase its share in total world imports and exports, and that increase was from a very low level. Comecon's share in exports dropped from 10.6 to 10.2 percent; and in imports, from 10.0 to 9.5 percent.[20]

Most significant in terms of Comecon's announced goal of increasing cooperation among the CMEA states was the actual decline in the share of intra-bloc trade in total trade of the member states (from 63.09 percent in 1965 to 60.69 percent in 1970). Only in Bulgaria and Poland did the share of dealings with fellow CMEA states in the individual country's total foreign trade increase during this period.[21]



Headquarters of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, Kalinin Prospect, Moscow.

Photo by M. Redkin, from TASS via Sovfoto.

The failure of Comecon trade exchanges to grow as planned spurred a second great debate on the future of the organization during 1968–71, culminating in the adoption of the Comprehensive Program with its ambitious integrative targets. Clearly the 1962 "Basic Principles" and institutional measures had been insufficient to create a satisfactory division of labor among the CMEA countries.[22] Cooperation was blocked by a number of "barriers": *e.g.*, administrative protectionism, failure to develop direct links between economic units located in different countries, the practice of basing trade on rigid quotas, the persistence of bilateralism in trade arrangements and the clearing of international accounts, the lack of a true international currency within Comecon, unrealistic exchange rates, distorted domestic prices and their separation from world prices, and a lack of mobility of capital and labor.[23] These barriers, moreover, were grounded in the reality of the East European economies, particularly in the difficulties encountered in the quest for so-called "intensive" economic growth and in

[18] This data was derived from the statistical yearbooks of the respective countries.

[19] See J. Soldaczuk, "The Role of Foreign Trade in the Growth of the National Economy," *Handel zagraniczny*, No. 12, 1971, pp. 423-28.

[20] GUS (Central Statistical Office), *Rocznik stratystyczny handlu zagranicznego 1968* (Statistical Yearbook of Foreign Trade—1968), Warsaw, [1968], pp. 82-83; *Rocznik statystyczny handlu zagranicznego 1971* (Statistical Yearbook of Foreign Trade—1971), Warsaw, [1971], pp. 92-93; and GUS, *Rocznik statystyczny 1971* (1971 Statistical Yearbook), Warsaw, [1971], p. 719.

[21] See CMEA Secretariat, *A Survey of 20 Years . . .*, pp. 89-90; and GUS, *Rocznik handlu zagranicznego 1971*, pp. 101-03.

[22] See, *e.g.*, *Problemy ekonomicheskoi integratsii stran-chlenov SEV* (Problems of the Economic Integration of the Member Countries of CMEA), Moscow, Ekonomika, 1970; and *Integracja ekonomiczna krajow socjalistycznych* (Economic Integration of Socialist Countries), Warsaw, KiW, 1970.

[23] See T. Kiss, "Integration of CMEA Countries' National Markets," *Acta Oeconomica* (Budapest), No. 3, 1970, pp. 210-11; and J. M. Montias, "Obstacles to the Economic Integration of Eastern Europe," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles), No. 3/4, 1969, pp. 38-60.

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the deep-rooted penchant for autarky. Let us examine these factors before turning to the Comprehensive Program itself.

Referring to Tables 1–5 presented earlier, one can get a clear picture of the achievements and failings of the 1966–70 economic plans in Eastern Europe. Every country was able to accelerate its rate of growth during this period except Poland (which maintained its 1961–65 pace) and Romania (which slowed to a still impressive 7.6-percent average annual growth rate). However, everywhere growth continued to be associated with heavy increases in investment—in fact investment grew faster than planned in all countries except Bulgaria and Romania. The share of accumulation in national income reached new highs in 1967 in all the East European countries and continued to grow thereafter in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and the USSR. The efficiency of capital improved only in Czechoslovakia and the GDR—two countries which had shown exceptionally low levels of efficiency during 1961–65—and despite heavy investment outlays, the targeted average rates of growth of labor productivity were realized only in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania.

From this evidence, it is clear that economic growth in Eastern Europe during the second half of the 1960's continued to be of the "extensive" rather than of the desired "intensive" variety. Consequently, the need to modernize and restructure the respective economies remained urgent. Furthermore, in attempting to restructure their industrial production, the countries tended to turn *en masse* to the manufacture of the same new commodities, viewed as "progressive"—*e.g.*, automobiles, trucks, tractors, metal-working machines, textile machines, equipment for the chemical industry and power generation, and railway engines. Little attention was paid to specialization and coordination in these areas. As noted by two observers,

> *. . . independent decisions of individual CMEA countries as to the starting of new production leads to uneconomic dispersion of resources and increasing* disintegration. . . .[24]

In light of this continued autarkic tendency, specialization within Comecon made slow progress. Comecon directives concerning mutual supplying of specialized products covered at most 30 percent and as little as 2 percent of total imports of various groups of machinery and equipment. Furthermore, in the absence of any sanctions, the rate of nonfulfillment of specialization tasks was very high. For example, Poland exported 22 out of 29 items subject to the directives in 1963; 24 out of 40 in 1964; 15 out of 34 in 1966; 48 out of 68 in 1967; and none out of 79 in 1969.[25] (This reflected a combination of neglect by the exporters or their inability to meet obligations because of dispersion of resources to other sectors of the given economy and of changes in demand on the part of importing countries because of delays in plant implementation or rejection of goods because of late delivery or low quality.)

Centripetal Forces

There were, however, important economic forces pushing toward integration within Comecon, including the need to overcome the technological gap between CMEA states and the advanced non-socialist countries, the machinery bias in industrial output and the resulting export priorities, and the need to solve major problems concerning the supply of fuels and raw materials.

Eastern Europe apparently became fully aware of its technological backwardness relative to the West only in the late 1960's. As the CMEA states groped for means to overcome this handicap, they discovered that self-sufficiency would no longer work.[26] No individual country could hope to incorporate the most recent technology into its production processes on a wide front through its own efforts. The purchase of advanced machinery or of licenses from the West was one possible solution, but there was precious little foreign exchange available to permit such an approach. Consequently, there was a need for the socialist economies to participate in international exchange of scientific and technological knowledge, at least within Comecon,[27] if not on a broader, worldwide scale.

[24] Gora and Knyziak, *op. cit.*, p. 54 (emphasis added).

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 55.

[26] See, *e.g.*, I. Medvedkov, "The Scientific-Technical Revolution and Economic Collaboration Among the Socialist Countries," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenila* (Moscow), No. 12, 1969, English tr. in *Problems of Economics* (New York), No. 3, 1970, pp. 34-52; and L. Zacher, "External Aspects of the Policy of Structural Changes in the Economy," *Gospodarka planowa*, No. 12, 1969, pp. 20-24.

[27] J. Kleer, *Wzrost intensywny w krajach socjalistyczynch* (Intensive Growth in the Socialist Countries), Warsaw, CRZZ, 1972, pp. 9-58.

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Another compulsion which has ultimately led toward integration within Comecon has been what Professor Peter Wiles terms structural "snobbery" in East European foreign trade—that is, a predilection to limit the import of consumer goods and the export of raw materials while emphasizing the expansion of both imports and exports of machines and equipment.[28] This perspective was an outgrowth of the switch from stressing basic heavy industries to a very rapid expansion of machine-building industries. Unfortunately, with the exception of the USSR, the countries of Eastern Europe have insufficient domestic markets for such products and must therefore find export markets or produce at a suboptimum scale.

Indeed, the share of machines and equipment in the total exports of all CMEA countries has increased rapidly (see Table 6), and this level is considerably higher than the share of such items in exports of non-socialist economies with similar levels of development. (This comparison excludes the USSR, which —as noted above—has a sufficient internal market for its own output.) The share of other industrial products in CMEA exports is lower than the corresponding figure for all developed non-socialist economies except Denmark—and then only the GDR and Hungary exceed Denmark's low level of 20.3 percent.[29]

The CMEA countries, however, have experienced serious difficulties in attempting to export their ma-

[28] P. J. D. Wiles, *Communist International Economics*, New York, Praeger, 1968, pp. 19 and 185.

[29] GUS, *Rocznik statystyczny handlu zagranicznego 1971*, pp. 95-98.

Table 6: Comecon Trade in Machines and Equipment

(in percent)

A. Share of Machines and Equipment in Total Exports and Imports

	Exports					Imports				
	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970
Bulgaria	0.0	2.6	13.6	24.8	28.1	37.2	51.4	43.2	43.7	40.1
Czechoslovakia	26.4	43.5	45.1	48.5	50.2	11.2	13.3	21.7	29.9	33.4
GDR	28.0	55.7	48.2	48.9	49.9	5.5	3.4	12.6	17.9	32.8
Hungary	23.0	29.8	38.0	32.7	32.4	22.0	12.3	28.3	28.7	31.0
Poland	7.8	13.1	28.0	34.4	38.5	32.4	30.9	27.1	32.8	36.4
Romania	4.2	6.1	16.6	18.6	21.7*	37.1	37.2	32.5	38.9	44.3
USSR	11.8	17.5	20.5	20.0	21.5	21.5	30.2	29.8	33.4	35.0

B. Directions of Total Exports and Imports in 1967

	Exports				Imports			
	CMEA	Other Socialist Countries	Advanced Non-Socialist Countries	Other Non-Socialist Countries	CMEA	Other Socialist Countries	Advanced Non-Socialist Countries	Other Non-Socialist Countries
Bulgaria	91.6	3.8	1.1	3.5	79.8	0.4	19.6	0.2
Czechoslovakia	76.7	6.4	5.6	11.3	77.6	2.4	19.8	0.2
GDR	81.6	7.1	5.9	5.4	72.6	2.4	24.9	0.1
Hungary	88.0	5.1	2.1	4.8	75.3	2.7	21.9	0.1
Poland	81.0	7.5	3.2	8.3	75.2	2.3	22.4	0.1
Romania	66.1	18.5	2.6	12.8	40.1	0.9	58.9	0.1
USSR	59.0	16.6	2.8	21.6	74.5	2.5	23.0	0.0

* In 1969.

SOURCES: GUS, *Rocznik statystyczny handlu zagranicznego 1971* (Statistical Yearbook of Foreign Trade 1971), Warsaw, [1971], pp. 95-96; J. Soldaczuk, Ed., *Handel zagraniczny a wzrost krajow RWPG* (Foreign Trade and Economic Growth of the CMEA Countries), Warsaw, PWE, 1969, p. 205; and J. Kleer, *Wzrost intensywny v krajach socjalistycznych* (Intensive Growth in the Socialist Countries), Warsaw, CRZZ, 1972, pp. 173, 177, 179.

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chines and equipment to markets outside of Comecon, particularly to the advanced non-socialist countries (see Table 6). The quality and level of technological sophistication of products have proven to be low, and even the products of some brand-new factories have proven obsolete as soon as production commenced.[30] This may happen even when production is based on licenses or produced on machines purchased from the West, because of inordinate delays in the completion of investment projects. Ineffective marketing, shortages of spare parts, inadequate packaging and servicing, as well as the creation of various tariff barriers of discrimination against CMEA products, aggravate the situation.[31]

Consequently, during the 1960's, trade with the West in these categories never attained as much as 10 percent of the total export of this group of commodities by any CMEA country. Comecon has been somewhat more successful in marketing its machines and equipment in the less developed non-socialist countries. However, expansion of trade in this sector requires the ability to offer credit, and the markets are scattered geographically and difficult to service.

As a consequence, a very high proportion of the CMEA countries' exports of machinery and equipment is traded within Comecon, and this commodity class accounts for high proportions of total exports to other CMEA states except in the cases of the USSR, Romania and Bulgaria (see Tables 6 and 7). Yet, in the second half of the 1960's, it became increasingly more difficult for these countries to export such products even to their CMEA partners, because there was a strong preference for obtaining technologically superior machines from the West. (This interest in Western machinery was partly based on the belief that the relatively inefficient and obsolete machinery used in CMEA countries was an important factor in deceleration of growth throughout the region.[32]) Imports of machines from Western

Table 7: Share of Machines and Equipment in Intrabloc CMEA Exports

(in percent)

	1957	1965	1971
Bulgaria	8.8	29.9	36.8
Czechoslovakia	42.4	56.3	60.8
GDR	48.6	58.6	60.7
Hungary	45.8	42.8	46.8
Poland	28.6	48.6	52.4
Romania	11.0	24.5	31.9
USSR	8.6	18.0	23.8

SOURCE: *Zycie gospodarcze* (Warsaw), No. 15, 1972, p. 11.

sources were growing at an annual rate of 15 percent, contrasted to an 11-percent rate for imports from other socialist countries. Intra-bloc trade in machinery in the 1960's grew at almost the same rate as in 1956–60—a situation interpreted by some as a sign of "saturation" in this trade.[33]

Such a situation is especially serious, because it involves precisely the products of newly-established or newly-modernized industries which have consistently received high priority in the allocation of managerial skills, manpower, and investment funds. In light of the limited possibilities of increasing exports of this commodity group to non-socialist countries, the CMEA market remains the most important outlet; yet expansion in this direction cannot take place unless that market is reorganized and unless the products are improved and made comparable to those available from other sources.

Primus inter Partners

In this connection, the Soviet market is of decisive significance. In the years 1966–70, the USSR purchased about half the total exports of machines and equipment of the other CMEA countries. This included 85 percent of ships, boats and marine equipment; 60 percent of railway equipment; 60 percent of equipment for the chemical and food industries; and over 50 percent of machinery for light industries (textiles, leather goods, etc.). As one East European expressed it, this means that

[30] See R. Wilczewski, *Srodki trwale w powojennym przemysle polskim* (Fixed Aspects in Postwar Polish Industry), Warsaw, PWE, 1971, p. 78; and A. Bodnar, *Problemy polityki gospodarczej PRL* (Problems of the Economic Policy of the People's Republic of Poland), Warsaw, KIW, 1969, p. 175.

[31] See S. Albinowski, *Handel miedzy krajami o roznych ustrojach* (Trade Between Countries with Different Systems), Warsaw, KiW, 1968, pp. 165-66; and E. B. Ruminska, "Current Problems in East-West Trade," *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 30, 1972, p. 14.

[32] This was noted by A. Karpinski in his *Polityka uprzemyslowienia Polski w latach 1958-1968* (The Policy of Industrialization of Poland in the Years 1958-68), Warsaw, PWE, 1969, pp. 105, 394, 400.

[33] See, for example, S. Polaczek, *Integracja gospodarcza krajow socjalistycznych a handel zagraniczny Polski* (Economic Integration of the Socialist Countries and Poland's International Trade), Warsaw, PWE, 1971, p. 78.

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. . . to a considerable extent, the structure of the Soviet Union's demand for machines and equipment determines the directions of specialization of the CMEA countries.[34]

Furthermore, Soviet imports of machines and equipment from other CMEA countries is expected to increase from the 12 billion rubles imported in 1966–70 to over 18 billion rubles during 1971–75.[35]

Thus, in attempting to utilize their industrial potential, the other countries of Comecon must adjust production to the needs of their largest customer, even when—it is alleged—the profitability of this trade is not high.[36] From Moscow's viewpoint, moreover, it is essential that the machinery imported from its East European partners be of the right types, of high quality, and of the most advanced technological design, if it is to contribute to the "intensive" growth of the Soviet economy. Under such circumstances one can understand the interest in far-reaching integration of East European and Soviet industries—both to solve the problems encountered by exporters of machinery and equipment and to satisfy the standards set by the users of such goods within the bloc.

Equally important for the economies of Comecon is the question of fuel and raw material supply. These economies have continued their emphasis on heavy industry—particularly on the production of steel, which requires large inputs of fuel and raw materials—in the face of inadequate local supplies of these commodities; and despite heavy investments to develop domestic raw material bases, the East European states have experienced sharply rising deficits in these commodities, particularly since the beginning of the 1960's.[37] Moreover, the serious imbalance between demand and supply in this sector has been aggravated by a continued "leakage" of raw materials from Comecon trade to other countries outside the bloc. The extent of this leakage can be gauged by examining the destination of increases in exports of Comecon countries in the years 1955–67. For foodstuffs, 59.7 percent of increases in exports were directed outside the bloc; for fuels and minerals, 50.8 percent; and for other raw materials, 71.3 percent. If one looks—for purposes of comparison—at the trends in exports for the same categories of goods by Commart countries for the same time frame, it turns out that the corresponding figures for shares of increases in exports of these three categories of raw materials which were directed outside of the EEC were 29.5, 34.2 and 32.2 percent, respectively.[38]

The tendency of Comecon countries to export raw materials outside of the bloc is caused, in part, by balance-of-payments difficulties experienced by CMEA countries in their attempts to purchase specialized machinery from the West for new investment projects. Having lost traditional consumer-goods markets during the industrialization drive and experiencing difficulties in marketing the output of newly-established industries, the East European countries can earn essential "hard currencies" only by exporting raw materials and foodstuffs—what Professor J. M. Montias has termed "hard goods" [39] —to the advanced non-socialist countries. Export of fuels and raw materials to countries outside of Comecon has also been fostered by the practice of using world prices for transactions in these commodities within the bloc. These prices do not reflect the relative degree of scarcity of raw materials which exists within the bloc and therefore cannot make the Comecon market more attractive than other markets.[40]

On the other side of the coin, the CMEA countries rely on sources within the bloc for between 54 and 72 percent of total national imports of raw materials and fuels. Here, as in the trade in machinery, the role of the Soviet Union is decisive. It supplied 41 percent of total intrabloc imports of this group of commodities in 1955, 56 percent in 1965, and above 60 percent in 1970; and it has agreed to increase considerably its annual exports of some basic fuels and raw materials to other CMEA countries during 1971–75: *i.e.*, oil from 138 million tons in 1970 to

[34] Kleer, *Wzrost Intensywny . . .*, p. 189.

[35] I. Oleynik, "The USSR in the System of Cooperation of the Socialist Countries," *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 3, 1972, p. 11.

[36] In the absence of realistic prices, exchange rates and methods of cost calculation, it is almost impossible to judge when exports are profitable. See Z. Kamecki, "Directions of the Development of Economic Integration of the CMEA Countries," in *Integracja ekonomiczna* (fn. 22 *supra*), p. 64.

[37] Polaczek, *op. cit.*, pp. 130.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 134.

[39] See his *Economic Development in Communist Rumania*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1967, and "Socialist Industrialization and Trade in Machinery Products: An Analysis Based on the Experience of Bulgaria, Poland and Rumania," in A. A. Brown and E. Neuberger, Eds., *International Trade and Central Planning*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1968, pp. 130-59.

[40] See O. I. Tarnovski, "International Trade Prices and the Tasks of Socialist Economic Integration," *Gospodarka planowa*, No. 8, 1972, pp. 496-500. An analysis of the foreign trade prices of the CMEA countries can be found in P. Marer, *Postwar Pricing and Price Patterns in Socialist Foreign Trade (1946-1971)*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1972.

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Remote-control panel of the Druzhba Oil Pipeline at Kuibyshev on the Volga River. The arrows indicate flow of Soviet oil to the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.

—Photo by N. Granovsky, from TASS via Sovfoto.

243 million in 1975, natural gas from 8 to 33 million cubic meters, electric power from 14 to 42 billion kwh, and iron ore from 72 million to 94 million tons.[41] It is on the basis of these figures that the five-year plans of the recipient countries for 1971–75 have been built.

Despite the enormous Soviet potential in this field, maintenance of an adequate and continuing supply of raw materials and fuels from the USSR to the other CMEA countries is regarded by Soviet and East European economists alike as a very difficult problem, and a considerable deficit is expected to appear in the CMEA countries other than the Soviet Union by 1980.[42]

Part of the problem lies in the costliness of the Soviet extractive industries. Already at the time when the five-year plans were coordinated for 1966–70, Soviet economists pointed out that the average capital-intensity of the basic raw materials and fuels exported to other CMEA countries by the USSR was from 3 to 3.5 times higher than that for the machinery supplied to the USSR by those countries in exchange.[43] Moreover, the gestation period for investment in extractive operations in the USSR is long (10–12 years); worsening conditions of exploitation and unfavorable contract prices have decreased the "effectiveness" (profitability) of fuel exports; and it is increasingly difficult to meet export needs from resources in European Russia, while exploitation of deposits in Siberia and the Far East requires larger outlays of capital and of manpower. Consequently, the USSR is seeking to foster increased integration in the fuel and power industries of Comecon,[44] to be accomplished principally through investment in these Soviet industries by other CMEA countries. Indeed, the Comprehensive Program of 1971 envisaged a large number of such mutually-financed projects to produce fuel and raw materials, most of them to be located in the USSR and Mongolia. The investors are to be repaid with the raw materials produced.

In light of all the factors examined above, it was recognized by the outset of the 1970's that the degree of cooperation within Comecon was not commensurate with either the needs or the potentialities of the CMEA countries.[45] Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev highlighted this view in his speech to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:

> [*The*] *possibilities of the socialist location of economic activity and division of labor are not yet fully utilized. . . . It is necessary to deepen specialization and cooperation in production, to establish closer links among national economic plans, in short, to advance along the road of* economic integration *of the socialist states.*[46]

While discussion favoring integration tended to stress the economic factors (presented as "the outcome of objective development tendencies"[47]), there also were various political factors militating both for and against such a course. Advocates of integration saw it as a means of forging closer rela-

[41] L. Skibinski, "The CMEA Countries in 1971-75," *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 33, 1971, p. 10.

[42] See A. Bodnar, *Polska-ZSRR: Wspolpraca gospodarcza* (Poland-USSR: Economic Cooperation), Warsaw, KiW, 1967, p. 85; O. Bogomolov, "Current Problems of Economic Cooperation of the Socialist Countries," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 5, 1966, pp. 15-27; O. I. Tarnovski, *loc. cit.*, pp. 496-98; and L. Ciamaga, "From Coordination to Integration," in *Integracja ekonomiczna . . .*, p. 40.

[43] Bodnar, *Polska-ZSSR . . .*, p. 86.


[44] See, *e.g.*, A. Alekseev and J. Savenko, "Economic Integration of the Expansion of Fuel and Power Industries of the CMEA Countries," *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 12, 1971, pp. 47-56.

[45] Guzek, *op. cit.*, p. 35; P. Bozyk and J. Soldaczuk, "International Economic Agreements of the CMEA Countries," in *Integracja ekonomiczna . . .*, p. 147.

[46] *Pravda* (Moscow), March 31, 1971.

[47] M. Deniszczuk, "International Division of Labor and Economic Integration of the CMEA Countries," *Handel zagraniczny*, No. 7, 1971, p. 214.

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Principal projects relating to the Comecon Comprehensive Program.

—Released by Novosti in January 1973, via Soviets.

tions among the socialist states and strengthening them against the alleged divisive policies of capitalist countries aimed at "softening socialism" in Eastern Europe.[48]

Member Misgivings

However, the national interests and aspirations of individual member states loomed as a potential obstacle to comprehensive integration. In the early 1960's, Romania was the most vociferous in defending member-state sovereignty against Khrushchev's proposal to make CMEA supranational.[49] Such concerns are very real, particularly in light of the dominating political, military and economic power of the Soviet partner and the very high degree of economic dependence of the other partners on the USSR as a supplier of raw materials and as a market.

The less developed CMEA states, again Romania in particular, feared that closer integration within Comecon would benefit the most developed countries while petrifying the less developed economies at their present level of industrialization—fears similar to those which had earlier defeated efforts to develop interbranch international division of labor involving the division of countries into suppliers of foodstuffs and raw materials, on the one hand, and

[48] See, for example, J. Soldaczuk, *Handel miedzynarodowy a rozwoj gospodarczy w socjalizmie* (International Trade and Economic Development under Socialism), Warsaw, PWN (Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe), 1970, p. 130; also P. Alampiev and G. Sorokin, "Internationalization of Economic Activity and Socialist Integration," in *Problemy ekonomicheskoi integratsii . . .*, p. 5.

[49] For a discussion of diverging interests with CMEA in the years 1961-66, see M. Kaser, *Comecon: Integration Problems of the Planned Economies*, 2nd ed., London, Oxford University Press, 1967, pp. 92-129.

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those specializing in industrial production, on the other. It was only after obtaining various concessions and guarantees on this issue that Romania signed a joint document expressing the need for integration at the 23rd CMEA Session in April 1969.[50]

The more advanced countries of the bloc also had their fears. Czechoslovakia did not want excessive integration to hinder its growing trade with Western markets—its main source of advanced technology and a highly useful medium for "verifying" the technological standards and quality of Czechoslovak exports.[51] For its part, the GDR wished to safeguard its special relations with the Federal Republic of Germany—a member of the EEC. To satisfy these reservations, it was agreed at the 23rd CMEA session that integration should not hamper the development of member states' economic relations with the rest of the world.[52]

The Comprehensive Program

The "Comprehensive Program" finally adopted at the 25th session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance at Bucharest in July 1971 reflected the various compromises hammered out on these complex issues over a period of several years. The Program stated:

. . . further intensification and improvement and the development of the socialist economic integration of CMEA member nations will be carried out in accordance with the principles of socialist internationalism and on the basis of respect for national sovereignty, independence, and national interests, of nonintervention in the internal affairs of nations, and of total equality, mutual advantage, and comradely reciprocal aid.

It further noted that:

. . . socialist economic integration is carried out on an entirely voluntary basis and is not accompanied by the creation of supranational organs, nor does it affect matters pertaining to internal planning or the financial and cost-calculating activities of organizations.[53]

In other words, each country decides whether to participate in a given integration project on the basis of calculations of the benefits of the project to its own economy and of the profits which participating production and trade organizations would gain.

Furthermore, one whole section of the Program was devoted to provisions for eliminating differences in levels of development between member countries —a task specified as one of the objectives of integration. Less developed members would be allowed to select certain new lines of production for specialization in order to spur individual growth as long as the products were of sufficiently high quality and technological sophistication. More advanced members were to extend assistance in this regard, as well as to help less advanced members participate fully in research and development activities.[54] To coordinate efforts in this latter area, the July 1971 session of Comecon created a Committee for Scientific and Technical Cooperation to direct the establishment of various joint research institutes, the allocation of tasks among national institutes, the exchange of scientific personnel and of research findings, and the joint production of scientific instruments and equipment.

Since the Comprehensive Program created no supranational planning authorities, other measures had to be devised to coordinate efforts toward cooperation and integration. The Bucharest session created a Committee for Cooperation in Planning to promote closer coordination of national five-year and long-term economic plans and exchanges of information on economic policies and planning experience. With regard to national five-year plans, preliminary joint discussions are to be held concerning ways of coordinating economic activities within the bloc, and decisions reached are to be formalized in bilateral or, where feasible, in multilateral agreements prior to formal adoption of the plans by the respective state authorities—a procedure designed to guarantee full incorporation of such coordinating decisions into the individual national plans.

The most important concrete tasks of the new Committee for Cooperation in Planning appear to be (1) to solve "in a comprehensive manner" problems such as the assurance of adequate supplies of raw materials and power throughout the bloc, in-

[50] Soldaczuk, *Handel miedzynarodowy . . .*, pp. 137-38.
[51] Z. Sedivy, "On the Concept of International Economic Cooperation, *Planovane hospodarstvi* (Prague), No. 7, 1968.
[52] Soldaczuk, *Handel miedzynarodowy . . .*, p. 140.
[53] For the full text of the Program, see *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* (Moscow), No. 33, August 1971. An English translation appeared in *Soviet and Eastern European Foreign Trade* (White Plains, New York), Fall-Winter 1971-72, pp. 187-305.
[54] *Ibid.*, p. 196.

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troduction of the most advanced technological processes in the manufacture of new machines and equipment, and expansion of the transportation system within Comecon; (2) to prepare proposals for international cooperation in the construction of important investment projects; and (3) to further joint planning among interested members for individual branches of industry and types of production.[55] Such joint planning will encompass all stages, including forecasting of demand, preparatory activities, the production process, and the distribution of output among various markets over an agreed period of time. The stress will be on specialization in the production of parts rather than finished products. There will be very close direct links among cooperating units with a system of severe penalties for nonfulfillment of contracts.

In addition to introducing some mobility of capital within the bloc through joint investment by exporting and importing countries in the development of natural resources, the Program also introduced an element of labor mobility. Building on the experience of joint Czechoslovak-Polish construction work and of the use of Bulgarian workers to help exploit forest resources in Northern Russia to produce timber for both the USSR and Bulgaria, the Program provides that construction companies fulfilling a contract in another country may be asked to provide line workers in addition to technical personnel. In this manner Poland, with a surplus of labor, may be of assistance to the GDR and Czechoslovakia, which have labor shortages. In addition, movement of labor-intensive industries across international frontiers to regions with surplus labor is expected to result from coordination of plans and from specialization agreements.

Intra-Comecon trade will continue to be based on multiyear commercial agreements with annual joint decisions concerning implementation, but these agreements are supposed to be more closely connected with the five-year plans. In order to increase flexibility in trade, there will be three types of exchange. Trade in the most important raw materials, fuels, machines and equipment, and even some foodstuffs and manufactured consumer goods, will be governed by rigidly-defined quotas specifying quantities, delivery dates, and other matters. For a second group, composed of less essential commodities, the only quota established will be a figure for the total value of goods exchanged. A third group will not be subject to any quota and will not have to be bilaterally balanced. In order to facilitate integration, a new ruble—freely convertible within the bloc—is to be introduced, and the rates of exchange of all CMEA currencies are to be revised to make them more reflective of economic realities. A CMEA Investment Bank has been established to facilitate long-term investments, and the International Bank of Economic Cooperation will be reorganized in order to stimulate credit transactions and multilateral clearing.

[55] "CMEA: Socialist Integration," *Zycie gospodarcze*, No. 26, 1972, p. 7.

Inching toward Integration

What concrete results does Comecon expect from these measures, and how likely are they to materialize? During the 1971–75 plan periods in each of the Comecon countries, international trade—and particularly intrabloc trade—is expected to play an important part in national growth and the shift to "intensive" patterns of development.[56] Every East European member of Comecon (excluding the USSR), anticipates that international trade will grow more rapidly than national income (even though in all countries the rate of growth is to be more moderate than in 1966–70, in keeping with more modest targets for growth of investment and of national income). More significantly, trade with socialist countries is generally expected to grow more rapidly than total trade during 1971–75, in contrast to the pattern witnessed in 1966–70 (see Table 8). One may assume that the major part of this "intersocialist" trade will take place among Comecon member states.

But while trade within Comecon will doubtless increase during the current five-year period, one cannot predict with any certainty to what extent it will be along the multilateral lines envisaged in the Comprehensive Program and to what extent it will flow through traditional bilateral channels. Nor can one foresee just how extensively the Comprehensive Program's integrative measures will be implemented. Nevertheless, one can anticipate the development of closer integration within Comecon in some

[56] The linkage between growth strategy and trade was discussed by the author in greater detail in "The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Development and Trade in 1971-75," a paper presented at the Conference on "Canada and Eastern Europe" held at Carleton University, Ottawa, in March 1972. A French-language version is to appear in *Revue de l'Est* (Paris).

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Table 8: Growth of Comecon Foreign Trade: 1966–70 Results and Plans for 1971–75

(in percent)

	Total Trade		Trade with Socialist Countries	
	1966-70	1971-75	1966-70	1971-75
Bulgaria	70	60-65	62	84
Czechoslovakia	40	36-38	34	43-45
GDR	60	n.a.	55	75
Hungary	50	40-50	52	75
Poland	55	46-57	60	50
Romania	75	70	n.a.	n.a.
USSR	52	33-35	43	50

SOURCE: Statistical yearbooks of the above countries, and B. Zielinska, "The Five-Year Plans of the Countries of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance for 1971-75," *Gospodarka planowa* (Warsaw), No. 9, 1971, p. 526.

fields, particularly fuel extraction, power generation, metallurgy, and the engineering and chemical industries. Most industrial organizations in these categories are likely to be bloc-wide units rather than smaller regional units. Although the recent opening of the frontier between Poland and the GDR and the formation of various specialization agreements between two or three of the smaller CMEA states does raise the possibility of a regional type of development, one suspects that the USSR would not allow this tendency to become widespread.

If the plans for creating numerous Comecon-wide integrated industries materialize, there will be little need to establish any supranational Comecon planning authorities. All essential decisions in major industrial sectors would then be made within the corresponding integrated industries and be incorporated in the national plans of the member states through the process of preliminary coordination described above. This would not, however, indicate the absence of a broader coordination; for this function would, in effect, be performed by the State Planning Commission of the Soviet Union, which will effectively control these industries through its own decisions to purchase industrial output and to provide essential raw material inputs.

The integration envisaged in the Comprehensive Program is thus quite different from the integrated CMEA market which many East European economists had hoped might serve to increase the role of market forces and to permit decentralization of decision-making. To the contrary, one might expect the integrated industries to become more centralized—although the degree of centralization or decentralization will presumably be decided individually within each integrated industry.

Of course, it will take considerable time for the new Comecon machinery even to begin coping with the complex problems of such a gigantic venture. Moreover, the decision to do without supranational authorities, coupled with the existence of various provisions for safeguarding the autonomy of member states in economic planning and management and allowing them the right to decide whether or not to participate in particular integration measures, seems likely to place serious constraints on the Program. Such limitations may, indeed, perpetuate the gradualist approach of the past described by Professor Egon Neuberger as a "limited regret strategy."[57]

Nevertheless, one must not discount the possibility that Comecon will achieve a significant measure of integration, both economically and hence politically and militarily as well. This, indeed, appears to be the main objective of the Soviet Union even while it finds it necessary to expand its own economic relations with the advanced capitalist states in order to modernize its own industrial structure and introduce the intensive pattern of growth.

For their part, the East European members of Comecon—faced with the prospect of intensified economic pressures resulting from an enlarged Common Market—have very little choice but to go along with integration. They need larger markets in order to support efforts to modernize their industrial production, and they must readjust the structure of that production to take account of existing export possibilities. They also must secure for themselves essential supplies of raw materials, which—because of shortages of convertible currencies—they can only acquire from the USSR. They will certainly find it increasingly difficult to find any domestic surpluses of foodstuffs or raw materials to export to the advanced capitalist countries to finance imports of modern technology. Unless they can increase the number of specialization agreements with Western firms and expand exports of industrial goods to non-socialist countries, their only alternative would appear to be integration within Comecon, and integration within Comecon means integration with the Soviet Union.

[57] "International Division of Labor in CMEA: Limited Regret Strategy," *American Economic Review* (Evanston, Ill.), May 1964, pp. 506-15.

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Dissent in a Complex Society: The Soviet Case

By Walter D. Connor

In the years since the fall of Khrushchev, two undertakings have claimed a good deal of the energies of students of Soviet politics and society. The first has been the attempt to elaborate new and more penetrating models of the Soviet system as the "fit" of the totalitarian model has grown looser and a relatively stable pattern of "collective leadership" has emerged. The second has involved an effort to understand and assess the significance of the growing and increasingly open political dissent in the USSR, which—through the medium of *samizdat*—has revealed to Western eyes a whole range of critical viewpoints taken by Soviet citizens toward their own society and government. These two undertakings, it seems, have come together relatively rarely. While the phenomenon of dissent is a matter of continuing and even growing interest to scholars and explanations of its rise are not wanting, there has generally been little in the way of attempts to integrate it into more generalized, analytical views or models of the socio-political system as a whole.

The present essay will be a tentative effort in this direction. The "model" of the Soviet system it presents is a loose and partial one drawing on the ideas of many scholars, and it is not intended as a free-standing alternative to other models. Within the general framework it provides, dissent is viewed as both product and symptom of the confrontation of two phenomena in the contemporary Soviet system —on the one hand, the structural complexity of a society at a rather high level of development; and, on the other, the persistence of a centralist-command mode of integrating the increasingly differentiated segments of that society. In the view taken here, dissent assumes the character of a "normal" phenomenon and one whose significance for the system as a whole is *problematic*, but not necessarily *dramatic*, in terms of the Soviet future.

Mr. Connor is Assistant Professor of Sociology and staff member of the Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Michigan (Ann Arbor) and author of Deviance in Soviet Society: Crime, Delinquency, and Alcoholism, *1972. He is currently an Associate of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University (Cambridge, Mass.)*

Problems of a Complex Society

The USSR today is a complex society manifesting, as do other modern societies, a relatively high degree of structural differentiation. While the "modernity" of the USSR relative to *other* modern societies is a matter of some debate[1] (and is, in a sense, one of the issues involved in this discussion), it is of a degree sufficient to place the Soviet Union squarely among those nations whose complexity creates serious problems of coordination or integration.

Integration in "traditional" or "primitive" societies presents less problems given the fact that these very designations signify that these societies are less differentiated and less complex. The distinct structural entities in such societies are relatively few and tend to be multifunctional: the family is the unit of pro-

[1] Much depends, of course, on the definition of "modernity." This paper does not attempt to resolve the question in any general way, but the material which follows *does* touch upon *one* criterion for judging "modernity"—*i.e.*, the degree of structural differentiation in a society. Soviet society *is* highly differentiated, but is this "modernity"? Some would say yes. Others, who find the differentiated parts lacking the *autonomy* that is regarded as characteristic of "modern" Western societies, would be less ready to agree that the contemporary USSR is "modern." This, certainly, is not the only, or even necessarily the most important, criterion of modernity, but it is one to which several of the authors cited herein attach considerable importance.

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duction and consumption, of education and socialization; and the functions of priesthood and kingship are frequently fused in the same role.

The modernization of a relatively simple society—entailing the processes of industrialization, urbanization, etc.—involves a progressive structural differentiation, a diminution of the importance of multifunctional units, and their replacement by units more functionally specific and better fitted to the performance of needed activities. Roles, as well as the structures in which they are nested, become more specialized, and as the dissimilarity of human activities increases, integrative problems also multiply. Modes of integration rooted in custom and tradition, which were fully adequate to meet the integrative needs of simpler systems, no longer suffice; new modes are needed if the adaptive capacity of the society is to increase. And as a nation moves along the path from traditionalism to modernity, the problems of integration become major foci of struggle in the political arena.[2] Integration, in short, is an eminently political matter.

The success potential of varying integrative strategies, and hence the choice between them, seems to depend in large part on three factors: (1) the degree of differentiation (or "modernity") of the society in question in the period prior to the choosing of a "strategy"; (2) the content of the antecedent political culture and its relative "vitality," or chances of persistence; and (3) the objectives of modernization itself. The case that concerns us here—that of Soviet Russia—presents interesting divergences from the "average" modernizing nation in each of these regards.

The Russian society of 1917, though severely disrupted by war and governmental collapse, was substantially more "modern" that it had been 30 years before—and more modern, certainly, than the societies of Africa and Asia were 30 years later, when they finally embarked on modernization after World War II. Substantial industrialization and development of communications and transport systems, as well as a rate of GNP growth sufficient to qualify imperial Russia as a nation nearing the "takeoff" point, had been achieved between 1885 and 1917.[3] The Bolshevik "modernizing elite" consequently faced a society already fairly complex—which meant that the integrative task would be of commensurate complexity.

While war and revolution had brought the end of Tsarism, the political culture that had been both its product and its support survived. That culture was characterized by parochialism and passivity on the part of the masses, by a quasi-mystical mode of relating to the Tsar-autocrat, and—in the absence of any strongly-developed entrepreneurial orientations or traditions—by an acceptance of the state as the "doer," promoter, and coordinator of a broad range of social and economic matters.[4] Given such a legacy, as Zbigniew Brzezinski has observed, "a democratic Russia—either liberal or socialist—does not seem to have been a real alternative."[5] A political formula, if it is to "fit" a society, must be consistent with that society's cultural peculiarities, with its level of civilization, and with the prevailing notions of its citizens about the bases of political obligation.[6] The Bolshevik formula was a fairly good "fit"—even allowing for the obvious differences between its dynamic "totalitarian" thrust and the inertia of Tsarist authoritarianism.

The Bolshevik modernization program was both transformational and defensive in its objectives. While the internal implications of the Marxist-Leninist value system clearly included the necessity of a transformation from tradition to modernity, national security concerns were of no less importance. Stalin's enumeration of the defeats Russia had suffered in the past as the price of backwardness and his formulation of the objective of "socialism in one country" echoed the concerns of Russian defensive modernizers stretching back to Peter the Great. Added to the centralism so dominant in the inherited political culture, this ingrained preoccupation with national security virtually guaranteed that the differentiation of structures which would come with modernization would be integrated in a centralistic,

[2] See S. N. Eisenstadt, *Modernization: Protest and Change*, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966, p. 37. (Hereafter cited as *Modernization*).

[3] On prerevolutionary development, see Theodore H. Von Laue, *Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1963; also the essays by von Laue and Alexander Gerschenkron in Cyril E. Black, Ed., *The Transformation of Russian Society*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960.

[4] On Russian and Soviet political culture, see Frederick C. Barghoorn, "Soviet Russia: Orthodoxy and Adaptiveness," in Lucien W. Pye and Sidney Verba, Eds., *Political Culture and Political Development*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 450-511. Concerning cultural influences on "development" in Tsarist and Soviet Russia, see Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship*, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday Anchor Books, 1969, pp. 183 ff.

[5] "The Soviet Past and Future," *Encounter* (London), March 1970, p. 6.

[6] See Leonard Binder, "National Integration and Political Development," *American Political Science Review* (Menasha, Wisconsin), Vol. LVIII, No. 3 (September 1964), p. 625.

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"command" fashion, and that *control* would become an obsessive concern of the bureaucracy that would emerge to rule the society.

Whether control eventually acquired the character of an end, or remained a means, is a moot question,[7] but there is no need to enter into it here. For present purposes, it suffices to note that control was so critical an element in the structuring of the Soviet system during its modernization that general agreement prevailed among Western analysts well into the late 1950's on the "totalitarian" nature of the system.[8] Totalitarian integration shaped the Soviet system and, given the historical circumstances, was relatively well-suited to the task. Yet this mode of integration represents only one alternative, however natural its choice may have been at the outset, and an understanding of the issues raised by its maintenance under the conditions of a maturing Soviet society may be useful in clarifying some of the major problems the system faces—problems which are reflected, as we shall later argue, in the style and content of domestic political dissent.

The Soviet Pattern of Integration

With the declining vogue of the "totalitarian model" among Western analysts of Soviet affairs, new models, approaches, and terminologies have been put forward in an attempt to provide the conceptual apparatus necessary for a clearer understanding of the post-Stalin system. Among the many contributions, a few are striking in the degree to which their authors concern themselves directly—though in different terms—with the same problems of differentiation and integration.

T. H. Rigby has distinguished three main modes of integration or coordination of social effort: custom, contract, and command, characterizing the determination of objectives, roles and methods in "traditional, market, and organizational" societies respectively.[9] In "customary" coordination, the parties—superordinate and subordinate—are both "passive," inasmuch as objectives, roles and means in the "ideal type" of traditional society are themselves "given." Contractual (*i.e.*, market) coordination involves shared determination of the matters in question: that is to say, each party agrees to "perform" in a certain way in return for some consideration. Finally, "command" involves an active party who determines and a passive party who obeys. The type of society, obviously, is a question determined by the *relative* domination of one or another mode of integration. Typically, modern societies manifest different "mixes" *mainly* of command and contractual elements, purely customary forms having given ever greater place to other types of coordination. In these terms, the USSR is an "organizational" society, and the modernized states of the West are "market" societies. The Soviet polity—*i.e.*, the state-party bureaucracy—is generally seen as commanding the other specialized sectors: economic, military, educational, and the like; it does not deal with them in a process of negotiated "give and take." The evidence seems to suggest that both command and contract are *viable* modes of integration. Whether they are equally efficient in the management of systems of growing complexity is another question.

Along similar lines, Mark Field sees the increasing complexity and differentiation of modern societies as a phenomenon problematic in its outcome. The process of differentiation, in his words,

> *. . . implies a fair amount of autonomy for the differentiated spheres and the development of criteria of action specific to these spheres; it also raises the important question of the* integration *of these different areas through a system of exchange of outputs.*[10]

Autonomy, however, is only a *tendency*, and among the outcomes of differentiation is that of

[7] For example, to what extent is Hollander correct in arguing that Soviet bureaucracy "has developed primarily as a device of control and only secondly as an instrument for the management of modernization"? Was the rapid increase, after 1928, of state "penetration" into every area of life an outgrowth of a *conscious* commitment, inspired by Stalin's pathological suspicion and distrust, to maximize "totalitarian" control almost as an end in itself, or was it an incremental process of *ad hoc* responses by the regime to *resistance* to "developmental" objectives (*e.g.*, the resistance to forced collectivation)? See Paul Hollander, "Politicized Bureaucracy: The Soviet Case," *Newsletter on Comparative Studies of Communism*, (Buffalo, N.Y.) May 1971, p. 14.

[8] See Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1st ed., 1956, 2nd ed., 1965. See also Carl J. Friedrich, Ed., *Totalitarianism*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1954.

[9] T. H. Rigby, "Traditional, Market, and Organizational Societies and the USSR," in Frederick J. Fleron, Jr., Ed., *Communist Studies and the Social Sciences*, Chicago, Rand McNally and Company, 1969, pp. 170-87 (hereafter cited as *Communist Studies*).

[10] Mark G. Field, "Soviet Society and Communist Party Controls: A Case of 'Constricted' Development," in Donald W. Treadgold, Ed., *Soviet and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Differences*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1967, pp. 189-90. (Emphasis added.)

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"constricted" development, a situation in which one of the differentiated spheres will attempt to dominate the others coercively by restricting and regimenting their tendencies toward autonomy.[11]

In Field's view, the outcome of the Soviet mode of integration has been just such a "constricted" development. Differentiated and specialized as its subsystems are, the Soviet system as a whole is dominated by the polity—the state-party bureaucracy. Subsystem autonomy would imply integration by exchange of outputs; domination is antithetical to both.

Frederick Fleron's typology of political systems—*i.e.*, monocratic, adaptive-monocratic, cooptative, and pluralist—is based on differences in the way political elites obtain from other, "specialized" elites the skills necessary for managing a society.[12] At one end of the continuum, a "monocratic" elite either possesses all the necessary skills itself or can mobilize them from among the "specialists" by coercion and without any *quid pro quo;* at the other, a pluralist system contains no "professional-careerist" political elite, and all elites are in competition. Fleron leans toward a view of the Soviet system as "cooptative"—that is, one in which needed skills are obtained by coopting appropriate "specialists" into the administrative structure—thus placing it somewhere between the two extremes, but rather far from pure "monocracy." While this view may be open to question, what is relevant to the present discussion is the fact that Fleron sees such a system, with its inherent bias toward monocracy, as facing a difficult problem—namely, the risk that "these specialized elites might attempt to trade their skills for some degree of participation in the political policy-making process." [13]

The remarkable similarity with which Rigby, Field, and Fleron frame the issue of integration—*i.e.*, in terms of command vs. contract, little or much exchange of outputs, coercing needed specialized skills or "trading" for them—directs attention to a critical question. This is the question of the fitness of the Soviet polity, as presently constituted, to manage a larger social system in which structural differentiation has given rise to many competing interests and where there are, at least potentially, two types of power. With regard to the latter, Boris Meissner has observed that "the power of the top bureaucrats rests in the *positions* they hold, while that of the intelligentsia is rooted in the authority and prestige inherent in the *functions* it performs." [14]

For a long time, the USSR managed to suppress the organization of the different interests arising from differentiation under the cover of an *ersatz* "plebiscitarianism." [15] In the "system-building" phase, such a policy was probably rational, because reliance on "contract" as a means of coordinating effort was not a viable alternative, given the ambitious objectives of forced-draft industrialization and the shortage of politically reliable and technically competent specialized cadres. Had the autonomous interests arising from differentiation been given freer play, it is quite possible that the industrialization of the Stalin era could not have proceeded so swiftly and successfully (discounting human costs).

The Strategy of Penetration

With success achieved, however, the situation changes, and the critical question noted above presents itself. For success has brought with it a high level of differentiation, an increase in the number and complexity of differentiated spheres within which persons develop specific "criteria of action," specific viewpoints. Still, however, the polity "penetrates" these spheres, seeking to maintain control over them according to its *own* criteria of action. This situation, it will be argued, "produces" much of the political dissent facing the Soviet regime today, and in a general sense the continuing penetration of the polity into other specialized spheres provides at least some of the dissenters with "item number one" on their agenda.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 190.

[12] Frederick J. Fleron, Jr. "Toward a Reconceptualization of Political Change in the Soviet Union: The Political Leadership System," in Fleron, Ed., *Communist Studies*, pp. 222-43.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 232.

[14] "Totalitarian Rule and Social Change," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1966, p. 58. (See also fn. 17.)

[15] The term is Bendix's (*Nation-Building and Citizenship, op. cit.*, p. 177). Eisenstadt makes a related point in discussing "mass-consensual" orientations as one of the characteristics of modern societies (*Modernization*, pp. 15-16): "This tendency to broad, mass consensuality does not, of course, find its fullest institutionalized expression in all different types of modern societies. In many regimes in the first stages of modernization it may be weak or intermittent, while totalitarian regimes of course tend to suppress its fullest expression. But even totalitarian regimes attempt to legitimize themselves in terms of such values, and it is impossible to understand their policies, their attempts to create symbols of mass consensus, without assuming the existence of such a consensual tendency among the major strata within them and its acknowledgement by the rulers."

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"Totalitarianism," even in the extreme form assumed by its Stalinist variant, did not completely obliterate the distinction between state and society. In reality, there existed neither the resources nor the knowledge necessary to control many "important areas of socially relevant activity," such as leisure-time activities, mating, and child-rearing.[16] But society, if not totally dominated by the state, was *penetrated* to an unprecedented degree by the polity, and this penetration still persists, even though it lessened somewhat in the post–1953 period. The consequences of such penetration for an increasingly "mature" (*i.e.*, complex and differentiated) Soviet system have been a matter of concern to Western analysts and Soviet dissenters alike.

A strong diagnostic consensus regarding the effects of this penetration was reached among a number of scholars who contributed to a symposium carried in this journal during 1966–68 and initiated by Zbigniew Brzezinski's essay "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?" (*Problems of Communism*, January–February 1966, pp. 1–15).[17] The "greater institutional maturity of Soviet society," Brzezinski argued, had been important in prompting the abandonment of violence in political competition, but pattern-breaking "moves" by the polity had also grown more difficult because the society was "far more developed and stable, far less *malleable* and atomized" than in the past.[18] In this situation, the party's function had become less clear, posing the whole question of its "relevance" to the USSR of the 1960's:

. . . Soviet history in the last few years has been dominated by the spectacle of a party in search of a role. What is to be the function of an ideocratic party in a relatively complex and industrialized society, in which the structure of social relationships generally reflects the party's ideological preference? To be sure, like any large socio-political system, the Soviet system needs an integrative organ. But the question is, What is the most socially desirable way of achieving such integration? Is a "strong" party one that dominates and interferes in everything, and is this interference conducive to continued Soviet economic political, and intellectual growth? [19]

In a similar vein, Robert Conquest viewed the USSR as a nation "where the political system is radically and dangerously inappropriate to its social and economic dynamics." [20] Frederick Barghoorn, though disagreeing with Brzezinski on the urgency of the "transformation-degeneration" dilemma, agreed that the "existing Soviet political structures and the ideology which serves as a major source of their legitimacy are increasingly irrelevant to a more and more diversified society." [21]

The substantial measure of Soviet success in the system-building phase had, in fact, created a situation in which—as noted elsewhere by Alfred G. Meyer—the problems of system-management were complex beyond the coordinating capacities of a political structure clinging to a "penetration" strategy at a time when that structure was no longer "creative." [22] Effective coordination required a favorable balance of innovative over conservative tendencies in Soviet political institutions—a balance that seemed to be lacking.[23] Conquest even saw, in the confrontation of polity and society, the "conditions of a classical Marxist prerevolutionary situation." [24]

The problems which evoked such alarming diagnoses from Western observers, and which are reflected in the less systematic but perhaps "richer" content of *samizdat*, seem to be reducible to two, which are interrelated: first, the quality of bureaucratic management of the economy and the larger society; and second, the style of political recruitment in a differentiated system ruled by a "politicized bureaucracy."

A Parasitic Bureaucracy

The party elite, in the view of Western observers and of some Soviet dissenters alike, lacks the expertise, flexibility, and perceptiveness necessary for the creative coordination of social and economic

[16] Rigby, in Fleron, Ed., *Communist Studies*, p. 179.

[17] This and the other contributions to the discussion, including Boris Meissner's article cited above (fn. 14), were subsequently published in book form as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ed., *Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1969 (hereafter cited as *Dilemmas*). Henceforth page references to Brzezinski's and other symposium articles cited will be to the book version.

[18] Brzezinski, *Dilemmas*, pp. 13, 20.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

[20] "Immobilism and Decay," in *ibid.*, p. 72.

[21] "Changes in Russia: The Need for Perspectives," in *ibid.*, p. 41.

[22] Meyer makes this point eloquently in his essay, "Political Change through Civil Disobedience in the USSR and Eastern Europe," in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, Eds., *Political and Legal Obligation: Nomos XII*, New York, Atherton Press, 1970, p. 423.

[23] For a discussion see Eisenstadt, *Modernization*, pp. 40, 149-50.

[24] In Brzezinski, *Dilemmas*, pp. 70-71.

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forces. It contributes little to the society and has few relevant "outputs" to exchange with other specialized sectors. In Meissner's words,

The ruling power elite is increasingly regarded as parasitic, for two reasons. In the first place, it represents a foreign body in the fabric of the elite structure of an industrialized society, since it does not submit to an economic rationality that is characteristic of an industrial merit society. The goal of promoting the conditions for existence and growth is only of secondary relevance to it. Its primary objective is the consolidation and expansion of its power base.

Second, the ruling elite is immensely exploitative of the other social groups. Through its absolute monopoly of power and unrestricted control over the means of production and property of the state, it is in a position to divert a disproportionately large share of the social product to the achievement of its political objectives, and at the same time to secure a higher personal income for its members.[25]

The Soviet dissidents S. Zorin and N. Alekseev, in their *samizdat* pamphlet "Time Will Not Wait," further develop the themes of exploitation and parasitism, focusing particularly on the *nomenklatura* system, which in their view elevates Soviet "managers" to a position that is virtually unassailable and remote from the masses. They see *nomenklatura* as a form of *property*

as inalienable as capital in a bourgeois society. It serves as a legal basis for our system much in the manner of the law of private property under capitalism.[26]

The new, nomenclatured "class" is vertically differentiated. Each level takes orders from the one above and gives them to the one below, with the subordinate level having no right of appeal. Career-making is the watchword of the system and induces the upward reporting of successes and the concealment of failure, thus maximizing misinformation at the top. Although the top is where the real "power" is, its misinformed and isolated state guarantees that its power will be used in an irresponsible manner, with the result that what eventuates can scarcely be called "control" in any sense of coordination. While the party is typically seen as "running" the system, Zorin and Alekseev see a different system in which "there is no proprietor, but there is an all-powerful and voracious consumer—the party-state bureaucracy."[27] In short, the political elite emerges as the main extractor of "surplus value" in the Soviet system. Though its language is more emotional than analytic, the Zorin-Alexseev diagnosis seems to be in general agreement with many Western critiques which see the Soviet bureaucracy as forced to rule by command rather than by contract because, having no "outputs" to exchange, it can scarcely enter into contractual relationships.

The political elite, certainly, is aware of the manifold problems it faces—*i.e.*, the problem posed by lagging economic growth rates and recurrent agricultural crises, the problem of reconciling the practical need to grant greater autonomy to economic managers with the eternal compulsion toward "control," and the problem of comprehending the sources of dissent and the "style" and the actions of the ever-more-publicized dissenters. Its response to this last problem has indicated relatively little change of perspective. That response has been an on-again, off-again campaign against dissent through the incarceration of dissenters in labor camps or mental hospitals, supplemented by the linking of dissenters with Western imperialism or "international Zionism" and other variations on familiar propaganda themes. The calls continue for reinforcing the "ideological vitality" of the party, for an even more tough-tempered, uncompromising stand against "alien" ideas. Yet, at the present stage, as the requirements imposed by the need for continuing economic development and adaptation press harder, it is unclear that ideology itself is relevant as a base for continued party dominance.

Elite Recruitment

What of the patterns of recruitment into this troubled elite? We know rather little about this—less, certainly, than we should like. Given the closed nature of Soviet society, we are in some sense reduced to judging the efficiency of recruitment not "in process," but by the outcome—that is to say, by *who* is in office, *how* those in office respond to the

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 83.

[26] This pamphlet is discussed and quoted in D. Pospielovsky, "Programs of the Democratic Opposition," Radio Liberty Research Paper No. 38, 1970. The quotation given here appears on p. 6 of this Research Paper.

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 7-9.

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problems they confront, and how "successful" they are. There is plenty of room for disagreement here. Few would deny, however, that what Meissner terms the "ability to get ahead"—in terms not so much of functional efficiency as of personality, adaptability to an often arcane set of game rules, personal "connections" and the efficient use of them—plays a large role in the CPSU, certainly a larger role than in bureaucracies less "politicized." [28] This ability to "play the game" well does not necessarily reflect creative talent or individual initiative, nor is it likely to be accompanied by a readiness to pay attention to interests and pressures which are of potentially great significance but are not yet represented "institutionally" at the high-level bargaining table. Brzezinski doubts that the CPSU can remain "vital" when its personnel policies render it, "almost unknowingly, inimical to talent and hostile to political innovation." [29]

But whatever the party's *tendencies,* has it been so hostile and inimical as to drive *most* of the society's talent to careers in other sectors, and if so, who are left? The Medvedevs, the Amalriks have been driven away, but what of others who may be sympathetic to some of their ideas? What *is* dissent? Who is a dissenter? How much, if at all, might such terms cover the hidden ideas of some of the nameless persons within the bureaucracy itself? This is a worthwhile question. And, if the rank-and-file *apparatchiki* are generally lacking in talent and innovative qualities, what about those higher-level party members who simultaneously belong to the specialized functional elites and subelites upon which the *apparatchiki* must to some degree depend? Barghoorn discerns among these elements some "latent and increasingly vigorous but still rather amorphous tendencies":

To some degree at least these party members, who are under pressure to give their primary loyalty to the party but who are also by training and occupation functional specialists in industrial management or military science, for example, develop perspectives which diverge from those of the full-time party functionaries and may lead to friction or even to policy disputes between them and the former.[30]

As yet, we cannot tell to what extent such persons are effectively "coopted" and cease to represent any basis for change. The degree to which the "specialists" have the *desire,* or the resources, to innovate is a matter for speculation (of which there has been a great deal). What seems important here, however, is to try to comprehend how far such "insiders" may share, or may come to share, some of the attitudes and evaluative criteria of the clear-cut dissenters. The Soviet elite is not "accessible" to the non-elite in the sense of the latter having any real control over the selection of the former.[31] Thus, if the ruling bureaucracy is to "adapt" to change in any real sense, the adaptation must be from within, although the *idea* of change and the range of alternatives may come from "outside" sources. Typically, students of Soviet politics and society have viewed the embattled bureaucrats (a term whose scope is rather unclear) as the "insiders," the dissidents as "outsiders." Is this view correct?

Sources of Dissent

As noted at the outset, it is the author's belief that Soviet political dissent can be regarded as both product and symptom of those aspects of the Soviet system discussed earlier: that is, the increasing structural and role differentiation resulting from "modernization"; and the adoption of a response to the accompanying integrative problems that has differed radically from the type of response developed in most Western societies. "Command," rather than contract, has been the predominant Soviet mode of integration, and this choice has produced a society that conforms to Field's earlier-mentioned concept of "constricted" development.

To a large degree, it is this "constriction" that motivates political dissidence, and it does so on two levels. First, the denial of autonomy to many differentiated spheres that are functionally important causes frustration and dissatisfaction, especially among the elite in those spheres, and engenders demands by them for increased autonomy in the name of "rationality," efficiency, expertise, or other values—demands which the leadership thus far seems unwilling to accommodate. Secondly, the leadership's more general commitment to maintaining "uniformity" in attitudes, value and behavior in the society as a whole (in order to facilitate control

[28] In Brzezinski, *Dilemmas,* pp. 77-78.
[29] *Ibid.,* p. 10.
[30] "Soviet Russia: Orthodoxy and Adaptiveness," *loc. cit.,* p. 465.
[31] On the concept of "accessibility," see William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society,* New York, Free Press, 1959, p. 53.

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over the specialized sectors) evokes broader protests against the lack of individual freedom, violations of legality, and the persecution of religious "nationalists" such as the Crimean Tatars, and other groups. These protests come from a wider "opposition" that has grown beyond the bounds of the specialized intelligentsia.

It is precisely the unproductive "domination" of other spheres by the polity that is attacked by the authors of "Time Will Not Wait," and it is also one of the targets of the dissident Soviet nuclear physicist, Andrei D. Sakharov. For while the party was indeed a major force—perhaps *the* major force—in dragging Soviet society into "modernity," the form that this modernity has taken is a peculiar one which Edward Shils has characterized as a "tyranically deformed manifestation of potentialities inherent in the process of modernization." [32] One of the evidences of this "deformity" is a peculiarity in the way that "interests" which have become divergent by virtue of differentiation are articulated. In the past, many analysts would have thought interest-articulation itself incompatible with a Soviet-type system, but most today would probably agree with Francis Castles' observation that "totalitarian regimes are not so much antipathetic to the articulation of interests, as to the formation of groups." [33] In liberal-democratic systems, "outside" dissenters would move toward the formation of *associational* interest groups; in the USSR, insofar as dissenters are "organized," they are beyond the law, while *institutional* interest groups—*e.g.*, the armed forces, the police, and (some) industrial managers—have a monopoly on officially-tolerated "groupism." Interests outside the latter umbrella can, for the most part, be articulated only in ways that may be dealt with by the authorities as criminal. Herein, precisely, may be seen the reflection of "deformed modernity" as it affects the articulation of political demands. Given the level of differentiation in Soviet society and the degree to which the existence of differentiated spheres of activity has produced "criteria of action specific to these spheres" [34] among those who function within them, the system provides an incommensurately small number of mechanisms for expressing demands dictated by such criteria.[35]

[32] "Further Observations on Mrs. Huxley," *Encounter*, October 1961, p. 45.

[33] "Interest Articulation: A Totalitarian Paradox," *Survey* (London), Autumn, 1969, p. 127.

[34] The phrase is Field's, *loc. cit.* (see fn. 10), p. 190.



Andrei D. Sakharov, center, with Igor R. Shafarevich, left, and Grigory Podiapolsky, right, all members of the Committee for Human Rights, which seeks to reform Soviet society from within.

—*The New York Times*, Jan. 18, 1973.

Recognition that interest articulation through *institutional* interest groups does exist at the top level of Soviet policy-making raises some interesting questions. Is it possible that, at the Central Committee level or above, the party itself is penetrated by "dissidents" who might at least be potential articulators of the interests of noninstitutional "groups"? Or, to put it differently, does dissidence "cover" some *within* the power structure, as well as those on the "outside"? On the possible existence of a concealed "democratic" opposition within the leadership, one student of Soviet affairs writes:

Seen against the background of the ever-growing and increasing reprisals against all kinds and shades of dissidents in the USSR, this sounds like an unlikely paradox. However if, despite the persecutions and arrests, a process of democratization is in progress among the post-Khrushchev leadership, it has its own peculiar dialectical logic. The reactionary elements of the leadership (and it is they who are in power, or else there would be no persecutions)

[35] Kornhauser's remarks (*op. cit.*, p. 136) are suggestive of problems the Soviet system, in a time of large-scale crisis, might face because of this small number of "mechanisms" (in most instances, recognized *groups*) through which interests can be articulated. "Multiple independent social groups support authority by sharing in it," he writes, "that is, by themselves acting as intermediate authorities capable of ordering limited spheres of social life. In the absence of effectively self-governing groups, the state not only lacks restraint; it also lacks support."

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are made very uneasy by the hierarchical proximity of their more democratically inclined colleagues. In the absence of absolute autocracy, which would permit the supreme dictator to eliminate all such top-level "heretics" individually, Brezhnev, Suslov and company can only permit themselves to persecute low-level democratic and opposition circles at the present moment. Thereby they probably reckon on depriving their more democratically inclined colleagues of support among wide sections of the intelligentsia, after which it should not prove too difficult to remove these colleagues. This was exactly the method once used by Stalin against the Trotskyites and other intraparty oppositionals: first there was a purge of the low-level party opposition, then action was taken against Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, etc.[36]

Supporting evidence for this idea may be found in the boldness with which top-level Soviet scientists like Sakharov have dared to criticize the authoritarian character of the system. In (relatively) close contact with the leadership, they could possibly have reasons for believing that it contains "reasonable and moderate circles."[37] The survival of the *Khronika tekushchikh sobytii* (Chronicle of Current Events) has also caused some to wonder if the KGB may not be penetrated by persons sympathetic to the dissidents. Yet it seems dangerous to rely too heavily on such evidence. After all, Sakharov and the other dissident scientists may simply be *wrong*, and the KGB's failure thus far to suppress the Chronicle is subject to other, less "optimistic" interpretations. In a matter so speculative, it seems to the author that the burden of proof must, at least for the present, remain with those who claim that the top leadership *does* include "reformist" elements with links to, or support in, the population of dissidents "outside."

"Insiders" and "Outsiders"

The complexity of Soviet society today is mirrored quite clearly in the variety of dissent itself. Dissent varies not only in "style" but also in content; not all dissidents criticize the same aspects of the system, for the same reasons. Just as the sphere of the system in which a non-dissident works and lives determines to a significant degree his "criteria" and the way he sees the world (for example, a senior scientist at *Akademgorodok* and a general in the Soviet Army undoubtedly see things in differing lights), so the dissidents, being drawn from diverse spheres of a highly differentiated society, show similar differences. Dissidents holding high positions in a specialized elite and having a certain "authority" rooted in the functions they perform (the paradigm here is Sakharov) are in a sense "insiders." Their style and their "prescriptions" and programs for change differ markedly in many cases from those of "outsiders"—the Amalriks and Marchenkos—who have no "lever" by which to influence the system and whom the Politburo might regard (quite correctly in its own terms) as not "needed" in any way by society. (If Sakharov can lay claim to some high-level regard as a renowned research physicist and one of the "parents" of Soviet nuclear weapons, there is little to induce the Politburo to view Amalrik as anything more than a "spoiled" historian who "flunked" the defense of his dissertation and has since held a variety of menial and unskilled jobs on the margins of Soviet life.)

If one is, like Sakharov, on the "inside," one's protest, logically enough, takes the form of persuasion aimed at the political elite. Hence, Sakharov's manifesto, "Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom,"[38] radical as it may be in content, is an attempt to *convince* the leadership of the "error of their ways" and make them realize the counterproductiveness of continuing "to do business as usual." Needless to say, Amalrik's *Will the USSR Survive until 1984?*[39] is a very different sort of document—part exposé, part gloomy "futurology." It and other documents such as "Time Will Not Wait" reflect the style, the viewpoint, and the position of "outsiders" whose most frequent and, in many cases, *only* contact with the elite is through the KGB.

But the scope of dissent is even wider than a range of ideas extending from "reformist Leninism" to more radical calls for Western-style multiparty government, full civil liberties, etc. There are other kinds of protest from sources quite different, such as the neo-Slavophiles, the "nationalists," and other groups (some of whom might be lumped together as a "right wing"). Given the current state of Soviet

[36] Pospielovsky, *loc. cit* (fn. 26), p. 13.
[37] *Ibid.*
[38] English translation published in *The New York Times*, July 22, 1968.
[39] New York, Harper & Row, 1970.

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internal policy, the neo-Slavophile *samizdat* journal *Veche* is in no sense "reactionary," but manifestoes such as "A Nation Speaks" display strong elements of aggressive nationalism, anti-Semitism, and racism,[40] occupying a position in the spectrum of Soviet dissent perhaps somewhat similar to that of Moczar and the "Partisan" faction in Poland.

Dissent along these lines seems to reflect disgust and disgruntlement at the sham "internationalism" of the CPSU, at the "foreign aid" extended to "brotherly socialist countries" (adherents of this line strongly supported the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968), and at any increase in the role played by minority nationalities even in the symbolic structures of government. These "Russites" are, of course, more easily tolerated by the regime than the other types of dissenters, as much of their "program" makes them supporters of the Politburo and Central Committee hardliners. It is also not difficult to surmise that they must be well represented in the military and the KGB—certainly, the predominant "ideology" among the former, their rhetoric, and their "criteria of action" seem more nationalist than anything else.[41] It is indeed quite conceivable that such circles within the elite encourage this sort of "opposition," partly as a counterweight to the democratic movement, and partly because they realize how weak a basis the current "official" ideology provides for any kind of emotional linkage with the regime.[42] To whatever degree the "Russites" may be manipulated by the leadership (or by some elements within the leadership), however, theirs seems to be as "authentic" a reaction to the system as that of the "democratic opposition." The currents of aggressive nationalism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobia are strong, and the brand of Marxism-Leninism that has been communicated to the Soviet masses over the years has done little to discourage them. The sectors of the system where such feelings flourish are no less integral parts of Soviet society than are those which tend to produce liberal dissenters.



Andrei Amalrik, who—in his essay, "Will the USSR Survive Until 1984?"—despaired of the possibility of the present Soviet system's reforming itself.

—Photo from CBS News.

Dissent and the Soviet Polity

In the preceding pages, dissent in the USSR has been portrayed as a "natural" phenomenon arising out of the interplay between the growing complexity, or differentiation, of a rapidly modernizing Soviet society, on the one hand, and the persistent reliance by the regime on what have been termed "command-centralist" modes of integrating the differentiated segments of society in the face of rising demands for autonomy on the part of these segments, on the other. This leads us to the much more difficult task of assessing the long-term impact that dissent is likely to have on the future evolution of the Soviet polity.

To begin with, it seems doubtful that the alternatives that the Soviet system faces can be so succinctly summarized as "transformation" or "degeneration," "adaptation" or "decay," etc. The USSR

[40] For commentary on *Veche* and "A Nation Speaks," see D. Pospielovsky, "The Samizdat Journal *Veche:* Russian Patriotic Thought Today," Radio Liberty Research Paper No. 45, 1971.

[41] See Michael Scammell, "Soviet Intellectuals Soldier On," *Survey*, Winter, 1971, p. 100.

[42] See Jonathan Harris, "The Dilemma of Dissidence," *ibid.*, p. 121.

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is, after all, an amazingly stable society.[43] The institutional framework that had crystallized under Stalin by the mid-1930's remains essentially unaltered, and it shows no signs of imminent alteration. Despite all that has been said about "insecurity" in office as one of the characteristics hampering the administration of public affairs in the USSR, the average *apparatchik* seems, rather, to have a tight grip on job security and a real "stake" in the system. In an era when most "revolutions" have turned out to be somewhat ephemeral, the Soviet state and party have successively survived bloody civil war, a coercive transformation of the countryside costing millions of lives, the Stalinist terror of 1936–38, and the trauma of World War II. Few systems can boast such staying power, and those that can would seem to be unlikely candidates for "degeneration" in a period of relatively greater tranquility.[44]

The *apparatchiki,* then, would appear to be still firmly in control. Even if there *is* internal dissent within the top-level elite, the "conservatives" would seem to have the advantage over any "reformist" elements—and they can "turn on" more repression at will, or "back off" when they deem it expedient. Moreover, they are not likely to lose their advantage. There are at least three reasons why this is so—reasons that have to do with interest articulation, the political culture, and the balance of resources.

Interests *are* articulated in the Soviet polity—not all interests, but certainly those which seem critical for the survival of the system. The large institutional interest groups are, in one way or another, "taken care of." They are not ignored, for they are important mainstays of the system. But this is scarcely true of the dissenters, even those belonging to the scientific-technical intelligentsia. The regime has largely ignored their demands, without any apparent reduction of its stability. Once again, the burden of proof would seem to fall upon those who argue that failure to respond to these demands must have important consequences for the system—at least in the reasonably foreseeable future.

The political culture links the bureaucratic elite and the "masses" more closely than it links the dissidents to either. The institutional framework that emerged in the Stalin era "fitted" relatively well with the antecedent political culture of Tsarist Russia at the most critical points, and to all appearances the *contemporary* Soviet political culture still "fits" this relatively unchanged institutional pattern quite well.

The current culture, as reflected in the attitudes, the demands, the perceived "issues," and the general mental "set" of the masses toward the polity, might be said to be in a state of arrested development. The masses as a whole do *not* demand "legality," representative institutions, "freedom," which to them are unfamiliar and exotic concepts. Their economic demands are modest and are being met—if slowly and with occasional setbacks—so far as housing, consumer goods, and food are concerned. Perhaps, sometime in the not so distant future, they can even look forward to owning a *Zhiguli* car. In their own terms, they "never had it so good." Many of them have not even heard of the dissenters whose names are now so well known in the West, and those who have generally react in ways ranging from hostility to incomprehension—reactions that would hardly seem to justify the relatively optimistic view of the "popular masses" which some (though by no means all) of the dissenters themselves apparently entertain.[45] While dissent and dissenters may indeed be a natural product of more than fifty years of Soviet rule—and indeed may be "symptomatic" of Soviet society in its current phase of development—equally "natural" is the failure of the dissenters to strike a responsive chord among the masses at large, whose mentality is similar in so many important ways to that of the *apparatchiki* who rule in their name.

[43] For an eloquent argument supporting the prospective stability and staying power of the Soviet polity and institutional structure, see Tibor Szamuely's contribution to the symposium entitled "The USSR Since Khrushchev" in *ibid.*, Summer, 1969, pp. 51-69.

[44] Jerry Hough's stimulating essay in this journal ("The Soviet System: Petrification or Pluralism?" March-April 1972, pp. 25-45) makes an eloquent case for the staying power of the system, but his conclusions are rooted in evidence of strong adaptive capacities within the system and currents of change that are *increasing* such capacities. While his essay raises more issues and treats more topics than can be dealt with here, it is well to note at least his remark that "on all but the most central questions, party policy is less and less incorporated into clear-cut, undebatable ideology, with a consequent widening of the areas open to public discussion." This is scarcely a characterization of an "immobile" system. Moreover, as Hough rightly notes, "immobilism" and "irrelevance," applied to the polity, are general and somewhat vague terms, resting on unprovable assumptions about what a society "requires" at a particular point in time. However, the regime's position on the "most central questions" (presumably political) *is* one of relative immobility, and it is just this category of questions that the dissidents address. The regime may indeed be adaptive in many areas, but it may thereby strengthen its ability to sustain immobility on those issues it considers most critical to its survival—the very issues on which the Sakharovs and Amalriks challenge it.

[45] See Pospielovsky, *loc. cit.* (fn. 26), pp. 15-17.

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Finally, there is the problem of resources, by which we mean the essential sinews of political power. No detailed examination of these resources need be attempted here; for our purposes it suffices simply to ask in whose hands command of these resources resides. Who controls finances, jobs, and the preponderance of information available to the masses? Who has "legitimacy"—insofar as this can be measured? Who presently commands enough specialized expertise to keep the system running? In each of these cases, the answer seems clear: the party-government elite, which—in spite of the absence of institutionalized arrangements for the transfer of power at the top—has nevertheless proved remarkably successful in "replenishing" itself and preserving the foundations of its power.

By comparison, what are the resources at the disposal of the dissidents? While it may be true, as Robert Dahl has observed, that advanced economies "automatically distribute political resources and political skills to a vast variety of individuals, groups, and organizations," it is also true, as Dahl acknowledges, that there is no close correspondence between levels of economic development and the character of political systems.[46] Admittedly, the dissidents are by no means without resources, but those resources and their "convertibility" into power (or, more accurately, influence) are difficult to measure. A good deal of scientific and technical expertise? Yes, but presumably there is an adequate supply of such expertise available from the *non*-dissident intelligentsia. Idealism, as opposed to the regime's cynicism/realism? Certainly, but in politicai competition idealists have generally fared no better, and perhaps worse, than realists. Again, some dissident factions have shown a capacity for innovative challenges to authority—witness the relative success of the Jewish emigration movement—but can this long continue in the face of "legal" responses like the "education tax"? Most difficult to assess, probably, is the relevance of non-elite mass support, as in the cases of nationalist and religious dissidence; but in any case this would seem to be a resource that could be mobilized to full effectiveness only in the presence of some critical *external* challenge to the system. Certainly, so far as the institutional levers of power are concerned, the dissidents at present control *none*, and this is critical.

In sum, while resources and skills may now be more widely distributed in the USSR than ever before and quite possibly the maintenance of centralistic, "hegemonic" political control is becoming more costly and inefficient as the society itself becomes more "advanced," nevertheless the balance of resources *today* still seems to favor the maintenance of a hegemonic system.

Shape of the Future

If change should eventually come, one can conceive that it might arise from one of two potential causes that at present are quite unpredictable: (1) the massive trauma of protracted war and the failure of the "center" to hold, as in Amalrik's picture of "1984"; or (2) through the natural process of recruitment into the party bureaucracy of a "new generation" of cadres who, as products of the post-Stalin era, might be "different" from their predecessors and more responsive to the issues now being raised by the dissenters but ignored by the institutional interest groups that have places at the bargaining table of power today.

What change born of the trauma of war would be like is uncertain in the extreme. Amalrik himself is unclear on this.[47] However, the possibility of the emergence of a relatively "democratic" polity of the sort many of the dissidents apparently desire seems very slight indeed. Soviet soil seems no more hospitable to such an outcome today than it was in 1917. Moreover, speculations based on the occurrence of some such "trauma" seems rather futile at present.

What, then, of the possible emergence of a new generation of bureaucrats more responsive to the need for change, more willing to grant autonomy to diverse interest groups and to accept, for the party, the more modest role of interest broker/conciliator? Jonathan Harris describes this hope of some of the younger intelligentsia:

. . . the younger members of the intelligentsia, in particular the students, are most coherent about the nature of change and most optimistic about the future. In their view, it is not the Soviet system per se *which fails to respond to people's needs, but the present aged and rigid leadership. They place their hopes in a new generation of CPSU leaders, totally*

[46] See Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1971, pp. 76-80.

[47] Andrei Amalrik, "Will the USSR Survive Until 1984?" *Survey*, Autumn, 1969, pp. 76-78.

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untainted by Stalinism. In their view, those who joined the CPSU after Stalin's death cannot possibly share the authoritarian outlook of the present generation of leaders, all of whom built their careers over the bodies of their colleagues who perished in the purges of the 1930's. Although now obliged to repeat the slogans of their superiors in the party, this younger group, it is argued, will be more willing to dismantle the controls over intellectual life when it takes over the reigns of leadership in the 1970's and 1980's. As one student insisted, the coming generation of CPSU leaders will be as receptive to new ideas as to jazz and miniskirts.[48]

Given our limited access to Soviet society, the fact that such hopeful optimism is entertained by some who are part of that society should of course be taken seriously. Yet some pessimism seems in order. The CPSU is, after all, very much a *minority* of Soviet society, and the segment of it that occupies the seats of real power is even smaller. The CPSU does its own recruiting, and it does so according to its own priorities, its own mental framework, its own political culture; it is *not* a voluntary association that one simply "joins." Even if a "gap" does exist in the USSR between the older and the younger *political* generations, with most of the youth on the relatively "liberal" side (though this is itself still open to question), will there not be among the young a *sufficient* supply of potential new cadres whose outlook is closer to that of the current *apparat* than to that of their liberal-minded "peers" to assure the continuation of the current pattern of political rule well into the 1970's and 1980's? Who is getting "in" now, if not former Komsomol activists and others whose attitudes are "acceptable" to the party? *Can* we assume that their "repetition of slogans" is merely a means of self-protection, or is it evidence of the same complacent satisfaction with the status quo that marks their elders? Today, aging men in the Politburo and Central Committee adamantly oppose the movements of dissenters generally younger than themselves. Is it not possible that tomorrow the dissenters will still be opposed by succeeding leaders closer to their own ages?

The fact is that the "style" of party rule has been a relatively stable thing, and for the reasons just mentioned it seems likely to remain so. It is the style which those who will take command in the 1970's and 1980's have been learning during their years of apprenticeship, and which they will probably bring into office with them. And it is precisely this style that most of the young dissenters of today are protesting and seeking to change. On balance, there is little reason to expect that their party "peers" will be significantly more receptive to their aspirations than are the present party leaders.

What, then, does all this signify in terms of the Soviet future? The widely-accepted image of the Soviet polity as one that is "immobile" and faces degeneration or decay because of its inability to cope with the problems involved in managing an increasingly complex economy and society is a striking one, although it has recently been subjected to challenge from various scholars, including Jerry Hough.[49] Whatever the merits or weaknesses of such an image, it seems clear that many Soviet dissidents see the system in this light. But "immobility," even if that term accurately characterizes the present state of the system, does not necessarily signify weakness. The polity may or may not be increasingly "irrelevant" to the economy and society; yet can one conclude that it cannot "hang on," or that the swelling of dissidence since the mid-1960's points the way to a different future? To acknowledge, as Paul Hollander does, that the Soviet bureaucracy "is at once a barrier to significant change and a major pillar of the frozen stability of Soviet society" [50] is not to prove that the bureaucracy itself will eventually be *forced* to yield to change, whether in the direction the dissenters wish or in others; it is, rather, a testimonial to the strength of that bureaucracy and its potential for endurance. The "democratic movement" has a great deal to overcome, and for now at least the balance of advantage appears to lie with the bureaucratic "immobilism" of the current collective leadership and its supporters. The costs of managing a complex, differentiated society by command techniques may indeed be mounting, but even if this is the case, one cannot predict with any certainty when the bill will come due.

[48] Harris, *loc cit.* (fn. 42), pp. 118-19.

[49] See fn. 44.

[50] *Loc. cit.* (fn. 7), p. 18.

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The Ideology of Althusser

By Maurice Cranston

As the only philosopher of eminence remaining on the Central Committee of the French Communist Party (*Parti Communiste Français*—PCF) since the expulsion of Roger Garaudy in February 1970, Louis Althusser must be regarded as the leading theorist of the party. Indeed, he is among the most distinctive and original of living Marxist philosophers. First, he is a structuralist, which helps to make him fashionable in France. Second, he is robustly anti-metaphysical and therefore appeals to the scientific, empirical minds of the English-speaking world. Finally, he is both a scholar and a hard-line Communist—combining originality in Communist philosophy with orthodoxy in Communist politics. It is to his works that one naturally turns in attempting to determine the real substance of the PCF's contemporary policy and thought.

Such an investigation seems particularly appropriate in light of the new and softer voice with which the political leadership of the PCF has been speaking since the summer of 1972. It has adopted a new style, a new language, even what has been called a "new face." [1] The change has been occasioned by the PCF's electoral pact with the French Socialist Party, the *programme commun* worked out for purposes of contesting the general election of March 1973. The designers of the new style were Georges Marchais, who had only recently replaced the ailing Waldek Rochet as General Secretary of the party, and René Piquet, who serves as chief of propaganda. Marchais, at 52, is relatively young for the job; he is a vigorous and attractive speaker, a thoroughly professional politician. Piquet is an equally clever publicist.

The first problem that confronted the French Communist Party when the united front was negotiated was that of overcoming the fear among voters that a government containing Communists would mean the piecemeal introduction of communism into France. So the strategy Marchais adopted was to assure the voters that the *programme commun* (the common election program of the Communists and the Socialist Party) was not a communistic, but only an "anti-capitalist" one, and that the Communist Party was not such a fierce animal after all, but really a cozy, domestic creature, even man's best friend.

At the 20th Congress of the French Communist Party held in Paris in December 1972, Marchais told an audience which included many fraternal delegates from the Socialist Party that the PCF was "no longer the party of the clenched fist, but that of the outstretched hand." [2] The Paris daily *Combat* described the atmosphere of the Congress as "*la vie en rose*." [3] Throughout the election campaign there was no angry talk of class war or of the dictatorship of the proletariat; indeed all the hard language of the old PCF gave way to talk of "humanism" and "humanity," "democracy" and "social justice," and Marchais himself often spoke the word "*printemps*" (spring), a word indelibly associated in the minds of the French Left with the events of Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1968, when Mr. Dubcek tried to create "socialism with a human face" and incurred at that time the bitter enmity of all orthodox Communists, including those in France.

Mr. Cranston is Professor of Political Science at the London School of Economics. His recent books include Political Dialogues, *1969, and* The New Left, *1970.*

[1] See the analysis by Alain Duhamel, "Le Parti communiste, a-t-il changé?" *Le Monde* (Paris), January 27, 1973.

[2] *European Gazette* (Brussels), February 1973, p. 1.

[3] Dec. 21, 1972.

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Marchais' election speeches did make various references to socialism as the ultimate goal of his own party, though he admitted that it was not part of the *programme commun;* however, he assured the voters that by socialism he meant something wholly French—there was no question of importing a model of socialism from a foreign country.[4] On more than one occasion, Marchais claimed that the PCF represented French Christianity, and he even went so far as to suggest that the party had inherited that true love of France which had inspired General de Gaulle. At a meeting of the Central Committee of the PCF held on January 24–25, 1973, René Piquet emphasized the importance of the *"style nouveau"* in the party's oratory; "the tone of serenity, dignity and seriousness was the best answer," he believed, "to the sterile polemics, to the falsehoods, insults and provocations of the adversary." [5]

What is one to make of the *style nouveau* of the PCF? How much of the new posture reflects the opportunism of a political organization seeking to maintain an electoral alliance and win voter support, and how much reflects the deeper convictions of the leading French Communist politicians? Paradoxically, had Garaudy not been summarily drummed out of the PCF's Central Committee three short years ago, he would doubtless today be providing powerful theoretical support for the new soft party line. For Garaudy was a systematic exponent of "socialist humanism." He rejected the concept of an alien model of socialism and—in *Pour un socialisme français*—demanded a distinctively French type of socialist organization.[6] He was always seeking some understanding with Christians, and he was a passionate champion of Mr. Dubcek's *printemps* in Prague (this indeed was the major reason for Garaudy's expulsion).

Althusser and the New Style

But Garaudy is *persona non grata,* and it is Althusser who continues to enjoy the perquisites and prestige of membership on the PCF's Central Committee. One can only infer from this that his Marxism is acceptable to the party's political leadership. Yet one is puzzled as to what sort of philosophical support Althusser can give to Marchais and Piquet in their current endeavor. His books are not always easy to read,[7] but the thrust of his arguments is clear and unequivocal. Althusser has attacked almost everything that Garaudy believed in; he argues that there is only one kind of Marxism, and that is the Marxism of the Leninist tradition—hard, revolutionary and uncompromising.

Althusser is a French-Algerian by birth, and he joined the PCF in 1948, when he was 30. In that same year he was appointed a professor of philosophy at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris. Although Althusser has condemned all French schools and universities as "instruments of bourgeois ideology," [8] this has not prevented him from serving for twenty-five years on the faculty of the most *élitiste* of French academic institutions.

He is a forceful and aggressive polemical writer; he is also a considerable Marx scholar, or Marxologist, who continually refers—in a manner rare among Marxist polemicists—to Marx's actual texts. His thinking is not only out of line with what is being said by Marchais and Piquet; it is also opposed to the Marxist humanism propounded by philosophers like Lukács. By Marxist humanism Althusser means that type of "seductive" Marxism which bases itself upon Marx's early "Hegelian" writings, and which presents Marxism as a philosophy of alienation, a philosophy which looks forward to the emergence of a new man in a world of neighborly fraternity and peace. Althusser says that Marxism is not a philosophy of love, but of war—class war; not a philosophy of Man, but of the masses; and he accuses the Marxist humanists of distorting the true nature of Marxism. He is himself conspicuously unsentimental, and he makes no pretense of being tolerant. Conferring on Lenin something like infallibility in the interpretation of Marx, he castigates all deviations from Lenin—evolutionism, revisionism, economism,

[4] *Le Monde*, December 3-4, 1972.

[5] *Le Monde*, January 26, 1973.

[6] Paris, 1965.

[7] Althusser's most important books are: *Pour Marx*, Paris, Maspero, 1965 (trans. with additional material as *For Marx* by B. Brewster, London, Allen Lane, 1969); (with Etienne Balibar) *Lire le Capital*, 2 volumes, Paris, Maspero, 1968 (trans. as *Reading Capital* by B. Brewster, London, New Left Books, 1970); and *Lénine et la philosophie*, Paris, Maspero, 1969 (trans. with additional material as *Lenin and Philosophy* by B. Brewster, London, New Left Books, 1971). All references henceforth will be to the English translations.

[8] In *Lenin and Philosophy*, where he makes this accusation, Althusser writes: "I ask the pardon of those teachers who, in dreadful conditions, attempt to turn the few weapons they can find in the history and learning to 'teach' against the ideology, the system and the practices in which they are trapped. They are kind of hero" [sic] (p. 148). The inference must be that Althusser sees himself as one such "hero." On the other hand, since Marxists in the French teaching profession are far too numerous to have to suffer for their opinions, it is hard to see what "heroism" is called for.

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and the rest—as evil distortions. No reader of Althusser's books will be surprised to learn that Althusser, in his youth, was an ardent Catholic. For just as there is something unmistakably Calvinist in Sartre, so there is in Althusser more than a suggestion of the Counter-Reformation Jesuit.

Althusser dates the rise of Marxist humanism from the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party when Stalin was repudiated, a reaction which he views as unfortunate. Unlike Roger Garaudy and other Communist intellectuals who were deeply disturbed by the exposure of Stalin's black record, Althusser seems to bear Stalin no animus; he was a Stalinist in Stalin's time, and he feels no remorse about it. Sartre may become excited about *"le phantôme de Staline,"* but the only ghost that worries Althusser is *"le phantôme de Hegel."* [9] For Hegel, as he sees it, is the ghost who haunts the early writings of Marx, those from which Marxist humanism draws its inspiration. Althusser notes that Marx's early writings were first published between the two wars, and he claims that they were used in the 1930's as weapons against Marxism by "petty-bourgeois liberal intellectuals." He readily admits that they lend themselves to such use. What disturbs him more is that these same writings should have been adopted by Communists, both in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, as the theoretical foundation of a new, "post-Stalinist" philosophy. Althusser explains this humanist reaction against Stalinism as an ideological phenomenon which is dangerous because it masks the real problems—which are all political and economic problems—confronting Communists in the Soviet Union and elsewhere since 1956. This category of the ideological figures prominently in Althusser's theory, and more will be said about it later in this essay; but first we must consider the main lines of Althusser's own reading of Marx, which is central to his whole argument.

Marx's Epistemological Break

Althusser claims that Marx's writings fall into two main parts, and that only the later ones are properly to be considered Marxist. The first part—the early Marx— is still part of the German idealist tradition; but the second part, says Althusser, is totally different: it is "scientific." And he asserts that the whole genius and glory of Marx rest on the fact that Marx became a scientist—that Marx "made a great scientific discovery" by "opening up the continent of history to science." In order to realize this achievement, Marx had to cut himself off from his own idealist past. Specifically he had to break with his own early humanism.[10] Between the early and the later writings of Marx, there occurred what Althusser speaks of as an "epistemological break." [11]

This notion of an "epistemological break" has been favored in recent years by several writers of the structuralist school as an explanatory device in intellectual history. But it is not a new idea. It was put forward by Gaston Bachelard in 1938 in his book *La Formation de l'esprit scientifique,* where he attacked the prevailing Cartesian belief that scientific knowledge advances by the accumulation, assimilation and continuous modification of a rational system of thought, arguing instead that scientific knowledge advances by revolutions or radical breaks with tradition—breaks in which a wholly new conceptual synthesis is put forward to take the place of the old. In more recent years this idea of an "epistemological break" has been taken up in a modest way in America by Thomas Kuhn, the Princeton historian of science, in his *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions;* and it has been taken up on a more flamboyant scale in France by Althusser's former pupil, Michel Foucault, in such books as *L'Histoire de la folie* and *Les Mots et les choses,* where the whole of cultural history is depicted as a series of radical "epistemological breaks." Althusser himself employs this concept only to explain Marx's particular intellectual development, and to answer the question: "What is Marxism?" Marxism, Althusser replies, is not constituted by the whole of Marx's theoretical writings: Marxism is the "science of history" which Marx expounded *after* he had made the "epistemological break" with the idealist philosophy that had inspired his earlier writings. Marxism emerged when Marx made "the leap" from the "prescientific" to the "scientific." The *locus classicus* of Marxism is *Das Kapital,* the most substantial book of Marx's maturity, and the book to which Althusser has devoted a large part of his research.

Marx, says Althusser, was born "under a heavy layer of ideology"; but, he goes on to say, Marx himself recognized this fact—and recognized it,

[9] *For Marx,* p. 116.

[10] Althusser argues that Marx first subscribed to a form of liberal-rationalist humanism inspired by Kant, and then subscribed to a form of communalist humanism inspired by Feuerbach. It was not simply a matter of making a break with Hegel.

[11] *For Marx,* p. 33.

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moreover, as a peculiarly German predicament. "Ideology," as Althusser uses the word, exists in all societies, but the ideology of early 19th-century Germany was uniquely and oppressively idealistic. This circumstance Marx attributed (rightly, according to Althusser) to the historical backwardness of Germany and its social classes. France and England had had their bourgeois liberal revolutions and achieved their national goals; but Germany, unable to realize either national unity or a liberal revolution, sought refuge in a romantic dream world, where the German intellectual class had to enact in imagination what other nations had accomplished in reality. The German mind had turned to idealistic metaphysics as a consolation for the failures of actual experience. This "theoretical overdevelopment" of the German mind, Althusser suggests, found its most monumental expression in the philosophy of Hegel; and Hegel's tragedy was to have conceived a philosophy which was truly the "sum of all knowledge then acquired," but a knowledge that was seriously distorted by the ideological perspective from which it was acquired.

Althusser locates the beginning of Marx's "epistemological break" in Marx's realization that he would have to "retreat" [12] from Hegel's ideology in order to return to real history. This "retreat," Althusser insists, was not a dialectical supercession, or *dépassement,* of a Hegelian kind; it entailed a total break with Hegel and ideology. Althusser suggests how this came about. He argues that Marx first thought of France and England, in Hegelian terms, as embodiments of the ideas of Reason and Freedom; then when circumstances forced Marx to live in France and England and he observed those countries with his own eyes, what he saw was not Reason and Freedom but political oppression and class conflicts. It was in this way, Althusser believes, that Marx came to see the light—to "penetrate the myths" by which he had previously been deceived, and to discover reality itself. This was the break: introducing objective experience, or scientific knowledge, in the place of Hegelian ideological immanence. What Marx did thenceforth was to apply this scientific method to the understanding of history. He passed from "the enslaved thought of the Young Marx to the free thought of Marx," [13] and this "prodigious break with his own origins" marked the "foundation of a new discipline, historical materialism." [14]

A Structuralist Approach

It is as a practitioner of Marxist philosophy that Althusser presents himself to us, but to this philosophy he gives his own peculiar interpretation—an interpretation which can fairly be called a "structuralist" one, even though the word "structuralist" has become a little worn, especially in France, from too much use.

Althusser asks the sensible question: "What is society?" and he answers, "Society is a structured social whole." The type of structure he envisages is not something which has an economic center and a series of cultural and political epiphenomena projecting from this center; for such models, he asserts, rest on a metaphysical conception of essence and accident which a Marxist should repudiate. Althusser depicts societies as complex structures of economic, political, ideological, and other elements between which there are innumerable complicated relationships and interactions. Althusser insists that he is a sound Marxist economic determinist, but he claims that while economic determination operates *"in the last instance,"* above and before that last instance there are vast networks of causality within the cultural and other noneconomic layers of the social structure. Althusser writes:

In different social structures the economy is determinant in that it determines which of the instances of the social structure occupies the determinant place. Not a simple relation, but rather a relation between relations, not a transitive causality, but rather a structural causality.[15]

He explains that by "structural causality" he means a form of causality that is neither linear nor ideological: a cause is "structural" when an effect is produced by "the complex organization of the whole, present-absent in its economic, political, ideological,

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 83. Althusser dates the "epistemological break" from the time in which Marx wrote *The German Ideology* (1845). He divides Marx's writings into the following periods: 1) Early Marx (1840-44): *The Holy Family, Manuscripts of 1844,* etc.; 2) Works of the Break (1845): *The Theses on Feuerbach* and *The German Ideology;* 3) Transitional works (1845-57): *Communist Manifesto, Poverty of Philosophy,* etc.; 4) Mature works (1857-83): *Das Kapital,* etc.

[14] Althusser makes a distinction between Historical Materialism, "the science of history," and Dialectical Materialism, "the theory of science" *Reading Capital,* p. 315.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 224.

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and epistemological effect." [16] He further suggests that every element in the social structure has its own specific causal efficacity: the institutions of society are not mere expressions of the economy (as "vulgar Marxists" believe) but constitute "an autonomy within a structured whole where one aspect is dominant"—this dominant aspect "being determined in the last analysis by the economy." [17]

In his attempt to improve upon "vulgar Marxist" conceptions of the social structures, Althusser provides an analysis of the state which, by implication, eliminates any anarchistic yearnings for the state to wither away. He suggests that it is necessary to distinguish between state power and state apparatus. What a Marxist must seek to destroy is the *bourgeois* state apparatus; state power is what has to be seized in order to destroy that *bourgeois* state apparatus. A new *proletarian* state apparatus will, however, be needed to replace the old.

Althusser next distinguishes two types of state apparatus: the legal and political institutions which are commonly identified with the concept of the state; and "another reality" [18] which Althusser believes to have been largely neglected: the "ideological state apparatus," consisting of culture, religion, family, the media of information, and education. He claims that no class can hold state power without exercising hegemony over the "ideological state apparatus." In the feudal period the dominant "ideological state apparatus" was the Church; in mature capitalist societies the dominant "ideological state apparatus" is, he suggests, the educational system.

It is usual for Marxists to speak of society as being dominated by the institutions of violence or force that are set up to serve the interests and protect the advantages of the property-owning class. What is original about Althusser is that while he believes in the existence of such political and legal institutions resting on force, he attaches more importance to those social institutions which operate on men by a kind of veiled persuasion, and which make men look at the world in certain ways and feel and act, in consequence, in a certain manner. These institutions make up what he calls the ideological apparatus of society, and he suggests that it is precisely these "ideological structures" that substantially determine the patterns in which everybody thinks and behaves.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 310.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 313.
[18] *Lenin and Philosophy*, p. 136.

Althusser is far from adopting the suggestion of Sartre and others that the concept of economic determinism must be jettisoned as a residue of 19th-century misconceptions of science; yet he rescues economic determinism only by fitting it into a highly complex theory of structural causality in which the economic determinant plays a crucial, but far from ubiquitous, role. His particular theory of ideology obliges him, indeed, to give greater prominence (if not greater importance) to psychological determination, and so to draw on the language and thought of Freud, especially as Freud is mediated by the French structuralist psychologist, Jacques Lacan.[19]

Ideology—an Essential Structure

It must be noted that Althusser considers the ideological to be an essential element in all societies, not only bourgeois or feudal but even Communist, and he dismisses as utopian those theories which conceive of a classless society as a society without ideology. He writes:

Ideology is indispensable in any society if men are to be formed, transformed and equipped to respond to the demands of their conditions of existence.[20]

For ideology, as Althusser uses the word, is not some system of ideas worked out in the head of an *idéologue*. Ideology is something which dwells in everyone, in the unconscious more than in the conscious, something actually experienced in the relations between men and their world.

It is precisely because he regards ideology as largely unconscious that he conceives the task of comprehending it as being in the nature of an analytical exercise similar to Freudian psychoanalysis. This perception even informs his advice to students. In a preface to a French translation of *Das Kapital*,[21] he sets down a specific order in which to read the

[19] In an essay "Freud and Lacan," reproduced in *Lenin and Philosophy*, pp. 177-202, Althusser says that Lacan's theorization of Freud would have been impossible without the insights of a new science, structural linguistics. Althusser congratulates Lacan for his discovery "that the discourse of the unconscious is structured like a language," and Althusser employs a similar approach to the interpretation of ideology. Freud's own formulation of his theory is unacceptable to Althusser because Freud (mistakenly he thinks) adopted the model of thermodynamic physics as his scientific paradigm.
[20] *For Marx*, p. 232.
[21] *Lenin and Philosophy*, p. 80.

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several sections of Marx's book and prescribes a further program of reading. "This advice," he writes, "is more than advice: I am willing to present it as an imperative." At such moments, Althusser is little different from an old-style French professor laying down the law. But his theory of reading is actually much more complicated. He recommends what he calls a *symptomatique* (symptomatic) approach to reading a book—a technique which he himself compares to a Freudian interpretation of a dream. This is necessary because Althusser believes it to be the nature of ideology to distort reality just as dreams distort reality. He thinks it is possible to see through and dispel these distortions, given the right perspective and the right analytical method.

The perspective that Althusser demands is what he calls the "proletarian perspective." "Proletarian" is a word which is familiar enough to readers of Marx—the proletariat, for Marx, is the "universal class." On the assumption that Marx's assertions are true, Althusser can claim that anything perceived from the point of view of that "universal class" is perceived without class bias. It should be stressed that Althusser, in speaking of the "proletariat," does not refer to the existing working class, for he believes that the thoughts and attitudes of the existing working class are distorted by the bourgeois ideology by which members of that class have been indoctrinated and bred. Hence, for Althusser the achievement of the proletarian perspective is not a matter of actually being a working-class person—a worker must make the same effort to see through the biases of current ideology as a middle-class intellectual.

By uncovering the distortions of a given ideology, one can gain control over ideology. Here again the analogy with psychoanalysis is evident. Just as, for Freud, it was knowledge of one's unconscious which sets a person free from the constraints emanating from that unconscious, so, for Althusser, it is knowledge of the unconscious ideology of a society which can lead to the liberation of the exploited:

Only the existence of ideology and the recognition of its necessity enable us to act on ideology and transform it into an instrument of deliberate action on history.[22]

These beliefs about ideology are logically tied to Althusser's uncompromisingly *dirigiste* approach to politics. Not only before and during a revolution is discipline required, he argues, but even in a socialist society, "men's adaptation to their conditions cannot be left to spontaneity, but must be constantly assumed, dominated and controlled"—hence the need for ideology.[23]

In arguing in this way, Althusser can fairly claim to be a disciple of Lenin, since one of the most conspicuous modifications of Marxist theory which Lenin proclaimed was his suggestion that the revolutionary mission could not be entrusted to the workers, but must be undertaken in their name by the disciplined party elite. Althusser gives a new reason for mistrusting the "spontaneity" of the working class—namely, that the workers are deceived by ideology—but the practical policy he recommends is the same as Lenin's. Indeed, his policy is possibly even closer to Stalin's, since Lenin was concerned with exercising party dictatorship in the name of the workers mainly during the revolutionary phases, whereas Althusser (like Stalin) emphasizes the need for "domination" and "control" even after socialism has been achieved.

A further Leninist modification of Marxism to which Althusser subscribes is Lenin's notion of imperialism. Marx himself despised the petty-bourgeois gospel of nationalism, which he viewed as responsible for creating negative myths and emotions about imperialism; he saw the extension of European empires into backward areas of the world as part of the march of history toward the ultimate triumph of socialism and was not disposed to let his passions be inflamed by the inevitable. But Lenin, who owed much of his success in 1917 to the chaos caused by imperial war, did discern the propaganda value of castigating imperialism, even if he never clearly defined what the word "imperialism" meant. Althusser joins Lenin in this imprecision. He frequently names "imperialism" as the "enemy of socialism" without providing a coherent analysis of imperialism—whether on Marxist or other grounds. Imperialism seems to figure in his thinking like Satanism or some other unidentified evil in medieval Christian theology. The word is emotive and not much else.

Certainly Althusser's hostility to "imperialism" does not entail any disapproval of the extension of the Soviet Union into Eastern Europe. Indeed, his references to the Soviet Union are invariably flattering, and he even goes so far as to suggest that the Soviet Union (unlike China) has passed beyond

[22] *For Marx*, p. 232.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 235.

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the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat to a higher stage on the road to communism. "In the USSR," he claims, "men are indeed now treated without any class distinction, that is, as persons." [24] In another passage Althusser writes:

The communism to which the Soviet Union is committed is a world without economic exploitation, without violence, without discrimination—a world opening up before the Soviets the infinite vistas of progress, of science, of culture, of bread and freedom, of free development—a world that can do without shadows or tragedies.[25]

Althusser is only troubled by the fact that, despite this positive situation, some in the Soviet Union have felt the need for Marxist humanism as a "philosophy of man," a tendency which has led since 1956 to the emergence there of a Marxist-humanist ideology. It is certainly not surprising that he should object to the growth of Marxist humanism outside the Soviet Union; for besides any philosophical objections to it, he was bound—as a loyal Communist—to dislike a movement of thought which in numerous countries has undermined the authority of orthodox Communist theoretical spokesmen and promoted various rival left-wing groupings claiming to be Marxist in their inspiration. But one wonders how Althusser can conceive of Marxist humanism even arising in the classless society he already discerns in the USSR. Moreover, one is tempted to ask how Althusser can think that such an ideology poses a genuine threat to the Soviet order. After all, the totalitarian structure of the Soviet state permits no such developments, and in Czechoslovakia, where the local party leadership under Dubcek adopted some of the ideas of Marxist humanism, the Soviet leaders intervened to suppress the movement with merciless severity.

The philosophical grounds for Althusser's opposition to Marxist humanism are far from explicit. He clearly cannot complain that Marxist humanism is bad on the ground that it is "ideological," since he holds that ideology is necessary at every stage of every society's history. The burden of his complaint seems to be that Marxist humanism is a dream-like ideology which diverts attention from the practical problems which the Soviet Union now confronts (having ended the dictatorship of the proletariat). What he evidently has in mind is that the Soviet Union now needs a more action-oriented or organizational type of ideology. He nowhere goes into detail on the subject, but leans heavily on *a priori* reasoning, passing from the assertion that Marxist humanism is idealistic to the conclusion that it cannot serve desired material purposes.

Materialist or Idealist?

There is, however, something highly paradoxical about Althusser's materialism. He affirms his materialism emphatically enough. But he also asserts, as Fichte once did, that all philosophers have to be either materialists or idealists, and this is an assertion which can only be true if "materialism" and "idealism" are defined so widely and loosely that a whole host of divergent philosophies can be fitted into one or the other of these categories. And indeed Althusser's own philosophy can be considered materialist only in some such extended sense. For his whole theory of ideology is an example of the principle that "ideas precede things" (Fichte's characterization of idealism), and it is only by making ideology part of a complex structure which is ultimately determined by the economy that Althusser can claim to subscribe to the principle that "things precede ideas" (Fichte's characterization of materialism).

Marx himself was more obviously a materialist in the conventional sense than is Althusser. This is evident in the two thinkers' differing use of the word "ideology." For Marx, "ideology" was a pejorative word. He used it to mean "false consciousness"—the set of ideas by which people deceived themselves into believing what their class interest made it advantageous for them to believe. But for Althusser, "ideology" is not always a pejorative word. While he agrees that most ideologies are illusory, he insists that men cannot live without ideology and therefore there must exist nondeceptive ideologies appropriate to socialist or Communist societies.

Althusser follows Marx in distinguishing ideology from science. Science, he says, is a system of knowledge, whereas ideology is a system of representations which serve a practical social function beyond the limited scope of knowledge. But he dismisses as fanciful the belief that ideology can be replaced by science—such a view is as utopian, he thinks, as the belief that religion can be replaced by science. Here he reiterates his belief that ideology is not just a myth, but an essential structure of society:

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 222.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 238.

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In a class society ideology is the means whereby, and the element in which, the relation between men and their conditions of existence is settled to the profit of the ruling class. In a classless society ideology is the means whereby, and the element in which, the relation between men and their conditions of existence is lived to the profit of all men.[26]

This assertion, it must be emphasized, is strictly Althusserian. Marx could not have said it because for him the word "ideology" connoted the distorting myths which belong essentially to society with classes.

Althusser's sophisticated theory of ideology may be an improvement on Marx's, but it is certainly not materialist in the sense that Marx's theory is materialist. Admittedly there are times when Althusser writes like a materialist sociologist of knowledge. For example, in deploring the lack of socialist theory in France, he writes about the French intellectual tradition very much as Marx himself wrote about the German intellectual tradition. Althusser suggests that the French bourgeoisie, having successfully accomplished their Revolution, assimilated the intellectuals, whereas intellectuals were spurned by the ruling classes of Germany, Russia and Italy. Thus French intellectuals became too tame, too *embourgeoisés* to serve, like the intellectuals of other countries, as theorists for the workers' movement. Furthermore, in this atmosphere of bourgeois comfort, the French philosophical tradition remained provincial and narrowly metaphysical—hence "the stubborn, profound absence of any real theoretical culture in the history of the French workers' movement." [27]

But despite his biting commentary on the impracticality of most French intellectual life, Althusser himself has far more to say about the effect of thought—including, assuredly, unconscious thought—on things than he has to say about the effect of things on thought. His program is not to overcome ideology altogether—the conventional materialist program—but to turn ideology against ideology. This purpose throws some light on the intensity of Althusser's hostility to Marxist humanism. It is because he believes that ideologies shape events that he has such a strong desire to develop the right ideology, and such a marked hostility toward any wrong ideology. He believes that the cult of the Early Marx is bad because it must lead back to the liberal-rationalist humanism of Kant or the communitarian humanism of Feuerbach—and not forward to the militant communism of Marx's own maturity. This is what makes the whole tone of his writings so reminiscent of a Counter-Reformation theologian arguing against heresies.

For the Jesuits, opinion could damn a soul; for Althusser, opinion can constitute reality. This is evident enough in his theory of the proletariat. According to any familiar materialist analysis, membership in the working class must be determined by the actual economic situation of the man concerned. But for Althusser, membership in the proletariat is determined by the existence of certain attitudes in the minds of individuals—in a word, by the ideology to which a man adheres. Given this state of mind, the external economic situation (whether a person is in the lower-, middle-, or upper-class income group) hardly matters.

In a paper entitled "Lenin and Philosophy," first read to a meeting of the Société Française de Philosophie, Althusser tried to defend Lenin's claim to be a serious philosopher in the face of French academic scorn. He suggested that this scorn was prompted by the narrow bourgeois values of the French academic tradition. Ironically enough, his own achievement has been to restate Marxism in terms which render it more intelligible within that French tradition, less alien to the rationalistic values which the mainstream of French philosophy, both past and present, invokes. Althusser has produced a Marxism which restores to the intellectual the preeminence and privilege to which French culture has accustomed him.

In this respect, Althusser has been of great service to Marxism in France, at least on the philosophical plane. But his philosophy offers no comfort to his party's politicians in their present policy of smiling moderation. Althusser's unreconstructed *dirigisme* and his contempt not only for what he sees as the distortions of bourgeois ideology, but also for any sort of Marxist humanism, are hardly compatible with the *style nouveau* or the *programme commun* propounded by Georges Marchais and René Piquet. In their hearts, these leaders doubtless agree with Althusser, and one may be sure that his theories are read by Communist study groups behind closed doors. But it would clearly be an embarrassment to the PCF's leadership if Althusser's writings were widely read elsewhere in contemporary France.

[26] *For Marx*, p. 236.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

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Books
The Comparative Economic Approach

By Nicolas Spulber

V. NESVERA: *Investitionen in Österreich und in der Tschechoslowakei* (Investments in Austria and in Czechoslovakia). Vienna and New York, Springer-Verlag, 1971.
H. G. KOSTA, H. KRAMER and J. SLAMA: *Der technologische Fortschritt in Österreich und in der Tschechoslowakei* (Technological Progress in Austria and in Czechoslovakia). Vienna and New York, Springer-Verlag, 1971.
G. KADE, H. J. ZUBROD, and R. HUJER: *Organisationsprobleme der Wirtschaftsreformen in der USSR und der DDR in Lichte der Kybernetik und Graphentheorie* (Organizational Problems of Economic Reform in the USSR and the German Democratic Republic in the Light of Cybernetics and Graph Theory). Vienna and New York, Springer-Verlag, 1971.

PROFESSOR WASSILY LEONTIEF once remarked that "comparativism" as a method of scientific research provided a "convenient refuge for unimaginative minds." He did not mean by this that various historical economic changes could not be described and illustrated by numerical comparisons and statistical manipulations. Rather, Leontief was suggesting a more challenging problem: How can the interdependences which comparisons reveal be integrated into the broader analytical framework of a whole economic system's operation at any given point in time?

If this question nags the "comparativist" who deals with economic changes within the framework of a given socio-economic system, it plagues him *a fortiori* when he attempts to extend the scope of his investigation to different socio-economic systems. The effort is further obstructed by the fact that much of the research done in the field of "comparative economic systems" continues to be carried out along such traditional lines as the methodical comparison of various types of aggregative indices.

However, important attempts have been made recently to approach the study of changes within and between systems from a different angle. These studies focus on a "system" as a whole, and they employ the tools and techniques of "systems analysis"—modern management science, information theory and "systems engineering."

The monographs under review, published under the sponsorship of the Austrian Institute for Economic Research, use both approaches. The first two, which focus on comparative growth and development patterns in Austria and Czechoslovakia since World War II, use the traditional comparativist method; the third, which focuses on comparative system changes in the USSR and East Germany, uses the "systems" approach. All three works address themselves to the following questions: 1) Why do the growth rates of the gross domestic product and of various sectors display similar long-term trends in countries with different socio-economic systems? 2) Which changes are attributable to differences in patterns of access to advanced technology and in applications of the latter to production? 3) What specific trade-offs occur within a Soviet-type system between the expansion or contraction of controls and the increase or decrease in its internal and external destabilizing factors?

With respect to the first question, Nesvera's monograph on investments presents as a principal finding the discovery that Austria and Czechoslovakia—two countries with roughly the same *per capita* income but having dissimilar economic structures—both demonstrated a declining trend in their rates of growth over the period 1950–66. This "striking common feature" is attributed by Nesvera to the same cause: the absence of responsiveness throughout the various sectors of both economies to changes "in the objective situation facilitating growth in different sectors."

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However, neither the basic data presented in this monograph nor the conclusions drawn from them may be accepted without qualification. In the first place, the growth rates of the 1950's, and particularly of the early part of that decade (which was, after all, a period of reconstruction and postwar boom), are inappropriate as a reference point for the 1960's. Once the long-term output potential had been reached after reconstruction, the 1960's were bound to display a broadly decelerating trend, although the deceleration itself varied from country to country according to both general and specific interactions between supply and demand factors.

Nesvera also seems to ignore the fact that the entire group of centrally-directed socialist economies (CDSEs), and particularly the most industrialized among them, showed rapidly declining growth rates from the end of the 1950's on. Among the CDSEs, Czechoslavakia ranked second from the bottom in terms of average annual rates of expansion for the period as a whole: its 5.2-percent annual growth rate compared poorly with the 7.0-percent average rate for all CDSEs. In industrial Western Europe, on the other hand, the growth rates of the gross domestic product showed a markedly jagged pattern. Austria itself displayed a pronounced downward trend at the same time that it achieved one of the highest average rates of growth in the West—5.1 percent as against a group average of 4.5 percent.[1]

It is impossible to reduce these complex shifts and adjustments to some simple denominator, such as investment inertia or lag in investment responsiveness. Up to a point, an inflexible investment structure oriented toward heavy industry certainly played a role in the declines registered in some CDSEs. But even here, a variety of supply and demand factors were at work. For example, as other analysts have pointed out, there were significant shortages of raw materials and excessive buildups of inventories, marked deterioration in output-input ratios and rising production costs, large amounts of unfinished construction and malinvestments, and imbalances in foreign trade. Czechoslovakia, in particular, also suffered from the vigorous competition of Western machinery supplies in the Eastern (socialist) market in which it had enjoyed a truly monopolistic position during the 1950's.

The specific short-run deceleration factors at work in Austria were of a quite different nature. Rather than the lack of responsiveness to shifting economic conditions pointed to by Nesvera, there appears to have been, if anything, a tendency in the Austrian economy to respond too quickly to short-term international fluctuations. Thus Austria, along with the rest of industrial Western Europe, experienced investment booms in 1958–61 and again in 1964–65, but in the intervening and subsequent years—reflecting a less buoyant international economic atmosphere—there was a hesitancy to take advantage of opportunities for new investments, a constriction of public investment expenditures, and a falling-off of export effort—all of which combined to dampen the overall growth rates of the economy for the 1960's. In short, Nesvera mechanically superimposes similar trends on widely different underlying causes, with the result that his whole inquiry concludes on a rather unenlightening note.

THE KOSTA-KRAMER-SLAMA study also suffers from certain serious shortcomings. For one thing, it is based up to a point on some questionable aggregative indices, particularly concerning GNP *per capita,* per person employed, by industrial origin, and so on. In addition, the disparate though plausible variables it presents to measure technological development—*e.g.,* levels of research and development expenditures, revenues per weight-unit of technical products exported, the extent to which certain innovations have been introduced in various industries (for example, oxygen in steelmaking), the production and consumption of man-made fibers, shifts in energy balances, the use of computers, and so on—do not provide a satisfactory explanation of the actual rates of technological change. As the authors themselves note, Czechoslovakia spent nearly three times as much as Austria on research and development (as a percentage of GNP) and employed nine times as many persons in research (for every 10,000 inhabitants). Yet all this was associated with a *lower* technological level than that of Austria and produced only disappointing output increases. The authors then fall back on the familiar argument that these poor results were attributable mostly to the deadening effects of bureaucratic control, institutional separation of consecutive stages of innovational processes, and counterproductive policies with respect to incentives, managerial motivation, and input-output patterns.

[1] See *Economic Survey of Europe 1969,* Geneva, United Nations, 1970, Part 1, pp. 9, 14, and *passim.*

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This typical enumeration of sources of inefficiency in CDSEs is accompanied by the more telling observation that Austria met its demand for advanced technology largely from Western sources while Czechoslovakia had to rely heavily *on her own* and partly on other Communist sources—an observation that is coupled with a comparison of the costs of foreign licenses as against the costs of imports of foreign capital and equipment in the two countries. Here, of course, is the crux of the matter. A Hungarian economist frankly acknowledged not long ago that much of the East European output and trade in machinery has involved the production and exchange of obsolete technology, and that this situation has led to what he aptly termed "quasi" development rather than actual development as compared to Western achievements.[2] Kosta, Kramer and Slama are perhaps correct in pointing out that Austria may experience serious inconveniences arising from "overdependence" on imported technology (they assert that this is already the case in certain industries with limited domestically-based research foundations), but the fact remains that development in pace with the most advanced technology of our time is inconceivable in segregated markets which are isolated from the broad currents of world trade and world markets.

IN THE THIRD monograph under review, Kade, Zubrod, and Hujer attempt to provide some new insights into the nature and scope of the Soviet economic reforms of the 1960's as well as into the changes in plan formulation and implementation undertaken at that time in East Germany.

The Soviet reforms are appraised in terms of the system's "sensitivity" to external or internal interferences or destabilizing factors, its learning adaptability (*i.e.*, the capacity to modify instruments in use in order to achieve preselected goals), and its relative or absolute centrality (*i.e.*, the importance of any given point in the system's communication network and of the network's "centralization" as a whole). On the basis of detailed analysis, the authors conclude that the Soviet organizational changes introduced in the 1960's achieved their goal with respect to the reduction of internal disturbances but, in exchange, had the end result of making the system less "adaptive" than before. With respect to "centrality," they consider the changes to have been neutral.

In the case of East Germany, on the other hand, the authors find that changes in planning methods increased overall system "sensitivity" but at the same time extended the range of action and the set of instruments available both to planning bodies and to the various implementing units.

In sum, these studies reveal that "systems" theory is still in a foundling stage of development, and that much remains to be done in order to make its concepts fully operative. In the not too distant future, however, this approach will undoubtedly play an increasingly significant role in the fields of comparative policy, economic-management analysis, and comparative studies of economic systems in general. The Austrian Institute of Economic Research is to be commended for attempting to explore imaginatively all the avenues now open for furthering the study of inter-systems comparisons.

[2] Ferenc Janossy, "The Origins of the Present Contradictions in Our Economy and How to Eliminate Them," *Kozgasdasagi szemle* (Budapest), July-August 1969.

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Moscow, Peking, and the UN

By Lincoln P. Bloomfield

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN, and GEORGE GINSBURGS, Eds.: *Soviet and American Policies in the United Nations.* New York, New York University Press, 1971.
BYRON S. J. WENG: *Peking's UN Policy: Continuity and Change.* New York, Praeger, 1972.

WHILE READING the very capably organized and executed comparative study edited by Rubinstein and Ginsburgs of Soviet and US superpowerism in the UN over the postwar years, I suddenly had a vivid memory of sitting in the UN Delegates' Lounge a couple of years ago chatting with an old acquaintance who is one of the senior Soviet diplomats in New York. As we sat there, scores of delegates, advisers, and other diplomatic hangers-on filed by in their various dashikis, gabillehs, lounge suits, and (occasionally) dresses. My friend and I were talking about the urgent necessity of US-Soviet understanding on some crucial current political and security problems. As the noise got louder and the crowd thicker, he suddenly looked up and burst out, "We simply *cannot* do business in this place."

Nor have we tried to. Most of the series of postwar crises of the hair-raising, cliff-hanger variety have been strictly between the US and the Soviet Union (and occasionally China), and all of them have been defused primarily through bilateral diplomacy. True, the UN had a marginally valuable role to play in such egregious "nasties" as the Berlin blockade of 1948 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and confrontations between the Big Two have unfailingly reverberated through the international body. But by and large, the giant problems have been kept out of the UN, and major US-Soviet agreements have been arranged privately. Thus, President Nixon was acting quite realistically when he went not to New York but to Moscow (and Peking) in 1972 to try to straighten out vitally important American relationships with the two historically hostile nuclear powers. (At the same time, the price of Mr. Nixon's successes may have been neglect of other sectors—notably multilateral diplomacy, which in my opinion represents the most potentially crucial, if unacknowledged, corollary to his own "Nixon Doctrine.")

There has been, then, more than a little convergence in US and Soviet attitudes toward the UN over the almost 30-year history of the organization. Each state has wanted a world body which would conform to its own interpretation of national interest and international order—a wish, of course, shared by most powers (though they have lacked the means to bring it about). There has also been a shared impatience with the quasi-democratic processes of the UN except where friendly majorities could be found to ratify one's policies. Finally, the two nations have both displayed an unwillingness to get stuck on the UN's notoriously adhesive flypaper in any way that might impede their freedom to act unilaterally. In short, the USSR and the United States have been the two countries in the world with the power to undertake unilateral ventures, and this in turn has shaped the UN in the postwar years.

Of course, the attitudes of the two superpowers have also differed in major respects. I believe (though many of my students do not) that, for the most part, the United States has tended to favor moderation, conciliation, nonviolence, and the pacific settlement of international disputes. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has seemed to me on balance more concerned with fomenting dissent and making propaganda than with fostering world community—often running terrifying risks and then wanting to be rescued from the consequences of its own brinkmanship (the two most recent Arab-Israeli wars are prime examples).

Nevertheless, the two superpowers, doubtless *because* of their superpower, have both shown a

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fundamental disposition simply to ignore the UN. That position has been matched in full measure by the growing disillusionment of the great majority of states with the Big Two, by the increasing willingness of other nations to emulate the superpowers' unilateral use of military force for "reasons of state."

The point of superpowerism, to be sure, is that in a sense what others do does not matter. My Soviet diplomat friend's scornful rejection of the UN's turbulent and uncontrollable setting as a place in which serious questions could be discussed is the daily reality in the highest councils of Washington and Moscow (as well as of Paris, London, Peking, etc.). Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk summed up the attitude in his reference to "swirling majorities" in the UN's "parliamentary diplomacy." [1]

But in fact a vital symbiotic relationship exists between the superpowers and these majorities, just as there does between the two superpowers. The swirling majorities are, in a Maoist sense, the "fish" in the seas where both Moscow and Washington must function and—if that is the game—"win." Without the support of those "fish," a superpower, like a Maoist guerrilla, finds its environment not hospitable but hostile. Hence, to the extent that the superpower game is a struggle for political and moral influence, the fish are crucial, whether in the UN fishbowl or in their native habitat. For this reason, pure superpowerism needs to be balanced with some kind of diplomatic concept akin to Robert Benchley's fabled answer to an international law exam question related to the Greenland Fisheries dispute. (Benchley had not studied it, so he analyzed the case from the viewpoint of the fish).

THESE BASIC TRUTHS are echoed throughout the Rubinstein-Ginsburgs collection of essays, which were prepared for an October 1969 conference at the University of Pennsylvania to explore the interaction of the United States and the Soviet Union in the UN from 1945 to 1970. One reason for the apparent success of the gathering may have been that all the participants were asked to identify the assumptions underlying the policies of both superpowers; to define the key policy objectives of each and the extent to which these had been accomplished or had changed; and to probe the domestic and international factors that had shaped the assumptions, policies, and behavior of each.

Professor Robert Wesson's paper charts the various periods of superpower influence and unpopularity in the organization—from the era when the USSR sought to limit the damage that multilateral initiatives through the UN might inflict on Soviet interests, through the era when the US attempted to do the same after the Soviets had seemed to capture the colonial issue. He carries his story into the present era when bilateral détentism coupled with the virtual US abandonment of multilateralism in security matters (the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia) produced a situation where a Russian and an American could sit down and bemoan the nuisance to which they were jointly committed. Wesson is particularly interesting when he underscores the contradictions the Soviets confront between the values of the UN as a forum to push its attack on the "imperialists," and the inherent rivalry between the organization's programs and those of Moscow. The UN approach, being meliorative and reformist, is *ipso facto* contrary to the exclusivist "laws of struggle" that Moscow professes, and the inevitable result is that the Soviets infuse their relationship vis-à-vis the UN with the same ambivalence that they do their relationships with individual capitalist states.

Essentially, I have only a few minor criticisms of Professor Wesson's excellent article. I myself would have thought, for example, that Russian history and the defensive mentality based on that history, in combination with internal security requirements imposed by dictatorship, are more explanatory of Soviet insistence on narrow national sovereignty than ideology.

Former Indian Ambassador to the UN Arthur Lall contributes a piece on the UN and disarmament in which he correctly concludes that for both superpowers the UN is still a "forum" rather than a "force," though he seeks some inchoate rules of conduct to which both pay attention. (His selection of Guatemala, Hungary, the Dominican Republic, and Czechoslovakia as examples of unilateral intervention to advance self-interest, however, tempted me to suggest expansion of the list to include Hyderabad, Goa, and the former East Pakistan in order to broaden the perspective a little.)

Professor Harold Jacobson discusses the colonial field (that is, decolonization), in which the UN

[1] Speech prepared for delivery at Columbia University, Jan. 10, 1964. He first used the phrase "parliamentary diplomacy" with respect to the UN in "Parliamentary Diplomacy," *World Affairs Interpreter* (Los Angeles), Summer 1955.

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has been deeply involved. He helpfully reminds the reader that in the early years the Soviet Union was increasingly excluded from the UN's major work-areas such as the Trusteeship Council, visiting missions to the UN's trust territories, and *ad hoc* committees. In addition, he contrasts the USSR's movement toward an influential position in the UN by championing anticolonial causes, with the decline in the prestige of the US because of Washington's general shift to a more conservative position on colonial issues. By 1960-67, the Soviet Union was to be found on the "winning side" with respect to colonial questions 83 percent of the time, while the figure for the United States was 36 percent. In 1946–55, the percentages for the two had been even. Does this change matter? It does if one takes seriously our earlier references to the fish in the sea in which the superpowers must swim.

Professor Daniel Cheever provides a useful chapter on the international regulation of seabed matters (what some wag once christened "beds and bottoms"). After an interesting comparison of various Soviet and American policy approaches in the technical and economic fields, he turns to a discussion of the congruence of superpower interests as the Soviet Union comes of age as an "oceanographic power." He concludes that while parallel Soviet and American interests will tend to encourage the US and the USSR to support the UN's role, both countries will also be inclined to hold the UN on a short rein. Since Professor Cheever wrote his article, his judgment has been upheld in a number of ways during the negotiations to elaborate the treaty barring the installation of nuclear weapons in the seabed. For example, the Big Two incurred the disfavor of many nations by insisting on a highly restricted amount of international inspection.

The book winds up with contributions by James Patrick Sewell on security politics and by Edward McWhinney on the rule of law and the settlement of disputes. These require little specific comment except to raise a question about Mr. Sewell's definition of US objectives with regard to UN peacekeeping (to stop communism and establish stable, *i.e.,* Communist-resistant, systems). To be faithful to such objectives, the United States would have had to join the British and the French in their Suez policy in 1956 and should have intervened unilaterally in the Congo in 1960. My own impression of the US stance toward UN peace-keeping in that period puts it in the category of reflex actions against "destabilizing" outbreaks of violence.

BUT ONE BLIND man's elephant is another one's dragon. The entry of the People's Republic of China into the United Nations in the fall of 1971 marked a major watershed in modern diplomatic history, and the results were not long in coming. Within less than two months after China's admission, Moscow and Peking found themselves in a UN Security Council slugfest over the India-Pakistan war. In August 1972, the brief interval of Sino-Soviet amenities clearly ended when Peking cast its first veto (on Bangladesh's admission). At that point, one might have been tempted to conclude that behind the protestations of just being one of the lesser boys, behind the humble denial of superpower status, and despite the quest for a mantle of Third World leadership far purer than that worn by the cynical "socialist imperialists" from Moscow, there stood just another great power, cold-bloodedly trading the kudos of Third World popularity for a quick trick (Pakistan) in the complex Asian power game.

Further predictions regarding the interaction between the most populous nation on earth and the international organization containing most of the remaining world population will benefit from Byron Weng's thoughtful and often exceedingly perceptive analysis of the aspects of Chinese thought, diplomacy, and behavior that are likely to influence Peking's actions in the UN. His book was written before 1971, but I think it shows what illumination a good historical and textual analysis can shed on future events. Dr. Weng's central proposition is that Peking has always had a UN policy entailing both continuity and change. 'n this sense, Peking "behaves just like most other nations in acknowledging the United Nations as an international actor as well as an arena" (p. 5). The underlying theoretical base of Chinese policy has been "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung thought"—a world view grounded on a belief in a universal law of contradictions. To the Chinese, the UN constitutes a place where struggle between contradictions takes place.

In his historical survey, Dr. Weng provides an interesting analysis of China's 1965 call to establish a "revolutionary UN." He relates President Sukarno's withdrawal of Indonesia from UN membership to Chou En-lai's famous trial balloon calling for the establishment of another United Nations "so that rival dramas may be staged in competition with that

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body which calls itself the UN," but which, according to Chou, was only a mischief-making tool of American imperialism. It is also helpful to the reader to have subsequent shifts in Chinese rhetoric on UN membership looked at against the backdrop of the Cultural Revolution and the "revolutionary pragmatism" that followed in its wake and produced renewed interest in the international body.

Dr. Weng perhaps overcomplicates China's long hostility toward the UN. That hostility has always seemed to me to be a perfectly simple and unideological reaction to the "social situation" created by the US-directed effort to refuse China's entry by the front door. Anyone who has lived among the Chinese realizes that they must have looked upon such an effort as merely the latest episode in a lengthy history of slights, exclusions, racial bigotry, and insulting condescension—all epitomized by the notorious signs in the parks of Shanghai's prewar International Settlement (which I never did see there, though I looked) "Chinese and dogs not allowed." Ideological and inner-party interpretations simply do not do adequate justice to the visceral rage built up among the Chinese by this record of exclusion.

As to more contemporary matters, there is considerable merit in Professor Weng's notion that Peking really perceives five different UN's: the UN of the Charter, the UN under US control, the UN of parliamentary diplomacy, the "revolutionary" UN, and the UN of US-Soviet collusion. In some of these perceived capacities, he contends, the UN can be a friend of the PRC. But the Chinese will always approach the political side of the UN in the light of their unyielding national positions (such as their legal stance regarding Taiwan) and, of course, in light of the thoughts of Chairman Mao. It would appear to me, however, that a China which can veto Bangladesh's admission and insist on eliminating all traces of the presence or even statistics of the Republic of China (Taiwan)—a demand to which the UN buckled—resembles a would-be superpower more than one dedicated only to winning out in the meritocracy of revolutionary leadership.

If the Soviet Union is becoming a fairly middle-aged power, China still shows very mixed signs for those concerned with cooperation in building a better world order, or even in making the existing one work. Still another Asian pre-superpower—Japan—is now visibly chafing at its continued exclusion from the UN's top table. A permanent Security Council seat for Japan could either strengthen the forces of cooperation or add one more element of paralysis to those already present.

In this sense, the UN makes all too real the abstract geometry of triangles, quadrangles, and parallelograms with which today's pundits like to describe the fateful interplay of the great powers.

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The Alienation of Soviet Jews

By Maurice Friedberg

MORDECHAI ALTSHULER, Ed.: *Russian Publications on Jews and Judaism in the Soviet Union, 1917–1967.* Jerusalem, Society for Research on Jewish Communities and The Historical Society of Israel, 1970.
YEHOSHUA GILBOA: *The Black Years of Soviet Jewry, 1939–1953.* Translated from the Hebrew by Yosef Shachter and Dov Ben-Abba. Boston, Little, Brown, 1971.
RICHARD COHEN, Ed.: *Let My People Go!* New York, Popular Library, 1971.

STUDENTS OF SOVIET affairs would be well advised to pay closer attention to recent developments affecting that country's Jews, not only because of the subject's intrinsic interest but also as a possible paradigm for future developments in a country in which the Russian majority is gradually becoming a minority—if, indeed, it has not already been reduced to that status. There is ample if fragmentary evidence that—like the blacks in the United States—the Soviet Union's ethnic groups, both large and small, have no intention of meekly disappearing in the Soviet melting pot. In addition to the many recent reports of Jewish protest activity, rumblings about arrests in the Ukraine, about bloody disorders in Lithuania, and about continuing unrest among the deported Crimean Tatars—among other signs of ferment—have reached the pages of Western newspapers with some frequency.

The Soviet Establishment, by and large, appears to have chosen for its policy the all-too-familiar Stalinist combination of inertia and repression. Yet it has become obvious that this response is not adequate for the long run; Stalin's *Marxism and the National Question,* a dogmatically simplistic essay over half a century old, no longer has relevance for the Soviet situation, if indeed it ever did. The example of the Soviet Jews—in many respects among the weakest and least cohesive of the minorities—is highly instructive. Described as late as 1966 as the "Jews of Silence" by a highly sympathetic observer, the French Jewish novelist Elie Wiesel, they have in recent years become the most vocal and fearless of the Soviet minorities, exhibiting a desperate defiance of the mighty state that is unprecedented in the history of the USSR.

Not unexpectedly, the struggle of a significant segment of Soviet Russia's Jews has stimulated much writing on the subject. An annotated bibliography brought out by the American Jewish Committee enumerates some 300 items in English alone published between 1967 and 1971, and the list is already in serious need of updating. Much of this work is journalism of varying quality. A few specialized monographs have also been produced, although thus far no satisfactory history of the Jews in the USSR has emerged.

While the need for the latter now appears greater than ever, a patient student will be able to reconstruct some of the highlights of this history from Mordechai Altshuler's bibliography of *Russian Publications on Jews and Judaism in the Soviet Union, 1917–1967,* a companion to his 1961 compilation listing Yiddish and Hebrew books and periodicals. To a scholar, a bibliography is what tracks are to a hunter, fingerprints to a detective, and scattered bones to a paleontologist. Tedious and meaningless to outsiders, a bibliography yields fascinating information to those who will take the trouble to scrutinize its contents.

To begin with, Dr. Altshuler's volume effectively demolishes a myth stubbornly perpetuated over the decades by the Soviet authorities—the claim that the admittedly high level of linguistic assimilation among Russia's Jews is indicative of a similarly spectacular erosion of Jewish ethnic consciousness. During the Civil War and the first years of the Soviet regime, as Dr. Altshuler's bibliography attests, hundreds of

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books and scores of periodicals in the Russian language disseminated information on virtually every subject of Jewish concern and reflected the intensity of Jewish religious, cultural and ideological activity among the country's educated and linguistically acculturated Jews. It was only later, during the Stalin era, that coverage of Jewish affairs was severely curtailed, with what little was produced restricted to Yiddish (Hebrew, tainted as the language of liturgy and of the nascent Zionist movement, was effectively proscribed with the advent of the Soviet regime).

There is interesting data reflecting other Soviet attitudes toward Jewish matters. Thus, for instance, the absence since the middle 1920's of *any* Soviet publications whatsoever in the field of Jewish history, not even orthodox Marxist ones, eloquently demonstrates the effort to destroy among Russia's Jews all traces of awareness of the Jewish people's historical continuity and geographic universality. There is food for reflection in Dr. Altshuler's finding that "at the beginning of the 1930's publications against anti-Semitism ended"—particularly in view of the virulence of anti-Jewish hatred in the USSR in the four decades that followed, much of it clearly government-inspired. The unequal contest between Jewish religion and atheism in the Soviet Union (an inequality which, in varying degrees, has affected all religious denominations) is eloquently demonstrated in the bibliography, which lists over 100 "anti-Judaic" books and pamphlets and exactly four religious books. The last of them, a bilingual edition of the Biblical Book of Ruth, appeared in 1925. No complete Hebrew Bible has ever been published in the USSR; by contrast, between 1958 and 1965—*i.e.*, during the much-heralded post-Stalin "thaw"—the so-called "Atheist Bible" was printed in over a million copies.

Dr. Altshuler also provides interesting evidence indicating that Judaism has been attacked with proportionately greater intensity than other religious faiths:

Publications against the Jewish religion in 1958–67 constituted 9% of all works against specific religions, while the Jewish population, according to the 1959 census, constituted only 1.1% of the population of the Soviet Union. Also, the number of copies of books [i.e., the total of print runs] against the Jewish religion was seven times as large as the number of books against Islam and almost twice as large as that against Christianity.

Unfortunately, Dr. Altshuler's bibliography does not list works of fiction of specifically Jewish interest, an omission which is regrettable but unavoidable (as the editor points out) in light of the sheer scope of such an undertaking. We are thus deprived of information on the publication of such writers as Isaac Babel, Ilya Ehrenburg and, among translated Western authors, Lion Feuchtwanger. Such data would have been most welcome, particularly in view of the well-known tendency of Russian readers to regard imaginative litterature as a trustworthy source of factual information on a variety of subjects. As if to compensate for the omission, the bibliography offers several samples of a curious "de-Judaization" process applied by the censors of Russian translations of Soviet Yiddish writing. Thus, for instance,

In some of Leib Kvitko's children's poetry, which became very popular in the Soviet Union in Russian translation, the Jewish names of children disappeared. Also, in translations of prose into Russian, the word "Jews" or any special situation displaying Jewish heroism or martyrdom was eliminated. That this was a deliberate policy can be seen when comparing the translation with the original. The policy of obscuring basic national feelings within Soviet Yiddish literature, which took shape at the end of Stalin's life, still continues up to this day to influence translations from Yiddish to Russian.

THE TRAVAIL OF Russia's Jews during the last years of Stalin's life is the subject of Yehoshua Gilboa's *The Black Years of Soviet Jewry*, a detailed, painstakingly documented and studiously dispassionate account dealing with the period from the Nazi-Soviet pact in 1939 to the dictator's death in 1953. In Mr. Gilboa's view, it was the alliance with Hitler's Germany that laid the groundwork for much of the anti-Semitism of the postwar years. By implication, he appears to agree with Dr. Lina Shtern—a survivor of one of Stalin's final acts of persecution against prominent Soviet Jews in 1952—who, when told years earlier that the Nazi-Soviet pact was merely a marriage of convenience, warned that "even such a marriage can produce offspring." It was during the Nazi-Soviet honeymoon that information about Hitler's persecutions of the Jews was first suppressed, a policy that created a precedent for the postwar period.

Some accounts of postwar anti-Jewish campaigns in the USSR view them, at least in part, as responses to the outburst of Jewish

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pride that accompanied the arrival in Moscow in 1948 of the first envoy of the newly independent state of Israel—Golda Meir, the present Prime Minister. Mr. Gilboa convincingly demonstrates the far greater importance of the upsurge of Jewish nationalism during the war against Hitler. Much of his evidence is drawn from wartime Soviet Yiddish literature; indeed, the chapter on such literature and the portraits of individual Soviet Yiddish writers are among the best parts of *The Black Years of Soviet Jewry.* Eschewing the customarily elegiac tone of much Western journalism, which retroactively endows all of the martyred Soviet Yiddish writers with heroism and honesty, Mr. Gilboa differentiates between those who managed to retain their integrity as men and as artists (*e.g.*, David Hofstein, Der Nister, Peretz Markish) and those who shamelessly kowtowed to Stalin in the hope of survival (*e.g.*, Itzik Fefer, David Bergelson, Leib Kvitko). In the end all perished, as of course did many of their colleagues—Russians and non-Russians alike.

Mr. Gilboa's story of successive waves of anti-Semitic campaigns in postwar USSR is scholarly and detailed. First there was the so-called "anti-cosmopolitan" drive when, according to the late Soviet film-maker Mikhail Romm, the term was widely used as a euphemism for "dirty Yid." Then came the closing of all Jewish schools, theaters and publications, and the arrest of hundreds of persons associated with them. There was also the mysterious "Crimean affair," which to the reviewer's knowledge is described here in greater detail than in any other source. (This rather fantastic episode involved a proposal by certain Jews to resettle survivors of the Nazi holocaust in the Crimea, on the basis that the peninsula had been depopulated by the wartime deportation of native Tatars and that it was dangerous for many Jews to return to their former homes in areas liberated from the Nazis; according to report, the suggestion was distorted into evidence of an alleged Jewish conspiracy to use the Crimea as an American military base against the USSR.) Finally, there was the "doctors' plot" of 1953 which, as the Soviet dissenter Roy Medvedev recently related in his work *Let History Judge,* might have—but for Stalin's sudden death—resulted in a nationwide pogrom and mass deportation of the Jews to Siberia.

What were the causes of all these anti-Jewish outbursts? Mr. Gilboa advances a number of cautious hypotheses:

The anti-Jewish policy of the "black years" did not stem from ideological sources but was entirely based on opportunistic, "mercantilist" considerations. It was brutally calculated to correspond to Soviet needs, either real or imaginary, and profit weighings, right or wrong, both in connection with the country's internal developments and its foreign relations. . . . The growth of Russian chauvinism and xenophobia, the intensification of the cold war, the inflation of anti-Westernism, and the encouragement of hatred of the United States certainly helped direct the blame of all kinds of mishaps and dangerous trends against Jews.

It is to be regretted that Mr. Gilboa's carefully written book is marred by occasionally sloppy translation and an unusually large number of misspellings of proper names.

THE CONTENTS OF *Let My People Go,* a paperback anthology compiled by Richard Cohen, are convincing evidence of the failure of Soviet anti-Semitic campaigns to achieve their objectives. Described as "today's documentary story of Soviet Jewry's struggle to be free," the book includes a number of brief accounts of astounding Jewish defiance of the Soviet authorities.

Among them are documents clearly demonstrating that many of the anti-Semitic practices in the USSR are government-inspired; accounts of trials of alleged "Zionists"; underground leaflets urging Jews to insist on listing their native tongue as Yiddish in the Soviet census of 1970; courageously-worded demands for permission to emigrate to Israel; as well as several personal statements. The most moving of these accounts, entitled "How They Taught Me I Was a Jew," was written by a once thoroughly Russified girl in her late teens who has since succeeded in reaching Israel.

The books reviewed are heartily recommended not just to those interested in the subject of Soviet Jewry but to all students of Soviet affairs, as an example of the current resurgence of ethnic consciousness in the USSR. Whether this trend will continue to intensify among the various Soviet minorities is a question for the future, but the possibility seems strong. Those who feel doubtful might do well to ask themselves how many analysts in the West would have been able a decade ago, at the close of the Khrushchev era, to imagine the emergence of a strong and vocal Jewish nationalist movement within the USSR, let alone the emigration of some 30,000 Soviet Jews to Israel.

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Culture under Lenin and Stalin

By Ludmilla B. Turkevich

SHEILA FITZPATRICK: *The Commissariat of Enlightenment: Soviet Organization of Education and the Arts Under Lunacharsky, October 1917-1921.* London, Cambridge University Press, 1970.
GLEB STRUVE: *Russian Literature Under Lenin and Stalin, 1917-1953.* Norman, Okla., University of Oklahoma Press, 1971.

THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION of 1917 marked the beginning of a critical era in the history of Russian culture. Nineteenth-century dreams of freedom seemed near realization, and the talents and energy to give them literary and artistic expression were there, vibrant and ready to the challenge. Russian arts, in spite of crushing Tsarist curbs, had already achieved excellence in practically every field. Now there was hope that the changeover from autocratic despotism to a new social and political order would usher in an even more fruitful era of intellectual and artistic freedom of expression.

The first postrevolutionary decade, though it had its darker aspects, did see a considerable measure of artistic and literary experimentation thanks to the activity of mature and prestigious artists and writers from the prerevolutionary period. While—as Sheila Fitzpatrick notes in her book—many of them considered themselves revolutionaries, they were strong, highly individualistic personalities with firm artistic views of their own, which they strove to express. In this effort, they were helped by the fact that directives from the "summit" in these early days of the Communist regime were not always clear and sometimes even contradictory—a situation which had the effect of leaving the door open for continued artistic innovation even while it caused many squabbles. For a while, the result was the emergence of some novel and avant-garde music, painting, theater, and literature, as authoritatively related by Gleb Struve in his book on Soviet literature.

This period of relative freedom of artistic expression did not last long. Toward the end of the 1920's, the Bolsheviks, having set their course toward the building of a totalitarian party dictatorship, resolved to transform the arts into a subservient instrument of the state and the official ideology. The regime took it upon itself to dictate what constituted art and imposed stringent ideological controls on all aspects of literary and artistic activity. Increasingly severe persecution of any "deviationism" under Stalin soon stamped out virtually all overt attempts at artistic originality and reduced Soviet arts and literature to a state of sterile conformism.

Both the Struve and the Fitzpatrick books deal with aspects of this subject, though their respective time frames and focuses are quite different. Sheila Fitzpatrick centers her attention on the pivotal administrative unit—the Soviet Commissariat of Enlightenment, or NARKOMPROS—which, under the direction of Anatoli V. Lunarcharsky, was charged with the supervision of all cultural and educational activities in the new Communist state during the four disoriented years, 1917-21. Struve, on the other hand, chronicles thirty-six years of Soviet literature under Lenin and Stalin from 1917 to 1953. The Fitzpatrick book thus complements the early part of Struve's history.

In her study, Miss Fitzpatrick carefully traces the intricate four-year history of NARKOMPROS, vividly portraying the rugged conditions under which Russian culture labored in those early years of communism. *Prosveshchenie* (enlightenment) is a broad concept, and the responsibilities of Lunacharsky's commissariat were manifold. It was in charge not only of literature and publication, of fine arts and museums, of theaters and the performing arts, but also of all aspects of education from the kindergarten on up through the

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technical institutes, universities, and the Academy of Sciences. (Its duties were broadened even further during its existence to include supervision of child welfare and providing housing and material supplies for its numerous staff members and service personnel.)

Monumental in itself, the task of NARKOMPROS was made even more difficult by the unsettled political situation, the severity of the climate and attendant shortages of food and fuel, clashes between artistic and professional personalities, and organizational power struggles. There was rivalry between Moscow and Petrograd and discord between generations, social classes, and literary camps. Yet even amidst this chaos dedicated people strove to further cultural progress as they understood it.

IN SPITE OF ALL the difficulties that hampered cultural activity in this troubled period, the literary output of the time, as Mr. Struve's survey bears witness, displayed a considerable degree of originality. Many new "leftist" literary trends that had appeared on the scene just before 1917 as a revolt against the prevailing fashions—*e.g.*, futurism, cosmism, imaginism—were given a chance to develop. Innovative dramatic techniques were tried out in the theater with stunning results, and audiences in Moscow and Petrograd were treated to grand film extravaganzas the like of which G. W. Griffith never dreamed of. Yesenin and Kliuev, Maiakovsky and Khlebnikov, broke down the barriers to new forms of poetry. Prose meanwhile saw a rebirth of the Russian novel. Although some writers floundered about producing mere trivialities, others, like Sholokhov, Leonov and Gladkov, laid the foundations for some of the more lasting positive elements in Soviet letters.

There was a quality of vitality and freshness about some of the literature of this decade. Zamiatin's utopian novel *We* is fascinating. Written in the Soviet Union of 1920, but published abroad, it depicts with uncanny vision the monolithic technocracy that was to emerge from the Bolshevik blueprints. This was also the decade that produced Bulgakov's *Master and Margarita*, at once an amazing story of persecution and frustration, a satire on Soviet life in the 1920's, and a philosophical disquisition — all ingeniously woven together in a web of the most disparate elements. For some reason, Struve postpones dealing with *Master and Margarita* to a projected sequel volume, but in the reviewer's opinion it should not have been omitted here. The novel was conceived and written in the late 1920's and reflects the life and problems of the time. Moreover, the story of its nonpublication inside the Soviet Union has relevance for the more recent trials and tribulations of Soviet literature. Who knows what other daring literary experiments of the day might still be hidden away in "desk drawers" awaiting their authors' posthumous restoration to respectability?

The early 1930's saw the Soviet government consolidate and harness the literary forces under its control in the new Union of Writers. Andrei Zhdanov, the official expositor of Stalinist orthodoxy in culture, laid down the rules of "socialist realism" and designated it as the only acceptable literary method. Quoting Stalin, Zhdanov termed authors "engineers of the human mind" and handed them a "blueprint" for applying their art in the service of communism. No deviation, esthetic or ideological, was to be tolerated. As post-Stalin revelations confirm, the 1930's were horror-filled years. Soviet literature, forced to conform, produced countless stereotyped works with so-called "positive heroes" dedicated heart and soul to the building of a glorious socialist future.

As the 1940's began, the growing external menace of Nazism caused the Soviet regime to ease

Reviewers in This Issue

NICOLAS SPULBER—Professor of Economics at Indiana University (Bloomington); author of *Socialist Management and Planning; Topics in Comparative Socialist Economics*, 1971.

LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD—Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Cambridge); a former policy planner on UN affairs in the US Department of State; author of a forthcoming book entitled *Foreign Policy for the Disillusioned.*

MAURICE FRIEDBERG—Professor of Slavic Languages and Literatures, Indiana University (Bloomington); author of, most recently, *The Jew in Post-Stalin Soviet Literature* (1970).

LUDMILLA B. TURKEVICH—Professor of Russian and Chairman of the Russian Department at Douglass College, Rutgers University (New Brunswick, N.J.); compiler of *Spanish Literature in Russia and in the Soviet Union, 1735-1964*, 1967, and author of numerous monographs and articles on Russian and Soviet literature.

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internal pressures, and the ensuing struggle for survival fused the entire nation into a solid entity united by patriotism. Amazingly, socialist realism's "blueprint" for literature became suffused with human pathos and meaning. The brave Soviet soldier depicted as a "positive hero" breathed an air of stirring authenticity. There was no need for the regime to challenge the realism of the writers' portrayal of the collective heroism and sacrifice of the Leningrad and Stalingrad sieges, or of the Red Army's marches east or west. Conversely, no Soviet writer was disposed to question the authority and determination of the socialist leaders. For the Soviet people, the conflict was not "World War II," but the "Great Patriotic War" for the defense of the motherland. As Struve relates, the literature that sprang from the conflict was often intensely spontaneous and moving —such, for example, as some of the war poetry of Inber, Simonov, Aliger and Bergholts.

The experiences of wartime, contacts with the West during the struggle, and the temporary relaxation of cultural controls combined to breathe new spirit into Soviet literature, but only briefly, for the renewal of Soviet suspicions of and hostility toward the Western world soon brought a return to rigid ideological controls over all cultural life. To drive their point home, the leaders made scapegoats of two exceedingly gifted authors—the humorist Zoshchenko and the poetess Anna Akhmatova. This episode, called by Struve the "Zhdanov Bombshell," is presented in detail, using updated material. (Although Akhmatova survived this ordeal by some twenty years, her later published poetry lacks the inspiration of her earlier works.) After this new outbreak of literary persecution, the "freeze" remained on until after Stalin's death in 1953.

In his sequel volume, Struve promises to deal with the literature of the post-Stalin era, some of which has provided chilling glimpses into the hidden realities of the Stalin times. Compared with the searing honesty of the submerged literature that has come to light in the last decade, the published literature of the Stalin era was merely a thing of shadows, reflections. It has taken works like Solzhenitsyn's *First Circle* to impress on us to some degree what Stalin's impact on Russia really was.

The flowering of Soviet literature following Stalin's death is indeed a topic worthy of careful investigation. It raised hopes that the promises held forth for Russian culture in the first postrevolutionary decade would at last be fulfilled. However, whether these hopes will be realized remains an open question.

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Notes & Views
Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20547.*

POLISH POLITICS

TO THE EDITORS: The article by Adam Bromke entitled "A New Political Style," which you published in your September-October 1972 issue as one of two dealing with "Poland under Gierek," contains certain doubtful points—*e.g.*, in some of the translations.

But the main point that I would like to raise here is connected with the part of the article which deals with Gierek's allegedly seeking "to broaden his base of popular support by taking actions specifically designed to win mass support outside the party rank and file" (p. 11). This observation, concerning personalities at the central level, is then illustrated by the case of Mrs. Skibniewska, made a Deputy Speaker of the Sejm, and Prof. Groszkowski, made Chairman of the Presidium of the "National Unity Front" (and two other non-party men made deputy chairmen).

In fact, the creation of a *third* post of Deputy Speaker so as to have a non-party lady architect placed there was pure political window-dressing—even more so as the Sejm, though certainly more active than before 1956—is still mostly a rubber-stamp body having only minor legislative authority and control. The "National Unity Front," on the other hand, is a propaganda transmission belt from the party to the non-party population, with the task of drumming up some support or at least lessening some tensions by creating the illusion that "all are equal." Its efforts toward these ends are reflected, for instance, in a resolution of the Front of April 1972 stating, *inter alia*, that "We are all responsible for the fate of the fatherland . . . party members and non-party people" *(Trybuna Ludu,* April 7, 1972). A truly idyllic picture—all sharing equal duties (though not rights!)—and note the word "fatherland." Thus the placing of a non-party man at the top of the "Front" and of two other non-party people among the six existing deputy chairmen is nothing more than what the rulers believe to be clever political cosmetics.

While noting these small gestures which are without consequence, Bromke completely overlooked evidence of the reverse trend under Gierek. In the first place, the Cabinet in the Gomulka era included at least one non-party minister, and at one time there were two (both professors, one responsible for the Merchant Marine and the other for Health and Social Welfare). But under Gierek, the last non-party man disappeared from the Cabinet after the March 1972 "elections." Secondly, under Gomulka, a non-party scholar was always Chairman of the Polish Academy of Sciences, a post corresponding in Poland to ministerial rank; but under Gierek the last incumbent (Prof. Groszkowski) was replaced in 1971 by a strong party man (Prof. Trzebiatowski, a member of the Central Committee). Thus non-party specialists were eliminated from all top-level posts involving real responsibilities. If any meaningful talk about "national unity" under the Communist party were ever initiated, it would require at least—say—five or six non-party people being placed in ministerial positions (and a few dozen in immediately lower ones, such as deputy ministers, ambassadors, etc.).

What must be strongly stressed is the fact that there are two increasingly distinct groups of citizens in Poland: the overprivileged party members and the non-party pariahs. If you belong to the latter, you might even have fought against the Nazis, and yet you might, for instance, be thrown out of your Warsaw home to a much worse flat somewhere in a bad district, so that your apartment could be transformed into a "diplomatic flat" for an Eastern or Western youngster with, judging from the size of the apartment in question, the rank of third secretary at most (see *Zycie Warszawy,* Sept. 29, 1972). If, on the other hand, you belong to the party elite, you might advertise in the same *Zycie Warszawy* (Oct. 21, 1972) that you were looking for a maid to serve you in Moscow!

RICHARD SZAWLOWSKI
Associate Professor of Political Science
University of Calgary
Alberta, Canada

PROF. BROMKE REPLIES: I do not think there is any major quarrel between Richard Szawlowski and myself in evaluating the limited scope of the conciliatory gestures by Gierek toward the non-party people. All that Szawlowski does is give more evidence, all of which I could not include in what was a general (and already overlong) article.

Szawlowski is wrong, however, in stating that I do not produce enough evidence of an opposite trend. I do so in no uncertain terms, supporting my own views with quotations from writers in Poland, virtually all through p. 12. Indeed, in my conclusion I single out the question of "entrusting greater responsibility and authority to non-party people" as one of the key problems in contemporary Poland (p. 18).

ADAM BROMKE
Professor of Political Science
Carleton University
Ottawa, Canada

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DMOWSKI'S BIAS

TO THE EDITORS: Professor Roman Szporluk describes Roman Dmowski as "the prominent Polish statesman and nationalist" ("The Plight of the Minorities," *Problems of Communism,* September-October 1972). That Dmowski was prominent there can be no dispute, but to describe him as a statesman and nationalist is like describing Hitler as "the prominent Austrian-born German statesman and nationalist."

The chief characteristic of Dmowski was his antisemitism, which obsessed him just as much as Jew-hatred obsessed Hitler. Convinced that the Germans and the Jews were the chief enemies of the Polish people, Dmowski created the Endecja, the first antisemitic party in Polish history. Moreover, although Professor Szporluk describes him as a nationalist, he convinced millions of Poles that their only future as a people lay in becoming part of a Judaeophobic and anti-liberal and anti-socialist Tsarist Russia and that all the Polish attempts to recover independence, from the Kosciuszko Insurrection to the 1905 Revolution, were the work of Jews and Freemasons.

During the First World War and after, Dmowski believed and preached that the chief enemies of Poland's restoration and existence were the Jews and the Germans. He charged the Jews, especially those of Germany, Britain and the United States, with responsibility for Poland's failure to establish frontiers in the West that would have been almost identical with those achieved by Poland thanks to Stalin after the Second World War. His *bête noire* was Lloyd George, whom he repeatedly describes as "Germany's spokesman" and "the instrument of Jewish policies." (R. Dmowski: *Polityka polska i odbudowanie panstwa,* Hanover, 1947, V.2, *passim.*) Germany's policies after her defeat in the First World War were determined, according to Dmowski, on the evening of November 23, 1918, at the congress of all the German Freemason lodges held in Dorotheenstrasse in Berlin.

On the following day there were reports circulating all over Berlin that a pact had been signed at the congress between the German Freemasons and the Jews, which provided for the Jews a free hand to act as it suited them inside Germany and also gave them a number of leading positions in the political life of Germany. In return, the Jews undertook to defend Germany's interests at the peace conference. . . . The full costs of the pact were to be borne by Germany in the shape of internal disorganization and the disintegration of its national forces, as well as by the nations which it would be possible to wrong at the peace conference in favor of Germany, Poland to be the chief sufferer. (Ibid., p. 4).

Dmowski continued to regard the Jews and Germans —in that order—as Poland's chief enemies until Hitler's accession to power. Then, his Jew-hatred being the dominant force in his intellectual and emotional makeup, he declared that the Germans had ceased to threaten Poland because the German *Drang nach Osten* had been the work of the Jews and Hitler was busy liquidating Jewish power in Germany. Adolf Nowaczynski, the most brilliant popularizer of Dmowski's ideas among Poland's *intelligentsia,* could therefore write in the No. 29 issue of *Prosto z Mostu,* only a few weeks before Hitler's invasion of his country, that ". . . if we have a war over Gdansk, we shall owe it to the extent of 50 percent to the fact that in 1918 the Gdansk statistics noted the presence of 10,427 Jews in the city."

In his study, "Polish-Jewish Relations during the Second World War," Emanuel Ringelblum, the historian of the Warsaw Ghetto, asked: "Was it right that when from all over Poland the trains of death were carting the Jews to Treblinka and other places of slaughter, the last sight of God's world they carried away with them should have been the indifferent and even gloating expressions on the faces of their Polish neighbors?" For this state of affairs the man described by Professor Szporluk as a prominant statesman and nationalist bore a responsibility second to none.

The events of 1967-69 leading to the formal liquidation of Jewish presence on Polish soil after a history of over ten centuries must be regarded as the final triumph of Dmowski's ideas. They have proved stronger than the ideas epitomized by Kosciusko, Mickiewicz and even Pilsudski, who all three were of Lithuano-Byelorussian origins and saw Poland as an idea of an ideal commonwealth of peoples and not as it really was. Above all, Dmowski's ideas have triumphed over those of Marx, whose exponents Dmowski described in 1905 as "syphilis in the Polish national body." The antisemitic campaign of 1967-69, whose chief theme was that the "Zionists" had allied themselves with the "West German revenge-seekers" and the "US imperialists" in a worldwide conspiracy against Poland, was nothing else but an updated version of Dmowski's and his party's view of Polish history during the First World War and after. And no wonder that it should have been so, since the men who organized the campaign are former Endeks or former members of the fascist ONR or have been brought up on Dmowski's ideas, which combined loyalty to Tsarist Russia with Jew-hatred.

R. AINSZTEIN
Little Hadham,
Herts, England

PROF. SZPORLUK REPLIES: Mr. Ainsztein has evidently read only the first part of the sentence in which Dmowski was identified as "the prominent Polish statesman and nationalist." Had he read it to the end, he would have noticed that its point was to draw attention to Dmowski's antisemitic position. In a later part of the review Mr. Ainsztein would have found those Communists who in 1967-1968 pursued antisemitic measures described as Dmowski's spiritual heirs. Because Dmowski had been one of the men who helped bring about Poland's independence after World War I, had served as head of the Polish National Committee in Paris during the war, and had been Poland's delegate to the Peace Conference (he signed the Treaty of Versailles on Poland's behalf), his standing in Polish opinion in 1925, when his *Polityka polska* was published, was higher than that of an ordinary politician. So much greater therefore was his responsibility, and so much more harmful and dangerous were prejudice and hatred when preached by a man like him.

ROMAN SZPORLUK
Assoc. Professor of History,
University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, Mich.

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STUDIES OF MARXISM

TO THE EDITORS: One of your Marxist contributors, Professor Howard Sherman, reviewing (November–December 1972) two expositions of Marxism by a Trotskyite leader who avoids quoting Marx, claims that "the *dogmatic conservative* critic's approach" is *"often* encountered in books on Marx." He defines such an approach as one which "assumes that Marx is *always* wrong and uses *voluminous* quotes" from him, *"always* taken out of context," simply "to prove that he is *not worth discussing"* at all (emphasis mine).

To support these several assertions, would Mr. Sherman care to specify even as many as ten such books out of the hundreds of studies of Marxism by significant authors published for the educated public in America or Western Europe during (say) the past ten years? Maybe it is Cold-War-like to say so, but I suspect that the deplorably persistent intellectual obsession with Marxism in one form or another—another writer in the same issue describes it as "part of the global cultural and power-political establishment"—is accentuated by the relative paucity of recent works (comparable to earlier analysee by Böhm-Bawerk, Bober, Robbins, Federn, Popper, von Mises, and Bochenski, for instance) which show with accurate documentation not only that Marx was no "prophet" but also that he reached incorrect conclusions about contemporary phenomena precisely because of his erroneous methodology.

D.L.W. ASHTON (MA)
Connaught School
London, England

PROF. SHERMAN REPLIES: In answer to the letter by Mr. Ashton, I do have to admit that he is still affected by the Cold War. He implies that the "hundreds of studies of Marxism by significant authors . . . during the last ten years" have been quite objective, unlike earlier attacks on Marx. I can only say that *almost all* of these studies written for the general public in the United States or Western Europe continue to be "dogmatic conservative criticisms" built on distortions of Marx's thought. It would be unfair to pick out just ten of them. Nor do I blame these authors as individuals. Since the ruling ideology is in fierce opposition to Marxism, it would be surprising if most popular and academic works did not follow the same line.

Of course, there has been some difference in recent years. Since the Cold War has died down and coexistence is more the fashion, the *style* of the newer works is mostly less vituperative. As always, they claim to be objective, but their attack is simply somewhat more insidious and muted than before. It might be added that I agree with Mr. Ashton if he means that most of the recent attacks are not original but merely repeat the arguments of the critics from Böhm-Bawerk to Bochenski whom he has cited. For example, almost all the modern works on Marx's method continue with the misconception that Marx believed in a kind of mechanical, simple-minded form of economic determinism. Or to take the most distinguished example in economics, Paul Samuelson's most recent article in the *Journal of Economic Literature* makes a considerable pretense of objectivity toward Marx's labor theory of value, but still puts forth the same alleged contradiction between Volumes I and III of *Capital* that was argued by Böhm-Bawerk. You will find a different approach to Marx only in the works of the young radicals in the social sciences, as seen in the *Review of Radical Political Economics* (Ann Arbor, Mich.), or in my book *Radical Political Economy* (New York, Basic Books, 1972).

HOWARD SHERMAN
Professor of Economics
University of California
Riverside, Calif.

PEKING IN AFRICA

TO THE EDITORS: Lucius Beebe's review of *China and Africa, 1949–1970,* which I authored (*Problems of Communism,* November–December 1972), misrepresents my text and includes other inaccuracies. First, he writes:

Larkin, while acknowledging that "specific and usually localized political breakdowns have occurred," tends to overemphasize the degree of political stability and economic advance prevailing in the newly-independent states, whose elite leaderships—he says—have for the most part enjoyed "uninterrupted tenure."

This is a rather unfair misstatement of my text:

In some cases [the new elites] have enjoyed an uninterrupted tenure, but sporadic and usually localized political breakdowns have occurred, and in some instances—Congo (K), Sudan, and Nigeria—violence has taken place on a massive scale.

Beebe also writes that

Larkin gives little credence to the wealth of evidence supporting the view that Peking furnished military equipment, money, and ideological indoctrination to the guerrillas fighting against the legal central government in Leopoldville . . .

But, on the contrary, I record and accept evidence of support for anti-Leopoldville forces in the form of equipment (p. 73), money (p. 181) and instruction (p. 72n).

Beebe rightly asserts that the book emphasizes the years to 1966. I agree that the Tanzania-Zambia railway is "the most impressive and significant aid project" and discuss it (pp. 96–102), though the chief commitments were made after 1966. That "many of the liberation movements were founded" after 1966 is simply wrong: none of the acknowledged groups in Rhodesia, South Africa, Southwest Africa, Angola and Mozambique were founded after 1966 (*cf.* Table 5 in my book). Lamenting that "the immediate post-Cultural Revolution period is minimized"—which I take to mean the period from the *onset* of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution—Beebe claims that "careful screening" of sources cited reveals "very few dated after 1966"; I count 75 in four chapters, without being careful.

I agree that additional data on Southern Africa would be useful and regret that in attempting to write a brief work on China's policies toward some 50 states and regions I have drawn an Africa which has less depth and dimension than its history deserves. But I am confident my judgments are better than those of Mr. Beebe, who would have us believe that

Advancement of Peking's long-range objective . . . would only require the acquisition of control over certain key elements of the African regime's policies, and

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such control could be achieved subtly, with little awareness on the part of the victims of what was happening.

Fu Manchu strikes again!

BRUCE D. LARKIN
Assoc. Professor of Politics
University of California
Santa Cruz, Calif.

PROF. BEEBE REPLIES: I regret that Professor Larkin took such umbrage with respect to my review of his book *China and Africa, 1949–1970.* In my opinion the work has some very fine features, which I commented upon as scholarly contributions, but I feel it has some weak features which I also believe deserve emphasis. I still contend that the following sentence reflects general political stability:

In some cases [the new elites] have enjoyed an uninterrupted tenure, but sporadic and usually [*emphasis mine*] *localized political breakdowns have occurred, and in some instances—Congo (K), Sudan, and Nigeria—violence has taken place on a massive scale.*

This simply is not the fact—nearly all of the independent countries have had coups, attempted coups, political assassinations, and mutinies.

A second major criticism, which Larkin rejected, was his "little credence" given to the evidence supporting Peking's role during the Congo crisis. He did mention the Chinese role—equipment (p. 73), money (p. 181), and instruction (p. 72n). Three isolated references to the means with which the rebels were able to sustain their fight for nearly five years is, in reality, slight attention.

If Mr. Larkin will screen his bibliography, he will note that few of the entries are dated after 1966; he has, however, made generous use of more recent FBIS and JMJP sources in footnotes, and for this error on my part I ask his forgiveness.

I still believe that only a casual nod to Southern Africa, the target area for all of the liberation movements which were formed prior to 1966, is a serious oversight. This is the area in which major future African problems and hostilities will be centered, and the beginnings of those hostilities had certainly manifested themselves at the time Larkin was writing his book. Southern Africa is also part of Africa.

In the petty matter of judgment, I am not Fu Manchu, but I will stand on my own. It is not in the northern countries of sub-Saharan Africa that the Chinese have continued to increase and consolidate their gains; it is rather in the countries of South Central Africa, where the liberation movements are headquartered and which are contiguous to the white-ruled targets.

LUCIUS BEEBE
Assistant Professor of
Political Science
The Citadel
Charleston, S.C.

MORE PROBLEMS OF ECONOMICS

(The comments below continue an exchange of views initiated in the Correspondence Section of the January-February 1973 issue—Eds.)

TO THE EDITORS: Since the Brown-Neuberger rebuttal to my response to their review article (*Problems of Communism,* January–February, 1972) still shows a lack of comprehension of elements of national income accounting, a counter-rebuttal is essential.

Hungarian Net Agricultural Product
(1950=100)

Year	Official NMP Series I	Official NMP Series II	Official Net Output Series I	Official Net Output Series II	Our Index
1960	107	106	101	102	101.4
1961	102	100	96	96	104.2
1962	104	104	99	101	102.4
1963	109	110	104	107	113.4
1964	112	113	108	110	116.8
1965	101	102	95	99	102.7

Brown and Neuberger see a "paradox" in the fact that my GNP series makes the Hungarian economy "appear more stable than do the official series." It surely is not "explained simply by the difference in weights. . . ." Brown and Neuberger should face more squarely the difference in concept between GNP and the net material product (NMP) version of national income, the latter a truncated concept of aggregate production. The services included in GNP (but omitted from NMP)—housing, government, professional and personal services, etc.—are relatively stable components. A volatile sector, such as agriculture, will have a much more dampened effect on the trend of GNP than on that of NMP.

Let us go further. The Brown-Neuberger reply states that something about my "statistical methodology" must be at fault, and it sees some "clue" in my handling of "net agricultural product, which figures in both the NMP and GNP concepts." They err; net agricultural product as such does not figure in GNP. The reviewers state that somehow "arbitrary adjustments" for depreciation affect my GNP calculations. This is nonsense. GNP in agriculture, in the way it has to be calculated by everyone, is completely invariant in regard to depreciation. GNP comes first; net national product (NNP) is derivative. Since I do not use NNP in my article, the Brown-Neuberger tabulation comparing the official net Index and Czirjak's NNP in agriculture is irrelevant.

Official national income statistics in Eastern Europe for the 1950's are certainly not beyond question. Although Hungarian statistics have been improving, uncritical acceptance of official measures for sophisticated production-function or other mathematical-economic analyses with the aim of showing a "precise picture" of development is hazardous, especially for the 1950's. Responsible Hungarian economists who know their data series do not entertain such aspirations of precision. Findings are bound to be relative to concepts of production, crop-year definitions, prices, choices of indexes, alternative weighting regimens, and analytical procedures. One cannot speak of a single "accurate picture" under the circumstances;

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various imprecise pictures are bound to emerge. Those whose foundations are explicit and published can be subjected to further study. The Czirjak index is fully documented; the NMP is not. One might well ask why there was such a big break (38 percent) in the official net series between 1951 and 1952. Is this to be taken at face value, without checking, as reflecting "genuine change in the output of Hungarian agriculture"? The official index for total crop and animal production shows a much smaller decline.

Brown and Neuberger charge that "Alton's recalculated series" published in Occasional Paper No. 14 (hereafter OP–14) of the Research Project on National Income (prepared by Czirjak) "diverge markedly" from the official index after 1958. Unfortunately, they omitted the more recent figures from the tabulation they copied from OP–14, making it impossible to judge the charge of divergence. On p. 77 I reproduce from OP-14 the official index and our index, and show three additional, more recently published official net indexes for agriculture taken from official Hungarian sources. I use 1950=100 since the more recent indexes are not given for 1949. We note *marked convergence*, not the opposite, between the official indexes and ours during 1960–1965. This would seem to settle the charges made by Brown.

The original review article speaks of "preparation for the takeoff" in studies of East European economies being generated evidently by the work of Brown and Neuberger at Indiana and elsewhere. Refined models for studying economic development are to be recommended so long as some modesty regarding the results is manifested. One should guard, however, against the possibility of GI-GO (garbage in—garbage out), especially when dealing with official data for the 1950's.

THAD P. ALTON
425 Riverside Drive
New York, New York

TO THE EDITORS: In my letter of February 16, 1972, I pointed out the alteration of my text to include the word "short," which in the review (p. 76) is juxtaposed to "a relative abundance of capital." This certainly colors things. The statement in my *Summary* (p. 439) was intended to be more than a casual "at one point" remark. The reviewers belabor the obvious.

A. A. Brown and E. Neuberger's only reference (p. 76 of the review article) to A. A. Brown, "CES Production Function Estimates in Postwar Hungary," IDRC Internal Research Memorandum, MS, Bloomington, Indiana, International Development Research Center, Indiana University, May 1970, is not available from Indiana, and a discussion paper, Brown and Neuberger, "Dynamic L-Shaped CES Functions in Eastern Europe" (Windsor University, Canada) contains the caution: "Preliminary. Not to be cited without authors' permission." The authors' rebuttal to my reply now cites Weitzman's article, a responsible statement that can be quoted. Weitzman speaks (see *American Economic Review*, September, 1970, pp. 676 ff.) of the "weak theoretical underpinnings" of the aggregate production function and the "incomplete" or even "ambiguous" picture that at best it yields (p. 676). With further cautions against "misplaced notions of rigor," and assuming that the "somewhat nebulous concepts of aggregate output, capital, and labor have been fairly represented" by the indexes he uses, Weitzman presents his findings for the USSR. In his conclusion (p. 685), Weitzman is tempted to speculate on the implications for future Soviet growth. This he does, warning that there has to be a wide margin of error even in short-run projections, which themselves are subject to three "ifs": (i) *if* (italics Weitzman's) Soviet industry is accurately described by the production function, (ii) *if* the parameter values have been accurately identified, and (iii) *if* they do not change very much in the near future. Then, he concludes that "it would appear a strategy of strong capital accumulation must be considerably less successful for the present relatively mature Soviet economy than for its labor-surplus predecessor."

Brown-Neuberger call this "strong evidence"; evidently Weitzman does not. When it is weakened further in their attempt to have it speak for Hungary, what have they shown? I have not seen Brown-Neuberger's results, but knowing the history of the official Hungarian industrial production index, with diverse methodologies applying to its various links and the cautions regarding it voiced by Hungarian statisticians, I would feel that Brown-Neuberger should tread exceedingly lightly on their constructions.

LASZLO CZIRJAK
44 Shady Lane
Greenwich, Conn.

PROFESSORS BROWN AND NEUBERGER REPLY: We hope that our exchange of letters can close in a constructive way. Let us begin by giving credit to Alton for his emphasis that the adjusted GNP (gross national product) series are likely to be more stable than the official NMP (net material product) series for certain methodological reasons. We will consider three main points in this regard.

First, both services of a material nature (*e.g.*, transportation) and those of a nonmaterial nature (*e.g.*, education) are included in the GNP series, while only the former type figure in NMP. If nonmaterial services tend to fluctuate less over time than other components of GNP (material services and output of goods), then the GNP series will be more stable than the NMP series. Assuming that the volume of nonmaterial services does show a greater stability, the question is to what extent the stability of aggregate output is affected by the inclusion of nonmaterial services. We return to this question below.

Second, depreciation is included in the calculation of GNP but not of NMP. If we assume that depreciation tends to rise at a relatively stable rate over time, then the gross series will be more stable than the net. This will not be true, however, if depreciation allowances are arbitrarily changed from time to time. As we have noted in our previous communication, the usefulness of Czirjak's agricultural output series was vitiated by arbitrary jumps in depreciation allowances and repair-and-maintenance charges (Occasional Paper No. 14 of the Research Project on National Income, p. 115). However, as Alton reassures us in his reply, he properly did not rely on the final net agricultural output series which appeared in that Occasional Paper when he calculated his aggregate ad-

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justed GNP series. There thus remains only the question of the extent to which exclusion of depreciation from the official NMP series increases its instability vis-à-vis the GNP series.

Third, a possible explanation for the greater stability observed in the recalculated GNP series than in the official NMP series is the exclusion of the highly volatile foreign trade price-equalization gains or losses from the former. Although Alton did not refer to this difference in his communication, it would lend support to his claim that his series should be expected to be more stable. Foreign trade price-equalization gains and losses, used to adjust the internal and external valuation of exports and imports, appear only in the official national income accounts and vanish when adjusted factor-cost prices are used.[1] Thus, we may also examine to what extent the exclusion of the foreign trade price-equalization account (which is generally negative in Hungary) affects adjusted GNP.

We present in the table fluctuations in the volume of alternative output aggregates for Hungary in the years 1949-67. The measure used was the standard error of the least squares fit to the logarithms of the index of growth.[2] The table shows that both the exclusion of foreign trade losses (*cf.* columns 1 and 2) and the inclusion of nonmaterial services (*cf.* columns 2 and 3) tend to reduce fluctuations in aggregate output. It appears, however, that the effect of these adjustments is relatively small, and they still fail to explain the considerably greater stability of Alton's GNP series. To some extent at least, the remaining difference may be the result of the inclusion of depreciation allowances in the GNP. Since we have no data to assess the effect of depreciation, we will only cite George Staller, who has argued that

Depreciation charges are small relative to national income in the planned economies, and consequently their exclusion could not increase significantly the measured degree of instability even if we make the extreme assumption that their growth rate was constant.[3]

To conclude, the evidence presented provides partial support for Alton's claim that the methodological differences between the GNP and the NMP provide an explanation of the greater stability of his adjusted output series.

However, even for the 1950's, a careful study of the official statistics can be

Fluctuations in Output Indexes for Hungary: 1949–67

	Net Material Product [a]	Net Material Product [b]	Net National Product [c]	Gross National Product
Market prices				
Official index [d]	6.4			
Constant 1949 prices	6.9	6.6	6.4	
Constant 1954 prices	6.8	5.9	6.2	
Constant 1959 prices	6.6	6.3	5.9	
Factor-cost prices				
Constant 1955 prices (Alton)				4.8

[a] Including foreign trade loss.
[b] Excluding foreign trade loss.
[c] Net material product plus nonmaterial services.
[d] At comparable prices. The official index is a chain index of three constant price series: 1949-54, at constant 1949 prices; 1954-59, at constant 1954 prices; and 1959-67, at constant 1959 prices. The constant price indexes are linked at 1954 and 1959, respectively.
SOURCES: Calculated in the case of market prices from the Hungarian statistical yearbook for various years, and in the case of Alton's factor-cost prices, from his *Compendium* article (p. 46).

constructive, in spite of their admitted shortcomings. It is of interest, for example, that the official NMP series exhibits strong fluctuations in the 1950's, which Hungarian economists have called the "bing-bang cycle." Thus the absolute declines of the official NMP in 1952 and 1954 (and the very sharp decline in 1956) contributed directly and indirectly to the Hungarian planners' willingness by the mid-1950's to sanction sharp criticisms against the traditional planning system. In fact, the subsequent wholesale disillusionment with the old system in the 1960's, which culminated in the establishment of the New Economic Mechanism, was rooted in the earlier disenchantment that began in 1952 when the official series first registered a decline in NMP despite massive inputs.

As for the components of aggregate output, we feel that agricultural instability in the official series is worthy of further study. Alton raised the question of why such a big break (38 percent) occurred in the official net series between 1951 and 1952. We tried to verify his explanation that "the official index for total crop and animal production shows a much smaller decline," but found that a standard official source contradicts this hypothesis at least as far as crop production is concerned—according to that source, crop production in 1952 fell from 1951 levels by about 40 percent or slightly more than the decline in net output.[4]

What is the desirable extent of skepticism regarding official East European statistics? Alton seems to imply that we should be no more willing to accept at face value official reports of adverse events, such as cata-

[1] Treatment of the foreign trade price-equalization loss in calculating GNP at factor cost is discussed in T.P. Alton *et al.*, *Hungarian National Income and Product in 1955* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 78; see also pp. 58 and 61.

[2] The formula is: $\left\{ \text{antilog} \left[\frac{(\log y_t - \log \hat{y}_t)^2}{n-2} \right]^{\frac{1}{2}} - 1 \right\} 100.$

This was one of the several different methods tested by George Staller. As for his alternative methods, he found that "They all led to essentially the same results." See *The American Economic Review* (Evanston, Ill.), June 1964, p. 386.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 387.

[4] According to *Adatok és Adalekok* (Facts and Figures), Budapest, 1957, p. 158, the index of crop production declined from 111 to 67 between 1951 and 1952.

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strophic harvests, than their opposite, *i.e.*, reports of great overachievements. A reminder that we should be unbiased in our evaluation of official statistics is, of course, most welcome. Perhaps one may argue that unpleasant statistics are subjected to more careful official scrutiny before they are released, but we cannot be certain.

We wholeheartedly agree with Laszlo Czirjak's warning about the pitfalls awaiting anyone brave enough to venture into the thickets of East European econometric analyses. We would only point out that utilizing implicit models rather than explicit ones does not reduce the dangers of such inquiry.

As for our other points of disagreement, they are hardly worthy of a continued public debate. Surely, our specific comments on the contributions by Alton and Czirjak were not intended to disparage the painstaking efforts of the Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe to recalculate the official output series. If some of our comments have been critical, we certainly had no desire to denigrate the efforts by Alton and his associates. On the contrary, their pioneering analysis of basic East European data should be encouraged, and this much-needed work should continue.

ALAN A. BROWN
Professor of Economics
University of Windsor
Ontario, Canada
EGON NEUBERGER
Professor of Economics
State University of
New York at Stony Brook

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Problems of Communism

JUNE 1978



CHINA

Economic Growth
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Political Succession
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Bohdan R. Bociurkiw

Book Reviews
Jack Perry
Melvin Croan
Anna M. Cienciala
Stephen Osofsky
Surendra K. Gupta

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Problems of Communism

3

MAY-JUNE 1973 VOL XXII

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Looking Inside China

1 An Economic Reappraisal
by Dwight H. Perkins

13 The Succession Problem
by Ting Wang

25 West Siberia: The Quest for Energy
by John P. Hardt

37 The Shaping of Soviet Religious Policy
by Bohdan R. Bociurkiw

BOOKS

52 The USSR and the Environment
by Jack Perry

55 Ostpolitik—Westpolitik
by Melvin Croan

57 East European Nationalism
by Anna M. Cienciala

60 Rival Agricultural Models
by Stephen Osofsky

65 Indo-Soviet Relations
by Surendra K. Gupta

Cover: Liu Shang-hsiu, Chairman of the Lingpao County Revolutionary Committee, joins peasants in farm work. Photo from *China Pictorial* (Peking), No. 9, 1968, p. 26.

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Looking Inside China

EDITOR'S NOTE: Developments in the last few years have opened new windows into the People's Republic of China for outside observers and at the same time have given birth to new perspectives on old issues. The following articles deal with two aspects of the current Chinese scene in this context. Mr. Perkins reexamines the country's economic progress since the late 1950's in light of the increasing information that has become available after a long statistical blackout. Mr. Ting looks at the question of the political succession to Mao in the wake of Lin Piao's ouster.

An Economic Reappraisal

By Dwight H. Perkins

Ever since the blackout on statistical data from the People's Republic of China began in the early 1960's following the disruption of the nation's data-reporting services, outside appraisal of China's economic performance has had the character of an occult art. Controversies have raged through the relevant literature over whose estimates most accurately portrayed the state of the economy, and both the estimated figures and their interpretation have differed considerably. One group of analysts, for example, argued that China's total farm output in the mid-1960's was no higher than in 1957—a claim which, if true, would have meant that per capita farm production had fallen considerably, given the intervening growth in population. Another group, however, countered with evidence that agricultural output not only had kept pace with population increases but perhaps had even kept a bit ahead of the number of mouths to be fed.

In the spring of 1973, the end of controversy about China's economy is not yet in sight—and perhaps never will be. But the raw material that will make it possible to narrow the range of disagreement between contending analysts is once again beginning to trickle out of China, as the PRC government has at last resumed publishing statistical indicators of national economic performance. To be sure, the statistical blackout of the 1960's was never total, and the volume of data now being released is still small, leaving great gaps in coverage. Nevertheless, the contrast between 1973 and, say, 1969 in this area is very striking—as indeed it is in many other areas as well.

What is it that the new information tells us, and does it jibe with what we thought was happening in the Chinese economy in the middle and late 1960's? First let us see what fresh light this informa-

Currently Professor of Economics and Associate Director of the East Asian Research Center at Harvard University, Mr. Perkins is the author of Agricultural Development in China: 1368-1968, *1969, and* Market Control and Planning in Communist China, *1966. An earlier version of his article was presented to the China Study Group of the Adlai Stevenson Institute of International Affairs, University of Chicago, where the author was previously a Fellow.*

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tion sheds on the rates of growth achieved over the past decade and a half. Then let us attempt an analysis of the policies and organizational changes that lay behind this performance.

Growth Rates in Industry

For many years there has been little doubt that Chinese industry, particularly the producer-goods sector, was growing faster than agriculture and production for consumption in general. Data released during the past two years, however, have made it clear that the differential has been even larger than we had previously thought. It is not that farm output grew more slowly than previous estimates had indicated, but rather that industrial output grew more rapidly. To mention only one key indicator, total steel output in 1970 was 18 million tons and rose to 23 million tons in 1972 (see Table 1), whereas earlier estimates for the middle and late 1960's had generally placed annual steel production at 10 to 12 million tons.[1]

There are still not enough data to come up with a precise estimate of industrial growth, in terms of value added, between 1957 (the last year of plentiful and accurate statistics) and 1972, but a plausible and reasonably narrow range of estimates can be reached. Two kinds of relevant data are now available for the last few years. On the one hand, there are output figures for several important commodities (a number of these are presented in Table 1). On the other hand, there is an officially-released estimate of the gross value of industrial output in 1970, which can be compared—not without some difficulty—to the official figures for the 1950's.

On the basis of the figures given in Table 1, China's crude steel output grew at an average annual rate of 10.2 percent between 1957 and 1972. It does not necessarily follow, of course, that the close correlation that existed in the 1950's between steel production and the total output of producer goods continued into the 1960's. In the 1950's, steel itself and machinery (a big steel user) accounted for a high proportion of the total industrial development program, whereas in the 1960's chemicals, petroleum, nuclear weapons, missiles, and conventional weapons became the leading sectors. Even so, steel and machinery continued to account for a substantial portion of the growth in producer-goods industry, and in addition there were apparently a number of slow-growing sectors (*e.g.*, coal) which tended to offset the impact of chemicals and the like on the growth rate. Hence, even for the 1960's, it is plausible to assume that total producer-goods output increased at a rate similar to, if not identical with, that of steel—say, 9 to 11 percent per year.

Somewhat similar reasoning can be applied to the industrial consumer-goods sector. Again on the basis of the data in Table 1, cotton textile output between 1957 and 1970 grew at an average rate of 4.1 percent a year, although the failure to report any figures for 1971 and 1972 may indicate that output in those years was below or only slightly above 1970. Since most manufactured consumer goods in China are, like textiles, still heavily dependent on agricultural raw materials, and since, moreover, the overall agricultural growth rate was certainly less than 4 percent a year (see below), it is reasonable to assume that the growth rate for industrial consumer goods as a whole closely approximated the relatively low rate for cotton textiles. On the other hand, output of some consumer items not dependent on agriculture, such as bicycles and cloth made of synthetic fibers, is known to have grown at a much higher rate than the average.

Table 1: Selected Output Data for the People's Republic of China, 1957-72

	1957	1970	1971	1972
Crude steel (million tons)	5.35	18	21	23
Chemical fertilizer (million tons)	.63	14	17	20
Petroleum (million tons)	.46	20	25	29
Cotton cloth (billion meters)	5.05	8.5	n.a.[a]	n.a.
Grain (million tons)	185	240	250	240

[a] "n.a." indicates figures are not available.

SOURCES: The 1957 figures were published by the State Statistical Bureau in various periodicals. The 1970, 1971, and 1972 data are either from Edgar Snow's interview with Chou En-lai (*The New Republic* [Washington, DC], March 27, 1971) or from various 1971 and 1972 yearend press releases issued by the New China News Agency.

[1] Steel output, according to Chou En-lai, probably did fall to 10 million tons in at least one year during the main phase of the Cultural Revolution (1967-69), but it is likely to have been well above that figure in 1965 and 1966. See Edgar Snow's report of his talks with the Chinese Premier in *The New Republic* (Washington, DC), March 27, 1971, p. 20.

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A short article such as this is clearly not the place to attempt to present all the arguments and evidence behind a particular set of estimates. The above figures are presented simply to give some idea of what is involved and what the remaining gaps in our knowledge are. Nevertheless, we can use these figures as a starting point toward arriving at an estimate of overall Chinese industrial growth. Thus, if we apply average growth rates of, say, 10 percent for producer goods and 4 percent for consumer goods to 1957 value-added figures for these sectors (in 1952 prices), the result is an annual growth rate for industry as a whole (including mining, handicrafts, and utilities) of about 8 percent for the period between 1957 and 1972.

A careful study by Thomas Rawski, using more data (including provincial data) and a slightly different methodology, comes up with a rate of growth for all industry of 9.4 to 10.4 percent per year between 1957 and 1971.[2] The addition of 1972 would lower the rate somewhat, but not significantly. Rawski's figures are for the gross value of industrial output, not for value added, and use of the latter would probably, although not necessarily, lower the indicated growth rate further. The only recent official figure thus far given out by the Chinese for total gross value of industrial output, namely the figure for 1970 ($90 billion) given by Chinese Premier Chou En-lai to American newsman Edgar Snow,[3] also suggests a growth rate of 9 percent per year for the 1957-70 period, although it is unclear whether the figure was calculated in prices comparable to those of the 1950's.

An average annual rate of growth of 8-9 percent in industrial value added between 1957 and 1972 does not, of course, imply that there was steady growth throughout the period at that rate—far from it. Accelerated development in 1958-59 was followed by a sharp decline in 1960, then by recovery and renewed growth in the early and mid-1960's. Subsequently, when the Cultural Revolution was at its height in 1967-69, it certainly disrupted industry and transport for a time. However, it has now become clearer than ever that these disruptions did not have a long-lived impact. All indications are that China's industrial output in 1970 was above that of 1966, perhaps by a significant margin.[4]

In 1971, the gross value of industrial output was officially stated to have increased by 10 percent over the preceding year,[5] and other published data are consistent with that claim. No figure for 1972 has yet been published, however, and all indications are that the rate of output growth fell sharply. The decline stemmed only partly from difficulties in agriculture, as the rates of growth for steel and petroleum—neither of which is dependent on farm-based raw materials—likewise dropped, although still remaining relatively high.

In sum, the recent statistical information from China seems to confirm that the average annual rate of industrial growth from 1957 through 1972 was approximately 8 to 9 percent. It should be added that this rate, though quite respectable, was well below the rates of the First Five-Year Plan period (1953-57), when the officially estimated rate of growth was 19 percent a year. But a decline from that rate was almost inevitable. The abnormally high growth rate of the 1950's resulted from the existence of much unused capacity at the beginning (1952) and an excessive diversion of investment resources away from other sectors toward industry—a diversion that was bound to have a dramatic impact on output performance in what was then still quite a small sector of the economy.

Growth Rates in Agriculture

Our knowledge of the rate of growth is more solidly based for the agricultural sector than for industry. For one thing, we have a nearly complete series for grain output in the 1960's and early 1970's, and grain accounts for over half the output growth in terms of value added for the entire sector.[6] In addition, we also know something about a number of other key crops. For example, since raw cotton output is closely correlated with the production of

[2] Thomas G. Rawski, "Chinese Industrial Production, 1952-1971," forthcoming in *Review of Economics and Statistics* (Cambridge, Mass.).


[3] See Snow's report of his interview with Chou, *loc. cit.*, p. 21. The $90 billion figure was converted into US dollars at the official exchange rate, but Chou did not specify whether it was based on current or constant prices and, if the latter, for which year. Prices, particularly of industrial products, have been quite stable in China since the early 1950's; however, there have been some variations.

[4] Data for nine provinces plus Peking collected by T.G. Rawski (*loc. cit.*) indicate considerable increases in industrial output in these provinces between 1965 and 1970, but except for Peking, Kirin and Szechwan, the provinces included were not major industrial centers.

[5] New China News Agency (henceforth cited as NCNA), Dec. 31, 1971.

[6] In 1957, for example, grain (including potatoes) accounted for 59 percent of the gross value of agricultural output (in 1933 prices). See D.H. Perkins, *Agricultural Development in China, 1368-1968*, Chicago, Aldine, 1969.

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The Kuochuang brigade of Hsiaohsien County, Anhwei Province, achieves productivity gains in the 1970 harvest.

—Photo from *China Pictorial* (Peking), No. 2, 1971, p. 18.

cotton textiles (with a one-year time lag), and since we now know—as pointed out earlier—that cotton textile output grew at an average rate of 4 percent a year from 1957 to 1970, it follows that the growth rate for raw cotton from 1957 through 1969 must have been approximately the same. By the same reasoning, the apparent decline in cotton textile output growth in 1971 (inferred from Peking's failure to report the production figures for those years) suggests that the same was true of raw cotton output after 1969. As for such other major agricultural crops as soy beans, peanuts and other oil-bearing seeds, the fact that exports of these items have yet to recover to the levels of the 1950's[7] suggests that their rate of output growth has been slow, perhaps below the rate of population increase.

Finally, we have an official Chinese estimate of the gross value of agricultural output in 1970 ($30 billion), although it is uncertain (as in the case of industry) whether the prices used in arriving at this figure are close enough to the prices of the 1950's to make comparison meaningful.[8] If prices in 1970 and 1957 were the same, then the agricultural growth rate averaged 2.3 percent per year. If prices rose (and it is highly unlikely that they fell), the growth rate would be slightly lower. Either way, the rate of increase in the value of farm output as a whole appears, not surprisingly, to be highly correlated with the growth rate of grain output, which averaged 2.0 percent annually between 1957 and 1970, or 1.7 percent if the calculation is carried through 1972 (based on the output figures in Table 1).

Of course, as in the case of industry, production in agriculture did not rise along a steady path. After a bumper harvest in 1958, grain output fell sharply in 1959, 1960 and 1961, and it had only just recovered to the 1957 level by 1963. Between 1963 and 1971, as a result of a major shift of investment resources to agriculture, growth averaged nearly 4 percent, although a decline of 4 percent in 1972 brought the average for the period 1963-72 down to 3.1 percent.[9]

The improvement in the rate of agricultural growth, though it may seem small, is highly significant. Available evidence suggests that China's population, as in the 1950's, continues to increase at a rate of about 2 percent a year.[10] Thus, the growth achieved in agriculture since 1963 has been enough to enable China not merely to keep pace with the food needs of the people, but also to recover the ground lost as a result of the stagnation in agriculture between 1957 and 1963.

Growth in GNP

Estimating the rate of growth of China's Gross National Product (GNP) is more problematical than estimating the growth rates for industry and agriculture alone. In 1957 these two sectors accounted for roughly 77 percent of China's total GNP; hence, to arrive at a growth rate for GNP over the 1957-72

[7] Chinese trade figures are based on reports of China's trading partners and appear in various places, including A.H. Usack and R.E. Batsavage, "The International Trade of the People's Republic of China," in *People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment*, A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1972.

[8] Snow interview with Chou, *loc. cit.*, p. 21.

[9] The figures for 1971 and 1972 were released by NCNA, Dec. 28, 1972 (see Foreign Broadcast Information Service *Daily Report*, Dec. 29, 1972, pp. 3-4).

[10] No official figures on the growth of China's population have been published since the 1950's, but Chou En-lai has recently told at least one visitor that the rate is still about 2 percent per annum (see *The New York Times*, Jan. 28, 1973).

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period, one must have a figure for the remaining 23 percent, *i.e.*, the services sector. Unfortunately, there are almost no solid data on which to base an estimate of growth in services. About the best one can do is to assume that certain services (finance and trade) grew at the same rate as industry plus agriculture, and that others (residential rents, personal services, and government administration) kept pace with population. On this basis, the annual growth rate for the service sector as a whole between 1957 and 1972 can be estimated at about 4 percent.

Combining this figure with the indicated growth rates for industry (8 percent) and agriculture (3 percent), we arrive at an average annual rate of GNP growth between 1957 and 1972 of between 5 and 5.5 percent. If, however, we calculate on the basis of 1933 prices instead of those of 1952 (because the former give weights to industry and agriculture that are closer to those of other less developed nations), the indicated rate of GNP growth falls slightly, to between 4.5 and 5 percent.[11] In 1971 the rate appears to have risen to between 7 and 8 percent, but in 1972 it fell back to between 3 and 4 percent, mainly because of the poor grain and cotton harvests and the secondary effects of those poor harvests.

In any event, it appears from the foregoing discussion that, in spite of the economic setbacks of 1960-61 caused by the Great Leap Forward and the Soviet withdrawal of technicians, and in spite of the disruptions resulting from the Cultural Revolution in 1967-69, China has managed an overall rate of economic growth that has kept well ahead of the increase in population. Most of the rise in per capita product has resulted from growth in the producer-goods sector, but if 1963 is used as a base year rather than 1957, there has also been some increase in the per capita availability of consumer goods.

Investment and Planning in Industry

Let us turn our attention now to the factors responsible for this quite respectable economic performance. One factor of major importance has apparently been the maintenance of a high rate of investment. While there are no official figures on the investment rate, it is possible to arrive at some general conclusions on the basis of what we know about the producer-goods sector. Thus, it is clear from the reasoning in the preceding sections that the share of producer goods in China's GNP has doubled between 1957 and 1972, and we know that these goods are generally used for one of three purposes—*i.e.*, for investment, as inputs into other producer and consumer goods, and for the production of military equipment.[12] Given the much higher rate of growth in the output of producer goods as compared to that of consumer goods, the proportion of total producer-goods output used as inputs into the production of consumer items has undoubtedly declined. As for the military share of producer goods output, even though China's expenditures on military equipment and installations have risen sharply, particularly since 1960 when Soviet military supplies were cut off, it is unlikely that they could have absorbed all of the very marked increase indicated above in the overall share of producer goods in GNP. Hence, the most plausible conclusion is that there was a rise in the proportion of such goods allocated to investment.[13]

A second major factor in China's economic performance over the past decade has been the regime's arrival in the early 1960's—after years of experimentation and changing policies—at settled ways of organizing the economy that have evidently proven effective. Because the organization of the industrial sector is quite different in form, if not in spirit, from that of agriculture, the two will be dealt with separately. Let us look at the industrial sector first.

In the early 1950's, China introduced the highly centralized Soviet system of planning and control, complete with a powerful planning commission in Peking which, in principle, was expected to exercise direct control over all industrial firms above the handicraft level. However, because China had tens of thousands of industrial firms with widely different technologies and, in many cases, with primitive accounting procedures, it was found to be totally impossible for the central authorities to keep track of performance at the plant level in each of these enterprises. To remedy this situation, it was decided

[11] These calculations are based, in part, on data for the year 1957, in 1952 and 1933 prices, from T.C. Liu and K.C. Yeh, *The Economy of the Chinese Mainland, National Income and Economic Development, 1933-1957*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 66.

[12] Producer goods can also be exported, but Chinese exports of such goods have been quite small.

[13] It is also possible, of course, that the share of machinery and equipment in investment rose in the 1960's, but the rise would have to have been very large if the rate of investment remained the same as in the 1950's or fell.

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in late 1957 and early 1958 to decentralize authority over production and even over investment choices, but this decision was carried out in such a way during 1958 and 1959 that there was in fact no authority responsible for coordinating inputs and outputs. The result was chaos, with firms churning out items that were often of low quality and of little use to anyone.

Beginning in the early 1960's, order was restored —not by recentralizing economic authority in Peking, but by placing it in the hands of provincial and county (*hsien*) planning and control organs. Individuals firms still had to meet essentially physical output targets and stay below targeted levels of input use, but principal responsibility for drawing up these targets was in the provincial and county seats, not in Peking. Only a few enterprises were controlled at the national level, and the number of firms in this category appears to have declined throughout the 1960's. As long as most of a firm's inputs were purchased within a given region and its output sold within that same region, there was no need for coordination on a national scale.[14]

With regard to the impact of the Cultural Revolution on the economic structure, the available evidence suggests that it was largely limited to the manner in which the planning and control apparatus conducted itself, and that it entailed few major changes in the *formal* planning system. How the Revolution affected the behavior of the economic apparatus can be inferred from criticisms that began to appear in the Chinese press in the early 1970's with respect to the conduct of cadres during the 1967-69 perlod. The criticisms implied that many cadres had failed to distinguish "rational rules and regulations from revisionist practices of controlling, restricting and repressing the working masses" and had taken the mistaken position that "all rules and regulations which obstruct anarchism are no good."[15] Such complaints strongly suggest that the Cultural Revolution witnessed a recurrence of at least some of the excesses that had marked the 1958-59 Great Leap Forward. As indicated earlier, however, the excesses of the Cultural Revolution period slowed growth only temporarily, mainly because they were not allowed to get out of hand as in 1958-59. Thus, the early 1970's were dominated by calls in the press to end anarchy, to strengthen management and accounting, to make more careful inventories of warehouses, to pay more attention to veteran workers, and to emphasize product quality. At the same time, a number of individuals who had been severely criticized during the Cultural Revolution as architects of the economic policies of the early 1960's, most notably Ch'en Yun, were rehabilitated —another possible sign of a return to the main lines of pre-Cultural Revolution policy for the economy.

Other key features of the industrial policies of the 1960's that have continued unchanged into the early 1970's include special emphasis on the development of military equipment industries, on rapid expansion of agricultural support industries (most notably the chemical fertilizer industry), and on a major increase in the number of rural-based small-scale firms of many types.

The effort to expand small-scale rural industry merits closer attention. Rural China has always had small-scale handicraft industries for the processing of food and similar activities, but what is different today is that the concept has been extended to a number of industries that hitherto were not typically either small in scale or rural-based. This effort, too, began during the Great Leap Forward, when there was a drive to develop small enterprises such as the much-publicized "backyard" iron and steel furnaces. As in the case of so many other activities connected with the Leap, implementation of the program, though energetic, was poorly thought out and resulted in waste of raw materials and poor quality of output. Most of the backyard furnaces were closed down in the early 1960's, as were many other small plants, but in others an attempt was made to rationalize production procedures rather than to close the plants down altogether. Apparently the effort was deemed successful, for the number of small plants was once again on the rise by the mid-1960's. By 1970, thousands of such enterprises dotted the countryside, and hundreds—perhaps even thousands—more were built in 1971 and 1972.

Although there are many kinds of small-scale firms, they are centered mainly in five industries: iron and steel, cement, chemical fertilizer, energy (coal and electricity), and machinery (chiefly farm-machinery repair shops, but also production of simple tools). The development of rural-based cement and chemical fertilizer plants is, perhaps, the most unusual aspect of the program in comparison to what is found in other less-developed

[14] The planning and organization of Chinese industry are discussed at greater length in D.H. Perkins, "Plans and Their Implementation in the People's Republic of China," *Papers and Proceedings of the American Economic Association* (Menasha, Wisconsin), 1973.

[15] Numerous Chinese radio broadcasts in 1971 and 1972 criticized cadres for behaving in this manner during the late 1960's.

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A "top-bottom" oxygen converter at the small Yentai iron-and-steel complex in Shantung Province.

—Photo from *China Pictorial*, No. 6, 1971, p. 9.

countries today.[16] In 1971, some 60 percent, or 10 million gross tons, of China's total chemical fertilizer output was produced in such small rural plants, while 40 percent of China's cement output was produced by 1,800 small enterprises (the addition of 600 more small cement plants during 1972 brought the percentage of total cement production up to 48).[17]

Unfortunately, we do not yet have enough information to judge whether the development of these small-scale rural plants makes possible more efficient use of China's endowment of productive resources, characterized by surplus labor and short capital. What we do know is that such enterprises have helped to familiarize millions of Chinese farmers with modern industrial technology. This effort seems bound to produce both economic and social benefits, the latter by breaking down the sharp distinction that exists in so many less-developed societies between the sophisticated, modernized cities and a primitive countryside.

Agricultural Organization and Policy

It is agriculture, however, that lies at the heart of China's economic problems, for the agricultural sector must not only provide the ever-increasing amounts of food required by the country's mounting population but also generate surpluses needed to help finance the development of industry. As pointed out earlier, while the rate of growth in industry has far exceeded that of agriculture, the latter has shown

[16] A useful first-hand description of a number of small-scale Chinese rural industrial plants can be found in Jon Sigurdson, "Rural Industry—A Traveller's View," *The China Quarterly* (London), April-June 1972, pp. 315-32.

[17] NCNA, Dec. 28, 1972.

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marked improvement since the early 1960's, so that output is now expanding at a pace more than adequate to take care of population growth. Let us now look at the changes in agricultural organization and policies that have brought about this significant improvement.

During the period extending from the start of agricultural collectivization in China in the winter of 1955-56 up to 1962, the Chinese Communist regime experimented with a wide variety of organizational forms. In 1958 and 1959, under the banner of the Great Leap Forward, virtually all remaining non-collectivized farming activities (the peasants' private plots and the small free markets) were abolished, and the farmers were organized into communes of 4,000-5,000 families each, with control over their activities centralized in the hands of the commune leadership. These innovations, however, contributed to a sharp recession in agriculture which forced a reversal of policy. In the depths of the rural depression in 1961, many areas experimented with something called the "agricultural responsibility system," which was tantamount to a virtual abandonment of collectivized agriculture.

This period of instability in agricultural policy ended in 1962, when China finally settled on a basic organizational structure for agriculture which has not undergone any major changes since. The larger existing communes were split up into several smaller ones, and at the same time authority over the planning and management of labor and crops was decentralized to a considerable degree from the commune to a small subunit of the commune, the production team. The production team was also made the accounting unit, a change which meant in effect that whatever profits (or losses) the individual team made (after taxes) were no longer pooled and shared with the entire commune but accrued to the team itself. Whereas several thousand families had shared the fruits of their collective labor in the initial communes, now only several dozen families did so. Even before this, moreover, small private plots and rural free markets had been reinstituted in order to revive declining food production, and these institutions were continued after 1962.

There have, of course, been minor adjustments in this basic organizational pattern since 1962. Over the next few years, for example, the amount of land in private plots (which were supposed to be kept to about 5 percent of total cultivated acreage) appears to have increased slightly.[18] During the Cultural Revolution, there was some talk of restricting or abolishing private plots, as well as of recentralizing more authority in the hands of the production brigade (a unit above the team but below the commune), but little if anything was actually done along these lines. The rural areas were generally kept out of the mainstream of the Cultural Revolution, and they appear to have suffered little disruption of any kind in that period—certainly not enough to affect crop output.

As of 1971 and 1972, there continued to be little indication of any major change in rural organization or general agricultural policy. If anything, it is possible that the independence of the individual production teams may have increased, inasmuch as "self-reliance" has been the leitmotif of the "Learn from Tachai" Campaign, which has played such a big role in the Chinese countryside in recent years.[19] The basic idea of "self-reliance" is that all units should try to produce as much of their own needs as possible and thus minimize their dependence on others; however, this sort of self-sufficiency neces-



Shopping in the Wu Hsi market.

—1971 photo by Hugues Vassal, Gamma.

[18] At least that was the case in four communes visited in 1965 by Shahid J. Burki. See his book, *A Study of the Chinese Communes, 1965*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1969, p. 35.

[19] Tachai is the name of a production brigade belonging to a commune in Shansi Province. The brigade was singled out as a model for all of China.

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Table 2: Foreign Trade of the People's Republic of China

(in millions of US dollars)

	1959	1962	1966	1970	1971
Total Imports	2,060	1,150	2,035	2,183	2,247
Machinery and Equipment	1,058	52	490	395	495
Metals	248	62	280	560	605
Wheat	0	200+	330	275	204
Chemical Fertilizer	44	27	150	190	180
Total Exports	2,205	1,525	2,170	2,063	2,364
Textiles and Clothing	651	523	470	490	550
Foodstuffs	412	156	595	655	800
Total Trade	4,265	2,675	4,205	4,246	4,611

SOURCES: Most of the data for 1959 and 1962 are from figures compiled by Alexander Eckstein (on the basis of trade statistics of China's trading partners) and published in his *Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1966. Data for other years were compiled by the US Consulate-General, Hong Kong, and published in various issues of the periodical *Current Scene*.

sarily implies a reduction in the influence of outsiders on decision-making at the production-team level.[20] The higher authorities must instead resort to more indirect methods of exercising control.

An interesting example of the use of such indirect methods was the government's decision in 1971 to raise the purchase prices of bast fibers, oil seeds, and sugar.[21] In 1972, in spite of a generally poor harvest, the output of these items increased 20 percent in the case of sugar and rapeseed (a major oil seed) and 40 percent in the case of bast fiber.[22] It is possible that unusually good weather in the relevant regions or, perhaps, even direct orders from the central authorities to emphasize these items were more responsible for the increases in output than the higher prices offered, but the most plausible explanation is that the farm production teams responded with alacrity to the incentive of better prices. In contrast to this experience, major increases in the purchase prices of certain lagging cash crops in 1956 and 1957 had failed to stimulate higher outputs of these items (in 1957, in fact, all declined); however, the farm cadres at that time had been operating under clear directives to emphasize grain output and consequently had not been at liberty to raise the gross income of their units by concentrating on crops yielding higher monetary returns.[23] Now the production teams seem to have enough autonomy to be more flexible in their production decisions.

Autarky in Trade

It is readily apparent from the preceding survey of China's economic performance in the last fifteen years, that the government's overall policy of economic development has been characterized by a strong element of autarky, or an emphasis on achieving "self-reliance" or self-sufficiency both within the economy and on a national and international scale. It may therefore be relevant to see how this tendency has manifested itself in the PRC's foreign trade over approximately the same time span.

Some pertinent trade data for various years between 1959 and 1971 are presented in Table 2. Several conclusions are immediately apparent from the figures. First, China's total trade in 1971 was only $346 million, or 8.6 percent, above the previous peak level of 1959. Since world prices in the meantime had risen by more than the indicated percentage increase, China's trade in real terms was still below the 1959 level. Further, between 1959 and 1972, China's economy had grown con-


[20] For a more thorough discussion of the emphasis on "self-reliance" in rural China in the early 1970's, see Audrey Donnithorne, "China's Cellular Economy: Some Economic Trends Since the Cultural Revolution," *The China Quarterly*, October-December 1972, pp. 605-19.

[21] NCNA, Dec. 31, 1971.

[22] NCNA, Dec. 26, 1972.

[23] For further discussion of these developments, see D. H. Perkins, *Market Control and Planning in Communist China*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966, pp. 70-71.

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The Taching oil field has contributed heavily to China's expanding domestic oil production. The photo shows Chang Hung-chih, Vice-Chairman of the field's Revolutionary Committee, at work.

--Photo from *China Pictorial*, No. 9, 1971, p. 4.

siderably, as indicated earlier, so that trade as a percentage share of GNP (X + M/GNP) fell from between 7 and 11 percent in the 1950's to under 5 percent in the early 1970's.[24]

China's declining dependence on foreign trade emerges more clearly in relation to specific items. In the 1950's, for example, the PRC had to import virtually its entire supply of petroleum, *i.e.*, about 3 million tons a year, whereas China produced 29 million tons domestically in 1972 (see Table 1) and may soon become an oil exporter. Again, as seen in Table 2, over half of China's total imports in 1959 consisted of machinery and equipment and included a large number of complete plants, reflecting the fact that the domestic industrial development program was heavily dependent throughout the 1950's on complete plant imports from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In contrast, throughout the 1960's and early 1970's there have been few Chinese purchases of complete plants, and machinery and equipment imports by 1971 were less than half of the 1959 level, with most Chinese investment in new plants and equipment being supplied from domestic sources.

China also is no longer dependent financially on the outside world. Foreign aid from the Soviet Union in the form of long-term credits ended in the mid-1950's, and all such credits had been repaid with interest by 1965. Since then, although the PRC, like all countries, has resorted to short-term credits to facilitate trade, it has neither sought nor received long-term credits. Instead, in fact, China has become one of the world's major aid-givers, her commitments in 1970 and 1971 averaging about US $600 million a year, exclusive of aid to North Vietnam.[25]

The PRC's policy of economic self-reliance, or lack of dependence on foreign trade and aid, does not imply, however, that Chinese trade with the outside world is going to wither away. China's trade in 1971 was slightly above 1970, at least in money terms, and the increase in 1972 was even larger. Nevertheless, there are no signs of a reversal of the basic disposition toward autarky.

Incomes Policy and Growth

One further matter that merits attention here is the rather unusual fact that China has endeavored to couple its pursuit of rapid economic growth with a policy of eliminating inequalities in income distribution. This sets the PRC clearly apart from the rest of the less-developed countries of the world. Although a good many of the latter have espoused some form of "socialism" during the past few decades, it has in most instances been socialism for the rich, and particularly for the bureaucracy. Great effort has been made in these countries to find jobs in state enterprises and government offices for the newly-emerging elite, but relatively little has been done to keep the incomes of this elite from rising too far above those prevailing among the great majority of the people.

The PRC has deliberately followed a different path. One of the central purposes of the Cultural Revolution, for example, was to prevent or reverse the rise of a new elite class based on the party-

[24] It is not possible to calculate the share of trade in GNP with precision because we do not have a single figure for GNP in, say, 1970: equally important, statistics of China's trade are calculated in prices different from those used in estimating GNP.

[25] Leo Tansky, "Chinese Foreign Aid," in *People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment*, *op. cit.*, p. 372.

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government bureaucracy. As a result of this effort, all but a handful of cadres in the various government and party offices are now required to go to the countryside and work at unskilled jobs for considerable periods, and youth, instead of moving steadily up the educational ladder, are expected to spend several years at manual labor before they can even be considered for admission to university. Numerous other measures have been adopted with a similar purpose.

Apart from such measures to prevent the re-emergence of elitist attitudes, the Communist regime set out from the beginning to reduce the range of income differentiation between different types of labor as well as between different levels of skill and responsibility. While substantial disparities in income still remain, these disparities have certainly been sharply reduced in comparison to those that existed in China before 1949 or presently exist in other less-developed nations. However, most of the steps in this direction were taken in the 1950's, and there has since been a slackening of efforts to push ahead with income equalization as this policy has come into conflict with the requirements of growth and the policy of self-reliance.

The nature of the problem can be seen most clearly in agriculture. In the 1950's, the newly-established PRC government effected a major redistribution of rural incomes by first confiscating the land of landlords and redistributing it to the poor peasants and then incorporating the peasants' holdings into cooperatives in which earnings were based solely on labor and not on the amount of land brought into the cooperative. Welfare funds were set up within the cooperatives; grain was distributed at least in part on the basis of need rather than individual production; and education and health services were provided gratis or at nominal cost to members of the cooperatives. But several sources of inequality remained. Families with more and better workers, for example, received more income per capita than families made up of the old and weak. The continued existence of private plots also gave an advantage to those with relevant farming skills, particularly if their village was near an urban center where produce from the private plots could be marketed. By far the most important continuing source of inequality, however, was the diverse amounts and quality of land in farming units.

Because of these differences, farm incomes varied considerably. A 1965 study of 13 communes, for example, showed that the ratio of income per worker between the richest and the poorest commune sampled was 3.4 to 1.[26] Moreover, this differential obscures the fact that in the poorest communes the income of some production teams was below the average for the whole commune, while some teams in the richest commune earned incomes higher than the commune's average. In effect, the smaller the basic producing and accounting unit, the greater the inequalities of income in the countryside. For the past decade, the basic unit has been the production team consisting of only a few dozen families, and it has been kept small because the initial experience of the communes proved that large units were less efficient.

Measures that could offset the continuing differentials in farmers' incomes have, in general, not been extensively resorted to. No major effort has been made, for example, to move people around so that all units would have lands of equivalent productivity to farm; nor has the agricultural tax been either very large or very progressive (there is a slight progression). Furthermore, investment in agriculture has most often been channeled into the naturally better-endowed areas where it would have the biggest impact on productivity, rather than into the poorer areas where it would help bring about a more equalized distribution of income. For example, in the drainage area of the Yellow River, a generally poor and dry region, grain output rose by only 7 percent between 1957 and 1970, whereas in the rich and wet middle and lower Yangtze Valley, by contrast, grain output in 1971 was 69 percent above the 1957 level;[27] and much the same picture emerges in the case of cotton. The obvious explanation is that it has been the areas that can best use chemical fertilizers—generally the areas with plentiful supplies of water—that have received the lion's share of the fertilizer supply.

The policy of self-reliance also is often in direct conflict with a policy designed to redistribute income more equally. If communes and production teams are expected to rely on their own resources, those that save and invest more and that work harder and more effectively will naturally get ahead of the others, and those that are better endowed to start with will often have an advantage over all the rest.

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[26] Shahid Burki, *op. cit.*, p. 29. The poorest commune in this sample, it should be noted, was considered a success story by local authorities.

[27] These percentages are based on official Chinese statistics reported in Thomas G. Rawski, "Recent Trends in the Chinese Economy," forthcoming in *The China Quarterly*.

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A "barefoot doctor" (in this case a graduate nurse) applies first aid in the fields of the Hsinhua Commune.

—1971 photo by Hugues Vassal, Gamma.

It is an obvious point, but one that is frequently overlooked.

Our knowledge of income distribution in China's urban areas in the early 1970's is less solidly based than our knowledge of the corresponding situation in the countryside. In the 1950's, of course, city dwellers as well as inhabitants of the rural areas experienced a major redistribution of incomes. The incomes of the wealthy who remained were sharply reduced, while those of the poorest groups were raised and the basic needs of the latter were guaranteed through the rationing of key commodities. Wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers and between managers and workers were based on a scale similar to that of the Soviet Union.

Visitors to China in 1972 have reported that the eight-grade wage scale, with the top-grade wage three-plus times the bottom, continues to be the basis of wage determination in the larger enterprises just as in the 1950's. Professional and managerial staff are generally paid wages equivalent to or a bit higher than those of the most skilled workers. It appears, however, that the average wages paid to professionals have declined somewhat in recent years as younger engineers and technicians have replaced those trained before 1949. If this trend is verified by more systematic studies and continues, it would indicate a significant narrowing of income differentials in urban areas.

In sum, China still seems to remain committed to the principle of equalizing incomes, though the pace of such efforts has naturally slowed down by comparison with the rapid and drastic changes of the 1950's. The fact is that the PRC is still a relatively poor country and cannot afford to push the redistribution of income too vigorously at the price of markedly slowing down the rate of economic growth. During the Cultural Revolution the pursuit of social goals closely related to issues of income distribution did slow down or stop growth for a time, and it consequently was an effort that could not be sustained indefinitely. China has not abandoned these social goals in the early 1970's, but it does appear to have given them a lower priority in a generally successful effort to accelerate growth.

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What the ordering of China's priorities will be in the future is probably not known even to the current leadership of the People's Republic of China. We

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do, however, know something about the range of likely alternatives.

If the policies in effect today are continued, there is reason to believe that China's rate of economic growth will rise above the levels of the 1957-70 period. A high and rising level of investment should itself be enough to ensure that result. But there is a cloud on the horizon, and it looms in the vital agricultural sector. Expansion of farm output may prove to be more difficult in the late 1970's than it was in the late 1960's when large crop increases were achieved mainly through greater use of chemical fertilizer. China appears to be reaching the limits of what can be accomplished by this means alone, and the next steps are likely to prove either expensive (*e.g.*, harnessing the rivers of the north for irrigation purposes) or uncertain (*e.g.*, the development of new, improved seeds).

There is, of course, always the possibility that a renewed drive toward income equalization and related social goals, particularly if carried out in an atmosphere like that of the Cultural Revolution, or a situation of political instability created, say, by a succession crisis, might cause a departure from the present policies and slow down or halt the pace of growth temporarily. Over the longer run, however, the only question is whether China's national product will grow more or less rapidly. The elements of continuity in Chinese economic policies since the early 1960's suggest that no set of leaders is likely to stray very far from what has proven to be a successful formula for sustained development.

The Succession Problem

By Ting Wang

For a number of years, the question of the succession to Mao Tse-tung has played an important role in China's internal politics, and with Mao now 79 years old and in somewhat uncertain health, that question becomes of increasing significance in the Chinese political milieu. As long as Mao remains on the scene, of course, he seems able, by the sheer force of his leadership talent and his enormous authority within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), to check and balance different party factions and to maintain a political equilibrium. However, the leadership gap that will arise when he is gone will not be filled easily, and the power balance among various factions will in any case undergo drastic change. Hence, a rising storm of dissension could conceivably spill forth past Peking's Gate of Heavenly Peace.

This article will explore the succession issue from both short- and long-range perspectives. Predictions about the shape of the future are always hazardous and appear especially so in this case in light of the upheavals, purges, and rehabilitations that have taken place in China during recent years. Nevertheless, it does seem possible to identify at least some features or parameters of the state of affairs that will likely prevail after Mao's departure.

The first point to be made concerns the manner in which the succession is likely to be worked out. Historical precedents and the current Chinese situation alike suggest that it will involve fierce struggle, and that the victory of the successor (or successors)

Mr. Ting is currently Chief Editor of the Contemporary China Research Institute (Hong Kong) and head of the Research Department of Ming Pao *(Hong Kong). His publications include* Chiang Ch'ing ch'ien-ch'uan *(A Brief Biography of Chiang Ch'ing), 1967;* Chung-kung wen-ko yun-tung chung-ti tsu-chih yu jen-shih wen-t'i *(Chinese Communist Organizations and Personnel During the Cultural Revolution), 1970; and* A Preliminary Appraisal of the Personnel of the New CCP Central Committee, *1971.*

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will be legitimized only by the disappearance or submission of his (their) rivals. In short, the transition will hardly be smooth and orderly.

As for historical precedents, one can cite two types—the succession pattern in pre-Communist China and that under other Communist regimes. The transfer of political power in China prior to 1949 never resulted from a set of accepted, well-defined, institutionalized procedures. Under China's monarchic system, for example, transfer of imperial power occurred through inheritance within the family or by the employment of violence by groups outside the family. Even the method of inheritance did not always entail political peace, for in order to win and ensure legitimacy, the aspirants within the ruling group often resorted to violent measures. For instance, although Emperor T'ai-tsung (627-49 A.D.), the founder of the T'ang Dynasty, was quite an enlightened and great ruler, he obtained power in an extremely ruthless fashion. He killed his elder brother (the first in line to succeed to the throne) and his younger brother, and he forced his father to abdicate. Ts'ao Chih, a well-known Chinese poet of the third century and himself a victim of the brutal court politics, vividly described the frequent fratricide in the following verses:

They were boiling beans on a beanstalk fire;
came a plaintive voice from the pot,
O why, since we sprang from the selfsame root,
should you kill me with anger hot?[1]

The transfer of power in other Communist states has been marked by similar strife and contention as a consequence of the unstructured and haphazard fashion in which it has taken place. In the USSR, for example, the disappearance of a commanding leader has typically produced severe clashes among top figures of the Soviet party because of a divergence of political views or in defense of vested interests. After the death of V. I. Lenin, J. V. Stalin, the party's General Secretary, joined with C. Y. Zinoviev and L. B. Kamenev to repress the Trotskyites in order to consolidate his position; later, he collaborated with N. I. Bukharin, M. P. Tomsky, and A. I. Rykov to eliminate Zinoviev and Kamenev from the leadership; finally, he brought about the expulsion of Bukharin, Tomsky, and Rykov from the ruling group and eventually liquidated them.[2] In the wake of Stalin's death, Nikita Khrushchev cooperated with Georgi Malenkov and others in purging and executing L. P. Beria, the secret police chief, as a dangerous threat;[3] subsequently, Khrushchev turned on his main rivals, including Malenkov, V. M. Molotov, etc., and ousted them from positions of significant influence.[4]

While history does not inevitably repeat itself, the fact that the Peking regime has not developed a regular procedure for replacing its top political leadership renders the succession patterns in pre-1949 China and in the USSR instructive. Moreover, the character of the present Chinese political system tends to reinforce their relevance. Those in charge of the party and state machinery monopolize—as well as totally control the distribution of—prestige, fame, and material resources; hence, political power has become equated with privileges, material well-being, and personal renown. People believe that "he who has power has everything, and he who is without power has nothing." Thus, the principal leaders tend to feel that surviving and thriving in such a political environment means attaching the highest value to personal power.

One further aspect of the existing situation lends additional weight to the historical precedents. Mao has twice sought to designate his successor in order to avoid the debilitating effect that a struggle for power after his demise might produce, but each time the effort has turned out badly from Mao's standpoint. Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao, regarded at different times (and in Lin's case officially named) as the successor, both endeavored to enhance their power at Mao's expense. Thus, it appears unlikely that Mao will try a third time to appoint an heir.

Collective Leadership Initially

In these circumstances, the aspirants to Mao's leadership mantle will find few constraints against internecine battles to settle the succession issue. However, such battles will not necessarily com-

[1] Ts'ao Chih was a loser in the struggle to succeed his father, Ts'ao Ts'ao, as premier, and he suffered persecution by his elder brother, Ts'ao P'ei, the victor in the struggle. Allegedly, Ts'ao Chih was ordered to compose a poem in the short time required to walk seven steps, or face execution. Hence the poem cited above, which won Ts'ao Chih a pardon. For the story, see Lo Kuang-chung, *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, trans. C. H. Brewitt-Taylor, C. E. Tuttle Co., 1959, Vol. 2, p. 198.

[2] See, for example, Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled*, rev. ed., enlarged, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967, pp. 149-61.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 161-64, and *Khrushchev Remembers*, tr. and ed. by Strobe Talbott, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1970, pp. 323-41.

[4] Fainsod, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-75.

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mence right away. In the immediate post-Mao period, in fact, they will probably be muted, and the current patriarchal system seems destined to give way at least temporarily to one of collective leadership. Two factors make the establishment of a ruling coalition quite likely.

To begin with, the elites who may contend with one another for Mao's position after his death are relatively equal in strength, prestige, and authority. In the past ten years, Mao has done his utmost to deify himself, to make himself an idol that commands reverence. Under such conditions, senior party leaders—even those endowed with great talents and ability—have been overshadowed and have had no real chance to attain major prominence in their own right. As a result, none boasts sufficient prestige and authority to run the party single-handedly and enforce patriarchal rule.

Both in traditional China and in other contemporary Communist polities, the normal outcome of such circumstances has been the emergence of a collective leadership. Throughout imperial Chinese history, the founder-emperors of dynasties enjoyed extraordinary personal prestige and power because of their outstanding exploits in founding states and because of policies generally designed to stabilize social order; therefore, they were able to exercise a strong ruling hand. But subsequent emperors, for the most part lacking these advantages, discovered their power curtailed and even under challenge from rivals within the court's ruling circles. The situation during the T'ang Dynasty affords a good example. Li Yuan (Emperor Kao-tsu) and Li Shih-min (Emperor T'ai-tsung, a son of Li Yuan), who established the dynasty, managed to maintain a firm grip on the reins of authority. However, the third emperor (Li Chih, Emperor Kao-tsung) encountered assertive rivals within the court's ruling group, and the assertiveness increased during the reigns of ensuing emperors, with struggles for imperial authority occurring frequently.

In the Soviet Union, immediately after Lenin's and Stalin's deaths and Khrushchev's ouster, no leader boasted a significantly greater amount of prestige and power than any other. Therefore, collective leaderships took over the reins of authority, though there was a formally designated main secretary of the Communist Party in each case.

A second factor conducive to the formation of a collective leadership has to do with the probable attitudes of middle- and upper-level cadres of the CCP regarding "inner-party democracy." After the experience of working under Mao's patriarchal rule, they may well deem a diffusion of power desirable in that it would not only protect them from the capricious whims of a single individual but also give them greater scope to exercise their own personal initiatives. Their views will tend to carry appreciable weight in the immediate post-Mao period, for since none of the top party leaders will have the stature to assert full control over the regime, rivals for supreme authority will need to court support from below in order to try to enhance their positions.

Makeup of the Collective

The individual participants in the collective leadership—and hence the serious contenders for Mao's mantle of supreme power—will have to possess some particular qualifications. For example, dominant influence in certain functional areas of public life, as well as recognition and backing by the masses, will be exceedingly advantageous. The ability to dispose of military power will also have relevance, especially in the event that a severe political struggle develops and produces social chaos. By no means negligible, too, will be such things as previous contributions to the party, personal renown, and organizational ability.

Leadership cadres with substantial qualifications along these lines fall into three categories:

(1) The "royalists." This group includes such persons as Chiang Ch'ing, Mao's wife and a Politburo member in her own right; Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, First Political Commissar of the Nanking Military Region and First Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, as well as a member of the Politburo; Wang Tung-hsing, Director of the Central Committee's General Office and an alternate member of the Politburo; and Yao Wen-yuan, Second Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee and a member of the Politburo. The members of this group are Mao Tse-tung's favorites, and because of their identification with the policies pursued during the Cultural Revolution, they have a certain appeal among the low-ranking cadres and "rebel" youths who are dissatisfied with the country's Establishment. All those in the group admittedly suffer from a serious vulnerability in that they lack any long-standing ties with the People's Liberation Army—indeed, the vast majority of the senior and middle-level PLA officers probably are highly suspicious of them. Their close association with Mao, however,

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seems likely to assure them of representation in the leadership for at least a short period of time, for other political groups would doubtless hesitate to elbow them aside right away and thus risk charges of disloyalty to Mao.

(2) The bureaucrats, particularly those with rich administrative experience deriving from long tenure of top posts in the central government, and with demonstrated ability to direct diplomatic and economic activities. This group encompasses veteran officials like Premier Chou En-lai; Vice-Premiers Li Hsien-nien and Nieh Jung-chen, and even Ch'en Yun, once a powerful Minister of Commerce. (All the foregoing men except Nieh are also members of the current CCP Politburo. Though Nieh does not belong to the top party body, he serves as one of the three vice-chairmen of the highly important Military Affairs Commission of the CCP Central Committee.) Such individuals not only wield considerable power in the government, but they likewise have a strong base of support among government cadres. After the death of Mao, their organizational abilities and administrative experience will undoubtedly ensure them representation in the nucleus of the new leadership, for such talents will be vital not only to the consolidation of the successor government and the maintenance of a functioning administrative system, but also to the effective conduct of diplomatic and economic activities, the further development of science and technology, and—above all—the prevention of anarchy and disorder. It should be noted that participants in the collective leadership from this group will not necessarily come entirely from among the professional bureaucrats in the central government. Some career officials in posts outside the capital have distinguished themselves in government and party administration and in dealing with disturbances and disorders, and they wield substantial political influence today. Hence, a few of them could wind up playing significant roles in the national leadership, too.

(3) Career military officials in Peking and in the outlying areas of the country. At the moment, Yeh Chien-ying, Hsu Shih-yu, Ch'en Hsi-lien, and Li Te-sheng hold high places in the party as well as major posts within the military structure. All but Li are full members of the Politburo, and Li has alternate-member status. In addition, Yeh serves as one of the three vice-chairmen of the CCP Central Committee's Military Affairs Commission; Hsu, as First Secretary of the Kiangsu Provincial Party Committee; Ch'en, as First Secretary of the Liaoning Provincial Committee; and Li, as First Secretary of the Anhwei Provincial Party Committee. Whether these specific individuals will become key members of the successor regime is hard to judge just now, but they and the most able elements of the "Young Turks"—e.g., Yang Te-chih, who is a member of the CCP Central Committee, Commander of the Tsinan Military Region, and First Secretary of the Shantung Provincial Party Committee; and Su Yu, who is a member of the CCP Central Committee, a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee's Military Affairs Commission, and a Vice-Minister of National Defense—certainly seem distinct candidates for such a role. If these officers vanish from the political stage, however, others will likely move into the new power nucleus. The generals as a group definitely appear destined to play a significant part in the political life of the future.



Wang Tung-hsing (left), Director of the CCP Central Committee's General Office and head of the secret police, and Li Te-hseng (right), Director of the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army and First Secretary of the Anhwei Provincial Party Committee, both alternate members of the CCP Politburo, with American visitor Frank Coe at the CCP's 50th anniversary celebrations in July 1971 in Peking.

—Photo from China Pictorial, No. 10, 1971, p. 61.

It should be underscored that the preceding classification is not in terms of identifiable factions but in terms of political power bases and political views. For example, Yeh Chien-ying, Ch'eng Hsi-lien, Hsu Shih-yu, etc., were included in the same category not because they have formed themselves into a

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faction but because their power rests on the same political foundations, because their ideological and policy preferences—insofar as we can discern them—are comparatively similar, and because their interests are generally the same. The power base of each of the three groups tends to be self-evident, but the character of their political views may need further explication. Though they all adhere to dialectical materialism in their world outlook, their ideological and political perspectives differ significantly.

The professional bureaucrats, as a result of the fact that they belong to the "haves," harbor a strong desire to consolidate the present regime and to maintain the established political order. They have held power at the central and local levels for a long time. Indeed, they have served and are serving as leaders not only of party and government organs but also of economic and business enterprises. Since they have more direct responsibility for fostering economic development and for carrying on diplomatic activities than the members of the other groups, they tend to have correspondingly greater contact with intellectuals of advanced learning and with economic and diplomatic experts, and these contacts have provided them with a more comprehensive and more penetrating understanding of both the national situation and the outside world, comparatively speaking, than members of the other groups possess. This, in turn, has encouraged them to demand social stability and to frown on social disturbances which might disrupt the nation's administrative operations, diplomatic activities, and economic development. Their political philosophy is to pursue "unity" by reconciling "opposites"—that is, the so-called principle of "seeking great sameness while accepting small differences." They do not renounce "revolutionary" goals, but at the same time they advocate the adoption of realistic and flexible policies. While they do not truly "represent" the broad masses, they attempt to mitigate the contradictions between the masses of workers and peasants on the one hand and the government on the other, so as to ensure a stable environment for economic growth. Though they do not deny the existence of a contradiction between the West and China, they are quite eager to improve relations with the West, seeking not only "unity" out of contradictions but also the expansion of China's international trade so as to provide equipment, facilities, and markets for its economic development.[5]

In contrast to the bureaucrats, the royalist group, who constituted the "opposition" before the Cultural Revolution (in that they bore no responsibility for the development of the economy and the conduct of diplomacy) and who today "represent" low-level cadres and "rebellious" youth, are interested in "revolution," believing that they can create a new world of their own out of revolutionary upheavals and chaos. Their ideological perspective is that of the revolutionary principles of the Paris Commune of the 19th century. They want to "break through" the political traditions of the CCP and smash the established political order of the state so as to seize government and party power and to implement what they consider the "revolutionary line." Therefore, their political approach is to expand and amplify conflicts and contradictions and to emphasize "continuous revolution." Their analysis of the national situation and the outside world tends to be one-sided and radical—they do not feel con-



Hsu Shih-yu, Member of the CCP Politburo, Commander of the Nanking Military Region, and First Secretary of the Kiangsu Provincial Party Committee, hosts Dang Tran Thi, leader of a delegation of the Central Committee of the South Viet Nam National Liberation Front.

—Photo from *China Pictorial*, No. 10, 1971, p. 60.

[5] These ideological and political views differ widely from those of the palace group. The conflict between the May 16th Corps and the State Council during the Cultural Revolution affords a concrete illustration of the differences. For more detailed information, see "Resolutely Crush the Counterrevolutionary Adverse Current of Bombarding Premier Chou," in *Chu-ying Tung-fang Hung* (Canton), Sept. 13, 1967; and Revolutionary Rebels' Commune of the Peking Steel College, *Revolutionary Students Unite and Smash the Counterrevolutionary Conspiratorial Organization "The Black 'May 16 Corps,'"* September, 1968.

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tent with the status quo and entertain illusions about revolutionary power. They pay little attention to economic interests or to the desire of the masses for peace, and the specific policies they advocate contain elements of "left-leaning adventurism."[6]

The professional soldiers, in common with the professional bureaucrats (with whom they share the status of "haves"), defend the established political order and seek social and political stability in order to assure national security. However, the tactics that they favor for maintaining the authority of the CCP vary somewhat from those of the professional bureaucrats. The professional soldiers attach greater importance to the militarization of administration and, insofar as economic development is concerned, pay more attention to the development of military-oriented industry than do the bureaucrats. Between the professional soldiers and the palace group there are sharp contradictions. Certainly, the professional soldiers do not approve of the "left-leaning adventuristic" line of the palace group and do not like to see existing society threatened with destruction.[7]

Chou En-lai: A Key Figure

If Chou En-lai is still politically active and in sound health when Mao passes from the scene, he will in all probability be a key element in the post-Mao leadership. At present, Chou evinces no signs of a wish to become Mao's "successor." In fact, given his astuteness, his knowledge of Mao's character, and his own advancing age, he would be unlikely to manifest such aspirations or, indeed, to harbor a desire to rule in Mao's fashion. Yet there appears to be no one else on the political horizon who is better equipped to serve as the nucleus of the new collective leadership—and this may remain true for at least some time to come.

Perhaps Chou's greatest asset stems from the fact that he has had charge of the central government for a long period of time, and has thus acquired a solid political base among the bureaucrats in the government hierarchy. At the same time, he is not simply the chief representative of the government bureaucracy at the top of the political hierarchy. As an "old guard" of the party and the army, he also carries weight with the party secretaries and veteran army cadres.

Many observers seem to believe that Chou lacks influence in the army, but they forget that he has had important ties with the army from time to time throughout his career. For example, he was the planner of the "August 1 Uprising" in 1927. As head of the Military Affairs Commission of the CCP Central Committee in the early 1930's, he led the Red Army in its struggle, and he only handed over his military responsibilities to Mao Tse-tung in 1935 after the Ts'unyi party conference. For a while after the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Chou held the post of Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council concurrently with his other duties. Although he had no direct hand in guiding the army after he relinquished this job, he did renew his association with the army for several years beginning in 1966, during which period he was thought to be serving as a Vice-Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission of the CCP Central Committee.[8] As a result of these sporadic links, Chou probably enjoys some latent influence in the armed forces, at least among the army commanders and above.

In addition to widespread support, Chou possesses personal attributes of a kind that will undoubtedly be crucial in the sort of political circumstances that will most likely prevail when Mao dies. First, Chou has distinguished himself for his ability and fortitude in handling disputes in the provinces and for his smoothness and patience in dealing with political matters. (These qualities were especially evident during the Cultural Revolution.) When political troubles arise, others tend to push Chou to the fore even if he does not want to assume responsibilities of his own accord. Second, his long experience in the diplomatic sphere has provided him with a deeper grasp of the international situation and of China's diplomatic enterprises than most other political figures can boast. Third, his direct responsibility for the development of China's national economy, culture, education, and science has afforded him many opportunities for contact with economists, industrial management staffs, and other highly-

[6] For relevant documentation, see Wang Li *et al.*, "The Proletarian Dictatorship and the Proletarian Cultural Revolution," *Hung-ch'i* (Peking), No. 15, December 1966; Lin Chieh, "The Newborn Things as Unconquerable," *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* (Peking), April 8, 1967; and The Taching Commune of Peking Petroleum College, "The 27 Fiendish Crimes of Chi Peng-yu," leaflet dated Feb. 26, 1968.

[7] The conflicts between local military commanders and the Red Guards—especially that at Wuhan—during the Cultural Revolution testify amply to this point.

[8] Often during the Cultural Revolution, Chou even issued orders directly to the army.

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Premier Chou En-lai and Chang Ch'un-chiao (right), First Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, like Chou a member of the CCP Politburo, with Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, atop the Shanghai Building in October 1971.

—Photo from *China Pictorial*, No. 12, 1971, p. 11.

trained intellectuals. Such contacts have given him a broader view of China's long-term interests and practical needs than many other top leaders have.

Chiang Ch'ing's Role

Since, to Mao, his wife Chiang Ch'ing probably represents the most dependable "close comrade-in-arms," a few words about her future role also would appear to be appropriate. The changes in the order of seniority of Politburo members since the fall of Lin Piao in September 1971 have greatly enhanced her political position. Before September 1971, the ranking of the top 11 members of the Politburo went as follows: Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, Ch'en Po-ta, K'ang Sheng, Huang Yung-sheng, Chiang Ch'ing, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Yao Wen-yuan, Yeh Chien-ying, and Li Hsien-nien. Now the order is Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, K'ang Sheng, Tung Pi-Wu, Chu Te, Liu Po-ch'eng, Chiang Ch'ing, Yeh Chien-ying, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Yao Wen-yuan, and Li Hsien-nien.[9] Though formally Chiang Ch'ing remains seventh on the list, she has in actuality moved from seventh to third—*i.e.*, just below Chou and Mao—if one considers only active Politburo members. Before the 1971 shake-up, the four individuals between Chou and Chiang Ch'ing, all of whom were in their sixties, constituted active elements of the ruling nucleus. Currently, three of the four—Tung Pi-wu, Chu Te, and Liu Po-ch'eng—are in their late seventies or eighties and in a state of semi-retirement, seemingly playing only a supportive role in the body's affairs. The other, K'ang Sheng, has been inactive for some time, possibly because of ill health.

There have likewise been recent signs that Mao and Chiang Ch'ing both wish to build up her prestige within and outside the party. For example, Peking newspapers and Radio Peking have from time to time published or broadcast articles exalting her "revolutionary model theatrical works." Perhaps most interesting, the latest edition of the *Atlas of the World* put out in Peking not only eulogizes Mao's exploits but praises Chiang Ch'ing as well at two points—without once referring to Chou En-lai or any other leaders.[10]

Mao's enormous prestige and Chiang Ch'ing's special relationship to him give her considerable political advantages which she can exploit in the post-Mao era. So does her immense influence among the "rebel" youth and low-ranking cadres who are unhappy with the existing order of things. However, she also has some major handicaps that cloud her political future. She is physically weak and often gets sick,[11] a tendency which offsets her compara-

[9] See *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), October 1971 to April 1973.

[10] See *Shih-chieh t'i-tu* (Atlas of the World), 1972 ed., Peking, Map Publishing Press, 1972.

[11] On the subject of her health, see Ting Wang, *Chiang Ch'ing ch'ien ch'uan* (A Brief Biography of Chiang Ch'ing), Hong Kong, Contemporary China Research Institute, 1967.

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Chiang Ch'ing (Madame Mao), member of the CCP Politburo, converses with Dutch film director Joris Iven in mid-1971.

—Photo from *China Pictorial* (Peking), No. 10, 1971, p. 61.

tive youth (she is less than 60 years old); and she lacks a firm political base, enjoying only limited influence in the party and the army. Moreover, she owes her present standing to political connections and not to any really concrete contributions to the party. In light of the deep roots of the concept of "reward according to one's merits" in Chinese culture, it will be difficult for her to obtain the vigorous support of party cadres and army men in the absence of extraordinary pressure from some outside source.

As regards this last consideration, one must remember that the Chinese people traditionally believed that a man must have rendered especially meritorious service to the state to qualify him for posts like prime minister or minister. It was considered incompatible with the established moral standard to gain office through special connections with the imperial court or through the use of illegitimate means such as force. For example, two prime ministers in Chinese history—namely, Yang Kuo-chung of the T'ang Dynasty, who was the brother of Yang Kuei-fei, Emperor Hsuan-tsung's favorite concubine; and Wei Chung-hsien of the Ming Dynasty, who was a favorite of Emperor Ch'ung-chen—have always been held in particular contempt by the Chinese people because these men attained their positions without having made any significant contributions to the state.

This traditional concept of "reward according to one's merits" has quite clearly survived within the Chinese Communist Party. In the early 1950's, for instance, Politburo member Kao Kang took umbrage at the fact that his chief rivals, Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai, occupied posts senior to his, for he maintained that the "red party" (*i.e.*, the section of the party that operated in the guerrilla base areas where Kao had served) had advanced the party cause more than had the "white-area party" (*i.e.*, the section of the party that operated in areas under non-Communist control where Liu and Chou had carried on their activities during the early stages of the Communist struggle for power).[12] Similarly, the cadres of district-level party committees in Kwangtung and Shantung often clashed with cadres from other places on the ground that since the former had set up the "revolutionary bases" in these provinces, it ran counter to the moral principle of "reward according to one's merits" to have cadres from other places telling them what to do.[13]

On balance, Chiang Ch'ing does probably possess enough assets to retain her current political position for at least a while. Beyond that, she will have to prove herself in the storms of political struggle.

The Collective's Policies

If Chou becomes the most important figure in the collective leadership after Mao's death, what effect will his prominence likely have on the character of the regime's policies? On this subject, one can venture only a few general observations.

Since some of the new powerholders are bound to be "royalists," it seems most unlikely that any large-scale anti-Mao campaign will get under way immediately. Consequently, Mao's image as an idol will probably persist for some time. However, such a situation does not mean that Chou and his partners will institute no changes. Without serious prejudice to Mao's political dignity, they could conceivably undertake major initiatives of an essentially practical nature.

In foreign policy, the collective leadership might well try to improve its state relations and minimize its theoretical row with Moscow, for both China and the Soviet Union are feeling the economic burden of military confrontation. It might exhibit even greater flexibility in dealings with other countries than the current government has, and it could become more active in the United Nations so as to consolidate

[12] "Resolution on the Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih Anti-party Alliance," approved by the CCP National Party Conference, March 21-31, 1955, in *Jen min Shou-ts'e* (People's Handbook), Peking, 1956, p. 77.

[13] See, for example, Ezra Vogel, *Canton Under Communism*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1969.

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China's position vis-à-vis the Third World. It might step up "united front" activities at home and abroad so as to win the backing of the non-party elements, the intellectuals, and the overseas Chinese and thus to isolate and undermine the anti-Communist forces in Taiwan; at the same time, it could launch an all-out "peace offensive" aimed at splitting Taiwan's local anti-Communist front. While such an offensive would not necessarily succeed, it would undoubtedly complicate the problems of the Taipei government.

With respect to domestic policy, the new power-holders will likely show increased concern for economic performance. To achieve greater productivity, they will probably adhere to the rural policies associated with Liu Shao-ch'i—*i.e.*, they will allow the peasants to keep small plots of land for private production and to engage in private enterprise as a means of solving their own economic problems, thus easing the contradictions between the peasantry and the government.

Such policies, of course, would not mean that Chou En-lai and company were forsaking revolution. Indeed, it would be deadly wrong to interpret these kinds of quite limited concessions to the peasantry as a manifestation of an intention to lead China onto the road of "democracy" and "liberalization," or of an immediate preoccupation with the material life of the people. Tactical flexibility in struggle serves the strategy of socialist revolution. According to the concept of "the unity of opposites," the "smile offensive" is only another form of "revolution." In short, China in the age of Chou En-lai seems most unlikely to undergo a "peaceful transition" to a Yugoslav type of "modern revisionism."

The Longer Term

Much of the preceding analysis, it must be pointed out, is based on the assumptions that Mao will die within a relatively brief period of time—say the next two or three years—and that Chou En-lai will still be a major force in Chinese politics when Mao disappears from the scene. But these assumptions could prove erroneous. For example, Mao could live for, say, another ten years. In this case, Premier Chou, who is already 75 years old, may possibly have predeceased him, and even if Chou should remain alive,

"Generation" and Age of CCP Cadres

Generation	Other Designation	Year Joined CCP	Age Range [a]	Average Age	Present Rank [b]	Representative Figures
First	Veteran cadres	1921-26	65-85	75	1-6	Mao Tse-tung Chou En-lai Chu Te Yeh Chien-ying
Second	1927 or Old Red Army cadres	1927-33	60-70	65	2-8	Li Hsien-nien Chen Hsi-lien
Third	Long March cadres	1934-36	55-65	60	4-10	Chang Ch'un-ch'iao Wang Tung-hsing
Fourth	1937, War of Resistance, or Yenan cadres	1937-45	45-60	55	6-13	Chiang Ch'ing Chi Teng-k'uai
Fifth	Liberation War cadres	1946-48	40-50	45	11-18	Chao Hsin-yuan Lu Man
Sixth	1949 cadres	1949-52	40-45	42	14-21	Yao Wen-yuan
Seventh	New cadres	1953-73	25-40	35	17-25	Wang Hung-wen Hsu Ching-hsien

[a] Estimates of the ages of cadres are based on the memoirs of representative cadres, collected in such sources as *Hung-ch'i P'iao-p'iao* (The Red Flag Is Waving), Peking, 1957 *et seq.*, and *Hsing-huo Liao-yuan* (The Spark Resulting in the Prairie Fire), Peking, 1958 *et seq.*

[b] The ranking classifications employed in this breakdown are those to be found in *Chung-ying tsai-cheng fa-k'uei hui-p'ien* (Collection of Financial and Administrative Laws and Regulations of the Central Government), Peking, 1957. High-ranking cadres fall in the 1-13 range; middle-level cadres, in the 14-17 range; and basic-level cadres, below grade 17. There are 30 grades in all, but those below grade 25 are clerical in nature.

Some of the "representative figures" listed in the next column—Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Wang Tung-hsing, Chiang Ch'ing, Yao Wen-yuan, Wang Hung-wen, and Hsu Ching-hsien—hold political positions much, much higher in rank (generally in the 2-8 range) than other cadres of the same generation. The rankings given in this column, however, refer to the generation as a whole.

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he would probably be too old to be any longer an active force in Peking's political picture. Or Chou En-lai could conceivably fall from power in a new round of intraparty conflict before Mao's demise. Under such circumstances, the transition to a new leadership would likely be a great deal less smooth than it would be if Chou assumes the key role in the new leadership.

The problem of the succession is further complicated by Chou's age in any event. This suggests that even should Mao pass from the scene in the relatively near future and Chou form the nucleus of the new CCP leadership, Chou will not be at the helm for an extended period. Thus, a fierce struggle for succession not dissimilar to that which appears probable if Chou loses his position or dies before Mao's departure will ultimately ensue. It behooves us, therefore, to ask what cadres—or at least what groups of cadres—will figure in that struggle and what the broad character of their relationships with other cadres will likely be.

In approaching these questions, one must first take into account the "generation" (defined in terms of the date of entry into the party) and age groupings of CCP cadres. The table on page 21 attempts to delineate these groupings. It should be noted that available data on the dates when cadres joined the party and on their ages are incomplete. In making the breakdown presented here, the author has relied on both this piecemeal information and his own experiences when he worked on the mainland.



Ch'en Hsi-lien, Member of the CCP Politburo, Commander of the Shenyang Military Region, and First Secretary of the Liaoning Provincial Party Committee, welcomes Salem Robaya Ali, Chairman of the Presidential Council of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, to Shenyang in summer 1971.

—Photo from *China Pictorial*, No. 10, 1971, p. 60.

At the moment, members of the first and second generations hold the chief positions of power in the CCP Politburo and the State Council, and the average age of these generations is 75 and 65, respectively. Let us suppose that Chou En-lai dies ten years hence. By that time, most of the cadres of these two generations will either have died, too, or be close to death, and those remaining will by and large be too old to play important roles in the political process. The only possible exception is a small group of cadres including such men as Ch'en Hsi-lien (age 60), currently a Politburo member; Li Te-sheng (thought to be 60), now an alternate member of the Politburo; and Wu Te (59), now First Secretary of the Peking Municipal Party Committee—all of whom will still be relatively youthful, have already demonstrated their organizational abilities, and possess rich experience in political struggle.

The bulk of the future contestants for political power, then, will come from the third-generation (Long March) and fourth-generation (War of Resistance) cadres. Of the two groups, those from the fourth generation are likely to be the more important. This generation, now averaging 55 years of age, not only contains a substantial number of persons with strong political aspirations, but also enjoys comparatively greater assets than the members of the third generation. Those in the fourth generation participated in the War of Resistance against Japan (1937-45) and the Liberation War (1946-48) and have thus had contacts with the armed forces. They have worked as members of party committees or as government officials, and many have also managed economic enterprises or assisted in the conduct of diplomatic activities. They generally have fairly strong political bases in some government organ, a certain locality, or the armed forces.

Aside from Chiang Ch'ing[14] and Chi Teng-k'uei—respectively a member and an alternate member of the Politburo—the fourth-generation cadres still work in local party and government organs in posi-

[14] She, incidentally, never had a role in the armed struggle against Japan, though she went to Yenan in 1940.

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tions of secondary importance or serve in the State Council as deputy ministers, assistant ministers, or department directors. Some examples of those of outstanding ability would include Chao Tsu-yang, a Vice-Chairman of the Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee, and Ken Ch'i-ch'ang, a Secretary of the Honan Provincial Party Committee.

Many cadres of this generation, of course, have never received any publicity in the press, and their names are largely unknown to outside observers. Yet their virtual anonymity at this juncture does not mean that they cannot become leading actors on the future political stage in Peking just as much as those who enjoy a fair degree of political prominence today. Indeed, the latter individuals may fade from view as a result of a variety of factors such as poor health, political mistakes, etc. What one can say with certainty is that representatives of the fourth-generation cadres will probably loom exceedingly large on the Chinese political landscape over the next decade.

Institutional/Ideological Groups

A second way of appraising what cadres will be involved in the eventual struggle after Mao and Chou are gone and what the likely relationship of these cadres with one another will be, is in terms of groupings based on institutional affiliations and political outlooks. Here, three groups—the "royalists" or the "palace" group, the bureaucrats, and the professional soldiers (all of which have been defined and described previously)—seem to be the crucial ones.

In the uncertain situation that will prevail, extreme confusion and chaos could beset Chinese society, and even the threat of disorder gives professional soldiers strong political assets. One has only to look at the history of modern China to find manifold illustrations of the translation of military power into political power during times of internal trouble there. In 1912, for example, Yuan Shih-kai, the Peiyang warlord, was able to assume the presidency of the newly-founded Republic of China, and hence political power, from Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the first provisional president, largely because Yuan had superior military force at his disposal. After the toppling of Yuan Shih-kai, Li Yuan-hung succeeded to the presidency, but power quickly slipped into the hands of Premier Tuan Chi-jui, warlord of the Anhwei faction, as a consequence of the military might at his command. In the post-Chou era of the People's Republic of China, then, professional soldiers will probably exercise greater power and influence than they do now. They may even acquire a paramount position in the course of the political struggle.

Yet the professional soldiers will need the bureaucrats in the party and government as allies. The bureaucrats have administrative experience and skills in managing the economy and handling diplomacy, and the professional soldiers will have to mobilize these skills in order to stabilize society and consolidate the regime. The bureaucrats also possess influence in the party and government systems upon which the professional soldiers must rely in order to resist and thwart the interferences of the palace group and the "rebels" it supports.

At the same time, the bureaucrats will need the professional soldiers as allies, for the bureaucrats cannot maintain their political posts or implement their political line without substantial support from the military. Two other factors further enhance the likelihood of the formation of an alliance between the two groups (though one cannot even then rule out the possibility of "struggle in unity"). First, there are almost no purely professional soldiers in China comparable to military professionals in the West. Many of the so-called professional soldiers have concurrently held positions of party or governmental leadership for a long time. Second, the bureaucrats often began their careers in the armed forces; in some cases, they still retain military posts. These ties and the resultant tendency to identify to some extent with the views and opinions of the military facilitate unity in the face of threats to common interests, and both the bureaucrats and professional soldiers suffered from the same harassment, persecution, and assaults of the palace group during the Cultural Revolution.

Conclusion

To sum up, then, the long-term future appears likely to bring a tacit understanding between the professional soldiers and the bureaucrats to try to contain and reduce the power of the palace group. Moreover, the odds against the palace group emerging victorious over such a coaliton seem quite high. The palace group, it is true, does at the moment enjoy a close relationship with the secret police (Wang Tung-hsing is the head of the secret police

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as well as Director of the CCP Central Committee's General Office); thus, members of the group may gain the support of certain secret-police units. However, almost all members lack a solid base of political power (only Chang Ch'un-ch'iao boasts one—in Shanghai). Furthermore, virtually none of the key figures in the group—*e.g.*, Chiang Ch'ing, Yao Wen-yuan, Wang Hung-wen, Hsu Ching-hsien—participated in the Anti-Japanese Resistance War, the Liberation War, or the Korean War; consequently, they have no direct relationship with, and exert no influence on, the armed forces. Still further, the members of the group lack political prestige both within and without the party. Before the Cultural Revolution, they had no experience in working in party or government organs, and even now they are still without practical experience in the economic and diplomatic spheres. Perhaps most crucial, the revolutionary principles of the Paris Commune that they have advocated and the "left-leaning adventuristic" views that they have espoused are strongly opposed by most cadres as well as by the masses.

On the other hand, it does not appear probable that the palace group will disappear entirely from the leadership. The task of ensuring a minimum of stability in order to meet the demands of economic growth—which involves not only preserving a national center of power but also preventing conflicts among the cadres of the three groups from paralyzing it—will likely compel all groups to accept some measure of compromise. In short, while a coalition of professional soldiers and bureaucrats will probably occupy the commanding positions within ruling circles, the leadership will constitute a "collective" of elements from the three groups, thus presenting a facade of "great party unity." However, the strength of the palace group at the center will almost certainly be quite limited, and its influence on policy will be correspondingly far less significant than in the short term.

Just what the balance of power between the professional soldiers and professional bureaucrats will be no doubt will depend on social conditions. If extreme chaos and disturbances develop around the country, the professional soldiers cannot but play a more important role than the bureaucrats in the leadership. On the other hand, if no manifestations of social unrest occur at all, or at least if a fair degree of stability returns after the redistribution of power at the central and local levels, the bureaucrats are likely to outweigh the military in the ruling coalition.

As for the precise policies that the collective leadership described above may pursue, one can only venture a general observation or two. It seems most improbable that the new regime will follow what is now called the line of "extreme left-leaning adventurism"—*i.e.*, the policies in effect during the Cultural Revolution—in either the domestic or the foreign spheres. There are several reasons why this appears unlikely. Not only will the makeup of the collective leadership probably be based on compromise, but the bureaucrats will in all probability enjoy great influence in it. Moreover, the pressure of society for moderation and even for reform of existing policies will presumably be quite great in such a situation. Hence, the political line of the future leadership in Peking will most likely resemble that which Chou En-lai appears to favor at the moment.

In conclusion, however, it should be underscored that efforts to peer into the long-range future run considerable risks of projecting prevailing conditions forward indefinitely. New and unexpected developments could conceivably alter the picture entirely. Therefore, the foregoing long-term projections must be viewed as much more tentative than those advanced regarding the results of an early succession.

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West Siberia: The Quest for Energy

By John P. Hardt

Rapid development and qualitative improvement of fuel and energy resources are important requisites of the current and long-term development of the Soviet economy. In the USSR—as in the developed West—petroleum and natural gas have won favor as the preferred contemporary energy sources, having displaced coal, wood and peat, and not yet being seriously challenged by atomic power. In emphasizing exploitation of domestic oil and gas resources, the Soviet planners have accorded particular importance to development of the fields of West Siberia. The West Siberian complex—with related transmission, transportation and processing facilities—figures as one of the major capital investment efforts of the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971-75), although serious development of the region actually began during the previous plan period (1966-70). The Soviet government has publicly committed itself to this massive and—as we shall see—risky project in an attempt to create an important new regional industrial complex and to help meet expanding domestic and export requirements for oil and gas. Prospects for the ambitious undertaking depend not only on Soviet success in overcoming the very real risks involved but also on the favorable resolution of a series of critical political issues which affect the West Siberian venture in a major way—ranging from resource-allocation priorities and regional planning techniques to attitudes toward the role of foreign trade and credits in Soviet development.

There is an apparent correlation between the performance of a modern industrial economy and the level of its energy supplies.[1] Moreover, improvement in labor productivity and capital-output ratios such as the Soviet leaders seek to achieve requires increased availability and expenditure of energy. Finally, the decision to expand private ownership of motor vehicles in the USSR will have its desired incentive effect only if there is adequate fuel to run the new autos. The Soviet planners evidenced an awareness of these linkages in the 1971-75 Plan, which targets a 39-percent increase in national income to be fueled by an increase of 33.7 percent in annual energy output by 1975 (as compared to 1970). Petroleum and natural gas are to provide the lion's share of the additional energy for Soviet domestic and export needs, as can be seen from the accompanying diagram on page 26.

Beyond its immediate impact on Soviet domestic economic performance, oil and gas production also has important foreign-trade ramifications. First, these commodities are an important component of Soviet trade with the developed West, comprising 29 percent of exports in this direction during 1971.[3] Future expansion of commercial relations, especially

Senior Specialist in Soviet Economics at the Congressional Research Service, US Library of Congress, Mr. Hardt is also Professorial Lecturer at the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies and in the Department of Economics, George Washington University (Washington, DC). He edited, with Vladimir Treml, the volume Soviet Economic Statistics, *1972.*

[1] For example, in 1971 Soviet gross national product (GNP) was 548.6 billion dollars and primary energy of the USSR was the equivalent of 1,291 million metric tons of coal, whereas GNP in the United States was 1,000.4 billion dollars and primary energy was the equivalent of 2,130 million metric tons of coal. See Peter G. Peterson, *US-Soviet Commercial Relationships in a New Era,* US Department of Commerce, Washington, DC, August 1972, Annex A, p. 35.


[2] N. K. Baibakov, Ed., *Gosudarstvennyi piatiletnii plan razvitiia narodnovo khoziaistva SSSR na 1971-1975* (State Five-Year Plan for the Development of the USSR National Economy in 1971-75), Moscow, Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1972, pp. 23 and 98.

[3] Peterson, *op. cit.,* Annex B, p. 14.

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with the United States, depends on substantial increases in exports of petroleum and natural gas. Second, these commodities also figure importantly in economic relations between the USSR and Eastern Europe. In particular, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have substantial requirements for Soviet oil and gas, and future demand is likely to increase exponentially. The USSR must meet these needs or run the risk of seeing its East European allies turn to Middle Eastern or other fuel sources, and of thereby losing an important lever by which it can control the area.

Trends in Soviet Energy: 1970-75
(by source, in percent)



* For purposes of comparability, Soviet economists convert physical output of various energy sources into units of "conventional fuel" (*uslovnoe toplivo*), measured in metric tons containing 7,000 kilocalories.

SOURCE: N. K. Baibakov, Ed., *Gosudarstvennyi piatiletnii plan razvitiia narodnovo khoziaistva SSSR na 1971-1975 gody* (State Five-Year Plan for the Development of the USSR National Economy in 1971-1975), Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoi literatury, 1972, p. 98.

The Wager on West Siberia

The Soviet stake in rapid development of domestic oil and gas production is thus high, and the central role of the West Siberian project in these plans is readily apparent. Two-thirds of the increase in Soviet petroleum output during 1971-75 is scheduled to come from the West Siberian fields,[4] and the USSR Minister of Petroleum Industry, V. D. Shashin, expects the region to account for 75 to 80 percent of incremental output for the 1970's as a whole.[5] Siberian natural gas deposits have a similar pivotal role in Soviet plans for that energy source. West Siberian gas output, which amounted to 318 billion cubic feet in 1970, is expected to rise to 4.6 trillion cubic feet per year by 1975. In that year, Tyumen Province in West Siberia is expected to be the leading producer of both oil and gas among all Soviet provinces.[6]

In attempting to assess the prospects for West Siberian development, one must begin with a clear understanding of the risks involved—risks which have prompted one observer, Robert Campbell, to term the whole undertaking a "desperate gamble."[7] Elsewhere, Campbell noted:

The important issue is how costly it will be to keep oil and gas output in the new areas of Western Siberia growing. On the surface there is complete official optimism on this score, but one can't help

[4] Baibakov, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

[5] *Oil and Gas Journal* (Tulsa, Oklahoma), Aug. 24, 1970, p. 128.

[6] For Soviet predictions concerning West Siberia and Tyumen Province, see *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* (Moscow), No. 8, February 1973, p. 2; *Pravda* (Moscow), July 11, 1971; *Sovetskaia Rossiia* (Moscow), Dec. 9, 1971; *Gazovoe delo* (Moscow), No. 12, 1972, p. 4; and *Planovoe khoziaistvo* (Moscow), No. 4, 1973. Already in 1973, Tyumen Province is expected to become the leading producer of petroleum (see *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* [Moscow], No. 5, January 1973, p. 1).

[7] See his contribution to *Changing National Priorities*, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Economic Priorities of the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, June 1970, Part 2, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office. It was noted that the Middle Ob fields are noncommercial by standards on the Alaskan North Slope. The best Tyumen wells reportedly produce only 300 tons or 2,190 barrels a day; a marginal North Slope well will produce about 2,600 barrels a day, and an average well is expected to flow 10,000 to 15,000 barrels daily.

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having doubts because of the difficult conditions and the fact that the Ministry officials seem always to have been much less enthusiastic about the potential of the region than is the party.[8]

A number of factors highlight this uncertainty. In the first place, Soviet claims of "proven" or "explored" reserves of these resources in West Siberia must be carefully scrutinized. While there seems to be little question of the existence of abundant reserves of natural gas, confusion over the definition of "proven" or "explored" resources complicates planning and investment decisions.[9] The extent of oil reserves is still more problematic. An apparent shift in the definition of "proven" reserves to include those which are only "probable" by Western standards (and, for that matter, by former Soviet usage) has an ominous ring to those familiar with Soviet statistical legerdemain.[10] To paraphrase Khrushchev (from his criticism of bloated agricultural statistics), the USSR cannot fire its diesels with statistics. Some Soviet geologists appear to buttress their claims concerning Siberian reserves with new, unproven geological theories evocative of Trofim Lysenko's ill-founded "solution of the grain problem." [11]

When reading Soviet estimates of West Siberian reserves, one should also recall that in 1970 the Japanese were apparently discouraged from participating in the exploitation of natural gas in Northern Sakhalin when the USSR revised downward earlier optimistic estimates of "proven" reserves on the island.[12] An ironic sequel to this episode occurred in November 1972 when a Soviet proposal for Japanese participation in the exploitation of gas deposits in the Viliuiskoe oil field near Yakutsk—offered as a substitute for the Sakhalin project—floundered, apparently again over the issue of the reliability of Soviet estimates of proven reserves.[13]

The "attractiveness" of the West Siberian oil and gas deposits has doubtless been enhanced in official eyes by the unpleasant realization that production in the Ural-Volga fields of the Tatar and Bashkir autonomous republics and in Kuibyshev Province was peaking out sooner than anticipated.[14] The oil deposits of the Mangyshlak Peninsula of West Kazakhstan have also proved disappointing inasmuch as their high paraffin content complicates exploitation. The result is an implicit imperative to locate more promising sources of oil and gas.

Beyond the issue of the size of West Siberian reserves, there is considerable debate even within the Soviet Union over the costs of exploiting these deposits. Highly placed academicians and party representatives argue that the cost will be lower than comparable development in European Russia.[15] Yet some Soviet professional economists have argued that such optimistic estimates understate the cost of transmission facilities and of essential social overhead. The latter have estimated that Siberian development costs may be two to four times the costs of further development of the Ural-Volga fields.[16]

The fact that most of the gas reserves of West Siberia are located in the Urengoiskoe and Medvezhe fields—within 200 kilometers (or 124 miles) of the Arctic Circle—adds a major element of technological difficulty and uncertainty. The permafrost has complicated geophysical prospecting and resulted in the sinking of a number of costly dry holes in areas of "indicated" deposits; it has also occasioned major cost overruns and time delays in the extraction of gas and the development of transmission networks. According to the *Oil and Gas Journal*, Soviet scientists "admit they don't know what will happen, for example, when large-diameter development wells are drilled through thick permafrost in the trans-Arctic." [17] (Oil development—occurring at

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[8] *ASTE Buiietin* (Washington), Fall 1970, p. 11.

[9] *Neftianoe khoziaistvo* (Moscow), No. 3, 1971, pp. 1-62; and N. S. Lvov, *Resursi prirodnovo gaza SSSR* (Resources of Natural Gas in the USSR), Moscow, Nedra, 1969, pp. 33, 36.

[10] For different Soviet views on this matter, see M. M. Brenner, "On Proportions in the Petroleum Extraction Industry and the Method for Their Determination," *Geologiia nefti i gaza* (Moscow), No. 11, 1968; and F. F. Dunaev, *et al., Problema opredeleniia ratsionalnykh sootnoshenii mezhdu zapasami i dobychei nefti* (The Problem of Determining the Efficient Correlations Between Oil Reserves and Output), Moscow, VNIIOENG, 1967.

[11] See for example Academician A. Sidorenko of the USSR Ministry of Geology, "Oil Riches—In the Service of the Economy," *Pravda* Feb. 25, 1971. *Cf.* F. G. Gurari, "Oil and Gas in West Siberia: Prospects, Problems," *Priroda* (Moscow), No. 1, 1971, pp. 16-23.

[12] Kyodo News Service from Tokyo, Feb. 18, 1970; *Oil and Gas Journal*, March 1970, p. 26; and Kiichi Saeki, "Toward Japanese Cooperation in Siberian Development," *Problems of Communism* (Washington), May-June 1972, pp. 8-9.

[13] *Izvestia* (Moscow), Nov. 1, 1972. Although a rich potential may exist, the area is still relatively unexplored, and proven reserves are small.

[14] See *Neftianoe khoziaistvo*, No. 3, 1971, pp. 1-62.

[15] For example, see A. Probst, "Toward a Prognosis of the Economic Development and Productive Specialization of the Eastern Regions of the USSR," *Seriia ekonomicheskaia* (Moscow), No. 5, 1970, p. 69.

[16] T. Khachaturov, "The Economic Effectiveness of Capital Investments," *Kommunist* (Moscow), September 1966, pp. 66-67. See also Leslie Dienes, "Issues in Soviet Energy Policy and Conflicts over Fuel Costs in Regional Development," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), July 1971, pp. 26-58.

[17] *Oil and Gas Journal*, Aug. 24, 1970, p. 128.

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lower latitudes in the Samotlorskoe and neighboring fields, is fortunately hampered only by the difficulties of the taiga and swampy terrain.)

There is the further possibility that Soviet turbodrill technology, which works well in the shallower Ural-Volga drilling operations, may prove ineffective in West Siberia, where wells must be sunk considerably deeper. Some Soviet observers, in fact, believe that American rotary-drill technology, proven in Alaskan conditions, may be better suited to West Siberian conditions.[18] Campbell has noted that the US rotary drill is a standard, all-purpose tool which is most efficient at depths below 1,500 meters. However, conversion by the Soviets to this technology would also necessitate purchase of better drill pipe capable of withstanding torque and turning the bit.[19]

However, the importation of drilling technology and large-diameter transmission pipe could place heavy demands on Soviet hard-currency reserves. An alternative is to finance such imports on a barter basis, *e.g.*, to trade petroleum output for pipes.[20] In this way, the output of the West Siberian fields would be at least partially mortgaged. Similarly, the "Comprehensive Program" for Comecon integration obligates the USSR to deliver oil and gas output to East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland in return for investment by these countries in the expansion of Soviet production of these commodities.[21] The question then emerges of how much domestic oil and gas consumption the Soviet Union would be able to derive from such an approach to developing its West Siberian deposits.

A final element of uncertainty is the highly optimistic time-frame allotted for completion of the major West Siberian projects—*i.e.*, the five years of the 1971-75 plan period. This is roughly half the time allotted for other similar Siberian projects.[22] In this context, it should be reiterated that what is involved in West Siberia is not just the drilling of more oil and gas wells but the integrated development of extraction, refining, transmission, and related consuming facilities. Although no one link in this complex chain is a uniquely critical bottleneck, there is a high degree of indivisibility and interrelation among the numerous projects. For example, oil extracted from the southern part of Tyumen Province must be transported—via barge, pipeline, and rail facilities still under development—to an expanded refinery at Omsk or other refining centers along the main east-west pipeline. Petrochemical and related industries must be expanded, or even built from scratch (as at Tobolsk), to utilize the new resources.



Soviet workmen battle the taiga swamps to lay a road along a section of the Surgut-Nizhnevartovskii oil pipeline.

—Photo by A. Skurikhin, TASS, via Sovfoto.

Directives and Delays

In light of all these manifold uncertainties and complications, one can reasonably ask whether the Soviet Union can and/or will see the West Siberian oil and gas project through, and if so, at what cost. In order to get the anticipated payoff from this gamble, the Soviet leadership must—at the very least—continue to accord the numerous interrelated construction projects high investment priority and must effectively coordinate and optimize development of the region. To this end, a joint party-government directive on West Siberian development issued in

[18] *Neftianik* (Moscow), No. 1, 1971, p. 5.

[19] Robert W. Campbell, *The Economics of Soviet Oil and Gas*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1968, pp. 108-20. In fact, the Soviet Union has already made purchases of such equipment in the West.

[20] This approach was discussed by Soviet Oil Minister V. D. Shashin in an interview published in *Oil and Gas Journal*, Aug. 24, 1970, p. 22.

[21] See Z. M. Fallenbuchl, "Comecon Integration," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1973, p. 35.

[22] See G. A. Prudensky, Ed., *Ekonomika stroitelstva i osvoyenia novykh predpriiatii* (Economics of the Construction and Breaking-In of New Enterprises), Moscow, Stroiizdat, 1966, p. 26. Indicative of the problems involved in Soviet capital construction was the revelation that some 901 out of the 1,243 large or "titled" projects of the 1971-75 Five-Year Plan were started *before* 1966, *i.e.*, more than five years earlier (*Voprosy ekonomiki* [Moscow], No. 6, 1971, p. 8).

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
January 1970 instructed various USSR ministries, including the Ministry of Defense Industry (a rare public reference to this organization), to coordinate their efforts to assure expeditious completion of the many West Siberian projects.[23] The fact that West Siberian construction accounted for about one-third of the list of the 75-odd large or "titled" construction projects specifically mentioned in the Directives for the Ninth Five-Year Plan is possibly further evidence of the high priority accorded development of that region, although it may also reflect in part the relative newness of plans for the region.[24]

Despite such apparent priority, the West Siberian projects have experienced numerous setbacks and bottlenecks. For example, party officials of Tomsk complained in July 1971 that "prolonged disputes [between the Ministry of Chemical Industry and the Ministry of Petroleum Industry] over raw-material sources have resulted in inexcusable and irreparable losses of time" in the construction of the Tomsk Petrochemical Complex, originally scheduled for completion in 1975.[25] There have also been delays in the completion of transmission networks, with the result that even utilization of existing production wells has had to be kept well below capacity. As one comment put it,

One would think that the growth rate of petroleum extraction is so high that it cannot get any higher. But the oilworkers say that it can. For instance, there are many drilled wells that are inoperative. What is wrong? The wells are ready—but there is no output. They will produce crude oil when the petroleum-collecting network reaches them, when storage tanks, high-pressure pumping stations, etc., appear near the wells. But the construction workers are not coping with the growing volume of work. "Unfinished work" on oil-field facilities has grown to 211 million rubles' worth.[26]

Moreover, there is evidence that construction brigades working on oil and gas pipelines are competing with one another for the same welders, pipe, and other materials.[27]

However, the regime seems more determined than ever to forge ahead with the West Siberian ventures. This resolve may, in fact, have been strengthened by the failure of the Soviet economy to meet its overall targets for oil and gas production in 1972.[28] Indeed, shortfalls in energy output may rival the well-publicized agricultural disaster of 1972 in their negative impact on fulfillment of the 1971-75 Soviet economic plan. According to the one source, the rate of increase in natural gas output registered in the USSR for 1972 was the lowest since World War II—at a time when peak growth rates had been expected by Soviet planners.[29] The major shortfalls in gas production were in the Northern Caucasus, while shortfalls in oil production occurred in the Old Baku and Grozny fields.[30] By contrast, Tyumen Province performed well, producing some two million tons of oil over its 1972 quota.[31] On the basis of this performance, the Soviet planners, while scaling down overall 1973 production targets for oil from



Construction work on the Tyumen-Surgut railroad in 1970.

—Photo by I. Sapozhkov, TASS, via Sovfoto.

[23] For the text of the decree, see *Pravda*, Jan. 15, 1970.
[24] For the directives, see *ibid.*, April 7, 1971.
[25] See the letter of a Secretary of the Tomsk Party Committee published in *ibid.*, July 10, 1971.
[26] *Ibid.*, March 4, 1972.
[27] *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, No. 11, 1972.
[28] See article of Premier A. N. Kosygin in *Kommunist* (Moscow), December 1972; *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, Dec. 14, 1972; and Theodore Shabad, *The New York Times*, Dec. 14 and 24, 1972.
[29] *Oil and Gas Journal*, No. 1, 1973.
[30] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 8, February 1973, p. 2.
[31] *Ibid.*

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429 to 423 million tons and for gas from 256 to 238 billion cubic meters,[32] have placed increased emphasis on production in West Siberia to offset the disappointing results elsewhere.[33]

Investment Issues

Success on this front—as noted above—will depend on the scope and effectiveness of investment in the West Siberian region. However, West Siberia is only one of numerous claimants on investment resources under the 1971-75 Soviet economic plan. Others include the agricultural sector,[34] the consumer-goods sector, non-ferrous metallurgy, and the electrification program. And this says nothing of the existing or potential claims of the defense establishment on the allocations pie. Clearly, the Ninth Five-Year Plan is every bit as taut—*i.e.*, overcommitted—with regard to investment funds as its predecessors. This became particularly evident during 1972 when the Soviet economy suffered a severe slowdown as a result of agricultural disasters. In an address to the December 1972 session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, N. K. Baibakov, Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee, indicated that total capital investment in the Soviet economy for 1973 would amount to 96 billion rubles. Although he advertised this as a 3.5-percent increase over the "anticipated" growth in investment for the year,[35] it actually amounts to an absolute decrease in investment from the 100.9 billion-ruble figure mentioned in press references prior to 1972.[36]

In light of the strong commitment of the Soviet leadership to development of the civilian sectors of the economy, one may surmise that the claims of the military sector have been reduced—or at least held constant. If so, this would mark a reversal of the trend observed in the 1960's, when military outlays grew at an estimated annual rate of some 7 to 8 percent compared to an annual growth of only 5 percent in Soviet gross national product.[37] While such a reversal of priorities is not unprecedented in Soviet history—witness Khruschev's decision to base the 1959-65 Seven-Year Plan on a combination of military demobilization and increased civilian investment—it is not clear that the current party chief, Brezhnev, is in as strong a position as the former First Secretary was when he faced down the Soviet defense-industrial establishment in the late 1950's. However, Brezhnev may have attempted to increase his options in this regard by causing the publication of optimistic Soviet press reports on progress in negotiations with the United States and its West European allies.[38]

Of course, history also tells us that such clear-cut decisions are not necessarily the rule, and that the Soviet leaders are perhaps more likely to try "muddling through"—shifting resources back and forth among competing sectors as successive allocations pinches arise.[39] Such a resolution of the problem of conflicting demands on resources is, however, becoming less feasible in current Soviet conditions. What we are dealing with now—whether in West Siberian development or advanced weapons systems—are highly complex projects involving advanced technology and skilled manpower, with relatively long lead-times and high indivisibility of resources. Once the leadership becomes committed to a given project, such as West Siberian development, the cost of a reversal to, say, full-scale deployment of SS-9, SS-11, or other advanced missile weaponry would be very great indeed. Resources committed to the former could not be easily shifted to the latter. Furthermore, failure to see the regional development through to completion would impede adequate utilization of costly production facilities already completed and would squander the results of expensive prospecting activities already accomplished.

From every evidence, the Soviet leadership has indeed opted to commit the necessary inputs of capital, advanced technology, and manpower required to exploit the energy potential of West Siberia. Despite the tightening resource-allocation picture, they have pledged the Soviet government to step up investment in oil and gas production and transmission facilities, particularly those in West Siberia.[40]

[32] *Ibid.*

[33] See V. D. Shashin, USSR Minister of Petroleum Industry, in *Planovoe khozlaistvo*, No. 4, 1973, p. 19.

[34] Douglas B. Diamond, "Principal Targets and Central Themes of the Ninth Five-Year Plan," in Norton T. Dodge, Ed., *Analysis of the USSR's 24th Party Congress and 9th Five-Year Plan*, Mechanicsville, Maryland, Cremona Foundation, 1971, pp. 47-53.

[35] *Pravda*, Dec. 19, 1972.

[36] *E.g.*, see *Izvestia*, Dec. 20, 1971.


[37] Diamond, *loc. cit.*, p. 52.

[38] See, *e.g.*, *Pravda*, Feb. 14 and March 31, 1971.

[39] One is reminded of Brezhnev's own admission of such shifting of resources in a speech to the October 1968 plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee (*Pravda*, Oct. 31, 1968).

[40] *Pravda* of Dec. 19, 1972, reported that investment in the extraction of oil and gas and in pipeline construction would increase by 18 percent in 1973. *Izvestia* of Dec. 20, 1972, noted a targeted increase of 1 billion rubles in these sectors. These figures seem to have at least preserved the priorities of the Ninth Five-Year Plan.

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WEST SIBERIA IN SOVIET OIL AND GAS PLANS

areas of oil and gas

oil pipeline

oil pipeline proposed or under construction

gas pipeline

gas pipeline proposed or under construction

oil field

gas field

SOURCE: Adapted from maps in *Atlas SSSR* (USSR Atlas), Moscow, Glavnoe upravlenie geodezii i kartografii pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, 1969; *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* (Moscow), No. 6, February 1970, p. 5; and Robert N. North, "Soviet Northern Development: The Case of NW Siberia," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), October 1972, pp. 173, 174, 176.

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As if to underline the regime's commitment to the latter development, Premier Kosygin himself spent four days in January 1973 making a well-publicized tour of West Siberian construction sites.[41]

Integrated Planning

In light of the great costs involved, the limited supply of investment resources in the Soviet economy, and the highly interrelated nature of the numerous West Siberian projects, there is a strong imperative for Soviet planners to optimize the process of development in the region. The Soviet economy cannot afford a repetition of the widely criticized fiasco of East Siberian hydroelectric development, where a major new energy source was created —at great cost—without concurrent development of consuming industries and population centers.[42] The fact that discussion of the West Siberian complex has included direct references to the Ural-Kuznets Kombinat plan of 1931—*i.e.*, an undertaking of the old production-engineering type of planning—is not reassuring on this score. That earlier regional project appeared to have been largely a politically based decision. The economic justifications presented were based on very shaky data.

On the other hand, there has been some promising talk of the application of mathematical modeling and integrated regional planning techniques to projects such as the West Siberian development. V. Krasovsky has claimed that multibranch coordination and modeling of capital construction programs, by reducing costs and shortening construction time, would augment growth of the Soviet national income over the 1971-75 period by 27 to 29 billion rubles.[43] Articles on West Siberia by S. M. Vishneva and by A. G. Aganbegian indicate interest in the application of such methods to development of the oil-and-gas complex of that region.[44] Furthermore, there are definite signs of sympathy for the integrated-planning approach on the part of General Secretary Brezhnev.[45]

Increased impetus might be given to this trend should the Soviet Union succeed in enlisting Western capital in the long-range development of the West Siberian deposits. Professional economists of Mr. Aganbegian's Institute of Economics and Organization of Industrial Production in Novosibirsk would presumably be better equipped to coordinate long-term planning efforts with American or Japanese industrialists than would the traditionalists in Moscow currently in charge of West Siberian development.

There are, indeed, various factors which argue in favor of seeking large-scale involvement of Western capital and technology in the West Siberian complex. Such participation might help to relieve the pressure on limited Soviet domestic investment resources, and it might also help Soviet engineers to overcome the technological problems of exploration, extraction and transmission of oil and gas in the difficult climate and terrain conditions of West Siberia. Consequently, the USSR has shown growing interest in exploring various forms of trade and joint ventures with the United States, Japan, and other developed industrial countries of the West.

Such arrangements for Western participation in Soviet oil and gas exploitation may be divided into three categories entailing ascending degrees of involvement. The first is a *barter-type arrangement* in which specific industrial products needed for West Siberian development are imported into the Soviet Union in return for exports of Soviet oil or gas. For example, in 1969, the Thyssen, Mannesmann firm of West Germany agreed to provide the USSR large-diameter gas transmission pipe on a credit of DM 1.2 billion repayable in 10 years at 6-percent interest, with repayment to be made through Soviet deliveries of natural gas to West Germany scheduled to begin in 1973.[46]

[41] See *Pravda, Izvestia* and *Sovetskaia Rossiia* items of Jan. 15-16, 1973.

[42] See *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 8, 1966, pp. 55-56. The present author discussed this problem in the chapter "Investment Policy in the Soviet Electric-Power Industry," in Gregory Grossman, Ed., *Value and Plan: Economic Calculations and Organizations in Eastern Europe*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1960.

[43] *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 6, 1971, p. 14.

[44] See *Ekonomika i matematicheskie metody* (Moscow), Vol. 7, No. 2, 1971; and *Sbornik "Neft i gas Tyumeni"* (The Collection "Tyumen Oil and Gas"), No. 5, Tyumen, 1970 (cited in *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 6, 1971, p. 8).

[45] Brezhnev spoke directly to this point at the 24th Party Congress: "The integrated approach to planning and the adoption of major decisions of a national-economy nature is becoming more and more important. The very nature of the tasks confronting us is such that their accomplishment, as a rule, calls for coordinated efforts by many branches and economic regions. . . . Do we have any positive experience in this field? Certainly. To speak only of the past few years, we have the program for an upswing in agriculture, the program for the development of the vast petroleum-bearing region in West Siberia, the program of space research, and others." (*Pravda* March 31, 1972.) Further evidence of his advocacy of integrated planning is cited in Craig Wilde's article "Issues in the Development of Siberia and the Far East," in Norton T. Dodge, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-35.

[46] *Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Oct. 20, 1972.

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A second type of arrangement might be termed a *production-sharing joint venture.* The Japanese are presently considering a proposal to help finance development of the Tyumen oil fields and construction of an eastern extension of the Soviet pipeline system (from Irkutsk to Nakhodka on the Sea of Japan). The Japanese would provide a credit of approximately 1 billion dollars,[47] and as Kiichi Saeki observed in these pages, the Japanese are seeking to limit any loans extended to the USSR to a term of five years with no grace period for repayment and to establish a production-sharing arrangement wherein the Japanese credit would be repaid by delivery of oil to Japan at prices lower than world market prices, thereby assuring the Japanese a profit.[48] In this arrangement, there would be no need for Japanese surveys of the Tyumen fields or participation in construction and extraction. So far, however, there has been no indication that the Japanese and Soviet negotiators have reached agreement on this project.

[47] See *The New York Times*, Jan. 9 and Nov. 25, 1972; also, *Forbes* (New York), Dec. 1, 1972, pp. 25-26.

[48] Saeki, *loc. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

Project "North Star"

The third and most ambitious form of joint venture under consideration is one which would likely lead to an unparalleled Western *participation in decision-making* because of the size of Western investment funds involved. While the North Sakhalin and Yakutsk gas projects (mentioned above and apparently now in abeyance) are two examples, the most prominent current proposal is the so-called Project "North Star," for the extraction, liquification, and export of gas to the West from the Urengoiskoe



Construction of the oil pipeline from Aleksandrovskoe to Anzhero-Sudzhensk during 1971. The 850-kilometer link to major Siberian production centers and points east was completed in early 1973.

—Photo from Novosti via Sovfoto.

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field of West Siberia. According to the US firms negotiating with the Soviet Union—Tenneco, Inc., Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, and Brown & Root, Inc.—a credit of 3 billion dollars (US) and an additional 700 million in cash provided by the USSR would finance purchase of American-made transmission equipment (compressors and 1,500 miles of 48-inch steel pipe capable of withstanding temperatures of minus 60 degrees Fahrenheit) and construction of a plant at the ice-free port of Murmansk to liquify the gas for shipment to the east coast of the United States. The US credits would consist of a 6-percent loan of 1.5 billion dollars from the Export-Import Bank and a loan of equal amount from various US banks, insurance companies and suppliers, the latter guaranteed by the Export-Import Bank. In addition, the American partners would build a fleet of 20 specialized LNG (liquified natural gas) tankers at an added cost of 2.6 billion dollars. The USSR would repay the credits and earn an additional 10.8 billion dollars (which could only be spent in the US) by deliveries of gas over a 25-year period beginning in 1980.[49]

In light of the magnitude of the undertaking, the need for Western technological know-how, and the adverse effects on American lenders of any interruptions or delays in supply of West Siberian natural gas, it is likely that the American parties to the deal will expect and require a considerable measure of direct participation in Soviet operations. In the first place, there is the issue of on-site inspection to assure Western investors of the adequacy of gas reserves and to permit them to estimate extraction costs. On the first count, the firms negotiating on Project "North Star" seem assured of sufficient gas reserves.[50] However, there is a distinct need for Western technicians to survey the gas fields for the purpose of making accurate cost estimates and to share in decision-making with their Soviet counterparts in order to insure proper installation and operation of specialized Western technical facilities in severe climatic conditions. This would entail further arrangements for communications, housing, transportation, and working facilities.



Western equipment is used in laying the Medvezhe-Nadym-Punga gas pipeline during 1972. Before placement in the trench, the pipes are heated by gas burners and wound with multilayer insulation.

—Photo by L. Polikashin, Novosti, via Sovfoto.

Another set of problems revolves around the interest charge on credits and various questions of pricing and repayment. If the USSR is granted long-term credits at low interest, then pricing of the natural gas delivered as repayment would have to assure the Western purchasers of a profit on resale. Next, the United States government, for one, is unlikely to grant the Soviet Union credit terms more favorable than it grants other nations. Should such major capital projects based on credit proliferate, they might overtax capital markets and make it more difficult for the USSR to get favorable interest rates and repayment terms. Furthermore, according to *The New York Times* of April 5, 1973, it is possible that the USSR may balk at requirements of the US Export-Import Bank for disclosure of Soviet foreign-reserve balances as a precondition for extending credits in the amounts indicated for Project "North Star." While such requirements are standard procedure for Export-Import Bank operations, such disclosure would be unprecedented for the Kremlin.


Although the negotiations concerning Project "North Star" are continuing amidst an atmosphere of considerable optimism, it is not clear when or even whether the joint project will be finalized. Agencies of the US government involved in approving the project have reportedly shown concern over the price of the Soviet natural gas (about three times current wellhead prices in the US), but the US firms involved in the negotiations have argued that domestic prices are likely to rise to similar levels by 1980.[51] Clearly the future of this project is closely linked to the whole question of the nature

[49] For discussion of the project, see *Oil and Gas Journal*, Nov. 13, 1972, pp. 97-99; *The Washington Post*, Nov. 13 and Dec. 26, 1972; and *The New York Times*, Jan. 9, 1973.

[50] *The New York Times*, Jan. 9, 1973.

[51] *Ibid.*

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Petroleum processing at Perm, one of the cities which will draw on West Siberian oil fields.

—Photo from TASS via Sovfoto.

and success of Soviet-American efforts at promoting détente as well as to the issue of overall US energy policy.

The extent to which Project "North Star" could contribute to meeting overall Soviet energy requirements remains unclear. The opportunity to export significant quantities of natural gas at favorable prices in return for the importation and installation of advanced Western production and transmission technology should improve the Soviet capability for exploiting the reserves of the Urengoiskoe and related fields, either for additional exports to hard-currency areas or for domestic utilization. How soon this payoff would come and how large it might be cannot be answered definitively. Much depends on timing, the degree of Western help, the repayment terms of any final agreement, and the success of the Soviet Union in completing its part of the project. Without "North Star," the Soviet Union would have great difficulty becoming a net exporter of gas. Even with "North Star" it is not assured of becoming a net exporter by the early 1980's, although the possibilities are definitely improved. Depending on the terms of the deal—quantities, prices, and delivery schedules for natural gas—the USSR might find the capacities of the West Siberian fields totally mortgaged against the cost of imported Western equipment. Should the country be unable to complete the complex project on time, the USSR might even need to use other reserves to meet repayment.

* * *

What overall picture emerges from this examination of the vast West Siberian regional venture and of the various options and constraints facing the Soviet Union? What are the prospects for successful attainment of Soviet oil and natural gas targets through the exploitation of West Siberia's rich Tyumen Province?

Writing even before these targets were cut back (in the 1973 plan at least), the West German economist Werner Gumpel concluded that the USSR might find itself a net importer of both oil and gas by 1980. He posited an inland oil consumption of 613 million tons for the USSR in 1980 and quoted Soviet estimates placing domestic oil production in that year at 607 million tons or "more than 500 million tons," as compared with original plan targets of 690 to 710 million tons. If a deficit in oil production does materialize, it might be covered by substituting natural gas or by importing oil. Since the original gas output target (680 to 720 billion cubic meters in 1980) has now been scaled down to 536 billion cubic meters, substitution in the required volume cannot be carried out. The alternatives would be to lower consumption or import oil or gas to make good the deficit.[52]

A less pessimistic view, at least as regards gas production, is provided by Frank J. Gardner, International Editor of the *Oil and Gas Journal*. While he attributes the poor performance of 1972 to "a major breakdown in the Kremlin's vaunted long-range industrial planning," and notes that "the Communists haven't been able to coordinate their field developments with the construction and efficient operation of gas-treatment plants and new pipelines," he predicts that the USSR will again be a net exporter of natural gas by 1975.[53]

[52] "Soviet Oil and Soviet Middle East Policy," *Wissenpolitik* (Cologne), No. 1, 1972, pp. 110-11. L. Zevin, in *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, No. 7, 1971, pp. 17-26, predicted Soviet importation of 60-90 million tons of oil and 40-50 billion cubic meters of gas annually from the Middle East by 1985.

[53] *Oil and Gas Journal*, No. 1, 1973.

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But what if, for reasons of poor planning, insufficient investment, or the sheer difficulty of the task, West Siberia fails to pick up the slack in Soviet oil and gas production and the 1975 targets are not met? Neither cutbacks in domestic consumption nor reductions in export commitments seem admissible. Reduced domestic consumption would predictably impede overall economic performance and efficiency. A cutback in deliveries to Comecon—on top of mounting East European consumption of oil and gas—would force Moscow's partners to seek new sources of fuel, an approach not favored in the past by the Kremlin.[54] Alternatively, the USSR could reduce oil exports to the West, as it did in 1969, at the cost of reduced hard-currency earnings.[55] But judging from Soviet salesmanship at the Eighth World Petroleum Congress, held in Moscow in June 1971, this prospect is clearly unattractive to the Soviet leaders, particularly since oil and gas exports appear to figure so strongly in developing East-West commercial relations.[56]

In attempting to offset a shortfall in domestic output of oil and gas, the USSR would be forced to expand production in older fields, import oil and gas, or seek alternative energy sources. Expansion of production in the Ural-Volga fields would lead to oil recovery at an uneconomic ratio of 1.1 with water. Imports of oil from most Arab countries would be a heavy drain on Soviet hard-currency reserves, although Moscow might import natural gas or oil from Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan or Libya in exchange for military or industrial equipment. Iraq, in particular, might repay Soviet military and economic aid totaling almost one billion dollars by delivering crude oil. In fact, the USSR and its allies are currently helping Iraq develop the facilities to produce and export 50 to 100 million tons of crude oil annually from the North Rumaila fields. (But there is doubt as to how long military shipments can finance oil imports from Iraq.) As another alternative, the USSR might feel constrained to exploit low-quality, high-cost coal deposits in the Moscow basin.

The role of oil and gas in the Soviet quest for economic efficiency during the Ninth Five-Year Plan is clear, and acceleration of increases in production of these commodities depends on the highly uncertain West Siberian project. This enterprise is fraught with technological difficulties and problems of cost and capital scarcity. It is integrally linked to important political issues—the allocation of limited domestic funds and the question of enlisting Western capital and know-how in West Siberian development. Moreover, the complexity of the task would seem to call for increasingly sophisticated models of integrated regional planning, and it remains to be seen whether the Soviet leadership will recognize and act on this reality.

If the Soviet Union can resolve these many interrelated issues, its economy may be in a position to perform more efficiently on an improved energy base. If not, energy difficulties may obstruct Soviet domestic economic development, complicate the economic and political relations of the USSR with its Comecon partners, and limit the prospects for expanding commercial relations with the United States and other developed industrial nations.

[54] *Platts Oilgram* (London), Feb. 13, 1970, p. 1, predicted an East European oil deficit of 84 million tons by 1980. The Polish agreement with British Petroleum for the latter to furnish supplies of petroleum products in lieu of Soviet deliveries is a notable exception to past policy (see *The Economist* [London], July 10, 1971, p. 90).

[55] The year 1969 was the first in which exports to the non-Communist world declined since the USSR became a net exporter of oil in 1955. Such exports have been the Soviet Union's "largest single source of foreign exchange . . . about 350 million dollars in 1969." J. Richard Lee, "The Fuel Industries," in Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, *Economic Performance and the Military Burden in the Soviet Union*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1970, p. 35.

[56] See reports carried in *The Washington Post* in June 1971, and Robert Ebel's comments in *World Petroleum* (Washington, DC), June 1971.

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The Shaping of Soviet Religious Policy

By Bohdan R. Bociurkiw

Official expositions of Soviet religious policy have changed remarkably little since Lenin's times. According to "Leninist principles," religious organizations must be completely separated from the state and the school system, and their activities restricted solely to the "performance of religious rites." Every person should be free to profess any religion whatsoever—as long as his religious practices do not interfere with the public order or with other citizens' freedom of conscience—or alternatively he should be free to recognize no religion; in either case, his beliefs must not expose him to legal or economic discrimination. The state should treat all faiths and religious organizations equally and not interfere with their internal activities as long as they do not violate Soviet laws. In contrast to the state, the Communist Party is considered to have an obligation to strive actively for the complete emancipation of the masses from religious "prejudices." To this end, the party conducts systematic scientific-atheist propaganda—supposedly without, however, offending the religious sentiments of believers.

Both the state and the party are said to have continuously and consistently carried these principles into effect. If administrative repressions were applied in the past against some churchmen or sectarians, it was only because they violated Soviet laws; but now most of the clergy and the faithful are loyal Soviet citizens. The large majority of the Soviet population is said to have abandoned religion as a result of education and scientific-atheist propaganda; "inevitably," therefore, the number of clergy, houses of worship, theological schools and monasteries has sharply declined in the USSR. There never was nor could there ever be "religious persecution" in the Soviet Union, since the state has always strictly enforced Soviet laws "guaranteeing" freedom of conscience for all Soviet citizens.[1] During the past decade, Soviet spokesmen have slightly amended this official version of the regime's religious policy by admitting that the cultural-educational function of the Soviet state involves the dissemination of a scientific-atheist world-view.[2] Aside from this small concession to the obvious, however, official descriptions of Soviet religious policy have continued to tend toward concealing rather than elucidating the realities of church-state relations in the USSR.

A somewhat more realistic view of Soviet church policy has emerged from the growing number of Western and émigré studies on religion in the USSR, though many of these analyses have also tended to be overdrawn. On the whole, they have treated Marxist-Leninist atheism as the chief motivating force behind Soviet religious policy and the complete eradication of religion as its grand objective. The Soviet regime has been portrayed as ruthlessly and consistently striving toward this goal, restrained only by the opposition of believers and by foreign pres-

Mr. Bociurkiw is Professor of Political Science at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. An authority on church-state relations in the Soviet Union, he is co-editor (with John W. Strong) of the forthcoming book, Religion and Atheism in the USSR and Eastern Europe.

[1] See G. T. Utkin, "Religion and the Church," in *Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia* (Great Soviet Encyclopedia), Moscow, Gosudarstvennoe Izd-vo Sovetskikh Entsiklopedii (hereafter GISE), Vol. 50, 1957, pp. 642-43; Alexei Puzin, *Religion in the USSR*, Moscow, Novosti, n.d.; Vladimir A. Kuroedov, *Religiia i zakon* (Religion and the Law), Moscow, Znanie, 1970.

[2] See, e.g., Yu A. Rozenbaum, "The Separation of Church and State in the USSR, "*Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* (Moscow), No. 3, 1972, p. 64.

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sure; any signs of Soviet toleration or concession have been interpreted either in terms of these domestic and foreign deterrents or as a temporary reward to subservient religious leaders for political services rendered to the regime.[3]

Both Soviet and Western sources have ascribed to the regime's church policy more single-mindedness and consistency than can in fact be detected; they have also overemphasized ideological motives in the Soviet treatment of religion. While the official explanations have stressed the "norms" of Soviet policy in this field and have identified "what ought to be" with "what is," dogmatically assuming that constitutional formulas represent a correct description of Soviet practice, Western critics have concentrated on the "outputs" of Soviet ecclesiastical politics, in particular on the effects of Soviet legislative and administrative measures on the Russian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations.

The present analysis is less concerned with such specific measures and their impact on particular religions than with the broad and, to some extent, systemic determinants of Soviet religious policy. The article will attempt to identify and analyze these determinants, in particular the underlying motives and attitudes of the top policy-makers. It will also explore disagreements over the choice of means to attain objectives in this field—differences arising in part from the interaction between religious policy and such other considerations as domestic security; the peasant, nationality, and foreign policies of the regime; and the changing requirements of political socialization. Finally, the article will examine the institutional framework within which Soviet religious policy has been shaped and will distinguish the various elements in Soviet society which have influenced policy decisions.

Attitudes of the Soviet Elite

At least three interrelated attitudes underlying the Kremlin's religious policy may be inferred from the political culture and behavior of the Soviet elite. The first appears to be rooted in the memory of the Russian Orthodox Church's interdependence with Tsarist autocracy, its collaboration with the anti-Bolshevik forces during the 1917 Revolution and the Civil War, and its early opposition to the Soviet regime—a memory which has thus tended to identify institutional religion as an instrument of the internal and external enemies of the Soviet system.

A second major strand in Communist thought has its roots in the vulgarized, militant version of Marxist atheism developed in the writings and pronouncements of Lenin and his followers, who were strongly influenced by the native anti-clerical tradition. Leninism has "explained" religion not merely in terms of the masses' cultural backwardness and ignorance but also as a deliberate "fraud" (*obman*) designed to prevent the toilers from attaining a true consciousness of their class interest by dulling and distorting their senses and paralyzing their will. Unlike classical Marxists, Lenin did not trust the "objective" social-economic processes to emancipate the masses from religious "illusion." His impatience with these slow-working processes, combined with his distrust of the masses' rationality, reinforced the Bolshevik inclination to accelerate "objective" secularization processes by agitation, manipulation and force.[4] At the same time, the party's claim to collective infallibility generated its quasi-religious intolerance of "false" teachings, making it incapable of any meaningful dialogue with religious believers and encouraging it to answer critics of Soviet atheism and the regime's religious policy with verbal abuse and "administrative methods."

The third attitudinal element motivating religious policy has been the regime's compulsion to suppress those institutions and organizations which could not be effectively integrated into the Soviet political system and transformed into the party's "conveyor belts." After the consolidation of the party dictatorship in the USSR, religious organizations were the only legally existing institutions which remained outside the party's ideological controls and—what is more—disseminated teachings that could not be

[3] See, *e.g.*, John S. Curtiss, *The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917-1950*, Boston, Peter Smith Publishers, 1953; Matthew Spinka, *The Church in Soviet Russia*, New York and London, Oxford University Press, 1956; Alexander Kischkowsky, *Die sowjetische Religionspolitik und die Russische Orthodoxe Kirche* (Soviet Religious Policy and the Russian Orthodox Church), Munich, Institut zur Erforschung der UdSSR, 1957; Walter Kolarz, *Religion in the Soviet Union*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1962; Nikita Struve, *Christians in Contemporary Russia*, New York, Scribner, 1967; Robert Conquest, *Religion in the USSR*, New York and London, Praeger, 1968; and Giovanni Codevilla, *Stato e Chiesa nell' Unione Sovietica* (State and Church in the Soviet Union), Milan, Jaca Book Edizioni, 1972.

[4] For the best available collection of Lenin's writings and pronouncements on religion, see *V.I. Lenin ob ateizme, religii i tserkvi* (V.I. Lenin on Atheism, Religion and the Church), Moscow, Mysl, 1969. Also see this writer's "Lenin and Religion" in Leonard Schapiro and Peter Reddaway, Eds., *Lenin: The Man, The Theorist, The Leader. A Reappraisal*, New York and London, Praeger, 1967, pp. 107-34.


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reconciled with the Bolshevik political culture, thus serving to hinder the political socialization of a large segment of the Soviet population. In contrast to its role in all other public associations in the country, the party could not establish itself as a "leading core" of religious organizations, nor could the *nomenklatura* system ensuring party control over personnel appointments be effectively applied in the selection of ecclesiastical and sectarian leaders. While the pretense of a "separation" of church and state had to be maintained at the level of overt governmental supervision over the activities of religious organizations, the continuous concern of the leadership about these "islands" of ideological nonconformity and potential political subversion impelled it to surround religious organizations with a close network of covert police controls. Eventually, "voluntary" submission to such controls, renunciation of any public criticism of the Soviet treatment of religion, and commitment to the positive support of Soviet policies at home and abroad became the price that religious groups had to pay for continued legal existence.[5]

The configuration of attitudes stemming from the historical memory, the ideological legacy, and the authoritarian aspirations of the regime has naturally affected the Communist elite's perception of religion. Viewed through these several prisms, the church (and any form of institutionalized religion) has appeared to the Bolsheviks as a kind of commercialized vice,[6] catering to the displaced needs of the ignorant

[5] On this process of "normalization" of the Russian Church's relations with the Soviet regime, see William C. Fletcher, *A Study in Survival: The Church in Russia, 1927-1943*, New York, Macmillan, 1965. Also see this writer's "Church-State Relations in the USSR," *Survey* (London), January 1968, pp. 4-32.

[6] This analogy was suggested by the late Metropolitan Sergii (Voskresensky), Patriarchal Exarch for the Baltic States, in his account of church-state relations before the last war, written during the German occupation and published in the US: "The Church in the USSR before the War," *Rossiia* (New York), Oct. 9-13, 1945.



The small church of Simeon Stopnik today serves as the site of an aquarium off Moscow's showcase boulevard, Kalinin Prospekt.

—Wide World Photos.

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and backward elements of society and diverting them from socially useful endeavors—a vice providing a livelihood to a parasitic stratum of the clergy which, despite its professions of loyalty, has always been inherently hostile to the Communist world-view and determined, should a suitable occasion arise, to subvert the Soviet order.[7] To the Communists' way of thinking, religion—though rooted in the "lagging consciousness" of the least advanced social strata and nourished by certain collective and individual misfortunes—would have declined much faster after the "liquidation" of the old exploiting classes if not for such factors as the continuous agitation of *tserkovniky i sektanty* (churchmen and sectarians) and the "infiltration of bourgeois influences" from abroad. The official line holds that as long as a large segment of society remains addicted to this "spiritual drug," the state cannot completely suppress religion without driving religious "addicts" into desperate resistance, which might endanger the regime. The latter must, nevertheless, attempt to minimize the influence of religion on society through such means as suppression of religious propaganda,[8] vigorous atheist indoctrination, compromise of the church and the clergy in the eyes of believers, progressive reduction in the number of licensed houses of worship and clergy, and provision of substitutes for religious rites and traditions. Above all, the authorities must prevent religious organizations from recruiting new adherents, especially among the youth. The security agencies should maintain a constant and close surveillance over the dispensers of "religious opium" to prevent them from violating the above restrictions and from using their power over the believers against the interests of the Soviet system. At the same time, the state must withdraw for socially useful purposes the excessive profits accumulated by the clergy from their "fraudulent activities."

Within this frame of reference, hostility, contempt and suspicion have dominated the feelings of the Soviet elite toward religion, with significant effect on the process of policy formation. Among the top policy-makers, such feelings seem to have been periodically activated by a variety of stimuli issuing, for example, from the party's ideological apparatus, the police, or the special government agencies in charge of religious affairs—agencies which have been strategically located to help develop the "inputs" of Soviet ecclesiastical policy. A review of the official rationalizations of past antireligious campaigns shows that the most frequent signals triggering top-level crackdowns have been stepped-up charges that *tserkovniki* and *sektanty* were threatening Soviet society in one or another of three basic areas: (1) internal security (by allegedly engaging in "counterrevolutionary activities" and "espionage," by "infiltrating Soviet institutions," by "violating Soviet law," by "preaching disobedience to Soviet authorities"); (2) political socialization processes (by "poisoning the minds" of or "spiritually mutilating" the "children and youth," by "opposing education and culture," by "reinforcing old, backward, reactionary customs," by "rekindling nationalist prejudices," by "subverting communist moral norms"); or (3) economic performance (by committing "economic sabotage," by "wrecking," by "diverting time and resources from production").[9]

Allegations of such activity reaching the policy-makers have no doubt stimulated and reinforced their hostility toward religion. But it has taken more to transform hostility into major policy initiatives. Generally, such stimuli have had to be reinforced by extraneous pressures generated by factional conflicts; reversals in the nationality, peasant or foreign policies of the Kremlin; real or imagined internal or external threats to the regime; etc.

As in some other policy fields, Soviet decision-making in ecclesiastical matters has followed a spasmodic "from campaign to campaign" course—a behavioral pattern owing to the over-concentration of decision-making at the top of the Soviet political system, where the multitude of policy concerns confronting the Kremlin leaders has made it impossible for them to deal with religious matters in any continuous and systematic manner. Neverthe-

[7] The speed with which religious organizations abandoned their loyalty to the Soviet regime, once they found themselves under the German occupation during World War II, no doubt reinforced this view.

[8] Nominally allowed under the terms of the 1918 Soviet Russian Constitution, the "right to religious propaganda" was withdrawn by a 1929 constitutional amendment.

[9] See F. Garkavenko, Ed., *O religii i tserkvi. Sbornik dokumentov* (Religion and the Church. Collection of Documents), Moscow, Izd-vo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1965. At different times individual "threats" have been associated with specific religious denominations. Thus, charges of "reinforcing old, backward, reactionary customs" have usually been reserved for Islam; accusations of "espionage" were at first aimed primarily at the Roman Catholics, but were applied, along with "sabotage" charges, to all religious denominations during the 1930's; the "rekindling of nationalist prejudices" has invariably been ascribed to "non-Russian" denominations—Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, and in particular the Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Uniates in the Ukraine.

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less, published party and government decisions on religion have always claimed consistency and continuity in Soviet policy in this field;[10] new policy tacks have never been attributed to changes in the party's attitude toward religion but rather explained as necessary and justifiable *responses* to shifts in ecclesiastical attitudes toward the Soviet regime. "Positive shifts in the latter respect have been described as "necessitated by life itself," while negative ones have evoked charges of "complacency" or "lack of vigilance" on the part of responsible officials.

Contradictory Tendencies

In terms of its ultimate objective, the CPSU has never abandoned its commitment to create a completely atheistic society, whatever private views may have been held by its leaders concerning the immediacy, or even the attainability, of this end. However, in the choice of means designed to realize this objective—and in the timing and application of short-range policies to individual denominations, nationalities, geographic regions, and social strata—the Communists have shown considerable flexibility, not to mention inconsistency, traceable to a variety of factors. Thus, from the very beginnings of the Soviet regime, its leaders have differed over the role to be assigned to the government and the law as opposed to that relegated to the party and the "revolutionary initiative of the masses" in combating religion; there have also been divergent views with respect to the optimal speed and methods of antireligious struggle and over the tactical uses of religion. Disagreements among sections of the party elite over the proper translation of ideology into religious policy have also been affected by differences in their institutional "loyalties," their occupational roles, and their clienteles.

Perhaps of greatest significance for the course of Soviet church policy has been the continuing tug-of-war between the "fundamentalist" tendency, entrenched primarily in the party Agitprop organization and the Komsomol apparatus, and the "pragmatic" orientation displayed by party and state workers charged with the practical functioning of the system, as well as in the ranks of the police. Characteristic of the "fundamentalist" viewpoint has been an emphasis on continuous and intense antireligious struggle and hostility "on principle" to all forms of religion and every church and sect. From the first, the "fundamentalists" have opposed any form of cooperation between church and state, and indeed have taken the position—once held by Lenin—that the more reactionary and obscurantist the religion, the greater the success that could be achieved by antireligious propaganda.[11] Aiming at the speediest possible liquidation of religion, they have been inclined to resort to restrictive legislation and administrative coercion to combat different faiths.

The "pragmatists," on the other hand, have differentiated among religious groups in terms of their readiness and capacity to further or thwart the current political and economic objectives of the Kremlin. This approach has called for rewarding the friends and punishing the enemies of the regime. Less optimistic about the immediate success of atheistic propaganda, the "pragmatists" have persistently striven to "Sovietize" religious organizations, both for reasons of internal security and for the sake of the regime's legitimization among the believing masses. Unlike the "fundamentalists," who have sought to establish Communist ideology as a prime source of the system's legitimacy, the "pragmatists" have been mindful of the continuing importance of religious traditions in shaping the social values of many Soviet subjects. Hence their emphasis on securing from all religious groups in the country a *de jure* recognition of the Soviet regime as "providentially ordained" and entitled to believers' obedience, "not from fear but from conscience."[12]


These two tendencies, each nourished by a facet of Leninism—the "fundamentalists" by its utopian assumption of the infinite malleability of human nature, and the "pragmatists" by its pessimism about the practical possibility of raising the masses to the level of the elite's consciousness"—have clashed repeatedly at different stages of Soviet church policy. Yet, in one sense, the two trends have complemented each other. Repressive measures have tended to "condition" the various churches and sects to accept the Soviet political platform and have helped to make their leaders into pliant tools of the official policy. At the same time, the more subtle "Sovietiza-

[10] See *Ibid.*

[11] See in particular Lenin's two 1913 letters to M. Gorky, reproduced in *V.I. Lenin ob ateizme . . .*, pp. 270-75.

[12] For an early exchange on this point between M. Latsis (a Chekist) and P. Krasikov, see *Izvestiia* (Moscow), Dec. 2 and 14, 1919.

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Metropolitan Pimen of Krutitsky and Kolomna, pictured in January 1971 at Novo-Devichy Monastery in Moscow, where he was Acting Patriarch prior to his election as Patriarch of Moscow and All-Russia in June 1971.

—Photo from TASS via Sovfoto.

tion" of these religious groups has weakened their capacity to resist the regime's assaults on religion.

The Sovietization of religious groups has had important consequences for the government's role *vis-à-vis* "loyal" religious groups. For, once the authorities established effective controls over the "registered" churches and sects and approved their statutes and leadership, they had to abandon the early *divide et impera* tactics toward these groups, including the incitement of the rank-and-file believers against the clergy and the hierarchy. Religious dissent in the form of intrachurch opposition to the government-approved ecclesiastical rules and leaders became the main threat to Soviet control over religious organizations, assuming the dimensions of political dissent as well.[13] Hence, we see the paradoxical spectacle of the admittedly atheistic authorities intervening in internal ecclesiastical conflicts or interchurch clashes to suppress dissenters or to force the absorption of some religious groups by the more "patriotic" or "loyal" churches.[14]

The unifying principle resolving this apparent contradiction between the "fundamentalist" and "pragmatic" tendencies in Soviet church policy and supplying some consistency to the party's meandering line on religion has been the Leninist formula subordinating the struggle against religion to the "interests of the class struggle of the proletariat."[15]

Interdependent Policy Considerations

In the post-1917 context, this formula meant the subordination of ideological purity and consistency to the immediate considerations of the regime's political survival, security and power. With the later consolidation of the Soviet system, the need for political resocialization became an increasingly important factor affecting the Soviet treatment of religion, while the emergence of Soviet-type regimes in Eastern Europe after World War II supplied an external dimension to the Kremlin's church policy. The different phases of Soviet development have involved an ongoing alignment of church policy with the changing party line in several realms—most specifically, internal and external security, peasant policy, nationalities policy, and foreign affairs. Let us examine the effect on religious policy of these concerns.

[13] See this writer's paper, "Religious Dissent and the Soviet State," in Peter Potichnyj, Ed., *Papers and Proceedings* of the *McMaster Conference on Dissent*, Hamilton, Ontario, McMaster University, 1972, pp. 73-112.

[14] To cite some examples, in 1943-44, the Soviet authorities forced the absorption of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (reconstituted during the German occupation of the Ukraine) into the Russian Orthodox Church. In 1945-49, they assisted in the "conversion" of the Uniates in the Western Ukraine to Russian Orthodoxy. After 1961, they intervened actively to crack down on the dissident elements among the Evangelican Christians-Baptists.

[15] See Lenin's 1909 article "On the Relationship of the Workers' Party to Religion," in *V.I. Lenin ob ateizme. . . .*, pp. 72-73.

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(1) Considerations of internal and external security have always been present in Soviet policy-making in the religious field. During the early years of Bolshevik rule, the severe legislative and administrative measures and selective terror applied against the Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches were at least in part motivated by Soviet fear of their collusion with the Whites and the Poles, respectively.[16] The intervention of the Soviet authorities in 1922 in support of the Renovationist *coup d'église* was affected to some extent by the propaganda activities of Russian ecclesiastical and political émigrés, who were counting on the Orthodox Church to eventually rescue Russia from Bolshevism.[17] During the 1930's, accusations of "espionage," "sabotage" and "terrorism" figured prominently in the sweeping purges of the leaders and clergy of all denominations—attesting to the Soviet view of churches as at least potentially subversive organizations.[18] Stalin's converse concessions to the Church during World War II were no doubt motivated by a desire to defuse what he viewed as an "internal" ecclesiastical front for the sake of maximum mobilization of the country's war efforts.

From the very beginning of Soviet rule, religious organizations were treated as a "security problem" necessitating not only close police surveillance of "churchmen and sectarians" but also the infiltration of their ranks with collaborators, informers and agents-provocateurs. Despite the establishment of special government agencies for religious affairs, an intimate involvement of the security organs in ecclesiastical affairs has remained a permanent feature of Soviet church-state relations.[19]

(2) The linkage between religious and peasant policies—though of declining importance with the progressive urbanization and secularization of Soviet society—derived in the first decades of Communist rule from the stronger and more lasting hold of religion on the peasant masses, which constituted the least politically socialized stratum of the new society and which had little vested interest in the Soviet system. At least until World War II, sharp turns in Soviet religious policy coincided with major shifts in the regime's peasant policy: thus, the introduction of the New Economic Policy was paralleled by a relatively lenient policy toward believers, with some sects (especially those preaching communal living) being granted special concessions by the Commissariat of Agriculture during the 1920's.[20] With reverse consistency, the collectivization drive was accompanied by a massive escalation of antireligious propaganda linking the clergy to the kulaks as the chief enemies of collectivization. Given reports in more recent years indicating that the great majority of religious congregations are in rural areas and that at least twice the proportion of practicing believers live in the countryside as in the cities,[21] such questions as the effect of religious practices on peasant productivity—or the extent to which antireligious pressures might drive peasants into passive opposition or even deliberate work slowdowns—are still relevant to the makers of Soviet policy.

(3) Because of the intimate interrelationship between religious and national cultures, nationality policy has been an important factor affecting the Soviet line on religion. Examples can be cited from

[16] See Boleslaw Szczesniak, Ed., *The Russian Revolution and Religion*, South Bend, Ind., University of Notre Dame Press, 1959, *passim*.

[17] See the relevant documents of the émigré Russian Church Synod at Sremski Karlovci, held in November-December 1921 (*ibid.*, pp. 58-62). Prepared by a violent press campaign against the "churchly counterrevolution" and preceded by the arrest of Patriarch Tikhon, the *coup* involved the seizure of the central and local administration of the Russian Orthodox Church by a group of "progressive" clergy who proposed to "renovate" the church by purging it of its "counterrevolutionary" leadership and ideology and by bringing its organization, teachings, and political orientation "closer to life"; above all, the *Obnovlentsy* ("Renovationists") hoped to reach a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet regime which would improve the legal and material position of the clergy. Whether or not the authorities masterminded this takeover, they openly supported the "Renovationists" by preventing the Tikhon-appointed deputies from assuming office, by arresting or deporting the principal ecclesiastical opponents of the new "progressive" church administration, and by withdrawing "registration" from the priests and parish congregations which refused to recognize it.

[18] Typical samples are F.M. Putintsev, *Politicheskaia rol i taktika sekt* (The Political Role and Tactics of Sects), Moscow, GAIZ, 1935; and Boris Kandidov, *Tserkov i shpionazh* (The Church and Espionage), Moscow, GAIZ, 1938.

[19] See in particular Antoni Starodworski, *Tragedja Cerkwi Prawoslawnej w ZSSR* (The Tragedy of the Orthodox Church in the USSR), Warsaw, Instytut Naukowego Badania Komunizmu, 1934, pp. 90-107; Simon Wolin and Robert M. Slusser, Eds., *The Soviet Secret Police*, London, Methuen, 1957, pp. 23, 126; and the more recent accounts by religious dissenters in the USSR appearing in two volumes edited by Michael Bourdeaux, *Religious Ferment in Russia*, London, Martin, 1968, and *Patriarch and Prophets*, New York, Praeger, 1970, *passim*.

[20] See Kolarz, *Religion in the Soviet Union*, pp. 287-96.

[21] *E.g.*, in the Ukraine, by the mid-1960's, only 11 percent of all houses of worship were said to be located in urban centers: Anatoly O. Ieryshev. *Dosvid sotsiolohichnykh doslidzhen relihinosty* (Experience of Sociological Studies of Religiosity), Kiev, V-vo Akademii Nauk URSR, 1967, p. 68. A. Okulov, Director of the Institute of Scientific Atheism in Moscow has reported that "in some cases" believers constitute up to 15 percent of urban dwellers and up to 30 percent of the rural population: *Nauka i religiia* (Moscow), No. 8, 1967, p. 16.

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every period of Soviet history. Thus, in the early years of Soviet rule, a moderate policy toward such faiths as Judaism, Islam and Buddhism reflected the relatively tolerant treatment of the national minorities concerned. A similar correlation existed between the "Ukrainization" policy of the early 1920's and the early Soviet tolerance shown to the Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the Ukraine. The reversal of Soviet nationality policy by the end of the 1920's brought in its wake destructive attacks on "national religions" as bastions of "bourgeois nationalism." The same Ukrainian Autocephalous Church was forced to "dissolve" itself in 1930, following the alleged "discovery" by the secret police that it was acting as a "cover for the mobilization of guerrilla cadres" in an underground League for the Liberation of the Ukraine.[22] While the Russian Orthodox Church shared the persecutions of the 1930's, the progressive rehabilitation of Russian nationalism in the guise of "Soviet patriotism" prepared the way for the regime's reevaluation of the historical role of the Russian Church and for the dramatic reversal of the regime's relationship with the Moscow Patriarchate during World War II.[23] The immediate postwar years provided one of the most striking demonstrations of the interrelationship between Soviet nationality and religious policies, when the Soviet authorities not only suppressed the Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church in the Western Ukraine but also—in the tradition of Nicholas I—joined with the Russian Church in forcibly "converting" the Uniates to Orthodoxy.[24] As a final, well-known example, the last two decades have seen a steady increase in Soviet propaganda identifying Judaism with Zionism and pro-Israeli sympathies.[25] It seems clear that Soviet intolerance of the so-called "bourgeois nationalist" content of religion has sprung in part from fear that "national" denominations might offer an autonomous organizational framework for dissent movements.

(4) Numerous links can be detected between Soviet religious and foreign policies. This interrelationship has derived both from the sensitivity of foreign public opinion to the fate of religion or of specific denominations in the USSR and from the Kremlin's desire to neutralize religiously-motivated hostility in other countries to the Soviet regime and to communism in general. The early years of the the regime offer several examples of pressure from foreign governments affecting the Soviet treatment of leading religious figures[26]—though such interventions were bitterly resented by the Kremlin and, in the long run, did not improve the status of the respective denominations as a whole. As a rule, the Soviet authorities have been more responsive to appeals and criticism coming from their foreign friends and neutrals than to those of their enemies.

Soviet treatment of individual churches and sects, especially since World War II, has been affected by the extent to which they could or would advance foreign policy objectives of the regime. This treatment has further depended on the differing degrees of correspondence between the external interests of the Soviet state and those of the individual religious groups, ranging from a high positive correlation in the case of the Russian Orthodox Church to a negative one in the case of Judaism. Denominations like the Roman Catholics, subordinate to an international ecclesiastical center abroad, have of course been of different political utility to the regime than—for example—the Armenian Church with its Catholics of Echmiadzin claiming spiritual authority over all Armenians, not only those in the USSR but also the more numerous diaspora.[27]

During the interwar period the price of limited Soviet toleration for any religious group involved a commitment by that group to renounce any foreign intervention on its behalf, even in times of severe antireligious attacks, and an obligation to promote support of the Soviet system among its followers in other countries.[28] Since the 1940's, the Russian

[22] See *Izvestiia*, Nov. 22, 1929; and Dymtro Ihnatiuk, *Ukrainska avtokelfalna tserkva i Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukrainy* (The Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine), Kiev, Derzhavne Vydavnytstvo Ukrainy, 1930.

[23] See Nicholas S. Timashev, *Religion in Soviet Russia (1917-1942)*, London, Sheed & Ward, 1943, pp. 114-18.

[24] See this writer's "The Uniate Church in the Soviet Ukraine: A Case Study in Soviet Church Policy," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* (Ottawa), Vol. VII (1965), pp. 89-113.

[25] See, *e.g.*, Joshua Rothenberg, "Jewish Religion in the Soviet Union," in Lionel Kochan, Ed., *The Jews in Soviet Russia since 1917*, London, Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 175-79.

[26] The release of Patriarch Tikhon from prison in 1923 was, in part, the result of British intervention, while the freeing and banishment to Poland of the already condemned Roman Catholic Archbishop Cieplak was due to strong Polish pressure. Similarly, Rabbi Joseph Schneerson of Liubavichi, sentenced to death in 1927, was instead allowed to leave the USSR as a result of foreign pressure.

[27] Kolarz, *Religion in the Soviet Union*, pp. 150-53.

[28] Following a "normalization" of relations between the regime and the Russian Orthodox Church in 1927, the émigré bishops and clergy in the Moscow Patriarchate's jurisdiction were requested by Metropolitan Sergei to sign pledges of loyalty to the Soviet government. Similar requests were made of their cobelievers abroad by the leaders of certain other denominations in the USSR. On Metropolitan Sergii's repudiation of a campaign by foreign churches to defend his persecuted Church, see Fletcher, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-57.

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Among religious leaders attending services during the June 1971 Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church are (front row, from left) Metropolitan Philippos mar Theophilos, head of the Molobar Church; Bishop Kerlos of Ethiopia; Cardinal I. Willebrandts; and Vazgen I, Supreme Patriarch-Catholicos of All-Armenia.

—Photo from TASS via Sovfoto.

Orthodox Church and certain other "loyal" religious denominations have assumed more active roles in espousing Soviet foreign policy objectives and conducting propaganda among their coreligionists abroad,[29] through the channels of bilateral and multilateral interchurch relations and organizations, including the Christian Peace Conference and—since the 1960's—the World Council of Churches, as well as through participation in the pro-Soviet "peace" movements. The religious organizations have helped the regime both by projecting a positive image of the Soviet system and by mobilizing support for certain Soviet policy initiatives among churches in other Communist states and in developing countries. They have also been instrumental in neutralizing or at least weakening anti-Soviet forces in some foreign churches throughout the establishment of "friendly" relations with these churches (*e.g.*, with the Vatican). By making the establishment and continuation of bilateral and multilateral ecclesiastical relations with foreign churches dependent to a large degree on the suspension by the latter of their public criticism of the Soviet regime, the churches of the USSR have in a sense projected some of the requirements of Soviet domestic religious policy onto churches and ecumenical organizations outside the Soviet sphere of control.[30]

The shifting patterns of Soviet control over Eastern Europe since World War II have added a new dimension to Soviet religious policy. Over the years, the Soviet model of church-state relations has been emulated to differing degrees in the various East European countries, and the Soviet Union appears to have exerted some influence over the religious policies of these states.[31] In the early postwar years, political penetration was paralleled by the expansion of the influence of the most privileged of the churches in the USSR—the Russian Orthodox Church—over the Orthodox churches of the "people's democracies." The weaker these churches were in their respective countries, the more dependent they became on the Moscow Patriarchate, through which Soviet influence could be channeled to the Orthodox national minorities.[32] On the other hand, the greater the extent of the subsequent "desatellization" of these countries, the less was the influence retained by the Kremlin and the Patriarchate on their ecclesiastical affairs. Nonetheless, through the medium of bilateral ecclesiastical relations, the Christian Peace Conference and "co-ordinated" actions in the WCC and other ecumenical bodies, the churches of the USSR have tried with varying success—to assist Soviet attempts to retain control over the foreign policies of its East European allies.

This contribution of the Russian Orthodox Church, and—to a lesser extent—some other denominations[33] to Soviet foreign policy has placed them in a limited bargaining position with the Soviet regime which they could use to gain or maintain concessions at home and to blunt the impact of internal anti-religious measures, at least on the central apparatus of the respective religious organizations. It is hardly a coincidence, for example, that the "external relations" of the Moscow Patriarchate greatly expanded in the years 1959-64, a period when the Russian

[29] In particular, the Russian Orthodox Church has been trying to "reunite" the Orthodox Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian émigrés and thus to remove them from the influence of "anti-Soviet," "schismatic" churches abroad.

[30] A one-sided arrangement which does not, *e.g.*, prevent the Russian Orthodox Church from occasionally echoing the Kremlin's criticism of foreign governments.

[31] *E.g.*, the suppression of Uniate churches in Romania and Czechoslovakia and their "conversion" to Orthodoxy, as well as Warsaw's refusal to grant official recognition to the remnants of the Ukrainian Uniate Church in Poland, appear to have been influenced by the Soviet government.

[32] *E.g.*, the Autocephalous Orthodox Churches of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

[33] Notably, the Evangelical Christians-Baptists, Lutherans, and Moslems.

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Orthodox Church (along with other denominations) was under massive antireligious attack at home.[34]

With the consolidation of the Soviet political system, the usefulness of "Sovietized" churches as agencies of political socialization for the "backward" social strata has evidently been declining (except, perhaps. in the territories annexed to the USSR after 1939[35]). From the regime's point of view, the Soviet educational system, the communications media, and the youth organizations are obviously more reliable agents to induct the young generation into Soviet political culture. The family, however, has remained an important agent for the transmission of religious values. As a rule, the party ideological apparatus—including the Agitprop, cultural, and educational sectors bearing primary responsibility for political socialization and adult indoctrination—has been the mainstay for the "fundamentalist," militantly antireligious orientation in Soviet religious policy. Almost every time Soviet leaders have called for an assault on the "remnants of the past in men's consciousness," or for counterattacks against alien "ideological influences," or for an accelerated education of the "new Communist man," their exhortations have signalled a renewed attack by the party propaganda agencies on religious "survivals" and organizations, and the latter have borne the brunt of "remedial" administrative measures.

The Institutional Framework

Soviet secretiveness with respect to religious policy formulation makes it extremely difficult to analyze all the elements that go into the process. Before attempting to identify the various interest groups that directly or indirectly bring their influence to bear, let us examine the institutional framework within which the policy has been shaped and implemented.

It can be safely assumed that major policy decisions in the religious field[36] have involved the top decisional units of the Soviet system—the Politburo (or one-time Presidium) of the CPSU Central Committee, and the Council of Ministers (previously the Council of People's Commissars, or Sovnarkom).[37] But the information on which such decisions have been based—including desiderata of the groups and institutions concerned and feedback from past policies—has reached the top policy-makers largely through several subordinate agencies which have then been called upon to interpret, augment and implement these decisions. As these comparatively "visible" institutions have no doubt exercised an important influence over Soviet religious policy-making, they deserve to be examined in some detail.

Following the adoption in 1918 of the "Decree on the Separation of the Church from the State and of the School from the Church"—the first major elaboration in law of the party's program on religion—Lenin's government divided up the tasks of implementing ecclesiastical policy among several different agencies of the new Russian republic. Within the Commissariat of Justice, a subdivision later known as the Department of Cults was charged with "general supervision over the implementation of the Separation Decree." The Commissariat of Internal Affairs was entrusted with the "administration" of the provisions on religion requiring the "legalization" of religious groups, the "sanctioning" of ecclesiastical conferences, the "registration" of parish congregations and the clergy, and the "leasing" of nationalized houses of worship to congregations allowed legal status (in practice these duties devolved upon the administrative departments of the local Soviets). The Cheka—the first of a long line of police organizations—assumed responsibility for

[34] An examination over several years of the official *Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii* (Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate) shows that during and since the crackdown of the 1960's a lion's share of the Holy Synod's business has concerned the external relations of the Patriarchate.

[35] This is explained by the shorter period of Soviet rule, the far greater percentage of believers, and consequently the concentration in the annexed territories of a great majority of the active religious congregations in the USSR.

[36] To offer a partial and very brief list of such decisions: the adoption of the "Decree on the Separation of the Church from the State" in 1918; the regime's intervention in support of the "Living Church" *coup* and the arrest of Patriarch Tikhon in 1922; Tikhon's release in 1923; the acceptance of Metropolitan Sergii's 1927 Declaration as a basis for a "normalization" of church-state relations; the launching of a mass antireligious campaign and the revision of Soviet legislation on "cults" in 1929; the adoption of a "religious NEP" in 1943, and the 1945 Sovnarkom resolution restoring to the Church limited rights of a juridical person; the two 1954 Central Committee decrees on antireligious work; the 1958 or 1959 decision to launch a new antireligious campaign and the subsequent withdrawal frfom religious groups of some of their wartime concessions. For details the reader is referred to Curtiss, *op. cit.*, and this writer's "Church-State Relations in the USSR," *loc. cit.*

[37] In the latter case, it has probably been the "inner cabinet," that made the decisions (*i.e.*, the wartime State Committee on Defense and the postwar Presidium of the Council of Ministers).

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"combating churchly counterrevolution"—*i.e.*, for the systematic surveillance and infiltration of churches and sects. Finally, antireligious propaganda was initially made the responsbility of a special "political education" unit of the Commissariat of Education, working under the "guidance" of the party's Agitation Department.[38]

This wide dispersal of responsibilities led to tensions, policy conflicts and jurisdictional squabbles among the agencies involved and in the party apparatus. Major conflicts had to be resolved at the Politburo or the Sovnarkom level and, on several occasions, Lenin personally intervened to overrule decisions.[39] Such problems soon led to the periodic reshuffling of responsibilities from one agency to another and to the creation of new party organizations to oversee religious policy. In a few instances, *ad hoc* bodies were formed to oversee particular projects—for example, a secret Trotsky-led committee guided the confiscation of church treasures in 1922.[40]

In the same year, a standing "Commission on the Implementation of the Decree on the Separation of the Church from the State" was established at the Central Committee level. Headed by Emelian Yaroslavsky, this semi-secret body also became the instrument of the Secretariat in planning, guiding and coordinating the activities of the party and state agencies, trade unions and other "mass organizations" on the "anti-religious front" (hence its informal designation as the "Antireligious Commission"). Throughout the 1920's, the "Commission" played an important role in policing the implementation of party policy and resolving disputes among the professional "antireligionists" (*antireligiozniki*).[41]



Emelian Yaroslavsky, prominent antireligious writer and head of the former Union of Militant Godless, pictured in 1939 upon nomination for election to the USSR Academy of Sciences.

—Photo from Sovfoto.

In 1925 Yaroslavsky was also named to head another brainchild of the Agitprop Department of the Central Committee—a mass atheistic organization called the Union of Godless (renamed in 1929 the Union of Militant Godless). Drawing on cadres and resources of the party, Komsomol, trade unions, the army, the Commissariat of Education and other institutions, the Union became the chief vehicle for combating religious beliefs and practices among the population, reaching a nominal membership of five million by 1932.[42]

Meantime, in 1924, the aforementioned Department of Cults in the Commissariat of Justice was abolished and its responsibilities transferred to a

[38] See P. V. Gidulianov, *Tserkov i gosudarstvo po zakonodatelstvu RSFSR* (The Church and the State in RSFSR Legislation), Moscow, Izd-vo NKIu, 1923, p. 3. See also *Revoliutsiia i tserkov* (Moscow), No. 1-2, 1924, pp. 111-12. With respect to police controls, while there is little official documentation available, contemporary Soviet accounts abound in references to the far-reaching powers of the Cheka-GPU/OGPU-NKVD/NKGB-MGB/MVD-KGB over religious groups. See Metropolitan Sergii (Voskresensky), *loc. cit.*, and the two volumes by Bourdeaux cited above.

[39] For example, during 1921 Lenin ordered the party Secretariat to tone down its antireligious propaganda and compelled the Central Committee to moderate its resolutions on the elimination of believers from the party membersihp: See *V.I. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (Complete Collected Works), 5th edition, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1965, Vol. LII, pp. 140, 386; ;and Vol. XIV, 440, 721. In December 1922 Lenin overruled decisions of the "Little Sovnarkom" dissolving the Department of Cults within the Commissariat of Justice, thereby prolonging its life until 1924: See *Lenin na khoziaistvennom fronte* (Lenin on the Economic Front), Moscow, 1934, pp. 98-100.

[40] See the 1921-22 correspondence in the Trotsky Archive, Harvard University, item T 728, T 736. See also Joan Delaney, "The Origins of Soviet Antireligious Organizations," in Richard H. Marshall, Jr., Ed., *Aspects of Religion in the Soviet Union, 1917-1967*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1971, pp. 103-10.

[41] See Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, Vol. XLV, p. 692; *Izvestiia Tsentralnovo Kommiteta RKP(b)* (Moscow), No. 11-12 (47-48), November-December 1922, p. 17; and S.N. Savelev, "Emilian Yaraslovsky and the Surmounting of Anarchistic Influences in Antireligous Work in the USSR," *Yezhegodnik Muzeia istorii religii i ateizma* (Yearbook of the Museum of the History of Religion and Atheism), Vol. VII, Leningrad, Izd-vo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1964, pp. 37-49.

[42] See Fedor N. Oleshchuk, *X let Soiuza Voinstvuiushchikh Bezbozhnikov v SSSR* (Ten Years of the Union of Militant Godless in the USSR), Moscow, OGIZ-GAIZ, 1936.

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"Secretariat [later called Permanent Commission] for the Affairs of Cults" attached to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. The membership of this body consisted of representatives of the Executive Committee, the Commissariats of Justice, Internal Affairs, and Education: the police apparatus (reorganized in 1924 as OGPU), and the trade unions.[43] Though the Commission on Cults formally continued in existence until 1943,[44] the circumstantial evidence available suggests that during the 1930's, when the problem of religion in the USSR came to be equated with that of domestic "counterrevolution," the OGPU's successor—the NKVD—assumed major responsibilities for dealing with "churchmen and sectarians."

The quiet dissolution of the Union of Militant Godless early in World War II was the harbinger of a rather dramatic reversal in Soviet religious policy toward limited toleration of "loyal" believers, culminating in a historic meeting of Stalin with three senior hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church in September 1943.[45] This rapprochement led to the creation of new state institutions to oversee religious activities. In the fall of 1943, a Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church was established —a mark of the special recognition accorded by the regime to the largest and most "patriotic" church in the USSR—and placed under the leadership of a veteran police specialist in religious affairs, G. G. Karpov. In 1944 all other religious groups were brought under a parallel agency, the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults. By unpublished legislation, the two Councils were given all-union status as agencies of the federal Council of People's Commissars, with the authority to assign "plenipotentiaries" to the republic governments and to the executive committees of *oblast* soviets. The functions of the Councils were officially described as those of advising the government on matters pertaining to "religious cults," drafting legislation on religious activities, providing liaison between religious organizations and the government, and assisting in the satisfaction of the legitimate needs of recognized churches and sects.[46]

For a decade or so, the emphasis of the work of these two councils was on their function as "go-betweens" in church-state relations, and in this capacity they apparently provided useful services. However, there is much evidence to indicate that the new institutional framework—far from diminishing police controls over religious activity—in fact facilitated the penetration of the ecclesiastical apparatus by the security organs.[47]

From the mid-1950's on, the retreat of Nikita Khrushchev (*et al.*) from the "religious NEP "of the 1940's impelled the Councils to act increasingly as agents of the regime in enforcing strictures on religious activity. The new party line—sounded as early as 1954 in a call for the resumption of systematic "scientific-atheist" indoctrination—apparently encountered some initial opposition from the Council for Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church and other quarters, paving the way for the eventual dismissal of Karpov in 1960.[48] In the years 1959-65, the regime resumed a full-scale frontal attack on organized religion, apparently with the ready cooperation of the Councils.[49]. When the tide finally subsided, the two organs were merged in early 1966 into a single "Council for Religious Affairs," which has remained in operation to the present. According to its chairman, Vladimir Kuroedev (writing in August 1966), the new Council was given "a much greater role and greater responsibility in supervising observance of the laws on cults" and "correspondingly greater powers" to combat religious dissent.[50]

[43] M. I. Shakhnovich, *Lenin i problemy ateizma* (Lenin and Problems of Atheism), Leningrad, Izd-vo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1961, p. 578; and *Otdelenie tserkvi ot gosudarstva. Dopolnenie k knige P.V. Gidulianova* (The Separation of Church and State. Supplement to Book of P. V. Gidulianov), Moscow, Iuridicheskoe Izd-vo NKIu RSFSR, 1929, p. 12. In 1932, the Commission assumed from the NKVD the now largely theoretical powers of sanctioning national church conferences and setting procedures for registration of, and reporting by, individual religious organizations; *Kommunisticheskaia partiia i Sovetskoe pravitelstvo o religii i tserkvi* (The Communist Party and the Soviet Government on Religion and the Church), Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1959, pp. 93-95.

[44] According to V. D. Bonch-Bruevich, "Freedom of Conscience in the USSR," in his *Izbrannye sochineniia*, (Selected Works), Moscow, Izd-vo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1959, p. 86.

[45] On this event and its aftermath, see Fletcher, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-115.

[46] See A. Kolosov, "Religion and Church in the USSR," in *Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, Vol. on the SSSR, Moscow, GISE, 1948.

[47] Wolin and Slusser, *op. cit.*, p. 126. Several postwar defectors from the USSR with KGB or military intelligence backgrounds have attested to such wide police controls over organized religion.

[48] The almost simultaneous dismissal of Karpov and the resignation of the Patriarchate's chief political spokesman, Metropolitan Nikolai (Yarushevich) of Leningrad, attested to such opposition to the shift in the government's religious policy.

[49] Charges that the two Councils had been abusing their powers to strangulate organized religion in the USSR figured prominently in protests of the Orthodox and Baptist dissenters during the 1960's. See L. Ilichev's address of November 1963 on the "Formation of the Scientific Worldview and the Atheistic Upbringing," in *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 1, 1964, pp. 22-46.

[50] Kuroedov, who had replaced Karpov in 1960, was quoted in *Izvestiia*, Aug. 30, 1966.

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On the propaganda front, the vacuum left by the dissolution of the Union of Militant Godless was only partially filled in after the war by the Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge, an organization designed to mobilize the resources of the Soviet intelligentsia for the work of "adult education" among the masses. Early in the course of its renewed assault on religion, the Khrushchev regime attempted to assign to this organization (since renamed Society "Knowledge") responsibility for an intensive antireligious propaganda campaign.[51] However, despite repeated proddings from the party, the Soviet intelligentsia showed little enthusiasm for the task of antireligious propaganda. Thus, the main burden of the atheist campaign had to be assumed by the Agitprop apparatus under the guidance of L. Ilichev, Khrushchev's chief ideological lieutenant.[52]

The Spectrum of Interest Groups

Within this changing institutional framework, several organizational interests and functional groupings have been able to play an important role in shaping or modifying Soviet religious policy. With little information available on how influences are brought to bear, only the vaguest silhouettes can be drawn of group actors performing in the shadow theater of Soviet religious policy.

In terms of direct access to religious policy-makers, the party "ideologues," the "priests" of the ruling faith, have from the very beginning enjoyed the advantages deriving from the role ascribed by the Bolsheviks to ideology in guiding political practice, as well as from Agitprop's control over the media of mass communication. Their vested interest in the antireligious struggle was easy to legitimize in terms of the Leninist ideological legacy, while their "news-management" function could be utilized to magnify the internal and external threats of religion and otherwise affect the perception of religion on the part of the policy-makers. The chief "allies" of the professional *antireligiozniki* have been functionaries in the Komsomol and the trade union apparatus, army political personnel and, in more recent times, school teachers—that is, groups performing crucial roles in the political socialization of youth.

Functional and psychological differences between the party's ideological and executive *apparatchiki* have on occasion placed the latter (the "doers") in opposition to the antireligious workers (the "talkers"), especially when the cadres and resources recruited for atheistic campaigns—or the resentment of believers over such drives—have threatened the fullfillment of economic tasks for which the party and the government executives and economic managers were responsible. During World War II, similar priority considerations led the professional military cadres to display considerable indifference in the face of increasing manifestations of religiosity among the army rank and file. For their own reasons, then, these functional groupings have occasionally assumed a "tribunate" function on behalf of the politically disfranchised believers. The excessive zeal of the interwar Union of the Militant Godless may have contributed to the unfavorable image of the professional *antireligioznik* reportedly held by many party executives—an image which has apparently combined the features of a politically irresponsible fanatic with those of a cultural vandal and hooligan, a parasitic "red priest" whose militant abuse of the believers has contributed to the survival of religion in society.

The police—the early Cheka and its successive reincarnations—have been deeply involved in the control and manipulation of religious groups, both directly and through the governmental bodies charged with the enforcement of Soviet religious policy. As has already been noted, in contrast to the "fundamentalists" in the party Agitprop organization, the police have spearheaded from the earliest years of the regime a "pragmatic" line aiming at the "Sovietization" and political exploitation of institutional religion. An important consideration underlying Chekist "pragmatism" appears to be the realization that believers can be controlled much more effectively when allowed to operate in the open, within "registered" congregations presided over by "registered" priests, than when driven underground into the hands of "illegal" clergy. One may also assume that the police have had a collective vested interest in the continuing existence of institutional

[51] On this subject see *Nauka i religii*, No. 2, 1962, pp. 3-14, and No. 3, 1962, pp. 9-20. Also see this writer's "Destalinization and Religion in the USSR," *International Journal* (Toronto), Summer 1965, pp. 316-21.

[52] Khrushchev's massive antireligious campaign of 1959-64 appeared to combine several elements: it was an important political resocialization undertaking in connection with his grand design to "build communism" in the "present generation;" it was an aspect of his "destalinization" course—a return of the original "Leninist principles" in the Soviet religious policy; and, possibly, it was a concession to the party "ideologues" disconcerted and demoralized by his ideological innovations and pragmatic experiments in other policy spheres.

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religion—along with other potentially "subversive" elements—to justify their vast establishment and to maintain their power in Soviet politics. Like the Agitprop, the police exercise considerable control over channels of communication—especially covert ones—and thereby directly and indirectly influence top-level decision-making in the realm of religion. It was indeed mainly through police channels that ecclesiastical and sectarian leaders had to bargain with the Soviet authorities during a good part of the interwar period.[53]

To turn to the various religious groups themselves, how have believers been able to influence the course of the regime's policy? During the early years of the Soviet system, certain sectarian groups captured the attention of the Bolshevik leadership because of their cooperative rural life-style and economic efficiency, and for a while were championed as the "vanguard" of the peasant class (though with a "false consciousness"); however, their influence was short-lived.[54] Not again until the early 1940's did religious leaders—this time the hierarchs of the Russian Church—gain occasional direct access to top Soviet government leaders. For at least a decade after World War II, the two aforementioned Councils for ecclesiastical affairs provided religious groups with a regular channel for voicing their wishes and complaints to the government. As in the interwar period, however, the transactions arranged through these liaison bodies were carried out in an atmosphere of secrecy; contacts between church and state representatives were never made in the open except on ceremonial occasions. Such "closed-door" negotiations were undoubtedly to the advantage of the authorities, making it easier for them to disregard their own "cult legislation" and to manipulate ecclesiastical leaders. After the regime renewed its attack on religion in 1959, in the process enlisting the aid of the two councils on religious affairs, these mechanisms came under increasingly vocal criticism from the ranks of the believers.

During the 1960's, important dissent movements emerged both within the Orthodox Church and among the Evangelical Christians and Baptists. The dissenters challenged the pattern of church-state relations as nothing more—nor less—than "collusion" between timid or corrupt religious leaders and atheistic state officials, the result of which would only be the demoralization and eventual destruction of the respective churches.[55] By appealing directly to the Soviet authorities, as well as to churches and public opinion abroad, these dissidents probably contributed more to the abatement of the anti-religious campaign by 1965 than the "loyal" church leaders themselves. Ironically, the latter were then able to capitalize on the threat posed by the dissenters to secure some concessions from the government, which by the late 1960's was eager to undercut protest.

In the years since 1966, the ranks of the original religious dissenters have been swelled by protesters from other faiths as well as by Soviet political dissidents. These elements have continued to bear the brunt of a wide array of administrative, judicial and police repressions (albeit such actions are now directed less against religion in itself than against the "crime" of dissent). Nonetheless, they have provided religious believers with new, bold voices that have been amplified through the media of *samizdat* (underground literature) and broadcasts from abroad, and through the supportive protests of some well-known Soviet intellectuals.[56]

The rise of religious dissent in the USSR, which has broken the seal of silence imposed upon the religious organizations as one of the conditions of their legalization, is part of a wider and deeper process set in motion by Khrushchev's program of "destalinization." With the decline of the worst excesses of terror, the erection of some legal safeguards against official arbitrariness, and the resulting abatement of feelings of fear and political inefficacy, an embryonic public opinion began to emerge in the Soviet Union. Despite the post-Khrushchev retreat from "destalinization" and the reinforcement of coercive methods and mechanisms, public opinion has continued to germinate, helping to articulate the demands of social groups which have hitherto seen their views misrepresented

[53] For the best documented case illustrating this practice, see a history of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church during the 1920's, written by its first head, Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivskyi: *Istoriia Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy. Rozdil 7: Vidrodzhennia Ukrainskoi Tserkvy* (History of Ukrainian Orthodox Church: Part 7. Rebirth of the Ukrainian Church), Winnipeg, John Gryshchuk Foundation, 1961.

[54] See Kolarz, *Religion in the Soviet Union*, pp. 287-96.

[55] See a 1965 letter to N. V. Podgorny from the priests Nikolai I. Eshliman and Gleb P. Yakunin in Bourdeaux, *Patriarch and Prophets*, pp. 189-94, and discussion on pp. 195-254, 276-303.

[56] The most recent example of such protests was a letter from Alexander Solzhenitsyn to Patriarch Pimen accusing the Patriarchate of sacrificing the Church's interest for the sake of good relations with the atheistic regime; reproduced in full in *Russkaia mysl* (Paris), March 30, 1972.

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Christmas Mass in January 1972 at the Patriarchal Bogoyavlensky Church in Moscow.

—Photo by B. Trepetov, TASS, via Sovfoto.

(*e.g.*, the intellectuals and the nationalities) or which have been politically disfranchised (*e.g.*, the believers). The common themes now sounded by the more vocal members of such groups are demands for "the rule of law," "publicity" and open government, and "respect for human rights."[57] In this emergent public opinion, religious dissenters have found a powerful stimulus and source of strength to carry on their struggle for a genuine separation of the church from the state, for real guarantees of freedom of conscience, and for the equalization of believers' rights with those of non-believers.

During the past decade, the makers of Soviet religious policy have been confronted not only by open criticism from believers and more general demands for freedom from various dissidents, but also by indirect yet important pressures from other non-religious sectors of society. To cite one development as an example, the "cultural nihilism" of some Soviet functionaries during Khrushchev's anti-religious campaign—which resulted in the destruction of a number of religious structures and objects of historical or artistic value—has led to the formation of volunteer public societies for the protection of historical and artistic monuments, helping to stem the tide of atheistically-motivated vandalism. A number of otherwise "loyal" Soviet writers have also spoken out in defense of religious monuments, traditions and values.

Paradoxically, the secularization processes in Soviet society—which in the past have been more effective than official antireligious measures in weakening religion's hold on the population—have also undermined the ideological appeals of communism, including dogmatic "scientific atheism." There is continuing evidence today of a resurgence of nationalism—Russian and non-Russian—which has partly filled in the resulting vacuum. Among Soviet youth of various nationalities, the search for cultural indentity and continuity with the past seems to have engendered a new appreciation of religious tradition as an integral part of their own national cultures.[58] It seems just possible that religion may find a new lease on life as the most important remaining link with the past and as a repository of firmer moral values than those offered by the ambiguous Communist "moral code."

It is too early to determine the specific effects of these processes on Soviet religious policy; but there seems little doubt that before long the Communist leadership will have to undertake a basic reassessment of that policy in the context of the profound changes going on in Soviet society.

[57] See this writer's "Political Dissent in the Soviet Union," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles), April 1970, pp. 74-105.

[58] L. A. Filippov, "On Militant Materialism and Atheism," *Voprosy filosofii* (Moscow), No. 3, 1972, pp. 73-74.

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Books

The USSR and the Environment

By Jack Perry

MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN: *The Spoils of Progress: Environmental Pollution in the Soviet Union.* Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1972.
PHILIP R. PRYDE: *Conservation in the Soviet Union.* New York, Cambridge University Press, 1972.

SOVIET ATTITUDES with respect to the problem of environmental protection, which form the subject matter of the two books under review, represent a relatively new area of interest for Western observers of developments in the USSR. The matter first attracted outside attention in the mid-1960's when the battle over pollution of Lake Baikal erupted in the Soviet press to become an ecological *cause célèbre.* Even Western scholars at that time knew little about the Soviet ecological situation, but it became readily apparent to students of Soviet politics that deterioration of the environment was becoming an active issue in the USSR when Soviet writers such as Mikhail Sholokhov, Oleg Volkov, and Leonid Leonov—as well as others less privileged—came out with sharp criticisms of official policies in *Literaturnaia gazeta* and *Komsomolskaia pravda.*[1] Even after this publicity, however, the scope and substance of the Soviet debate on environmental issues remained obscure, and little was known about the institutional aspect of environmental decision-making in the USSR—*i.e.,* about what groups were in contention and what their respective positions were. Even Soviet specialists within the US government continued to devote relatively slight attention to the subject until the autumn of 1971, when studies were begun to work out the lines of what was eventually to become the US-USSR Environmental Agreement signed by Presidents Nixon and Podgorny in May 1972.

In part, the unawareness in the US and elsewhere of Soviet environmental developments reflected simply a lack of interest in something that seemed to have little bearing on the major political issues involved in Soviet relations with the rest of the world. Even as public interest in the environmental problem began growing, students of Soviet and international affairs tended to regard the subject, at most, as peripheral to their primary concerns. This reviewer, for example, while serving at the US Embassy in Moscow in 1964, had occasion to pay a visit to Lake Baikal, and as an amateur environmentalist I was deeply impressed not only by the preciousness of the lake but also by its ecological fragility. However, it never occurred to me to mention the environmental problem in my trip report, and I am not sure who in Washington would have read that section of the report had I written it.

Another reason for outside unawareness of Soviet environmental problems, of course, has been that the Soviet authorities persisted for some time in pretending that no such problems existed or in obfuscating the issue by claiming the inherent superiority of the socialist system in solving problems connected with population growth, conservation of natural resources, and the like.

In the last couple of years, however, our knowledge of Soviet developments in the environmental field has grown impressively as area specialists have begun giving the subject increased attention. In addition to some informative articles published in various journals,[2] we now have the two books under review—one by Pro-

[1] See, *e.g., Literaturnaia gazeta* (Moscow), Feb. 6, March 18 and 30, April 10, 13, and 15, 1965; Jan. 29, June 2, 1966; *Komsomolskaia pravda* (Moscow), May 11, 1966. Leonov's article (*Literaturnaia gazeta,* March 30, 1965) is reprinted in *Pryde,* pp. 220 *ff.*

[2] *E.g.,* Keith Bush, "Environmental Problems in the USSR," *Problems of Communism,* July-August 1972.

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fessor Goldman of Wellesley College and the other by Professor Pryde of California State University at San Diego—which represent the first broad and systematic treatments of environmental problems in the USSR.

Philip S. Gillette, who commented on both books in *Perspective*,[3] noted that Goldman's seemed to be written primarily for a non-specialized audience (the chapter on Lake Baikal had originally appeared in *The New Yorker*), while Pryde's seemed intended more for scholars and environmental specialists. The two studies nevertheless complement each other well, for Goldman seeks to describe the actual extent of pollution, citing telling examples as reported in the Soviet press, while Pryde concentrates rather on Soviet conservation policies and practices, focusing particularly on land use. Despite these quite different perspectives, the two authors come to strikingly similar conclusions. Both find that the Soviet authorities, though well-disposed toward conservation *per se*, have nonetheless succumbed to their own produce-or-perish mentality and allowed the nation's environmental problems to assume serious proportions—as serious in a number of vital areas as in the United States. The two authors also agree that the Soviet system, notwithstanding its strong centralization of authority and its emphasis on long-range planning, has not proven in any way superior to the decentralized, free-enterprise system of the United States when it comes to confronting and solving environmental problems. Both books conclude with urgent appeals for cooperation rather than polemics over which country's environmental record is better (or worse):

Goldman (p. 291): *So far no one political system, be it the American model or Soviet socialism, seems to have a monopoly on all the right answers. Far from it. We must learn to cooperate with each other and our environment. If we fail to do so, no one will be the winner.*

Pryde (p. 178): *In both countries it is a matter of will, not of means. The fact that the United States excels the USSR in some areas of conservation is no grounds for complacency; it is also worse in some, and outstanding in very few. In the final analysis, there is little to be gained from an exercise in intercontinental polemics over who is "least worst." There is still much to be done in both countries and, as yet, still time to do it. The livability of our spaceship Earth rests in the balance.*

AS ONE READS these books and notes the progress made toward bilateral cooperation through the conclusion of the US-USSR Environmental Agreement, one's thoughts are inevitably drawn to the striking similarities, as well as the dissimilarities, in the two countries' evolving attitudes toward their environments. A fundamental similarity stems from the historical fact that the two nations both inherited vast continental areas which they believed it their manifest destiny to explore, settle and exploit. It is not surprising, in view of the seemingly inexhaustible resources of these areas, that the process took place in both countries with very little regard for conservation. Something of the same thoughtlessness can be discerned in the past unconcern of Americans for the virtual extinction of the bison and the attitude that produced the old Russian notion that the only good wolf is a dead wolf. And Americans' past disregard for the preservation of their forests finds a parallel in the still common Soviet image of the man who fells the most trees as a hero.

On another plane, Americans

[3] *Perspective* (Washington, DC), August 1972, pp. 151-52, and November 1972, p. 213.

Reviewers in This Issue

JACK PERRY—Foreign Service Officer, US State Department; now assigned as Special Assistant to the Chairman of the President's Council on Environmental Quality.

MELVIN CROAN—Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin (Madison); co-author of the Brookings Institution study, *United States Troops in Europe*, 1972; currently doing research on West German *Ostpolitik*.

ANNA M. CIENCIALA—Professor of Slavic History, University of Kansas (Lawrence); author of *Poland and the Western Powers, January 1938—April 1939* (1968).

STEPHEN OSOFSKY—Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee (Knoxville); author of articles on Communist agriculture for various scholarly journals, currently working on a book-length study of contemporary Soviet agriculture.

SURENDRA K. GUPTA—Associate Professor of History, Kansas State College (Pittsburg); presently working on a full-length study of Soviet-Indian relations in the Stalin era.

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have tended to share with Soviet citizens—at least until rather recent times—the idea that progress equates with growth, that the most important criterion of national success lies in the steady upward rise of GNP or, in the Soviet case, the fulfillment of planned targets of output growth. Now, perhaps, more Americans than Russians have begun to reexamine this attitude and to speak of "the limits of growth," although —as Pryde reports (pp. 165-66)— a few daring Soviet environmentalists have also come out with the same idea—for example, P. Oldak, who wrote in *Literaturnaia gazeta,* June 3, 1970:

We must be willing to slow our economic growth by probably 7 to 10 percent for several years to divert funds to rescuing the balance of nature.

When it comes to treating the environmental problem as a public issue and a field for governmental action, however, there are perhaps more dissimilarities than similarities between the two countries, and these dissimilarities derive largely from the more fundamental differences between the two systems. In the United States, not only has there been a phenomenal growth of popular concern about protecting the environment, but the resultant pressure on both the private and governmental sectors to take appropriate action has been highly effective. In the USSR, on the other hand, the pressure for environmental action has come from a rather small and unorganized band of scientists and intellectuals, who have managed to express their views publicly only through occasional articles in *Literaturnaia gazeta* or other publications. Their admirable efforts have indeed helped to arouse public concern, but lacking any organizational base, these efforts have tended to become diffused in the complex party-government bureaucracy and have not succeeded in bringing about any change in the fundamental orientation of the system toward growth at any cost. Hence the paradox that the potential strengths of the system for combating environmental dangers have been offset by other characteristics of the system itself. The result is that while Soviet officials directly involved in environmental matters are now showing an increasing willingness to recognize that the USSR and the US face problems of similar magnitude in this area, the Soviet bureaucracy as a whole remains reluctant to acknowledge that they, no more than Americans, can afford to look with complacency on an unrestrained cycle of economic growth and population growth.

But there are hopeful indications that this official attitude, too, has begun to change. Moscow's decision to enter into the US-USSR Environmental Agreement was itself a significant indication of change, and the report on environmental measures delivered by V. A. Kirillin, Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, before the Supreme Soviet in September 1972 was another.[4] In any event, the two books under review help to remind us that the preservation of the environment is a cause that demands action on the part of all nations. Though Benjamin Franklin spoke in quite a different context, his words are apt in this case, too: "We must all hang together, or we shall all hang separately."

[4] For Kirillin's report, see *Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 20, 1972. (English translation of excerpts in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* [Columbus, Ohio] Oct. 18, 1972.)

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Ostpolitik—Westpolitik

By Melvin Croan

PETER BENDER: *Die Ostpolitik Willy Brandts oder Die Kunst des Selbstverständlichen* (Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* or the Art of the Self-Evident). Reinbek bei Hamburg, Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1972.
HEINZ LIPPMANN: *Honecker. Porträt eines Nachfolgers* (Honecker. Portrait of a Successor). Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1971.

SEVERAL YEARS AGO, while serving as Foreign Minister in West Germany's Grand Coalition government headed by Chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, Willy Brandt remarked: "We must start from the status quo. What else is there to start from? But it would be against nature and against reason to renounce any desire for future development."[1]

These basic thoughts have inspired West German *Ostpolitik* as it has unfolded under Brandt as Chancellor. His helmsmanship has set Bonn's course toward a détente with the East based on "existing realities" in Europe—*i.e.*, on West German acceptance of established post-World War II borders and recognition of the existence of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as a separate German state. At the same time, looking beyond the status quo, Brandt's *Ostpolitik* envisages a step-by-step development of East-West cooperation in Europe which will ultimately heal the present division of the continent into antagonistic camps. A key element in this longer-term perspective is the vision of a transformation of the hostile estrangement between the Federal Republic and the GDR into a genuine rapprochement between the two Germanies.

Peter Bender's analysis of Brandt's *Ostpolitik* focuses particularly on the present government's decision to accept the status quo as a starting point toward rapprochement. The author pointedly criticizes the "illusions" that, in his view, characterized West German policy toward the East until Brandt became Chancellor in 1969, and he offers a spirited defense of the wisdom of Bonn's subsequent initiatives. The book is nevertheless much more than a mere partisan tract designed to answer domestic critics of Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. It is a detailed and thoroughly reliable account of the tangled skein of diplomacy and politics that has shaped the Bonn government's approach to the Eastern problem from the immobilism of the Adenauer era to the dynamic realism of the Brandt period. Curiously enough, however, Bender pays scant attention to Brandt's long-term aspirations with regard to future relations with the GDR, and he consequently has little to say about the obstacles that may obstruct the hoped-for reconciliation of the two Germanies.

Since the publication of Bender's book, substantial progress has been made toward restoring relations between the Federal Republic and the GDR, as evidenced by the conclusion of a General Treaty between the two governments. It is nevertheless apparent that East Germany's leaders still continue to perceive West German *Ostpolitik* as a potential threat to their own security. Although they have agreed to a number of contacts with the Federal Republic, they have simultaneously redoubled their efforts to enforce ideological "delimitation" (*Abgrenzung*) from the West and have unleashed a domestic campaign against "social democratism" to drive home the point. And despite all the specific improvements in relations between the GDR and the Federal Republic, there has been no move toward dismantling the Berlin Wall or the heavy fortifications along the GDR's frontier with the Federal Republic. As Erich Honecker explained in a candid interview with C. L. Sulzberger of

[1] Willy Brandt, *A Peace Policy For Europe*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968, p. 122.

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The New York Times, "they remain as existing realities." [2]

HONECKER'S WORDS might just as well have come from the lips of Walter Ulbricht, whose retirement as head of the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) in May 1971 clearly facilitated what progress has since been made toward détente. A partial explanation of this apparent paradox can be gleaned from Heinz Lippmann's study of Honecker, which provides a timely political "portrait" of the man who, as Ulbricht's successor, is now destined to play an important role in a delicate and complex period of intra-German and European international politics. Based in part on the author's personal acquaintance with Honecker, Lippmann's book contains much fresh or previously little-known material. Though open to criticism on certain points of interpretation, the study constitutes a genuinely open-minded and basically well-balanced assessment and should serve to correct some of the misconceptions prevalent in the West concerning the East German leader.

The book is divided into three parts. The first part, entitled "Childhood and Youth," relates what is known about Honecker's upbringing as a Communist miner's son in the Saar, setting it against a general background description of the distinctive socio-economic conditions then prevailing in that region, and showing that young Erich's early commitment to communism was an entirely natural outgrowth of the influences surrounding him. Part 1 then goes on to trace his early career through the time of his arrest for illegal activity in Nazi Germany and his subsequent incarceration from 1935 to 1945. Here, Lippmann draws upon hitherto unpublished material provided him by the East German Committee of Anti-Fascist Resistance Fighters to show that Honecker's imprisonment was really a much less psychologically scarring experience than previous Western accounts have suggested.[3] According to Lippmann's information, the prison in which Honecker was confined was "correctly" run, and he was not subjected to solitary confinement for any length of time, if at all. Indeed, toward the end of the war he was assigned to work outside the prison walls, and in March 1945 he managed to escape, apparently without the authorization of the underground KPD network.

The second part of the book deals with Honecker's role as a "participant" in the building and exercise of Communist party power in East Germany during the decade 1945-55. Here the author draws heavily on his own former personal relationship with Honecker, under whom he served in the *Freie Deutsche Jugend* (FDJ), the East German youth organization. His description of Honecker as a skilled and dynamic FDJ leader is sharply at odds with the conventional picture of the man at that time as a dour, wooden, and not particularly intelligent subaltern. According to Lippmann, Honecker—though occasionally given to ill-considered acts of independent initiative — demonstrated genuine organizational talents which were fully appreciated by his superiors. As a result, he was assigned in 1955 to spend a year in the Soviet Union in order to prepare to take over far more important duties involving the political direction of East German security and military affairs.

The third part of the book is devoted to Honecker's performance in this new role and his gradual emergence as Ulbricht's heir-apparent. In this reviewer's opinion, Lippmann's treatment of these matters is far less satisfactory than his account of Honecker's earlier career, perhaps because for this later period he has had to rely exclusively on published East German sources. For one thing, the case he makes for believing that mounting differences between Honecker and Ulbricht played a significant part in the latter's retirement seems greatly overdrawn. On the basis of what we know at present, it appears most probable that it was the Russians who forced Ulbricht to step down, but that they as well as the entire East German elite were anxious to choose a successor who would preserve an appearance of political continuity, with the end result that the choice fell quite naturally on Honecker.

What caliber of leader, then, is the new East German party chief? Lippmann, in comparing Honecker's basic personality traits with those of his predecessor, pinpoints both his strengths and his weaknesses. According to Lippmann, Honecker appears less aloof than Ulbricht, more capable of genuine personal friendships, and more considerate of his subordinates. These qualities have earned him greater personal popularity, but by the same token—in Lippmann's view—Honecker runs far greater risk of becoming enmeshed in a political clique composed of his own personal

[2] *The New York Times*, Nov. 23, 1972, p. 1.

[3] In his interview with Sulzberger, Honecker made light of his prison experience, quoting the old German adage: "Prison is good for your health—if it doesn't kill you."

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friends within the ruling elite. The author also sees Honecker as commanding more consistent credibility than his predecessor thanks to his directness and forcefulness, and at the same time as sharing Ulbricht's political acumen, personal toughness and resourcefulness, and a frame of mind that is essentially anti-intellectual. In Lippmann's judgment, these are the fundamental characteristics that have made Honecker a successful *apparatchik,* and they help to explain certain peculiarities of his behavior, such as the paradox that, although "by his very nature an anti-bureaucrat, he seeks to combat bureaucracy by bureaucratic methods."

In light of this analysis, it is not surprising that Honecker has acquiesced to a Soviet policy on the German question that Ulbricht did his utmost to oppose, yet has at the same time emerged as a forceful protagonist of *Abgrenzung* from the Federal Republic. As the East German regime gains in international stature and domestic stability, its attitude toward West Germany may eventually soften, but under Honecker such an outcome is by no means foreordained. For the time being, West German *Ostpolitik* and East German *Westpolitik* can scarcely be regarded as two sides of one and the same coin.

East European Nationalism

By Anna M. Cienciala

PETER F. SUGAR and IVO J. LEDERER, Eds.: *Nationalism in Eastern Europe.* Seattle and London, University of Washington Press, 2nd ed., 1971.
FRANCOIS FEJTÖ: *A History of the People's Democracies: Eastern Europe Since Stalin.* Trans. by Daniel Weissbort, New York and London, Praeger, 1971.

A COMMON EMPHASIS on the role of nationalism in the modern history of Eastern Europe forms a unifying—if somewhat tenuous—link between the two books under review, which otherwise differ sharply in time-span surveyed, format, method of treatment, and intended audience. On the one hand, the study edited by Professors Sugar and Lederer, compiled primarily for students of East European history, traces the evolution of national consciousness in the various East European countries from its roots in the 19th century through World War I, giving little attention to developments after 1918. Except for an introductory chapter setting the general theme of nationalism, moreover, the book deals with each country separately, bringing together studies by nine different historians, each writing on the country of his particular specialization. On the other hand, the book by François Fejtö—a well-known Hungarian-born writer on contemporary East European affairs, who has long been a resident of France—deals with nationalism within the framework of a general historical survey of the development of the East European "people's democracies" in the post-Stalin period (since 1953). The book was written as a sequel to the author's earlier *Histoire des démocraties populaires* (Paris, 1952), which traced the East European regimes through the Stalin era, and both books were obviously intended for general French (and other) readers interested in East European developments but without specialized knowledge of the area and its affairs.

The two books are both excellent in their quite different ways, yet neither is without shortcomings. The specialist contributors to the Sugar-Lederer volume provide thorough accounts of the history of ideas in the individual East European countries; however, the book suffers from a weakness that has characterized virtually all works on nationalism to date: a lack of adequate attention to the process by which the ideas of the national elites come to be as-

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similated by the masses to form a *national* consciousness. Similarly, while one can agree with Fejtö that "scholars and intellectuals have made history" (p. 314), perhaps the more relevant and fascinating question is just how this came about. Professor Lederer perhaps puts his finger on the root problem when he observes that what is needed in order to learn more about the process of assimilation by the masses of a sense of national identity is an investigation of the formation of public opinion during the 19th century. The methods he suggests are content analysis of the contemporary press, examination of memoirs, and study of such statistics as may be available on the level of education, literacy rate, etc. (Some examples of this kind of information are cited by a few of the authors of the separate essays.)

DESPITE THE LACK of adequate resort to material of this sort, the contributors to *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* do venture some opinions as to what factors were most instrumental in building up a national consciousness among the masses. Professor Sugar contends that education was a primary factor; others point to resentment against misrule by outsiders; and still others stress the influence of the native intelligentsia, especially writers and poets.

While agreeing that the intellectual community (whether teachers or writers) can influence the thought of the masses, this reviewer believes that the process works both ways, and that the essential precondition for the outbreak of nationalist revolutions in 19th-century Europe generally was the emergence within ethnic groupings of a mass feeling of dissatisfaction with the circumstances of life under alien domination. Thus, careful study of the Serbian, Greek and Romanian nationalist revolts of the early 19th century suggests that all three were triggered by a general sense of indignation at intolerable conditions regarded as resulting from alien rule. It is interesting to note that the masses who participated in these revolts were for the most part illiterate.

In light of these considerations, the reviewer is somewhat surprised by Professor Sugar's assertion that nationalism in Hungary and Poland "remained aristocratic until the end of the Second World War," and that "the spirit animating it did not change even if the personalities involved in it were non-nobles" (p. 49). The facts prove not only that the leaders of the rebellious nationalist movements often included members of the non-aristocratic classes, but that the ideals motivating these leaders were frequently democratic and not aristocratic at all. Even in those lands with native aristocracies—and Poland and Hungary were both in this category—the revolutionary leaders belonged to the gentry rather than to the magnates, and they combined demands for independence with demands for democratic government.

Thus, for example, political liberalization and peasant emancipation were among the principal aims of the Polish gentry revolutionaries in Galicia in 1846 and 1848. It is true, to be sure, that in most cases the leaders from the Polish and Hungarian gentry did not favor extending democratic rights to ethnic "minorities," but their attitude in this respect was hardly any different from that of middle-class liberals in Western Europe (as evidenced, *e.g.*, by the attitude of British political leaders toward the Irish Catholics and Britain's colonial subjects). Moreover, there were instances in which the Polish and Hungarian liberal gentry did [illegible] close to granting equal rig[illegible] other ethnic groups—as, fo[illegible] ample, in the case of the [illegible] "Reds" of 1863 and their [illegible] cessors, the Polish socialists [illegible] of Karolyi and Jaszi in Hur[illegible] Finally, as for Professor Su[illegible] contention that Polish and [illegible] garian nationalism remained [illegible] tocratic until the end of Worl[illegible] II, he certainly cannot fa[illegible] know that Polish and Hung[illegible] peasants fought for their [illegible] tries in 1919-20, and their [illegible] tivation for doing so surely d[illegible] not come from dedication to [illegible] tocratic ideals.

It is also misleading, in [illegible] reviewer's opinion, for Profe[illegible] Sugar to claim that the aristoc[illegible] elites who assumed leade[illegible] roles in Eastern Europe in [illegible] 19th century used nationalis[illegible] ly as a means of enhancing [illegible] political positions (p. 12). [illegible] may have been true of the [illegible] tional leaders of Hungary and [illegible] trian Poland (Galicia) *after* [illegible] were accorded political autor[illegible] (*de jure* in the case of Hun[illegible] and *de facto* in that of Aus[illegible] Poland) in 1867. It was not [illegible] however, of the earlier Hunga[illegible] nationalist leader, Louis Koss[illegible] and his followers, who had [illegible] sistently sought both auton[illegible] and parliamentary democracy [illegible] Hungary, and who actually estab[illegible] lished a shortlived republic during the revolutions in 1848.

The key elements of nationalism in Eastern Europe were, in fact, everywhere the same—whether expressed by Czech bourgeois leaders; by Polish, Roman-

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an or Hungarian aristocrats; by the officer caste or by liberal democrats. They stressed the right to national independence or self-government, employment of native tongue in education dministration, and the right storic" frontiers—which in- ally always included minori- f other nationalities. In all , moreover, the demand for etermination went hand in with a demand for democ- although it must be admitted he latter was not as strong g some national elites as g others. If, in insisting upon ight to govern their own re- ive national groups, the bers of the national elites been interested solely in sub- ing themselves for another f elite leaders, then it seems ely that they would have ed that demand with a de- for democracy.

N CONTRAST TO the Sugar- rer volume's focus on the ative period of East Euro- nationalism, Fejtö deals the continuing role of estab- d nationalism in the quite rent setting of Communist- Eastern Europe since the of the Stalin era. And though nalism is certainly a major e in Fejtö's book, his anal- of it is incidental to a gen- chronological survey of poli- developments in the East pean Communist states from 8 through 1968, which he supplements with a discussion of "Structures and Tendencies." While logical enough, this organization unfortunately gives rise to considerable overlapping and repetition. Also, though the author has some useful insights to offer, the value of his book is somewhat diminished, in the opinion of the reviewer, by the fact that the author, who is not a political scientist, largely limits himself to a historical account of events without an adequate attempt at political analysis.

Fejtö's account amply confirms the fact that nationalism is still very much an integral part of the general political-economic life of the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. Except for the East German government, which rules only part of the divided German nation, all the East European states stress the continuity of national traditions, and the individual Communist parties have, in varying degrees, taken on the character and attitudes of "national Communist" parties. The momentous events of 1956 in Poland and Hungary and of 1968 in Czechoslovakia demonstrated, moreover, that nationalism is still strong enough to act as a catalyst of economic-political discontent. (It should be pointed out, however, that there were little, if any, nationalistic overtones in the events of December 1970 in Poland, which are not covered in Fejtö's book.)

It is also clear from Fejtö's account that the leadership of the Soviet Union, at least since 1955, has come to recognize the link between the nationalism of the East European peoples and their aspirations for economic and political liberalization. In both 1956 and 1968, the Soviet leaders tried to assuage the pressures for liberalization by channeling them into moderate programs of reform, and there is indisputable evidence that on both occasions they hesitated before deciding to resort to force (in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968). In light of these observations, it seems strangely inconsistent for Fejtö to label Brezhnev "a raging barbarian bureaucrat" (p. 317).

Soviet efforts to placate East European nationalism also cast doubt on the validity of Fejtö's attempt to liken the Soviet role in Eastern Europe to that of Tsarist Russia in the 19th century and of Nazi imperialism in the 20th (p. 187). Tsarist Russia did not recognize any nationalism other than its own, and Hitler's Germany aimed at the total eradication of any nationalities daring to stand in the way of the Third Reich's imperialist ambitions and refused to recognize the national interests of vassal states when these interests conflicted with its own. Even Fejtö—with curious inconsistency—seems to accept Raymond Aron's contention that Stalin himself, by investing the Soviet Union's postwar East European satellites with formal sovereignty, left the door open to their eventual de-satellization (p. 243). In this reviewer's opinion, Stalin acted as he did simply because as a realist he understood that permanent Soviet military occupation and annexation of Eastern Europe would be impossible.

In his analysis of post-Stalin trends, Fejtö places heavy stress on the influence of Communist China and Yugoslavia on the changing scene in Communist Eastern Europe. It is undoubtedly true that the Sino-Soviet quarrel and the Yugoslav example have been important elements in encouraging the growth of independence in the East European states. Nevertheless, the reviewer believes that Moscow's increased readiness to adjust to East European pressures was probably a more decisive factor. Though the Soviet Union, like any great world power, sets limits on how much independence it will tolerate on

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the part of the states within its sphere of dominance, these limits have clearly expanded in recent years, and the present Soviet leadership has shown an increased flexibility in trying to accommodate East European desires for economic reform and greater national autonomy.

To sum up, then, the two books under review are important contributions to our knowledge of the past and present of nationalism in Eastern Europe. It is a pity that the Sugar-Lederer volume generally stresses the 19th century to the detriment of the interwar and World War II periods. These witnessed the consolidation of the nationalist ethos on a mass scale. The weakness of the Fejtö book lies chiefly in its preoccupation with facts, to the detriment of analysis. Also, the author does not sufficiently stress the assimilation of national traditions by the various governments of Eastern Europe. Despite these drawbacks, however, both works provide much valuable information for those who wish to become better acquainted with East European nationalism.

Rival Agricultural Models

By Stephen Osofsky

ROY D. and BETTY A. LAIRD: *Soviet Communism and Agrarian Revolution.* Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1970.
ARTHUR E. and JAN S. ADAMS: *Men vs. Systems—Agriculture in the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia.* New York, Free Press, 1971.
JAMES R. MILLAR, Ed.: *The Soviet Rural Community.* Urbana, Ill. and London, University of Illinois Press, 1971.
W. A. DOUGLAS JACKSON, Ed.: *Agrarian Policies and Problems in Communist and Non-Communist Countries.* Seattle and London, Univ. of Washington Press, 1971.

THE ORGANIZATION of agriculture has long been one of the major problems facing Communist regimes—a reflection of the fact that the economies of most of the countries where communism has come to power have been predominantly rural in character. The four books under review address themselves to the manner in which a number of Communist regimes have dealt with this problem, examining the collectivized systems these regimes have adopted and assessing their effectiveness as compared with non-collectivized agriculture in other countries.

The Lairds' small volume explores the historical roots and present dimensions of agrarian problems in the Soviet Union, their diagnosis of these problems leading them to urge developing nations that are land-short and labor-rich to adopt a non-specialized and intensive type of private farming rather than the Soviet collectivized system of large, mechanized farms. Pointing out that the abundant use of labor can, under certain conditions, be more productive than heavily mechanized cultivation, they cite as an illustration the small-scale, labor-intensive, and less mechanized farming of Western Europe, where yields are higher per acre than they are on the large-scale, mechanized farms of the US (though the latter make good sense in US conditions of abundant land and a national food surplus).

The Adamses' study represents an attempt to develop some general conclusions about "Communist agriculture" on the basis of observations made during an extended 1967 visit to the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The authors visited a variety of farms in each country and talked to agricultural technicians, administrators, managers, scholars and politicians, although they were generally unsuccessful in their attempts to talk with actual farm workers. Despite the obvious shortcomings of using such an experience as the basis for a generalized study (*i.e.*, the superficiality of the impressions gained during a single tour, and the probably atypical character of the farms they were shown), their observations are generally perceptive and serve to verify the

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relatively poor conditions of farm life as well as the state of constant work slowdown that seems to characterize operations on both state and collective farms (particularly the latter) in all three countries. The chapters on Poland are of particular interest because they show that Polish agriculture now consists predominantly of small (mostly 12 acres or less) privately-owned farms, and that these substantially outperform the much more mechanized state and collective farms, earning their owner-operators incomes significantly higher than those of state and collective farm workers. The Adamses' study would have been still more interesting had it been extended to cover Yugoslavia's experience in dealing with agriculture, which has somewhat paralleled that of Poland. In particular, an examination of Yugoslav methods of manipulating and stabilizing farm size in the private sector would have provided a natural complement to the authors' study of Polish experience.

The Millar volume, consisting of 15 papers originally presented at a 1969 symposium sponsored by the University of Illinois, represents a major contribution to the literature on the Soviet agricultural system. The quality of the individual papers is consistently high, especially those in Part III (entitled "Recent Trends in the Rural Economy"), which contains contributions by such well-known specialists as Karl-Eugen Wädekin, Norton Dodge, David Bronson and Constance Krueger, Folke Dovring, and the editor, James Millar. The papers of Jerzy Karcz ("From Stalin to Brezhnev: Soviet Agricultural Policy in Historical Perspective") and Alexander Vucinich ("The Peasants as a Social Class") are also highly impressive. Taken all together, the compilation provides a comprehensive, multifaceted and coherent analysis that is interdisciplinary in approach, combining the perspectives of history, law, economics, sociology and literature.

THE JACKSON study is also based on a symposium, this one sponsored by the University of Washington in 1967, and comprises papers presented by 16 scholars, mostly economists, together with the comments of various discussants. The four-year delay in publication was not at all the fault of the scholars involved, but it unfortunately results in a certain staleness of the factual materials presented. The compilation nevertheless represents a pioneering effort in the comparative study of agricultural systems, both Communist and non-Communist. There are four papers on the Soviet system, including one by French economist Henri Wronski on the role of Soviet consumer cooperatives (a subject on which there are few fairly up-to-date sources of information in English). There are also four essays on agriculture in the People's Republic of China, one by Karl Wittfogel comparing Chinese and Soviet agricultural experience, and one dealing with agriculture on Taiwan. The remaining papers include a highly useful comparative study by Konrad Merkel of agriculture in East and West Germany, two studies comparing agricultural performance in North and South Korea, and one paper on Japanese agriculture. (Given the importance of postwar developments in Japan's agriculture, it is unfortunate that the single paper dealing with that country is rather narrowly focused on the subject of areal crop specialization instead of providing a general survey that would have been more valuable from a comparative standpoint.)

The Jackson volume's papers and comments dealing with agriculture on the Chinese mainland generally support the conclusion that China's version of collectivization, though not as economically and socially disruptive in its early stages, nor as extractive in its application, as that of the Soviet Union, has nonetheless proven unsuccessful from the standpoint of raising agricultural productivity. According to Leslie Kuo (p. 279), there has been no significant increase in Chinese agricultural productivity since collectivization, and Werner Klatt supports this view in maintaining that the rate of growth of China's farm output between 1957 and 1965 was zero. Anthony Tang points out further (p. 296) that there was no observable technical progress or modernization on Chinese farms between 1952 and 1965. In his view, the Great Leap Forward and the organization of the communes were not primary causes of the absence of agricultural growth after 1959, but rather represented desperate attempts to overcome the stagnation that already gripped Chinese agriculture prior to the adoption of these measures. Both Lawrence Lau (p. 337) and Shigeru Ishikawa (p. 347) agree that the Chinese, in instituting the egalitarian system of distributing income that was initially tried in the communes, in effect repeated—in a far more dramatic fashion—the Soviet error of destroying the individual farmer's incentive to put forth greater production effort. Finally, the papers and discussions on China underline the essentiality of achieving a better

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balance between industrial and agricultural development if distortions of incentives and of efficient production specialization, with a consequent impairment of productivity, are to be avoided.

THE INCLUSION in the Jackson study of Professor S. C. Hsieh's paper on the agriculture of Taiwan permits an illuminating comparison between the large-scale, collectivized farming practiced on the China mainland and Taiwan's system of predominantly small, family-owned, and intensively cultivated farms. According to Professor Hsieh, farms on the island average little more than one hectare (2.471 acres) in size, with an average of only three workers per farm; yet Taiwan's total agricultural output showed an impressive average growth rate of 8 percent annually over the period 1945-1960 (unfortunately, the paper cites no figures for more recent years). The author points out, moreover, that this growth record was achieved without any sizable increase in total cultivated area, principally through the use of such intensive methods of cultivation as double-cropping, relay planting, intercropping, and close spacing, all of which take maximum advantage of the tropical and subtropical climate. Produce accounting for 75 percent of the value of total annual farm production goes into commercial markets, refuting the notion that small-scale farms are not conducive to a thriving commercialized agriculture. Besides intensive cultivation, Professor Hsieh cites other factors contributing to Taiwan's success in agriculture, particularly the 1949 land reform which sharply reduced the incidence of tenant farming, and a variety of government measures to promote flood control, irrigation projects, improved communications, channels for the dissemination of technical agricultural information, and the formation of farmers' cooperatives.

Hsieh concludes that Taiwan's agricultural experience proves that all the problems and disadvantages of small farms can be overcome, and he further maintains (p. 394) that technological and organizational modernization such as Taiwan has carried out can enable other Asian nations to achieve a rate of economic growth sufficient to eliminate the necessity of checking population growth. The latter contention strikes this reviewer as a rather tenuous generalization, particularly since it is not supported by precise data relating the rate of population increase to resource capacity in Taiwan as compared to corresponding data for other Asian countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, South Vietnam and Malaysia.

The comparisons provided in the Jackson volume of agriculture in North and South Korea and in East and West Germany likewise tend to favor the non-collectivized systems—albeit with some reservations in the Korean case. Professor Ki Hyuk Pak finds North Korea's large and substantially mechanized collective farms, at best, only marginally more productive than the largely unmechanized, family-owned farms of the South averaging less than three hectares in size. But while Pak takes an optimistic view of the future development of agriculture in the South, his countryman, Professor Young C. Zeon, points to the fact that crop yields in the South remain chronically low and suggests that the South Korean government needs to devote greater resources to agricultural development relative to those devoted to industrial expansion. Konrad Merkel's paper on Germany concludes that the family-owned farms in the Federal Republic, ranging in size from 10 to 50 hectares, have significantly outperformed the larger collective and state farms of East Germany, and he attributes the poor performance of the latter, in substantial measure, to ineffectual management practices.

THE CONSENSUS of opinion that emerges from the findings and views of the many scholars who participated in producing these four volumes is that the Soviet model of collectivized agriculture —both at home and in its adaptations elsewhere—has proven remarkably inefficient and that this inefficiency has been due primarily to flaws that are inherent in the basic Soviet conception of agricultural organization. Marx and Engels, and after them Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev, were addicted to the notion that agricultural labor could be effectively organized along the same lines as labor in industry and, furthermore, that the same "economies of scale" attainable in industry could likewise be realized in agriculture —in other words, that farms should be as large as possible. What they failed to understand was that in agriculture intensity of cultivation is as important as the acreage of farms, and that the law of diminishing returns dictates a search for the optimal rather than the maximum possible size of farming units.

As these studies show, agricultural experience in Taiwan, Japan, Western Europe, and even in Communist Poland has shown that very small farms—by Soviet and

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Chinese standards—can produce efficiently by adopting intensive farming techniques and labor-saving technology. Yet dogmatic beliefs and a vested interest in perpetuating a system that has been all but enshrined in Soviet doctrine caused Khrushchev to continue enlarging the size of Soviet farms through kolkhoz amalgamations and the creation of bigger sovkhozes. In 1965 Brezhnev's admission that some farms were too large to be well-administered prompted the start of discussions in the Soviet press concerning the optimal size of farms, but as yet there has been no sign of any fundamental reconsideration of the system.

In part, the lack of success of the existing system stems from failure to recognize agriculture as a largely biological process. Successive Soviet regimes have tried to subject agriculture to the same sort of controls exercised in industry, to replace the judgment of the field worker by an inflexible plan that cannot possibly anticipate the multiplicity of unpredictable natural problems that the farmer has to deal with. The result has been that Soviet farmers cannot react spontaneously to fast-changing field conditions, but must either await orders from above or risk being charged with insubordination. The system thus denies decision-making authority to those who are closest to production conditions and consequently best able to respond to unexpected situations.

Agricultural operations also differ from those in industry in that they are by nature diverse, multifunctional and idiosyncratic, and consequently do not lend themselves to fixed, clearly-defined work assignments or regular shifts. Moreover, the fact that agricultural work is characteristically performed over large areas instead of in one place as in the case of an industrial plant presents formidable problems for the official control network. Instead of incurring the tremendous costs of maintaining an army of control personnel, it would be far more efficient to activate the self-interest and personal initiative of the farmers by rewarding them for maximizing productivity. As things stand at present, Soviet peasants habitually exercise most of their ingenuity in simulating hard work and merely meeting officially-prescribed delivery quotas. This attitude has resulted not only in stagnant production but also in poor-quality produce—the latter because the system relies on success indicators expressed in terms of physical volume in order to simplify planning and accounting procedures.

It was, of course, Stalin who more than anyone else set the mold of the Soviet system of collectivized agriculture that still remains fundamentally unchanged today. His primary objectives in doing so were to gain control over the hitherto independent peasantry and over the terms of resource distribution between industry and agriculture. Once these objectives were attained, he proceeded to reduce the agricultural sector and the peasantry to a state of virtual servitude, depriving agriculture of capital investment and diverting from it resources to finance rapid industrialization. As a result of these policies, Soviet agriculture in 1953 was still burdened by a primitive transportation network and incredibly low levels of mechanization, electrification, and chemical fertilizer use. The incomes of collective farm members remained extremely low, and the peasants had to rely on the sale of produce from their private plots for the bulk of their incomes. Long working hours, poor schools, and inadequate transportation facilities tended to perpetuate the semiliterate condition of the peasants, whose exodus from the countryside in search of a better life was curbed by an internal passport system. Despite such curbs, many of the more skilled and ambitious managed to leave the farms, with the result that the agricultural work force tended to become disproportionately made up of older men, women, and the very young.

IN THE POST-STALIN period, to be sure, various steps have been taken to remedy the poor performance of Soviet agriculture. For one thing, as economists David Bronson and Constance Krueger point out in the Millar volume (p. 229), higher procurement prices paid by the state for crop deliveries have resulted in a dramatic increase in farm workers' wages, bringing the average income of the individual state farm worker (exclusive of revenue from private plots) up to about 75 percent of the average income of industrial workers (as of 1967), as compared with 53.9 percent in 1953. The corresponding figures for collective farm workers are 48 percent in 1967 as against 17.9 percent in 1953. In addition, post-1953 reforms have for the first time given collective farmers guaranteed minimum wages and retirement pensions. Still further, the collective farms themselves have benefited from the discontinuance of discriminatory tax, credit and pricing policies, and under Khrushchev and his successors there has been an impressive increase in the volume of

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capital investment in farm mechanization, rural electrification and road construction, irrigation, and chemical fertilizer production.

Parallel with these moves, Khrushchev inaugurated a series of attempts to rationalize the huge and cumbersome complex of planning, procurement-coordination, and control organs for agriculture, but these attempts took the form of a succession of erratic administrative reforms involving alternate cycles of decentralization and recentralization. Robert Miller, writing in the Millar volume (p. 80), sees the chief intent behind all of Khrushchev's administrative modifications as having been to bring agricultural administrators into closer contact with actual farm production, but he concludes that perhaps the most important lesson taught by Khrushchev's experiments in this area was, paradoxically, that the involvement of party officials in the management and technical aspects of agriculture was a counterproductive anachronism—a lesson which Miller feels Khrushchev's successors have taken to heart. One might go further and suggest that Khrushchev's frantic search for a "cure-all" administrative solution failed because he was treating the symptoms rather than the disease.

In any event, these various measures thus far appear to have been unsuccessful in generating any significant rise in farm labor productivity. Economist Folke Dovring (Millar, pp. 273-74) attributes this failure in large part to the oversized work forces customarily employed on the farms and their low level of skills. Alexander Vucinich (Millar, pp. 315-16) suggests that the Soviet leaders, by continuing a policy of limiting educational opportunities in rural areas and thus holding down the skill-level of farm labor, may be deliberately fostering rural underemployment in order to prevent urban industrial underemployment.

Moreover, while the Soviet rural population is certainly much better off now than under Stalin, the farmers and their families still suffer to some degree from the Stalinist legacy of neglect. The relatively low level of consumer goods and services available to the rural population attests to a continuing official policy that appears to discriminate in favor of urban dwellers. As the Adamses observed when they toured Soviet rural areas in 1967, indoor running water and toilets remained a rarity even on the more modern collective farms (pp. 48, 64). Cultural, medical, and public service facilities have also remained markedly less extensive than those provided in urban areas, and these conditions—in addition to the fact that farm work still requires much heavy manual labor (because of lagging mechanization) and long hours—have tended to produce a sullen, work-evading peasantry with little real incentive to raise their low level of productivity.

IN SUM, the four studies under review generally concur that, if one posits maximization of production and minimization of cost per unit of output, together with a labor input consistent with an effective system of incentives, as the desired goals in agriculture, the collectivized, command-type farming systems, with their centrally planned and imposed production quotas, have proven themselves economically inefficient as well as administratively unwieldy and irrational. The Lairds, the Adamses, and German economist Werner Klatt (in Jackson, p. 465) go further and suggest that countries with Soviet-type agricultural systems would be well-advised to abandon them in favor of either genuine farm cooperatives or economically viable family farms. The Adamses (p. 254) express the view that adoption of a loose type of farm cooperative like the Polish agrarian circles, which make modern agricultural equipment and technology available to small farmers, could stimulate the modernization of small-scale agriculture in East European conditions. The Lairds, however, see little possibility that the Soviet Union will ever decollectivize agriculture, mainly because of political and ideological considerations: they argue that too much of the prestige of Marxism-Leninism is invested in the existing system, and also that "to abandon collectivization would be to undercut the Communists' most important argument for persuading national liberation movements in predominantly peasant, developing nations to accept the Soviet lead" (p. 61).

On the latter point, German economist Otto Schiller (Jackson, p. 243) disagrees with the Lairds in seeing little evidence of any effort on the part of the socialist states, including the USSR, to propagate the collectivized system of agriculture in the Third World. Certainly, this reviewer would hardly consider the Soviet agricultural model the most effective weapon in Moscow's arsenal for persuading Third World countries to look to the USSR for leadership. To date, in fact, none of the non-Communist but left-oriented regimes in Africa, for example, has seen fit to adopt this model, although Mali, Guinea, Ghana under Nkrumah, and Algeria have supported Soviet positions and accepted Soviet economic aid.

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Indo-Soviet Relations

By Surendra K. Gupta

J. A. NAIK: *Soviet Policy Towards India: From Stalin to Brezhnev.* New Delhi, Vikas Publications, 1970.
DEVENDRA KAUSHIK: *Soviet Relations with India and Pakistan.* New Delhi, Vikas Publications, 1971.

ONE OF THE MOST interesting developments in postwar international diplomacy has been the establishment of close and friendly relations between the Soviet Union, the most powerful Communist country in the world, and India, the world's largest democracy. Since the political systems of the two nations are so fundamentally different, it is certainly not ideological affinity that has brought them together. One must rather look to the national interests of the two countries for an understanding of their complex relationship. An excellent study by Arthur Stein, published in 1969, considered this question from the viewpoint of India's interests.[1] The two books under review look to the other side of the coin, seeking to explain Moscow's reasons for working so assiduously in the last two decades to gain prestige and influence on the Indian subcontinent. The books are also important because they are the first major studies undertaken by Indian scholars on this subject.

J. A. Naik's volume in particular deserves to be considered a major work, although it has weaknesses as well as strengths. One of its important failings needs to be stated at the outset. Namely, like some other writers, Naik proceeds from the assumption that the USSR's accommodative policy toward India evolved only after Stalin's death and that Stalin's policy was one of "indifference" or "hostility." As specific evidence for this, he cites an alleged lack of coverage in the Soviet press of the declaration of India's independence on August 15, 1947. According to Naik,

> *. . . this utter indifference, accompanied by hostile posture, was reflected in the Soviet publicity organs, which did not even bother to note the proclamation of Indian independence. Neither* Pravda *nor any other Soviet paper of importance carried the news of Indian independence.*

This statement reiterates a mistake made by a number of other scholars who apparently have not given a careful enough reading to the Soviet press of the Stalin era or fully analyzed his policy toward India. The Soviet news media did in fact publish news of the Independence Day celebrations in New Delhi,[2] and they also covered Indian Ambassador Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit's Moscow press conference of August 15 and publicized her message to the Soviet people issued on that day.[3] Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov also sent a message of greetings and congratulations to the Indian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru.[4]

At the time of her arrival in Moscow some months earlier, moreover, Mrs. Pandit had received very special treatment from the Soviets, a fact noted in *Time* magazine, which attributed it to her anti-Western statements at the United Nations General Assembly session in the fall of 1946.[5] However, India's support of some Soviet positions at that session (for example, on the use of the veto), gave way to new positions in the fall of 1947 backing the Western powers' stance both on the veto and on the question of Korea's future; in fact, on the latter issue there was a direct verbal clash between the Indian and Soviet delegates.[6] This change in New Delhi's attitude led Mos-

[1] Arthur Stein, *India and the Soviet Union*, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1969.

[2] "Ceremonies in Connection with the Declaration of India's Independence," *Izvestia* (Moscow), Aug. 16, 1947.

[3] "Message of Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Indian Ambassador to Moscow," *Pravda* (Moscow) and *Izvestia*, Aug. 16, 1947.

[4] "Molotov's Congratulations to Jawaharlal Nehru," *Aj* (a Hindi daily published in Varanasi, India), Aug. 24, 1947, p. 5.

[5] "Robin Redbreast," *Time* (New York), Sept. 8, 1947, pp. 27-28.

[6] See this author's "Soviet-Indian Relations, 1946-47: From Cooperation to Hostility," a paper presented at the Western Conference of the Association of Asian Studies, Tucson, Arizona, October 1969.

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cow in turn to respond with hostility toward Indian independence in general and New Delhi's foreign policy in particular. Yet Moscow's attitude was to soften once again in the early 1950's, as India became critical of US policy toward Korea, China, and the peace settlement with Japan.

A REALIZATION of these several turns in Soviet and Indian postures during the Stalin era is essential for an understanding of Soviet-Indian relations in the post-Stalin period, for it underscores the fact that it has always been the national interests of the two countries which have determined their attitudes and policies toward one another. Whenever their interests have been in conflict, there have been strains and even bitterness in their relationship; when they have found a mutuality of interests, their relations have been friendly.

Despite the above limitation, Naik offers a good analysis of Moscow's policy toward India as it was pursued by Stalin's successors. The most important event bringing about a new alignment of forces on the subcontinent was the United States' decision in 1954 to supply arms to Pakistan and to persuade her to become a member of the US-sponsored Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Nehru opposed the formation of an anti-Communist military alliance in Asia and was especially critical of the US-Pakistan alliance, since it affected India directly. The Soviets, who were of course already aware of the deterioration in US-Indian relations because of differences over aspects of the Korean question and the issue of a peace treaty with Japan, now saw specific gains to be made by cultivating better relations with India. No doubt Moscow calculated that rapprochement with India and support for the policy of nonalignment in general could lead to better relations with other nonaligned nations in the region, helping to counteract the strategic threat posed by SEATO. Moreover, friendship with India—a non-Communist country and a major power in the Third World—might improve Moscow's standing with countries elsewhere in the world which might still be suspicious of Soviet intentions. As Naik says,

In Soviet foreign relations . . . Russia's building up a close relationship with India had more than a bilateral significance for the former, as the Soviet leadership used the model of the Indo-Soviet relationship as a proof of its policy of coexistence with countries following other political systems.

In the author's view, there were also economic inducements leading Moscow to favor closer relations with India. While economic aid has generally been represented by its donors as an act of generosity—and the Soviets have been no exception in this respect—such aid generally has had strings attached to ensure that part of it would be used by recipients to buy machinery or other items from the aid-giving country. Naik thus sees a relationship between the Indo-Soviet rapprochement and the fact that in post-Stalin Russia, with an annual increase of about 9 percent in its gross industrial product, "there was an obvious compulsion on Soviet foreign-policy makers to face the problem of finding markets for Russia's heavy-industry producing economy." This is an important point, and one regrets that Mr. Naik has dealt with it rather briefly.

Once the Soviets decided to befriend India, they went all the way to extend support—economically, politically, and militarily. In addition to providing aid to such projects as the Bhilai and Bokaro steel plants, the Soviets gave full support to India on Kashmir and Goa. Even on the China-India border dispute, the Soviets, for the most part, appeared to be neutral, or more pro-Indian than pro-Chinese. Militarily, the Soviet Union became the major supplier of weapons to India.

WHY DID INDIA respond so enthusiastically to Soviet overtures? India's concern with the US-Pakistan alliance, Washington's support to Pakistan on the Kashmir question, and US indifference to India's position on Goa—all these have been cited as reasons by other writers. In addition, Naik, in one of the most valuable portions of his book, cites Soviet help to India in the areas of heavy industrial development and oil exploration. He points out that because of a severe shortage of steel in the early 1950's (indicated by an import level of one million tons of steel in 1955), the Indian government decided to construct large steel plants in the period of its Second Five-Year Plan.

For help, India first approached "her traditional trade partners in the West." She got two kinds of responses, both disappointing. First, according to a report quoted by Naik, India received "sermons about creating a favorable climate for private foreign investment, about the advantage of importing steel . . . rather than producing it . . . and [about] the need to concentrate on infrastructure." Second, even when aid was offered,

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the proposed rate of interest was very high. For example, the West German firms, Krupp and Demag, when approached for help in constructing the Bhilai steel plant, reportedly offered credits at an annual interest rate of 12 percent. Later, the Soviet Union not only agreed to provide credits for Bhilai at 2.5-percent (!) interest but also agreed to repayment in the form of Indian goods.

In the case of another major steel plant, Bokaro, India again had to rely on the Soviets for aid. Although Naik does not mention all the details, Nehru first requested assistance from the US. Impressed with how Bhilai had become a showpiece of Soviet economic assistance, both President Kennedy and then US Ambassador to India John K. Galbraith favored US participation in the construction of Bokaro, but the US Congress would not approve aid for a project in the public sector. Nehru thereupon withdrew his request for aid and approached the Soviets, who were more than willing to oblige.

A second important field in which the West forfeited the opportunity to go to India's assistance was oil exploration. According to Naik, Western experts who were approached by the Indian government for advice about the possibilities of such development expressed the opinion that the country was "oil dry" and that it would be a waste of money to undertake explorations in India. Here again, Moscow stepped in to provide assistance, and Soviet experts uncovered reserves said to amount to a "record performance in world oil history." Today, India has its own fast-developing oil industry.

To what extent have the Soviets been able to influence India's foreign policy? Although Indian leaders usually deny any partiality to the Soviet Union, it would be almost impossible for them not to feel special consideration for a country which has not only provided economic assistance in many critical areas, but which has also provided political support on several questions which India considers vital to her interests. Naik cites the case of India's stand on Germany as one in which the Soviets were gradually able to "pressure" New Delhi into modifying its stand.[7] Thus, Indian support of Bonn's position on the problem of German reunification was still manifest in an Indian-German joint communiqué issued in 1957, after the visit of the West German Foreign Minister to New Delhi; but by 1961 a Soviet-Indian joint communiqué issued in Moscow after talks between Nehru and Khrushchev referred to "the existence of the [two] German states" and said that "any attempt to change the frontiers will have dangerous consequences." According to Naik, the Indian side thus "abandoned its hitherto-followed German policy and offered *de facto* recognition of East Germany, obviously a concession to the demanding Kremlin." It should be noted, however, that Moscow was long unable to persuade India to extend formal diplomatic recognition to East Germany, despite a very active pro-Soviet lobby on this question[8]; obviously, New Delhi did not want to go so far as to jeopardize her good relations with Bonn, which had given India considerable economic assistance. Only after Bonn and Moscow signed a treaty of rapprochement did India formally recognize East Germany (in October 1972), feeling this step would no longer hurt Indian-West German relations.

Despite the fact that Soviet ties have been beneficial to India, Naik has some warnings for his countrymen. Although India continues to be important in Soviet considerations, he argues that there can be no permanency about the relationship. Future Soviet policy toward New Delhi, he says, will be "largely determined by India's utility to Soviet Russia in the latter's regional and global needs," and Soviet economic assistance to India could be affected by a different Soviet posture toward New Delhi. In his view, neither nonalignment *per se* nor India in itself is vital in the Kremlin's foreign policy considerations, and the development of any strains in their relationship might lead to a diminution of both aid and trade.

Secondly, he warns of a more serious danger. Although denying any effort on Moscow's part to propagate communism in India in the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras, he asserts that "the spread of communism abroad is one of the objectives of Soviet power since the days of Lenin, and the Soviet state has not yet abandoned it, nor is it likely to abandon it . . . so long as the Communist Party controls life in Russia." Specific-

[7] One might also refer to such other cases as the Indian stand on Soviet armed intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968—a stance which would probably have been more critical had not India been so dependent on Moscow. See Kuldip Nayar, *Between the Lines*, Bombay, Allied Publishers, 1969, p. 101.

[8] *E.g.*, see several articles in *Blitz* (a popular pro-Soviet Bombay weekly): Kunhanandan Nair, "The Blockade is Broken: Time for India to Recognize GDR," Sept. 6, 1969, p. 10; "India-Wide Campaign to Recognize GDR," Sept. 20, 1969, p. 10; and "Professor Norden Tells *Blitz* . . . Time for Full Normalization of Indo-GDR Ties," Dec. 12, 1970, p. 10.

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ally with respect to India, he writes:

To the extent which the Soviet influence in India increases and adds up to Indian dependence [on the USSR] . . . in the economic, political and military fields, the objective of communization is likely to increasingly figure in Soviet calculations regarding India.

Notwithstanding his oversights in regard to the Stalinist period, Naik has written an important book, providing, from an Indian viewpoint, a balanced evaluation of Soviet policy toward India.

DEVENDRA KAUSHIK'S book falls into a different category. It is not an objective, scholarly presentation of Soviet policy toward India and Pakistan, but rather the work of a Soviet protagonist. Kaushik, it might be mentioned, has written articles for the pro-Soviet Indian CP organ, *New Age,* and the pro-Soviet leftist weekly, *Link;* also, a book of his on Soviet Central Asia has been published in the USSR and reviewed favorably in the Soviet press.*

Much of the work under review is devoted to defending Soviet actions or policies toward India since 1917. While he admits that the Soviets acted wrongly at times, he argues that this was not a matter of questionable motives or sincerity but of Moscow's being misguided by others. For example, an incorrect Soviet evaluation of the Indian national bourgeoisie in the 1920's was not the fault of Lenin or his cohorts, but rather the result of "the ultra-left sectarian assessment . . . by Indian representatives in the Comintern" (he cites the roles of Manabendra Nath Roy at the Second Congress and of Shaukat Usmani and Saumendranath Tagore at the Sixth Congress). Similarly, the reasons for the condemnation of Gandhi in early Soviet writings lie, according to Kaushik, either with Gandhi himself ("in the complexity of Gandhi's world outlook [and] contradictions in some of his practical actions") or "in the lack at that time of data for a thorough and all-round investigation of Gandhi's activities." The closure of the Tashkent Military School for Indians after the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement of March 1921 did not take place because the agreement had prohibited Communist propaganda activity but because of "internal bickerings between rival Indian groups."

Concerning Soviet policy toward India and Pakistan in more recent years, Kaushik approvingly quotes a Soviet statement which characterizes Moscow as "a sincere and *disinterested* friend" (emphasis added) of both, working very hard to bring about a settlement of their disputes. If there have been problems in Soviet-Indian or Soviet-Pakistani relations, the causes for these lie not in the selfish or wrong motives of the Soviets but in some action of India or Pakistan. Thus he approves Moscow's neutral posture during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 (because any other stand "would only have aggravated the conflict") without analyzing why the Soviets had taken sides on the Kashmir question in the past and why they found it advantageous to abandon that stand in 1965. Even Moscow's decision to provide Pakistan with arms in 1968, which at the time created severe strains on Soviet-Indian relations, is blamed on the Pakistanis, not the Soviets: Kosygin, during his visit to Pakistan in early 1968, "was greeted with slogans like 'Give us tanks, not tractors.' Under these circumstances the Soviet Union was constrained to give a very limited quantity of arms to Pakistan."

Although Kaushik is thus uninterested in appraising Soviet foreign policy in terms of Moscow's objectives and requirements in different periods, or in assessing the value of either India or Pakistan in Moscow's scheme of things, his book does have one great merit: he shows that Moscow has been consistently interested in *both* India and Pakistan. A major policy statement by Georgi Malenkov in August 1953 has often been quoted by both Western and Indian writers to indicate the importance placed on India by the post-Stalin leadership; but another paragraph on Pakistan in the same speech has generally been ignored. In rectifying this mistake, Kaushik has focused attention on the fact that while good relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union did not develop as Malenkov had hoped, Moscow never gave up the hope of cultivating better relations with Pakistan and of drawing it away from the West. It is only in the light of this approach that much of Moscow's later policy toward the Indian subcontinent can be understood.

In sum, the books by Naik and Kaushik provide examples of two kinds of writing currently being done in India on the Soviet Union and its policies toward the Indian subcontinent. One is scholarly and dispassionate, the other biased and opinionated. Yet, in different ways, both books add to our understanding of the complex Indo-Soviet relationship.

* See, *e.g.*, V. Makarenko, "An Indian on Central Asia," *Aziia i Afrika sevodnia* (Moscow), December 1971, pp. 58-59.


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Problems of Communism

LY-AUGUST 1973



EAST-WEST TRADE

Comecon — Michael Kaser
China — William W. Whitson
Drug Abuse — David E. Powell
Soviet Population Policy — H. Desfosses Cohn
The Peaceful Path — George W. Rice

Book Reviews | Allen S. Whiting, Roman Kolkowicz, Walter N. Vickery, Donald W. Green, W. Raymond Duncan

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Problems of Communism

4

JUL—AUG 1973 VOL XXII

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MANAGING EDITOR: Marie T. House
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East-West Trade

1 Comecon's Commerce
by Michael Kaser

16 China's Quest for Technology
by William W. Whitson

31 Drug Abuse in Communist Europe
by David E. Powell

41 Population Policy in the USSR
by Helen Desfosses Cohn

56 Nonruling Parties and the "Peaceful Path"
by George W. Rice

BOOKS

72 Probing China's Cultural Revolution
by Allen S. Whiting

75 Changing Systems and Security Relations
by Roman Kolkowicz

78 From Pasternak to Solzhenitsyn
by Walter N. Vickery

82 Command, Compute, or Reform
by Donald W. Green

85 Castroism: From Theory to Practice
by W. Raymond Duncan

NOTES AND VIEWS

88 Correspondence

Cover: The Soviet passenger liner "Mikhail Lermontov" steams past New York City's World Trade Center in June 1973. Photo by *The New York Times*.

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East-West Trade

EDITORS' NOTE: Prospects for expanded commerce between Communist countries and the West have captured growing world attention during the past year. As in previous periods of East-West détente, much is heard of the size and potential value of markets previously regarded as barred to Western traders. And also, as in the past, much is heard of the pitfalls and peculiarities of trade with societies founded on radically different principles from those of the West. As a contribution to dispassionate discussion and rational assessment by scholars and decision-makers we offer here two articles written to inform rather than to justify or persuade. The first, by Professor Michael Kaser of Oxford University, examines the existing and potential patterns and the possible scope of trade between the developed industrial societies of the West and the command economies of the European members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon).
The second article, by Dr. William W. Whitson of the Rand Corporation, reviews the part played by foreign technology in the economic growth of the People's Republic of China and assesses the role of East-West trade and continued technology transfer under Peking's probable development strategy for the remainder of the 1970's.

Comecon's Commerce

By Michael Kaser

Trade between the socialist states of Eastern Europe and the industrialized market economies could well be on the verge of a dramatic growth. The smaller East European states already buy one-fifth of their imports from Western Europe, and the vigorous pursuit of trade with the United States by the traditionally autarkic Soviet Union suggests that the USSR—the world's second industrial power—has recognized the advantages of an international division of labor and, in particular, the attractions of Western developmental capital and technology.[1] It is, therefore, an appropriate time to examine the phenomenon of East-West trade, to define its present and potential composition and dimensions, and to assess the factors contributing to or impeding its growth.

After an initial indication of the overall magnitude of East-West trade, this study concentrates on the

Mr. Kaser, formerly a staff member of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (Geneva), is currently Professorial Fellow of St. Antony's College and Reader in Economics, Oxford University (England). His Soviet Economics, *1970, has appeared in French, German, Japanese, Spanish, and Swedish translations, and a third edition of his* Comecon: Integration Problems of the Planned Economies *is forthcoming.*

[1] One cannot exclude the possibility that the USSR, in expanding its trade with the West, may siphon some of the increment away from its fellow members in Comecon—whose potential is dependent on their own exports and creditworthiness.

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relationships of the European members (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the USSR) of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) with developed market economies.[2] Comecon's endeavors toward economic integration have given it a measure of institutional homogeneity as a counterpoise to the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), but such symmetry is only partial and is still less evident in trade patterns. Justifying concentration on the East European perspective in the present study is the fact that Comecon members have a much larger "East-West" component in their foreign trade than do the market economies. This is true even though the former are generally less dependent on foreign commerce, as measured by the ratio of trade to Gross National Product (GNP). Furthermore, the exports of East European countries to the West tend to resemble those of developing countries, whereas the reverse

[2] Albania, which ceased to participate in Comecon in 1962, trades primarily with China. Yugoslavia, by virtue of its open trading practices, generally can be included with the West, though it has an observer status with Comecon.

Table 1: Trade of OECD with the East in 1971-72

(In millions of US dollars)

	Exports to "socialist countries" (f.o.b.) [a]			Imports from "socialist countries" (c.i.f.)[a]		
	1971	1972	% Change	1971	1972	% Change
European Economic Community	**6062**	**7327**	**+20.9**	**4946**	**6070**	**+22.7**
Of which:						
Belgium and Luxembourg	253	339	+33.9	260	319	+22.7
France	1028	1207	+17.4	733	939	+28.0
Italy	1297	1311	+ 1.1	1246	1593	+27.9
Netherlands	343	400	+16.9	335	399	+19.0
West Germany	3141	4070	+29.6	2372	2821	+18.0
European Free Trade Association	**2757**	**3150**	**+14.3**	**2898**	**3210**	**+10.8**
Of which:						
United Kingdom	901	917	+ 1.9	989	1140	+15.4
Denmark	162	171	+ 5.9	156	180	+15.1
Sweden	410	428	+ 4.6	376	422	+17.5
Norway	80	133	+65.8	189	166	−11.8
Finland	345	469	+36.2	515	520	+ 1.0
Switzerland	313	405	+29.5	190	214	+12.8
Portugal	7	8	+17.1	24	23	− 5.7
Austria	524	595	+13.4	437	500	+14.3
Iceland	16	23	+40.9	21	24	+12.1
Others						
Spain	112	142	+26.0	100	216	+114.6
United States [b]	558	1050	+88.2	325	504	+55.0
Canada [b]	457	708	+55.2	121	171	+42.0
Japan	1241	1536	+23.7	1078	1381	+28.1
OECD Total [c]	**11573**	**14299**	**+23.6**	**9858**	**11935**	**+21.1**

[a] For purposes of this table, these include Albania, Bulgaria, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, the Korean Democratic People's Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic, Poland, Romania, the USSR, the Vietnamese Democratic Republic, and Yugoslavia. In the case of exports, the designation f.o.b. (free on board) indicates the cost of a commodity delivered to the point of shipment abroad; for imports, the term c.i.f. (cost, insurance and freight) indicates the cost of a commodity delivered to the point of entry of the importing country.

[b] Both exports and imports are quoted f.o.b. for these countries, *i.e.*, import figures do not include the cost of freight and insurance from the point of departure of the exporting country to the importing country's point of entry.

[c] The OECD total includes figures for the countries listed plus Greece, Turkey, Australia, and Ireland, for which figures for the last quarter of 1972 had to be estimated.

SOURCES: Data on trade for past years in this and subsequent tables are taken from official statistical sources of the countries concerned, unless specified otherwise.

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Table 2: Trade Dependence of Comecon Members in 1971

(GNP and imports in billions of dollars)

	Total Imports of Members			Breakdown of Imports by Trading Areas							
	GNP	Imports	Imports as % of GNP	From USSR	% of GNP	From other EE countries	% of GNP	From Western Europe	% of GNP	From rest of world	% of GNP
Bulgaria	13	2.10	16.2	1.11	8.5	0.44	3.4	0.36	2.8	0.19	1.5
Czechoslovakia	34	4.01	11.7	1.36	4.0	1.21	3.6	1.02	3.0	0.42	1.2
GDR	41	4.97	12.1	1.90	4.6	1.34	3.3	1.32	3.2	0.41	1.0
Hungary	17	2.99	17.6	1.02	6.0	0.87	5.1	0.80	4.7	0.30	1.8
Poland	49	4.04	8.2	1.43	2.9	1.16	2.4	1.04	2.1	0.41	0.8
Romania	27	2.10	7.8	0.49	1.8	0.49	1.8	0.77	2.9	0.35	1.3
USSR	555	12.48	2.2	—	—	7.26	1.3	2.41	0.4	2.81	0.5

flow of goods from the West more closely resembles the cross-section of manufactured goods normally traded among advanced Western economies.

Table 1 shows that the socialist countries (in this case comprising not only the European members of Comecon listed above, but also the People's Republic of China, Cuba, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and Yugoslavia) imported some $14.3 billion of goods from the West in 1972. This represented an increase of 23.5 percent from the preceding year (in current prices). In turn, the West imported from these same countries some $12 billion, an increase of 21.1 percent. In speed of growth—including a significant element of price inflation—East-West trade thus continued to be more dynamic than world trade as a whole, while running a little behind EEC's and ahead of EFTA's trade, a pattern established in the 1960's. In trade with the EEC during 1972, socialist countries registered a deficit of $1.2 billion (imports totaled $7.3 billion, and exports totaled only $6.1 billion), whereas trade with EFTA was balanced at $3.2 billion each for imports and exports. Although a market with a total annual turnover of $26 billion is quite substantial, it would doubtless be significantly larger if the socialist countries chose to become more dependent on trade. As a group they must account for over a third of the world's manufactures, but their exports (including those to one another) are only about one-eighth of the world total.

The narrower group of socialist countries represented by the European members of Comecon rapidly increased their trade with the developed West (here defined as the OECD—Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development—plus Australia), in the 1960's, from total turnover of $5.4 billion in 1960 to $14.3 billion in 1970. Although the latter figure was still only 2.3 percent of total world trade, the rate of growth of this trade (10.2 percent a year) outpaced the rate of growth in total world exports (9.1 percent) and the growth rate for both total Comecon trade and intra-Comecon trade (8.7 percent). This East-West trade was considerably more significant in the foreign commerce of the Comecon states in question than it was in the trade of the OECD. Its share in total Comecon trade turnover grew from 20.5 percent in 1960 to 23.2 percent in 1970, contrasted to shares of 2.6 and 3.2 percent in total OECD trade in the same years.[3]

Trade Dependence in East Europe

However, as suggested above, the overall degree of dependence on foreign trade of the East European economies in question is not high. This can be seen from the data in Table 2, which compares GNP,

[3] Among OECD countries, members of the EEC had a stable proportion of East-West trade in total turnover (4.1 and 4.0 percent at the beginning and end of the decade), whereas the share in the trade of EFTA members rose from 3.7 to 4.6 percent. It should be noted that these figures are from Deutsche Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, *Economic Bulletin* (West Berlin), Vol. 9, No. 4, 1972, p. 33, and are based on Comecon trade data converted into dollars at official exchange rates, which tend to run higher than OECD data. For example, in 1970 the Comecon figure for exports was 13.0 percent higher, and for imports 1.9 percent higher, for a total turnover some 7.7 percent higher than OECD figures. This discrepancy has been diminishing in recent years.

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Signing an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation between the USSR Council of Ministers' State Committee on Science and Technology and the West German firm "Friedrich Krupp GMBH" on Feb. 13, 1973, in Moscow. From left, B. Beitz, Chairman of the Advisory Council, and H. Elentz, a member of the board of Krupp, and D.M. Gvishiani, Deputy Chairman of the State Committee on Science and Technology.

—Photo by V. Kochevoi, TASS, via Sovfoto.

total imports, and imports by origin (the USSR, other Comecon members, West European countries, and the rest of the world) for each European member of Comecon in 1971.[4] Hungary emerges as the most trade-dependent, and if one corrects for a number of pricing factors which distort the statistics involved,[5] that country's trade dependence in 1971 may have been as high as 20 percent—a figure in line with the current shares of imports in the GNP's of the most trade-dependent countries of the West, *e.g.*, the United Kingdom or the Benelux countries. Bulgaria, by virtue of heavy imports from the USSR (financed partly by credit and partly by counter-deliveries of equipment to a guaranteed Soviet market), has rapidly increased its trade dependence and in 1971 ranked second among Comecon's members in this respect. At the opposite extreme is the highly self-sufficient Soviet Union, whose imports in 1971 were a mere 2 percent of estimated GNP. The value of goods imported by the remaining Comecon members amounted to a moderate 8 to 12 percent of their gross national product in 1971.

From the same table one can see that the degree of dependence on trade with the West also varies, ranging from 0.4 percent of GNP in the case of the USSR to 4.7 percent of GNP for Hungary. In 1971, the USSR imported three times as much from its fellow Comecon states as it did from Western Europe. The other Comecon members, with the exception of Romania, each imported more from the USSR than from the West or from other Comecon economies; their imports from the latter two sources were roughly comparable in value. Romania, the only exception, imported considerably more from Western Europe than from within the bloc.

Should these general relationships persist throughout the 1970's and the degree of trade dependence of the East European members of Comecon remain unchanged, one could at best anticipate a modest, gradual expansion of East-West trade in absolute terms—predicated on a continued growth of the GNP's of the Comecon states. (The present writer observed in *The Financial Times* [London], June 20, 1972, that Comecon plans envisage an annual growth of only 4 percent in trade with the West during 1971-75 compared to a growth of 11 percent in 1966-70.) The imminent potential for change, however, was summed up by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in his opening address to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki on July 3, 1973 (reported in *Pravda*, July 4), which called for "unrestricted, I emphasize

[4] In contrast to Table 1, the data here include Yugoslavia among the countries of Western Europe. The GNP statistics are estimates in dollar purchasing power derived by extending the series linking Eastern GNP by West European price weights which were presented in articles by Stanley Cohn and Maurice Ernst in Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1966, pp. 99-132 and 873-916. These data probably overstate values in relation to US purchasing power, just as an alternative series, based on comparative product regressions (see Economic Commission for Europe, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1969*, Part I, Geneva, United Nations, 1971, Appendix Table 4.V), may understate them.

[5] The weak and confused relationship between domestic prices of Comecon members and those which confront them in foreign trade necessitates caution in dealing with such categories as gross national product or trade dependence. "World market" prices in which Comecon members publish their trade returns do not precisely reflect the values at which the corresponding goods would be traded among Western partners. The ratios of prices at which domestic transactions take place in Comecon states differ sharply from those ruling within market economies. Finally, translation of Comecon's world-market prices into dollars at official exchange rates fails to allow for the higher equivalent value in a Comecon economy of an import from a country with a convertible currency than of one from a Comecon partner. The now-extensive literature on this subject began with the debate between Horst Mendershausen and Franklin Holzman in the *Review of Economics and Statistics* (Cambridge, Mass.), May 1959, May 1960, May and November 1962. For perspective on intra-Comecon pricing, see the forthcoming work of E. A. Hewitt, *Foreign Trade Prices in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance*, Cambridge University Press.

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unrestricted, business relations with capitalist countries."

The countries of Eastern Europe which are already trade-oriented are self-evidently anxious to expand their commerce with the capitalist West but have hitherto been constrained in part by their dependence for raw materials on the USSR, which has accepted in payment manufactures not saleable in the more competitive West. For both economic and political reasons a major acceleration in the growth of trade between Comecon and the West significantly depends on initiative from Moscow, and the Soviet Union would have to evidence a greater willingness to depend on world trade for the economic needs of itself and Comecon. Such a trend is demonstrable from numerous practical steps—the Soviet Union's conclusion of trade and cooperation treaties with the US (October 1972) and with the Federal Republic of Germany (May 1973) and the USSR's importation of grain from the West after a poor harvest in 1972—and has been afforded fundamental theoretical justification in an article argued with numerous quotations from Marx, Lenin and General Secretary Brezhnev—in *Pravda* of May 16, 1973. In an article entitled "Socialism and International Economic Cooperation," N.N. Inozemtsev, Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences, presented projections prepared by his institute estimating that the foreign trade of capitalist countries between now and 1990 will grow 1.6 times and private capital flows 1.8 times as fast as the total gross national product of these economies. He concluded that there were a number of advantages which the USSR could gain "from developing external economic ties in general and with the capitalist countries in particular." Among these were the importation of advanced technology, fuller exploitation (through foreign machinery, know-how and capital) of Soviet natural resources, an increased Soviet export capability that would permit higher imports to raise the Soviet standard of living, and finally, an improvement in the general international political climate. It was precisely this line which Brezhnev took during his extended talks with President Nixon and American businessmen during the Soviet leader's visit to the United States this June.



Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade, Nikolai S. Patolichev, is received at the White House by President Richard M. Nixon on Oct. 18, 1972, after signing of US-USSR agreements on trade, Lend-Lease settlements, and mutual granting of credits.


—UPI photo.

Projecting Trade Levels

Judging from such evidence, one may anticipate a significant expansion of the foreign trade of the Comecon countries generally, and with the West in particular. Some data on possible levels of Comecon trade by the year 1980 are presented in Table 3, which provides three ranges—upper, middle and lower—the first based on a projection by the author, the third on another by the Secretariat of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), and the middle one as a composite.

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TRADE DEPENDENCE IN COMECON AND THE EEC
Imports in US dollars (1971) per capita



*This line-up represents the EEC as expanded in 1973.

The first of these sets of projections are based on the hypothesis of a marked intensification of trade. For Bulgaria and Hungary, the ratio of imports to GNP has been assumed to grow to 20 percent (allowing for price adjustments mentioned above, the real percentage might be closer to 25 percent); for the USSR the figure was set at 5 percent;[6] and for the other Comecon states, at 15 percent. The 1980 totals for GNP were derived by assuming that the Comecon states will achieve rates of GNP growth roughly half the planned annual rates of growth in Net Material Product (NMP) targeted in the 1971-75 economic plans of these countries. Such an approach attempts to allow for deficiencies likely to arise in the planned expansion of production in some sectors—notably agriculture—and in providing the promised wider range of personal services (which, together with costs of civil administration and defense, account for much of the difference in the economic activities included in the concepts of GNP and NMP).[7] The result of these calculations is an estimated total of $80 billion of imports for Comecon in 1980, or 7.7 percent of an estimated aggregate GNP of $1,035 billion for the seven countries.

How realistic is so large a figure? One test is to set the projected imports against likely population in 1980[8] and to compare the resulting per capita trade figures with 1971 levels for Comecon states and for the European Economic Community. As the accompanying chart shows, four Comecon countries would have import levels of more than $400 per capita; Romania and Poland would have something less than $300 per capita; and the USSR—whose degree of autarky was assumed to remain higher than elsewhere in the bloc—would triple its current $50 of imports per capita to $150. By contrast, only two members of the EEC in 1971 were at a level as low as the levels projected for the most

[6] Projecting targets for trade in the current (1971-75) Soviet Five-Year Plan on to 1980 would certainly yield more than the 2.2 percent import:GNP ratio of the USSR in 1971. The 5-percent figure seems the most that the Soviet Union could achieve by the end of the decade.

[7] The data on annual rates of growth of NMP were cited from official statistics by Osterreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, *Monatsberichte* (Vienna), No. 3, 1973, p. 176, with weighting from the ECE, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1969, op. cit.*, Part II, 1970, p. 1. Other factors affecting these calculations but tending to offset one another are the increasing weight of depreciation in maturing economies and possible bias of the Soviet index of output weighted by wholesale prices unchanged since July 1, 1967.

[8] The population projections were presented in US Department of Commerce, *International Population Reports* (Washington, DC), Series P-91, No. 23, March 1973, and previous issues.

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Table 3: Projections of Comecon Foreign Trade in 1980

	Planned rate of annual growth of Net Material Product, 1971-75 (percent)	Gross National Product (billions of US dollars) 1971	1980 [a]	Projected trade dependence (imports as percent of GNP)	Three projections of possible 1980 import levels (billions of US dollars) Upper [b]	Middle [c]	Lower [d]
Bulgaria	8.3	13	19	20	3.8	2.9	2.2
Czechoslovakia	5.1	34	41	15	6.2	4.7	3.6
GDR	4.9	41	55	15	8.3	6.2	4.9
Hungary	5.8	17	23	20	4.6	3.4	2.7
Poland	7.0	49	70	15	10.5	7.9	6.2
Romania	11.5	27	44	15	6.6	4.9	3.9
Total of above	**6.8**	**181**	**252**	**(16) [e]**	**40.0**	**30.0**	**23.5**
USSR	7.1	555	783	5	40.0	30.0	23.0
Comecon-Europe	**7.0**	**736**	**1035**	**(8) [e]**	**80.0**	**60.0**	**46.5**

[a] Author's projection, based on a rate of growth of GNP equal to one-half the planned rate of growth of NMP in 1971-75.
[b] The 1980 level of GNP multiplied by the trade-dependence ratio.
[c] Distribution according to proportions established for the upper range projection of a $60 billion total of imports derived, as explained in the text, from data of the author and the Economic Commission for Europe.
[d] Distribution of the $46.5-billion ECE projection presented in commodity-group breakdown in Table 4 below.
[e] Extrapolated from totals of imports and 1980 total GNP.

trade-intensive Comecon states, and the mean for the Community was $507 per capita. Therefore, even at these maximum projected levels, Comecon —with bloc-wide imports of $213 per capita— would continue to be far less trade-intensive in 1980 than the EEC was in 1971.

Moreover, the $80-billion level of imports projected for 1980 by the author can only be viewed as a hypothetical upper limit, inasmuch as the levels of GNP used in making these projections tend to overstate the value of GNP relative to its actual purchasing power in the Comecon countries. More modest projections of trade levels are provided by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. A study by its Secretariat envisaged imports of $124 or $157 per capita for Comecon by 1980, the two figures reflecting alternative assumptions for the rate of growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).[9] Working from the more modest of the two projections of GDP, the ECE anticipated an increase in Comecon trade dependence (figured as the ratio of imports to GDP) from 1.1 percent in 1967 to 6.2 percent in 1980, whereas the author's calculations envisaged a growth in trade dependence (figured as the ratio of imports to GNP) from 4.4 percent in 1971 to 7.7 percent in 1980.[10] A simple blending of the two approaches is to apply the ECE trade-dependence figure for 1980 to the author's GNP projection ($1,035 billion) and to apply the author's trade-dependence ratio to the ECE's lower figure for GDP ($744) billion) in 1980, and to average the results ($64 and $57 billion). The result is a projection of roughly $60 billion in Comecon imports by 1980. This figure is the middle-range estimate of Table 3, and it was distributed by the proportions established for the upper range.

The final and most conservative estimate of the level of total Comecon imports in 1980 also comes from the ECE Secretariat. The data are based on actual experience in 1971 and assume moderate Comecon economic growth, balanced trade with the developing countries, and a Comecon export surplus of $600 million. This import level—$47 billion—provides the lower range of possibilities presented in Table 3 above. Such a low level, with the

[9] *Economic Bulletin for Europe* (Geneva), No. 2, 1973, p. 51. The two growth rates used were 4.5 and 5.8 percent per annum; The rate used in Table 3 of the present article was 3.5 percent. It should be noted that the ECE projections of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) started at a 1967 level of $420 billion, and that the more moderate growth rate would yield a GDP of $744 billion by 1980. The author's calculations were based on a GNP figure of $736 billion in 1971, which rises to $1,035 billion in 1980. Since the excess of GNP over GDP—net factor income from abroad—is negligible in the case of Comecon members as a group, the two aggregates are virtually identical.

[10] The slower growth in trade dependence envisaged by the author is in part a reflection of the slower anticipated rate of GNP growth.

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assumption of an export surplus for Comecon, seems unlikely in light of the readiness of the developed West to offer credits with which Comecon can buy capital equipment and technology.[11] However, the ECE Secretariat's breakdown of this third projection by product (presented in Table 4) does indicate the patterns which broadly characterize the likely shape of East-West trade by the end of the decade.

Table 4: Commodity Structure of Comecon Trade[a] in 1967 (actual) and 1980 (projected)

(In billions of US dollars, f.o.b.)

	Imports		Exports	
	1967	1980	1967	1980
Developed market economies				
Food and agricultural raw materials	1.0	2.5	2.0	2.9
Fuels and other raw materials	0.6	0.7	1.6	3.2
Manufactures	3.4	13.4	1.5	5.2
TOTAL	5.0	16.6	5.1	11.3
Other European members of Comecon				
Food and agricultural raw materials	2.3	0.1	2.3	0.1
Fuels and other raw materials	3.1	3.3	3.1	3.3
Manufactures	8.3	20.5	8.3	20.5
TOTAL	13.7	23.8	13.7	23.8
Developing countries				
Food and agricultural raw materials	1.4	3.8	0.6	1.7
Fuels and other raw materials	0.1	0.6	0.4	1.5
Manufactures	0.2	1.7	1.5	8.9
TOTAL	1.8	6.1	2.4	12.0
Worldwide				
Food and agricultural raw materials	4.8	6.4	4.9	4.6
Fuels and other raw materials	3.9	4.5	5.1	7.9
Manufactures	11.9	35.6	11.3	34.6
TOTAL	20.6	46.5	21.3	47.1

[a] As elsewhere in this article, Comecon refers only to the European membership of that organization.

This table suggests the salience of manufactures in the projected imports of Comecon. Intra-Comecon sales of manufactured items are expected to grow from a 1971 level of $8.3 billion to $20.5 billion. Deliveries from the developed market economies may grow even faster, from $3.4 to $13.4 billion. The latter flow would perhaps total as much as $17 billion if the same percentages were applied to a total import level of $60 billion—the middle range of Table 3. Although Comecon is expected to expand its counterdeliveries of manufactures to the market economies, the $5.2 billion projected is smaller than the projected total exports of food and materials ($6.1 billion). Inasmuch as possible major Western-financed projects (see below) are unlikely to generate exports on any substantial scale until the 1980's, this total of $11.3 billion may be a fairly realistic estimate of Comecon's export potential by 1980. If Comecon imports the estimated $3 billion in food and materials indicated in Table 4, and perhaps expands its imports of manufactured goods to the $17-billion level suggested by this author, the total bill for imports from the West would amount to some $20 billion, leaving a debit balance of some $9 billion. When added to a forecasted net deficit of $1.2 billion on invisibles (shipping, tourism, etc.), the imbalance would total some $10 billion. This compares with a billion-dollar deficit in 1972.[12]

As the data of Table 4 suggest, there is a marked asymmetry in the East-to-West and West-to-East trade flows, an imbalance which seems likely to increase. Farm and mineral products predominate in Comecon exports to the West, whereas Western deliveries are concentrated in manufactures, particularly machinery. According to the major UN study of East-West trade,[13] chemicals, machinery and transport equipment accounted (in 1967, the report's base year) for 82 percent of exports from

[11] Although the figure does not provide for credit-facilitated imports, increased imports of Western goods are implicit in the assumption of overall growth and of increasing trade dependence. On the other hand, by working with *worldwide* trade figures, the ECE Secretariat imposed a strict consistency on itself: *i.e.*, it did not project more imports from a given area than the exports which that area's growth and trading ratios would permit under changing trade policies.


[12] *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR za 1972 god* (USSR Foreign Trade in 1972), Moscow, "Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenlia," 1973; traditional surpluses with developing countries reduced the deficit to $690 million. The deficit seems to have been largely generated by Soviet grain purchases, but the source—the official trade yearbook—differed from previous issues by omitting all data on wheat.

[13] *Analytical Report on the State of Intra-European Trade*, Geneva, United Nations, 1970.

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THE STRUCTURE OF COMECON-EEC TRADE

(in millions of US dollars, for 1969)



the EEC to Comecon, whereas food, raw materials and fuels accounted for 60 percent of Comecon deliveries to the EEC. As the accompanying chart shows, this imbalance persisted in 1969, when the EEC enjoyed a favorable balance of $1,324 million in trade of machinery and transport equipment with Comecon. In 1971, Belgium-Luxembourg, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom enjoyed a favorable balance of $1.5 billion in trade of machinery with Comecon.[14] Thus, the principal markets for the sizable output of machinery by Comecon members lie within Comecon, as demonstrated above in Table 4. This has been a strong trend, resulting from the Comecon specialization agreements of the late 1950's,[15] although it also reflects difficulties in penetrating Western markets.


The Comecon economies—exclusive of the USSR—during the years 1966-70 expanded total trade in manufactures slightly faster than they increased output of manufactures: imports grew 13 percent per annum, exports 11 percent, and output 9 percent. It should be noted that, in the same period, EEC members were expanding imports of manufactures by 16 percent and exports by 14 percent, with only a 7-percent expansion of output. In light of the specialization efforts within Comecon it is somewhat surprising that intra-Comecon trade failed to grow as rapidly as intra-EEC trade. Trade in manufactures between EEC members grew at 17 percent a year, comprising 45 percent of total imports and 64 percent of total exports of EEC members in 1970. By contrast, intra-Comecon trade in manufactures grew at only 11 percent per year and

[14] *Statistical Annex to the Economic Bulletin for Europe, 1970 and 1971*, UN Economic Commission For Europe, Geneva, 1972.

[15] The author discussed these decisions in his *Comecon: Integration Problems of Planned Economies*, 2nd ed., London, Oxford University Press, 1967, chap. 5. *Zycie gospodarcze* (Warsaw), April 9, 1973, provided the following data on the rapidly increasing share of machinery in intra-Comecon trade (figures in percent):

	1957	1965	1971
Bulgaria	9	30	37
Czechoslovakia	42	56	61
GDR	49	59	61
Hungary	46	43	47
Poland	29	49	52
Romania	11	25	32
USSR	9	18	24

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The first unit—already shipped—of the complete diesel-engine assembly line being constructed by the Ingersoll Milling Machine Company of Rockford, Illinois, for the major Soviet truck plant on the Kama River.

—Photo courtesy of Ingersoll.

comprised 27 percent of total exports and 47 percent of total imports of Comecon members in 1970.[16]

Although the failure of intermember trade in manufactures to grow at the same rate as aggregate Comecon trade in these items suggests a lack of progress in specialization, it does indicate some success in opening up new markets. In the case of trade with the EEC, however, Comecon has been handicapped by various import restrictions on East European goods,[17] which since January 1, 1973, have been subject to standardization under the EEC's Common Commercial Policy. Exclusionary practices of the Community—in the form of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)—also pose a serious threat to the export of Comecon agricultural products to the EEC. To mitigate the effects of the CAP, four countries of Comecon have individually negotiated a number of specific informal agreements with the Commission of the European Communities (the executive agency formed in July 1967 to coordinate activities of the EEC, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European atomic Energy Community): Bulgaria concluded agreements on wine in December 1970, dairy products (January 1971), pork (July 1971), eggs and poultry (October 1972); Hungary, on pork (July 1968), wine (November 1970), and dairy products (February 1971); Poland, on eggs (April 1965), live pigs, pork and poultry (April 1968), and turkeys (December 1970); and Romania, on live and slaughtered pigs, ducks, geese, Tilset cheese, and eggs in the shell (all November 1969), sunflower seed oil (July 1970), wine (November 1970), goat cheese (December 1970), and tomato purée (September 1972). However, these agreements are not a wholly satisfactory solution. The adherence, in January 1973, of the United Kingdom to the CAP has intensified the concern of Comecon member states over the future of West European markets for their agricultural output.

Comecon as Counterpoise

The development in Western Europe of increasingly preferential trading must clearly limit the potential expansion of trade by East European countries with the rest of the continent. Various actions have been taken to counter this threat, but perhaps the most significant has been a conscious effort to strengthen and unify further the Comecon system as an economic alternative as well as a bargaining counterpart to the EEC and EFTA. Such measures as the informal agreements on export of East European agricultural products to the EEC are, at best, stopgap devices. Clearly, more satisfactory solutions must await formal bloc-to-bloc negotiations, and this in turn involves diplomatic recognition of the EEC, a step which the Comecon states have thus far avoided collectively and individually.[18] In this regard, speeches by Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev in March and December 1972[19] have been widely

[16] See Secretariat of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, *International Trade 1971*, Geneva, 1972, pp. 174-75.

[17] On these restrictions, see C. F. G. Ransom in G. R. Denton, Ed., *Economic Integration in Europe*, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969, p. 104.

[18] The European Commission, incidentally, argues that Czechoslovakia and Poland, already members of GATT, had in effect granted the EEC legal recognition by signing the Kennedy Round of tariff agreements in GATT.

[19] See *Pravda* (Moscow), May 21 and Dec. 22, 1973.

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interpreted as evidence that recognition is at hand as soon as the EEC makes some concessions to what he described as "the realities" of Comecon.

As noted earlier, Comecon countries were able to expand their share of OECD trade from 2.6 to 3.2 percent during the 1960's—no mean achievement in light of the preferential trade arrangements among members of the EEC and the EFTA. Nevertheless, penetration of this market has grown increasingly rather than less difficult. As a result of this and other factors, the relatively dormant movement within Comecon toward integration of the member economies took on new impetus in the late 1960's, a development which was doubtless furthered by the Prague spring of 1968 and the subsequent invasion of Czechoslovakia by the USSR and other members of the Warsaw Pact.

At a meeting in April 1969, party and government leaders of the Comecon states resolved to renew efforts to coordinate their respective national economic plans.[20] This agreement was ratified by the heads of government in July 1971 in a document known by the abbreviated title, "The Complex Program for Further Economic Integration." Its implications for multilateral payments were further elaborated at a meeting of heads of governments in Prague in June 1973.

These developments were accompanied by a reversal in the direction of the economic reforms of the mid- and late 1960's. Such innovations as management boards for industrial enterprises (in some cases with worker participation), decontrol or at least frequent revision of wholesale prices, direct wholesaling between enterprises, and autonomy for enterprise directors to deal with foreign buyers and sellers were largely eclipsed during 1969 and 1970, save only in Hungary. In place of the profit-oriented industrial enterprises, most East European countries, including—since April 1973—the USSR itself, have come to feature industrial associations, standing as a pivotal operating authority between the enterprises and central industrial ministries.

With regard to foreign trade, the associations should help overcome the virtual isolation of industrial enterprises from foreign buyers or sellers formerly created by monopolistic state foreign-trade corporations. Certain industrial associations and even large enterprises have now been accorded direct trading rights (extensively in Hungary, less so in Bulgaria, the GDR and Poland). In Czechoslovakia and Romania some of the trade corporations have been assimilated into associations. Even the recent USSR statute on industrial associations accords these organizations greater initiative and responsibility in foreign trade matters than were formerly accorded industrial enterprises. It provides for a "fund for the development of production for export" in each industrial association and holds the latter responsible for assuring deliveries to exporters.[21] Presumably, these developments should facilitate trade not only within Comecon but also with Western markets.

This new institutional structure, uniformly applied throughout Comecon, also serves as a promising base for industrial collaboration within the bloc. Under the provisions of a newly-approved statute, a number of intra-Comecon branch organizations have been formed, such as Interchim, begun in 1970 for the joint production of small-volume



Wisniowka—a cherry cordial—being packaged for export from Poland to the United States.

—Photo by CAF (Poland's Central Photo Agency) via Eastfoto.

[20] For a detailed discussion of the political and economic issues leading to that meeting, see H. W. Schaefer, *Comecon and the Politics of Integration*, New York, Praeger, 1972.

[21] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* (Moscow), No. 14, April 1973, pp. 11-14.

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chemicals, or Interatominstrument, formed for the joint production of nuclear-engineering instrumentation. Older branch organizations—Intermetall and Agromash—have widened the number of participating Comecon members. Limited-partner organizations—such as the Hungaro-Polish Intercomponent (for electronic components)—have also been established. As for the overall coordination of national plans, planning officials and representatives of industrial ministries have been discussing drafts of the 1976-80 plans since 1971. The issues must be resolved soon, for interstate agreements covering cooperation in 1976-80 must be signed by mid-1975 in order to be appropriately reflected and embodied in individual national five-year economic plans.[22]

The Complex Programme also envisages the multilateralization of intermember payments by 1980 or so, on the basis of unified exchange rates. A serious obstacle to this development has been the historic separation of domestic and foreign prices in the socialist states. Although Comecon members trade among themselves at valuations approximating world prices, these prices are neither carried into domestic transactions nor allowed to reflect relative scarcity and demand within the individual member countries. In an attempt to relate the official (and everywhere excessively overvalued) rates of exchange of the national currencies to approximate domestic (wholesale) purchasing power, the East European states have applied a variety of "foreign trade coefficients" or "multipliers."[23] Such adjustments in the rates of exchange of national currencies have brought increased order into intra-Comecon dealings, but they do not yet provide an adequate basis for multilateral trade within Comecon. Price structures within Comecon are still disjunct, and the ability of this group to present an integrated and unified face to its Western counterparts remains impaired.

Interestingly enough, developing East-West economic relations may themselves help to diminish national divergences in pricing within Comecon and hence contribute indirectly to the establishment of convertibility in that bloc. The development of joint ventures involving Western corporations and East European enterprises may force domestic pricing to reflect more clearly international market pricing. Moreover, the infusion of substantial credits in convertible currencies as the basis for expanded trade might also facilitate the shift from the existing system of bilateral payments in Comecon to bloc-wide convertibility.



Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, emphasizes a point during a meeting on June 22, 1973, with US corporate and financial leaders at Blair House in Washington, DC. To the Soviet leader's left is US Treasury Secretary George P. Shultz.

—UPI photo.

Toward Increased Exports

One could adduce other evidences of the obstacles in the path of Comecon integration. More important, however, such integrative policies have not really offered an adequate solution to the problem of modernizing the Comecon members' economies. There is still a pressing need for the importation of advanced technology and equipment from the capitalist West. While integration may provide a better institutional basis for dealing with the EEC and the EFTA, Comecon production specialization efforts are not likely to develop export goods of sufficient technological sophistication and quality to compete on world markets and thereby finance needed imports. With the exception of the USSR—whose natural resources constitute a promising source of foreign ex-

[22] See *Magyar hirlap* (Budapest), Feb. 28, 1973, p. 7.

[23] Such a "multiplier" was first applied in Hungary, in January 1968, and similar coefficients have since been applied in varying manners in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Poland, and Romania. By definition, the USSR need make no such adjustment for intrabloc payments since its ruble is tied to the "transferable ruble" (created in 1964 for such payments) at par. See the author's articles in *International Currency Review* (London), January-February and May-June 1973.

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change earnings—the Comecon states must therefore find ways to increase their exports of manufactured goods.

Several courses suggest themselves. The first and most immediate possibility for expanding the Comecon countries' exports of manufactures lies in arrangements for payment-in-kind. Such arrangements may be divided into four types: pure barter, counterpurchases (in which the Western seller agrees to take a proportion of his payment in the products of the buyer), countertrade (in which the Western seller agrees to spend a proportion of his local-currency receipts in the country, sometimes on products designated by the buyer but in product lines other than his own), and national trade protocols (which specify a determined list of goods which must be purchased in turn for the right to sell an agreed set of products). The last of these is favored by Comecon members because it permits bargaining in quantitative terms over the whole mix of imported and exported products and permits compensation where quoted prices fail to reflect comparative advantage.

A favorable judgment on payments-in-kind as a means of fostering exports runs contrary to most treatises on East-West trade. It has been argued that such arrangements, even more than bilateral trade, tend to distort the patterns of trade and probably to depress overall levels of trade in the long run.[24] It has also been pointed out that in payment-in-kind deals Western exports tend to carry "a mark-up as compensation for possible loss on the resale of the unwanted purchases" from the East.[25] The approach has also been viewed by Western companies generally as "an alien and on the whole unacceptable method, both imprecise and awkward," although some argue that a company making a counterpurchase can gain "an important head start" on competitors who refuse to engage in the practice.[26] East European importers have increasingly turned to payment-in-kind as a means of furthering diversification of their economies without incurring the high cost of entering new markets on their own. In such circumstances, they appear willing to accept the implicit cut in price mentioned above.



Romanian State President Nicolai Ceausescu (center) exchanges a toast with Dr. Werner Kneiper, spokesman for VFW-Fokker, at the Bremen works of the West German aircraft manufacturer after conclusion of a contract on June 29, 1973. Looking on from the left is Krupp boss Ernst Wolf Mommsen, and from the right, Ceausescu's wife, Elena.

Photo courtesy of VFW-Fokker.

In the medium term, the situation should improve as the marketing techniques of the East European economies improve. To this end each Comecon state has established a "conjuncture" or "world marketing" institute to follow commodity and area market trends. Furthermore, various economic measures have increased the incentives of enterprises or associations to seek out foreign markets, and the Economic Commission for Europe has recently sponsored an East-West seminar on marketing.

Perhaps most promising in the long term is the development of joint East-West ventures in a few areas of high technology or sophisticated markets. The majority of such joint ventures to date are limited to arrangements for sales or mutual supply. Others are a developed form of "counterpurchase" in which, *e.g.*, an East European partner processes components for a Western finished good in exchange for quantities of that good. Finally, there are licensing and production arrangements such as Italy's Fiat firm has with the USSR, Poland and Hungary: Fiat automobiles are produced in the Soviet Union and Poland; the latter also ships Fiat autos to Hungary in return for Fiat-licensed components.

A further step is the establishment of direct equity participation of Western firms in Eastern enterprises.


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24 See John Pinder, "Problems of East-West Trade and Payments," an unpublished paper presented to a joint conference of the Council for Economic Development (USA) and the Council for Political and Economic Planning (UK), June 17, 1971. P. J. D. Wiles applies the term "enterprise reciprocity" to the phenomenon of counterpurchases and groups it with other trade-restricting procedures (see his *Communist International Economics*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1968, p. 283).

25 See J. Wilczynski, *The Economics and Politics of East-West Trade*, London, Macmillan, 1969, p. 94.

26 P. Zentner, *East/West Trade*, London, Parrish, 1967, p. 76.

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Czechoslovak welders attach the last link ("posledny") *in a section of the trans-European gas pipeline in July 1972. The line will ultimately transmit Soviet natural gas to Czechoslovakia, Austria, the GDR, and the FRG.*

—Photo by Novosti via Sovfoto.

This has been possible since 1967 in Yugoslavia and has recently become legally feasible in Hungary and Romania.[27] In Hungary, the Minister of Finance has yet to promulgate appropriate regulations governing such participation, but in Romania the first such venture—equity participation by Germany's Zahnraderfabrik RENK, AG, in Romania's Resita enterprise—was approved last November by the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Such arrangements offer East European economies opportunities to import technical and managerial know-how and to assure themselves of convertible-currency markets without the interest or repayment commitments entailed in traditional credits, joint ventures, or even flotations of bond issues on the Eurodollar markets such as those by the Hungarian National Bank in July 1970 and by Comecon's International Investment Bank in March 1973.

[27] See Article 31 of Hungary's Law on Economic Partnerships (Law 19 of 1970), *Magyar közlöny* (Budapest), Aug. 7, 1970; and Article 59 of the Law on the Foreign Trade, Economic and Technical-Scientific Cooperation of the Socialist Republic of Romania of March 17, 1971 (*Romania: Documents, Events, Bucharest*, Agerpress, Vol. I, No. 20, 1971, p. 28).

In the case of the Soviet Union, one might raise the question of whether sales of gold could pay for increased levels of trade. The USSR did sell gold heavily in 1972 to finance its grain imports, but even expanding gold output to the maximum consistent with Soviet costs and capital availabilities—at mid-1973 prices at least—would bring in just $1 billion.[28] (In addition, Romania mines a little gold, but the rest of Comecon has to buy Soviet gold for industrial purposes.) Moreover, rather than going to finance new imports, the Soviet gold may be needed to service and repay existing and future debt.[29] Soviet expansion of its merchant fleet could bring Comecon's invisible trade deficit into balance by 1980, but there would still remain the basic import bill of $20 billion to be covered by credits and export earnings.

Oil: The Ultimate Lubricant?

All the above measures will not, in themselves, be adequate to enable Eastern Europe to finance an annual import bill of $20 billion from the West by 1980; this region is therefore faced with the need for very substantial credits. Provision of huge credits by the West is clearly the crucial factor in the Comecon members' efforts to import the equipment and know-how required in order to develop the production of exports needed to repay such credits and—as they hope—to yield incremental returns at home. In the case of the USSR, much of the Western investment credits would go toward production of oil, natural gas, and metal ores.[30] For the other European

[28] Only at present prices is it efficient for the Soviet Union to mine its gold. See the author's appendix on this topic in D. Lloyd-Jacobs and P. Fells, *Gold 1971*, New York, Walter & Co., 1971, pp. 146-216, and *Gold 1972*, Consolidated Gold Fields, London, 1972, pp. 18-27.

[29] Soviet commercial debt to the West at the outset of 1973 may have totaled as much as $5 billion (including extraordinary Soviet convertible-currency purchases of $2.86 billion during 1972) according to an estimate by P. Hanson in *Financial Times* (London), Feb. 6, 1973. In addition, the October 1972 agreement between the USSR and the US stipulated annual reimbursements from the Soviet Union of $26 million to repay Lend-Lease debts—contingent upon American granting of most-favored-nation treatment.

[30] In 1972 the Soviet Union did increase its exports of copper from 174,000 tons in 1971 to 202,000 tons; of aluminum from 406,000 to 455,000 tons; of cadmium from 869,000 to 1,338,000 tons; of magnesium from 14,800 to 19,900 tons; and of crude petroleum and associated products from 105 million to 107 million tons (see *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 17, April 1973, pp. 20-21). However, deliveries would have to be sharply accelerated if such exports were to finance a major expansion of imports.

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members of Comecon, the investment would be in the modernization of industrial capacity to produce manufactures competitive in Western markets.

The exploitation of Soviet oil and gas for export—chiefly to the United States, West Germany and Japan—is without doubt the touchstone of the ability of Comecon to finance an augmented list of imports from the West. If the deals now under discussion with the Soviet authorities become operative, the climate will have been created for the enlargement of other facilities, again with Western credits and technology, for the exploitation of other mineral resources and for joint ventures in manufacturing. Much of course depends on assurance that oil and gas will actually be available to Western purchasers in large quantities. J. P. Hardt has already surveyed in these pages the significant risks involved in the Soviet gamble on Siberian oil and gas and the competing demands of Comecon and domestic Soviet claimants on this vital resource.[31] While the present author views as too high the projection of internal Soviet demand for oil made by W. Gumpel (favored by Hardt in his article),[32] mere maintenance of deliveries to Comecon at present levels would hardly allow the Soviet Union to expand sales to convertible-currency markets above current levels, barring major new investments in production and transmission facilities.[33] The argument is, of course, circular. Without the promise of expanded production, the USSR is not likely to obtain large credits; without large credits, major expansion of production is not feasible. The recent "Energy Message" of the President of the United States to Congress has voiced approval of US investment in Siberian oil and gas, and agreements of intent have been concluded by the USSR with two groups of American firms for exploitation of gas in East and West Siberia. On the other hand, some US observers have voiced concern over the danger of the US becoming dependent on Soviet fuel.[34] It is not yet clear if or when the West will advance the billions of dollars in credits required. Much hangs in the balance: Soviet participation in world trade, the expansion of East-West exchanges in general, and even—given the crucial role of raw material and energy supplies—the viability of the international economy.

[31] See *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1973, pp. 25-36.

[32] See Gumpel's *Energiepolitik in der Sowjetunion*, Cologne, 1970, and *Aussenpolitik* (Hamburg), No. 11, 1971.

[33] The USSR has for some five years been warning its East European partners to seek hydrocarbon fuel from other sources, but it seems rather unlikely that Moscow would reduce its current level of deliveries, particularly in light of the major enlargement of the Friendship Pipeline connecting the USSR with Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary and Poland, and construction of another line across Romania to Bulgaria.

[34] See, for example, the testimony of Robert E. Hunter in House of Representatives, US Congress, *Hearings of the Sub-Committee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, October 1972.

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China's Quest for Technology

By William W. Whitson

Although foreign trade is only a small component of the Gross National Product of the People's Republic of China (China's exports are only about two percent of GNP), the importance of its role in national economic development has compelled the Chinese leaders to give special attention to that sector. Historically, China's choice of trading partners, as well as the makeup of her overseas trade, has frequently been governed as much by political factors, both internal and international, as by economic factors. Therefore, in the current context of burgeoning "East-West" trade, it becomes pertinent to examine what those political and economic factors are and how they are likely to influence China's trade policies vis-à-vis non-Communist countries, especially with respect to the import of advanced industrial technology, which is of crucial importance to China's development. What considerations will constrain or encourage Chinese importation of foreign technology in the rest of the 1970's? And what influences are likely to condition Chinese choices among different types or levels of technology and among available non-Communist sources of supply?

The answers to these questions must necessarily be general. Nevertheless, in response to the first question, one can identify three fundamental factors that appear likely to condition China's reliance on foreign technology in the current decade: 1) the availability of exportable surpluses to offset imports; 2) the availability of foreign exchange (*i.e.*, reserves plus credits); and 3) internal power politics and the prevailing philosophy of economic development among China's civil and military leaders. Of these three factors, the past history of the People's Republic suggests that it is the last which is likely to be the dominant determinant of China's trade strategy. Therefore, let us examine that factor first.

Mr. Whitson is Director of China Studies at the Rand Corporation and editor of a forthcoming book, Doing Business With China, *to be published by Praeger Publishers, New York.*

The "Two-Lines" Controversy

Outside of a small circle of China specialists, the "controversy over two lines" that has gone on in China since the late 1950's is either a total unknown or a matter of merely academic interest. Yet it has considerable immediate and practical relevance for foreign business interests—particularly suppliers of advanced technology—who assign commercial significance to the China market; for their ability to estimate that market and obtain their share of it will depend to a considerable degree on their sensitivity to cyclical shifts in the controversy and the implications of such shifts for China's trade strategy.

What, then, is the "controversy over two lines"? At the highest level of abstraction, it involves fundamental questions of political and economic goals and the best administrative style for achieving them. During the course of the PRC's First Five-Year Plan (1952-57) and throughout the 1960's, two mutually opposed viewpoints gradually evolved among China's new leaders. The subordinate policy and program components of each viewpoint seem to have acquired a certain internal intellectual and economic consistency between 1958 and 1962, but by the late 1960's various political interest groups had become so closely affiliated with one viewpoint or the other that intellectual consistency was less important than the alignment of political forces. As a consequence, the temporary ascendancy of one coalition or another could determine major shifts in economic development (as well as military) strategy, weapons acquisition policy, educational

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policy, and political power distribution (as between central and lower-level authority). In a broad sense, China had developed a sort of two-party system in which each party had acquired a distinctive platform as well as a network of formal and informal allies. This concept may seem perfectly natural to most Americans, but it flies in the face of the common notion among China specialists that Chairman Mao has been a personal dictator. It also refutes the notion that his game plan for China has never deviated.

Differences in intellectual and administrative approaches to problem-solving lie at the heart of the two-lines controversy. Whether for reasons of long-term personal background and experience in the Communist movement or because of short-term political expediency, former Chairman of the Republic Liu Shao-ch'i preferred to approach problems armed with "bourgeois" principles of costs/returns expressed in *quantifiable* terms. From such a "conservative" systems-analytical viewpoint, a program should or should not be undertaken only after measuring and weighing its costs and returns against those of other options for achieving the same, relatively finite goal. Furthermore, estimates of costs/returns and optimal administrative style should be made by a well-trained elite; *i.e.*, by party cadres or, in the PLA, by military professionals. In contrast, Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung preferred to approach problems armed with "Marxist-Leninist" principles of costs/returns measured in *ideological* terms. From such a "radical" viewpoint, material goals were less important than a program's effect on social values; therefore, any program should or should not be undertaken only after weighing its effectiveness from the standpoint of altering traditional prejudices and precedents against the effectiveness of other alternatives. Such an estimate could best be made by using "the mass line"—that is, by sending party or military ideologues ("commissars") to learn from the masses, the peasantry in particular.[1]

In brief, Liu's priority goal was clothing bodies; Mao's was saving souls. Between the banker and the priest, a conflict over goals and means would inevitably invade every field where the question of resource allocations had to be decided. In the field of economic development, Liu's primary goal was economic growth; hence *production* should be in command. Perhaps more flexible in his definition of goals, Mao wished to transform the long-term motivations and values of human beings, even at the cost of their short-term physical well-being; therefore, *politics* should be in command.

Just as Mao believed in struggle, Liu believed in routine and the method of "a gentle breeze and a light rain." As Mao's faith lay in "the peasant masses" of rural China, Liu's lay in the educated elite of urban China. Mao's egalitarian "mass line" contrasted with Liu's elitism as expressed in the latter's September 1964 statement that "to unite 95 percent of the cadres is a precondition for uniting 95 percent of the masses."[2]

With respect to the pace of change, Mao wished to dare, to make leaps, to rebel against the restraints of tradition and precedent. Liu wished to move more cautiously, to proceed with careful calculations of the trade-offs involved in different options. In Liu's view, only well-trained party cadres could be counted upon to exercise the requisite self-restraint and discipline. In Mao's view, the party was dispensable if it became obstructive of the social goals that he wished to attain for the masses.

Conflicts in Key Areas

Such were the fundamental differences between the two lines with respect to intellectual and administrative approaches to problem-solving. Let us turn now to the concrete, practical expressions of these differences in three key areas involved in contemporary Chinese economic development: economic planning and administration; the interpretation of the principle of "self-reliance"; and the role of foreign trade and the importation of foreign technology.

In the realm of planning, Liuists preferred to concentrate the formulation of economic (and probably military) plans at the national level, thus retaining broad policy-making responsibility at the center, while decentralizing supervision of plan execution to the regional and provincial levels. In this way, plans for regional economic development would be made to tie in with plans for regional defense. Moreover, decentralization of supervision should not be carried so far as to encourage wasteful dupli-

[1] For an excellent analysis of the influence of urban *vs.* rural origins and experience on Liu Shao-ch'i and Mao Tse-tung, respectively, see Stuart Schram, "Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i, 1939-1969" in *Asian Survey* (Berkeley), April 1972.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 291.

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cation and autarky at the village or even the county level. Liuist professionals thus had a clear notion of a central plan serving as a set of national goals and as a blueprint for the detailed, integrated development of regional economies and defense systems under the immediate supervision of regional authority. Conversely, the ideologues of Maoist populism argued for a much more pervasive decentralization of both planning and implementation down to the level of the rural commune (comprising several villages with an aggregate population of perhaps 24,000) and the urban industrial plant.[3]

The implications of the foregoing for the two camps' differing interpretations of "self-reliance" are obvious. The Liuist systems-analyst would perceive and seek advantages of scale. He might divide China into about ten major economic regions, possibly coterminous with the borders of the military regions (of which there are 11 in 1973—see accompanying map). For greater economic as well as defense efficiency, regional economic planners (presumably including defense mobilization planners in military-regional headquarters and civil and military planners on provincial party committees) would be urged to aim at "self-reliance" in all sectors of the economy—agriculture, light industry, and heavy industry. This would not be a license, however, for wasteful county- or even provincial-level duplication of production in defiance of rudimentary principles of comparative advantage. On the other hand, the Maoists—in keeping with their belief in the superior force of motivation and their distrust of bureaucratic routinization—came to preach the virtues of "self-reliance" at the lowest levels of production and defense—a viewpoint which tended to foster a potentially wasteful autarky at the commune and county levels of administration.[4]

In the field of international economic policy, the Liuists, adhering to the same basic principles, could be expected to welcome foreign trade and, more particularly, the importation of foreign technology for the purpose of furthering rapid heavy-industrial (especially military-related) development under central control. If imports promised to promote the early fulfillment of centrally-planned goals for both national and regional development, they were disposed not to reject foreign technology on ideological grounds. The Maoists, on the other hand, were impelled by their own conception of "self-reliance" toward a nativistic rejection of foreign technology, particularly since it would be only marginally digestible in the predominantly rural-agricultural Chinese economy.

(It may be useful at this point to digress for a moment in order to take note of the practical constraints on China's ability either to export or to import. Since China's exports have historically been concentrated in agricultural and raw-material surpluses, her export capability—regardless of her desire for imported foreign technology—has necessarily been dependent on the food/population equation. When food production has failed to keep pace with population growth, China's exportable surpluses, and consequently her ability to import foreign technology, machinery and plants, have been correspondingly restricted. It is now clear that a large part of China's imports of technology from the USSR and other advanced industrial economies after 1950 was financed by Chinese exports to less-developed Third World countries.[5] Had China been willing to finance imports with long-term foreign debt, the process of technology transfer might not have been so constrained by the performance of the agricultural sector. Nevertheless, many economists have praised the Chinese leaders for avoiding the debt-ridden development strategy adopted by other less-developed countries such as India, Egypt and Pakistan.[6] The prospects for the survival of that policy will be considered in the concluding section of this article.)

In any event, it has been shown in the foregoing discussion that there were clear-cut differences between the two ideological lines and their practical expressions in the developmental and technology-import strategies of the two rival camps. Let us now turn to a review of the cyclical shifts in these strategies paralleling shifts in the political fortunes of the opposing camps between 1949 and 1972. For this purpose, China's domestic political and economic


[3] The author is grateful to Professor Jürgen Domes for calling this point of divergence to his attention. Its relevance to the fields of both military and economic resource planning and supervision is not coincidental but reflects the conflicting "style" of the two lines.

[4] This Maoist position came to full fruition in 1958 with the Great Leap Forward.

[5] For details on Chinese trade with Third World countries, see chapter by K.C. Yeh in W. Whitson, Ed., *Doing Business with China; American Opportunities for Trade in the 1970's*, to be published this year by Praeger, New York.

[6] See, for example, Arthur G. Ashbrook, Jr., "China: Economic Policy and Economic Results, 1949-71," in *People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment*, A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1972, pp. 3-51. (Hereafter cited as *Economic Assessment*.)

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
SOURCES: Adapted by William J. Wilson from maps in Parris Chang, "Peking and the Provinces: Decentralization of Power," Problems of Communism, July-August 1972, p. 85, and Robert Michael Field, "Chinese Industrial Development," in Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1972, p. 72.

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development from the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949 through 1972 may be conveniently divided into six periods, as briefly summarized in the following sections.

The Reconstruction Period: 1949-53

During the four-year period from October 1949 through the summer of 1953 and the truce in the Korean War, Chinese leaders were far more concerned with meeting day-to-day crises connected with the rehabilitation of a decimated economy than they were with alternative development strategies. Apart from imposing a confiscatory and brutal land-reform program, they accepted a remarkable array of non-Communist techniques, both private and public, in order to preserve economic stability in the midst of a major foreign war, and they temporarily deferred the pursuit of ideological goals.



The Chinese freighter "Xinghua" unloads bales of bed feathers on a Hamburg dock.

—Photo by Karl Greiser.

The principal form of technology transfer during this period was in the military sphere, with the USSR as the chief source of supply. By the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan in 1953, 70 percent of China's foreign trade was with the Communist bloc, and trade had more than doubled from $830 million in 1949 to $1.89 billion in 1952.[7] By the end of the period, many idle factories had been returned to production, the land was again being cultivated, and central authority had assumed control over all foreign trade. To some degree, all these achievements were spurred by the Chinese leaders' perception of an external military threat.

The First Five-Year Plan: 1953-57

Deeply influenced by the Soviet developmental model and by the growing army of Soviet civil and military advisers who poured into China from 1950 to 1960, Liuist planners designed China's First Five-Year Plan in 1952 and started its implementation before the end of the Korean War in 1953.[8] Like their Soviet counterparts, these planners wished to accent capital formation at the highest possible rate by channeling a maximum portion of available surpluses into heavy industrial development, and they adopted the principle that "local industry" (*i.e.*, administered by provincial and lower-level authority) should use small-scale, locally available, labor-intensive techniques and relatively low-quality resources which would be of little use to the modernizing heavy industrial sector under exclusive central control.[9] Such local industry, largely divorced from the benefits of imported foreign technology, would be responsible for supplying most of the needs of the rural agricultural population for both producer and consumer goods, while precious foreign technology and high-quality materials and manpower would be reserved for the development of heavy industry. As a result of these policies, local industry unrelated to centrally-controlled large-scale industry not only received little support from the central budget but

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[8] For an excellent comparison of Soviet and Chinese strategies of economic development, see K.C. Yeh, "Soviet and Communist Chinese Industrialization Strategies," Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corporation, 1965.

[9] For an amplification of this principle in action during the First Five-Year Plan, see Carl Riskin, "Small Industry and The Chinese Model of Development," in *China Quarterly* (London), April-June 1971, pp. 245-73.

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also received only minimal investment resources from provincial authority during the last three years of the First Five-Year Plan (1955-57). In Kwangtung Province, for example, industries of national importance operated by central agencies received about 68 percent of provincial capital investment, leaving only 32 percent for local industry.[10]

With respect to planning responsibility, the Liuist preference for centralism can be seen in the fact that, between 1950 and 1956, the center provided 84 percent of all budgetary resources for economic construction, the provinces providing only 16 percent.[11] It should also be noted that even provincial investment programs appeared to favor construction of large factories in traditional urban centers rather than the establishment of smaller factories dispersed to smaller urban districts and rural areas.

Further, the strategy of the First Five-Year Plan clearly called for major imports of foreign technology. In addition to the acquisition of military end-items, the Chinese adopted the "turnkey" approach, signing agreements with the Russians for the importation and construction of 300 whole plants valued at about $3 billion between 1953 and 1967.[12] The schedule called for a progression from fuel-producing plants to more complicated factories producing heavy industrial machinery and armaments. By 1960, about half of the scheduled plants had been completed.

The Great Leap: 1958-60

Approximately one year prior to the start of the Great Leap experiment, it must have become clear to China's planners and political leaders alike that the Soviet model and the Liuist "line" needed revision. Agricultural growth was lagging behind industrial growth to such a degree that marketed grain for the year 1956-57 was at the same level as for 1953-54, and local authorities were receiving voluminous complaints about neglect of the needs of the agricultural sector. Since agricultural surpluses were the principal source of foreign exchange to pay for foreign technology, it was clear that something had to be done to aid rural production.

The ensuing elaboration of the Great Leap was probably a Maoist initiative in direct opposition to the previous Liuist style of managing the economy. Reflecting Maoist faith in mass initiative, the Great Leap discarded Liuist principles of economies of scale, of disciplined, centralized state planning and control of the national and regional economies, and of reliance on professional expertise, substituting instead dispersion of authority, local self-reliance and nativism—the blooming of common sense at the commune and lower levels.

It is easy to blame the disaster which befell the Chinese economy after 1958-59 on the Maoist philosophy of economic development. Yet one must recognize that the pre-1958 Liuist emphasis on capital formation under central control had neglected vast human and low-quality material and productive resources available in the countryside (mainly handicraft and petty consumer goods production). If a revision of the Liuist approach could mobilize these resources more effectively, inspire peasant initiative, and increase agricultural production, conceivably both Liuist production objectives and Maoist ideological goals might be achieved. Thus a compromise strategy which would make maximum use of traditional as well as modern resource inputs and production techniques must have been appealing to planners in both schools of thought until the abrupt withdrawal of Soviet specialists in the summer of 1960, coupled with poor harvests, dramatized the failures of the Great Leap in terms of falling agricultural production, inability to import technology, and a serious drop in capital formation.

These failures were, in large part, bureaucratic in nature. The Maoist philosophy of economic development through "revolution from below" prompted the award of a large degree of local financial and planning initiative to inexperienced commune leaders, who promptly adopted schemes to maximize commune *profits* rather than to support basic agricultural *needs* for tools, labor and fertilizers.[13] At the same time, the center issued inappropriate and ill-advised directives calling for deep plowing and close planting regardless of local conditions.

Thanks in part to the bumper harvest of 1958, achieved while the communes were still in the formative stage, 1959 brought the highest level of foreign trade since 1949 ($4.29 billion), a level that would not again be reached until 1971.[14]

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 251.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 252.

[12] See Ashbrook, *loc. cit.*, pp. 17 *ff.* and Robert Michael Field, "Chinese Industrial Development: 1949-70," in *Economic Assessment*, pp. 61 ff.

[13] For examples, see Riskin, *loc. cit.*, p. 260.

[14] See Ashbrook, *loc. cit.*, p. 5.

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Nearly 70 percent of that trade was still with the Communist countries, principally the USSR, and turnkey projects remained the favored mode of importing Soviet technology, which the Chinese hoped to pay for out of the increased agricultural surpluses expected to result from the formation of the communes and the Great Leap.

By the winter of 1960-61, however, agricultural production had fallen 25 percent below the level of 1958, and starvation struck wide areas of China. This not only precipitated political crises in many of the stricken areas but also aroused doubts about the reliability of the PLA, whose soldiers were restive over the bad news coming from home. At the same time, Moscow's decision to withdraw Soviet technicians from China dealt a severe blow to industrial development plans.

While the Soviet decision was prompted by a variety of reasons, Maoist-inspired expressions of disdain for foreign technology must have played an important role.[15] In the context of Maoist ideological faith in the greater value of "redness" over that of expertise, party-trained Chinese factory managers often ignored or disputed the indicated stress-limits on Soviet-supplied machinery or attempted to simplify or improve on the Soviet equipment, frequently with disastrous results. Such experiences undoubtedly helped bring about the 1960 withdrawal of 1,200 Russian technicians, which stopped most plant construction and reduced production in many plants already built.

Rehabilitation: 1961-65

The next four years constituted a period of rehabilitation marked by a revival of Liuist economic development concepts of pace and managerial style in an effort to get the economy back on an even keel after the misadventures of the Great Leap. There was a recentralization of industrial planning responsibility in the hands of experienced professional authorities at the national and regional levels, and the autarkic competencies invested in the communes under the Great Leap with respect to the initiation and financing of local industrial and commercial projects were returned to higher-level organs more capable of perceiving potential economies of scale. On the other hand, responsibility for day-to-day planning decisions in agriculture was decentralized downward from the communes to the intermediate-level production brigades and basic-level production teams. There were, however, two major shifts in developmental policy in comparison with the pre-1958 period. First, central and provincial planners began allocating larger shares of industrial production (*i.e.*, fertilizers, pesticides, tractors, trucks, and other equipment) to agriculture under a new policy of "walking on two legs" in place of the previous concentration of resources in heavy-industrial development. Second, in the military industrial sector, the planners embarked on a major research and development effort in nuclear weapons.

While Maoists continued during this period to publicize slogans designed to inspire the masses, Liuist bureaucrats worked desperately to reverse the downward spiral of production. Many Great Leap factories were closed down, and their resources and labor were restored to more productive activities. Still, it was not until 1964 that the indices of industrial and agricultural production returned to the levels of 1958. The sharp shift in policies in the period further clarified the differences between the Liuist and Maoist lines and served to confirm the preferences of each faction with regard to the economic, military-strategic, and distribution-of-power implications of its own line.

In the particular area of foreign technology acquisition, the 1961-65 period brought two major policy changes. The first was a shift away from whole-plant imports. In contrast to the 1950's, which had heavily accented turnkey projects, the early 1960's saw the importation of only about 30 plants in all (see accompanying chart). Instead, because of the lack of foreign exchange, it was decided to switch to the acquisition of foreign technology via the slower but less costly method of purchasing information and prototypes—this to be coupled with reliance on Chinese production engineers to adapt such imports to Chinese technical and production skills. There was also to be increased emphasis on domestic research and development.

Although the evidence is unclear, this new strategy of technology acquisition appears to have been applied selectively with a view to achieving major advances in a few industries—*i.e.*, machine tools, petroleum refining, chemical fertilizers, and advanced weapons production. At the same time, however, Chinese purchasing missions evinced interest in a wide range of technology, apparently in

[15] For examples of such disdain, see Rensselaer W. Lee III, "The Politics of Technology in Communist China," in *Comparative Politics* (New York), January 1973, pp. 241, *ff.*

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
order to fill in gaps in their files of information. Their negotiations with potential and actual foreign suppliers also reflected an effort to compare quality among competing lines and to become familiar with different "generations" of foreign products in order to enable Chinese planners to select the technology best suited to a particular Chinese industry at a particular stage of development. These policies necessitated a stretching out of production goals, but they permitted the acquisition of prototypes and the updating of Chinese technological knowledge at relatively low cost in foreign exchange (and agricultural surpluses).

The second major change in the Chinese strategy of technology acquisition was a shift from Communist to West European and Japanese sources of supply. As the Sino-Soviet conflict intensified, China's trade with the Communist bloc dropped from 56 percent of her total foreign trade in 1961 to 30 percent in 1965, while Chinese trade with non-Communist countries rose from 44.2 to 69.9 percent of total trade over the same interval (see Table 1). During this period, China maintained a sizable export surplus vis-à-vis the USSR in order to pay off her debt for previous imports of Soviet plants and equipment, and she restricted new purchases from the USSR largely to replacement and spare parts for the Soviet-built plants.[16]

[16] For a general review of Chinese trade from 1949 to 1971, see A.H. Usack and R.E. Batsavage, "The International Trade of the People's Republic of China," in *Economic Assessment*, pp. 335-71.

CHINA'S IMPORTS OF MACHINERY AND WHOLE PLANTS: 1952-72

(in millions of US dollars)



Note: Data for whole plant imports unavailable for 1972.

SOURCE: Chart developed by H. Heymann, of the Rand Corporation, from various published materials.

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Table 1: Chinese Trade with Communist and Non-Communist Countries, 1950-1970

(in millions of US dollars •)

	Total Trade			Communist Countries			Non-Communist Countries		
Year	Turnover	Exports	Imports	Total	Exports	Imports	Total	Exports	Imports
1950	1,210	620	590	350	210	140	860	410	450
1951	1,900	780	1,120	975	465	515	920	315	605
1952	1,890	875	1,015	1,315	605	710	575	270	305
1953	2,295	1,040	1,255	1,555	670	885	740	370	370
1954	2,350	1,060	1,290	1,735	765	970	615	295	320
1955	3,035	1,375	1,660	2,250	950	1,300	785	425	360
1956	3,120	1,635	1,485	2,055	1,045	1,010	1,065	590	475
1957	3,055	1,615	1,440	1,965	1,085	880	1,090	530	560
1958	3,765	1,940	1,825	2,380	1,280	1,100	1,385	660	725
1959	4,290	2,230	2,060	2,980	1,615	1,365	1,310	615	695
1960	3,990	1,960	2,030	2,620	1,335	1,285	1,370	625	745
1961	3,020	1,530	1,495	1,685	965	715	1,335	560	775
1962	2,675	1,525	1,150	1,410	915	490	1,265	605	660
1963	2,770	1,570	1,200	1,250	820	430	1,525	755	770
1964	3,220	1,750	1,470	1,100	710	390	2,120	1,040	1,080
1965	3,880	2,035	1,845	1,165	650	515	2,715	1,385	1,330
1966	4,245	2,210	2,035	1,090	585	505	3,155	1,625	1,530
1967	3,895	1,945	1,950	830	485	345	3,065	1,460	1,605
1968	3,765	1,945	1,820	840	500	340	2,925	1,445	1,480
1969	3,860	2,030	1,830	785	490	295	3,075	1,540	1,535
1970	4,220	2,050	2,170	825	480	345	3,395	1,570	1,825

• Rounded to the nearest $5 million. Because of rounding, components may not add up to the totals shown.

SOURCE: The table is taken from A. H. Usack and R. E. Batsavage, "The International Trade of the People's Republic of China," in *People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1972. Data are based on reports of China's trading partners and have been adjusted to show China's exports f.o.b. and China's imports c.i.f.

The Cultural Revolution: 1966-69

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) represented a major—and perhaps the last—effort by the Maoists to impose their economic development and national defense strategies on China. As during the Great Leap, the Maoist attempt to shift the center of gravity of decision-making authority over resource allocations and pace of development away from the central and upper-level bureaucracy down toward "the masses," and over defense away from the professional military hierarchy to the locally-organized militia (self-defense) forces, resulted in widespread disruption of established bureaucratic processes and a temporary setback to overall production.

Although the initial impact of the GPCR on the economy in 1966 was minimal, Red Guard seizures of factories and of local party and government offices during 1967-68 led to work stoppages, factory shutdowns, disruption of train schedules, and chaos in economic planning. As a consequence, industrial output dropped by about 20 percent in 1967 and remained depressed in 1968.[17] On the other hand, agricultural production—already operating under decentralized local authority and still fueled by private plots, private trade, and rural handicrafts—actually increased in 1967, and capital accumulation in the form of new plants continued almost unabated, with the result that excess plant capacity was available by the end of the GPCR in 1969.

The relatively moderate economic impact of the GPCR was due in large part to the fact that the excesses of the Maoist Red Guards swiftly set in motion opposing forces of Liuist persuasion, both civilian and military. Chou En-lai's priority interest in production and rational planning found repeated expression in warnings to the Red Guards to stay away from factories and defense-related facilities—

[17] For details, see Ashbrook, *loc cit.*, p. 27.

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warnings which for a time they refused to heed, to their later regret. There is, indeed, good reason to believe that Chou's professional sympathies had been aligned with Liuist economic and military management philosophy since the early 1930's, but his keen political judgment alerted him to the need for compromise between the two lines in the 1960's, even if such compromise might mean a temporary setback for the economy.

In the field of foreign trade, the composition of China's imports shifted steadily during this period toward an increasing emphasis on manufactures, the share of such items in total imports rising from 27 percent in 1965 to 46 percent in 1969 (see Table 2). (This trend has continued since the end of the Cultural Revolution, with manufactures already exceeding 50 percent of total imports by 1970.) Reflecting the delayed economic impact of the Cul-

Table 2: Composition of China's Exports and Imports, 1965-1970

(in millions of US dollars •)

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
TOTAL EXPORTS	**2,035**	**2,210**	**1,945**	**1,945**	**2,030**	**2,050**
Foodstuffs	530	615	510	535	615	645
Of which:						
Animals, meat, and fish	205	230	170	175	210	215
Grains	115	150	140	130	115	110
Fruit and vegetables	105	120	125	140	175	170
Crude materials, fuels, and edible oils	405	480	440	415	450	430
Of which:						
Oilseeds	80	90	90	85	75	65
Textile fibers	75	105	100	90	120	100
Crude animal materials	75	90	75	100	130	115
Chemicals	75	90	85	85	90	105
Manufactures	915	920	850	850	820	860
Of which:						
Textile yarn and fabric	295	305	250	270	310	340
Clothing	190	185	170	180	195	155
Iron and steel	85	90	70	25	35	40
Nonferrous metals	40	40	35	25	35	25
Other	110	105	60	60	55	10
TOTAL IMPORTS	**1,845**	**2,035**	**1,950**	**1,820**	**1,830**	**2,170**
Foodstuffs	520	510	380	410	350	355
Of which: Grain	400	400	295	305	260	280
Crude materials, fuels, and edible oils	375	340	320	300	310	360
Of which:						
Rubber	70	85	75	85	145	80
Textile fiber	190	150	150	100	90	110
Chemicals	230	250	285	315	310	330
Of which: Fertilizer	145	155	200	200	205	230
Manufactures	695	910	945	775	850	1,115
Of which:						
Textile yarn and fabric	40	35	45	40	30	45
Iron and steel	145	225	325	265	275	390
Nonferrous metals	50	55	85	125	225	210
Machinery and equipment	330	455	380	275	240	395
Other	25	25	20	20	10	10

• Rounded to the nearest $5 million.

SOURCE: This table combines two tables from A. H. Usack and R. E. Batsavage, "The International Trade of the People's Republic of China," in *People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1972. Data are based on reports of China's trading partners. Where data are incomplete, estimates have been made on the basis of fragmentary information from trade agreements and press reports and of commodity breakdowns available for earlier years.

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tural Revolution, imports of machinery and equipment peaked at $455 million, or 22.3 percent of total imports, in 1966, but thereafter declined steadily to $240 million, or 13 percent of total imports, in 1969, before recovering to $395 million, or 18 percent of total imports, in 1970. Throughout the period, as indicated by the chart on p. 23, imports of whole plants remained at an insignificant level relative to imports of machinery.

Post-Cultural Revolution: 1969-72

As China left the Cultural Revolution behind, there was a new shift in developmental philosophy on the core issue of the locus of planning authority. To capsulize the evolution that had thus far taken place in this regard, it can be said that the Liuist line in favor of centralized planning *from above* predominated in the years up to 1958 and again during the 1961-65 period of rehabilitation following the Great Leap fiasco, and that the opposing Maoist line calling for heavier reliance on initiative *from below* held sway during the Great Leap and GPCR periods. More specifically, planning authority in the periods of Liuist dominance tended, for the most part, to be centered in the Peking bureaucracy, while the Great Leap and GPCR intervals of temporary Maoist supremacy witnessed attempts to shift the primary locus of planning down to the commune level or below.

The new shift that has developed in the post-Cultural Revolution period appears, in essence, to be one that can best be characterized as a "Chouist" compromise that leans more toward the Liuist than the Maoist line—a compromise whereby certain limited areas of planning have reverted to the center while the rest remain decentralized, but only down to the regional and provincial rather than the commune level. Summing up the situation as it appeared to him in 1970, a Czech observer remarked:

. . . the Chinese economy is divided into two sectors. The first, comparatively centralized, deals with research and production for military purposes; the second sector, which serves the basic requirements of the workers, is strongly decentralized and largely runs on the principles of self-reliance.[18]

Thus, while the center retains exclusive decision-making authority over special armaments production and technological research and development of a defense character, such authority with respect to steel production, coal and iron production, financial and general developmental planning seems to have shifted from the State Planning Commission and ministries under the State Council to the regional and provincial levels. As evidence of this downward shift of authority, Chou En-lai told Edgar Snow in December 1970 that only 10,000 cadres then manned central agencies as compared to some 60,000 before the GPCR.[19]

The expanded role of the regional/provincial authorities in economic planning and decision-making has led an expert British observer to liken the post-GPCR Chinese economy to a system of highly protectionist states, each seeking to minimize inter-regional imports and push exports.[20] The new entrepreneurs of this "cellular" system are the commercial departments at the regional and provincial levels, which seem to be the new locuses of business management expertise and of power to negotiate. The same analyst writes:

China forms a Customs Union but not a Common Market. This is to say, the whole country has a common trade barrier against the outside world, but does not have free trade within its national boundaries. . . . In the long run, [however,] technological modernization may be expected to break down the cellular nature of the economy . . . through the spread of the economic influence of the major industrial centers into their hinterlands as they seek to widen their markets and provide themselves with raw materials.[21]

If this picture of the Chinese economy is approximately accurate, it has important implications for China's foreign trade. It suggests that the central government must depend upon the regional economies to generate the requisite surpluses of textiles, foodstuffs, light manufactures, and raw materials which can be funneled through the central trade organs into export channels, principally to Third World and other non-Communist countries, in order to obtain foreign exchange to pay for imports of equipment, machinery, and advanced technology

[18] Quoted in Audrey Donnithorne, "China's Cellular Economy: Some Economic Trends Since the Cultural Revolution," *China Quarterly*, October-December 1972, p. 605.

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 611.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 619.

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for the military-industrial sector, mainly from Western Europe and Japan, with both of which China carries substantial trade deficits. By 1970 (see Table 1), no less than 80 percent of China's total trade was with non-Communist countries, and of the total $1.8 billion of Chinese imports from non-Communist sources in that year, $1.26 billion, or 70 percent, came from Western Europe ($660 million) and Japan ($600 million). An even larger proportion of China's imports of foreign technology evidently came from these same sources, with Western Europe and Japan sharing about equally in supplying *all* of China's 1970 imports of machinery and equipment from non-Communist sources, aggregating $255 million.[22] Japan alone supplied 30 percent of China's total 1970 imports of machinery and equipment, as well as 64 percent of her steel and iron imports and 42 percent of her imports of fertilizer.

Chinese Policies in the 1970's

Thus far, we have surveyed the impact of cyclical swings in the two-lines controversy on the organization and strategy of development in the PRC, with particular reference to Chinese policies governing the import of foreign technology. In the light of this survey and of the approach that the Chinese leadership appears to be taking in the current policy phase since the end of the Cultural Revolution, we can now return to the questions posed at the outset of this article: What factors will constrain or encourage Chinese importation of foreign technology in the 1970's? And what influences are likely to condition Chinese choices among alternative sources of supply and among different types or levels of available technology?

The answer to the first question will necessarily depend, in the first instance, on China's readiness and, more important, her capacity to expand her foreign trade in general. Chou En-lai's remarkably successful campaign since 1970 to broaden China's diplomatic contacts and potential overseas trade openings would suggest that the readiness is there. However, on the basis of the record of the past 20 years, most analysts believe that the future volume of China's external trade will be constrained by the determination of her leaders to keep imports and exports in annual balance so as to avoid long-

[22] See Usack and Batsavage, *loc. cit.*, p. 358.



Chinese journalists observe American technology at a Ford assembly line in Chicago in June 1973.

—Photo by UPI.

term foreign debt.[23] If, indeed, such a policy is adhered to, it could impose a major restriction on China's import capability inasmuch as population growth may absorb all or most of the increased output of exportable agricultural products and light manufactures as fast as their production can be expanded. China's meager reserves of foreign exchange (which may perhaps have reached $1 billion, including both gold and foreign currency, by the end of 1972[24]) obviously would not permit imports much in excess of the value of China's exports for any prolonged period of time.

Should such factors impose serious constraints on China's capacity to import, the rate of growth of her overall foreign trade could be as low as three percent per year, or slightly less than her estimated long-term GNP growth rate of four percent annually.[25] At that rate, China's total foreign trade might amount to between $5.5 and $6 billion annually by 1980, with imports and exports presumably in approximate balance at a level somewhere between $2.75 and $3 billion.

As to the sources of China's imports, if we assume that the proportion of total Chinese trade conducted with non-Communist countries continues

[23] See, *e.g.*, *ibid.*, p. 365.

[24] See *ibid.*, p. 341, for an analysis of China's foreign exchange situation through 1970.

[25] For this estimate, see Ashbrook, *loc. cit.*, p. 39.

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at the current 80-percent level, this would mean a level of imports from non-Communist sources of $2.2 to $2.4 billion by 1980. If we assume further that Chinese central authority will continue to adhere rigidly to the rule of not depending on any single foreign source for more than 25 percent of China's imports, the PRC may be expected by 1980 to be obtaining roughly equivalent shares of its imports from Western Europe, Japan, and the United States, at a level of between $550 and $600 million from each. This, of course, would be conditional upon the ability of the US to gain a share of the Chinese market commensurate with those of Japan and Western Europe, whose respective exports to China had already reached or passed the $600-million level by 1970, as pointed out earlier. Given Japanese estimates in late 1972[26] that Sino-Japanese trade should at least double before the end of the decade (to perhaps $3 billion in Japanese exports by 1977), it appears certain that competition for the China market among West European, Japanese and US exporters will be extremely keen, and that China's imports from these sources will achieve at least the levels suggested above—that is, unless trade growth should be interrupted by a recurrence of serious internal political conflict on the scale of the Great Leap and Cultural Revolution periods.

The Impact of Regionalism

Within these general parameters, however, the extent to which the new regionalism now taking shape in China erodes central authority and control over economic planning, over trade policy and the foreign trade apparatus, and over the disposition of major foreign-exchange reserves may well prove to be a much more important determinant of Chinese choices among different types of technology and competing foreign sources of supply than such factors as price, quality, or fear of excessive dependence on a single outside source. How far, then, is the current trend toward regionalism likely to go?

So far as the central leadership is concerned, present political-military power realities within China would seem to confirm the mid-term viability of Chou's compromise formula for China's development—a formula which appears to leave to regional authority a wide measure of initiative and responsibility for planning and managing the development of regional economies of scale while reserving to the center close control over those sectors of the economy of particular importance to national security and defense, including foreign trade. With respect to trade and the acquisition of foreign technology, it seems clear that Chouist planners have no real commitment to Maoist-style autarky. Indeed, Chou may well be expected to rely heavily on foreign trade and imports of technology, under tight central control, as a bargaining instrument not only for "buying off" regional opposition to the present central leadership but also for assuring acceptance by regional military and civil leaders of an eventual successor regime in Peking without disruptive domestic political conflict.

Chou must therefore be especially sensitive to the goals and values of powerful regional leaders; but at the same time he cannot afford to permit the advantages for national defense of decentralized economic planning and production, or the advantages of regional economies of scale, to lead to an excessive concentration of power at the regional level that would rob central authority of the power to mobilize military and economic resources for the common good. This is to say, he must avoid at all costs a degree of "regionalism"—not to mention any form of local "warlordism"—that would paralyze the center in the face of both internal and external threats to the regime's survival after Mao's death.

In light of these considerations, the leaders at the center may be expected to exert every effort to retain control of the foreign trade apparatus and especially of the selection, importation, and allocation of advanced foreign technology, embracing both prototype and whole-plant imports. In part, the center would wish to retain such control in order to be able to coordinate the development of China's most advanced weapons systems dependant to some extent on foreign technology; in part, it would be motivated by recognition of the domestic political utility of such control for the purpose of manipulating the regime's most powerful regional allies and/or adversaries.

Nevertheless, the increased economic authority of the regional administrations, especially in non-defense sectors, seems bound to have important repercussions in the sphere of foreign trade. For example, will regional economic planners and administrators now find ways of negotiating directly with

[26] See Selig S. Harrison, "China and Japan: The New Asian Partnership," *The Washington Post*, March 4, 1973, p. B-5. Harrison's article cited estimates by Japan's International Trade Promotion Association predicting a two-way trade of $5 billion with China by 1977.

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A Boeing 707 aircraft, first of 10 ordered by the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), pictured in mid-1973 after being painted. The Chinese characters stand for CAAC.

—Photo by Boeing Commercial Aviation Company.

foreign suppliers? Will foreign technicians again be welcomed (as in the 1950's) by Chinese end-users to discuss import specifications? Will foreign businessmen be accorded increased opportunities to move freely about China and meet with local planners and plant managers in order to assess local and regional markets for foreign products not related to defense?

Obviously, we can only guess at answers to these questions. For the most part, foreign businessmen have been frustrated by their inability to deal directly with Chinese end-users for the purpose of reducing the time-lag between exposing a product to a state trading corporation official and receiving an answer about specific import requirements. In part, this lag resulted from a requirement that the technical opinion of the end-user be taken into consideration in the decision to import. Current trends in the procedures of China's central trade apparatus suggest that regional and provincial planners and end-users in nondefense sectors are likely to exert increasing influence over decisions concerning the specific types of foreign technology to be imported, the volume of such imports, etc.

At the same time, economic and technological arguments, as well as Chou En-lai's evident interest in the favorable domestic political implications of accelerated economic growth, seem likely to foster a liberalization of contacts between foreign traders (both exporters and importers) and local officials. From Peking's standpoint, such contacts might help to divert the attention of senior regional leaders away from the strengthening of local defense systems toward programs to step up the pace of economic growth and thus aid in solving one of China's gravest problems—providing employment for the country's youth. Chou must be especially conscious of the needs and desires of the growing numbers of young people, some 15 to 20 million of whom are joining the labor force annually.[27] To satisfy their expectations, China's economy must provide jobs or risk creating unacceptable frustration levels that might add fuel to potential political struggles among China's factional and regional leaders.

The Outlook

To sum up the main themes of the present discussion, it seems most likely that Chinese central authority, strongly influenced by the powerful military figures who presently surround Chou En-lai, and who are likely to retain political ascendancy throughout the decade, will focus its major attention on the uncertainties of the Asian security environment and keep a firm grip on control of the selection and purchase of foreign technology related

[27] For a recent analysis of China's population policy and problems, see John S. Aird, "Population Policy and Demographic Prospects in the People's Republic of China," in *Economic Assessment*, pp. 220-334.

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to national defense so as to coordinate development of the modern weapons sector. If this hypothesis holds true for the decade, we may expect the center to vary its expenditures for foreign defense-related technology between relatively cheap purchases of protoypes (*e.g.,* Spey jet engines, Boeing 707's, and solid-fuel technology) and more costly purchases of whole plants (*e.g.,* petroleum refineries, steel mills, and petrochemical facilities), the mix between the two depending upon the center's perception of the imminence of external danger, the availability of foreign exchange (through exports or long-term credits), and the willingness of foreign suppliers to sell the desired technology. If China's security is perceived to be immediately threatened, purchases of foreign technology are likely to focus on end-items instead of whole plants, and to the extent that the development of regional industry permits, the center will probably "import" from the regions "homemade" military technology, frequently adapted and simplified from more complex foreign prototypes.

On the other hand, the purchase and selection of foreign technology not related to defense seem likely to come increasingly under the purview of regional authority primarily concerned with local economic integration and development. As the regional economies and commercial departments, using their own local resources, gradually achieve their industrialization goals, the trend in Chinese imports of foreign nondefense technology may be expected to shift more and more away from turnkey projects toward "management technology" (*i.e.,* the application of systems-analytical concepts and equipment, most likely from the US) needed to rationalize an increasingly complex economy; toward modern American heavy-duty agricultural equipment, as well as "garden plot" Japanese equipment, needed to increase agricultural production; toward highway and railway construction equipment (and related rolling stock); and toward improved telecommunications systems.

In any case, foreign suppliers of technology outside the military sector are likely to find increasingly that they are not dealing with a single, integrated China market but rather with a complex variety of separate regional and even provincial markets managed by local authorities with substantial power to make their own choices as to what kinds of technology they desire and from what foreign suppliers to purchase them.

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Drug Abuse in Communist Europe

By David E. Powell

Along with the advantages which mankind has gained from the progress of civilization, there have been and are some harmful consequences as well. Civilization has produced an arrhythmia in the life of society, and radical changes in the way of life which have resulted in great health problems. . . . One of them is drug addiction. . . .

13. Maj. (Belgrade), January 1972, p. 29.

One of the major objectives of the East European Communist leaders has been to overtake the advanced Western states. *"Dogoniat i peregoniat Ameriku* [Catch up to and surpass America]!" a favorite slogan of Nikita Khrushchev, expressed this ambition succinctly. While Soviet and East European propaganda slogans are now a good deal less strident, the Communist drive to reach Western levels of production and consumption has remained.

It ironic to see that progress achieved in this effort has been accompanied by "successes" of a very different sort. While focusing their energies on matching Western levels of industrialization, consumption, education and health, the Communist regimes have also acquired some of the less desirable by-products of modernization—*e.g.*, environmental pollution, inadequate housing, crime and juvenile delinquency. And now, scientific progress, urbanization, increases in disposable income, greater leisure time, and commercial and cultural contacts abroad have produced still another problem in Eastern Europe—the problem of drug abuse.[1]

To be sure, drug dependence and drug abuse are not entirely new to the region. Opium poppies have long been grown in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the USSR, and there has always been some addiction among citizens of these countries. Indeed, when peasant mothers in what is now Czechoslovakia wished to work undisturbed, they often gave their babies empty poppy heads to chew (a practice said to have been abandoned since the advent of Communist power).[2] Many of the Muslim peoples of Central Asia and the Balkans have used hashish for centuries, and the Communist authorities in these areas today continue to tolerate a certain amount of smoking by elderly citizens. Moreover, as anywhere in the world, some chronically ill or disabled patients in the East European area have become addicted to the medicines (mainly morphine or codeine) prescribed to treat their condition.[3] There has also been a certain amount of addiction among members of the medical profession; a report out of Poland, for example, states that the incidence

Mr. Powell, who spent the 1972-73 academic year as an Associate of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University (Cambridge, Mass.), is Associate Professor in the Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia (Charlottesville). His previous publications include a contribution to Problems of Communism, *"Mao and Stalin's Mantle" (March-April 1968).*

[1] The following discussion does not deal with Albania or the German Democratic Republic because of the difficulties in obtaining reliable information concerning drug abuse in those countries.

[2] *Zivot* (Bratislava), Aug. 18, 1971, in Joint Publications Research Service, hereafter JPRS (Washington, DC), No. 54135, p. 6.

[3] F. Vondracek *et al.*, "Recent Patterns of Addiction in Czechoslovakia," *The British Journal of Psychiatry* (London), Vol. 114, 1968, p. 289; Eleonora Gorbunova, "Drug Addiction—How Is It Handled in the USSR?", *Soviet Life* (Moscow), December 1970, p. 9; E.A. Babaian, "Drug Addiction Control in the USSR," *Bulletin on Narcotics* (New York), No. 1, 1971, p. 1.

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of addiction is significantly higher among public health personnel than among the population in general.[4]

Recently, however, other segments of the various East European populations have also decided to experiment with drugs; as a result, the problem has become both more visible and more serious. Reported instances of theft, prostitution, and death through overdose are becoming more numerous as the pattern of drug use has changed.[5] Moreover, indications that the recent converts to drug use are primarily well-to-do university students and schoolchildren have caused official concern. While the limited use of mild drugs by unproductive members of society could be tolerated as a relatively harmless "vestige of the past," drug use by the future leaders of these countries is a very different matter. How this new problem is manifested and what is being done to cope with it are the subject of this article.

The Scope of the Problem

Precise figures on the incidence of drug abuse in the various East European countries cannot be ascertained from the fragmentary evidence that is available. Two factors account for this. One involves the problem of definition, while the other stems from official reluctance to gather and release data.

The literature on drug use in Eastern Europe, both scholarly and journalistic, suffers from considerable terminological carelessness. Even specialists do not always differentiate between heavy drugs and milder substances: marijuana, hashish, amphetamines and narcotic drugs—whose psychological and physiological effects differ substantially—are often treated as though they were indistinguishable.[6] In addition, very different forms of drug dependence are sometimes referred to as "addiction," whether the dependence is psychological, physical, or both.[7] Finally, persons who merely experiment with drugs are not always distinguished from full-fledged addicts.

Compounding the definitional problem is the even greater difficulty involved in trying to assemble meaningful data. Official statistics on the extent of drug abuse are not made public. In all probability, they simply do not exist. The figures which occasionally appear in newspapers or popular magazines are acknowledged to be only rough guesses. Specialized publications provide more precise but still incomplete data. For example, statistics on emergency admissions to hospitals of drug patients tell only a small part of the story; for every individual requiring hospitalization, there are others who drug themselves below the level where a doctor's intervention is necessary. Police statistics relating to drug abuse also understate the problem: they include only cases in which a law has been broken and the culprit arrested.[8] (Drug use in itself is not a crime in most countries of the area.)

It is clear that drug use and misuse are far less widespread in Eastern Europe than in the West, and they have not yet begun to rival alcoholism as a social problem. But if drug abuse has not yet assumed crisis proportions—and there is a good deal of uncertainty about this with respect to some countries—it does represent a social danger of considerable magnitude. There is evidence that East Europeans have begun to experiment with a wide range of drugs. They inhale dangerous and volatile substances (*e.g.*, glue and household cleaning fluids), they smoke cigarettes treated with special ink (when burned with a cigarette it induces a state of intoxication), they synthesize novel substances by combining ingredients from various legitimate medicines, and they consume the more familiar marijuana, hashish, LSD, amphetamines, barbiturates, cocaine, opium, morphine and codeine. At the present time, hashish, barbiturates and amphetamines are reported to be the most popular drugs.[9]

Officials in Poland and Yugoslavia have expressed particular concern over the use of drugs in their countries. That they do so publicly is attributable in part to the relative openness of the media in the two

[4] See *Sluzba zdrowia* (Warsaw), Jan. 9, 1972, in JPRS, No. 55360, p. 12.

[5] See, *e.g.*, *13. Maj* (Belgrade), January 1972, p. 33; *Studentski list* (Zagreb), April 4, 1972, p. 18; *Slobodna Dalmacija* (Split), Aug. 19, 1972, p. 8. For a description of a Soviet case involving narcotics which led to a murder, see *Sotsialisticheskaia industriia* (Moscow), Aug. 6, 1972, p. 4.

[6] The term "narcotic" generally refers to opium and its derivatives, as well as cocaine and a number of synthetic drugs known as "opiates." See *Fact Sheets* (Washington, DC), Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, US Department of Justice, 1971, p. 19.

[7] This problem is discussed in Vondracek *et al.*, *loc. cit.*, p. 285.

[8] See, *e.g.*, *Trybuna ludu* (Warsaw), July 12, 1971.

[9] See *Smena* (Bratislava), Jan. 11, 1972, in JPRS No. 55074, p. 4; *Rolnicke noviny* (Bratislava), Feb. 4, 1972, in JPRS No. 55241, p. 7; *Sluzba zdrowia*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 15-16; *Tygodnik demokratyczny* (Warsaw), Oct. 17, 1971, in JPRS No. 54750, p. 9; *13. Maj*, January 1972, p. 31.

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states—but also to the greater magnitude of the problem in these countries. The language which commentators use underlines their views of the gravity of the situation. According to one Pole, the problem "is becoming very alarming," and "it is urgently necessary to apply large-scale preventive measures" to keep it from spreading.[10] Two Polish doctors have stated, even more emphatically, that drug abuse is rapidly assuming "the proportions of a social disaster."[11] The number of addicts admitted to Polish hospitals is said to be growing rapidly, doubling between 1970 and 1971,[12] and these patients represent only a small fraction of drug users: "From them we know that this is a fairly widespread phenomenon and in some youth circles is of massive proportions."[13]

The problem in Yugoslavia appears to be even more serious. According to a Zagreb physician specializing in drug cases, large-scale use of drugs among young Yugoslavs has been growing rapidly since 1965, and today it has reached epidemic proportions.[14] Others have termed the situation in the country "depressing" and "alarming."[15] A poll of youths in the upper grades of Belgrade schools in the spring of 1971 indicated that six percent of the pupils were taking drugs *regularly*—though precisely what kinds were not specified.[16] The aforementioned physician has suggested that as of that year at least 2,000 people were using drugs in the city of Zagreb, while an even greater number could be found in Belgrade.[17] Another estimate puts the Zagreb figure at 5,000 or more and gives a figure of 40,000 for Yugoslavia as a whole.[18] However rough these estimates are, the conclusion is clear. As a Yugoslav authority has put it, the problem of drugs is no longer "knocking on our door. That is the situation we were facing yesterday. Drug addiction is here, it is clearly visible." Asked what would happen if its growth were not stopped by energetic measures, he answered unhesitatingly: "We shall face the situation which exists today in the West."[19]

East European authorities used to argue that their countries were immune to the problem of drug abuse. As a Soviet journalist put it in 1963, "there is no special milieu" for drug abuse under socialism: "We have no flophouses or gambling dens, no oppressed or underprivileged people, no unemployment, no moral emptiness or uncertainty about the coming day. . . ."[20] This kind of thinking is not relevant to the problem of drugs in modern and modernizing societies today. Indeed, the very fact of progress and change in the Communist world has probably helped to bring about greater use of drugs.

Roots and Causes

The official drive toward modernization has disrupted people's lives and produced substantial psychological stress. Large and heterogeneous groups of people have been brought together. Subjected to new and threatening stimuli, they have shown an increased incidence of psychological disorders. In attempting to cope with—or perhaps to avoid confrontation with—the environment, some have come to rely on drugs as a support.

More and more people who would not technically be classified as drug addicts appear to have become heavy users of drugs. These people, who regularly—and sometimes compulsively—resort to tranquilizers, anti-depressants and certain other psychotropic drugs, are, in a very real sense, caught up in a socially acceptable form of drug abuse. This problem has gotten particular attention in the Czechoslovak press. To quote one Czechoslovak commentator:

I am amazed at the nonchalance with which some of those close to me solve the problems of their daily lives, their worries and troubles. They keep these "solutions" in their pockets, handbags, or somewhere at home in a drawer.

. . . They devour pills.

. . . everything is in one pill. . . .

. . . What actually is this "everything"? A general, universal, absolute panacea for headache, spleen, frustration, bellyache, disappointments, being fed up, hot or cold, boredom, . . . a hangover . . . , melancholy or exuberance, jealousy and rheumatism, and God knows what else.

. . . But isn't this blind belief dangerously close to an addiction to narcotics . . . ?[21]

[10] *Sluzba zdrowia*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 18, 19.

[11] *Zdrowie* (Warsaw), August 1971, in JPRS No. 54042, p. 18.

[12] *Tygodnik demokratyczny*, *loc. cit.*, p. 11. See also *Sztandar młodych* (Warsaw), Nov. 6-7, 1971, in JPRS No. 55360, p. 26.

[13] *Zdrowie*, *loc. cit.*, p. 18.

[14] *Vjesnik u srijedu* (Zagreb), July 7, 1971.

[15] *Studentski list*, March 28, 1972, p. 9, and April 4, 1972, p. 18.

[16] *Politika* (Belgrade), May 11, 1971, p. 9.

[17] *Vjesnik u srijedu*, July 7, 1971.

[18] *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), Aug. 15, 1971, p. 5.

[19] *Vjesnik u srijedu*, July 28, 1971.

[20] *Sovetskaia Rossiia* (Moscow), March 27, 1963, p. 4.

[21] *Vecerni Praha* (Prague), Dec. 8, 1971, in Radio Free Europe, *Czechoslovak Press Survey* (New York), No. 2411, pp. 1-2.

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This type of reliance on drugs does not involve hallucinogens (such as LSD), whose use is reported to be fairly well controlled, but rather pain-killers and sedatives. Indeed, "analgesicism" is said to have begun to rival alcoholism as a social problem in Czechoslovakia.[22]

Blame for the phenomenon of "proper"—*i.e.*, socially acceptable—drug abuse is laid to two situational factors often cited in other societies. On the one hand, patients put pressure on doctors to prescribe analgesics, stimulants or depressants for real or imaginary ailments. In the words of the analyst quoted above, "the tribe of pill-devourers resorts to all kinds of trickery and fraud in order to obtain these things to which they have become addicted, in which they blindly believe, and without which they would feel miserable."[23] On the other hand, some physicians are said to be too willing—occasionally to the point of negligence—to prescribe such medicines. Following the prevailing fad, they may employ a new drug too hastily, when there is no clear-cut need for it.[24] In these circumstances, a Polish sociologist has observed, "pharmacology often strays toward pharmacomania."[25]

The excessive use of "legitimate" drugs by adults has undoubtedly helped to induce young people to experiment as well. The example of their parents or other adults has aroused the curiosity of some and provided others with a convenient rationalization for taking pills. There are, of course, other reasons for youngsters to try drugs. Some are simply seeking to have fun and regard non-addictive drugs as a modern, sophisticated substitute for drinking. Others reach for drugs to help them cope with personal problems and psychological stress (adolescence is as much a period of tension and insecurity in Eastern Europe as anywhere else). Still others act out of a feeling of political alienation; for them, the use of drugs symbolizes rejection of "the system."

According to reports, the overwhelming majority of those who experiment with drugs are young, usually teenagers or people in their early twenties.[26] The reduction in parental supervision over children, increased contacts with drug-using elements of Western youth, dissatisfaction with their own opportunities and/or achievements, family problems, the desire to experience new and exotic sensations, the influence of older and allegedly more sophisticated young people—all these factors help to attract young East Europeans, particularly those in the most advanced urban centers, to experiment with drugs.

There is evidence to indicate that most of these youths come from well-to-do families, and almost all are high school or university students (the number of addicts among young workers is claimed to be negligible).[27] They tend to be from the more prominent families: for example, addiction among young Poles whose parents are on foreign assignment has been termed "especially alarming."[28] Some are students seeking assistance from drugs in their studies or examinations; others are "dropouts," members of hippie-like youth groups who gather to "turn on" and/or initiate friends in the rites of drug use.[29] Most, however, are simply bored and restless youngsters who want to try something new or who consciously seek to emulate drug experimenters among Western youth.[30]

A number of reports touch on the problem of young people who have become estranged from their families and have assembled in drug-oriented groups. Boys and girls from unhappy homes seem particularly apt to gravitate into these hippie-like surroundings; finding home and/or school burdensome, they seek relief or escape in drugs. An 18-year-old Czechoslovak boy has described his reasons for turning to drugs as follows:

I started "turning on" in the first class of secondary . . . school. I had no idea about life or the world, so it was all the same to me. I chose toluene. At first I felt bad when I inhaled, but then it was fine. I did it because other people did it, it was modern. . . .

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[22] *Svet v obrazeche* (Prague), June 26, 1971, in Radio Free Europe, *Czechoslovak Situation Report* (New York), No. 13, p. 13.

[23] *Vecerni Praha, loc. cit.*, p. 2. See also *Svet prace* (Prague), March 31, 1971, in *Czechoslovak Situation Report*, No. 13, p. 13.

[24] *Svet prace, ibid.* The Bulgarian Ministry of Justice has proposed an addition to the Penal Code according to which any doctor who writes an unnecessary prescription for narcotics will be deemed to have committed a crime. See *Zemedelsko zname* (Sofia), Jan. 30, 1972, p. 2.

[25] *Studia socjologiczne* (Warsaw), No. 1, 1971.

[26] See *Tygodnik demokratyczny, loc. cit.*, p. 11; *13. Maj*, January 1972, p. 30; *Delo* (Ljubljana), Jan. 13, 1972, p. 3; *Psychiatria polska* (Warsaw), May-June 1972, in JPRS No. 56956, p. 2.

[27] *13. Maj*, January 1972, p. 30.

[28] *Sluzba zdrowia*, Aug. 15, 1971, in JPRS No. 55360, p. 15.

[29] *Prawo i zycie* (Warsaw), May 16, 1971; *Rolnicke noviny*, Nov. 19, 1971, in JPRS No. 54695, p. 22.

[30] East European authorities on drug abuse often link this phenomenon with modern art, jazz, rock music and hippies—the so-called "idols with syringes" of some East European young people. See, *e.g.*, *Zemedelsko zname*, Jan. 30, 1972, p. 2; *Delo*, Jan. 13, 1972, p. 3; *Smena*, March 24, 1972, in JPRS No. 55670, p. 7.

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Mother did not know about it, and anyway she does not care about me. She and father are divorced, but we all live together in the same apartment. . . . We get on each other's nerves.[31]

The product of a broken home, artificially kept together, this young man apparently moved from loneliness and frustration to self-pity, protest and escape. Precisely how representative his reactions are cannot be determined from the evidence available, but his path appears to be an unfortunately attractive way out for numerous troubled adolescents. Feeling themselves manipulated by adults, they seek independence, either in solitude or in association with like-minded youngsters.

A number of young people—precisely how many is uncertain—seek to protest against what they regard as the norms imposed on them by society. Some reject "the system" in its entirety. Resenting the restrictions and demands dictated by the party and regime, they embrace instead "the ideology of absolute freedom."[32] Unhappy and frustrated, they become alienated from their surroundings and identify with a counterculture. Their reaction suggests that drug abuse is, in some measure, a social sickness, rather than merely a response to problems of personal adjustment.[33]

The final factor contributing to the drug problem is increased international contacts. Many East European youngsters seek to imitate Western styles and mores, and some assume that the latter demand experimentation with drugs; in this pursuit they are aided by smugglers—both professionals and amateurs. Eastern Europe as a whole is experiencing dramatic increases in tourism, trade and cultural contacts. Foreigners are visiting the area in ever greater numbers, and more and more East Europeans are traveling abroad as students, tourists or workers. As a result, some drugs inevitably pass into and out of the region. As a Polish commentator has observed, "This is the price we may have to pay for the dynamic growth of international contacts, which in other respects are advantageous and even necessary for our economic and cultural development."[34] In short, increased trafficking in drugs may be an unfortunate but inevitable by-product of détente.

Combating Drug Abuse

The authorities in Eastern Europe clearly have been puzzled by the spread of drugs and have had great difficulty in dealing with the problem. They have resorted basically to five approaches, none of which has proven altogether successful: (1) tightening customs controls to cut down on smuggling, (2) introducing criminal sanctions, (3) tightening administrative controls over the legal sale of narcotics and other drugs, (4) providing medical and psychiatric treatment for drug users, as well as rehabilitation for addicts, and (5) generating publicity and propaganda campaigns against the use of drugs. Each of these approaches will be examined in turn.

(1) *Efforts to combat smuggling.* All of the East European states are parties to the United Nations 1961 Uniform Convention on Narcotics (establishing international control over opium, morphine and its compounds, and cocaine), as well as to the 1966-67 UN agreements controlling hallucinogens.[35] The system of controls has not been foolproof, however; drugs continue to be smuggled in from abroad. In fact, as most governments in the region, including the USSR, have sought to expand foreign commercial, cultural and personal contacts, the drug control efforts of local police and customs officials have been complicated.

Yugoslavia appears to have the most substantial problem with smugglers. Its lengthy coast, in many places isolated from major population centers, makes Yugoslavia an ideal point of entry for smugglers and also encourages a native smuggling trade. Moreover, the country is readily accessible to the principal Asian and European drug sources (Turkey, Iran, Lebanon and France). According to official statistics, Yugoslav customs officials confiscate hundreds of kilograms of narcotics each year, and an undeter-

[31] *Smena*, Sept. 29, 1971, in JPRS No. 54265, p. 31. For a similar story from Poland, see *Tygodnik demokratyczny*, Oct. 24, 1971, in JPRS No. 54844, p. 24.

[32] *Walka mlodych* (Warsaw), Feb. 6, 1972, in JPRS No. 55789, p. 14; *Polityka* (Warsaw), April 1, 1972. In Czechoslovakia, the 1968 liberalization movement led by Alexander Dubcek is said to have contributed to moral decay among young people, leading some of them to drugs. See *Smena*, March 24, 1972, *loc. cit.*, p. 8.

[33] To quote a Bulgarian physician, drug abuse "is as much a social as a psychic illness." See *Kooperativno selo* (Sofia), Jan. 30, 1972.

[34] *Argumenty* (Warsaw), Feb. 20, 1972, in JPRS No. 56063, p. 16.

[35] On this subject see "Coming into Force of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961," *Bulletin on Narcotics*, No. 1, 1965, p. 1; Miloslav Matousek, "The History of the Abuse of Narcotic Drugs in Czechoslovakia," *ibid.*, No. 3, 1966, p. 2; *Zdrowie publiczne* (Warsaw), No. 12, 1970, in JPRS No. 53738, p. 4; *Pravovedenie* (Leningrad), No. 6, 1970, pp. 108-14.

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mined (but apparently vast) amount is transported through the country to processing centers in France or Germany.[36] Some drugs are of course siphoned off for domestic consumption, which is reportedly sizable not only among youth and urban elements but also among certain nationality groups with a tradition of drug use.

Smugglers, whether treating Yugoslavia as a market or as a conduit to the West, have stepped up their operations in recent years. They are particularly active during the summer tourist season. To quote a Yugoslav newspaper:

A warm tourist summer . . . has the greatest effect on smugglers and peddlers of drugs and on domestic drug addicts. On the beaches, in coves, in hotel rooms, camping areas, dance halls, bars, under cover of night, and along with a glass of whiskey, big business deals are made. Hashish, LSD, and other dangerous narcotics [sic] get into "the right hands" this way and find their way to Zagreb, Belgrade, and Sarajevo.[37]

Despite official awareness of smuggling activity and efforts to control it, the available evidence suggests that the stream of drugs entering Yugoslavia and other countries of the region has continued to grow. While Soviet sources report that the USSR has been relatively successful in preventing smuggling,[38] the other countries have been less ready to make such claims. The Yugoslavs admit for example that special training programs designed for local customs officials have been slow to take shape,[39] and that smugglers have been able to evade controls by using cargo ships, luxury yachts, private automobiles and even the regular mails to ship drugs into the area; foreigners are usually implicated in such trafficking, but local citizens are sometimes named as well.[40]

Penalties for smuggling operations in Yugoslavia are surprisingly light, entailing at most a relatively small fine (the equivalent of $2,000 to $3,000) and several months in prison. Courts in Piret and Dimitrovgrad in the last five years alone have handed down over 100 sentences for drug smuggling (primarily hashish) from the Near East to Western Europe. But since these sentences have averaged only a few months in length, their deterrent effect has been negligible. Yugoslav police and customs officials are pressing for more substantial sanctions.[41]

(2) *Expanded use of the criminal law.* Each of the East European states has enacted legislation to limit the distribution of narcotics and dangerous drugs. These laws, as well as police and judicial practices, vary considerably from country to country. Strict legislation and rigorous application of the law can be found in Romania and the USSR, while Polish and Yugoslav policies are relatively unsystematic and easygoing. Indeed, the latter two countries—which have experienced Eastern Europe's most severe drug problems—have yet to put together a comprehensive body of law to deal with drug abuse. Police and prosecuting officials have to rely on outdated and piecemeal legislation, not to mention judges who seem to be astonishingly lenient in dealing with offenders.

The basic purpose of the drug laws in each state is to restrict access to drugs to licensed physicians, pharmacists, and patients under treatment. In Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, the penal codes prescribe penalties for the illicit manufacture, export or distribution of narcotics.[42] In Romania, the law is newer and far more detailed. According to a statute adopted in 1969, it is illegal to produce, possess, extract, treat, prepare, offer, attempt to sell, purchase, distribute or transport narcotics; to cultivate plants for the purpose of processing them into narcotics; or to organize or permit their consumption without official permission.[43]

Legislation in the USSR is, if anything, even more detailed. Criminal responsibility is specified for the theft, misappropriation, illegal manufacture or sale of narcotics, as well as for the planting of opium poppies or marijuana without official permission. The use of narcotics without medical certification is illegal in the Transcaucasian and Central Asian re-

[36] *Oslobodjenje* (Sarajevo), Sept. 2, 1971, and Oct. 9, 1971; *Vecernji list* (Zagreb), Oct. 16 and 17, 1971; *Pravda* (Bratislava), July 6, 1971, p. 1.

[37] *Oslobodjenje*, Sept. 2, 1971, p. 12.

[38] Babaian, *loc. cit.*, p. 1; Gorbunova, *loc. cit.*, p. 9.

[39] *Tygodnik demokratyczny*, Oct. 24, 1971, p. 26. However, the Federal Customs Bureau in Yugoslavia has introduced a system of bonuses for officers showing unusual zeal and skill in apprehending drug smugglers. See *Politika ekspres* (Belgrade), July 22, 1972, p. 13.

[40] *Oslobodjenje*, Sept. 2 and Oct. 9, 1971; *Vjesnik*, Aug. 5 and 15, Oct. 16 and 27, 1971; *Delo*, Oct. 14, 1971.

[41] *Oslobodjenje*, Oct. 9, 1971; *Politika ekspres*, July 22, 1972.

[42] *Svobodne slovo* (Prague), Sept. 25, 1971, in JPRS No. 54940, p. 30; *Mlada fronta* (Prague), Nov. 2, 1971, in JPRS No. 54695, p. 23; *Zemedelsko zname*, Jan. 30, 1972, p. 2.

[43] *Buletinul Oficial Al Republicii Socialiste Romania* (Bucharest), Part I, No. 152, December 1969, in JPRS No. 49929, pp. 81-88; *Scienteia* (Bucharest), Jan. 15, 1972, in JPRS No. 55186, p. 7.

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publics, though mere use by itself is not treated as a crime elsewhere in the USSR.[44] The most comprehensive legislation is found in Soviet Georgia. According to a 1969 decree of the Presidium of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet (later incorporated into the republic's criminal code), "persons using or attempting to use narcotics without a doctor's prescription are subject to arrest for a period of 10 to 15 days." Those apprehended a second time are confined for six months to a year. The penalty for manufacturing, purchasing, storing or selling narcotics is deprivation of freedom for 3-10 years; repeated or large-scale offenses incur a penalty of 10-15 years. A 3-10 year term has also been introduced for maintaining premises for the use of drugs.[45]

Drug-connected crimes have met with increasingly harsh treatment by Soviet courts. As early as 1966 judges began to interpret laws defining narcotics abuse more strictly. Two plenary sessions of the USSR Supreme Court held in March and November of that year established rigid guidelines to aid lower courts in "restricting the activities of citizens who . . . use narcotics,"[46] and since that time, judges "have markedly intensified their struggle against drug addiction."[47] In addition, almost all the union republic criminal codes have been amended in order to introduce harsher penalties for drug-connected crimes. A Georgian official has claimed that this crackdown is "not of a temporary, but of a permanent character."[48]

The legal framework for deterring and punishing drug abuse is much weaker in Poland and Yugoslavia, a fact which no doubt has contributed substantially to the problem in these countries. In Poland, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, there are severe penalties for trafficking in narcotics, for forging or stealing prescriptions, and for stealing narcotics from pharmacies.[49] But according to press reports, the upper range of penalties are seldom used: sentences longer than one year are rare. In fact, prison sentences often are suspended, and young people are allowed to repay their debt to society by performing socially useful work (cleaning streets or public vehicles without pay) rather than serving a term in prison.[50] Moreover, there is no punishment for drug use *per se*. According to the principal legal document (a 1951 law on pharmaceutical agents), only those who, without a doctor's prescription, use a stupefacient *in the company of another person* are subject to imprisonment (for up to one year). The objective is to combat the group use of narcotics; individual use, even to the extent of addiction, is not covered by the law.[51] Finally, and perhaps most important, many intoxicating chemical substances used by Poles—especially new kinds of pills and aerosols—cannot be classified as narcotics under the 1951 law. Use or misuse of these substances is not a crime.[52]

Legal restraints are even milder in Yugoslavia. Possession of drugs is not a crime, and many other acts which are proscribed elsewhere in Eastern Europe are reported to go unpunished in Yugoslavia. This has led one official to complain:

Today one can give somebody drugs and be totally free from criminal prosecution. A person can talk another person into taking drugs with equal impunity. One can rent an apartment and organize group drug sessions and be free from the law. In other words, the law does not provide penalties for drug users contaminating others.[53]

Expressing a view widely held by police and prosecuting personnel, the same official has spoken out for expanded police powers to control drug abuse.

(3) *Administrative controls*. An elaborate system of administrative controls complements the efforts of the customs service, police and courts to keep drugs from users and potential users. Practices vary only slightly among the states of the region. According to regulations, narcotics (and some other drugs as well) are supposed to be sold only on presentation by the buyer of a prescription printed on special paper and marked with a serial number. Dosages are strictly limited, and a refill requires another prescription. Moreover, use of certain addictive drugs and preparations has been prohibited in

[44] *Sotsialisticheskaia zakonnost* (Moscow), No. 5, 1971, pp. 61-64, and No. 9, 1970, pp. 64-67.

[45] *Zarya vostoka* (Tbilisi), Oct. 11, 1969, p. 4.

[46] *Pravada* (Moscow), March 3, 1966; *Sovetskaia yustitsia* (Moscow), No. 9, 1966, pp. 29-30; *Izvestia* (Moscow), Nov. 26, 1966, p. 3.

[47] *Zarya vostoka*, Jan. 14, 1970, p. 2.

[48] *Ibid.*

[49] See *Tygodnik demokratyczny*, Oct. 24, 1971, p. 27; *Glos wybrzez* (Gdansk), Aug. 24, 1971, in JPRS No. 54492, p. 23; *Prawo i zycie*, May 16, 1971.

[50] *Zycie Warszawy*, March 25, 1972, in JPRS No. 55620, p. 6; *Trybuna ludu*, Feb. 20, 1972.

[51] See the sources cited in footnote 49.

[52] *Argumenty, loc. cit.*, p. 13.

[53] *Vjesnik u srijedu*, July 7, 1971.

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medical practice, and the number of items which can be obtained at pharmacies without a prescription has been reduced sharply.[54] In Poland, the authorities are introducing a system of standard prescriptions for strong medicines and narcotics, which are to be sold only upon presentation of personal identification, and under no condition to minors. An effort is being made to bring the entire process of production and distribution of narcotics under strict control. The regulations go so far as to require that drugs held in pharmacies be kept in separate premises having barred windows and iron-covered doors with special locks.[55]

Despite the efforts of the authorities, however, this control network is said to be ineffective. Opium growers in the several countries that have poppy crops sometimes set aside a portion of their output and sell it on the black market. According to one report, more than half of the 65,000 kilograms of raw opium produced in Macedonia during the period 1967-71 was kept from state purchasing authorities by farmers hoping to profit from the drug trade.[56] A Polish source adds that when the sale of a particular drug is restricted or prohibited, consumers are usually able to find a ready substitute.[57] Among other practices, according to a variety of press reports from several countries, prescription forms are stolen, prescriptions are falsified, pharmacies and pharmaceutical plants are burglarized, drugs are synthesized by laymen (especially students), special seals are stolen or counterfeited, and unscrupulous public health officials peddle certain drugs. Judging from these reports, the control system is circumvented with alarming frequency.[58]

In Yugoslavia it is not even always necessary to resort to subterfuge or crime to obtain drugs. Amphetamines, barbiturates, tranquilizers and codeine are said to be readily available in pharmacies; indeed, the latter have been described as "the easiest, simplest, cheapest, most reliable, and finally the most legal source" of drugs. A Yugoslav commentator, remarking on the extraordinary character of the situation, suggests that "our pharmacies not only compete well with the illicit drug traffic but have even succeeded in replacing it, suppressing it, and making it almost unnecessary." There are no regulations prohibiting over-the-counter sale of codeine, syringes and needles for injection. And, despite occasional exhortations from concerned Yugoslavs to stop such abuses, indiscriminate advertising and merchandising of narcotics continue. The drug industry's urge for increased profits has been blamed for a serious injury to the public interest.[59]

(4) *Medical treatment.* Given the vast resources available to the police of the region, it would probably not be difficult to arrest most of the drug addicts. The problem is what to do afterward. Prison sentences are hardly the answer; the principal alternative, medical treatment, has also proved to be inadequate to the task.[60] According to report, very few citizens undergo treatment voluntarily, and in most countries of the region, compulsory hospitalization of addicts is permissible only for violations of the criminal law. Thus, proceedings cannot be instituted against addicts as such; in Czechoslovakia, for example, judges who have attempted to stretch laws on compulsory hospitalization of alcoholics to cover drug users as well have been reprimanded by higher courts.[61]

Only two countries—Bulgaria and the USSR—have legalized hospitalization of adult addicts without their consent, though in the specific instance of morphine addiction, Romanian law also provides for compulsory treatment.[62] According to a Soviet source,[63] addicts in the USSR who refuse to undergo

[54] *Gorbunova, loc. cit.*, p. 9; Babaian, *loc. cit.*, p. 1; *Zivot, loc. cit.*, p. 8; Matousek, *loc. cit.*, p. 2.

[55] Irena Egierszdorff and Tadeusz Delong, "Some Aspects of the Production, Turnover and Control of Narcotic Drugs in Poland," *Bulletin on Narcotics*, No. 3, 1967, pp. 4-6.

[56] *Privredni pregled* (Belgrade), Jan. 21, 1972, p. 3.

[57] *Psychiatria polska, loc. cit.*, p. 4.

[58] See, *e.g., Glos pracy, loc. cit.*, p. 2; *Glos wybrzez, loc. cit.*, p. 3; *Zemedelsko zname*, Jan. 30, 1972, p. 4. According to one report, pharmacists in Bulgaria sometimes fill prescriptions which they know to be falsified out of fear of violence-prone addicts. *Zemedelsko zname*, Jan. 30, 1972, p. 2.

[59] *Farmaceutski glasnik* (Warsaw), No. 8-9, 1971, in JPRS No. 54324, pp. 30, 31. Quotations on p. 30. See also *Vjesnik u srijedu*, July 7, 1971, and *13. Maj*, January 1972, p. 38.

[60] A third alternative would be to require drug addicts to register with the authorities to receive drug allowances. While no state in the region has adopted this approach, the idea has been advanced publicly from time to time. See, *e.g., Vjesnik u srijedu*, July 7, 1971, and *13. Maj*, January 1972, p. 38.

[61] *Svobodne slovo, loc. cit.*, p. 30.

[62] See *Revista romana de drept* (Bucharest), No. 3, 1971, in JPRS No. 52943, p. 68.

[63] A. A. Gravina, "Court Use of Legislation on the Compulsory Treatment and Labor Re-education of Malicious Drunkards (Alcoholics) and Narcotics Addicts," in Ye. V. Boldyrev and A. I. Pergament, *Nauchnyi kommentarii sudebnoi praktiki za 1970 god* (A Scientific Commentary on Judicial Practice in 1970), Moscow, Yuridicheskaia literatura, 1971, pp. 218-19. The most recent legislation in this respect was adopted in the RSFSR: see "On the Compulsory Treatment and Labor Re-education of Narcotics Addicts," *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta RSFSR* (Moscow), Aug. 31, 1972, Item 870, pp. 574-75, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, Ohio), Vol. XXIV, No. 37, p. 7.

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treatment voluntarily, who "violate labor discipline, public order, or the rules of socialist communal living," or who continue to use narcotics after supposedly having been "cured," may be forcibly hospitalized.

The compulsory treatment of drug addiction is also under consideration in Poland, though as of this writing it can only be authorized by parents for children under 18 years of age. Some Polish authorities have argued against the proposal on the ground that there is no way to handle additional patients, since existing facilities at psychiatric hospitals and rehabilitation wards are already inadequate, and since there is an acute shortage of specialized personnel experienced in addictive drug withdrawal treatment.[64]

The official response to the pressing need for expanded research and treatment facilities seems to have been hesitant and inadequate throughout the region. No clearly defined medical programs are available, and political support for treatment centers (not to mention an area-wide program of compulsory treatment) has not been forthcoming. There are few institutions dedicated to the treatment of drug addicts. Instead, such patients are dealt with in psychiatric hospitals and clinics, together with alcoholics and/or mental patients. (Most hospitals are said to be hesitant to accept drug addicts at all, having experienced considerable difficulty in keeping drugs away from them and from other patients as well.)[65]

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the rate of failure in treatment of narcotics addicts is high. According to a 1971 report from Yugoslavia, for example, fully half of the users who had completed a detoxification program were back on drugs within five months.[66] Post-hospitalization rehabilitation programs are virtually nonexistent. People "with a past" are said to be ignored and/or condemned by society and officialdom.[67] Unable to overcome their burden by themselves, former addicts almost invariably fall back "into the 'revolving door' of their weaknesses and dependencies" and are soon back on drugs.[68]

(5) *Propaganda and preventive measures.* It might be expected that the Soviet and East European authorities—medical, legal and educational—would by now have put together a crash program explaining the dangers of narcotics abuse. In point of fact, however, there has been little publicity about the drug problem. Information programs, particularly those directed at students, are few in number and limited in scope and imagination. Indeed, as a Polish commentator has pointed out, "one observes an embarressed silence on these matters."[69] No doubt this attitude is traceable in part to the disposition of most Communist regimes to minimize social problems and shortcomings. In this vein, some sources have expressed concern that public discussion of drug abuse tends to encourage a "demonization" of the problem, while others have argued that anti-addiction propaganda would actually promote the use of narcotics by arousing the curiosity of impressionable youngsters.[70]

The view that publicity would only be harmful seems to be widespread, even among education officials. While drug cases involving students are sometimes singled out as public mortality lessons, more often they are hushed up in order not to endanger a school's reputation or arouse an unhealthy curiosity among other students. As a result, citizens and officials remain unaware of the nature and dimensions of the drug problem. Judging by available reports, few schools hold discussions on the effects of addiction, and central authorities provide little in the way of methodological advice to schools which seek to be innovative. Ministries of health and education seem to have been unresponsive to the growing need for help, and there are few signs that matters will improve. One possible exception is the "League to Combat Drug Addiction" established in Yugoslavia in early 1972.[71] It arranges lectures for student groups, has begun to publish anti-drug literature, and has pressed for the creation of rehabilitation centers and meeting-places for those

[64] *Tygodnik demokratyczny*, Oct. 24, 1971, *loc. cit.*, pp. 25, 27; *Sztandar mlodych*, Sept. 4-5, 1971, *loc. cit.*, pp. 17-18.

[65] On these various problems, see Belgrade Radio, Dec. 24, 1970, as cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service *Daily Report, East Europe* (Washington, DC), Dec. 29, 1970, p. I-17; *Politika*, Dec. 16, 1971, p. 12, and Feb. 18, 1970, p. 7; *Zedemelsko zname*, Jan. 30, 1972, p. 2; *Kooperativno selo*, Jan. 30, 1972.

[66] *Vjesnik u srijedu*, July 7, 1971. See also *Tedenska tribuna* (Ljubljana), Feb. 2, 1972, in JPRS No. 55360, p. 35; *Tygodnik demokratyczny, Oct. 17, 1971, loc. cit.*, p. 12.

[67] See *Tygodnik demokratyczny*, Oct. 17, 1971, *loc. cit.*, p. 10.

[68] *Sztandar mlodych*, Jan. 15-16, 1972, in JPRS No. 55620, p. 4.

[69] *Tygodnik demokratyczny*, Oct. 24, 1971, *loc. cit.*, p. 26.

[70] *Argumenty, loc. cit.*, p. 16; *Smena*, March 25, 1972, in JPRS No. 55670, p. 10; *13. Maj*, January 1972, p. 38.

[71] For descriptions of the League and its activities, see *Studentski list*, March 28, 1972, p. 9, and April 4, 1972, p. 18. For similar, though somewhat less ambitious, efforts in Gdansk, Poland, see *Glos wybrzez*, March 2, 1972, in JPRS No. 55424, p. 31.

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who have already been rehabilitated. Whether the League can aid materially in the struggle against drugs in Yugoslavia remains to be seen.

Concluding Remarks

Soviet and East European leaders are discovering that many of the successes they have achieved have added to strains in their societies. Continuing programs of political mobilization and large-scale social and economic change have helped to encourage boredom, alienation and anomie. Urbanization and industrialization have resulted in less comprehensive supervision over young people, particularly in the cities. Increases in leisure time and disposable income, without a commensurate expansion of recreational facilities, have added to popular frustration and restlessness. Repressive measures and anti-Western propaganda have served to intensify the curiosity and daring of the young. Finally, the advances of medical science in helping the seriously ill have provided those who are merely troubled or who seek to be nonconformists with a new and dangerous way to express themselves.

It is clear from many accounts that those who are experimenting with drugs come from the social groups which have been the principal beneficiaries of progress in the Communist world. In both the USSR and Eastern Europe, drug abuse is essentially an upper-middle-class phenomenon and is particularly widespread among better-educated young urbanites. The reasons are not hard to fathom. Coming from more affluent families, these young people are more likely to have the money to buy drugs. They also have more opportunities to come into contact with foreign and domestic elements from whom drugs can be purchased. Unlike working-class or peasant youths, they are free during the summer, are more apt to visit resorts frequented by tourists and foreigners, including drug pushers, and are likelier to think it "sophisticated" to be part of the drug culture they associate with the outside world. (Working-class youths—and older people as well—apparently continue to seek escape from their frustration or disenchantment through alcohol.)

Most of the regimes of Eastern Europe have failed thus far to appreciate or respond adequately to the growing problem of drugs. While official complacency was understandable in the past, it is increasingly inappropriate in the light of changing conditions. It is now easy to find young people in Moscow and Leningrad smoking marijuana or hashish obtained from Central Asia; such encounters would have been almost impossible a few years ago. The use of stimulants and depressants in other countries of the region, especially Yugoslavia and Poland, has also increased markedly, or at least is now much more openly acknowledged. By official admission, more drug users require hospitalization, and instances of death through overdose have become more frequent. The misuse of drugs presents genuine public health and public security problems today, and the likelihood is that these will become more severe.

What can be done? A comprehensive program, promising at least to slow the rate of growth of drug abuse, would have to include the following: (1) improved official understanding of the problem, based on a better appreciation of the differences among various drugs and forms of drug dependence, as well as further research on the long-term and short-term effects of drug use; (2) more vigorous and consistent application of laws governing the purchase, sale and use of drugs; (3) closer control over the opium crops, the pharmaceutical industry, and pharmacies; (4) improved medical and rehabilitation programs; (5) improved public information programs, particularly among schoolchildren and students, and a more open acknowledgement of the real dimensions of the drug problem; (6) greater cooperation with Western governments and international bodies seeking to control the drug trade.[72]

The development of a serious drug problem in Eastern Europe and the USSR is hardly a matter of historical inevitability. Nor is the use of marijuana or hashish certain to lead to the use of more dangerous substances. Properly conceived and applied, government policies could certainly influence suppliers, consumers and potential consumers. Throughout the region, however, efforts to deal with drug usage have thus far proved inadequate. Unless official myopia and reluctance to recognize the danger signals of recent years are superseded by more realistic and enlightened programs, it seems likely that the problem of drug abuse will grow.

[72] With respect to the last point, the rejection by the Communist states of plans to broaden the 1961 Uniform Convention on Narcotics is hardly encouraging. The action of the Communist regimes—taken at a UN conference in Geneva in early 1972—was explained in terms of their concern over outside intervention in their domestic affairs. See *Glos robotniczy* (Warsaw), March 29, 1972, in JPRS No. 55739, pp. 17-18.

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Population Policy in the USSR

By Helen Desfosses Cohn

Two prominent features of population dynamics in the USSR, long evident and now confirmed statistically by the 1970 census, have been the cause of considerable concern to the Soviet Union's political leaders, economists and demographers. A declining birthrate for the Soviet Union as a whole and a growing disparity between the birthrate in Central Asia and in the predominantly Slavic regions of the country have provoked an as yet unresolved debate over proper corrective measures aimed at preventing a long-term worsening of the labor shortage in the Soviet economy and at maintaining the current ethnographic distribution of the population. While it is clear to all concerned that to delay action in a field as imprecise as population policy (where it is especially difficult to enforce implementation when an increase rather than a decrease in the birthrate is desired) holds out the prospect of having to formulate policies to remedy an even worse situation later on, it is also evident that several critical obstacles stand in the way of resolute decision-making in this area.

At least partly responsible for the indecisiveness of Soviet official and academic reaction to objectionable population trends is a general ambivalence toward the idea of taking any direct action for demographic purposes if major economic costs are involved. The misgivings of those engaged in formulating demographic policies derive from considerations of the present labor shortage in the Soviet Union and the short- and medium-range resource allocations which would be required by the implementation of major pro-natalist programs in low-birthrate areas. Proposals for preferential housing assignments for large families, extended maternity benefits, and greater availability of public services (*e.g.*, kindergartens, child-care centers, laundries, etc.) have received broad coverage in the Soviet press and demographic literature.[1] But the Soviet government is not yet prepared to accept the short-term decline of female participation in the labor market and an immediate increase of expenditures for "demographic investment" for the sake of the *possible* achievement of a higher birthrate in the future.

In addition, the apparent racial overtones of any policy aimed at "ethnographic balance" between Slavs and non-Slavs has contributed significantly to the absence of effective population policy-making. The racial implications of the population crisis in the USSR are rarely made explicit. Proposals for a differentiated policy designed to increase the birthrate in the RSFSR, Byelorussia, the Ukraine, and the Baltic Republics while restraining the birthrate in Central Asia and the Caucasus are not voiced frequently, but it is clear that racial considerations do come into play in Soviet demographic policy sessions. If Soviet commentators truly considered all peoples in the USSR equal, they would not make repeated reference to "unspecified cultural differences" [2] to account for the large size of families

Helen Desfosses Cohn is an Associate of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University (Cambridge, Mass.), and author of Soviet Policy Toward Black Africa: Focus on National Integration, *1972. Her article is an expanded version of a paper delivered at the Harvard-MIT Joint Seminar on Political Development (JOSPOD), which this year focused on demography.*

[1] *Pravda* (Moscow), June 6, 1971; *Pravda vostoka* (Tashkent), May 22, 1970.

[2] Ye. M. Vorozheikin, "Population Dynamics and Law," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* (Moscow), September 1969, p. 28.

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in the central regions of the country. Indeed, they would register satisfaction that the contribution of the non-Slavic elements has kept the net reproduction rate for the whole USSR from falling below 1.0.

And finally, the methodological confusion which has prevailed until recently in Soviet demographic analysis also accounts for a paucity of positive action. This confusion has stemmed not only from the ambivalence and ethnic concerns of officialdom, but also from the relatively undeveloped state of demographic study in the USSR. The Center for the Study of Population Problems of Moscow State University (MGU) did not begin training "demographers"—previously classified as economists—until the mid-1960's, and only in 1973 did it initiate publication of the country's first demographic journal, *Sbornik narodonaselenie*. The newly-trained Soviet demographers' problems have been compounded by the reluctance exhibited by many scholars until recently to give up the "socialist law of population" of Marx and Engels as the ordering construct of their analyses. A continued *a priori* adherence to the premise that "socialist societies are characterized by a steady increase in population" [3] did much to limit the reliability of Soviet demography and thus its usefulness.

In the following essay the scope and potential consequences of the trends which Soviet demographers have been asked to remedy will be examined in some detail. The prevailing hypotheses which have been advanced by Soviet analysts—though there is little agreement among them, or among Western demographers for that matter—to explain the overall decline and ethnic imbalance of population growth in the USSR will be discussed. Then the corrective steps which have been proposed, their strengths and their weaknesses, will be studied with an eye to determining whether all the remedial measures contemplated thus far, even if combined into a coherent program and implemented, would be sufficient to turn the tide of unfavorable population dynamics in the USSR.

[3] See the discussion in O.V. Larmin, "On General and Specific Laws of Population," *Vestnik moskovskovo universiteta*, Seriia VII, Ekonomika, No. 5, 1971; trans. in *Problems of Economics* (White Plains, N.Y.), Vol XV, No. 2, June 1972, pp. 3-23.

Table 1: Population Growth in the USSR

(per 1,000 population)

Year	Births	Deaths	Net Increase
1926	44.0	20.3	23.7
1937	38.7	18.9	19.8
1940	31.2	18.0	13.2
1950	26.7	9.7	17.0
1960	24.9	7.1	17.8
1965	18.4	7.3	11.1
1966	18.2	7.3	10.9
1967	17.3	7.6	9.7
1968	17.2	7.7	9.5
1969	17.0	8.1	8.9
1970	17.4	8.2	9.2

SOURCE: *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1970 g.* (USSR National Economy in 1970), Moscow, Statistika, 1971, p. 47.

The Problem

Data made available after the 1970 census indicate that the overall birthrate in the USSR, which has declined almost constantly since the first Soviet census, continued to do so during the 1960's. From 44 per thousand in 1926, the birthrate fell to 26 per thousand in 1960 and 18 per thousand in 1966, and then to 17 per thousand in 1969 and 17.4 per thousand in 1970 (see Table 1). Despite this general decline, the Soviet rate of population increase remained high until 1960 because of a nearly offsetting decline in the national mortality rate. After 1960, however, the leveling-off of the mortality index revealed a serious growth rate problem manifested by a drop of net population increase from 18 per thousand in 1960 to only 9 per thousand in 1970. For a country where demographers have calculated the optimal net reproduction ratio (or pure coefficient of population reproduction—*i.e.*, the number of female babies which survive per 100 women of childbearing age) to be 1.21 percent in order to produce a slightly expanding population, the 1970 figure of 1.11 percent has evoked considerable alarm.[4]

This alarm is heightened when regional variations in the reproduction figures are examined (see Table 2). While the pure coefficient of population reproduction in the USSR is approaching 1.0, it is already less than 1.0 in the Baltic Republics, the RSFSR, and the Ukraine, while in Central Asia and Azerbaijan it is 2.0.[5] This means that while the

[4] A. Ya. Kvasha, "On the Optimal Type of Reproduction of the USSR Population," in A.G. Volkov *et al.*, *Voprosy demografii* (Problems of Demography), Moscow, 1970, p. 45.

[5] Roman Szporluk, "The Nations of the USSR in 1970," *Survey* (London), Vol. 17, No. 4 (81), 1971, p. 68.

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population of the former areas can be expected to decrease absolutely over the next 30 years (barring massive immigration into these areas), the population will double in the latter regions.

In addition to the inexorable laws of population dynamics, there are other factors which will project this regional disparity far into the future. The divorce rate in Moscow is almost six times that in Uzbekistan.[6] The percentage of people over age 60 in the Baltic Republics is almost twice that in Central Asia.[7] And the number of children desired in areas already characterized by a low birthrate is less than two.[8] These situations do not augur well for a ready resolution of current regional disproportions.

To the Western reader, whose reaction to population policy is largely conditioned by propaganda representing zero population growth (ZPG) as the millennium, the negative reactions of Soviet commentators to recent census figures may seem perplexing. Nevertheless, while there are a few Soviet spokesmen who point out that ZPG might mean lower expenditures for "demographic" (*vs.* economic) investment, the overwhelming majority view the current trends with undisguised dismay.[9] Their potential ramifications for Soviet labor resources, the age structure of the population, the international strength of the USSR, and the position of the Slavic peoples are deemed to be alarming.

Ramifications of the Current Situation

Labor resources are measurable in terms of both quality and quantity. The Soviet press has been engaged in an increasingly vigorous propaganda campaign in recent years to inspire the Soviet worker to greater levels of productivity. The December 1972 announcement that 1973 industrial production would be reduced significantly from original targets[10] indicated, however, that such propaganda appeals have not been very successful. Nor can the government rely too much on greater material incentives, since the projected increase in consumer goods and services for the current Five-Year Plan has already been reduced by almost half.[11]

[6] *The New York Times*, Sept. 7, 1969.

[7] S.I. Bruk, "Ethnodemographic Processes in the USSR," *Sovetskaia etnografiia* (Moscow), No. 4, 1971.

[8] *Pravda*, Oct. 5, 1969.

[9] See, for example, *ibid.*

[10] *Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1972.

[11] *Ibid.*, Dec. 25, 1972.

Table 2: Population Growth in the Soviet Republics, 1970

(per 1,000 population)

Republic	Births	Deaths	Net Increase
RSFSR	14.6	8.7	5.9
Ukraine	15.2	8.9	6.3
Byelorussia	16.2	7.6	8.6
Uzbekistan	33.5	5.5	28.0
Kazakhstan	23.3	6.0	17.3
Georgia	19.2	7.3	11.9
Azerbaijan	29.2	6.7	22.5
Lithuania	17.6	8.9	8.7
Moldavia	19.4	7.4	12.0
Latvia	14.5	11.2	3.3
Kirghizia	30.5	7.4	23.1
Tadzhikistan	34.7	6.4	28.3
Armenia	22.1	5.1	17.0
Turkmenistan	35.2	6.6	28.6
Estonia	15.8	11.1	4.7
ALL USSR	**17.4**	**8.2**	**9.2**

SOURCE: *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1970 g.*, pp. 50-51.

The lag in productivity growth in the USSR has impelled many Soviet economists to turn to the option of a more rapid quantitative expansion of labor resources (and therefore labor inputs) as a basis for increasing Soviet national income. There are primarily two methods of realizing such an expansion: 1) luring the individuals employed in housework or on private agricultural plots into the labor market and 2) increasing the size of the able-bodied population through a higher birthrate. Each of these alternatives, however, is fraught with difficulties; moreover, any attempt to effect one alternative has obvious negative implications for the viability of the other.

To begin with, the possibility of liberating significant numbers of people from the "personal labor sphere" seems slight in light of recent Soviet statistics showing that 92.4 percent of the working-age population is either employed in production or still attending school, as compared with 82 percent in 1959.[12] This means that the Soviet economy has already plumbed whatever effective resources the "personal labor sphere" had to offer. Indeed, some Soviet spokesmen feel that recruitment from these reserves had gone too far, and they charge that

[12] *Ibid.*, April 17, 1972.

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"for a long time our theory and practice [has] not consider[ed] the fact that employment in the home and plots reflects not only personal but social interests as well."[13] Private agricultural plots are an important element in Soviet food production, and many Soviet demographers argue, in the face of some Western views, that nonworking women provide the best hope of redressing the USSR's plummeting birthrate. Thus, while the Soviet Union faces a situation where, by Soviet estimates, the number of jobs available is at least 50 percent greater than the number of people wanting jobs,[14] it must be recognized that to appeal to nonworking women to help remedy the immediate labor shortage would have very serious long-range repercussions, since the number of children born to these women would most likely be reduced, leading to a significantly lower labor-supply curve in 18-22 years.

To turn to another aspect of overall labor availability, the Soviet population of working age (men 16-59, women 16-54) as a percentage of the total population declined from 57.4 percent in 1959 to 54.0 percent in 1970,[15] and leading Soviet demographers such as Professor D.I. Valentei anticipate a further decline in the 1980's after a brief respite during the remainder of the '70's.[16] The reaction of certain commentators—for example economic demographer V. Perevedentsev—is to demand immediate government action to increase the birthrate,[17] but other economists take the more sanguine view that the problem of labor resources will eventually work itself out, especially as technology and the psychological state of the Soviet worker improve. In the meantime, they argue that the current birthrate level has certain positive aspects from the standpoint of the labor problem, namely, that "the existing network of child-care facilities can fully accommodate the declining groups of children" and that the "loss of working time due to women leaving jobs during pregnancy and *postpartum* leave [and] during children's illnesses [will] decline."[18]

The ambivalence of Soviet reactions to the birthrate-*vs.*-labor-resource correlation is especially interesting in light of the almost universal concern over the aging of the population among Soviet demographic policy formulators. An aging population presages a more sharply lowered labor supply curve in the future and portends a decrease in the standard of living as a greater percentage of the population becomes pensioners, that is, as the ratio of nonproductive to gainfully employed persons increases. In 1959, 12 percent of the population consisted of pensioners, and in 1970 over 15 percent.[19] By the end of 1970, according to *Sotsialnoe obespechenie,* there were approximately 41 million pensioners in the USSR, and 16 billion rubles were being spent on pensions out of a total annual social security and insurance expenditure of 21 billion rubles.[20] The aging problem will become increasingly acute as the most numerous age group, born between 1928 and 1940, attains the age of pension eligibility. By the year 2000, perhaps one-quarter of the entire Soviet population will be receiving pensions from the state.

In regional terms, the aging problem is most acute in the large cities of the heavily industrialized western regions—cities which are already experiencing labor shortages. Moscow, for instance, has two million people over 50 out of a total population of somewhat more than 7 million. The Slavic western republics, which would like to maintain their developed status relative to the Central Asian regions, might find this more and more difficult as the imbalance in the proportion of persons of working age increasingly favors the non-western areas.

This leads to a third link between aging and the prospects for Soviet economic development, namely a potential decline in the technological skills of workers. Soviet economists have calculated that the accumulation of knowledge essentially ends at age 25-30, and that the more rapid the rate of scientific-technical progress, the more quickly

[13] A. Kotliar, "Territorial Problems Relating to the Structure of Employment in Terms of Sex," *Planovoe khoziaistvo* (Moscow), No. 4, 1971; trans. in *Problems of Economics,* Vol. XIV, No. 6, October 1970, p. 62. *Cf.* D. Peter Mazur, "Fertility and Economic Dependency of Soviet Women," *Demography* (Chicago), February 1973, pp. 37-51.

[14] *Ekonomiia i organizatsiia promyshlennovo proizvodstva* (Novosibirsk), No. 1, 1972, pp. 75-77.

[15] *Pravda,* April 17, 1971.

[16] See D. Valentei and G. Kiseleva, "The Family, Children, and Society," *Pravda,* Oct. 5, 1969. Dmitri Ignatevich Valentei became head of the Center for the Study of Population Problems at Moscow State University in 1968; at the present time he is head of the Department of Population in the Faculty of Economics of the same university.

[17] *Literaturnaia gazeta* (Moscow), Aug. 30, 1972.

[18] Kvasha, *op. cit.,* pp. 37-38.

[19] *Literaturnaia gazeta,* March 20, 1968; Godfrey S. Baldwin, "Estimates and Projections of the Population of the USSR—By Age and Sex: 1950 to 2000," *International Population Reports,* Series P-91, No. 23, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1973, pp. 15-16.

[20] *Sotsialnoe obespechenie* (Moscow), April 1970, p. 52.

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Members of the older generation in a park along one of Moscow's boulevards.

—Photo by Novosti via Sovfoto.

knowledge becomes obsolete.[21] As the proportion of young people declines in the USSR, it is anticipated, so will the proportion of those whose physical and educational strengths hold out the most promise for Soviet economic growth.

It is not difficult to read into the current Soviet demographic situation negative consequences for future Soviet international strength. A possible slowdown in economic growth and a decline in the share of the USSR in world population can, according to Perevedentsev, "have multifaceted consequences."[22] These consequences are never spelled out, but one detects in the writings of many Soviet demographers an acceptance of the premise that "a country's position in the world, all other things being equal, is determined by the size of its population."[23] Comparisons between the birthrate in the USSR on the one hand and the somewhat higher ones in Japan and the United States on the other crop up in Soviet demographic discussions time and again. They fully indicate that Soviet anxiety over the dual problem of lagging productivity and a falling birthrate is amplified by considerations of potential disadvantage vis-à-vis the USSR's prime international economic competitors. Ironically, concern for another competitor, China, may help explain why the Soviet government seems prepared to tolerate the continued migration of ablebodied Russians to potentially unreliable minority areas in Central Asia at the expense of economic and population growth in the RSFSR.

So much for the scope of the Soviet demographic problem and its potential ramifications for the future development of the USSR. It is now necessary to turn to a discussion of the causes of the trends with which Soviet population policy-makers are faced. Only after that will it be possible to evaluate properly the remedies which these policy-makers have proposed.

Decline and Imbalance: Causes

The years since the foundation of the Center for the Study of Population Problems at Moscow State University in 1965 have witnessed increasing efforts by Soviet demographers to explain population dynamics in the USSR. Laboring under the problems of politization typical of the social sciences in socialist countries and also forced to contend with a residual inclination in official statistical circles to discount the utility of demography as a distinct science, demographic specialists have had difficulty in obtaining the inclusion of certain highly signifi-

[21] A.G. Vishinevskii, "Economic Consequences of the Aging of the Ablebodied Population," *Demograficheskie tetradi* (Kiev), No. 2-3, cited in V. Perevedentsev, "New Demographic Literature," *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), September 1971, pp. 130-31. According to US Department of Commerce projections, the median age of the Soviet population in the year 2000 will range between 29 and 36.

[22] *Voprosy ekonomiki*, September 1971, p. 132.

[23] *Literaturnaia gazeta*, March 20, 1968, p. 11; see also L. Degtiar, "Scientific Council on Problems of Demography," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, March 1970, p. 155; and V. Guseinov and V. Korchagin, "Manpower Problems," *ibid.*, February 1971, p. 51.

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Children at rest time in a new nursery built to serve the youthful population of the new city of Amursk, a Far Eastern site of timber and chemical production.

—Photo by E. Ettinger, Novosti, via Sovfoto.

cant questions in Soviet census information sheets and are sometimes forced to derive all-USSR projections from sporadic and small samplings of the population. Nevertheless, Soviet analysts are attempting to free demography from the simple extrapolation of empirical patterns from one period to another and from one group to another, and also to remove the effects of the long-held first principle of Soviet demography, that changes in reproductive processes follow directly from the restructuring of society according to socialist ideology. Prominent spokesmen now urge the examination of population dynamics in the context of the cultural, psychological and developmental levels of a society. How else can one explain, they ask, the "great differences in birth and death rates in socialist countries and the similarity of these indicators in the developed countries of socialism and capitalism," for example, the USSR and the United States?[24]

As a result of their altered perceptions of the forces affecting the Soviet birthrate, demographers have formulated an ever-increasing number of studies to determine the reasons women cite for not having children and to specify the correlation between these reasons and actual birthrate statistics. This dual approach is especially necessary in view of the gap which exists between the number of children per family that demographers view as ideal (2.6-2.7 for a slightly expanding population), the number that women surveyed consider the optimum (2 or 3, according to 78 percent of women in Byelorussia, for example),[25] and the actual number of children per family revealed by the 1970 census (only 1 or 2 in 80-85 percent of Soviet families).[26] The trend toward one-child families, especially in the urban areas of the western USSR, is becoming increasingly worrisome to Soviet planners and demographers. According to D. I. Valentei, "one gets the impression that society is more interested than the family in a new baby being born."[27]

Among women surveyed, the same reasons for waning interest in childbearing crop up time and time again—poor housing, insufficient child-care facilities, and generally low living standards. Soviet demographers, on the other hand, seeking to explain such inconsistencies as the fact that republics with the highest living standards also have the lowest birthrates, emphasize broader socioeconomic and cultural causes for the declining birthrate, in the belief that the specific difficulties referred to by the women consulted would not loom insurmountable if a basic commitment to large families were present. Polls comparing the frequency of specific complaints among women with large and small families, in urban and rural locales, and in Slavic and non-Slavic areas support this hypothesis. Women in rural areas of Central Asia, for example, where the levels of housing, kindergarten facilities and income are not as high as in the Baltic Republics, continue to have many children.

This realization has prompted Soviet demographers to give special attention to those factors which determine attitudes toward childbearing among major sectors of the population. These factors include urbanization, the cultural peculiarities

[24] Volkov *et al., op. cit.*, p. 19; see also the views of T. Riabushkin, Chairman of the USSR Council on the Socio-Economic Problems of Population, cited in R. Galetskaia, "Social and Economic Problems of the Population," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, March 1972, p. 150. On extrapolation and the noninclusion of questions on census sheets, see V. Perevedentsev, "Continuation of a Controversy," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, March 20, 1968, p. 11.

[25] It is important to note that in Byelorussia only 33 percent of women who regarded the ideal family as one with three children anticipated having that many themselves; see A.G. Volkov, Ed., *Faktory rozhdaemosti* (Factors in the Birthrate), Moscow, 1971, pp. 35-51.

[26] *Pravda*, Aug. 16, 1972.

[27] D. Valentei, "Current Population Problems in the USSR," *Nauchnye doklady vysshei shkoly. Ekonomicheskie nauky* (Moscow), No. 1, 1969; trans. in *Problems of Economics*, Vol. XII, No. 7 November 1969, p. 52.

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of Central Asian Muslim society, and the career orientations of women.

The validity of the emphasis on urbanization as a factor conditioning attitudes toward family size is substantiated by virtually all Soviet (but not all Western) survey and census data. When urban dwellers leave relatively close-knit rural communities, they leave behind the well-ordered traditional forms of control and influence represented by their families and local public opinion and enter a world where stress, mobility, and "consumerism" are the norms. The significance of these forces seems to rise as the size of the urban area increases, with birthrates declining and, after a certain size is reached, deathrates rising as the population grows. For the USSR as a whole from 1913 to 1967, the share of urban population in total population rose from 18 percent to 55 percent. During the same period, the birthrate declined from 30.2 to 15.5 per thousand in urban areas and from 48.8 to 19.7 per thousand in rural areas.[28]

Soviet analysts find it especially revealing that the correlation between urbanization and birthrate cuts across ethnic and nationality lines. In other words, while birthrates tend to be higher in republics where the share of the urban population in total population is lower than the Soviet average, as it is in Central Asia, Russians who migrate to less urbanized areas have, on the average, more children than their counterparts in the RSFSR. Similarly, a survey in the Bashkir Autonomous Republic has revealed that changes in contemplated family size occurred when local families moved to urban areas. This survey did reveal national differences, as only 15.5 percent of the Bashkirs changed their opinions in contrast to 74.6 percent of the Russians.[29] But Soviet demographers are fairly confident that the importance of the nationality factor will decline as the long-range Soviet program of curbing excessive urbanization while urbanizing rural regions continues. In fact, some analysts look to urbanization as a means of equalizing the birthrate throughout the republics of the USSR or, perhaps more precisely, of serving as a birth control factor in the Central Asian republics.[30]

According to Soviet demographer S.I. Bruk, "the average annual rates of increase of the peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus are so high that it would be difficult to find anywhere in the world significant ethnic population groups with equally high rates of increase."[31] Bruk cites the role of World War II in this rapid increase, explaining that the peoples of Central Asia suffered less than those

[28] O.V. Larmin *et al.*, "Social and Demographic Aspects of Urbanization in the USSR," in *Problemy urbanizatsii v SSSR* (Problems of Urbanization in the USSR), Moscow, 1971, pp. 32-45.

[29] *Sovetskoe zdravookhranenie* (Moscow) No. 6, June 1970, pp. 35-36.

[30] See V.V. Pokshishevsky, "Urbanization and Ethnogeographic Processes," in *Problemy urbanizatsii v SSSR, op. cit.*, pp. 53-62; *cf.* R.I. Sifman *et al.*, "Methods of Research on Fertility and the Divorce Rate," *Vestnik statistiki* (Moscow), December 1967, p. 23.

[31] Bruk, *loc. cit.*

Table 3: Breakdown of Workers' and Employees' Families by Number of Children

(in percent)

	Urban Areas				Rural Areas*			
No. of children	1	2	3	4 or more	1	2	3	4 or more
ALL USSR	**54.7**	**34.7**	**7.3**	**3.3**	**34.3**	**34.1**	**16.9**	**14.7**
RSFSR	57.3	34.5	6.3	1.9	36.5	36.2	16.4	10.9
Ukraine	59.9	34.8	4.5	0.8	45.1	40.1	11.3	3.6
Byelorussia	49.0	42.1	7.4	1.5	30.7	36.4	21.8	11.1
Kazakhstan	43.6	35.9	12.7	7.8	25.2	28.0	21.0	25.8
Central Asian Republics	39.2	32.2	12.9	15.7	19.8	22.1	19.9	38.2
Trans-Caucasian Republics	34.2	35.0	18.4	12.4	18.9	22.2	22.2	36.7
Baltic Republics	59.6	34.1	5.2	1.1	44.6	35.7	13.9	5.8

* Collective farm families not included.

SOURCE: *Zhenshchiny i deti v SSSR* (Women and Children in the USSR), Moscow, Statistika, 1969, pp. 112-13. Based on a 1967 survey of 250,000 families with children under age 16. Families without children were not included in sample.

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in western Soviet territories occupied by "fascist invaders." He attributes primary responsibility for the regional variation of birthrates in the USSR today, however, to differences of social traditions and attitudes. In Central Asia and the Caucasus there are earlier marriages, fewer divorces and abortions, and a strong ethnic propensity to admire and respect large families. Furthermore, the percentage of women with higher education is considerably lower in Central Asia than in the RSFSR, for example, as is the incidence of salaried employment.

It is difficult to avoid the possible racial overtones of the fact that Soviet analysts lament the low career orientations of women in Central Asia while at the same time decrying the higher career orientations of women in the RSFSR, the Baltic Republics, Byelorussia, and the Ukraine. They complain that in Central Asia "the raising of a large number of children inhibits a rise in the cultural levels of mothers [and that] long interruptions in work limit their potential for participation in their jobs and in public affairs."[32] In contrast, they condemn the full participation of Slavic women in the national economy because of the deliberate self-limitation of family size which sometimes results.

In addition, Soviet analysts trying to clarify their attitudes toward career aspirations among women have to confront the problem of the relatively low mechanization and productivity levels of Soviet labor.[33] Low labor productivity implies that the number of workers employed is critical to production, and this in turn heightens the importance of the contribution of well-educated and highly skilled women to Soviet economic development. Unfortunately, many analysts see a negative correlation between the education and skill levels of Soviet women and the number of children they bear, so that the formulators of Soviet population policy

[32] Kvasha, *loc. cit.*, p. 38.

[33] *The New York Times*, Dec. 24, 1972, contained an estimate to the effect that the productivity of the Soviet industrial worker is 40 percent of that of an American worker, while the productivity of the Soviet agricultural worker is 10 percent that of his American counterpart. Moscow's Central Statistical Administration estimates the latter figure to be 20-25 percent; see *Nash sovremennik* (Moscow), No. 11, 1972.



Russian engineer Karetnikov with his family on the balcony of their new Moscow apartment.

—Photo by Sovfoto.

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find themselves once again forced to choose between increased availability of quality labor and an increased birthrate.[34]

Nor does the complexity of the labor-resource/reproduction nexus end here. For if the Soviet government were willing to allocate substantial funds to provide incentives for childbearing, the USSR would suffer a loss of rubles available for economic investment—as opposed to demographic investment—which would further aggravate the difficulties created by lower female labor availability. Ideally this would be a short-term loss that would be more than recouped when an expanded group of young workers entered the productive sector in 18-22 years. But Soviet analysts distrust the future. Uncertain as to which policies will actually significantly increase the birthrate, they focus their concern on the question of whether the reallocation of investment resources at the present time will do irreparable damage to the economy.

Clearly the dilemma facing Soviet planners is severe. If the participation rate of women in the labor force does not remain high, resources available for increased mechanization and material incentives to higher labor productivity will be diminished by a slowdown of production and by the diversion of funds to demographic investment. As a result, it will remain extremely costly economically to divert women from the labor force. On the other hand, if as high a percentage of women as works today continues to work in the productive sector, the labor shortage which is currently plaguing the USSR will reach crisis proportions in less than two decades.

Economics or Women's Rights

The writings of Soviet analysts and officials reveal some consensus on the economic factors conditioning the decision of women to have fewer children. Consider A. Kotliar's discussion of a primary factor in the desire of Soviet women to become full-time workers, namely, the necessity to augment family income:

. . . an analysis of family budgets of workers and employees in the RSFSR has shown that . . . the average wage per employed person fluctuates around 50 percent of the average family income, which in itself presupposes the existence of the earnings of one other family member. This is also confirmed by the data of many other studies which have shown that the family with two working members is most typical.[35]

Because of the decline in employment of adolescents which has resulted from longer schooling, it is usually both spouses who provide the support of the average nuclear family in the USSR. If a couple were childless, they might have money for "luxury" consumer goods, vacations, and other comforts. If they had two children, however, they would probably live at a minimal level of material comfort.



Hero Mother Irina Semenovna Lapasova, a shepherdess of the Baragash State Farm in the Gorno-Altai Autonomous Region, is pictured in 1971 with seven of her 10 children.

—Photo from TASS via Sovfoto.

[34] Guseinov and Korchagin, *loc. cit.*, p. 51. See also Jerzy Berent, "Causes of Fertility Decline in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, II," *Population Studies* (London), Vol. XXIV, No. 2, July 1970, p. 263.

[35] Kotliar, *loc. cit.*, p. 52.

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According to 1967 calculations of Soviet statisticians, the average monthly wage in the USSR was 103.4 rubles, and the minimum budget for a family of four was 206 rubles.[36] Clearly, a couple with the replacement number of children (which implies at least two) would not only have to eschew luxuries but might even have trouble making ends meet. Furthermore, since the average monthly expenses incurred in maintaining a child of preschool age have been estimated to be 50 rubles, to ask that the typical couple aid in expanding the Soviet population would be tantamount to asking them to accept financial hardship.[37]

Opportunity costs to women (measured in loss of professional status) and to the national economy (measured in loss of production) are a further component of the cost of bearing children in the USSR. The accepted method of calculating these costs is to place a value on a mother's time according to her education level and the average wage for working women with her academic preparation. Losses incurred during pregnancy and *postpartum* leave are then easily determined. While Soviet economists have done very little research in this area—perhaps to avoid encouraging further depression of the birthrate—there is a general acceptance of the fact that a woman loses not just earnings, but also skills, pension status, and possibly chances for advancement by temporarily leaving her job. In addition, since it has been determined that if a Soviet woman does not begin to advance within her profession while she is between 18 and 25 years of age she is not likely to do so later on,[38] there is at least an implicit acknowledgment that devotion of these years to childbearing might have negative consequences for a woman's fulfillment of her professional potential.

As for opportunity costs to the national economy when women are not working, those responsible for Soviet population policy have to admit that since the majority of Soviet women do not return to their jobs during the first year after the birth of a child, losses to the economy in maternity leave payments and decreases of the employed labor force are sizable. The implementation of recent proposals that women should receive financial rewards (half-pay) for having three children and that they should remain at home for two or three years after the birth of each child would, of course, make the losses even greater. Responding to these proposals in an article entitled "The Place of the Beautiful Half," one economist has made it very clear that needs of state dictate that the Soviet woman's place is definitely not in the home![39]

As significant as the economic costs of childbearing seem to be, it is important to realize that the willingness of women to attempt to combine family and career is being attenuated in the Soviet Union not only by financial realities, but also by the increasing dissatisfaction of Soviet women with the difficulties of self-realization as both mother and employee. Although there is no organized women's liberation movement in the USSR, evidence of an ongoing consciousness-raising process crops up continually in Soviet fiction and the press. At least one writer has referred to the development of a "women's question" in the USSR and has related it directly to the country's falling birthrate.[40]

Expressions of the "women's question" appear in Soviet literature, in survey responses, and above all, in reproductive behavior. All of these indicate growing disgruntlement with inadequate day-care facilities, the low level of industrialization of everyday life (as explained further on), and the lack of support and assistance provided by most husbands in the home. In the absence of any significant response to these complaints by either state or spouse, the Soviet woman has adopted her own solutions—divorce, abortion, and other less drastic methods of limiting family size.

Regarding day-care facilities, in 1960 Soviet institutions were able to accommodate only 23 percent of preschool children. Although the number of places has nearly doubled over the past decade, supply has not kept pace with demand, which has increased directly with income per family member and with education (rather than following birthrate trends).[41] In spite of repeated Communist Party directives that day-care facilities be expanded

[36] A.K. (sic), "A Demographic Problem: Employment of Women and the Birthrate," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, May 1969, p. 157.

[37] G.S. Sarkisian and N.P. Kuznetsova, *Potrebnesti i dokhod semi* (Demand and Family Income), Moscow, 1967, pp. 55, 66; cited in A.K. (sic), *loc. cit.*, p. 157.


[38] See article by M. Shishkan in N.P. Frolov *et al.*, *Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie problemy trudovykh resursov* (Social and Economic Problems of Manpower), Kishinev, 1971.

[39] *Literaturnaia gazeta*, April 16, 1969, p. 11.

[40] See *Zhurnalist* (Moscow), No. 1, 1971, pp. 40-42; also *Soviet Life* (Moscow), March 1972, pp. 52-53.

[41] Mark Field, "Workers (and Mothers): Soviet Women Today," unpublished manuscript, Boston University, 1964, p. 50. See also Bernice Madison, "Social Services for Families and Children in the Soviet Union Since 1967," *Slavic Review* (Columbus, Ohio), Vol. XXXI, No. 4, December 1972, pp. 831-32.

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The Soviet government failed to reach its 1966-70 goals for building day-care facilities, as this cartoon from Krokodil *(Moscow), No. 8, 1971, p. 2, reminds. The caption reads: "Comrade, here is your directive!" The head of a construction trust hurries away from an uncompleted children's nursery, while an indignant mother waves at him the passage from the 1966-70 Five-Year Plan which promised "to expand the network of children's establishments, to build during the five-year period at government expense preschool facilities with a capacity of more than two million [children] . . ."*

throughout the USSR, compliance has not been good, with results varying from republic to republic and according to the urban or rural nature of the region. Thus, while the ratio of supply of kindergarten places to demand is currently about 80 percent in Moscow and in Kaluga, several republics seem to have used funds appropriated for day-care facilities to construct administrative and sport complexes instead.[42] In addition, 83 million rubles allotted to investment in preschool institutions in 1968 went unused.[43] Such figures indicate that while a commitment to the idea of adequate day-care may have been made by the central government, other forces have interfered with the achievement of this goal.

Of course, there may be some justification for demographers' criticisms that the Central Statistical Administration is putting too much faith in the theory that an increase of day-care places will result in a birthrate rise. After all, between 1960 and 1966 the birthrate in Moscow dropped 25 percent even though the number of day-care places increased by 61.5 percent. However, given the frequency with which this factor is mentioned by women in surveys, it is at least conceivable that the decline in the Soviet birthrate in the 1960's would have been even more drastic had massive day-care construction efforts not been made.

Problems of "Free Time"

In addition to the problems of ensuring that her children are cared for during the day, the Soviet working woman must also contend with numerous difficulties and inconveniences during her "free time." A primary problem in this context is the "low level of industrialization of everyday life," that is,

[42] *Pravda*, Feb. 24, 1970.

[43] *Izvestia* (Moscow), April 24, 1969; *Pravda*, Feb. 24, 1970; *Pravda vostoka*, May 22, 1970; *Zdravookhranenie rossiiskoi federatsii* (Moscow), No. 5, May 1970, pp. 23-28.

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the low availability of labor-saving household appliances. Although there are major inconsistencies between the figures cited by economists and those publicized in *Pravda*, it seems that 58 percent of Soviet families have washing machines, while only 38 percent have refrigerators and only 11 percent have vacuum cleaners.[44] Moreover, recently announced cutbacks in the production of consumer goods[45] make it unlikely that Soviet women will be able to free additional time from the hours now spent on housework.

This problem is especially severe in a society where the publicly operated service sector is notorious for its inefficiency. Although Soviet planners assert that during the last Five-Year Plan the volume of everyday services doubled in cities and almost tripled in rural areas, the service sector began to develop from a very low base and remains inadequate. Furthermore, any desire to sustain the recent rate of expansion of services for even a short period seems precluded by the following labor utilization projections which appeared in *Pravda:*

Calculations show that the nonproductive sphere, if the former proportions and rates of development are maintained, will require by 1980 an additional number of people equal to two-thirds of the entire natural increase in the ablebodied population, while the share of this sphere in the total number of employed persons will rise to approximately 50-60 percent by the year 2000. Such a concentration of resources in the nonproductive branches may have a negative effect on the development of material production, which is even now experiencing a shortage of cadres.[46]

Soviet officials attempt to prepare the public for disappointment by constantly railing against "harmful consumer-spirit tendencies." But such propaganda provides small consolation to the woman who is exhorted to participate in public life in addition to responding to the Soviet Union's need for a higher birthrate.

The reaction of a growing number of Soviet women to these conflicting pressures is to opt out of the family-and-motherhood nexus through contraception, abortion, and divorce. It is difficult to determine the precise influence of any one of these factors on population dynamics in the USSR, but such statistics as are available and the falling rate of natural population increase provide ample proof of the frequency with which the women of the Soviet Union are turning to these options.

Western analysts estimate that every year approximately 7,500,000 abortions are performed in the Soviet Union, a figure 80 percent greater than the annual number of live births.[47] Soviet surveys suggest the influence of urbanization and work status on the abortion decision, with the lack of housing space in urban communities impelling many women to resort to this alternative and with the frequency of abortion among working women two and one-half times greater than that among nonworking women.[48] There is also an obvious link between existing family size and abortion. One study of women at a Moscow clinic has indicated that in Moscow families with no children 22 percent of undesired pregnancies end in abortion, while in families with two or more children the abortion rate rises to 100 percent.[49]

Despite these statistics, proposals to increase the Soviet birthrate by outlawing abortions have been rejected up to now. This is perhaps because of the basic Soviet ambivalence about making the sizable demographic investments which would be required by a high rate of population expansion. The widely held belief that a prohibition of abortions might increase the birthrate for one to two years but would then be followed by a decline in the birthrate to below the preprohibition level has also acted to prevent the imposition of a ban.[50]

In fact, Soviet demographers appear to be much more agitated by the rising divorce rate in the USSR than by the country's abortion rate. *Izvestia* has reported that almost one out of every three Soviet marriages is terminated in less than three years,[51] and official figures from the 1970 Central Statistical Administration yearbook showing that there were 0.4 divorces per thousand population in 1950, 1.3

[44] *Pravda*, June 6, 1971; *cf.* Guseinov and Korchagin, *loc. cit.*, p. 50. Also see *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR, 1922-1972* (USSR National Economy, 1922-1972), Moscow, 1972, p. 373.

[45] *Pravda*, Dec. 25, 1972.

[46] *Ibid.*, Sept. 21, 1971.

[47] Berent, *loc. cit.*, p. 281.

[48] E.A. Sadvokasova, "Certain Social and Health Aspects of the Study of Abortion," *Sovetskoe zdravookhranenie*, March 1963, pp. 46-47; cited in David Heer, "Abortion, Contraception and Population Policy in the Soviet Union," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), Vol. XVII, No. 1, July 1965, p. 80.

[49] Sadvokasova, *loc. cit.*, pp. 45-50.

[50] Heer, *loc. cit.*, pp. 80-83; and V. Belova and L. Darskii, "Opinions of Women on Family Formation," *Vestnik statistiki*, August 1968, p. 33.

[51] *Izvestia*, July 20, 1972.

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per thousand in 1960, and 2.6 per thousand in 1970 indicate that the USSR now has one of the highest divorce rates in the world.[52] This situation appears even more serious when one considers the fact that a significant percentage of Soviet divorces are not registered (a Moscow survey revealed that 30 percent were unregistered) and thus not reflected in official statistics. Furthermore, recent studies indicate that the single life is considered more and more attractive in the USSR and that fewer and fewer divorced young people seek to remarry. In part as a result of this, one out of every four men between the ages of 25 and 30 in the Soviet Union in 1970 was unmarried.[53]

The liberalization of Soviet divorce laws in 1968 to allow for a simple registry-office procedure for childless couples may be a factor in the high Soviet divorce rate and perhaps also in the decision of many couples to delay having children.[54] However, Soviet surveys and census data reveal that the impetus toward increasingly prevalent divorce stems from the very essence of social and economic change in the USSR. Since divorce is more frequent in urban than in rural areas (Moscow's divorce rate is 2.5 times the all-union average, Central Asia's only half the national average), the Soviet divorce rate is likely to increase apace as long as the Soviet government continues its program to urbanize less-developed areas.[55] In addition, Soviet data indicate a very high correlation between educational attainment and divorce, with this correlation especially marked among women. Because the requirements of the Soviet economy, and of modernization generally, are drawing more and more women into higher education, it is difficult to see how anything except a further increase in the divorce rate can be hoped for at the present time.

Clearly, monumental changes have taken place in the economic, social, and educational positions of Soviet women. Unfortunately, attitudes toward women in the USSR have not kept pace with these changes, state attitudes and particularly those of the average spouse lagging far behind those demanded by the current situation. The "women's question" in the USSR has had enormous ramifications for family stability. This in turn has affected the birthrate. For a variety of reasons Soviet officials and scholars have chosen to concentrate their efforts on increasing family stability as a means of bolstering the birthrate, while hoping—unrealistically—that the "women's question" will somehow resolve itself.

Demographic Crisis: Proposed Solutions

The complexity of the birthrate problem in the USSR and the basic ambivalence concerning the proper role of women that characterizes most Soviet commentary have meant, not surprisingly, much analysis but few concrete solutions for the problem of devising adequate incentives to boost and balance population growth while not hindering economic development. Financial considerations have delayed the introduction of monetary incentives to increased childbearing. They have also tempered propagandistic exhortations lest women take these too seriously and withdraw from the labor market. As a result, solutions proposed by Soviet writers avoid a frontal—and potentially costly—attack on the birthrate problem and concentrate instead on indirect measures which might raise the fertility index while not significantly reducing a woman's total time contribution to the Soviet labor force. These measures include lowering the marriage age, providing more women the opportunity for part-time work, and developing more effective regional planning to avoid the concentration of "male industries" in certain cities while thousands of unmarried women work in other geographic areas.

Perevedentsev, who points out that in the union republics with high birthrates the average age of newlyweds is low, is the foremost proponent of lowering the marriage age—preferably through attitudinal rather than legal changes.[56] The potential significance of any correlation between marriage age and birthrate for the USSR as a whole, however, is all but negated by a number of statistical realities. In the Ukraine, for example, where 1972 statistics showed that half of recently married women were un-

[52] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1970 g.* (USSR National Economy in 1970), Moscow, Statistika, 1970, p. 52.

[53] R.I. Sifman, "Dynamics of the Fertility of Female Cohorts in the USSR," in Volkov *et al., op. cit.*, p. 157; Sifman *et al., loc cit.*, p. 21; *Literaturnaia gazeta*, Aug. 30, 1972.

[54] For the 1968 changes in Soviet divorce laws, see *Pravda*, June 27, 1968.

[55] *Nedelia* (Moscow), No. 12, March 12-18, 1967, p. 18.

[56] According to Perevedentsev, 1959 census data indicated that in Byelorussian cities and towns 8 percent of females aged 18 or 19 were married, while in Turkmenian rural areas the corresponding figure was 54 percent: *Literaturnaia gazeta*, April 21, and Sept. 1, 1971.

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der 20, there has been a perceptible increase in early divorces as well as early marriages.[57] And in the Russian Republic, marriage age has been shown to have almost no effect on the average number of children per family.[58] In other words, the correlation between marriage age and birthrate may hold in the Central Asian republics, where there are traditional cultural factors conditioning a desire for larger families, but in the western areas of the USSR, where these factors are lacking, it is not likely that marriage age is very significant in determining childbearing behavior.

Concerning proposals to increase the availability to women of part-time work, Soviet census data suggest that their implementation would have little effect on the participation rate of women in the labor force or on the birthrate. The 1970 census inquired whether people of working age in the domestic and private economic sectors wished to enter the public sector. Only 50 percent of the 2.3 million such people in the RSFSR—most of whom were women—replied that they would consider making such a change, and the availability of part-time employment was only one of the conditions mentioned by those who said that they would.[59] In addition, since women working part-time are not likely to have more children than those not working at all, and since studies indicate that, given the financial realities of life in the USSR, the overwhelming majority of currently working women would not—or could not—settle for part-time jobs,[60] it is clear that making such jobs available would not provide any real stimulus to increased childbearing.

The final indirect measure proposed to increase the all-union birthrate calls for the alleviation of deficiencies in regional planning which have created "cities of brides and cities of grooms." In the Russian Republic alone, there are more than one hundred cities (out of nearly one thousand) with *pronounced* disproportions between the number of male and female laborers. In fact, most cities in the RSFSR have enterprises which employ mostly women, with the result that local men often emigrate, leaving rates of marriage and natural population increase at comparatively low levels. On the other hand, the concentration of heavy industry in the Urals and in Siberia has resulted in a predominantly male labor force in those regions. Fortunately the demographic consequences of this latter imbalance are not quite as severe as those in the western republics since wages in heavy industry are higher than in manufacturing and therefore provide a more favorable economic base for raising a family. The shortages of services and light industries in these regions partially negate the beneficial effects of higher wages, however, since they make living conditions less satisfactory and employment for women harder to find.

In fact, deficiencies in the siting of enterprises seriously restrain economic progress in Siberia and the Far East. In these areas a severe shortage of labor exists in many industries despite census figures showing 320,000 people in the domestic economy who want jobs.[61] The Five-Year Plan for 1971-1975 includes a directive that such demographically and economically harmful imbalances be corrected. But it is likely that problems of financing and a generally unresponsive planning system will make corrective measures very slow in coming.

Conclusion

In the face of probable minimal results from indirect efforts to raise the birthrate, some Soviet demographers have continued to press for a government program of well coordinated financial inducements such as longer paid maternity leaves, larger child-support grants, preferential housing assignments, and pension considerations for time spent raising children. The central government has taxed bachelors and childless couples, increased child-support payments to low-income families, and even extended maternity leaves somewhat, but these measures have fallen far short of the more sweeping programs proposed in economic journals. The persuasiveness of scholarly arguments has been diluted by the complacency and ambivalence of Soviet officialdom. In addition, widespread doubts whether a positive correlation actually exists between living-standard and birthrate levels—doubts strengthened

[57] *Izvestia*, July 20, 1972.

[58] O.V. Larmin, "On General and Specific Laws of Population," *loc. cit.*, pp. 22-34.

[59] *Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennovo proizvodstva*, January 1972, pp. 75-77. This article points out, however, that approximately 25 percent of those not working in the social sector in January 1970 had been recruited by July 1971.

[60] *Literaturnaia gazeta*, April 16, 1969.

[61] *Ekonomika i organizatsiia promyshlennovo proizvodstva*, January 1972, p. 77; Kotliar, *loc. cit.*, p. 53; and V.V. Pokshishevsky, "Population Migration in the USSR," *Priroda* (Moscow), September 1961, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, Ohio), Vol. XXI, No. 47, 1969, p. 12.

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by the fact that as the standard of living in the USSR has risen the birthrate has declined—have prompted one economist to discount the effectiveness of "measures which amount to proposals to transform maternity, in one degree or another, into professional, paid social labor."[62] In fact, Professor Valentei has concluded, financial incentives might be successful only among those ethnic groups whose cultural traditions have already given rise to the highest birthrates in the USSR.[63]

Soviet commentary has increasingly noted that economic necessity is not the sole factor prompting women to enter the labor force. More and more women in the USSR show an interest in career advancement and ultimately in "personal fulfillment." It is possible that society will have to provide women with greater job opportunities in order to bring about a decline in the intensity of female job orientation and a renewed interest in motherhood as a fulfillment source. Even if one assumes financial need to be the major motivating factor behind female participation in the labor force, it is highly probable that only a proportionate supply of prestigious and well-paying jobs for women will allow a family to save funds in anticipation of a time when the idea of having a second or third child might be entertained.[64]

Suggestions such as these clearly push any resolution of the Soviet birthrate problem far into the future. Given the fact that population dynamics in the USSR are intricately related to the very fact and nature of Soviet economic development, it seems likely that constant reminders that the full flowering of Marxist-Leninist society will resolve all problems of ethnic relations, attitudes toward women, and the modernization-urbanization process provide Soviet demographers their only basis for optimism.

[62] Yu. Bzhiliansky, "Methodological Prerequisites for Population Prognosis," *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, January 1972, p. 79.

[63] D. Valentei, "Current Population Problems in the USSR," *loc. cit.*, p. 53; also D. Valentei and G. Kiseleva, "The Demographer's View of the Cradle," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, March 17, 1971, p. 12.

[64] Kotliar, *loc. cit.*, p. 53; Bzhilianskiy, *loc. cit.*, p. 58; and *Pravda*, March 31, 1971.

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Nonruling Parties and the "Peaceful Path"

By George W. Rice

There have always been differences among the leaders of nonruling Communist parties (NRCP's) as to the proper strategy to be employed in the quest for political power. During the Stalin era, the problem was complicated by Soviet injunctions to all Communist parties—in most cases observed in local practice—to pursue strategies that primarily served the interests of the USSR and took little or no account of the domestic political contexts within which these parties had to operate. Since Stalin's death in 1953, this "system-support" role has become less important in determining the political behavior of the NRCP's. As a result of polycentrism, modified Soviet perspectives, the Sino-Soviet dispute, and other factors, the nonruling Communist parties now enjoy greater freedom to shape their strategies to fit their domestic setting, and the diversity of their strategies has increased. While neither the Soviet Union nor individual Communist organizations have ruled out armed struggle as the appropriate strategy in isolated instances, a majority of the NRCP's have opted for the "peaceful (including the parliamentary) road" to socialism endorsed by Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev in 1956 and are endeavoring to "play politics" within whatever political and social contexts prevail in their respective countries. This study attempts to examine the record of such activity in some 69 lands where NRCP's have opted for the "peaceful road."[1]

Mr. Rice is Associate Professor of Political Science at West Virginia University (Morgantown). His articles on various topics have appeared in Vidya *(Pittsburgh) and the* Midwest Journal of Political Science *(Detroit).*

The parties under review fall into four broad categories in terms of the degree and character of political influence that they currently wield. These are: (1) parties with no significant domestic influence; (2) parties with a marginal amount of national influence and even, in certain cases, a substantial amount of regional or local influence; (3) parties some of whose members occupy influential positions as individuals in "progressive" governments or ruling parties, though the NRCP's themselves may be officially illegal or may have formally dissolved; (4) parties of major political consequence at the national level.

The categorization of each party reflects, in essence, the extent to which that party has managed to form political alliances. In pursuing power by "peaceful" means, all NRCP's seek to forge several types of "alliances": for example, alliances with individuals through party membership, alliances with labor organizations (as "representatives of the proletariat"); alliances with various social segments of the electorate; and alliances with other parties to wage elections or to establish government coalitions. The success or lack of success of these efforts can be measured by such yardsticks as the size of party membership (in relation to total adult population), the prowess of the party in labor unions, the party's share of the electoral vote, and the party's relations with other parties. All these meas-

[1] Nonruling Communist parties in Burma, Cambodia, Guatemala, Haiti, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand, and South Vietnam have endorsed violent forms of struggle and are therefore excluded from consideration here. The Indonesian CP is excluded, too, because little is known of its actual strategy on the ground—if, indeed, it has any strategy other than to survive the continuing efforts of the security police to round up all who may have had some association with the abortive 1965 coup.

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ures will be explored in the course of the following discussion, and an attempt will also be made to assess the trend of the overall fortunes of each party over the last five years (1968-73).

The degree to which the individual parties exercise influence at present, of course, depends on a number of factors. Some of these—*e.g.*, the legal status of the party, its cohesiveness or disunity, the competitiveness of the political system in which it functions, etc.—apply to all parties; others—*e.g.*, a special parliamentary situation, the strength (or weakness) of the non-Communist parties of the Left, etc.—affect only specific parties. This article will endeavor to weigh these various factors and to reach some tentative conclusions about the relative importance of their impact.

Insignificant NRCP's

Having defined the scope of our analysis, let us now turn to an examination of the first category of NRCP's—those without appreciable influence in their own countries. Thirty-nine lands, as Table 1 shows, have parties which belong in this group. All the parties have memberships of 0.5 percent or less of local adult populations. Indeed, only six boast memberships in excess of 0.1 percent of the adult populations of their respective countries.[2] Though the parties in 17 lands enjoy legal status, in none of the 39 countries has a party managed to win the support of any substantial segments of the local electorate, to develop a significant base within local labor organizations, or to forge working alliances with local non-Communist, left-of-center parties. Thus, while the parties in these lands are capable of mounting occasional demonstrations, they exhibit little capacity to play more than a protest role in local political life.

As a group, these parties labor under several handicaps. In 22 countries, they are officially illegal (see Table 1); and in a slightly different 21 lands, they operate in semi-closed or closed political systems.[3] Moreover, in 16 of the latter group of countries, they are the object of police and/or military repression of varying intensity but sufficient to curtail their operational capabilities.

In a number of cases, the local Communist forces are divided into rival bodies or into factions within a single body. The Dominican Republic, for example, has six different parties. Other major splits exist in Bolivia, where the nonviolent Communist Party of Bolivia/Soviet Line (PCB/S) boasts just a few more followers than the combined memberships of the Communist Party of Bolivia/Chinese Line (PCB/C) and the Trotskyite Revolutionary Workers' Party (POR); and in New Zealand, where the pro-Peking Communist Party of New Zealand outweighs the nonviolent, pro-Soviet Socialist Unity Party. Elsewhere, the splits or factional disputes are less serious, but they still tend to weaken the parties concerned.

Since the overall fortunes of the parties in the vast majority of the 39 lands have been declining (in 24 instances) or have stayed about the same (in 10 instances),[4] the parties themselves have not been especially attractive as coalition partners for the stronger left-of-center parties that exist in 12 countries or for the labor and socialist parties that rule in another 10 countries. In effect, the social-economic programs and greater organizational

[2] It should be noted that the membership figures given in Table 1 and in subsequent tables in this article represent the aggregate membership of all local Communist parties adhering to a "peaceful" strategy in countries where more than one Communist party exists. In a few cases, moreover, the figures somewhat overstate the memberships of the parties committed to the "peaceful" path, for the best available membership data cover all Communist elements in the lands concerned—including members of splinter groups that endorse violent forms of revolutionary struggle. It should also be underscored that the estimates here are as of January 1, 1972, for compilations as of January 1, 1973, had not yet appeared at the time of writing.

[3] The categorization of political systems employed throughout this article is based on that used by Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson in *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1972. Closed systems (C) lack broadly representative political processes and institutions; semi-closed systems (SC) boast some processes and institutions of this kind; democratic systems (D) have broadly representative political processes and institutions and a competitive party system; repressive systems (R) employ security forces to curtail or repress Communist party activities.

Classification of particular political systems obviously entails judgmental issues. There are numerous borderline cases, and all systems are subject to change. The specific classifications in this article derive primarily from Taylor and Hudson's findings, but the author has attempted to update these to January 1973.

[4] For five parties, there was insufficient basis upon which to assess the trend in influence. In making the estimates of trends here and throughout this article, the author has relied heavily on data in the 1968-72 volumes of US Department of State, *World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1968-72, and in the 1966-72 volumes of Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*, Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1967-72. These publications discuss not only trends in CP memberships, the degrees of CP sway over organized labor, and CP electoral achievements, but also the impact on the parties of repressive measures, party fragmentation, and factional disputes.

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Table 1: Insignificant Nonruling Communist Parties

(as of January 1, 1973)

Country	Party Membership(s) [a] Number	% of Adult Pop.	Party Legal Status [b]	State of Party Unity [c]	Type of Political System [d]	Strength of Left Parties [e]	5-Year Trend in Party Influence
Afghanistan	400	nil	I	U	SC	—	down
Algeria	400	nil	I	U	SC/R	X	down
Austria	25,000	0.50	L	S	D	X	down
Belgium	12,500	0.18	L	S	D	XX	unchanged
Bolivia	1,500	nil	I	S	C/R	XX	down
Brazil	13,000	nil	I	S	SC/R	—	down
Canada	2,000	nil	L	U	D	XX	down
Denmark	5,000	nil	L	U	D	X	unchanged
Dominican Republic	500	nil	I	S	D	XX	down
El Salvador	100	nil	I	U	SC	XX	down
Fed. Republic of Germany	33,400	nil	L	S	D	X	unchanged
Greece	28,000	0.46	I	F	C/R	—	down
Honduras	300	nil	I	F	SC/R	—	down
Iran	500	nil	I	F	SC/R	—	down
Ireland	300	nil	L	U	D	XX	down
Israel	2,000	nil	L	S	D	X	unchanged
Jordan	500	nil	I	S	SC/R	—	down
Lebanon	1,500	0.14	L	S	D	—	?
Lesotho	nil	nil	I	U	C	—	?
Malagasy Republic	nil	nil	L	U	SC	XX	?
Malta	100	nil	L	U	D	X	?
Mauritius	nil	nil	L	U	D	X	?
Mexico	5,000	nil	L	S	D	X	down
Morocco	300	nil	I	U	SC/R	XX	down
Netherlands	10,000	0.14	L	U	D	XX	unchanged
New Zealand	100	nil	L	S	D	X	unchanged
Nicaragua	100	nil	I	F	SC/R	—	down
Norway	2,250	nil	L	U	D	X	down
Pakistan	1,750	nil	I	F	SC	—	down
Panama	250	nil	I	F	C/R	—	down
Paraguay	4,500	0.47	I	S	SC/R	—	down
Philippines	2,000	nil	I	S	SC/R	XXX	unchanged
Portugal	2,000	nil	I	S	C/R	—	unchanged
South Africa	100	nil	I	U	SC/R	XX	down
Spain	5,000	nil	I	S	C/R	—	unchanged
Switzerland	3,500	nil	L	S	D	XX	unchanged
Tunisia	100	nil	I	U	D	—	down
Turkey	1,250	nil	I	U	SC/R	XX	down
United States	30,000	nil	L	F	D	—	down

[a] Columns 1 and 2 represent combined membership in the case of countries which have more than one Communist party. "Nil" indicates a membership of less than 100 and also a share of membership in total adult population of less than 0.1 percent.

[b] L = legal; I = illegal.

[c] U = unified; S = split; F = factions.

[d] C = closed; SC = semi-closed; D = democratic; R = repressive.

[e] X = non-Communist left is ruling; XX = non-Communist left is stronger than the Communists; XXX = Communist party is the strongest party of the Left. The absence of an entry indicates that no determination could be made.

SOURCES: US Department of State, *World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations*, editions for 1968-72, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1968-72; Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*, editions for 1966-72, Stanford, California, Hoover Institution Press, 1967-72; Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1972; *The New York Times*; and *The World Marxist Review* (Toronto).

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abilities of the non-Communist left in these 22 lands seem to have "upstaged" the NRCP's and rendered them irrelevant and impotent.

The effort of several NRCP's to respond to this situation and enhance their image of legitimacy by renouncing subservience to Moscow in favor of "revisionist"—*i.e.*, more domestically-oriented—programs has had little discernible result other than to provoke debilitating factional controversies. The Austrian Communist Party affords an outstanding example. In 1970, anti-revisionist, conservative, pro-Soviet elements headed by Chairman Franz Muhri won the internal struggle and ousted revisionist forces led by Franz Marek and Ernst Fischer, who refused to stop condemning the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The termination or reduction of "system-support" roles and the pursuit of more independent courses in international Communist affairs by the CP's of Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain also generated crippling factional disputes without yielding any significant political gains.[5]

While one cannot totally dismiss the possibility that the influence of at least some of the parties in these 39 countries might grow appreciably in the future, the constraints under which the parties operate at present suggest that the prospects in this regard are fairly dim. For such a development to take place, some dramatic changes in the general political settings in which they function would probably be necessary.

NRCP's with Marginal Influence

Of the remaining 30 countries under consideration, 13 have parties with small or marginal influence in their domestic polities (see Table 2); however, the achievements of the parties in three of these states—India, Japan, and Uruguay—make them borderline cases and nearly put them into the category of successful NRCP's. While the parties in the latter three lands do not constitute forces to be reckoned with at the national level on a day-in, day-out basis, they have in some situations demonstrated an ability to mobilize important segments of the public and to force national action or reaction to their demands.

Since the parties in this general category tend to fall into two groupings, let us deal with them accordingly. The influence of the parties in the 10 countries aside from India, Japan, and Uruguay rests on fairly limited foundations. In none of these 10 states does party membership amount to as much as 0.5 percent of the total adult population, and in only three does it run more than 0.1 percent of that figure. The legalized parties have all failed to capture even 5 percent of the national vote; indeed, the most successful parties as far as legislative representation is concerned seem to be two outlawed parties. The Popular Vanguard Party in Costa Rica, though proscribed, functions openly and participated in the last general election on the slate of the leftist Socialist Action Party, which won 5 percent of the vote. In Nepal, individual members or sympathizers of the illegal local Communist



Franz Muhri, Chairman of the Austrian Communist Party, with Soviet General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev during a conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, in 1967.

—Photo by CTK (Czechoslovak Telegraph Agency) via Eastfoto.

[5] The data in this paragraph come from the 1968-72 volumes of the *World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations* and the 1966-72 volumes of the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*. Except where other sources are specifically cited, all subsequent information on party situations and developments in this article derives from the same sources.

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Party apparently have held important positions in the government, as well as some 15 percent of the seats in what are essentially advisory local and national "legislative" bodies, the Panchayat. Nor have any of the parties had appreciable success in forming alliances with non-Communist leftist parties in their countries. The Communist Party of Argentina in 1971 did join with five other parties to demand free elections, but unlike other leftist groups it did not gain the right to take part in the March 1973 national balloting.

The primary source of influence for the parties in these 10 countries lies in their sway over segments of organized labor at the national and local levels. This sway varies in strength from country to country. For example, the pro-Soviet, nonviolent Communist party in Ecuador dominates the largest labor organization in the country (a position which is further enhanced by considerable influence among student groups). In Nigeria, the Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party (SWAFP) exercises control over the second-largest trade-union body in the land. The pro-Moscow party in Peru still has substantial impact on local labor organizations, even though the split in the local Communist movement has had a debilitating effect in this regard and the party does appear to be losing ground. In Argentina, the local Communist party has had some success in displacing Peronist influence in labor unions; however, its foothold is concentrated in just a few groups.

In the case of the second group of parties, the sources of their influence are more diversified. While no party in any of these three countries possesses a membership of more than roughly 1 percent of the local adult population, parties in all the countries have won 5-10 percent of the national vote in recent elections. They have also registered some successes in establishing alliances—at least for electoral purposes—with other leftist or left-leaning parties. For example, the pro-Moscow Communist Party of India (CPI) concluded a number of local-level electoral agreements with the New Congress Party for the 1971 and 1972 state elections in order to restrict competition between the two organiza-

Table 2: NRCP's with Marginal Political Influence

(as of January 1, 1973)

Country	Party Membership(s) [a] Number	% of Adult Pop.	Party Legal Status [b]	State of Party Unity [c]	Type of Political System [d]	Strength of Left Parties [e]	5-Year Trend in Party Influence
Argentina	60,000	0.42	I	F	SC [f]	XX	unchanged
Australia	3,600	nil	L	S	D	X	down
Colombia	10,000	nil	L	S	D	XXX	up
Costa Rica	1,000	0.14	I	F	D	X	up
Ecuador	500	nil	I	S	C	—	down
Great Britain	29,000	nil	L	F	D	XX	down
India	155,000	nil	L	S	D	X	up
Japan	300,000	0.42	L	F	D	XX	up
Nepal	10,000	0.16	I	F	SC	—	up
Nigeria [g]	1,000	nil	I	U	C	X	up
Peru	2,000	nil	I	S	C	X	down
Uruguay	20,000	1.06	L	F	D	XXX	up
Venezuela	8,000	nil	L	S	D	X	down

[a] In countries which have more than one Communist party, columns 1 and 2 represent combined membership. "Nil" indicates a share of membership in total adult population of less than 0.1 percent.
[b] L = legal; I = illegal.
[c] U = unified; S = split; F = factions.
[d] C = closed; SC = semi-closed; D = democratic.
[e] X = non-Communist left is ruling; XX = non-Communist left is stronger than the Communists; XXX = Communist party is the strongest party of the Left. The absence of an entry indicates that no determination could be made.
[f] The future of Argentina's political system—despite the March 1973 presidential elections—remains somewhat in doubt; hence, it has been classified as "semi-closed" here.
[g] There are no legal political parties in Nigeria, but the existing government is leftist in character.

SOURCES: See Table 1.

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Kenji Miyamoto (center), Chairman of the Japan Communist Party, and his colleagues celebrate their election triumph of December 11, 1972, in which they won an unprecedented 38 seats in the lower house of the Japanese Diet.

—Photo by UPI.

tions.[6] In the Japanese national elections of December 1972, the Japan Communist Party (JCP) and the Japan Socialist Party entered into several pacts whereby the weaker candidate of one or the other organization dropped out of contention in order to further the chances of the other's candidate. Such arrangements enabled the JCP to increase the number of its seats in the Diet's lower house from 14 to 38, or to nearly 8 percent of the total.[7] In Uruguay, the local Communist party, which is the strongest individual left-of-center party in the country, was instrumental in the formation of the Frente Amplio, a popular front coalition, for the 1971 national elections. Though the front did less well than the party had expected in light of the serious economic problems besetting the country, it did accumulate 18 percent of the vote (with the CP itself garnering 6 percent).

Several factors appear to have affected the degree of influence attained by the NRCP's in this category. All the parties involved have enjoyed at least a modicum of opportunity to conduct activities and to make appeals to the populaces of their countries. Eight of the 13 countries have democratic political systems, and the local Communist parties are legal in seven of these. Moreover, in the only exception—Costa Rica—the local party operates openly. While the parties in the remaining five countries are proscribed and carry on their endeavors in closed or semi-closed political systems, they have still been allowed to function with a degree of freedom. That degree has been largely dependent on the attitudes of the governments of these states at any given time—especially in Argentina and Ecuador, where there have been several changes of government over the last decade, and in Nepal, where the monarchy has vacillated between arbitrary rule and experiments in limited, "guided" democracy.

In a few instances, special local circumstances have also enhanced the opportunities of the parties to engage in political activities. For example, the SWAFP in Nigeria has benefited from improved relations between that nation and the USSR growing out of Soviet diplomatic and material support for the

[6] See, for instance, Bhabani Sen Gupta, *Communism in Indian Politics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1972, pp. 132-33; and his "India's Rival Communist Models," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1973, p. 4.

[7] "Review of the Month," *Current History* (New York), February 1973, p. 93.

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Lagos regime during and after the civil war brought about by Biafra's attempted secession. Although it is not clear whether the nonviolent elements in Peru have profited from the closer contacts that Lima has had with the USSR and Cuba since 1970, the pro-Moscow party does seem to have bolstered its position somewhat by giving qualified support to the nationalistic and reform-oriented military government.

Two major impediments, however, have prevented the parties in these countries from achieving greater successes than they have registered. First, in all but one of the 13 countries, there have been factional disputes or open splits among local Communist forces. The most damaging ruptures have taken place in Ecuador and Peru—where nearly one-third of the Communist elements formed rival pro-Peking organizations advocating violent forms of struggle—and in India—where the movement is split into three competing bodies, two of which engage in parliamentary politics.[8] Elsewhere, the consequences have been less severe but nonetheless important. For example, small extremist groups have emerged in Colombia and Uruguay and have managed to tarnish and weaken the more moderate, pro-Moscow Communist parties there.



Rodney Arismendi, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uruguay, which contested 1971 elections as a member of the leftist Frente Amplio.

—A 1970 photo by TASS, via Sovfoto.

Second, the NRCP's in nine countries are overshadowed programmatically, organizationally, and/or electorally by non-Communist, left-oriented parties or governments. The situation in Peru, which is currently ruled by a reformist military regime which some observers regard as Latin America's most viable alternative to Marxism for bringing about economic growth and social reform,[9] affords one good illustration; but perhaps the best example, as well as the newest addition to the list, is the state of affairs in India. Prior to 1969, two rival electoral Communist parties there—the CPI and the Communist Party of India (Marxist), or CPI (M)—constituted the main leftist parties in the country; moreover, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's government had to rely on the parliamentary support of the CPI in the lower house (the Lok Sabha) after the 1969 split in the Congress Party and in the upper house after the 1970 elections reduced the number of seats of her New Congress Party to just 83 out of a total of 240. Now, however, the reform program espoused by Mrs. Gandhi's government has moved the New Congress Party to the left of center in the political spectrum; and while Mrs. Gandhi has continued to cooperate with the CPI, especially at the state level, her party's overwhelming victory in the 1971 elections has apparently relieved her of the need for CPI support nationally to carry through her reform program.[10]

Some Communist parties confronted by this second type of situation have sought to improve their

[8] The two parliamentary parties are the Communist Party of India, which has 90,000 members and is pro-Moscow in orientation, and the Communist Party of India (Marxist), which has 65,000 members and maintains an "independent" posture. The Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), with 7,000 members, is a clandestine, nonparliamentary, pro-Peking organization.

[9] See, for example, George W. Grayson, "Peru's Revolutionary Government," *Current History*, February 1973, p. 61.

[10] See, for instance, *The New York Times*, March 29, 1970, and Sen Gupta, "India's Rival Communist Models," *loc. cit.*, pp. 3-10.

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Table 3: NRCP's in States with "Progressive" Regimes

(as of January 1, 1973)

Country	Party Membership(s) [a] Number	% of Adult Pop.	Party Legal Status [b]	State of Party Unity [c]	Type of Political System [d]	Strength of Left Parties [e]	5-Year Trend in Party Influence
Egypt	1,000 [f]	nil	I	U	SC/R	X	down
Iraq	2,000	nil	I	S	C	X	up
Sudan	7,500 [g]	nil	I	F	SC/R	X	down
Syria	3,000	nil	I	S	SC	X	up

[a] In countries which have more than one Communist party, columns 1 and 2 represent combined membership. "Nil" indicates a share of membership in total adult population of less than 0.1 percent.
[b] L = legal; I = illegal.
[c] U = unified; S = split; F = factions.
[d] C = closed; SC = semi-closed; R = repressive.
[e] X = non-Communist left is ruling.
[f] This figure is an estimate of the strength of the Egyptian Communist Party at the time it formally disbanded in 1965.
[g] This figure is an estimate of the strength of the Sudan Communist Party prior to the abortive Communst coup of July 1971.

SOURCES: See Table 1.

images by adopting revisionist programs and discarding or reducing their "system-support" role (*i.e.*, their subservience to Moscow). For instance, the chief party in Australia no longer regards itself as the only group which will preside over the transition to socialism, but rather as a part of a coalition of the Left acting jointly to achieve this end. It has also formally abandoned its allegiance to Moscow and assumed an independent posture with respect to international Communist affairs.[11] The British Communist Party has advocated full protection of all civil liberties and a pluralistic system with equal rights for all political parties, even those opposed to socialism. Furthermore, it has criticized the USSR for the Soviet action against Czechoslovakia in 1968 and has in general become much less deferential to Moscow. In Venezuela, the Communist party's loyal support of the USSR has caused the majority of the old party to defect and form an independent Communist body known as the Movement to Socialism (MAS). The Japan Communist Party and to some extent the Mexican Communist Party have likewise staked out individual positions of their own on policy issues, especially on matters to do with the international Communist movement.

However, such efforts have produced decidedly mixed results. Only in Japan and India have parties that have modified their postures succeeded in strengthening their positions by doing so. Elsewhere, the general trend of the influence of the "independent" parties has been downward. Indeed, in some cases the shift in line has brought about splits, or additional splits, among local Communist forces. For example, in 1971 a minority of loyal pro-Soviet members of the Communist Party of Australia, which had already lost a group of pro-Chinese adherents several years earlier, broke away and founded a rival Socialist Party of Australia.

All in all, the future of the parties in most of these countries looks unpromising. In just seven have the fortunes of the local parties been on the upswing, and in four of these—Columbia, Costa Rica, Nepal, and Nigeria—the parties' bases of influence are still exceedingly tenuous, especially in light of their continued lack of legal status. Only in India, Japan, and Uruguay do their prospects seem reasonably bright.

NRCP's and "Progressive" Regimes

The Communist parties in four countries possess influence ranging from marginal to fairly substantial, but the source of this influence sets them apart from the parties in other categories and warrants treating them separately. In none of these countries do the parties boast memberships of any significant size in comparison with total local adult populations (see Table 3); and in all of them the parties—as illegal entities operating in closed or semi-closed

[11] Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Communist Party of Australia Today," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles), July 10, 1970, p. 69.

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political systems—lack both direct access to local electorates and independent bases of support among local labor organizations. The party in Egypt, in fact, has even ceased to exist as a formal body. However, in all four states individual Communists do have at least some chance to participate in local political life as members of existing leftist regimes or as members of "united front" ruling parties.

Such a situation has come about through a combination of factors. These regimes, though under non-Communist leadership, all qualify as "progressive" in Moscow's eyes. Most have close relations with the USSR and support Moscow's positions on numerous international issues; in addition, they all seem to be more or less committed to pursuing a "socialist" course of economic development.[12] Therefore, the Soviet Union has deemed it in its own interest to urge the indigenous Communist parties to cooperate with these governments. Indeed, there is evidence that in some cases it has gone so far as to ask the local Communist parties to dissolve themselves in order to preserve Moscow's solid ties with the existing national regimes. By the same token, close links with the USSR have encouraged the governments concerned to collaborate with the local Communist parties. On the whole, however, the leaders of these regimes have eschewed direct party-to-party cooperation and have sought to involve local Communists in official activities as individuals. In some instances, in fact, they have apparently asked Moscow to press the local Communist parties to disband; in return, they have seemingly promised to permit a greater Communist role within their own dominant political movements.

Both the influence of the parties and the trend of that influence vary considerably from state to state. At the outset, it should be noted that one Communist party which once belonged in this category has disappeared from it entirely. In 1964–65, the party in Algeria, proscribed and repressed since 1962, drastically reduced its organizational profile and directed its membership to join and work through the only legal party, the National Liberation Front. (Apparently, it did not go so far as to dissolve itself, for in 1965 it reappeared as the Socialist Vanguard Party.[13]) But the overthrow of Ahmed Ben Bella's government in June 1965 and the installation of a new regime hostile to local Communists rendered such an approach untenable. As a consequence, the Communist party reverted to an oppositional posture.

Of the parties that currently fall into this category, those in Egypt and the Sudan are decidedly the weakest, and their strength appears on the decline at this juncture. As already mentioned, the faction-ridden Egyptian party officially disbanded in 1965, and many individual Communists became members of the Arab Socialist Union, the country's sole legal party. Under Gamal Abdel Nasser, some of them even acquired positions of prominence, especially in the communications media. But the Sadat government that emerged after Nasser's death arrested or purged a number of such persons in 1971, and the status of individual Communists has deteriorated significantly.

From 1969 to 1971, the Sudan Communist Party, even though most of its leaders rejected the proddings of Moscow and local non-Communist leftists to dissolve the organization, managed to infiltrate the government of Jaafar Nimeri to a considerable extent. It eventually got into difficulties, however, over its insistence on maintaining a separate identity. Nimeri, unhappy over this state of affairs, moved to curtail the power of individual party members, and his actions ultimately precipitated an abortive Communist/army *coup d'etat* in July 1971. After a countercoup restored Nimeri to office, he executed some prominent members of the party, arrested others, and purged still others from influential posts; he also closed down all Communist-controlled front organizations, which had operated fairly openly for several years. Thus, the party, formerly the largest and most powerful in Africa, has suffered a major eclipse.

The fortunes of the parties in Iraq and Syria have been as volatile as the politics of the two countries, but the influence of the parties now seems reasonably high and on the rise. Under the military regime of Abdel Karim Kassem (1958–63), the Iraqi Communists occupied some key positions in the country's political hierarchy; however, they encountered hard times in the wake of the 1963 Baathist coup, whose

[12] For further discussion of "progressive" regimes, see Colin Legum, "Africa's Contending Revolutionaries," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1972, pp. 7-8; Jan F. Triska and David Finley, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, New York, Macmillan, 1968, especially chaps. 5 and 7. The USSR has classified as "progressive" the regimes of several other countries besides those listed here—*e.g.*, Burma—but these countries either have no organized Communist parties or have CP's which have rejected the "peaceful road" to socialism.

[13] Some analysts, however, have suggested that the party did in fact disband and not just go underground to reemerge later under a different name.

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leaders had a score to settle with them for the bloody battering that Baathists had received at the hands of Communist-dominated forces during internal armed clashes in 1959. Nevertheless, the party survived, and while the present regime has periodically cracked down on some of its activities, the ruling Baathists have allowed individual Communists to assume posts of importance in the national administration. For example, Communists hold the posts of Minister of Irrigation and Minister of State (without portfolio) in the current Iraqi cabinet, formed in May 1972.[14] Despite visible pressure from the USSR for the establishment of a National Progressive Front on the basis of full equality of the Baath Party, the Communist Party, and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan,[15] however, the Communists continue to be excluded from the national Revolutionary Command Council, where true decision-making power resides.

In Syria, individual Communists have served as government ministers off and on since 1966, and they do so today. Moreover, in March 1972, the ruling Baath Party agreed to form a National Progressive Front with the local pro-Moscow Communist party and three other leftist parties.[16] While the Baathists control the Front's Central Leadership directorate (with 10 of 18 seats, as compared with two for the Communists), the Front's very creation has at least partially legitimized a Communist role in the state's political life.

By and large, the level of influence of the local Communist parties in the countries under discussion here tends to be a function of the intimacy of the regimes' relations with the USSR and Moscow's willingness to use what leverage this intimacy gives it for the benefit of local Communists. For example, when Anwar Sadat in 1971 purged a group of leftists from positions of authority in Egypt, the USSR had a substantial foothold in the country, and the Soviet leaders chose to overlook Sadat's action in order to preserve their position. In Syria, by contrast, the USSR has not proved so indifferent recently. The Soviets actively promoted the formation of the Syrian National Progressive Front, consummated in March 1972. Furthermore, they turned down a request from the ruling Baathists—conveyed about the time that the USSR began negotiations with Damascus for Soviet base rights in Syria after the expulsion of Soviet military forces from Egypt in 1972—for assistance in getting the local pro-Moscow Communist party to disband and merge with their party. Moscow reportedly stressed the necessity of maintaining the Syrian party's independence of other local parties.[17]

It should be pointed out, of course, that the USSR's readiness to apply leverage to persuade "progressive" regimes to cooperate with the local Communist parties has not automatically ensured improving fortunes for these parties. Soviet pressure on the Baathists in Iraq, for instance, has not yet yielded a National Progressive Front embracing the Communist party or enabled it to gain representation on the Revolutionary Command Council.

Influential NRCP's

The parties in the final 13 countries exert a sizable amount of political influence on a fairly sustained basis (see Table 4). Except in Sri Lanka and Sweden, they have all garnered 15 percent or more of the electoral vote in national elections, and they all exercise significant sway at the national level on labor movements. Those in seven lands boast memberships of more than 100,000 and/or 1.0 percent of the local adult populations. Moreover, those in four countries have managed to establish national political alliances with other leftist parties, and three of these groupings at present constitute governing coalitions.

A number of factors account for the influence that the parties in these countries wield; other factors have imposed limits on the degree of that influence. To begin with, the parties everywhere function with reasonable freedom, for they are in all cases legal and operate in open, democratic political systems. Consequently, as just noted, the parties in every country but Sri Lanka and Sweden have been able to build up meaningful support among organized labor, and those in Chile, Cyprus, Finland, France, Guadeloupe, Iceland, and Italy have succeeded as well in attracting large totals of individuals into their ranks as members. In all but two lands, the parties have likewise won the backing of significant portions of their respective national electorates. Even where they have failed to do so—in Sri Lanka and Sweden—their electoral participation has at least given

[14] *Middle East Monitor* (Washington, DC), June 1, 1972, p. 2.
[15] *Ibid.*, April 1, 1972, p. 2.
[16] *Ibid.*, Aug. 15, 1972, p. 6.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

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Table 4: The More Influential NRCP's

(as of January 1, 1973)

Country	Party Membership(s) [a] Number	% of Adult Pop.	State of Party Unity [b]	Areas of Communist Strength [c]	Strength of Left Parties [d]	5-Year Trend in Party Influence
Chile	90,000	1.70	U	E L C S	X[e]	up
Cyprus	13,000	3.74	U	E L S	XXX	up
Finland	47,000	1.56	F	E L S	X	down
France	275,000	0.72	S	E L C S	XX	up
Guadeloupe	2,000	1.07	U	E L S	XXX	up
Guyana	100	nil	U	E L	X	even
Iceland	1,500	1.40	S	E L C S	XXX	up
Italy	1,521,000	3.85	S	E L S	XXX	up
Luxembourg	500	0.22	U	E L	XX	up
Martinique	1,000	0.58	U	E L	XX	down
Réunion	500	0.16	U	E L	XXX	even
Sri Lanka	4,000	nil	S	C	X[e]	up
Sweden	17,000	0.28	S	O	X	up

[a] In countries which have more than one Communist party, columns 1 and 2 represent combined membership. "Nil" indicates a share of membership in total adult population of less than 0.1 percent.

[b] U = unified; S = split; F = factions.

[c] E = polled over 15 percent of the vote in the last national election; L = significant influence over labor at the national level; C = member of an electoral coalition at the local and/or national level; S = party has more than 100,000 members or a membership that is greater than 1.0 percent of the adult population; O = other key elements of strength.

[d] X = non-Communist left is ruling; XX = non-Communist left is stronger than the Communists; XXX = Communist party is the strongest party of the Left.

[e] A Marxian Socialist party dominates the ruling coalition.

SOURCES: See Table 1.

them a basis for acquiring appreciable influence in national politics.

For example, the small pro-Soviet Communist party in Ceylon has recently (1970) obtained a role in the government for the first time in Sri Lanka's history as part of a ruling coalition of Marxian Socialists, Trotskyites, and Communists. This coalition, which is committed to the creation of a socialist economy and to a pluralistic, democratic political system, is led and dominated by the Marxian Socialists of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, the largest group in the legislature. But the pro-Soviet Communist party holds one of the 21 ministerial positions in the government.[18]

In Sweden, the main Communist party, with less than five percent of the seats in parliament, has enjoyed a good deal of influence in national politics since 1970 because of the particular makeup of the country's new unicameral legislature. The Social Democrats, the strongest party in the state, emerged from the 1970 elections without a working majority in parliament. In response to this situation, the Communist party, while reserving the right to criticize the Social Democrats, informally agreed to avoid confrontations which might topple a minority Social-Democratic government. However, it should be underscored that such limited support has not given the Communists sufficient leverage to affect major governmental policy decisions. For example, Communist opposition to Sweden's proposed special-relations agreement with the European Economic Community did not keep Stockholm from proceeding with negotiations on the matter.

Of course, in none of the 13 countries—as the author has argued elsewhere after a detailed examination of the electoral records and prospects of all legal CP's—does a Communist party yet have a chance to achieve power exclusively on its own.[19]

[18] See Charles S. Blackton, "Sri Lanka's Marxists," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1973, pp. 33-35.

[19] See "The Electoral Prospects for Nonruling Communist Parties," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* (Detroit), forthcoming, August 1973. The Italian CP has conceded as much in its own case; hence it has sought to shift the center of power in Italy gradually to the left, away from the centrist coalition. See Donald L. M. Blackmer, "Italian Communist Strategy for the 1970's," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1972, p. 43.

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Therefore, relations with other leftist parties have loomed particularly large in determining the amount of influence that the parties in this category possess.

As already mentioned, the pro-Soviet party in Sri Lanka has entered into an alliance with other leftist and left-leaning parties, and this coalition has assumed control of the government. A similar situation prevails in both Chile and Iceland.

The Chilean Communist Party constituted the second-strongest element of the Popular Unity coalition that backed Salvador Allende's presidential candidacy in 1970 (only Allende's own Socialist Party outweighed it from the standpoint of electoral votes), and the CP has had considerable impact on the character of governmental policies since Allende's installation in office. Association with the government has seemingly aided the CP in its recruitment efforts, for membership doubled during the 1970–72 period. Yet the fruits of this association have been mixed. The Popular Unity coalition, which drew only a plurality of votes for Allende in 1970, has since become enmeshed in serious internal disputes, has faced an increasingly hostile legislature, and has encountered major domestic problems which it has not handled particularly well. Public disenchantment and open opposition resulted in nationwide strikes and demonstrations against the government in the latter part of 1972 and further disturbances in mid-1973.

Prior to the 1971 elections in Iceland, a coalition encompassing the Progressive Party, the Labor Alliance (or Communist Party), and the Liberal Leftist Party was formed, and this coalition ousted the ruling Socialist-Conservative coalition in the elections. Although the new leftist government commands a bare two-vote majority in the legislature, it has already moved (in 1972) to adopt at least one measure which the Labor Alliance (along with other groups) has been urging in recent years—the extension of Iceland's territorial waters to 50 miles from shore. (By endorsing this and other similar causes—*e.g.*, the termination of Iceland's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the expulsion of all foreign military personnel—the Communists have sought to appeal to nationalist sentiments and thus to enhance their legitimacy and popularity.)

Besides the parties in Sri Lanka, Chile, and Iceland, one other party in the group is currently participating in a national political alliance with the non-Communist left. The French Communist Party (Parti Communiste Français—PCF) in the autumn of 1972 agreed to join with the French Socialist Party of François Mitterand to contest the French parliamentary elections of March 1973 on a mutual platform—*le programme commun* (the common program). This electoral alliance permitted the two parties to recoup collectively 90 of the 103 seats that they had lost in 1968, though the system of proportional representation enabled the Socialists to garner more seats (108) than the Communists (73) despite having captured a lesser share of the total popular vote.[20]

Two other parties have had limited success in shaping alliances with non-Communist leftist parties. In some recent local elections in Luxembourg, the Communist party there has collaborated with left-wing elements of the Socialist party in fielding candidates. More important, perhaps, the Finnish Communist party (*Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue*—SKP) for a few years belonged to a governmental coalition. In 1966, reformist leaders of the SKP re-



Luis Corvalan (right), leader of the Chilean Communist Party, with Carlos Altamirano, leader of Chile's Socialist Party, at the November 1971 speech of Fidel Castro in Valparaiso, Chile.

—Photo by Wide World.

[20] See the reports on the 1973 French elections in *The New York Times*, March 12-14, 1973. It should be noted that PCF candidates received a larger percentage of the popular vote than did Socialist candidates in both 1967 and 1973, but not in 1968. As already mentioned in the text, the Socialists won 108 seats as compared to 73 for the PCF in 1973, whereas the figures for 1967 had been 121 and 73, respectively. (In 1968, the Socialists captured 57 seats, and the PCF, 34.)

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sumed cooperation with the ruling Social Democrats after a breach of nearly 20 years; and the SKP entered a leftist coalition cabinet, receiving three ministerial posts. A year later, the SKP, as part of its quest for legitimacy and greater public support as a national entity, even adopted a reformist-revisionist domestic program. This step, however, was vigorously opposed by a hardline "Stalinist" minority, and the upshot was serious internal party squabbling. The controversy—coupled with growing differences between the SKP and the Social Democrats, especially over the proposed special-relations agreement with the European Economic Community—eventually prompted the Communists to pull out of the coalition in March 1971, precipitating a government crisis followed by new elections in January 1972. A new government coalition minus the SKP was formed in September 1972. Nevertheless, there still appears to be a certain potential for a revival of the old coalition if the SKP should desire it.

Except in Réunion, where the Communist party is the only leftist political entity, the parties elsewhere confront hostile non-Communist leftist parties, and this hostility has constituted probably the biggest impediment to the Communists' achievement of greater influence in these lands. Where the Communist parties are stronger than their leftist competitors—as, for example, in Cyprus, Guadeloupe, and Italy—the Communists have found it especially hard to dispel the non-Communist parties' often long-standing distrust. To take but one illustration, the Italian CP's efforts to "democratize" and otherwise improve its image in order to dissipate misgivings about itself have thus far produced only meager results. The problem has been less severe for the parties in places where they are slightly weaker than the non-Communist parties of the Left—as in Guyana and Martinique—but it has nonetheless been formidable.

To some extent, close identification with the USSR has also had distinct drawbacks for many of the parties in this category. In recognition of that fact, the parties in Iceland, Sweden and Réunion have assumed independent postures on international Communist affairs (though there were signs in 1971–72 that the Labor Alliance in Iceland was having second thoughts on the matter). Moreover, the Italian, French, and Finnish parties have either limited their support of selected aspects of Soviet domestic and foreign policies or expressed serious reservations about these aspects.

On balance, the outcome of these efforts has been positive in nature. In Finland, to be sure, such undertakings caused serious internal party conflicts, which in turn contributed to a broad decline in party influence in the nation; furthermore, in Réunion the party's independent stance has produced little change in the party's status. However, in Iceland, Sweden, Italy, and France, the overall trend of influence has been upward—even though the Iceland party's course precipitated the defection of some members, who formed a new Organization of Icelandic Socialists staunchly committed to a pro-Moscow line.

A final negative factor has been the absence of party unity. We have already referred to the splits in the party in Iceland and the factional dispute in Finland. In addition, pro-Chinese splinter groups have sprung up in France, Italy, Sri Lanka, and Sweden. Those in Sri Lanka number about 1,000 of a total membership of 4,000 for all Communist forces. While those in France, Italy, and Sweden are numerically and politically insignificant, their radical tactics have at times been embarrassing to the regular party organizations, particularly with regard to the latter's legitimizing efforts.

In general, the prospects of this group of parties appear reasonably favorable. Only the fortunes of those in Finland and Martinque have been on the wane in recent years, though the situations of those in Guyana and Réunion have failed to do more than remain stable. The parties in other lands have experienced a distinctly discernible rise in political influence.

Conclusions and Outlook

What overall conclusions can one draw from this survey of the many nonruling parties that seek political power by peaceful means, and what can one say about the outlook for the parties that have chosen this road?

With regard to the first issue, several questions bear consideration. To what extent does the legal status of an NRCP and the degree of openness of the political system have an impact on the party's success? How does the matter of legitimacy and an NRCP's "system-support" role affect the party's fortunes? To what degree does the strength of the non-Communist left limit Communist advances? And what effect does party unity or, conversely, party factionalism have on an NRCP's political influence? Let us explore these questions briefly.

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The parties in a total of 32 of the countries that have been examined here are illegal, and they operate in semi-closed or non-competitive political systems in 30 of these lands (in 18 cases they are even subjected to governmental repression).[21] These parties find their endeavors to influence the attitudes and behavioral patterns of the local populaces severely circumscribed or prohibited. Therefore, it is not surprising that, of the parties confronted with one or more of the above restrictions, only those in Iraq and Syria (the pro-Moscow party) have managed to gain more than marginal influence. In short, while legal status for a Communist party and the existence of an open political system in which it can function do not in themselves guarantee Communist success, they do seem to be necessary minimum conditions for it, barring very special circumstances. Without them, a Communist party must devote considerable energies merely to trying to reform or liberalize the political system in order to give the party a chance to operate freely.

At the same time, legal Communist parties carrying on activities in open political systems have encountered a serious image problem because of their traditions as conspiratorial, monolithic, Moscow-oriented parties cast in the Leninist mold. Hence, a number of parties have moved in varying degrees—and with quite mixed success—to "deradicalize" their programs and appeals in one fashion or another.[22]

NRCP's in Australia, Chile, Denmark, Sri Lanka, and several other countries have effected or attempted a transition to a pluralistic political doctrine. The pace of change has been uneven from country to country, and the reorientation might in some cases be construed as sheer political opportunism. But the frequency with which such "revisionist" undertakings have produced severe internal debates, factional strife, and even debilitating political splits suggests that these deviations from Leninist norms are not just tactical maneuvers. Rather, they amount to serious efforts to make the parties concerned relevant to the political systems in which they function.

In their quest for legitimacy and allies, many parties have also deemed it essential to adopt or support "reformist" instead of "revolutionary" programs of social and economic change. Yet such a course has by no means provided a panacea for these parties. First, it has caused members who oppose "revisionist" measures to engage in factional disputes or even to split off and form their own organizations. Second, Communist reform programs frequently differ little from those of Socialist and Labor parties, and since the latter are not suspected of being agents or instruments of a foreign power, they enjoy greater legitimacy in the eyes of local populaces than do the Communist parties.

In addressing the latter problem, some NRCP's have made still another "revisionist" adjustment—they have reduced or abandoned their dogged loyalty to Moscow. (While a number of these parties have merely moderated the intensity of their pro-Soviet stance, a few have assumed completely independent positions.) This course now involves much more than a choice of sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute; it has increasingly meant calling into question any Soviet policy which might harm a party's domestic image. Indeed, some parties have not merely refused to endorse the policies and views of Moscow on the one hand or Peking on the other hand; they have been critical of the policies and views of both. For example, the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and Soviet hostility toward Israel have generated nonsupport or open attack on the part of most of the more influential NRCP's and those committed to pluralistic political processes. To be sure, such deviations from "proletarian internationalism"—*i.e.*, from the Moscow line—have antagonized hardline elements within the NRCP's and have produced intraparty disputes and factional fragmentation. But while there has been some backsliding on the question of "system support," the situation is clearly quite different from that which prevailed in 1956, when practically all NRCP's endorsed the Soviet invasion of Hungary.

It is difficult, however, to assess definitely the extent to which these types of increased flexibility and independence in local Communist attitudes have yielded positive results. As often as not, they seem to have had a deleterious impact, depending on circumstances in the particular countries. And it is not even clear whether staunch adherence to the Moscow line necessarily spells political disaster even today.

The case of the Luxembourg party, one of the few in Western Europe which openly backed Moscow's actions in Czechoslovakia in 1968, affords

[21] These figures include Egypt even though the party there has officially passed out of existence.

[22] The expression is Robert C. Tucker's. See his "The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements," *The American Political Science Review* (Menasha, Wisconsin), June 1967, p. 354.

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a good illustration. Despite its unreconstructed outlook, the Luxembourg party won a larger percentage of the total vote in the December 1968 elections than it had in the previous balloting. The crucial question here is how many votes the party might have garnered had it moderated its "system-support" role, but there is no way of answering such a question.

To turn next to the impact of the relative strength of non-Communist leftist parties on the degree of influence exercised by the NRCP's, that impact is obviously considerable. We have advanced estimates of the relative strength of Communist and non-Communist parties in 51 countries where the situation seems clear enough to evaluate. In the 34 cases where the NRCP has only insignificant or marginal political influence, the non-Communist left rules in 16 lands, outweighs the Communists in 15, and is weaker than the Communists in only three. The four "progressive" regimes are all leftist; moreover, the substantial influence that the Communist parties in Iraq and Syria enjoy stems largely from governmental tolerance of them—tolerance born of the regimes' dependence on the USSR for foreign aid and diplomatic support in their conflict with Israel. Finally, of the 13 countries where NRCP's boast significant influence, there are five in which Communist parties constitute the strongest leftist parties; two where Communist parties, though weaker than local Marxian Socialist parties, participate in ruling coalitions with the latter; three in which Communist parties are second in strength only to the major party of the non-Communist left; and three where Communist parties are less powerful not only than the ruling parties of the local non-Communist left but also than the other, nonruling leftist parties.



Georges Marchais, General Secretary of the French Communist Party (PCF—Parti Communiste Français), casts his ballot in the French national election of March 4, 1973, during which the PCF formed an electoral alliance with the Socialists.

—Photo by Wide World.

The foregoing data suggest that in those countries where well-developed leftist movements exist, the Socialist and Labor parties tend to overshadow the Communists—regardless of whether or not the latter have actively fostered an image of legitimacy by taking the various revisionist steps already discussed. Put briefly, the NRCP's have been "upstaged" programmatically and organizationally in many lands by the non-Communist left.

As regards the relationship between party unity and party influence, we have found that the Communist movements of 44 countries have experienced factional disputes or open splits. (These have resulted, as noted earlier, from a number of developments, ranging from the Sino-Soviet dispute to commitments to domestic reforms and legitimizing efforts.) Their impact has tended to vary from party to party, and it is hard to make a precise appraisal of their effect in any individual case because party unity is only one of many factors which determine a party's strength or weakness. Moreover, there is no way of estimating what prowess a fragmented Communist movement, such as that in India, might possess were it unified. All other factors being equal, however, a Communist movement divided by contending factions or open splits clearly confronts a diminution of its overall capabilities to forge the kinds of alliances necessary to enhance its influence.

* * *

In attempting to assess the general position and prospects of the NRCP's on the "peaceful road" to

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socialism today, it is necessary to begin with a look at trends in the amount of political influence exercised by these parties during recent years. We have arrived at judgments on this score for parties in 64 countries. Of these, the parties in 18 countries have enhanced their fortunes over the last five years; those in 13 lands have maintained their influence at roughly stable levels; and those in 33 countries have suffered declining sway. Among the more influential NRCP's, those in nine lands have significantly improved their positions, with those in Chile, Cyprus, Iceland, Sri Lanka, and Sweden registering the biggest gains. Other consistent, if more gradual, gainers include parties in Guadeloupe, India, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, and Uruguay. Most recently, the French Communist Party, allied with the Socialists and aided by growing public disenchantment with the performance of the Gaullist Union of Democrats for the Republic, scored major advances in the March 1973 elections, though not enough to challenge the UDR leadership seriously in the legislature. However, the Communist-Socialist alliance, despite some important internal disagreements, did win a slim plurality of the popular vote; hence, the potential for future leftist advances is a factor which neither the Communist-Socialist allies nor the ruling party can ignore.

On the basis of these figures, it is exceedingly difficult to come up with any universally valid conclusions about the effect that pursuit of the "peaceful road" to socialism has had on the influence of NRCP's. The most that one can say is that it appears to have strengthened the sway of those NRCP's which already enjoyed a considerable measure of political clout, and not to have advanced appreciably the cause of those which were weak or were operating in unfavorable political environments. Such a judgment suggests that the most important single factor determining or limiting Communist political success has been the political context in which a party must work, and this is the product of so many diverse and variable factors that future trends in the political influence of the NRCP's that have taken the "peaceful road" become virtually impossible to predict.

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Books

Probing China's Cultural Revolution

By Allen S. Whiting

STANLEY KARNOW: *Mao And China: From Revolution to Revolution.* New York, Viking, 1972.
EDWARD E. RICE: *Mao's Way.* Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1972.
EDGAR SNOW: *The Long Revolution.* New York, Random House, 1972.

AT LAST the mystery and confusion of China's great political paroxysm, the Cultural Revolution, are being gradually dispelled. The late Edgar Snow's posthumously published account of his 1970-71 visit to the People's Republic relates Mao Tse-tung's own account of his motives in attempting to reshape the values and relationships of 800 million Chinese, while Stanley Karnow, China correspondent (in Hong Kong) of the *Washington Post* during the Cultural Revolution period, and Edward E. Rice, US Consul General in Hong Kong from 1964 to 1967, attempt to reconstruct the intense internal struggle whose reverberations were still agitating China's elite politics until as late as last year. All three offer insights and information which are essential to a deeper understanding of the Cultural Revolution and its significance for post-Mao China.

Though largely a reprinting of previously published articles, Snow's account provides a unique and invaluable first-hand source on the views of Mao, Premier Chou En-lai, and others, and in addition it contains fresh revelations which the meticulous reader can piece together with profit. Contrary to the implications of his earlier articles and to White House claims, Snow cites Chou to the effect that the initiative for Nixon's visit originally came from Peking—and not from Washington—as early as 1969 or 1970. He also attributes his lengthy recapitulation of the Cultural Revolution's origins and development to Mao personally, instead of to the previously cited "very responsible person." Unfortunately, Snow himself did not live to complete the volume, and it is badly edited, repetitious, and confused in chronology. One important error, either by Mao or Snow, gives January 1965 as "the moment of decision" on the ouster of Liu Shao-ch'i, whereas the context clearly indicates it must have been January 1966. Such minor faults, however, do not detract from the fact that Snow's sympathetic but perceptive comparisons of recent conditions in China with those he found on his earlier visits and his probing interviews with key officials provide new insights into contemporary Chinese reality.

The attention which Snow devotes to the rice-roots level of Chinese society is necessarily missing from the books by Rice and Karnow, who had to depend largely on press and radio reports from China available in Hong Kong—except for the refugee interviews copiously introduced by Karnow. Within this limitation, the two authors have painstakingly combed a mountain of Red Guard publications and reports by the Peking press corps—principally Japanese—from the Cultural Revolution period, as well as subsequent Chinese press accounts of those events. Rice's detailed account of all the identifiable actors and contending factions is an indispensable reference for China specialists. Karnow offers less detail but devotes greater attention to the impact of the main Cultural Revolution events on key socioeconomic groups, particularly the military. The two authors also offer skillful syntheses of the best scholarship on pre-Cultural Revolution developments and document their studies with many hundreds of footnotes.

YET, NEITHER RICE nor Karnow attempts a systematic analysis or

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retrospective assessment of the motivations and forces involved in the Cultural Revolution itself. Rice in particular weaves logic, hunch, personal experience, and wisdom into a highly speculative web of inference regarding the course of this incredibly complex and far-reaching phenomenon, but both he and Karnow fail to provide a consistent, comprehensive, and credible explanation of a key element in the puzzle, namely Mao's relations with his principal associates. At times their portrayals of events resemble a Chinese shadow-puppet show where colorful warriors and demons dash in and out amidst clamor and confusion but a third dimension is lacking.

In the two accounts, Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing, emerges as a key figure in the "radical" camp, essentially without independent political power of her own, but driven by petty jealousy and a selfish impulse to exploit Mao's frustrated desire to rule as well as reign. In opposition stands Chou En-lai, shrewdly and at times courageously protecting key individuals and institutions from Red Guard ravages. Lin Piao and Ch'en Po-ta are generally associated with Chiang Ch'ing, while K'ang Sheng hovers as a sinister police figure in the background. Today Lin and Ch'en are both gone, officially purged for "conspiracy" and "ultra-leftist" acts against Mao's wishes; but Chiang Ch'ing remains very active, while her "radical" Shanghai protégés, Yao Wen-yuan and Chang Ch'un-chiao, continue to rise in the public lists. On the other hand, Chou now stands at the zenith of his career, seemingly in command of foreign and domestic policy as he goes about restoring his temporarily purged ministers to office.

What model of Mao's relationships with his wife, his former personal secretary and chief ideological spokesman (Ch'en), his once-designated successor (Lin), and his top government administrator (Chou) can explain this zigzag course of events? If we were to go by the Rice-Karnow images of Chiang Ch'ing and Chou and the official indictments of Lin and Ch'en, it might all be dismissed merely as a typical case of court intrigue centering on an aging and perhaps senile leader. But however appropriate such an interpretation might be with respect to the dynastic politics of China's past, or even with respect to contemporary politics elsewhere, it hardly gives adequate weight to the profound policy differences which apparently divided the inner circle around Mao, with the chairman himself perhaps included in one faction.

Certainly, it is difficult to believe that Red Guard organizations throughout China grossly distorted reality when they perceived Chiang Ch'ing and Chou to be in confrontation along the lines of a radical-*vs.*-moderate cleavage—and, in fact, Rice and Karnow offer considerable evidence to support this perception, inferentially implicating Mao in the exhortations to violence and destruction. It seems equally impossible to credit Chou with the famous Dutch-boy role of plugging the dike single-handed to keep the flood of violence from sweeping away the entire political system, all the while retaining Mao's personal confidence and support.

SNOW DIFFERS from Rice and Karnow in seeing Mao as a benign revolutionary attempting to draw his colleagues back from extremes, deliberately oscillating between contradictory forces in the political environment but always moving events along a preconceived course. Snow is perhaps closer to the mark—as he was certainly closer to Mao—but so much evidence and logic argue to the contrary as to demand a wider

Reviewers in This Issue

ALLEN S. WHITING—Professor of Political Science and member of the Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan (Ann Arbor); author of *China's Political System*, 1967, and *Soviet Policies in China, 1917-24*, reissued in 1968.

ROMAN KOLKOWICZ—Professor of Political Science, University of California (Los Angeles); most recently coauthor of *Soviet Policy in the Middle East*, 1973, and *Comparative Communist Systems*, 1973, and author of "Strategic Elites and Politics of Superpowers," *Journal of International Affairs*, No. 1, 1972.

WALTER N. VICKERY—Professor of Slavic Languages and Literature, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill); coauthor of *The Year of Protest, 1956*, 1961, and author of *Pushkin: Death of a Poet*, 1968.

DONALD W. GREEN—Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia); currently working on the economics of professionalism and the role of production associations in the economic reforms of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

W. RAYMOND DUNCAN—Professor of Political Science, State University of New York (Brockport); author of *Soviet Policy in Developing Countries*, 1970, and coeditor of *Quest for Change in Latin America*, 1970.

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focus, beyond personal politics, that would encompass the bureaucratic interests and linkages leading particular elements to coalesce around one or the other faction. Within such a framework, a rigorous recapitulation of the evidence so industriously gathered in these volumes might test alternative hypotheses to explain the dynamics as well as the distribution of political power in China, both at the periphery and base and at the center and apex.

To cite one example, the consistency with which the air arm of the People's Liberation Army responded to a "radical center" against the local ground commanders' resistance to extremism during the Cultural Revolution may be linked with the grounding of the air force during the Lin Piao ouster in the fall of 1971 when no similar crisis affected the army. Such evidence of splits within the armed services cautions against the simplistic counterposition of "military" against "civilian" authority or the portrayal of Lin as commanding "the military." Standard operating requirements make an air force wholly dependent upon central authority, whereas ground forces—particularly in the semi-modernized state of the PLA—can subsist on regional resources. An air force needs sophisticated equipment that must be continuously upgraded through technological research and development, as well as stores of spare parts and special fuel, but the firepower and mobility of ground forces may remain unchanged for relatively longer periods of time and can be locally supported. In addition, the air force may tend to be more receptive to radical ideas than the ground forces by reason of the fact that it recruits from the more educated and privileged urban sector while the ground forces not only draw their recruits en masse from the countryside, but also literally live and move among the predominantly conservative peasant populace.

These bureaucratic and behavioral differences within the armed forces can predispose individual commanders to accept or to resist political orders that affect military responsibilities and capabilities. And if these differences are combined with cleavages elsewhere in the government, as for instance between those responsible for relations with revolutionary groups abroad and those responsible for China's diplomatic and economic intercourse, alignments can emerge to provide an institutional framework within which individuals of varying skills and influence vie with one another for opposing policy alternatives as well as for personal advancement. Such a framework can also help us to forecast the parameters of possible policy developments after Mao's eventual departure from the scene.

In short, a grand design on the order of Franz Schurmann's historic *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* is sorely needed to provide a conceptual framework for reordering the wealth of information contained in these volumes and an overall perspective to guide ongoing analysis of change and continuity. Hopefully, greater access to Chinese society and a longer perspective on past events will facilitate the elaboration of such a design. In the meantime, however, all concerned with contemporary China will find these books fascinating and fruitful reading.

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Changing Systems and Security Relations

By Roman Kolkowicz

WILLIAM R. KINTNER and WOLFGANG KLAIBER: *Eastern Europe and European Security.* New York, Nunellen Press, 1971.
ROBIN ALISON REMINGTON: *The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution.* Cambridge, MIT Press, 1971.

THERE WAS A TIME when Western studies of the Soviet Union and East Europe might have been described in terms of ecclesiastic orthodoxies. The cognitive universe of the Sovietologist was one of basic verities, ethical imperatives, and unquestioned dogmas. That universe was heliocentric, centered on Moscow. There were slavish satellites, whose orbits were predictable and whose "laws" of political, economic and ideological motion were accessible to anyone troubling to consult the sacred texts of the Founding Fathers or their exegeses in *Pravda* or *Kommunist*. There were homiletics on the Free West and the totalitarian, monolithic East, creating a pervasive sense of engagement in a crusade of the good *vs.* the bad, the free *vs.* the enslavers. Above all, there was a sense of an unchanging totalitarian system, held together by the terror machine, by the forces of oppression, indoctrination and static bureaucratism.

Yesterday's orthodoxies have become today's heresies, and *vice versa*. The vision of a Communist monolith has given way to polycentric, multipolar, schismatic schemas; the idea of a static Communist system has given way to perceptions of transformation, change, and flux. The ideological underpinning of that complex political system is now seen by some as a mere set of rationalizations for the more traditional power politics of statism and imperialism. The cold war verities have been challenged and are being replaced by the new verities of détentism. In brief, Sovietology is coming of age and becoming secularized; and at the present historical moment, under the pressures of prevailing academic styles, that means that Sovietology is seeking "respectability" by donning the robes of social scientism.

On the face of it, this development is laudable. It reflects the changing empirical realities in the Communist states, suggesting that they are not immune to the universal forces of change, modernization, development, complexity, rising levels of expectations, and demands from below. It further reflects a growing detachment and sophistication in the analysis of Communist systems—and an abandonment of some of the earlier, less viable approaches and methods of study.

Yet, this is not an unmixed blessing. In the rush toward a scientific, objective and comparative methodology, analysts and scholars have at times adopted a Procrustean approach. What doesn't fit the concepts of the model-makers and the comparativists gets short shrift. The plethora of systemic, structural/functional and developmental approaches may work well in the studies of developing countries, or in the developed Western countries; but they have not worked very well, so far, when mechanically applied to the study of Communist systems. There are many likely reasons for this situation, though there is not room here for an extensive examination. At the minimum, it may have been caused by the failure of analysts to understand the different political and sociocultural content of apparently similar structures and functions in diverse political systems; or more prosaically, by their failure to adapt "Western" models to the particular "Eastern" realities; or simply by their failure to ask the right questions.

THE KINTNER-KLAIBER and Remington volumes reviewed here represent interesting examples of this

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"transition" period of Sovietology: they are essentially traditional treatments of political and socioeconomic processes in Communist countries, imbedded in fragmentary methodological frameworks of Western comparativism. The results are on the whole useful, and at times impressive. The two volumes share similar basic premises—namely, that the relations between the Soviet Union and the East European former "satellites" have undergone some profound changes, resulting in greater independence of the East European countries from Moscow; that such changes have been caused in part by internal, socioeconomic pressures in the several countries, as well as by broader changes in the context of international politics; and, finally, that the Soviets and their allies are in the process of searching for new, mutually acceptable institutional/doctrinal frameworks and formulations which can account for these changes and create a new form of equilibrium in interstate relations.

The Kintner-Klaiber volume attempts "a partial explanation of domestic and international politics in East Europe through the testing of hypotheses in a historical context" (p. 4). The key hypotheses include the following:

Political development tends to vary with socioeconomic development, i.e., . . . *once the Communist systems of East Europe were susceptible to the necessity of change in their economic structures and processes, there should also be change in their political structures and processes* (p. 5).

The Communist systems are . . . in a precarious state of equilibrium held together primarily by the power of the regimes to deny the basic political rights to their respective citizenry—and this only with the backup of Soviet military force (p. 5).

Domestic developments are carrying each of the East European countries on an individual path, and the result is a growing diversity of political patterns in an area which, under Stalin, pursued a single path to communism (p. 2).

The elaborate methodological scaffolding of the study includes four vectors, about 500 indicators, and other techniques aimed at eliciting, classifying and interrelating the various aspects of political, social and economic processes within the respective states. Subordinate subsystems in several countries are examined according to posited criteria aimed at discerning their autonomy and their status as "dependent" or "independent" variables in the systemic structure. In sum, the authors cast a broad methodological net—alas, a net which has yielded a very poor substantive catch. Their empirical evidence and conclusions indicate that of the three countries they studied—Bulgaria, Hungary, and the German Democratic Republic—"the most highly developed (East Germany) experienced the lowest degree of political development during the reform period" (p. 139). But the authors are not discouraged by this finding, and seek to account for the disparity between model and reality through explanatory propositions of greater complexity and, at times, obfuscation: "The three countries under examination have not accommodated our original postulates in direct covariance between socioeconomic and political developments" (p. 139) because "the impact of socioeconomic development upon political development depends upon a number of historically conditioned factors which evolve differently in each country and evoke different stimulus-response relationships in the several political systems" (p. 185).

Beyond such scattered obscurities, the volume lacks structural integrity in that several of its major sections do not fit the overall organization of the study and are only loosely related to the subject matter. Moreover, the final chapter is jarringly out of step with the rather detached, "scientific" style and approach of the preceding sections; the authors' concluding remarks clearly reflect an ideological set of cold war attitudes, employing language and ideas that belong to the 1950's rather than to the 1970's.

These shortcomings aside, the Kintner-Klaiber volume represents an arduous effort to synthesize Western social science methodology with the traditional Sovietological approaches and may be considered a useful first step in the direction of a more fully developed analysis of Communist systems free of past orthodoxies.

THE REMINGTON BOOK is a narrative-analysis of the origins, evolution and peregrinations of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The author subtitles her volume "a case study in Communist conflict resolution," thus assuming that the WTO's purposes and roles are essentially those of containing the post-Stalin Communist community of nations under the reasonable control of Moscow.

The WTO was created as a reaction to the emerging threat of a rearmed Germany within NATO. The Soviet leaders seem not to have been quite clear about the

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practical utility and functions of WTO, which until the 1960's remained in effect a paper organization completely dominated by Moscow and considered to be an extension of its foreign-defense bureaucratic apparatus. However, the pressures for change in East Europe, the setting-in of "bloc fatigue," the internal power struggles within the CPSU, and the exacerbation of the Sino-Soviet conflict have forced a reappraisal of WTO's structure and function, and of the respective roles within it of the East European allies.

The author examines several types of demands and pressures from East Europe on Soviet leaders as they have affected WTO. She describes Soviet reactions to challenges from Hungary (1956) and Albania as "Invasion versus Exclusion"; the Romanian search for greater national autonomy and independence as "a case for containment"; the Kremlin's problems with East Germany as "the politics of persuasion"; and finally, the challenge from the Dubcek regime as a case of "multilateral intervention." What emerges from her skillful analysis is an informal typology of past Soviet "threat perceptions" involving East Europe and the respective reactions to such perceived threats. Thus, basic changes within the internal affairs of an East European country which were perceived to threaten some high values of the entrenched, more orthodox Communist elites were considered to require highest priority attention (Hungary, Czechoslovakia), while dissent and insubordination which did not threaten such internal objectives were considered of lesser priority and open to less stringent measures (Romania).

Ms. Remington emphasizes the growing military role of WTO, as evidenced by heightened wargame activities and increased participation of military personnel from East European armies in its recent activities. This I believe to be a questionable proposition: both WTO and its counterpart NATO were created out of largely political motivations, and their military functions have seemed less important than their roles as unifying mechanisms within the respective alliance structures. Indeed, as economic, political and diplomatic stresses within the two alliances have intensified and their *raison d'être* has become more obscure, NATO and WTO have become increasingly vital instruments for political consultation and the exertion of superpower influence.

The Remington book concludes with a rather thoughtful and melancholy comparative analysis of interventions by the great powers within their respective spheres of influence (the USSR in Czechoslovakia and the US in the Dominican Republic). The striking similarity of US and Soviet rationalizations for their acts of interference in the internal affairs of weak neighbor states, and especially their exaggerated images of the threats posed by developments in these states, evoke some sobering afterthoughts.

To sum up, both of the volumes reviewed deal with problems of change in political systems that were long assumed to be static. In identifying some universal forces of socioeconomic change in Communist societies and the impact of such forces on rigid structural forms and procedural norms, the authors have made a substantial contribution to a better understanding of these systems. While the methodological underpinning of their descriptive and analytical efforts is somewhat uncertain, the books nevertheless constitute an important building block for future studies.

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From Pasternak to Solzhenitsyn

By Walter N. Vickery

KRYSTYNA POMORSKA, Ed.: *Fifty Years of Russian Prose: From Pasternak to Solzhenitsyn* (2 vols.). Cambridge, Mass., and London, MIT Press, 1971.
GEORGE GIBIAN, Trans. and Ed: *Russia's Lost Literature of the Absurd: A Literary Discovery.* Ithaca, N.Y., and London, Cornell University Press, 1971.
ABRAHAM ROTHBERG: *Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn: The Major Novels.* Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1971.
GEORG LUKÁCS: *Solzhenitsyn.* Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1971.

THE ONLY REAL common denominator of the four books under review is that for the most part they involve works of Russian literature which have proved controversial in the Soviet Union and many of which have in fact never been published there.

Krystyna Pomorska's *Fifty Years of Russian Prose: From Pasternak to Solzhenitsyn* is a two-volume anthology in English translation. It contains 24 short stories by such authors as Boris Pasternak, Yevgeny Zamiatin, Boris Pilniak, Aleksandr Yashin, Vera Panova, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (represented by three stories), as well as two non-narrative pieces by Marina Tsvetaeva—one from her 1919 diary, "On Gratitude," and one from *My Pushkin* (1936). Each volume has a short introduction at the beginning and biographical notes at the end; and the dust jacket informs us that "about half" the stories in the collection are "original translations," the rest having been previously published in English.

Although the two slender Tsvetaeva pieces seem somewhat out of place in an anthology otherwise devoted to narrative writing, the choice of selections is generally good and gives particular emphasis to the years 1917-28 and the post-Stalin period. The editor's decision to focus mainly on these two periods seems highly appropriate on a dual count: not only do they seem to represent the most rewarding periods in Soviet literature, but there is also a certain link between the two in that the post-Stalin period has witnessed an attempt to reach back and pick up where the literary flowering of the 1920's was abruptly cut off.

Unfortunately, the preparation of the two volumes reveals haste. There are misprints and inconsistencies: for example, in the *My Pushkin* fragment two lines from Nabokov's translation of *Evgeny Onegin* are given incorrectly; Vera Panova's *Vremena goda* is wrongly translated as *Season of a Year* on p. 353 (Vol. II), though correctly titled *Seasons of the Year* elsewhere; and "The Story of My Dovecote" appears in the Introduction (Vol. I, p. xiii) as "The Tale of My Dovecote." It is also not helpful to find *My Pushkin* dated 1967 in the biographical notes (1967 being the date of its publication in Moscow), with no indication in the notes of when it was actually written; and if we look at the Table of Contents or at the text of *My Pushkin,* we are left to surmise that it is a "fragment"; only in the last paragraph of the Introduction is it so labeled.

These and other oversights may be regarded as minor, but there are more substantive shortcomings. The Introduction to each volume provides a summary sketch of the political events which affected literature in the period covered, plus brief comments on the individual selections presented in the volume. Many of the comments are very much to the point; some, however, say all too little. Even though the editor makes no claim to be exhaustive, it is still not enough to devote only two sentences to Alexander Grin ("*The* Watercolor") and three sentences to Yury Tynianov ("Second *Lieutenant* Likewise"). Again Platonov's "Fro," though it takes up *20* pages in the book, is for some reason entirely neglected in the introduction, and Platonov himself is barely mentioned among a bunch of other writers who "create their own vision by experi-

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menting with verbal material, freeing themselves from outdated conventions, sometimes called 'realistic.' " If Grin, Tynianov and Platonov are worth including, they would appear to deserve more meaningful—even if brief—comment.

The editor's most glaring *faux pas*, however, concerns Pasternak. That author is represented in the anthology by two stories, "Il Tratto di Apelle" and "Aerial Tracks." "It is fitting," we read in the Introduction, "that two stories from Pasternak's early prose should open this selection. Very few English-speaking persons know that before he wrote *Doctor Zhivago* Pasternak had been greatly occupied since his earliest years with a kind of prose reflecting the ideas and the style of his poetry. In his tale, 'The Childhood of Luvers' (1918), all the characteristic features of this symbiosis are manifest." The editor follows with two paragraphs regarding "The Childhood of Luvers" and—fair enough—two paragraphs on "Aerial Tracks." But why "The Childhood of Luvers"? Turning back to the Table of Contents, the reader reassures himself that, yes, the first Pasternak story in the volume is indeed "Il Tratto di Apelle," not "The Childhood of Luvers." Surely, after being told that "it is fitting that two stories from Pasternak's early prose should open this selection," the reader could properly expect the editor to discuss *those* two stories instead of bringing in a third story that does *not* appear in the anthology.

To sum up, Krystyna Pomorska's collection betrays signs of haste, and in the reviewer's opinion the commentaries and texts should be checked and revised in the event of republication, especially since the anthology does offer a worthwhile selection of representative works.

GEORGE GIBIAN, *in Russia's Lost Literature: A Literary Discovery,* presents his own translations of works by Daniil Kharms and Alexandr Vvedensky, both Leningrad writers little known in the West, who belonged to an early avant-garde artistic group known as Oberiu (*Obedinenie Realnovo Iskusstva,* Association for Real Art). Oberiu was one of the various groups or schools which competed with one another in the period following the Bolshevik Revolution, each claiming to represent the truly revolutionary in art (its Manifesto is included in an appendix). Kharms and Vvedensky wrote during the late 1920's and 1930's but were arrested soon after the outbreak of World War II and perished early in 1942. A few of the Kharms stories translated here have been published in the Soviet Union, but most of the works have circulated there only in manuscript form. As for readers abroad, Gibian writes that "few Westerners know of Kharms and Vvedensky, yet these two writers have a place in literary history and deserve to be widely known for their accomplishments."

Gibian certainly deserves credit for making available literary works that were hitherto unavailable to English readers, thus filling in a gap in our knowledge of Soviet intellectual currents in the late 1920's and 1930's. It seems questionable, however, that the publication of this volume can be accounted (as the book's jacket claims) "a literary event of the first magnitude." We recognize that both Kharms and Vvedensky possessed in abundance a sense of the illogical and incongruous, which is the very stuff of humor. But incongruities can be of different types, and in the case of Kharms and Vvedensky the personal tastes of the reader are strongly involved. Their type of "black humor" produces strong reactions—for or against. The reviewer's own reaction is to feel that their writings bear out two principles of literary criticism which are all too often ignored in dealing with Soviet authors: first, that persecution by the Soviet authorities does not necessarily indicate excellence in a writer; and second, that avant-gardism is no more a guarantee of good writing in Soviet than in Western literature. This is no reflection on Mr. Gibian; he has found and published materials most of which were previously unknown abroad. The reviewer, however, remains personally unconvinced that either Kharms or Vvedensky, as represented by the works in this volume, will stand the test of time.

THE THIRD AND fourth books under review are both works of criticism devoted to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. In commenting on them, one is very much aware of the complaints heard from time to time that we in the West are too prone to judge Soviet works in terms of their political and social commentary and to neglect their artistic merits or defects. Any such tendency is indeed regrettable. The fact is, however, that in Soviet literature—the Soviets would even say in all literature—it is impossible to separate the political from the esthetic. Certainly this is true of the works of Solzhenitsyn, whose writing expresses a pathos that is inseparably linked with his personal experience, and who sees the artist as having a duty to speak out before society on moral issues.

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Abraham Rothberg's book, as its title indicates, deals with Solzhenitsyn's three major novels: *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, The First Circle,* and *Cancer Ward.* The first chapter, entitled "The Writer's Life," offers biographical data designed to give an understanding of Solzhenitsyn's outlook on life and to provide a framework for the discussion of his works—a discussion which ranges freely over the political, the moral, and the esthetic. One chapter is devoted to each of the three novels, and a final chapter attempts to sum up Solzhenitsyn's *Weltanschauung.* Rothberg's main thesis is that Solzhenitsyn, like Lev Tolstoy, whom he admires and to whom he is obviously indebted, "is a moral writer, not a political one" (p. 15)—or at least only secondarily a political one. In Rothberg's view, the great cause to which Solzhenitsyn has dedicated his art is justice, and this point is well made throughout the book by sound argument and apt quotation.

Inevitably, there are points in Rothberg's critique with which it is difficult to agree. One doubts, for example, whether Kostoglotov's emasculation in *Cancer Ward* really "owes a literary debt to Jake Barnes in Ernest Hemingway's *The Sun Also Rises*" (p. 185). One may also be justifiably skeptical of Rothberg's thesis that the partial failure (as he sees it) of *Ivan Denisovich* can be explained on the ground that "the experiences Solzhenitsyn chose to deal with cannot be contained in the vessel he used. It may be that literary realism in characterization and language is insufficient to encompass the monstrosities, absurdities, and grotesqueries that Stalinism and Hitlerism have brought to modern life" (p. 59). Does Rothberg mean by this to suggest that some sort of avant-garde formal experimentation might have been more appropriate? If so, one can only point out that this would be quite alien to Solzhenitsyn's method.

A more basic point on which this reviewer disagrees with Rothberg has to do with Solzhenitsyn's so-called symbolism. Rothberg writes:

> *In his first two novels Solzhenitsyn chose a concentration camp and a prison research institute for metaphors of Soviet society; in his third he picked a cancer ward in a hospital as the metaphor . . .* (p. 134)

Why does a concentration camp have to be taken as a "metaphor," or a cancer ward as a "symbol," of Soviet society? We recognize that Solzhenitsyn can be understood at various levels. Concentration camps and cancer wards can be equated with society, Soviet or otherwise, but such equations are intellectual afterthoughts. The primary, spontaneous emotions are those provoked by the reader's becoming, in his imagination, part of concentration camp or cancer ward life. Defending *Cancer Ward* before the Secretariat of the Writers' Union on September 22, 1967, on precisely the charge that it was intended as a symbol of Soviet society, Solzhenitsyn insisted:

> *The fact is that the subject* [*of the book*] *is specifically and literally cancer,* [*a subject*] *which is avoided in literature.*[1]

[1] An account of the Secretariat meeting was first published in *Possev* (Frankfurt-am-Main), No. 8, 1968. (For an English translation of the account, see *Problems of Communism,* September-October 1968, pp. 40-47).

Rothberg claims that "Solzhenitsyn, in making this statement, was being less than candid" (pp. 178-79). We would have to respond that, whatever Solzhenitsyn's motives (and he was under severe attack), his esthetic priorities and perceptions were absolutely sound. In *Cancer Ward*—notwithstanding the presence of abundant political commentary and the obvious fact that the protagonists have been shaped by the Stalinist era—the immediate threat that inspires dread in the minds of the story's characters is not Soviet society but simply cancer. So also, the primary reality of *Ivan Denisovich* is the concentration camp—and the struggle for survival.

This difference of opinion notwithstanding, Rothberg's book is a sound work of criticism which makes rewarding and stimulating reading.

GEORG LUKÁCS' slender but reflective volume consists of two essays written five years apart and thus provides a sort of running commentary on Solzhenitsyn's literary development. The first essay, written in 1964, is devoted to *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich,* (and also includes brief comments on "Matriona's House," "An Incident at the Kretchetovka Station" and "For the Good of the Cause"); the second, written in 1969, deals with *The First Circle* and *Cancer Ward.*

Lukács treats *Ivan Denisovich* as a novella, as distinct from a novel. As he understands it, "the novella is based on a single situation and—on the level of plot and characters—remains there" (thus he would regard Ernest Hemingway's *Old Man and the Sea* as a novella), whereas the novel is

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vastly more ambitious in terms of the social canvas it portrays. Lukács notes further that "the novella frequently appears as a precursor to a conquest of reality by the great epic and dramatic forms, or as a rearguard, a termination at the end of a period"; and within this framework, he views *Ivan Denisovich* as representing "a beginning, an exploration of the new reality." For Lukács, "the central problem of socialist realism today is to come to terms critically with the Stalin era . . . it must rediscover the way to depict contemporary man as he actually is." Hence, in 1964, he presciently sees Solzhenitsyn's novella *Ivan Denisovich* as an "overture," and in 1969 he can point with satisfaction to the fulfillment of his hopes in *The First Circle* and *Cancer Ward,* which he hails as marking a new high point in contemporary world literature." Lukács' analyses of specific characters and situations in these two novels are illuminating, as are also the comparisons he makes with other novels such as Thomas Mann's *Magic Mountain.*

Two further observations. First, like Rothberg, Lukács speaks of symbols. Of *Ivan Denisovich,* he writes:

Solzhenitsyn's achievement consists in a literary transformation of an uneventful day in a typical camp into a symbol of a past which has not yet been overcome. . . .

True. But unless I am doing an injustice to Rothberg, Lukács' thinking on the symbolism of Solzhenitsyn's writings takes a quite a different direction from Rothberg's. Lukács is, of course, very much concerned with the social and political implications of Solzhenitsyn's works. In his view,

Solzhenitsyn's significance as a novelist rests above all on the fact that he gives clear and convincing compendia of the inhibiting aftereffects of the Stalinist period. Is this political? The answer is: directly, hardly at all; but indirectly, to a high degree.

The point is that while Lukács is very far from ignoring the political, he does in fact assert the primacy of the literary and the human.

Second, Lukács raises a very interesting question which *is* clearly political. He is concerned with the perspective, the outlook, that informs Solzhenitsyn's writing. Is it a Communist one; or is it not, rather, a plebeian one based on the instinctual ideas of the common people? Lukács praises Solzhenitsyn as "a worthy successor to the important plebeian tradition which became one of the foundations of the greatness of Russian literature." He warns, however, that "if Solzhenitsyn does not develop in subsequent works, it will restrict his literary importance." In sum, an excellent study which answers some questions but raises others.

Taken all together, the four books under review, in their different ways, make worthwhile contributions to our steadily growing knowledge of Soviet literature, both licit and illicit, and to our understanding of some of the problems that confront a writer in the Soviet Union.

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Command, Compute, or Reform

By Donald W. Green

E. G. LIBERMAN: *Economic Methods and the Effectiveness of Production.* Trans. by Arlo Schultz and ed. by Leonard J. Kirsh. White Plains, New York, International Arts and Sciences Press, 1972.
MICHAEL ELLMAN: *Soviet Planning Today: Proposals for an Optimally Functioning Economic System.* London and New York, Cambridge University Press, 1971.

BY THE EARLY 1960's, Western economists had become reasonably confident that the essence of Soviet economic life was captured in the model of the "command" economy, where basic economic decisions were made by political leaders and implemented through physical planning and hierarchical command. This model has become the standard tool for comparative analysis of socialist economies and for evaluating economic reform in the USSR and elsewhere. However, developments within the Soviet Union over the past decade raise two critical questions. First, has the series of economic reforms so changed the Soviet economic system as to make the "command" model obsolete? Second, what influence has the renaissance of Soviet economic thought had upon the course of systemic change in the USSR?

THE 1970 VOLUME by Soviet economist E. G. Liberman, *Economic Methods and the Effectiveness of Production,* is useful for putting the 1965 reforms in their proper perspective. Liberman's study essentially confirms the view of many in the West that the present system in the USSR is only a variant of the "command" model, one in which there has been a proliferation of both economic goals and bureaucratic channels of influence. Liberman seems to approve of this "administrative economy," and some will doubtless regard this book as a retreat toward orthodoxy from his 1962 *Pravda* position.[1]

Liberman's adherence to "administrative" (as opposed to "economic") norms is indicated by (1) the emphasis he now places on the category of "total sales" as a criterion of enterprise performance, (2) his analysis of the system of materials supply, and (3) his broad acceptance of the validity of bureaucratic discretion in economic matters. While he complains that his views have been misrepresented in the West, Liberman does admit in his introduction that he had earlier

> *. . . made a number of imprecise statements. The role of profit as a production stimulator was correctly emphasized. But the fact that the stimulation of an increase in the volume of output in many cases retains independent significance was not kept in mind. And in the given instance, the profit index cannot be the only one in providing incentives. These inaccuracies provided the basis for the distortion of the author's ideas* (p. 8).

Whatever Liberman's views actually were in 1962, it is clear that in implementing the 1965 reforms, the Soviet leaders reduced the salience of the profit motive by making managerial bonuses contingent upon the fulfillment of sales (output) targets.[2] Relating the size of the "fund for material stimulation" and the

[1] Liberman's article, "The Plan, Profits and Bonuses," published in *Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 9, 1962, initiated the discussion which led to the Soviet economic reforms of 1965. His suggestion that enterprise managers be guided by "indirect" levers, specifically a system of bonuses based on new performance criteria—enterprise profits and profitability—in effect proposed a major departure from direct administrative fixing of detailed targets for enterprise operations.

[2] Western economists quickly recognized this ambivalence of the 1965 reform; see Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Soviet Economic 'Reforms': A Study in Contradictions," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), July 1968, pp. 1-21; and Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Soviet Economic Reform at an Impasse," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1971, pp. 36-46.

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"fund for social and cultural measures" to the size of the wage fund (a measure approved by Liberman, p. 141) further undermines the managers' quest for efficiency by encouraging them to increase total output and employment.

TURNING TO the persistent inefficiency of the Soviet supply system, Liberman seems confident that such "temporary" problems can be resolved through organizational rationalization and the provision of additional inventories (pp. 35, 79-81). In step with the resolution of the September 1965 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party,[3] he calls for "a gradual transition to the planned distribution of equipment, supplies, and semimanufactures through the wholesale trade system" (p. 12). Liberman's discussion, however, makes it clear that contractual relationships are to be assigned from above rather than chosen from below. Buyer and seller may bargain bilaterally within the assigned contract, but there is to be no search for alternative partners and "no discussion whatsoever of 'competition' " (p. 88).

The net result of the 1965 reforms has been to further complicate the life of Soviet managers. They need to consider an increasing number of variables which affect enterprise status and managerial bonuses: the level of total sales, the assortment of goods produced, the total wages paid, the capital stock, and the level of profits. Moreover, the relative importance of these variables may be continuously manipulated at the discretion of the bureaucracy.

[3] See *Pravda*, Sept. 28, 1965, for the text of the resolution.

Though Liberman objects to "ill-advised" intervention, he approves the practice in principle; for example, he writes:

The decision of the September [1967] Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU to raise the wage rates of machine-tool operators by 15 percent is an even more convincing example [of the force of centralized influence]. Such an increase in rates will lessen the difficulties of staffing the decisive sectors of production with worker cadres (pp. 74-75).

Spontaneous elements in the economy are to be neither purged nor blindly followed, he argues; rather, ". . . they must be skillfully mastered specifically for the purpose of directing them into the planned channel" (p. 55).

An interesting part of Liberman's book, as editor Kirsh notes in his introduction, is the discussion of the recent trend toward mathematical expression and rigor in Soviet economic thought. Despite the sterility of Liberman's own analytical work (as in his discussion of performance criteria, pp. 154-59), he goes surprisingly far in accepting V. V. Novozhilov's equation of "socially necessary" with "marginal" (pp. 168-71). The very fact that Liberman uses the expression "marginal valuation" (*predelnoe zhachenie*) in a nonpejorative sense indicates a minor victory of the mathematicians over the less sophisticated forces which have long dominated Soviet economics.

MICHAEL ELLMAN'S *Soviet Planning Today* promises an answer to our second question, the relationship between the reforms and the renaissance in Soviet economic thought.

The author outlines the formulation of the "optimally functioning socialist economy," generally associated with Moscow's Central Economic Mathematical Institute (TSEMI), and then confronts that theory with the Soviet reality. This reviewer's major criticism is that, like the administrative economy itself, Ellman's work seems to be paralyzed by an overabundance of objectives. In addition to a review of the Soviet literature on "optimal planning," the reader is treated to a lengthy discourse on the problems of plan consistency and material supply, a digression on comparative cost, a formalist attack upon consumer sovereignty, and an appendix on Soviet research into regional input-output analysis. Though one does find the "mass of information" promised on the book jacket, he looks in vain for the coherence of conception and execution exemplified in such works as Abram Bergson's study, *The Economics of Soviet Planning*.

In his early chapters, Ellman carefully examines the programming approach to the allocation of resources in a socialist economy, which serves as the analytical basis for the TSEMI model. Though the organizational content of the model is never given explicitly, one surmises that it would feature profit-maximizing enterprises with markets for both final and intermediate commodities. Fees paid by enterprises for scarce resources (wage rates, charges and rents) would be based on values arrived at by the Planning Board in carrying out its aggregate programming function; these are Kantorovich's "objectively determined valuations" or,

[4] New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964.

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as they are known in the West, "shadow prices." [5]

Ellman devotes some attention to the theoretical limitations of the TSEMI model, but he is most interested in the social program implicit in optimal planning, arguing that the real thrust of the TSEMI vision is, in fact, on the political level. The main elements of the social program are a shift to consumerism from capital fetishism, a reduction in the role of party and bureaucracy in society, and a corresponding elevation of the authority of scientific expertise. Ellman seems to regard this program as detrimental to socialist society and a clear threat to the "vanguard" Bolshevik party. He notes correctly that "efficiency" in Kantorovich's terms is not a Marxist criterion for social policy (pp. 187-90), but he fails to acknowledge the sterility of orthodox Marxist economics in the USSR. Ellman's position reflects his conception of the party as an impersonal historical force rather than as an organizational elite with interests perhaps separate from Soviet workers or humanity in general. This may account for the absence of a critical analysis, Marxist or otherwise, of Soviet society—a prerequisite for understanding the significance of economic controversy and reform.

Ellman argues (in Chapter 8) that the Soviet reforms demonstrate neither the validity nor the influence of the optimal theories propounded at TSEMI. The failure of the reforms, he contends, stems from institutional inertia and the tendency for all administrative controls to degenerate into enterprise-specific norms (pp. 146-48). Ellman, like Liberman, accepts the view that profit cannot, in general, be a valid measure of efficiency as long as the administrative economy persists. On the other hand, he does acknowledge (Chapter 9) the considerable gains that can be achieved through mathematical methods as long as the problem has been "well-defined" by the administrative environment.

The evidence which Ellman and others provide suggests that the revival of economic theory in the USSR was more a consequence than a cause of the move toward economic reform. In a sense, the TSEMI phenomenon was tolerated because the party lacked confidence in its economic policy during the 1960's. However, Soviet leaders now appear confident that growth can be continued within the existing system by improving performance criteria and incentive rules and by technological borrowing from the West. Despite its utopianism, the TSEMI vision does serve as an effective antidote to the orthodoxy of command socialism. With the quasi-official endorsement of mathematical economics published recently in the Soviet party press,[6] one may hope that Soviet economists will proceed to the difficult problems involved in the establishment of enterprise rights and the abolition of centralized allocation of industrial raw materials and supplies—two crucial steps in any fundamental reform.[7]

[5] In this discussion, Ellman follows closely Leonid V. Kantorovich, *The Best Use of Economic Resources*, ed. G. Morton and tr. P. F. Knightsfield, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1965; see also Benjamin N. Ward, "Kantorovich on Economic Calculation," *Journal of Political Economy* (Chicago), December 1960, pp. 545-56.

[6] See I. Soloviov (pseudonym), *Pravda*, June 4, 1973.

[7] Two recent papers by Western economists dealing with these issues are R. D. Portes, "The Strategy and Tactics of Economic Decentralization," *Soviet Studies*, April 1972, pp. 629-58; and T. A. Marschak, "Decentralizing the Command Economy: The Study of a Pragmatic Strategy for Reformers," in M. Bornstein, Ed., *Plan and Market: Economic Reform in Eastern Europe*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1973, pp. 23-64.

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Castroism: From Theory to Practice

By W. Raymond Duncan

ROLANDO E. BONACHEA and NELSON P. VALDÉS, Eds.: *Revolutionary Struggle, 1947-1958*, Vol. 1 of the Selected Works of Fidel Castro. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1972.

CARMELO MESA-LAGO, Ed.: *Revolutionary Change in Cuba*. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971.

AMONG THE FLOOD of books, monographs and essays on the Cuban Revolution are numerous ideological and hortatory tracts, quick assessments, and undocumented impressions which muddy the waters of solid scholarship. Such descriptions, happily, do not apply to the two works discussed here. Though differing in nature—the one a collection of early Castro writings, the other a set of essays about Castroism in power—both are the result of painstakingly objective research and analysis and are indicative of the contemporary upgrading of the field of Latin American studies as a whole.

More specifically, the two works are admirable companion volumes for examining the origins and course of Cuba's Revolution. Bonachea and Valdés present a balanced, illuminating collection of Fidel Castro's works as a young revolutionary in the strife-torn politics of Cuba before the overthrow of Fulgencio Batista in January 1959. The editors have also provided a lengthy and thoughtful introductory essay which suggests a generational rather than class-oriented approach to understanding Castro, who—like many other Cuban revolutionaries—is a first-generation Cuban. Mesa-Lago has assembled 18 essays by competent scholars who survey the politics, economics and society of Cuba from 1959 to 1970 and probe the positive and negative aspects of the Revolution, the relationships between major sectors of change, and the mixture of tradition and innovation in the Castro era.

A reading of Castro's early writings reveals several key trends which provide a background for assessing the subsequent developments treated in the Mesa-Lago volume. We see the growth of a José Martí cult stressing the independence of Cuba, a growing repudiation of official corruption, and the coalescing of competing action-oriented groups dedicated to revolutionary and violent change of the *status quo*—among them Castro's own "26th of July Movement." The record also reveals the incessant and debilitating factionalism that prevailed among the various revolutionary groups, Castro's tactical ability to win out over competing political groups, and his awareness of the roles of charisma, symbolism and armed struggle—all lessons which he would not forget once in power.

Of particular importance in prerevolutionary Cuba was the issue of legitimacy. Castro, like many young intellectuals and much of the general populace, simply did not view the central government as the legitimate representative of the Cuban people. In their introduction, Bonachea and Valdés examine this issue in the context of legal norms and attitudes toward state institutions. However, they fail to probe a major psychological factor that contributed to the prerevolutionary regime's failure to establish its legitimacy: namely, the absence of a sense of national identity among Cuba's masses.[1] In prerevolutionary Cuba there was no myth of common descent and destiny to forge the island's peoples into a self-differentiating, homogeneous group such as the Japanese, the Germans, or the Han Chinese.

These problems and the nature of the responses to them developed by Castro in the pre-1959 period have had a striking imprint on revolutionary Cuba, as the second of the volumes under review attests. Castro's personalist style of political leadership, his ability to remain in command, and

[1] On this critical issue of national identity, see Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" *World Politics* (Princeton), April 1972, pp. 319-55.

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even many of his subsequent domestic and foreign policies undoubtedly had their roots in those earlier days. Who else but Castro could appreciate the importance of strong, charismatic, highly personal rule in controlling factionalism while instituting monumental changes in Cuba? And is it not logical, given the conditions from which he emerged, that Castro would assume a fiercely independent posture vis-à-vis the United States, advocate—at least initially—armed struggle after the Cuban example as a model for the whole hemisphere, and maintain at the pinnacle of power his own kind of trusted followers from the "26th of July Movement"? While change may be the "law of life," Castro's conduct, once he had gained power, demonstrated that tradition and habit are not easily broken.

Other aspects of Castroism discussed in *Revolutionary Change in Cuba* also seem to flow logically from the insights highlighted in the Bonachea-Valdés volume. Thus, we encounter a new emphasis on a moralistic Cuban social ethic to replace earlier alienation and corruption and on the development of mass organizations to stimulate popular identification with and active participation in the Revolution. The assertion of *subjective* values (moral incentives, zeal, consciousness, self-discipline, selflessness) over *objective* values (material incentives, a monetary-mercantilist economy, expertise, knowledge) as the basis of revolutionary change seems rooted in Castro's past experience. Such answers to the problems of legitimacy and economic survival were based upon a style of politics proven in the overthrow of Batista and emphasizing commitment, human will and determination. It is a style of problem-solving reminiscent more of Mao than of Stalin, Khrushchev or Brezhnev, but with a distinctly Cuban flavor.

IF CASTRO'S policies after gaining power reflected his earlier experience, they also sought to alter the Cuban future. The mixed results of the first decade are indicated in the essays presented in the Mesa-Lago book. After an early emphasis on industrialization adversely affected the Cuban economy, the regime shifted back toward emphasis on primary production—of sugar, cattle, ores, and fish—with some success. Collectivization of the means of production and the establishment of almost total state control over resources facilitated a steady rise in capital accumulation, a redirection of investment toward more productive sectors, and a reorientation of education toward technological and vocational training. Total mobilization of labor resources eliminated seasonal unemployment in agriculture. In response to Castro's emphasis on egalitarianism, a number of traditional social problems—such as major class distinctions, racial discrimination, and the gulf between urban and rural life—were eliminated or at least moderated.[2] There also appears to have been some improvement in the living standard of the poorest segments of the population, although the degree of change remains the subject of debate.[3]

But there also were negative developments which tend to outweigh the positive, as Mesa-Lago observes (p. 505). Worker absenteeism and malingering—perhaps caused in part by elimination of the threat of unemployment and in part by a waning of revolutionary enthusiasm in view of the rather modest improvement in living standards—began to appear. There was also a proliferation of bureaucratic jobs, accompanied by general inefficiency and wastefulness as planners constantly shifted policies and managers operated without the discipline of market competition. These deficiencies were manifested in and compounded by a lack of spare parts and failures in transportation. And on top of all this, Cuba's debt to the USSR mounted.

As the Mesa-Lago volume tells us, Castro responded to these multiple problems in the mid-1960's by tightening his personal control over decision-making and resorting to increased militarization of the direction and management of the economy and society. Additional stress was placed on moral incentives as the means to spur production and combat worker absenteeism and apathy. These shifts during the second half of the decade produced considerable outside criticism, in some cases from previously sympathetic observers, who reported tendencies toward more authoritarian leadership at the top, less participation at lower echelons, and even the emergence of a new

[2] One should note that racial prejudice still exists in employment distribution, in participation in political decision-making and in sexual mores. See Mesa-Lago, p. 509; also Geoffrey E. Fox, "Cuban Workers In Exile," *Trans Action* (New Brunswick, N.J.), September 1971, pp. 21-30, and John Clytus, *Black Man in Red Cuba*, Coral Gables, Florida, University of Miami Press, 1970.

[3] Lowry Nelson, well-known sociologist and author of *Rural Cuba* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1950) and a recent visitor to Cuba, disagrees, concluding that workers and peasants "have never in the history of the country been worse off" (see his essay, "Changes in the Social Structure," in Jaime Suchlicki, Ed., *Cuba, Castro, and Revolution*, Coral Gables, University of Miami Press, 1972, p. 64).

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ruling class of the type described by Milovan Djilas in Yugoslavia some years ago.[4]

WHILE IT IS TOO early to draw any definitive judgments, there have been in recent months (since publication of the Mesa-Lago collection) indications of still another shift in the policies of Castro's Cuba. Workers are making more inputs into the planning of production at factories and on farms, and the control exercised by bureaucratic administrators may be diminishing. Despite Castro's concept of "free goods" (an economy without money), work is progressing on improving price policy. And while military men still predominate in positions of authority, recent government actions seem to be aimed at least at establishing greater clarity and efficiency in the lines of control over the social and economic systems. In concrete terms, there is more food—both in quantity and variety—with butter available for the first time in years.

These developments cannot be separated from increased economic ties with the USSR. The flow of Soviet aid to Cuba has doubled since 1970, amounting currently to some two million dollars per day. Cuba's debt to the USSR, not including the military aid, now is estimated at over four billion dollars. Under the terms of a Soviet-Cuban agreement of December 1972, Cuba is not required to begin repayment of outstanding Soviet credits until 1986, but will then repay its debt over a 25-year period, interest-free.[5] Intensification of the linkage between the Cuban and Soviet economies was evidenced by formation of an Inter-Governmental Coordinating Committee in 1970 to mesh Cuba's actions with the 1971-75 economic plan of the USSR,[6] and by conclusion of a formal long-term economic agreement between the two countries in February 1971. Moreover, Cuba was admitted to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in July 1972.

Notwithstanding these growing economic ties, Castro's foreign policy shows a distinctly independent thrust. By muting his earlier calls for intransigent and armed guerrilla struggle and concentrating on normal state-to-state diplomacy, the Cuban leader seeks to undermine the ostracism of Havana by the OAS (Organization of American States) and presumably also to increase his options vis-à-vis Moscow. Thus Castro journeyed to Chile, Peru and Ecuador in November-December 1971 and spent two months in May-July 1972 visiting ten states of Africa and Eastern Europe, ending up in Moscow for ten days. (These extended travels, incidentally, also demonstrated the operational stability of the Castro government in the leader's absence.) Relations have improved with Chile, Peru, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Cuba has supported Panama in the latter's debate with Washington over control of the Panama Canal. The Cuban government has also increasingly aligned itself with Latin American critics of the inequality in development between the United States of America and Latin countries. This has won Havana appreciation and support not only in individual Latin countries, but even in the OAS itself,[7] hastening the erosion of the policy of isolating Cuba in the inter-American system.

Meanwhile, Havana has been pressing for increased trade with and aid from non-Communist countries outside the hemisphere. In addition to eliciting preferential trade arrangement from the European Economic Community (privileges which the EEC grants to various less-developed countries), Cuba established trade relations with Japan in 1969 and received a seven-million-dollar credit line from Great Britain in March 1972.

All this demonstrates Castro's ability to respond pragmatically and rationally to changing circumstances. He has sought to effect a radical restructuring of the Cuban economy, society and polity while simultaneously preserving the island's security, political independence and cultural uniqueness—an experiment in revolutionary state- and nation-building which has proceeded under Cold War conditions. Clearly, the staying power of the man is remarkable. By providing us with thorough documentation of the forging of this leader in the anti-Batista struggle and of his tempering during a decade in power, the present two volumes make essential contributions to our understanding of the Castro phenomenon.

[4] See, for example, René Dumont, *Cuba: Socialism and Development*, New York, Grove Press, 1970; Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, *Socialism in Cuba*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1969; and K. S. Karol, *Guerrillas in Power*, New York, Hill and Wang, 1970.

[5] See *The New York Times*, Jan. 5, 1973, and the Havana radio broadcast of Castro's speech of Jan. 4, 1973, on the new agreements between Cuba and the USSR.

[6] On Soviet-Cuban ties, see Jaime Suchlicki, "An Assessment of Castroism," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Spring 1972, pp. 35-37.

[7] OAS Secretary General Galo Plaza has said that the organization would welcome Cuba back (see Paris radio broadcast of Jan. 7, 1973).

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Notes & Views
Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave, NW, Washington, DC, 20547.*

ON COMECON

TO THE EDITORS: I am writing to say a few words on Z. M. Fallenbuchl's "Comecon Integration" (*Problems of Communism*, March-April 1973). This article strikes one unpleasantly on its first page, footnote one, where Syria is mentioned as a member of Comecon. Comecon, as is known, was founded by the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria in 1949, and was joined almost immediately by Albania (excluded since 1961), and, in 1950, by the German Democratic Republic. In 1962, the People's Republic of Mongolia was admitted—albeit illegally in light of the stipulation of Article II, para. 2, of the 1959 Comecon Charter, which limited additional membership to countries of Europe (see *United Nations Treaty Series*, Vol. 368, 1960, No. 5245). In 1964, Yugoslavia obtained a kind of associate status, and in July 1972, Cuba joined, like Mongolia, as an "illegal" non-European member. North Korea and North Vietnam occasionally send observers to Comecon meetings as did the People's Republic of China until 1965.

Finally, in March 1973 a draft agreement was signed between delegations of Comecon and Finland, providing for mutual cooperation in different fields of economy, science and technology; the creation of a cooperation committee, composed of representatives of the Comecon members and Finland. was also provided for (see *Pravda* [Moscow], March 14, 1973). During the visit of Soviet President N. V. Podgorny to Finland in April 1973, *Pravda* (April 6) announced that Finnish President Kekkonen had authorized the Minister of Foreign Trade to sign on behalf of Finland an agreement on cooperation of that country with Comecon. (It would be interesting, incidentally, to see sometime in *Problems of Communism* an article by an independent Finnish writer giving more background facts to this potentially consequential cooperation.)

These, according to the writer's best knowledge, exhaust the list of countries connected in one way or another with Comecon. The news about Syria is so sensational that it should be elaborated on—or, if incorrect, quickly rectified.

Lack of space prevents me from discussing at least several other debatable points. Just one additional remark: the 1971 "Comprehensive Program" is of such importance that it should have been given much more attention—if necessary, even at the expense of discussing other problems, some of them fairly old and well-known, which make up over 80 percent of the article. Whole chapters of the lengthy Program are not even mentioned in the article. And what happened in the translation in footnote 30?

RICHARD SZAWLOWSKI
Associate Professor of
Political Science
University of Calgary
Alberta, Canada

PROF. FALLENBUCHL REPLIES: I am obliged to Dr. Szawlowski for drawing my attention to mistakes in connection with two footnotes in my article. Footnote one, which mistakenly lists Syria as a member of Comecon, was added by the editors and my responsibility is limited to not noticing the mistake at the time of proofreading. In footnote 30, the English translation of the title of Wilczewski's book should read "Fixed Assets in Post-war Polish Industry" instead of "Fixed Aspects . . .", a typing error which I did not notice.

As for Szawlowski's comments on the extent of coverage of the "Comprehensive Program," this is, of course, a matter of judgment. My objective was to provide a general outline of trends and an interpretation of developments rather than to discuss a particular document, a full English translation of which has been available for some time. I regard it as a compliment that, according to Szawlowski, as much as 20 percent of the article represents some new material.

ZBIGNIEW M. FALLENBUCHL
University of Windsor
Ontario, Canada

FROM THE EDITORS: Our apologies to Prof. Fallenbuchl for the inadvertent addition of Syria to the list of Comecon members. There is no evidence of any Syrian affiliation with that organization.

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Problems of Communism

PTEMBER-OCTOBER 1973

THE SOVIET MILITARY

Foreign Policy Role
Malcolm Mackintosh

Party Ties
William E. Odom

MOLDING COMMUNIST YOUTH

The USSR
Joel J. Schwartz

China
Ronald N. Montaperto

CASTRO'S COURSE
Carmelo Mesa-Lago



Book Reviews
John A. Armstrong
Wayne S. Smith
Harold J. Noah
Jeffrey W. Hahn
Victor C. Falkenheim

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Problems of Communism

SEPT-OCT 1973 VOL. XXII

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The Soviet Military

1 Influence on Foreign Policy
by Malcolm Mackintosh

12 The Party Connection
by William E. Odom

27 Castro's Domestic Course
by Carmelo Mesa-Lago

Political Socialization: Two Paths

39 The Elusive "New Soviet Man"
by Joel J. Schwartz

51 The Maoist Approach
by Ronald N. Montaperto

BOOKS

64 Soviet Political Economy
by John A. Armstrong

67 Moscow's Latin Beat
by Wayne S. Smith

71 Communist Schooling
by Harold J. Noah

74 Messages and Miscreants
by Jeffrey W. Hahn

77 Urbanization in China
by Victor C. Falkenheim

Cover: Party and military leaders view samples of Soviet military might in Red Square, Moscow, on November 7, 1972. Photo by V. Mastiukov for TASS, via Sovfoto.

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The Soviet Military

EDITORS' NOTE: Throughout history military power has been one of the vital sinews of the foreign, and sometimes the domestic, policy of national states. This aspect of the nexus between power and policy is clear and indisputable. More complex is the matter of the influence of military men as such upon the process of formulating and determining policies which they will be called upon to support, and with which they may or may not be in agreement. Here, questions of constitutional structure and practice, of national traditions and cultural norms, as well as the interplay of individual convictions and interest-group politics, inevitably come to the fore. And, in the nuclear age, the impact of dramatically increased military might on the status of the military within the political system of a state raises additional complex questions affecting internal as well as foreign policy. The following two articles explore some of these many questions within the context of contemporary Soviet policy and practice. Mr. Mackintosh addresses himself to the role of the Soviet military establishment in foreign policy decision-making, while Mr. Odom examines the relationship of the military to the main locus of Soviet political power, the Communist Party.

Influence on Foreign Policy

By Malcolm Mackintosh

No one would deny that the Soviet Union is at present engaged in a series of active and sophisticated foreign policy initiatives on a worldwide basis. In these circumstances, the identification of the power structures in the Soviet Union which have real potential influence over decision-making in this crucial area has rarely been more intriguing or more important. Of those power structures, the large military establishment is certainly one of the most vital. It is the purpose of this article to explore the nature and extent of the influence of the military on foreign policy decision-making. There is, of course, some evidence that the military is not necessarily united in its views on foreign and defense policy; however, this is a separate study in its own right. In the present article "the military" is intended to mean the likely majority grouping within the High Command.

Before embarking on our inquiry, mention should be made of some basic background factors and issues that are important in any analysis of this complex subject. It should be noted, for example, that there is a difference between the roles of the military in influencing defense policy on the one hand and foreign policy on the other. Defense is, of course, part of the military's business, and military

Mr. Mackintosh is a consultant on Soviet affairs to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, and writes frequently on strategic and military matters. His published works include Juggernaut: A History of the Soviet Armed Forces, *1966.*

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influence in that sphere is, on the whole, easier to trace. Foreign policy, however, is the military's business only if the Communist Party invites the soldiers to participate in decision-making on foreign issues—and here the recent promotion of Marshal Andrei A. Grechko to full membership on the Politburo is naturally significant. We shall be looking at the role of the military in both fields, but to separate them arbitrarily into two subjects would probably not correspond to Soviet reality.

Secondly, the physical power, sophistication, and diversification of the Soviet armed forces' capabilities have grown steadily since the war. Apart from the postwar demobilization of the 1945–47 period and some cuts in manpower in 1955 and 1958, the trend has been for the Soviet forces to increase in size and in capabilities, especially during the 1960's and 1970's. Two new branches of the armed forces were added to the traditionally large land army and its air force and the navy: *i.e.*, the Air Defense Command in 1954 and the Strategic Rocket Forces in 1959. The navy has greatly expanded and modernized its fleets, and effective marine, air transport, and airborne forces have been developed in support of the traditional concepts of Soviet military power. It is very largely because of the great buildup of the Soviet armed forces, together with Soviet economic and technological development, that the Soviet Union has been able to pull itself up into the superpower class alongside the United States, and the Soviet military establishment is entitled to claim both credit for achieving this power and an interest in how it is used in support of the country's foreign policy.

The third point, which is more of an issue than a factor, relates to the problem of military access to the decision-makers. At least since the death of Stalin, the military seems on the whole to have had reasonable access to the political leaders in the sense that its members have been heard as professional experts called in to give an authoritative view on military matters. For example, the Minister of Defense, even when not a member of the Politburo, may well have been able to attend Politburo meetings on invitation, although there is no evidence to support this. It is possible that most senior members of the military establishment have been content with this usually limited role. But it also seems likely that in a system in which the political leadership relies so much on its military power to achieve its goals in foreign policy and to back up the USSR's claim to be the other superpower, there must be an urge within the armed forces to have a greater say in decision-making. In other words, there must be strong pressure within the Ministry of Defense in Moscow to ensure that the degree of formalistic access the military has already gained to the party decision-makers should mean both influence over and participation in decisions on foreign and defense policy. Thus, the central issue in the problem of the role of the leaders of the armed forces in this field appears to be: Does access necessarily mean influence?

Military Access to Decision-making

In order to study more closely the nature and results of the access to the political decision-makers accorded to the military, let us look first at the present institutional structure (as far as we know it) of the relationship between the party leaders and the Ministry of Defense. Clearly, the Politburo is the decision-making body with respect to both defense and foreign affairs in the Soviet Union, and traditionally the General or First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) has assumed top responsibility for directing Soviet foreign and defense policies. This is as true of Brezhnev today as it was of Khrushchev and Stalin. Moreover, we know from Soviet sources that the Politburo can deal with the details of weaponry as well as with the broader issues of force structure and employment.[1] We may assume from what we know of the Soviet system that only the Politburo can make a decision to go to war, to send troops into another country (as in the case of Czechoslovakia in 1968), to deploy combat units abroad (as to Egypt in 1970), or to use nuclear weapons. The Politburo also probably decides on the size, nature, balance and organization of the armed forces, as well as on their armament and deployment. In addition, it decides the type of political indoctrination the military forces receive through the army's Main Political Administration.[2] Apart from a few turbulent months in 1957 when Khrushchev

[1] In 1935, for example, the matter of what caliber the Red Army's standard anti-aircraft gun should be was referred to the Politburo for a decision: see N. F. Kuzmin, *Na strazhe mirnovo truda, 1921-1940* (On Guard over Peaceful Labor, 1921-1940), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1941, p. 153.

[2] The Main Political Administration of the armed forces is both part of the Ministry of Defense and a Department of the Party's Central Committee.

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admitted Marshal Georgii Zhukov to full membership on the Politburo, the party leadership has normally excluded professional soldiers from that body. Hence, Marshal Grechko's promotion to the Politburo in May 1973 may mark a new departure in army-party relations and in the system of checks and balances hitherto maintained by the Soviet political leadership.

Since the Politburo makes the final decisions on virtually every aspect of Soviet life, it is to be expected that some of its work on military affairs is delegated to, or handled in, a more specialized forum. This appears to be the Defense Council (*sovet oborony*) whose predecessor, the Higher Military Council (*vysshii voennyi sovet*) was mentioned in the case against Marshal Zhukov in 1957.[3] At that time the Higher Military Council, whose work Zhukov was apparently trying to disrupt, included both party and military leaders and was thus the highest-level organization in which the two leaderships could meet in formal session. It presumably had consultative rather than decision-making functions, but it is also possible that, as a joint military-political body, it might have been intended to form the nucleus of a supreme military-political leadership to direct the overall Soviet war effort in the event of hostilities with the West or with China. At some point after 1957 (perhaps after the fall of Khrushchev in October 1964), the Higher Military Council seems to have been renamed the Defense Council, possibly for presentational reasons. Western experts have recently referred to it as "the Defense Council" or as "the Defense Committee (or the Supreme Military Council)."[4] No information is available from Soviet sources on the responsibilities or the membership of the Defense Council today, but until the Minister of Defense was admitted to the Politburo in 1973, the Council was probably the military leaders' nearest point of access to the party chiefs on a constitutional basis.

Next in the hierarchy comes the Council of Ministers, of which the Minister of Defense is of course a member. In this capacity, he is in contact with and subordinate to the Council's chairman, Premier Kosygin, and the various First Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers is empowered to appoint specialist commissions on various subjects, including military-industrial problems, on which the armed forces are to be represented. But the Council's main military element is the Ministry of Defense, which has so far been headed by an active professional soldier.[5]



Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, pictured in December 1966.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

The Ministry of Defense is a unified ministry administering and controlling the General Staff, the five "branches" of the Soviet armed forces—the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Homeland Air Defense Command, the Ground Forces, the Air Force, and the Navy—and the logistic and support directorates which maintain the armed forces in peacetime and prepare it for war. The Minister, through his commanders-in-chief, can issue direct orders to the Strategic Rocket, Strategic Air, and Air Defense Forces and the Navy; and, on the evidence of the Czechoslovak operation of 1968, he can likewise issue orders through the General Staff to the Ground and Tactical Air Forces. Thus, his powers of force employment are considerable. However, authorization to exercise them can come only from the Politburo, perhaps through the Defense Council. The Ministry of Defense, moreover, has its own "Main

[3] Yu. P. Petrov, *Partiinoe stroitelstvo v sovetskoi armii i flote* (Party Structure in the Soviet Army and Navy), 1st Ed., Moscow, 1964, p. 462.

[4] John Erickson, "Soviet Military Power," Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, London, 1971, p. 29; and Lt. C. David Miller, "Soviet Armed Forces and Political Pressure," *Military Review* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas), December 1969, p. 65.

[5] In April 1967, when Marshal Malinovsky died, there was some press speculation in Moscow that he might be succeeded as Minister of Defense by a civilian, the experienced armaments expert, D. F. Ustinov. See *Morning Star* (London), April 5, 1967. As it turned out, Marshal Grechko was appointed to the post April 14, 1967, but the issue could reappear.

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Military Council," which issues directives to the armed forces on matters such as the need to improve discipline and party political work.[6]

Members of the armed forces also come into contact with political leaders through the CPSU Central Committee, on which 36 military officers at present serve as full or candidate members. Central Committee plenums discuss foreign (as well as domestic) affairs, and military members of the Committee are known to have spoken on these occasions.[7] On a routine basis, military affairs at the Central Committee level are dealt with by two departments: the Main Political Administration (already mentioned), which is responsible for the quality and direction of the political work in the armed forces; and the Administrative Organs Department. The former is headed by Army General A. A. Yepishev (who incidentally served under Brezhnev as an Army political officer in 1945), and the latter by a career political officer, N. I. Savinkin, whose war service was mostly in the Far East. To judge from Soviet military press comment, the Administrative Organs Department is primarily concerned with personnel and similar matters.[8]

From this brief survey of the formal points of contact between the military and the political decision-makers, it seems clear that the Ministry of Defense receives its directives from the Politburo, probably by way of the Defense Council, and is then responsible for the formulation and implementation of the party's military doctrine and for the preparation of the armed forces to put it into practice if required. Disputed points which reach the highest military level can presumably be debated in the Defense Council, or perhaps in a commission set up by the Central Committee or the Council of Ministers. Two vital responsibilities are reserved to the Politburo: the final acceptance of current military doctrine, and orders to deploy forces abroad or to go to war.

Finally, in this consideration of military access to the political leadership, we should not forget the probable influence of personal relationships. A great deal of Soviet business is probably done, as in other countries, behind the scenes and through personal and social contacts. Stalin terrified his military commanders, and they had minimum personal contact with him. Khrushchev in the 1950's built up his own "group" of army leaders who had served with him at the battle of Stalingrad and in the Ukraine; but he then antagonized them by slighting their advice and treating them in some instances with contempt. All the evidence suggests that Brezhnev has cultivated the military leaders both professionally and personally. While maintaining his authority over them, he has stabilized army-party relations and cemented a close personal relationship with Grechko which seems to have created, among other things, a new and less formal channel of communication between the Minister of Defense and the General Secretary of the party.

The Riddle of Military Influence

When we turn to consider the effectiveness of these formal and informal channels of communication and means of access for the military to approach the party leadership, we have to admit that we have no direct evidence as to what advice may have been given by the military to the political leaders on any significant aspect of foreign policy, whether that advice was unanimous among the military leaders,



Leonid Brezhnev as a political commissar in World War II, pictured addressing troops of the 18th Army prior to the campaign in the Carpathians.

—TASS via Sovfoto

[6] See Petrov, *op. cit.*, 2nd ed., 1968, p. 507, for a reference to a decree of the Main Military Council on party-political work, issued in April 1962.

[7] For example, Marshal Grechko, then Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact forces, spoke at a Central Committee Plenum on December 12-13, 1966, on "the international policy of the USSR and the struggle of the CPSU for the solidarity of the Communist movement."

[8] See the Soviet Army's daily paper *Krasnaia zvezda* (Moscow), July 15, 1972, for an indication of the type of work done by this department.

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and whether or not it was accepted by the Politburo. Looking back over the last seven years, we cannot prove that the military was in favor of, or opposed, military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 or the deployment of combat units to Egypt in 1970 and their enforced withdrawal in 1972. Nor have we any direct evidence on the true attitude of the Soviet armed forces with respect to the political and military confrontation with China, although we are probably justified in assuming that the military favors a tough line against so obvious a national enemy. We also know very little about recent reaction among the military to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the agreement of 1972.

It is, of course, true that the Soviet military press has discussed many of these issues, generally in terms that support the line taken by the Soviet government. While it is possible to detect changes of emphasis by one or another of the well-known military writers on foreign and defense affairs—such as Lt. General I. G. Zavialov and Major-Generals V. Zemskov and E. Sulimov [9]—we should remember that articles published in the central military press or in the journals of the various branches of the armed forces are prepared under the supervision of the Main Political Administration acting in its capacity as a department of the party Central Committee. In many cases, therefore, it would be misleading to assume that an article appearing in these papers or journals under the signature of a general or an admiral necessarily expresses the views of the military establishment or the author of the article. There are exceptions, of course—as, for example, when an officer of the seniority of Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, who has been Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy since 1956, publicizes his concept of the role of the Navy in support of Soviet foreign policy.[10] In general, however, it is difficult to rely upon published articles in the Soviet military press for the purpose of ascertaining individual military views on defense or foreign policy issues or learning what part the military establishment played in crises abroad involving the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, it is very important to distinguish between the growth and diversification of Soviet military capabilities that make it possible for the Soviet Union to intervene, effect a presence, or have a say in a certain part of the world, on the one hand, and evidence that the military leaders (who clearly welcome such heightened capabilities in general terms) do or do not advocate the policies that are then followed by the Soviet government, on the other.

Thus, the buildup of strategic nuclear forces in the late 1960's enabled the Soviet government to take part in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) as the equal of the United States, but we cannot *prove* that military opinion advocated the kind of agreement that was reached in 1972, or would have preferred a continuation of the strategic arms race. Similarly, expansion of the Soviet air and air defense forces enabled the Soviet government to deploy combat units to Egypt in 1970, but we do not know from *direct* evidence whether there was any military opposition to the potential risks involved in the development of the Soviet Union's first overseas military base in Egypt, a non-Communist country. The worldwide capabilities now possessed by the Soviet Navy have allowed the Soviet government to deploy a submarine nuclear strike force off the east coast of the United States, to maintain a "Guinea patrol" off the west coast of Africa, and to move a task force into the Bay of Bengal during the war between India and Pakistan in December 1971; but we cannot say with any certainty whether any of these actions resulted from a Navy initiative or aroused any doubts within the Ministry of Defense concerning the risks involved.

Some Case Studies

In spite of these rather discouraging reservations, let us look at a few specific cases in recent years in which Soviet foreign policy has involved the use of military forces or has had military implications. Somewhat arbitrarily, we have chosen one case involving a non-Communist country, the Arab-Israeli war of 1967; one concerned with Eastern Europe, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968; and one connected with the USSR's strategic relationship with the United States, the SALT negotiations, the first stage of which was completed in 1972. There are, of course, other cases of equal or greater importance—such as Soviet foreign policies with respect to China and to the Vietnam War—but an examination of the three cases selected may enable us to arrive at some general guidelines with respect

[9] *E.g.*, see General Zavialov's article in *Krasnaia zvezda* of April 19, 1973, on Soviet military and political doctrine in relation to modern war and the objectives of the armed forces.

[10] He did this in an interesting series of articles published in *Morskoi sbornik* (Moscow), Nos. 2-12, 1972, and No. 2, 1973.

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to Soviet military attitudes and their influence on foreign policy decisions.

Let us take the Arab-Israeli crisis of 1967 first. The Soviet Union had been arming Egypt for a number of years in the period following the Suez crisis of 1956 and had also been supplying arms to Syria and Iraq, while the United States and France had kept Israel supplied with weapons and equipment. No Soviet forces were stationed on Egyptian soil in 1967, but there were considerable numbers of Soviet advisers and technicians attached to the Egyptian armed forces, and many Arabs clearly were under the impression that the Soviet Union had committed itself to their defense in the event of another war with Israel. As the 1967 crisis moved toward its climax in May and June and President Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran and ordered the United Nations force out of the Sinai, Soviet diplomacy appeared until the last minute to encourage the Egyptians to act belligerently. There were also reports that Soviet military intelligence was spreading allegations of Israeli troop concentrations against Syria and of Israeli plans to attack Syria in a matter of days.[11]

When war erupted on June 5, 1967, the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian armies suffered total defeat, and the Sinai, the west bank of the Jordan, and the Golan heights were occupied by Israeli forces. Hundreds of Soviet-made guns, tanks, aircraft, small arms and ammunition were destroyed or captured, and Soviet policy as well as the Soviet Union's reputation as a reliable ally suffered a catastrophic setback among the Arabs. There must certainly have been serious recriminations in Moscow as a consequence of the defeat of the Soviet Union's Arab clients. Moreover, although no evidence is available on the prior attitude of the military toward the government's Middle East policy as it developed, there are grounds for believing that at least one aspect of the crisis worried the military establishment.

Two weeks after the outbreak of the war, a Central Committee Plenum was held in Moscow on June 20–21, 1967. The first item on the agenda was "the policy of the Soviet Union toward Israeli aggression in the Middle East," and the sole announced speaker was Brezhnev. We do not know how Brezhnev defended Soviet policy in the Middle East crisis, but some criticism of the Soviet course appears to have been voiced at the Plenum by N. G. Yegorychev, First Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee. Yegorychev was dismissed and demoted after the Plenum,[12] and he never recovered his party position.

The interesting point here is that Yegorychev, as First Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, was also a member of the Military Councils of the Moscow Military District and the Moscow Air Defense District, the latter commanded by V. V. Okunev. (These political-military councils direct the activities of all high-level Soviet force headquarters.) In July the Moscow Air Defense District Military Council held a special meeting attended by Yegorychev's successor, V. Grishin,[13] and the District then launched a lengthy air defense exercise. All this suggests that if Yegorychev did criticize Brezhnev's handling of the Middle East crisis at the June Plenum, he may have done so in his capacity as a member of the Military Council of the Moscow Air Defense District, for he would probably have had no grounds for intervening in a debate on foreign affairs in his normal capacity as the party leader of Moscow City.

While there is no evidence that Yegorychev had any military background, one can reasonably surmise that he may have been put up to his intervention in the Plenum debate by members of the military establishment. One can further surmise that what the military may have been saying, through Yegorychev, was in effect that the Soviet air defense systems were unready for war, and that if the Arab-Israeli conflict had escalated into a Soviet-American confrontation, the military establishment would not have been able to guarantee the air defense of the Soviet Union. If this interpretation is correct, the implication would be that in 1967 at least some members of the military considered the policy pursued by the Soviet government in the Middle East crisis too risky. This interpretation also suggests that members of the military establishment have tried to press their views on the Politburo through individual party leaders.

Before moving on to the other two cases, it may be useful to add some observations with regard to the probable attitude of the Soviet military toward the later evolution of Soviet policy in the Middle

[11] The evidence of such Soviet activities is reviewed in A. S. Becker and A. L. Horelick, *Soviet Policy in the Middle East*, Rand Corporation, September 1970, pp. 46-49. Specific mention is made of Soviet approval of the deployment of Egyptian forces into the Sinai in mid-May 1967.

[12] *Pravda* (Moscow), June 28, 1967.

[13] Petrov, *op. cit.*, 2nd ed., p. 506.

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East conflict. We do not know for certain how the Soviet military viewed Moscow's decision to deploy combat units to Egypt after the Israelis' deep penetration air raids during 1970–1971, or to the decision to use Egyptian airfields for the purpose of Soviet reconnaissance patrols against NATO forces in the eastern Mediterranean. So far as the latter is concerned, there presumably would have been a good deal of professional military support since reconnaissance from Egyptian bases would augment the Soviet armed forces' overall capabilities against NATO. With regard to the former, one can speculate that the military probably regarded the close involvement of Soviet military power in the defense of Egypt from 1970 to 1972 and the establishment of a large Soviet military mission in Cairo (interestingly enough, under the same General V. V. Okunev who had been in command of the Moscow Air Defense District in June 1967) as at least assuring the Soviet government of the kind of political control over Egyptian actions that had been lacking in 1967. It is therefore likely that the military leaders were less worried about the risks inherent in the 1970–72 involvement than they had been about those in 1967. Such an attitude would be consistent with the feeling among observers in Moscow since the expulsion of Soviet military personnel from Egypt in July 1972 that the USSR does not consider itself bound to help Egypt militarily in the event of another Arab-Israeli war.



General V.V. Okunev, chief Soviet military adviser in Egypt, is presented a medal by Egyptian War Minister Mohamed Sadek (right) at a farewell reception.

—UPI photo.

The Invasion of Czechoslovakia

The second case study is that of the Soviet Army's invasion of Czechoslovakia, along with forces from Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and the GDR, in August 1968. Here again we have to admit that we have no direct evidence of the views of the military on the decision to invade an ally's territory and overthrow its legal government by force. All we can say definitely is that the Soviet armed forces, in virtually ideal circumstances and without the urgency of an international crisis, built up a large invasion force around Czechoslovakia's frontiers between April and August of 1968 and then, upon the Politburo's order to invade, carried out a swift, overwhelming, and effective operation which successfully achieved the political objectives of the Soviet leadership.

The natural assumption in these circumstances is that the Soviet military welcomed the opportunity to display the country's military might, to prevent a member of the Warsaw Pact from defecting into neutrality, and to put the armed forces to a practical test in a realistic politico-military situation. One Soviet general, who commanded the Trans-Caucasus Military District, did in fact write that the invasion of Czechoslovakia provided an excellent testing ground for Soviet military training.[14] Another Soviet statement declared that "the counterrevolutionaries wanted to drive a wedge into the heart of the Warsaw Pact area, and through the Czechoslovak corridor, so to speak, West German soldiers could have marched straight to the Soviet border, and with them would be American troops." [15]

There is also no doubt that the Soviet military took the occasion very seriously as a test of their command and control procedures at the highest level. A very large forward headquarters of the Soviet General Staff was set up at Lignica in Poland in early August, and Stalin's wartime Chief of Operations, General S. M. Shtemenko, was recalled from

[14] Colonel-General S. K. Kurkotkin, in *Zaria vostoka* (Tbilisi), Feb. 23, 1969. General Kurkotkin was subsequently appointed to command the Soviet Group of Forces in East Germany in September 1971.

[15] Radio Moscow, Sept. 4, 1968.

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Soviet Army General A.A. Yepishev, Head of the Main Political Administration of the USSR Ministry of Defense, arrives in Prague on May 18, 1968, as the Czechoslovak crisis builds toward the August intervention by troops of the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact armies.

—Photo by CTK (Czechoslovak Telegraph Agency) via Eastfoto.

an administrative post to take charge of the invasion under the overall command of the Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Ground Forces, General I. G. Pavlovsky.[16]

One of the most interesting military lessons of the invasion was in fact the transfer of command from the regular Warsaw Pact headquarters to the Soviet High Command at the beginning of August. The Warsaw Pact, under Marshal I. I. Yakubovsky, supervised the buildup of forces around the Czechoslovak territory during the exercise known as "Sumava," which was staged in Czechoslovakia in June. As soon as the deployment was complete, however, the Warsaw Pact handed over command to the Soviet General Staff—a procedure which might well be followed in the event of war in Europe.

Perhaps the only hint of Soviet military views was contained in a report published in *Le Monde* early in the crisis. On May 6, 1968, the Paris newspape reported that the head of the Soviet Army's Mai Political Administration, General Yepishev, ha broached the possibility that "faithful Communists in Czechoslovakia might appeal to the Soviet Unio for military intervention, and had intimated that, i this happened, the Soviet Army would be ready t do its duty. Although the report was denied on Ma 19 by the Czechoslovak News Agency (Genera Yepishev was in Prague on this date), it may wel have been basically accurate. Further, Yepishe could have been speaking either in his party or i his military capacity inasmuch as it seems likel that the advice of the military establishment woul have favored the invasion of Czechoslovakia— assuming that NATO intervention could be ruled ou —in order to preserve the "buffer zone" west of the Soviet frontier intact.

As for the role of the Soviet military in the fina decision to invade, this is hard to assess. A study of Marshal Grechko's movements during August 1968, as reported in the press, shows that he inspected the invasion forces in East Germany and Poland with General Yepishev from August 15 to 18 and was not in Moscow to greet the Finnish Defense Minister, who arrived there on August 17.[17] This does not prove, however, that he did not attend the critical meeting of the CPSU Central Committee in Moscow on August 18-19, which reportedly took the final decision to occupy Czechoslovakia.[18] The most likely conclusion is that, if Grechko did attend the meeting, he reported on the readiness of his troops to move and was not called upon at this late stage to press the case for invasion on an already convinced party leadership.

The SALT Negotiations

This brings us to the third case study, *i.e.*, the SALT negotiations between the US and the USSR—a matter of vital concern to the Soviet military leaders since it affects the essential element of Soviet national security and defense policy more directly than even the preservation of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe, and certainly more than support for a Middle Eastern ally. Soviet agreement to Strategic Arms

[16] See the author's "The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact," International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphia Paper No. 58, 1969, pp. 14-15.

[17] *Krasnaia zvezda*, Aug. 18, 1968.

[18] Radio Free Europe Research Memorandum, "Czechoslavakia in 1968—A Chronology," Munich, Jan. 22, 1969, p. 12.

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Limitation Talks with the United States was initially announced on June 27, 1968, and was reiterated after the occupation of Czechoslavakia, on January 20, 1969. The talks began in November of the latter year and were concluded at the Moscow summit of May 1972, in the form of the agreement limiting the construction of anti-ballistic missile defenses in the Soviet Union and the United States and the interim agreement on offensive strategic missiles. The second round of the talks opened in November 1972.

From the point of view of the Soviet political leadership, the SALT negotiations have everything to recommend them. Through them the Soviet Union once again confirms its position as the other superpower alongside the United States; the Soviet Union is enabled to save a considerable amount of money and resources by eliminating the risk of a new round in the strategic arms race (which the Soviet Union could not win); and the interim agreement, though not without its advantages for the United States, secures the latter's assent to Soviet totals of nuclear delivery vehicles that assure to the Soviet Union the capacity to destroy vital American targets. Moreover, research and development are allowed to continue unhindered on both sides.

It would appear that the 1972 SALT agreements should also satisfy Soviet military planners on several counts. First, the agreed totals allow the Soviet Union to retain numerical superiority in land-based missiles and to continue expanding its arsenal of submarine-launched missiles up to a total yet to be decided but probably in the area which the Soviet military would have wished to reach anyway. Second, the Soviet defense industry can still produce MIRVs for the strategic nuclear forces. Third, the anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) agreement prevents the US from moving ahead with the kind of "thick" anti-missile defense which only the US could afford, while averting the vast expenditures on both sides which ABM defense demands. Finally, the leaders of the theater forces, which are not covered by the agreement, may well hope that they can absorb some of the resources that will be saved on strategic weapons.



Civilian and military members of the Soviet negotiating team arrive at the US Embassy in Vienna in April 1970 for the second round of SALT. From the left, V.S. Semionov, Chief of the Soviet delegation, John P. Humes, US Ambassador to Austria, Raymond Garthoff (back to camera), secretary of the American team, and Col. Gen. N.V. Ogarkov, Nikolai Kishilov, Col. Gen. N.N. Alekseev, and Oleg Grinevsky of the Soviet SALT team.

—Photo by USIS Vienna.

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Published statements by Marshal Grechko and his colleagues have unequivocally supported the official line on SALT, and there have been no recent indications of military disagreement with the negotiations or the agreements concluded.[19] But this was not so when the concept of strategic arms limitation was first raised. In December 1968, a Soviet military writer subordinate to the Main Political Administration of the armed forces underlined the importance of adequate strategic nuclear weapons by saying that to overemphasize the importance of conventional weapons was a "more serious error" than the mistake of relying too completely on nuclear arms.[20] In April 1969, still another officer commented that the American decision to deploy the Safeguard ABM system proved that the United States was not interested in limiting the strategic arms race.[21]

These quotations suggest that both the professional military and the political officers of the armed forces were apprehensive of the SALT negotiations in their early stages. As the talks went on, however, public expressions of military concern faded—partly, no doubt, because the issue of Soviet participation in the negotiations entered the field of the highest-level political decision-making, but partly also, perhaps, because the party was able to show the military, as the outline of the ultimate agreement emerged, that their interests would not suffer.

As for military representation at the talks themselves, the Soviet delegation included the First Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Colonel-General N. V. Ogarkov, representing the armed services with respect to operational and intelligence aspects of the subjects under discussion, and Colonel-General N. N. Alexeev, a General Staff officer with a technical background in missiles and electronic equipment. A third senior officer who was sometimes present, Colonel-General A. A. Gryzlov, was also a career General Staff officer. (While the talks were in progress General Alexeev was promoted to a Deputy Minister of Defense, and his place was taken by another representative of the General Staff, General K. A. Trusov.) The course of the talks provided some indications that the military representatives were not overly eager to pass on military information to the civilian members of the Soviet delegation, who found themselves deferring to the generals and postponing the discussion of certain items until the Ministry of Defense was ready to contribute.

To sum up the evidence in this particular case, it seems probable that some influential Soviet military figures were initially skeptical about the strategic arms limitation concept and the desirability of negotiating with the United States, but that this attitude changed as the talks developed. Clearly, the conduct of the negotiations depended a great deal on the military contribution, and the promotion of one of the senior military delegates while the talks were under way may have been significant in this context, although there is no proof that the importance of the SALT negotiations was responsible for the move. In any case, the evidence suggests that as the talks proceeded and the outline of the eventual agreement took shape, the military realized that its requirements were going to be met and therefore modified or abandoned its early reservations. Although the party had the ability to force the military into line by "administrative measures" (to use the Soviet phrase) or by removing opponents of its policy from their positions, it clearly proved unnecessary to resort to such measures in the case of SALT.

Some Conclusions

The lessons to be drawn from these case studies are admittedly fragmentary and inconclusive. Nevertheless, they tend to support the view that the military establishment favors hardline or at least firm foreign policies when issues concerning the defense of the Soviet homeland or Soviet hegemony in the "buffer zone" in Eastern Europe are at stake. On the other hand, they suggest that when a proposed foreign policy may involve the commitment of Soviet armed forces beyond just naval forces to areas far away from Soviet frontiers, the military still tends to react on the side of caution and a full evaluation of all the risks involved. As for the ability of the military to translate its attitude on foreign issues into actual influence on top-level foreign policy decision-making, the case studies suggest that when the particular policy concerned requires military support, the influence of military advisers is significant. They also demonstrate the fact that when a foreign policy adopted by the leadership coincides with military views, it is difficult to distinguish whether the policy was initiated by the party or by the military. Finally, there is nothing in any of the case studies to suggest any diminution of the party's

[19] See, *e.g.*, an article by Army General S. L. Sokolov, First Deputy Minister of Defense, in *Izvestia* (Moscow), Feb. 23, 1973.

[20] Lt.-Colonel V. Bondarenko, in *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil* (Moscow), No. 24, 1968.

[21] Lt.-Colonel T. Kondratkov, *ibid.*, No. 8, 1969.

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Soviet Minister of Defense Marshal Andrei Grechko, recently promoted to membership in the CPSU Politburo, attends a meeting of Soviet and North Vietnamese party leaders on July 10, 1973. On the extreme left is Le Duan, North Vietnamese party leader. On the Soviet side, starting at third from the left, are Konstantin Katushev, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, President Nikolai Podgorny, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, Premier Alexei Kosygin, and Marshal Grechko.

—TASS via UPI.

ultimate primacy in foreign policy decision-making in cases where the views of the armed forces might differ from those of the party leaders. The current presence of one military representative on the Politburo seems unlikely to affect this situation.

This brings us back to the matter of Marshal Grechko's promotion to the Politburo, the probable reasons for it, and its significance from the standpoint of military influence on foreign policy. Many explanations have been put forward for his elevation, along with the head of the KGB, to full membership in the Politburo. These include reward for past services (perhaps especially in the SALT negotiations), the need to bring the armed forces more closely into the decision-making process, and the personal preferences of Brezhnev. It seems likely that Brezhnev wanted to rally all his supporters round him in the final forum of Soviet decision-making at a time when he was facing some of his most critical decisions in foreign and domestic policy—and Grechko has certainly been one of Brezhnev's most cooperative and valued colleagues. After a cool start in 1967, the Brezhnev-Grechko relationship warmed, both professionally and on the personal level, in the difficult years of the Czechoslovak crisis and the establishment of the Soviet naval-air base in Egypt, and Grechko found himself frequently used on diplomatic tours which might normally have been expected to be entrusted to an official of the party or of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Grechko was the dominant figure in the delegation whose mission to Prague in the spring of 1969 effected the dismissal of Alexander Dubcek and the appointment of Gustav Husak. He was in India before the conclusion of the Indo-Soviet Treaty; in Egypt several times during the setting-up of the Soviet base; in Somalia before the appearance of facilities in that country probably designed for the use of the Soviet Navy. Thus, his role and value to Brezhnev in foreign as well as military affairs have grown in recent years. But does his political promotion mean that the influence of the military in the formulation of foreign policy has also grown commensurately?

The evidence seems to suggest that no startling change in the present position is likely. For several years, ever since Admiral Gorshkov's Navy undertook

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the overseas support of Soviet foreign policy (as mentioned earlier), the military has had to be consulted at an earlier stage and in greater depth than ever before, and this has given representatives of the armed forces more frequent and more secure access to the party leadership than they used to enjoy. Senior officers have apparently been able to present their points of view to members of the Politburo in person at the Defense Council, and as has already been mentioned, the Minister of Defense, even when not on the Politburo, has probably been summoned to attend meetings of that body when military matters were to be decided. Grechko's own close relationship with Brezhnev in recent years has given him access to the party's top leader on the personal as well as the professional plane. His appearance among the full members of the Politburo now gives him a vote on the full range of Soviet decision-making, but it does not necessarily increase his power position in practical terms. He will in any case be 70 years old in October 1973 and may not retain his ministerial post very much longer.

Finally, we must remember that even a rejuvenated Soviet High Command is still a force for stability and maintenance of the *status quo* in Soviet affairs. The military establishment is against dissent and innovation in Soviet society at home and in favor of an active—though not an "adventurist"—foreign policy abroad with military support. It probably favors a "special relationship" with the United States, bitterly opposes China, and hopes for a more advantageous position (in relative terms) in Europe as a result of Brezhnev's *Westpolitik* in this traditional area of Russian foreign policy. It is likely to be wary of new commitments in the Middle East, though it would like to be able to resume reconnaissance flights against NATO forces in the Mediterranean from a base in the area. Basically, the present Soviet military leaders want to serve—as well as have some influence over—a strong and nationalistic party and government with some sense of political mission. They do not want, either directly or by proxy, to have the responsibility of formulating Soviet foreign policy itself.

The Party Connection

By William E. Odom

Two questionable assumptions form the cornerstone of most Western analysis of Soviet party-military relations. First, it is taken for granted that the civil-military boundary in the Soviet polity marks a potential cleavage—a cleavage that has thus far been forestalled by the party's unique organizational control over the military, but one which is of increasing importance as a factor for eventual change in the political system. This assumption rests on the belief that men who become competent officers grow to see the party apparatus as an adversary because its activities undercut military competency; and that these officers also develop a sense of identity as soldiers that transcends the confines of a single state to form part of a general professional awareness common to officer corps in many states. On the other side of the boundary, the party is said to abet the adversary relationship because its ideological precepts are inherently "anti-military." Second, it is assumed to be self-evident that autonomy in "military professionalism" is the source of military efficiency and a state's readiness for war; and that if party controls deny professional autonomy to the

A specialist on Soviet military affairs, Mr. Odom was a Visiting Scholar at Columbia University's Research Institute on Communist Affairs in 1971-72. He is the author of The Soviet Volunteers: Modernization and Bureaucracy in a Public Mass Organization, *forthcoming from Princeton University Press.*

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officer corps, there is *ipso facto* a loss of military efficiency. Presumably, then, by insisting upon rigid party controls over the military, the Soviet leadership pays the price of reduced military efficiency.

These assumptions have long pervaded most of the literature on Soviet party-military relations, but perhaps the most unambiguous statement of them has come from Roman Kolkowicz:

On the one hand, they [the party leaders] pursue an ambitious foreign policy, predicated to a large extent on the continued availability of a powerful military capability. . . . On the other hand, the party antagonizes the military leadership and burdens a modern war machine with the archaic impediment of a political control system.[1]

Furthermore,

the relationship between the Communist Party and the Soviet military is essentially conflict-prone and thus presents a perennial threat to the political stability of the Soviet state.[2]

This assertion leads Kolkowicz to argue that the party

must reconcile its obvious need for an effective military organization, which demands broad professional autonomy, with constant concern that such an organization could someday reject party controls and make its own political claims.[3]

Of the military political administration, he goes on to write:

The result of these attempts to graft onto a military establishment certain traits peculiar to Communist political organizations is the anomaly of an up-to-date military machine that is forced to wear a horse collar of ideological and political controls.[4]

Nonetheless, Kolkowicz concludes by expressing the view that "in recent years . . . the military has been advancing toward greater professional and institutional freedom."[5]

It is not the purpose of this article to take issue with most of Kolkowicz's lengthy and impressive study, or to challenge the view that Soviet military leaders are frequently unhappy about particular policies implemented through the Main Political Administration in the armed forces. Conflict undoubtedly infests the Ministry of Defense and all its subunits. It does seem appropriate, however, to raise doubts about Kolkowicz's particular way of conceptualizing the adversary relationship between the Soviet party and military establishments—doubts that also extend to his conclusion affirming a recent trend toward increased institutional freedom for the military.

By implication Kolkowicz is arguing that if the Soviet military could rid itself of the party apparatus, it would be a more efficient military, providing more war power per unit of resource inputs. Professional autonomy, in this view, is the *sine qua non* of military effectiveness, and both are inversely related to political control.

In contending that military professionalism constitutes a guarantee of efficiency and has a zero-sum relationship with political control, Kolkowicz embraces an assumption that already has wide support. For example, Thomas Wolfe suggests that "in a sense . . . the history of Soviet political-military relations can be described as the search for a formula to reconcile political control with professional military efficiency. . . ."[6] Raymond Garthoff is a bit more cautious in observing that "despite many very unpopular commissars, the institution [*i.e.*, the military-political administration] retains something of a positive role,"[7] but he, too, finds professionalism impaired by political controls and implicitly equates professionalism with military efficiency. Even Merle Fainsod has casually referred to "the familiar problem of balancing the competing demands of professionalism and party control."[8]

If one accepts this conceptualization, one is more easily persuaded by claims that the military may be waging a domestic political struggle leading to some sort of incipient institutional pluralism in the Soviet system.[9] There are grounds, however, for

[1] *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 12.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 11.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 341-42.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 345.
[6] *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1964, p. 91.
[7] *Soviet Military Doctrine*, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1954, p. 242.
[8] *How Russia is Ruled*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1956, p. 406.
[9] Kolkowicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 347-48; and "Interest Groups in Soviet Politics: "The Case of the Military," *Comparative Politics* (New York), April 1970, pp. 445-72. In the latter, Kolkowicz seems to retreat from some of the analysis in his earlier-cited work.

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challenging it. First, let us consider the adversary relationship and then go on to examine what is understood by military professionalism.

The Theory of Antithetical Traits

Kolkowicz bases his assumptions about the adversary relationship on somewhat metaphysical grounds. He identifies five traits which he claims to be "natural" to any military establishment, and he juxtaposes them to five antithetical traits said to be "desired" by the party.[10] Thus he is able to insist that an inherent value-conflict shapes the whole character of party-military relations. This is fair enough if his attributions of "natural" and "desired" traits are valid, but these attributions give rise to both empirical and definitional problems, as a detailed consideration of the five antithetical pairs will show.

First, the military is described as *"elitist"* as opposed to the party's desire that it be *"egalitarian."* It is, of course, accurate to attribute some degree of elitism to almost any hierarchical organization, and one can readily accept this as a valid characteristic of the professional military. On the other hand, it is far from clear just how genuine is the party's supposed desire for an egalitarian military. Kolkowicz himself seems to sense that egalitarianism has not been altogether congenial to Bolshevism when he observes that Lenin, as early as 1905, affirmed the party's need for a hierarchical military organization.[11] Indeed, fondness for control and aversion to spontaneity among unstructured masses are distinctive traits of the Bolshevik ideological spirit. It is conceivable that the Mensheviks may have seriously believed in the doctrine of an egalitarian military or, more specifically, in the old Social Democratic program calling for a workers' militia to replace the bourgeois state army, but for the Bolsheviks the doctrine would appear to have been a tactic rather than an inflexible commitment. They advocated egalitarianism for organizations they did not yet control, as evidenced by their policy toward the Imperial Army in 1917; but once in control, they preferred hierarchy and elitism—witness their command policies in the Red Army during the civil war.

The party's supposed desire for egalitarianism in the military thus seems to belong to the same category as its aspiration for a withering away of the state in an ultimate society of full communism—still an official goal perhaps, certainly not one that is expected to materialize in the proximate future. In today's world (however Soviet ideologues may now define it), where potentially hostile forces are not merely alive but still formidable, egalitarianism in the Soviet military would—in the party's estimation—no doubt be recognized as an ideological error, a mistake in policy. Thus, the assumed contradictoriness of the first pair of traits may be more scholastic than real.

Second, the military is said to value *"professional autonomy,"* whereas the party is assumed to desire military *"subordination to ideology."* The problem here is what is meant by professional autonomy. Does it mean the authority to introduce into military organization new technology that has as its theoretical basis scientific principles that are incompatible with Marxism-Leninism? There is little evidence to indicate that this has been an issue between the party and the military. The party's ideological objections to the Heisenberg principle in nuclear physics have not stood in the way of Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons; nor have computers been spurned for military use because of some initial ideological perplexity over cybernetics. Or does professional autonomy mean the authority to determine budget levels and to set down explicitly what military leaders are fond of calling the "requirements" of defense? Surely it is clear from what we know of both Soviet and American internal policy debates concerning military expenditures that there is no way to ascertain unambiguous requirements for defense;[12] moreover, any budget question is at root a political issue. Does professional autonomy therefore mean, in reality, "political" autonomy? Can operational substance be given to the idea of an apolitical professional military judgment? We shall return to this problem, but for the moment it is enough to show that the presumed contradictoriness between these two traits rests on uncertain definitional grounds.

Third, a strong sense of *"nationalism"* is said to be a characteristic military trait in contrast to the party's preference for *"proletarian internationalism."* This assertion is far from self-evident in the Russian context. Invoking the principle of nationalism in

[10] *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party*, p. 21.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

[12] In the Soviet case, this conclusion is supported by the early debate on the "military question," but our knowledge of the substance of similar debates in more recent decades is admittedly more limited.

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Russia has always carried the danger of inviting the dissolution of Muscovite political hegemony over ethnic and religious "national minorities." Muscovite rulers, both civil and military (if that distinction has relevance in Russian history), have consistently asserted a legitimacy principle of universalist character, be it the 15th-century doctrine of "Moscow the Third Rome," the 19th-century ideology of "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality (*narodnost*),"[13] or the Soviet principle of "proletarian internationalism." Moreover, there is evidence that some Russian military leaders believed the military might help to integrate the national minorities. P.A. Zaionchkovsky, the Soviet historian of the military reforms of 1870, quotes from the archives instances of military officials advocating that officer recruitment include national-minority persons (Jews in particular) as a tactic for combating separatist sentiments.[14] In 1927, a Soviet officer took up the same theme at the level of troop recruitment, citing historical experience and claiming a special role for the Red Army in helping overcome the nationality problem.[15] The integrative role of the armed forces is still a recurring theme in the Soviet military press today.

Perhaps Kolkowicz merely means that military officers have more deeply visceral feelings of national patriotism than party leaders. But if this is his point, can he be sure that a young technician in the Soviet rocket forces reacts any more viscerally to the call of patriotism than an older, less educated party *apparatchik*?[16] A much more compelling argument would be that the privileged military elite and the party elite both have an equal stake in the Soviet state and the present political order. Once again, value congruence rather than conflict in party-military relations would seem closer to the mark.

The fourth pair of supposedly antithetical traits, namely, a military preference for *"detachment"* from society as opposed to the party's emphasis on *"social involvement,"* may at first glance seem more valid. An analysis of the record, however, reveals



Members of the Alexander Matrosov Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment attend their weekly political lesson with Major V. Vasilenko. At the rear is a political-administrative map of the USSR.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

that disputes between Red Army commanders and their party critics in the 1920's centered not so much on alleged detachment of the military from society as on how their integration was to be achieved. M.V. Frunze, Trotsky's successor as head of Soviet military forces, called for "militarization of the entire population," arguing that modern weapons made total involvement of the populace in war unavoidable.[17] Significantly enough, Frunze's concepts and rhetoric have recently reappeared in the Soviet military press, albeit in the more complex milieu of the technological revolution.[18] Present linkages between the military and industry, as well as the organizational requirements of mass mobilization, make notions of military "detachment" or "apartness" from society appear as irrelevant to Soviet military leaders today as they appeared to Frunze in the early years of the Soviet regime.[19]

[13] It should be remembered that *narodnost* does not mean "nationality" in the modern sense, but literally "peopleness," an ambiguous term even in Russian.

[14] *Voennye reformy 1860-1870 godov v Rossii* (The Military Reforms of 1860-1870 in Russia), Moscow, Nauka, 1952, pp. 307-14.

[15] Sidev, "The Appeal of Nationality," *Voina i revoliutsiia* (Moscow), May and June 1927.

[16] That such an assumption is open to question is supported by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's reported remark, based on personal observation, that Soviet Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev enjoys retelling his war experiences (as did his predecessor, Nikita Khrushchev). See R. F. Seehan, "Why Sadat Packed Off the Russians," *The New York Times Magazine*, Aug. 6, 1972.

[17] *Izbrannye proizvedeniia* (Selected Works), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1934, pp. 22, 180, and 375.

[18] See I. Zavialov's article in *Krasnaia zvezda* (Moscow), Aug. 3, 1972, for a recent reference to Soviet theoretical work on military affairs during the 1920's and 1930's and its relevance today.

[19] There is an interesting parallel in the lack of enthusiasm shown by US military leaders for an all-volunteer professional army, notwithstanding the increased institutional detachment that might result.

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It is probably closer to the truth in the Soviet case to describe both the party and the military leaders as vitally interested in how to integrate industrial, state administrative, educational, and military organizations in a fashion that permits swift mobilization of the society for war, yet does not unacceptably retard growth rates in nonmilitary sectors of the economy.

The fifth and last pair of incompatible traits is seen in a claimed military leaning toward *"heroic symbolism,"* in contrast to the party's assumed preference for *"anonymity."* Here again, the claim seems to flout reality. If we are looking for universally held values among military professionals, it is worth recalling that the Imperial German Army valued anonymity for its General Staff—a tradition that was reaffirmed by the chief of the Reichswehr in the Weimar period, Hans von Seeckt, when he stated unequivocally that "General Staff Officers are anonymous."[20] To be sure, actual behavior among officers is quite often at odds with such traditional military values, but the assertion of these values nevertheless contradicts the presumption of an inherent military dedication to "heroic symbolism." On the other hand, the party's commitment to the principle of "anonymity" has not always guided members' behavior. The CPSU, after all, has had serious problems with the "cult of personality," a rather grave deviation from official party norms.

Thus, even a cursory review of these pairs of antithetical traits ascribed to the military and the party creates doubt as to their validity. A more accurate assessment of the institutional values of the two entities suggests congruence, not conflict on *a priori* grounds.

Conflict or Consensus?

To be sure, those who see the Soviet party-military relationship as having an inherently adversary character do not base their argument purely on deductions from general propositions. They cite substantial published evidence of differences of opinion between party leaders and military spokesmen on current issues. No doubt such differences are numerous and at times even severe, but in judging their significance for the military-party relationship, it is extremely important to view them in fuller perspective. On reflection, the differences seem to exist against a background of broad pragmatic consensus. To demonstrate this point, let us review a list of perennial issues that confront the Soviet leadership. In every case it is possible to conclude that the military probably stands closer to the party than does any other public institution.

Consider first the question of economic reform, especially the issue of decentralization. Reformist voices notwithstanding, the party leaders have permitted no erosion of the central planners' power to set prices. The military likewise has a consistent record of attachment to this cornerstone of the command economy. The Red Commanders disliked the resort to market pricing during the NEP (New Economic Policy) of the 1920's and showed no sympathy for free peasant farming.[21] Today both military and party leaders seem to share a certain ambivalence toward economic reform. On the one hand they both value highly the control afforded by central planning, while on the other they are both unhappy about the retarding effect of the command system on economic growth. There may of course be some minor differences within the general consensus. While the party appears to harbor at least some genuine enthusiasts for reform of the pricing system, it is doubtful that there are many such in the military ranks.

A second issue on which the party and the military appear to be in general agreement is intellectual dissent. Criticism of the regime from the literary community or the intelligentsia at large has encountered fierce criticism from the military as well as from the party. The military press hews to a conservative line on literary affairs and often reflects concern that the views of some liberal writers may corrupt youth by undercutting patriotic fervor.[22] With the striking exception of retired Major-General Piotr Grigorenko, a well-known and outspoken critic of the regime, the party has been able to count on the military generally to voice approval of positive action against dissenters, or at least to give silent acquiescence to a hardline policy.

[20] *Thoughts of a Soldier*, Translated by G. Waterhouse, London, Ernst Benn, 1930, p. 111.

[21] See A. Volpe, "Military Industry in the Civil War," in A. S. Bubnov *et al.*, Eds., *Grazhdanskaia voina (1918-1921)*, (The Civil War, 1918-1921), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1928, p. 377; P. Dybenko, "The Tasks on Industry for National Defense," *Voina i tekhnika* (Moscow), No. 8-9, 1928, pp. 20-21; Frunze, *op. cit.*, p. 474. On military difficulties in food procurement, see M. Promakhin, "A General Agreement is Needed," *Voina i tekhnika*, No. 2-3, 1928, pp. 177-79.

[22] *E.g.*, see an editorial accusing writers and artists of neglecting to provide inspiring patriotic literature and works of art, in *Krasnaia zvezda*, July 22, 1972.

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The nationality question is another issue that appears to unite rather than divide the military and party elites. As much as anything else perhaps, this highly sensitive issue has made senior officers acutely aware that an apolitical military establishment is not a practical option in Soviet affairs. Neither the party nor the military has been able to escape the reality that the Bolsheviks seized power not in a nation-state but in an empire where military government in the outlying provinces had a long history.

Again, the crises arising from movements toward political and economic liberalization in Eastern Europe have found the party and military joined in a conservative union. Although no less an authority than Thomas Wolfe expressed the view in the mid-1960's that renewed Soviet emphasis on the Warsaw Pact primarily reflected concern over the USSR's military position vis-à-vis Western Europe, and only secondarily concern over political stability within the Soviet-East European bloc,[23] this order of priority —if it ever did prevail—has certainly been open to question since the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1968, and the Soviet military, through the Warsaw Pact, has in recent years played a growing role in the political stabilization of the bloc. The effect of this development has been to associate the Soviet military more closely with the party's political concerns in Eastern Europe rather than to create for the military a new level of apolitical institutional autonomy.

Finally, destalinization is an issue that cuts across the party-military boundary. Like many of the party *apparatchiki,* senior Soviet military officers value the insurance against blood purges that destalinization provides. At the same time, the denigration of the Soviet system that has to some extent been implicit in destalinization has evoked ambivalent and cautious reactions in both party and military circles.[24]

To be sure, none of these five points is new. However, grouping them together serves to demonstrate that there are firm grounds for arguing that a party-military consensus on a variety of issues does exist, and that this fact should be kept in mind in interpreting evidence of the marshals' displeasure with party policy. This thesis is further supported by behavioral evidence adduced by Milton Lodge in his study of elite "participatory attitudes."[25] Lodge's findings, based on content analysis of the leading publications of the party, economic, legal, military, and literary elites over the period 1952-65, indicate that the military was the least critical of the party's leading role. There were occasions when military criticism of party policies was relatively sharp, but on the whole the military remained the least vociferous among the institutional elites in challenging the party.

To sum up the first argument of this paper, then, neither an incompatibility of institutional ethos nor disagreement over fundamental issues seems to justify the assumption that the party-military boundary marks a real or potential cleavage in the Soviet political system. Let us now turn to the second major assumption that has colored Western analysis —namely the belief that there is an inverse relationship between military professionalism or efficiency and party control.

Military Professionalism

To place such an assumption on credible grounds, one must first have an operational definition of military professionalism, but finding a satisfactory empirical referent for this vague term is difficult. Upon reflection it strikes one as somewhat analogous to "phlogiston," the mythical substance that was supposed to explain fire before man understood oxidation. If confusion is to be cleared up, therefore, one must try to establish what scholars mean when they speak of "military professionalism." What specific notions are comprehended by the term? At least two such notions come to mind—notions which have sometimes been advanced separately but have also been frequently propounded as a pair.

The first of these notions seems to equate professionalism with technical rationality in the sense that Barrington Moore uses the term in his triad of implicit Soviet decision-making criteria: *i.e.,* power, technical rationality, and tradition.[26] Professional military behavior in this sense means doing things according to more or less value-free analyti-

[23] "The Warsaw Pact in Evolution," in Kurt London, Ed., *Eastern Europe in Transition,* Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1966, pp. 210-20. See also Wolfe's *Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970,* Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1970, pp. 386-425, 477.

[24] For examples from military circles, see reviews of Marshal K. S. Moskalenko's memoirs (in *Pravda,* June 21, 1972, and *Krasnaia zvezda,* July 5, 1972), in which Stalin is treated respectfully.

[25] "Soviet Elite Participatory Attitudes in the Post-Stalin Period," *American Political Science Review* (Menasha, Wisconsin), September 1968, pp. 827-39.

[26] *Terror and Progress USSR,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1954, pp. 185 ff.

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cal principles rather than according to arbitrary ideological doctrine or the political preferences of senior party leaders. Thus, in this understanding, party control and military professionalism stand in opposition much of the time, just as considerations of power are often incompatible with considerations of technical rationality in Moore's decision model. There is cogency in the analogy. The application of modern technology to military affairs has indeed brought about significant changes in the Soviet armed forces. But to see military professionalism primarily as a concern for technical rationality is to see professional soldiers as primarily scientists and technicians.

There is something incomplete about such a definition. Professional officers also concern themselves with controlling human behavior, and for control techniques they tend to turn to habit, tradition, and historical precedent—that is, considerations that can be included in Moore's third criterion, tradition. Not surprisingly, therefore, what passes as professional military opinion has not always remained in step with the revolution in military technology. Nor are military leaders inclined to think of themselves as primarily scientists or technicians. Indeed, such a narrow definition of the modern professional soldier would tend to erode the military's claim to a unique expertise that has no civilian counterpart.

A broader interpretation of military professionalism, which includes a nontechnical dimension, is provided by Samuel Huntington.[27] Briefly, Huntington says that a profession of any kind must be characterized by a sense of corporateness among its practitioners, a particular expertise that can be gained only through years of training and experience, and a set of ethical standards by which its practitioners can judge their social responsibility. To consider the last criterion first, the flaw is that one seldom finds a military establishment that is effectively bound by a comprehensive professional ethic. Even when a military elite strongly desires to adhere to a certain ethic, the task of making the desired rules of conduct operational with respect to policy choices is one of overwhelming difficulty. The ethic of the US Military Academy at West Point, summed up in the slogan "Duty, Honor, Country," is noble in spirit, but it is hardly an unambiguous guide for deciding between categories of military spending or between military and nonmilitary spending. In truth, almost any decision within the military has domestic political implications; and deep commitment to the most admirable social ethic may at times soften or alter those implications, but it will not remove them. Thus, Huntington's concept of a military professional ethic tends to obscure the fact that an apolitical military establishment is a mythical convention concocted in the parochial minds of Europeans and later embraced in the United States.

What of the first two criteria? Corporateness, obviously, is an operational standard and one that most military establishments meet. But what about a unique body of expertise learned through years of training? It is increasingly difficult to identify a specific set of skills or type of rigorous intellectual activity that characterizes the military profession as a whole. This is not to say that officers do not possess high levels of skill. Rather it is to observe that they possess such a diverse variety of skills that their common professional ground is difficult to find. Furthermore, skills that are unique to the military form a diminishing proportion of the total skills utilized in the military. In 1955 about 71 percent of all occupational specialities in the US military had civilian counterpart specialities.[28] A century earlier that proportion was less than 10 percent, and today it may well be close to 80 percent. The Soviet military is experiencing a similar trend. Today 45 percent of all officer duty posts in the Soviet military require engineers or technicians; in the rocket forces the proportion is 75 percent.[29]

One is forced to ask, therefore, how officers distinguish their skills from those of managers and specialists in industry, in the public bureaucracy, or in educational institutions. One is forced to wonder if the martial attributes of a rifle company commander are truly representative of the officer corps as a whole. One is forced to recognize that even the traditions of personal bravery and tactical acumen in battle are carried on not only by professional officers but also by reserve junior officers and draftee soldiers, the so-called non-professionals. They hear the bullets fly and know the fear of the battlefield. The professional officer holds no monopoly of these experiences, nor even the larger share.

This is hardly the last word on professionalism, but it is enough to show that formal definitions, such

[27] *The Soldier and the State*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1959, especially pp. 7-10.

[28] See Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1960, p. 9.

[29] *Krasnaia zvezda*, Feb. 23, 1972.

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as Huntington's, offer little analytical assistance and may introduce intellectual confusion.

Again, if one turns for an understanding of professionalism to policy studies of military institutions, one finds little encouragement for accepting Kolkowicz's assumption about a uniform relationship between professional autonomy and efficiency. This is true of studies both of modern defense establishments[30] and of armies in the new states.[31] One finds that these establishments are highly politicized institutions as diverse as the polities to which they belong and no easier to fit into a global model than the polities themselves.

The Military as a Bureaucracy

If professionalism is a dubious way to explain the source of military efficiency, can we be sure that political controls such as exist in the Soviet military impair efficiency? Does the political apparatus within the armed forces actually play the "horse collar" role ascribed to it? To answer these questions, a new analytical perspective is necessary. Instead of looking at the Soviet military establishment under the universal category of "military," as Kolkowicz does, let us view it rather as a large public bureaucracy, a hierarchical organization that operates in peacetime not altogether differently from other public agencies.

What does it mean for a public bureaucracy to be efficient? Obviously, if efficiency in this context is taken to signify effectiveness in advancing something as broad and nebulous as the "public interest," or the "general welfare," or the common defense," it gives rise to a host of thorny questions. Such definitional hazards can be avoided, however, if organizational efficiency is measured in terms of the degree to which the top leader's preferences with respect to goal-seeking activity are implemented by the institution's subordinates. After all, the top leadership defines organizational goals and programs, and it presumably does so with certain larger ends in mind. It follows that from the leadership's point of view efficiency has meaning primarily in terms of those ends. Moreover, it is this top-level point of view that is implicity taken for analysis by Kolkowicz and most other students of Soviet military affairs. Individuals below the top of the hierarchy, of course, may find their own preferences in conflict with the preferences held by those above.

In short, from the new perspective just outlined, behavior in the Soviet military is viewed as at root a bureaucratic political matter; and politics within bureaucracies is essentially a struggle by the top leadership to impose its value preferences on the lower bureaucratic levels.[32] Now, there are various ways in which subordinates may be able to defeat the gambits of the leadership, but control of information about activities and outputs is a vital element of power at any level, and one that is crucial to the success of any leadership maneuver. Subordinates want to conceal information about inadequate performance; superiors want to have that information in order to take corrective action.

This game is nowhere more exaggerated than in a military hierarchy. And it is the unmeasurable and ambiguous quality of the final product, *i.e.*, national security or state defense, that complicates the leadership's control of information about output and makes bargaining, deceit, waste, and general inefficiency so prevalent. To put it another way, the difficulty in observing military outputs and relating outputs to inputs is the source of the high degree of politics and the low degree of analysis in organizational decision-making affecting the military.[33] If the top learns more about activities and outputs at the lower levels, and if it can make the lower-level personnel uncertain about being able to deceive the top, then the power of the top is enhanced, and the efficiency of the organization can be improved. The party's control apparatus within the military provides an alternative information channel to the top, and it thus serves to raise the uncertainty level of sub-

[30] See, *e.g.*, S. P. Huntington, *The Common Defense*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1961; Morris Janowitz, Ed., *The New Military*, New York, Russell Sage, 1964; Herbert Rosinski, *The German Army*, New York, Praeger, 1966.

[31] See, *e.g.*, Henry Bienen, Ed., *The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in Political Development*, New York, Russell Sage, 1968; and J. J. Johnson, Ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1962. For a critique of the growing literature on the subject, see Eric Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Non-Western States," *The American Political Science Review*, December 1970, pp. 1135-48.

[32] See Michel Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1964, for a full development of this view of bureaucracy as a political arena in which individuals play their own games for their own ends. Crozier also introduces an interesting way of applying this analytical perspective to the Russian cultural context.

[33] See James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations*, New York, John Wiley, 1958, p. 145, for a discussion of these variables as they affect program content in organizations.

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ordinates and make collusion among them risky. It follows quite logically that the system of party control may well enhance rather than reduce Soviet military power by comparison with what it might be without them.

On the other side of the coin, it is the principle of *edinonachalie* ("unity of command" in Western military parlance) applied to organization that allows military subordinates to feed the high command selective information that distorts the top's perception and thwarts rational corrective action. At least this is the conclusion one would reach by reasoning in *a priori* fashion about Soviet military behavior from middle-range generalizations about organizational behavior.[34]

Admittedly, intervening variables from the cultural and political milieu might invalidate this reasoning. For example, in a society where every citizen is highly committed to the same social values and ideological principles, subordinates might be willing to make sacrifices for the sake of realizing organizational goals and thereby create an environment where social trust would permit unity of command to be an effective management technique. But that is hardly descriptive of Soviet society, where internalization of the official ideological precepts is not complete. It would seem, moreover, that where preferences about social ends and values are diverse and do not rest on some fundamental ideological consensus, the existence of dual and triple information channels would enhance the control and power exercised by the top. Furthermore, a change from a peacetime to a wartime environment might alter the effectivenss of the alternative command technique. This is apt to be true because fear of personal destruction and a changed perception of the "we" and "they" groups are likely to alter the value hierarchy of most individuals.

Horizontal Alignments

In turning to a bureaucratic-political frame of reference for analyzing the Soviet military's behavior in the sphere of domestic politics, we have shifted the emphasis from vertical institutional alignments to intra-institutional horizontal alignments. This shift has not been accidental or simply the logical consequence of taking a different set of analytical concepts. Historical perspective makes it compelling. One needs only to reflect on the exigencies of military power from the position of a general staff in Moscow.

No less than the elite of the Bolshevik party, the leaders of the Red Army in the civil war found themselves threatened as much by "localism" in the lower strata and subunits of their infant institution as by quarrels among the elite factions. The Red Army's procurement system of forced requisitioning provoked widespread hostility not only because grain was scarce but also because the system's executants abused their authority. The anarchist Makhno's antics in the Ukraine, the Kronstadt sailors' revolt, and the uprising in Tambov left the senior Red Commanders with the correct impression that they occupied jointly with the Bolshevik party the position of a besieged elite, notwithstanding their victory over the White armies. The so-called "scissors crisis" during NEP reinforced this assessment by revealing to both military and party elites the peasants' power to stifle the economy,[35] and the military elite—whether or not it was disposed to back Stalin's later move toward collectivization—again found itself threatened by rank-and-file disaffection in its own ranks. During World War II, defections by individual soldiers, units, and entire ethnic groups reasserted once again the primacy of horizontal political alignments over vertical ones, even if the Great Purges of the 1930's had given the officer corps cause for doubt about the wisdom of party unity above all. And as it has been argued above, perennial issues facing the contemporary Soviet political and military elites continue to create a consensus of concern not only for the stability and legitimacy of the regime on the domestic front but also for the stability of the Soviet political-military position in Eastern Europe.

In the process of forging this party-military amalgam, the party elite has not gone unaffected. It is often forgotten that the Red Army was the first major institution of government built after the

[34] Empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis is not entirely lacking. See A. K. Davis, "Bureaucratic Patterns in the Navy Officer Corps," *Social Forces* (Chapel Hill, N.C.), Vol. 27 (1948), pp. 143-53, for a study that is relevant to this writer's views of the potentially perverse effects of unity of command in peacetime, as well as to the preceding discussion of professionalism.

[35] The "scissors crisis" occurred in 1922-23 when the ratio of the prices of agricultural products to those of industrial goods swung sharply in favor of the latter. The peasantry reacted by reducing their purchases of industrial goods and holding back agricultural produce from urban markets, leaving the industrial trusts with rising inventories of unsold goods and the urban populace in desperate need of food.

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Bolshevik seizure of power. Whatever the party's original intentions, it soon found itself immersed in the task of mobilizing the Red Army. Thus, most of the party cadres in the early years of the regime had military experience. Trotsky displayed mastery and brilliance in military affairs; Stalin skillfully adopted military categories and rhetoric in his style of political analysis. Nor were military staff procedures novel to the generation that subsequently consolidated Soviet power. In 1941 the party leaders once again donned uniforms to experience four years of intensive military socialization. One of the most interesting aspects of Kolkowicz's study of this period is the abundant evidence it provides that the personal cliques formed among the elites in World War II cut across the party-military boundary. Furthermore, those cliques proved more durable than professional and institutional loyalties when it came to the removal of Marshal Zhukov from his post as Minister of Defense in 1957.

Such political experiences are not new in Muscovite history. The civil-military boundary has always been blurred in Russia. Imperial officers frequently played roles and indulged in bureaucratic intrigue within the government as well as in dissident movements. Tsars sometimes thought of themselves foremost as military leaders. The civil service system contained many military officers in its ranks.[36] The enduring political reality that confronted the top elites was the danger of sedition and insurrection in the lower social strata. Small wonder that the technique of setting colleagues to watch and inform on one another has deep roots in Russia.

The intent here is not to provide a definitive explanation of the role of the military-political apparatus in Soviet party-military relations. Rather it is to encourage a critical reexamination of the common assumption that party controls are a brake on Soviet military efficiency. In fact, for the reasons set forth in the preceeding pages, the very autonomy presumed to be essential for this efficiency could have precisely the opposite effect.

The Effects of Misconceptions

What have been the consequences of these long-standing misconceptions for the analysis of Soviet party-military relations? Certainly they have not seriously damaged much of the literature on Soviet military policy; nor, for that matter, have they destroyed the value of several of the central chapters in Kolkowicz's prodigious study. For a variety of reasons, however, they cannot be brushed aside as minor matters of semantics.



Army General V.G. Kulikov, promoted to Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces and First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR in 1972.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

In the first place, these misconceptions have underpinned the prognosis that the Soviet military would gain increasing autonomy vis-à-vis the party—a prognosis for which corroborative evidence has not been forthcoming. Proportionate military membership in the Central Committee has remained fairly stable. The promotion of the relatively youthful Army General V.G. Kulikov—ahead of several hundreds of officers senior to him—to the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces is not likely the work of a senior marshals' club; rather it probably reflects the powerful hand of the party Secretariat reaching deep into the ranks to make a selection of its own choosing. It might be argued that Marshal Andrei Grechko's elevation to Politburo membershp in April 1973 is at last the awaited turn toward greater military autonomy. But is it? Grechko is 70 years old. Not only is he separated in age by nearly 20 years from the group of young generals now emerging in the Soviet high command (Kulikov being merely the most illustrious of them), but he and his military peers are also separated

[36] John A. Armstrong, "Tsarist and Soviet Elite Administrators," *Slavic Review* (Seattle, Wash.) March 1972, pp. 14-15.

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Soviet Marshal Andrei Grechko (left) on the rostrum for the 1973 May Day Parade in Moscow's Red Square, four days after his promotion to the CPSU Politburo. With him are other key Politburo members: they are (proceeding from the left) Nikolai Podgorny, Leonid Brezhnev, Alexei Kosygin, and Mikhail Suslov.

—UPI photo.

from the younger generation by a gap in education. The turbulent 1930's and the war years advanced these older men rapidly but did not provide the technical education and sophistication characteristic of the younger group. The new generation rose in rank because of the imperatives of the technical modernization of Soviet armed forces and because of the personnel policies originated in Stalin's last years and during Zhukov's stewardship of the military in the 1950's—policies that have since been basically adhered to by Khrushchev and Brezhnev. It is unconvincing to argue that the younger generals attribute their rise to Grechko's lobbyist endeavors; on the contrary, there is strong reason to doubt that Grechko has a reliable constituency in the military. And if he does not, it is all the more likely that he owes his Politburo seat to Brezhnev rather than to the group pressure of "military interests."

Nor would this be an unusual situation in Soviet military-political affairs. Marshal Klimenti Ye. Voroshilov became Commissar of War in late 1925, a few weeks before he entered the Politburo. That he was considered utterly incompetent by his military subordinates was no secret—and likely a key reason why Stalin retained him in his defense post until 1940. He was not expelled from the Politburo until 1960, although he had actively assisted in Stalin's 1937 decimation of the Soviet officer corps. Zhukov, by reputation as impressively competent as Voroshilov was incompetent, nonetheless shared with Voroshilov the inability to turn the military department into his own reliable constituency. In sum, marshals in the Politburo have yet to act successfully as lobbyists for military institutional autonomy.[37]

Secondly, the misconceptions we have examined earlier in this discussion have encouraged proponents of "group theory" (as applied to the Soviet system) to treat the Soviet military as an incipient interest group. Even if the conceptual appropriateness of group theory is granted, however, this approach raises questions about the proper identification of both the "interest" and the "group" in the case of military policy. It may well be that groupings among the Soviet elite act in concert to win approval for certain military policies, but it is not at all certain how military officers are related to such groupings. Moreover, intra-military interest conflict may be more significant for policy-making than interests uniting the military as a whole.

Thirdly, these same misconceptions have generally been associated with a dubious interpretation of the role of political controls over the military. Certainly the military-political apparatus needs to be restudied. Such study should not be confined to the questions raised earlier about the impact of political controls on military efficiency. It should also examine efforts to adapt the controls to the changing social and educational structure of the Soviet armed forces. It may be too early to treat this latter subject with confidence, but Kolkowicz cites considerable relevant evidence and cogently observes that ". . . the rise of technocrats in the military has introduced far-reaching problems. . . ." [38]

Finally, the traditional assumptions have kept the comparative study of the Soviet military's role in domestic politics where the study of the military in developing countries languished when it first

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[37] It is worth noting in this connection that Marshal Grechko has made no major statement on either defense policy or military science since his pamphlet based on the 24th Party Congress, *Na strazhe mira i stroitelstvo kommunizma* (For the Preservation of Peace and the Construction of Communism), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1971. In contrast, Kulikov has become conspicuously articulate on both topics. See his articles in *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 3, 1973; *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil* (Moscow), No. 6, 1973; and *Krasnaia zvezda*, Feb. 23, 1973. Grechko's greatest domestic military visibility of late has been at the Fifth All-Army Conference of Party Secretaries, where he and Yepishev, head of the military political administration, spoke on the 1973-74 exchange of party documents and organizational measures aimed at invigorating the military's political apparatus. This is hardly the behavior of a "professional" officer striving to throw off a "horse collar" of ideological controls; rather, it is the behavior of a senior member of the Soviet political elite endeavoring to make the present system more effective for the purposes of that elite.

[38] *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party*, p. 310.

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became popular in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Because all officers wear uniforms, there has been a tendency to consider the officer corps a firm empirical referent for comparative analysis.[39] As more recent study has shown, however, uniforms do not insure analogous values or behavior from state to state.[40] The lesson seems to be that generalizations are risky unless unique cultural and political contexts are well understood.

An Alternative Conceptualization

If, then, the conventional way of conceptualizing Soviet party-military relations appears open to question on many counts, is there a better alternative? Implicit in the foregoing critique, of course, is the conclusion that more monographic research is needed before a succinct understanding can be cogently formulated. What follows, therefore, is at best an adumbration of an alternative conceptualization. It consists of five assumptions, selected to define the contemporary nature of Soviet party-military relations, and a brief excursion into the history of Imperial Russian civil-military relations designed to place those assumptions in cultural perspective.

First, *the military is an administrative arm of the party, not something separate from and competing with it.* When there are cleavages in the leadership over military policy, they are intraparty factional divisions, not division of party *vs.* military. This is true not just because members of the military elite are also party members. More importantly, it is because the variety of military institutions in Soviet society is so great that most policy issues are bound to find the military leadership divided on them rather than united as a bloc. Our ignorance of institutional structure tends to nurture misconceptions not only of the size of the military establishment but also of the diversity of military attitudes.

Moreover, there has been a tendency to overlook the extent to which Soviet military and civil activities are interlocked. Soviet nuclear physicist Andrei D. Sakharov recently chided both Soviet and Western scholars for failing to study the Soviet military-industrial complex, for example, which he believes consumes about 40 percent of national income.[41] Other examples of military-civil linkage are easy to cite. One is the little-explored relation of the military to the civil educational system: not only does the military operate a vast network of middle and higher educational institutions, but since the promulgation of the new military service law in 1967, the Ministry of Education has become deeply involved in basic military training. The military also has links with the Academy of Sciences, the universities, and most other institutions of higher learning, and most *tekhnikums* and institutes now have military chairs in their faculties.

There are still other linkages. The relation of the regional military administrations—*i.e.*, the system of military districts and commissariats—to regional and local-level civil government—is one that certainly should not be overlooked in view of its potential political ramifications. There is also significant military participation in republican and local soviets. Furthermore, the military is actively and extensively involved in civil defense activities. A Deputy Minister of Defense, whose post was only recently created, now heads a new civil defense system encompassing all civil defense activities in the USSR,[42] and the military press makes frequent references to civil defense troops and training. Thus, when Brezhnev states that "to strengthen the Soviet government . . . also means to strengthen the Soviet armed forces,[43] he is not uttering just an empty slogan, although the full import of his remark may be clear only to those aware of the plethora of Soviet civil-military ties.

Second, *the party-military relationship has symbiotic aspects in domestic politics.* Much attention has been paid by political scientists to the modernizing role that armies sometimes play in developing states, and certainly the part that the Soviet military has played in this respect as well as in the socialization of Soviet youth has been historically an important one. Ethnic representation in the Soviet high command suggests that members of some of the national minorities have found the military a route of upward social mobility. At the lower levels,

[39] On this point, see D. A. Rustow, "Modernization and Comparative Politics: Prospects in Research and Theory," *Comparative Politics*, October 1968, p. 43.

[40] See Nordlinger, *loc. cit.*, and Bienen, *op. cit.*

[41] Radio Liberty, *Research Bulletin*, CRD 178/72. Sakharov made his remarks in a statement concerning the US-Soviet SALT agreement signed in May 1972.

[42] See remarks by General-Colonel A. T. Altunin, *Krasnaia zvezda*, Oct. 4, 1972.

[43] *Kommunist*, No. 3, 1973, p. 77.

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it must also be noted that millions of peasants have passed through the army on their way to the urban-industrial sector of society. The military's role in breaking the peasant away from his agrarian milieu and socializing him for industrial life is a recurring theme in Soviet military policy from the 1920's on.

These first two assumptions may seem to direct attention away from high policy to organizational trivia, but this is not necessarily the case. Admittedly, the secretive propensities of the Soviet elite make it likely that military policy analysis will remain something akin to Kremlinology. By contrast, information about institutional structure, activity, and problems is relatively abundant, since the requirements of organizational management make such information difficult to conceal. The possibilities for learning about organizational structure and bureaucratic politics are consequently greater, and the better these things are understood, the greater will be our appreciation of their constraining effect on the highest military policy-makers. One of the consequences of institutional analysis, therefore, should be to improve both the scope and the realism of the assumptions that serve as a basis for the study of high policy. Western study of the Soviet economy offers an instructive analogy for students of the military. Our appreciation of the way GOSPLAN conceives its problems, dilemmas, and options would be severely limited without the wealth of insights generated by careful monographic analysis of Soviet economic institutions, beginning at the firm level.

Third, *the military is first and foremost a political institution.* Sophistic definitions of apolitical professionalism simply cannot depoliticize the activity of military officers, be they technical experts or heroic leaders. The argument for this assumption is presumably clear from the earlier discussion of military professionalism and need not be expanded here.

Fourth, *the military's political life is bureaucratic in character, not parliamentarian and not lobbyist.* This point, too, has been dealt with in the earlier discussion of the military-political apparatus and military efficiency. Concepts from organization theory and limited generalizations about bureaucratic politics, it was argued, can lead to new insights into the party-military relationship. At the risk of repetition, however, it is important to make explicit a significant difference between bureaucratic politics and interest-group politics.

Personal cliques and coalitions of cliques take shape in bureaucracies, but they differ generically from interest groups. They cannot formalize themselves and thereby institutionalize the pursuit of an interest. In the Soviet bureaucracy, informal cliques and coalitions are established only at great risk; they probably do not extend beyond small face-to-



An important event in the lives of these youths from Kalinin District of Moscow: their first line-up after induction into the Soviet Army.

—Photo by Novosti via Sovfoto.

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face groups; and they tend to float upward through the bureaucracy as age and promotions advance the charter members to higher levels. They cannot openly pronounce their views and recruit new and younger members in order to perpetuate and strengthen their group; rather they are succeeded by new cliques rising from below and doomed to a similar life-cycle. What remains more or less constant—the key factor in social cohesion and the source of roles and norms—is the bureaucratic structure in both its formal and informal aspects. The ambitious and effective individual player soon learns that the bureaucracy is enduring, the clique ephemeral. His participation in cliques and factions may be imperative for self-advancement and protection, but if he succeeds to the leadership of a subunit of the bureaucratic structure, he knows that he must fight and stifle opposing factions, particularly those within his subordinate hierarchy. Factions among his subordinates, even if they can bargain with him because they monopolize a service or expertise that he cannot do without, will find him defending bureaucratic norms as a means of constraining their behavior.[44]

The fifth and last assumption is that a *mechanistic factor is at work to make top-level military policy-making distinct from decision-making at the lower levels.* Technology in military weaponry thrusts military policy-making at the top into the realms of theoretical science, education, economic organization, and resource allocation. Marshals and generals simply cannot claim a monopoly of knowledge in all these areas, nor can they anticipate, most of the time, the implications of technical innovations for changes in military force structure. If anything, one would expect military elites to resist technical innovations, for as bureaucrats with fiefdoms they have reason to fear the changes that innovations frequently bring. Had there been a relaxed international setting, bureaucratic blocking tactics by the Soviet military in resistance to change might well have prevailed over the past two decades. The political leadership, however, has been acutely aware of international dangers and Soviet military inferiority, and this awareness has led the Politburo to assume an aggressive role in military policy-making. As a result, there has been a remarkably responsive and steady process of change in the Soviet military which has brought significant modifications of military technology and organization. Moreover, the broad economic and scientific ramifications of these changes meant that policy resolution at a lower level has been impossible.

The Marshals as Executants

In this environment, the marshals and generals are left to act as executants—executants of only a few aspects of the vast and complex process required by the Soviet military posture. They are not in a position to frame the issues; they can only respond to the way issues are framed above them. They have no functional equivalent to the US Congress where dissenting military views can be championed as a tactic in legislative struggle with the executive branch of government. Thus, the Soviet system is dominated by military policy-making but not by marshals.

These characteristics of Soviet civil-military relations are not without precedent in Imperial Russian experience. The Empire, like the Soviet system, was dominated by military policy; yet generals did not rule Russia, notwithstanding their conspicuous presence at the Tsars' court. Military exigencies, it has been argued, provided the major impetus for Peter the Great's reforms.[45] Money was for Peter "the artery of war," to use his phrase, but it could only be secured by vast social and economic development. The same predicament confronted his heirs, especially in the 19th and 20th centuries. Military requirements, as they were perceived and created by the Imperial rulers, consistently outstripped Russian social and economic development. Certainly that has been the situation facing the Soviet leadership. Stalin's "socialism in one country" was, in effect, a truce with the encircling world forced upon the USSR by economic backwardness. Khrushchev's "peaceful co-existence," a similar kind of truce, persists in present Soviet policy.

A second rather curious Russian tradition has its roots in the Petrine age. From Peter's death in 1725 until the Decembrist Revolt in 1825, the Guards regiments, which were created and raised to prominence by Peter, played a key role in succession struggles. Their influence was such that they often

[44] The case studies of cliques in Robert Conquest's *Power and Policy in the USSR*, London, St. Martin's Press, 1961, provide excellent empirical examples of this bureaucratic political style.

[45] See Michael T. Florinsky, *Russia: A History and an Interpretation*, New York, Macmillan, 1960, pp. 355-96.

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virtually dictated the succession. At the same time, they neither permitted others to encroach upon the tradition of autocracy nor usurped power for themselves. When the Guards met their political demise in the Decembrists' Revolt of 1825, it was because they had for the first time broken the traditional alliance between themselves and the throne in favor of programs for transforming, perhaps even ending, the monarchy. After defeating the Decembrists, Nicholas I restored the traditional alliance of crown and military in a somewhat altered form marked by intensified military discipline and police controls. The ensuing bureaucratic rigidity and lack of rapid industrial development led to stunning military defeats in the Crimean War and again in the Russo-Japanese War. Each defeat prompted military reform, the first in the 1870's and the second on the eve of World War I. During the last century of the Empire, however, the military elite played no role in imperial succession.

An ironic throwback to the political tradition of the Guards regiments seems to have occurred with the Bolshevik seizure of power. A number of Lettish rifle regiments, which retained exceptionally high standards of cohesion and discipline through the tumultuous year of 1917, went over to the Bolsheviks to become the party's mainstay of police and military force at crucial junctures in the early months of Soviet rule. Lettish riflemen dispersed the Constituent Assembly, and Lettish riflemen reportedly executed Nicholas II and his family in 1918. The Cheka leaned heavily on them for assistance.

Evidence suggesting survival of the Guards tradition in more recent times is more tenuous. Stalin apparently succeeded Lenin without special assistance from elite military units. The defeat of Beria's efforts to succeed Stalin, on the contrary, seems to have involved military units and key military figures. The events of 1957 and 1964 in connection with changes in the Politburo are murky, leaving great uncertainty as to the military's role in those events. There is, nevertheless, an institutional condition that seems to make possible a reemergence of the Guards tradition. The Ministry of Defense does not control all military units in the USSR, the Internal and Border Troops answering to other lines of command. This creates a situation in which the military—somewhat like the Guards of former times—might involve itself in a political struggle, but not as a united military. That is to say, military participation in a political crisis, even to the point of ordering troops out into the streets of Moscow, could conceivably take place without the military itself being a serious contender for power. Were it to occur, it would probably be part of an intra-party struggle in which military cliques would choose sides.

To trace out these traditions in Russian civil-military relations is not to explain them; on the contrary, it raises disturbing questions. Why did the Guards repeatedly choose not to usurp power? Why, in 1825, on the single occasion when they opposed the monarchy were they defeated? Answers to these questions are needed, but they are not essential to this discussion. The questions themselves and the traditions they identify are sufficient to show that it is quite ordinary in Russia for the military to assume an executant's role in an authoritarian political system and to refrain from usurping political power even when that power falls temporarily within its reach during a succession struggle. The past, of course, is never a certain guide to the future, but it can help us understand why some of our past predictions have not proven accurate. And it can sharpen our perception of persisting and changing realities in contemporary Soviet internal military affairs.

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Castro's Domestic Course

By Carmelo Mesa-Lago

In the autumn of 1970, Prime Minister Fidel Castro declared that Cuba's revolution was entering "a new phase"—one which was described both in Havana and abroad as a step forward in the democratization of Cuban socialism. Yet by mid-1973 the promise of Fidel's "Havana Autumn" had faded to little more than a forlorn hope. The events of the intervening years appear to have increased rather than decreased the degree of centralization and regimentation of Cuban life. In the following discussion we shall review the promises made by Cuba's leaders in 1970 and contrast them with the actual developments that have taken place in the ruling Cuban Communist Party (*Partido Comunista de Cuba* —PPC), in the central administration, the management of enterprises, the trade unions, the private agricultural sector, and among students and intellectuals in the ensuing three years.

The apparent shift in Castro's revolutionary policies in autumn 1970 seemed to be a response to various factors, in particular a marked decline in the evaluation of the Castro regime by once sympathetic and internationally respected Marxist scholars and specialists, and—more concretely—the failure to achieve the goal of 10 million tons in the sugar harvest in the spring of 1970. The decline in Castro's international reputation came as a result of return visits to the island in the late 1960's—often at Fidel's own invitation—by a number of individuals who had previously observed (or even served as consultants to) the Castro government and had then published favorable commentaries on his revolution. A second round of articles and books by those individuals, published in 1969-70, proved less laudatory. While continuing to praise the Cuban revolution in general, these authorities sharply criticized autocratic and personalist tendencies in Cuba, the accumulation of power in the hands of Fidel and his close inner circle of loyal followers, the militarization of the regime, and the erosion of the influence of trade unions and other mass organizations. These observers—all committed to a humanistic, democratic, participatory form of socialism—called on Castro to delegate more power to local organizations and more freedom to trade unions, to submit vital policy issues to public debate, and generally to permit greater popular participation in decision-making.[1]

A second probable factor in Castro's decision to announce a "new phase" in the revolution was the failure of the 1970 sugar harvest to reach its target. Despite massive mobilization of the population—both rural and urban—the government was able to achieve a harvest of only 8.5 million tons. The intense effort dragged down output in other sectors and resulted in increased popular disenchantment and labor absenteeism. Coming on the heels of the criticism by once-enthusiastic foreign observers, this failure may have dramatized the need for change.

Whatever his reasons, Castro in the period from May to December 1970 delivered a series of

Mr. Mesa-Lago is Professor of Economics and Associate Director of the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Pittsburgh. A recognized authority on Cuban affairs, he was the editor of Revolutionary Change in Cuba, *1971.*

[1] See, for example, L. Huberman and P. Sweezy, *Socialism in Cuba*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1969, pp. 201-18; M. Zeitlin, "Inside Cuba: Workers and Revolutions," *Ramparts* (Berkeley, Calif.), No. 8, March 1970, pp. 20, 70-78; and particularly, R. Dumont, *Cuba: est-il socialiste?* (Cuba: Is It Socialist?), Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1970, pp. 134-223; and K. S. Karol, *Guerrillas in Power: The Course of the Cuban Revolution*, New York, Hill & Wang, 1970, pp. 329-30, 410, 457-58.

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speeches in which he not only acknowledged but himself criticized the exaggerated role of the state in all aspects of Cuban life, the excessive centralization and bureaucratization of administrative functions and their usurpation by the PCC, the lack of democracy within economic enterprises, and the weak non-democratic state of the island's various mass organizations.[2] He proposed a number of measures aimed at clarifying and simplifying lines of command at the national level, decentralizing administrative functions, promoting worker participation in enterprise management, and democratizing and strengthening mass organizations and establishing channels for their more active participation in national affairs.

The Proposals

In a move to separate political and administrative functions within the PCC, Castro proposed the creation within the PCC Central Committee of a new Bureau of Production alongside the already existing Political Bureau. He also proclaimed that the party's role in governmental administration would henceforth be strictly coordinative and supervisory. To streamline the direction of national production under the Council of Ministers, he announced that central ministries and agencies with related functions would be clustered into several functional groupings for purposes of more efficient planning and coordination. At the same time, the Prime Minister criticized excessive state involvement in direct administration because it led to the creation of "super-agencies" and to public indifference. Instead, he declared,

we must begin to substitute democratic methods for administrative methods that run the risk of becoming bureaucratic.[3]

[2] F. Castro, "Comparecencia . . . sobre la zafra azucarera de 1970" (Appearance . . . on the 1970 Sugar Harvest), *Granma Resumen Semanal* (Havana), May 31, 1970; "Discurso en conmemoración del XVII aniversario del asalto al Cuartel Moncada" (Speech on the 17th Anniversary of the Taking of the Moncada Barracks), *ibid.*, Aug. 2, 1970; "Discurso en el X aniversario de la constitución de la FMC" (Speech on the 10th anniversary of the Cuban Women's Federation), *ibid.*, Aug. 30, 1970; "Discurso en la plenaria provincial de la CTC" (Speech at the Provincial Plenary Meeting of the CTC), *ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1970; "Discurso en la concentración para celebrar el décimo aniversario de los CDR" (Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 10th Anniversary of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution), *ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1970; and "Speech at the Closing Session of the National Plenary Meeting of Basic Industry," *Granma Weekly Review* (Havana), Dec. 20, 1970.



Fidel Castro leads the mobilization effort in 1970 as Cuba attempts to harvest a record 10 million tons of raw sugar.

—Photo by Kaeding for ADN (East German News Agency) via Eastfoto.

To this end, Castro, said that all mass organizations would go through a democratization process and ultimately be entrusted with close supervision and control of all administrative and political activities. Moreover, governmental control of activities of insufficient national importance to warrant central administration would revert to organizations at city-district level with representation of the workers and of various organizations of youth, women and students.

Castro further indicated that within enterprises management would cease to be the exclusive prerogative of the manager and instead would be vested in a "collective body" presided over by the manager but including representatives of the workers, the party, and youth and women's organizations. Elaborating on the latter point, Minister of Labor Jorge Risquet noted that workers had hitherto been considered only producers incapable of making decisions or correcting administrative mistakes and had consequently not developed a sense of involvement in the success of their enterprise. He stated that the party was considering means of consulting the workers in drafting and adopting production plans and long-term decisions of enterprises.[4]

[3] F. Castro, "Discurso en el X aniversario de la constitución de la FMC" (Speech on the 10th Anniversary of the Cuban Women's Federation), *loc. cit.*

[4] J. Risquet, "Comparecencia sobre problemas de fuerza de trabajo y productividad" (Appearance on Problems of the Efficiency of Labor and Productivity), *Granma* (Havana), Aug. 1, 1970.

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Throughout these speeches and discussions, however, there ran some important notes of caution. For example, in discussing the issue of collective management, Labor Minister Risquet warned:

The fact that Fidel and I have suggested that the workers should be consulted does not mean that we are going to negate the vanguard role that the party must play.[5]

In his own speeches, moreover, Castro stressed that the various reforms outlined would be submitted to "careful study."

As it turned out, one would have done well to heed these warning signals, for of the promised measures only the clustering of ministries and an allegedly "democratic" reorganization of the labor unions have thus far been implemented. Instead of coming under "collective management," enterprises have remained under the sole authority of the managers.[6] There have also been no further references to community-district bodies taking over state functions or of mass organizations supervising the party and administration.

This was not the first time that the Cuban regime had raised false expectations of greater mass participation in decision-making. In 1960-62, technical advisory councils had been set up in enterprises, candidates from among the workers selected, and the functions of the councils spelled out, but the matter was then abruptly shelved. Similarly, in 1967 some 22,000 delegates were elected to municipal governing councils (*poder local*), but these bodies were suspended indefinitely in the following year.

Castro's 1970 proposals to initiate collective management in enterprises and increase local governing autonomy did not even get as far as the abortive moves of the 1960's. In fact, the concrete measures taken by the Castro regime in the aftermath of Fidel's flurry of promises to democratize and decentralize Cuban society have actually constituted moves toward rather than away from centralized authority.

One evidence of this trend emerged in connection with the work of the PCC's Commission on Juridical Studies headed by Blas Roca, which had been charged in 1970 with drafting a comprehensive revision of the Cuban judicial system and legal codes. In summarizing the draft "bases" of the revision drawn up by the Commission, an article published in late 1971 stated that the revision would make the entire judicial system "hierarchically subordinate" to the Council of Ministries—a plain indication that there was to be no ultimate separation of judicial and executive powers.[7]

Further evidence of increased centralization was the creation in late 1972 of an Executive Committee within the Council of Ministers, comprising the Prime Minister (as chairman) and nine deputy prime ministers, each in charge of several ministries and state agencies. The division of responsibilities along functional lines was as follows:

Basic industry and energy
Consumer-goods industry and domestic trade
Sugar industry
Non-sugar agriculture
Construction
Transportation and communications
Labor, foreign trade and planning
Foreign relations
Education and culture

While the clustering of ministries by sector did follow the proposals of 1970 and may well have provided a more rational and efficient structuring of the central governmental administration, the upshot was



The Cuban people listen to Fidel's July 26, 1970, speech announcing failure to reach the goal of a 10-million-ton sugar harvest and acknowledging shortcomings of the Cuban revolution.

—Photo by Stephen Shames for Black Star.

[5] "Palabras en la plenaria provincial de la CTC" (Words at the Provincial Plenary Session of the CTC), *ibid.*, Sept. 9, 1970.

[6] Despite his earlier comments on labor participation in management, Labor Minister Risquet made it quite clear in mid-1971 that the managers continued to exercise total production authority within the enterprises (see his "Speech at the Closing Session of the 6th National Council of the Central Organization of Trade Unions," *Granma Weekly Review*, Oct. 24, 1971).

[7] "Nuevo sistema judicial" ("The New Judicial System"), *Cuba International* (Havana), November-December 1971, pp. 72-75.

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a shrinkage of the size of the top administrative body in Cuba, for the new Executive Committee was half the size of the Council of Ministries. Castro, still in charge (now as chairman of the Executive Committee), directly controls the strategic areas of the armed forces, security, and agrarian matters. All the deputy prime ministers, with the exception of Carlos Rafael Rodríguez (from the prerevolutionary PSP) are from Castro's inner circle.[8]

On the Labor Front

Although the Castro regime seems to have concentrated its efforts on reorganizing the central administrative apparatus and to have eschewed the promised introduction of collective management on the local level, it did attempt to breathe some life into the virtually moribund trade union movement. As an official Cuban publication noted, the practice of assuming "a total identity between the interests of the government and of the workers" during the 1960's had resulted in nearly "total dissolution" of the unions. Under orders "to win the workers for the revolution, to fight the counterrevolution and push production forward," the unions had become mere "ancillary instruments" of the government, and trade union democracy was "limited and formal," with meetings held irregularly. The same account noted that the launching of the "movement of vanguard workers" in 1967 had further undermined the unions. Consisting of the most productive and revolutionary workers, the "vanguard" groups (a selected minority) had began to usurp the few remaining functions of the unions (whose membership comprised the majority of workers). The situation was described as such that

Many thought that the unions could be eliminated without the nation losing anything, because the government, the administration and the party were ap-

[8] "Executive Committee of Council of Ministers Established," *Granma Weekly Review*, Dec. 3, 1972.



Fidel Castro (fourth from left) and his fellow officials lead the way as Cuban workers march to the theme of "Productivity" (Productividad) on May Day 1972 in Havana.

—Photo from Cuba *Internacional* (Havana), August 1972, p. 12.

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parently capable of doing whatever the unions could do.[9]

The alienation of the Cuban worker under these circumstances had been admitted in a remarkable display of self-criticism by Labor Minister Risquet in his August 1970 speech:

Theoretically, the administrator represents the interests of the worker and peasant state, the interests of all the people. Theory is one thing and practice another. . . . The worker may have a right established by the Revolution, [but] there is no one to defend him. He does not know where to turn. He turns to the party, and it does not know or it is busy mobilizing the people for production . . . the party is so involved with management that in many instances it has ceased to play its proper role, has become somewhat insensitive to the problems of the masses. . . . The trade union either does not exist or it has become the vanguard workers' bureau. . . .[10]

To correct this situation, Risquet recommended that open and democratic elections for the directorates of all local unions be held and that the labor movement be allowed to perform its natural role—*i.e.*, to see that labor laws are observed and the workers' rights protected. In September 1970, Castro himself confirmed that trade union elections would be held shortly and would be "absolutely free," although he intimated that elected union officials would be expected to "go all out to defend and fight for" the revolutionary line of the party.[11]

The elections did indeed take place between November 9 and December 9, 1970, and were acclaimed by the Cuban news media as free and democratic. There were, however, some indications of governmental manipulation of the electoral process. When, prior to the elections, the Confederation of Cuban Workers (*Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba*—CTC) discussed the electoral procedures, some union members were openly critical of the traditional methods being followed. These criticisms led one veteran union official to complain:

We turned the rabbit loose before the hunter had his rifle ready.[12]

Labor Minister Risquet finally intervened to silence the critics, branding them as "counterrevolutionaries" and "demagogues" who were creating a "negative situation [which had] to be changed radically."[13]

Rank-and-file complaints about the electoral procedures were, in fact, well-founded. These procedures prohibited candidates from publicizing their own candidacy and qualifications in any way, this function being exclusively reserved to a CTC Electoral Commission. Although the CTC did not spell out the precise "merits" expected of candidates, one may assume that the Commission was disposed to favor those candidates who displayed to the greatest degree the attributes of revolutionary loyalty and militancy stressed by Castro. In most enterprises, particularly small ones, there was one candidate. Not surprisingly, worker participation in the elections was poor: although the government predicted 100-percent participation, only half the labor force actually bothered to vote.[14]

As it turned out, approximately one-third of the officials elected to union office in the 1970 elections were incumbents. Most of those who were newly elected apparently satisfied the official criteria, although there were evidently some who did not. As Minister Risquet observed,

In the great majority of work centers, the masses elected their best representatives. . . . There were some cases, however—very few of them, we must say—where the workers elected did not have sufficient merits or the merits which would entitle them to act as leaders. . . . These are "warning lights," . . . a danger signal to the trade union movement and to the party, pointing out the location or the manifestation of failures in our political work. . . .[15]

Meanwhile, even before the election results were complete, the government took a number of precautionary steps clearly designed to tighten its control

[9] Lionel Martin, "Reestructuracion sindical en Cuba" (Restructuring of Trade Unions in Cuba), *Cuba Internacional*, April 1971, pp. 28-30.

[10] "Comparacencia sobre problemas de fuerza de trabajo y productividad" (Appearance on Problems of the Efficiency of Labor and Productivity), *loc. cit.*

[11] "Discurso en la concentración para celebrar el decimo aniversario de los CDR" (Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 10th Anniversary of the CDR), *loc. cit.*

[12] J. Risquet, "Palabras en la Plenaria Provincial de la CTC" (Words at the Provincial Plenary Session of the CTC), *loc. cit.*

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] Electoral predictions and preliminary results were published in *Granma* on Oct. 30 and Dec. 3, 1970. Final results were given by Fidel Castro in his May Day 1972 speech (see *Granma Weekly Review*, May 7, 1972).

[15] J. Risquet, "Speech at the Closing Session of the 6th National Council of the Central Organization of Trade Unions," *loc. cit.*

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over labor. One such measure was a reorganization of the national trade union structure so as to parallel the administrative hierarchies headed by the central government ministries. There are now 21 national unions, each with a pyramidal structure spreading out from an organization in the corresponding ministry at the top, through regional branches, to units in consolidated enterprises and plants at the bottom. A second action was the launching of a campaign to make managers more demanding of their employees, and workers more demanding of their own fellow workers. Finally, the government introduced a series of measures the combined effect of which was to create a complex system for recording the "labor-political" performance of each worker, measuring individual output, and curbing absenteeism. Because of space limitations, only this last set of measures will be examined in detail here.[16]

A key element in the new system was the requirement that a so-called "worker biography," including a complete record of "merits" and "demerits," be maintained for every individual worker, and that any worker must have such a record on file, as well as an identification card, in order to be eligible for state employment (a category encompassing as much as 90 percent of the total labor force). "Merits" are recorded for such things as voluntary (unpaid) labor in sugar harvesting, overfulfillment of work quotas (see below), overtime work without pay, postponement of retirement to continue working, defense of socialist (state) property, and a high level of political consciousness. "Demerits" are recorded for any "activities that negatively affect production, disturb labor discipline, and show a low level of consciousness," *e.g.*, absenteeism; negligence in handling equipment, raw materials and fuel; nonfulfillment of work quotas; quitting work at an enterprise without previous authorization; and desertion from labor camps before completing the terms to which the worker has committed himself. The "biography" also records any penalty imposed on the worker by civil, military, revolutionary, and people's courts.[17]

In a related step, the Soviet-style system of work quotas—first introduced and applied in Cuba in the years 1963-65—has been reinstated. The quota system had been neglected during the years from 1966 to 1970, when the country had been under the sway of Sino-Guevarism, characterized—as Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado observed—by "an excessive confidence in spontaneity, in the belief that without work quotas everybody would work willingly in an efficient manner."[18] By May 1972, however, quotas had been reinstituted at 3,000 enterprises employing some 700,000 workers (about one-third of state employment), and all state enterprises and workers are supposed to be covered by the end of 1973.[19] Under the revived system each worker is assigned a specific output quota to be produced on a given work schedule. Managers are to press for fulfillment or overfulfillment of these quotas, and failure by a worker to meet his quota makes him subject to penalties (including, as stated above, the entry of demerits in his labor file).

Already as early as the spring of 1971, the Cuban government had sought to maximize the productive utilization of available manpower by enacting a law against loafing that required all men aged 17-60 and physically and mentally capable to be productively employed. Even before the measure went into effect, the government had reportedly recruited some 100,000 idle men into the labor force. The legislation was also aimed at the problem of absenteeism, which had reached a rate of nearly 20 percent toward the end of 1970. Absence of more than 15 days was deemed a "precriminal stage of loafing," and recurrent absenteeism amounted to the "crime of loafing," punishable by penalties ranging from house arrest to imprisonment in a rehabilitation center at forced labor for 1-2 years.[20]

Issues vital to the workers were involved in all these matters, but there is no evidence that the trade unions—despite the rhetoric of Castro and Risquet in 1970—have been particularly active in defending worker interests. Instead they concentrate on such innocuous functions as organizing vacations and providing education and recreation for their memberships.[21] In May 1971 Castro announced that the 13th

[16] For details on the first two points, see Fidel Castro, "Speech at the Closing Session of the National Plenary Meeting of Basic Industry," *loc. cit.*; J. Risquet, "Speech at the Closing Session of the 6th National Council of the Central Organization of Trade Unions," *loc. cit.*; and "A Battle Already Under Way," *Granma Weekly Review*, Dec. 5, 1971.

[17] See, for example, "Projecto de evaluación laboral" (Plan for Labor Evaluation), *Granma*, July 8, 1970; "Projecto sobre méritos y deméritos laborales" (Plan for Labor Merits and Demerits), *ibid.*, Sept. 12, 1970; and Resolution No. 425, in *ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1970.

[18] Quoted in "Organización y normación del trabajo en 500 grandes centros industriales" (The Organization and Setting of Work Quotas at 500 Large Industrial Centers), *ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1970.

[19] See Fidel Castro's 1972 May Day speech in *Granma Weekly Review*, May 7, 1972.

[20] See Law No. 1231 of March 16, 1971, in *ibid.*, March 28, 1971, p. 2.

[21] See Martín, *loc. cit.*; and "Cuba: Trade Unions," in *Latin America* (London), July 28, 1972, pp. 234, 236.

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Congress of the CTC (the last such congress was in mid-1966) would be held toward the end of 1972, and it was generally expected to deal with such basic issues as collective management, worker participation in national decisions, and trade union defense of worker rights and interests. However, Castro apparently found the climate at the end of 1972 unpropitious for such a gathering and postponed the congress for a year.[22]

Small Farmers

While tightening its controls over the industrial and urban labor force, the Havana government has also proceeded with efforts to mobilize and politicize rural manpower—a process which had continued throughout the 1960's, beginning with land redistribution and moving on to the formation of cooperative and then state farms. By 1964 virtually all cooperatives and large or middle-sized private farms had been transformed into state farms controlling more than 70 percent of the total arable land. The remaining 30 percent of the land continued in the hands of some 200,000 small farmers, organized in the National Association of Small Farmers (*Asociación Nacional de Agricultores Pequeños*—ANAP). These farmers have been required to sell an ever-increasing share (*acopio*) of their crops to the state at prices below official market prices.

In the years 1967-69, the government purchased some 10,000 of these private farms and acquired others when the owners retired or died (land cannot

[22] See Castro's 1971 May Day speech (*Granma Weekly Review*, May 16, 1971), his speech on the 18th anniversary of the attack on the Moncada (*ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1971), and Radio Havana broadcast of Feb. 23, 1973.



A private farmer with his family outside their home.

—A 1970 photo by Stephen Shames for Black Star.

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be inherited under current Cuban law). In certain areas, particularly the "Green Belt" around Havana, the *acopio* has come to include the farmer's total crop, in which case the government has paid him a "rent" and allowed him to use a small portion of his land to produce food for personal consumption. The private farmers had been permitted to sell any surplus products to urban dwellers, who in turn consumed, bartered, or sold such products (illegally) on the black market; however, such sales by small farmers were sharply curtailed during the Revolutionary Offensive of 1968-69.

Another problem that troubled the regime was the private farmers' practice of hiring rural workers who had not joined the state farms during the campaigns of 1962-64. There remained as many as 30,000 to 60,000 such workers in 1966. The Castro government moved on this front in 1971 (after passage of the law against loafing) when it pressured the ANAP to launch a campaign to detect and transfer to the state sector thousands of workers employed part-time on private farms or working there full-time but at "low productivity."[23]

The increased pressure of the state administration on the small farmers was even more evident in late 1971 at the Second Congress of the ANAP— advertised as a landmark event in the "new phase" of the Revolution. The Congress turned out to be the occasion of heated controversy between spokesmen for the private farmers and the government. Prime Minister Castro expressed shock at the "incredible" demands of the farmers and observed: "Sometimes one must resort to rawness if one is to put a message across."[24] The main points of friction were evidenced in four main resolutions approved by the Congress, which imposed the government's will with respect to the issues in contention.[25]

The first measure called for the progressive incorporation of private farms and their owners and employees into the state sector in order to eradicate "every remaining vestige of class and private ownership of the means of production." Although the resolution eschewed the use of force or coercion in the process, the ANAP was committed to use political education to convince the farmers and workers to join the state sector voluntarily.

A second resolution sought to limit further the private sale of agricultural surpluses and pledged a war on black-market sales of food. Some small farmers had argued against such a policy and had even appealed for annulment of the law punishing illegal traffic in agricultural products, but the Congress rejected this appeal. Castro minced no words about how to treat those who rejected the decision:

Those individuals who engage in black-market operations should be made the object of political work. And the incorrigible ones should be deprived of all their rights [and] be treated as class enemies.[26]

The last two major resolutions of ANAP were aimed at further restricting the activity of those private farmers totally integrated into the *acopio* system and drawing "rent" from the government. The Congress resolved to set such rent payments below the level needed to cover basic necessities of the small farmers (a measure designed to force them to



One of Cuba's rural workers.

—A 1970 photo by Phyllis Stoffman for Black Star.

[23] Radio Havana broadcast of March 4, 1971.
[24] The speech was published in *Granma Weekly Review*, Jan. 9, 1972.
[25] Radio Havana broadcast of Jan. 13, 1972.
[26] *Granma Weekly Review*, Jan. 9, 1972.

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work part-time on state land) and also envisaged the ultimate abolition of private plots, with the farmers to be required to devote all their working time to the cultivation of state land.

In its efforts to mobilize rural manpower, the regime found a large number of rural workers (estimated at 6 to 10 percent of the total labor force) resistant to union organization and unreceptive to official political views. To remedy this situation the CTC launched a campaign in 1972 to recruit some 150,000 of these rural workers into its member unions and attempt to change these individuals' conservative political attitudes.[27]

The Problem of Youth

The Castro government has also moved to "rejuvenate" and "strengthen" its major mass organization for youth—the Young Communist League (*Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas*—UJC). As elsewhere, the motive seems to have been to increase the capability of the organization to impose official views and enforce official policy. As noted in a March 1971 commentary, there were serious problems with the island's youth: some 12 percent of the students population were neither working nor studying (up to 60 percent of those in the 16-year-old age group); the dropout rate was high (79 percent of those who entered elementary school in 1965 did not complete the 6-year course, and 86 percent of those who went on to high school also quit school before graduating); students preferred to enroll in "language" schools rather than in the vocational and technical schools favored by the government; and youth showed a general lack of concern and responsibility for the protection of state property. The commentary also criticized Cuban youth for wearing "extravagant foreign fashions," listening to American music, and reading "decadent literature." In some cases youths were said to have been used by "counterrevolutionaries" to protest against the revolution. Minors reportedly participated in half of all crimes (and the proportion was allegedly rising), and there were "residual manifestations" of prostitution and homosexuality among the younger generation.[28]



Jaime Crombet, Secretary General of the Young Communist League (UJC) addresses the 2nd UJC Congress, held in Havana in April 1972.

—Photo from Cuba *Internacional*, June 1972, p. 6.

At the Second Congress of the UJC, held in Havana in April 1972, League Secretary General Jaime Crombet admitted that the 10-year-old organization had a "poor, rickety membership" (it has on its rolls some 120,000 youths out of a potential 2 million).[29] The Congress called for the recruitment of hundreds of thousands of youngsters and for an intensification of political work aimed at making every young person "a self-sacrificing fighter" for increased production and productivity, for lower production costs, and for careful use of material resources, and at encouraging youth to donate overtime work without pay when necessary. The UJC called for "strict, revolutionary measures in the

[27] "Cuba: Trade Unions," *loc. cit.*, pp. 234, 236.

[28] This assessment can be garnered from the speech of Belarmino Castilla at the opening of the National Congress on Education and Culture in April 1971 and the Congress' declaration (in *Granma Weekly Review*, May 9, 1971); see also the speeches of Fidel Castro on the 10th anniversary of the creation of the Ministry of the Interior (*ibid.*, June 13, 1971) and at the final session of the April 1972 Congress of the Young Communist League (*ibid.*, April 16, 1972).

[29] "Summary of the Report of the National Committee of the Young Communist League," in *Granma Weekly Review*, April 9, 1972, and Radio Havana broadcast of March 1, 1972.

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shortest possible time" against "antisocial" youngsters, especially those who neither worked nor went to school and who were careless and irresponsible in handling socialist property.[30]

In his closing address to the Congress, Castro was more explicit. He proposed attacking the dropout problem by recruiting youths into compulsory military service or the militarized Youth Centennial Column, both of which engage in considerable agricultural and construction work. For other children, compulsory education would extend beyond the sixth grade to cover the age bracket with the highest incidence of dropping out (ages 13 through 17). Those who refused to continue schooling would be subject to special internment combining work and study.[31]

Castro has placed some of the blame for the high rate of juvenile delinquency on leniency of the existing (prerevolutionary) Cuban criminal codes with respect to offenses committed by youths under 18 years of age.[32] In a move to rectify this situation, the government published two draft laws in early 1973 which, if adopted, would establish adult criminal responsibility at age 16 (to include liability to the death penalty for certain crimes) and would punish crimes against "the normal development of sexual relations."[33]

The Intellectuals

While youth problems had also been an important item on the agenda of the First National Congress on Education and Culture, held in April 1971 in Havana, that gathering appeared to be even more concerned with "deviations" in the attitude of Cuba's intellectual and cultural leaders. The deliberations occurred against an ominous background. Just prior to the Congress, the regime had imprisoned on espionage charges a government technician who had been assigned as a research assistant to René Dumont during the latter's visit to Cuba in 1969, and it also jailed the internationally known Cuban poet Heberto Padilla. A large group of European and Latin American leftist intellectuals addressed a letter to Castro expressing indignation over Padilla's imprisonment and "the use of repressive methods against intellectuals and writers who exercise the right of criticism.[34] Castro, in turn accused the signers of the letter of "intellectual tutelage and cultural imperialism" and warned Cubans against the influence of "decadent culture." He renewed the attack while the Congress was in session, assailing "neocolonializing elements in the Cuban cultural movement" who had accepted "foreign cultural impositions" and had developed a "snobbish, servile copy of decadent art."[35] Shortly before the Congress ended, Padilla was released from jail after submitting a "confession" to the Ministry of Interior, and he proceeded to read a letter of self-criticism to a hundred of his colleagues at the headquarters of the Union of Writers and Artists. In the letter, he admitted his "errors against the Revolution," accused Dumont and K. S. Karol of being agents of the US Central Intelligence Agency, disclosed his links with several signers of the earlier letter to Castro, and denounced the "errors" of four Cuban writers present at the meeting (including his wife and three of his close friends).[36]

In this climate of spiraling tension, the Congress announced a toughened line on cultural affairs. No longer would it suffice for writers and artists to proclaim themselves revolutionaries and to abstain from criticizing the regime; they would have to prove their militancy by producing works with political content because, in the words of the final declaration,

. . . culture, like education, is not and cannot be apolitical or impartial. . . . Art is a weapon of the Revolution.[37]

Control of the mass media was to be centralized under a "single political-cultural leadership" which would combat the "infiltration of imperialist cinema, television and art." Staffing of the media, universities and artistic institutions was to take into account "political and ideological qualifications . . ." Regulations for literary contests were to be revised in order to assure the designation of juries with proper revolu-

[30] "Final Declaration of the Second Congress of the Young Communist League," *Granma Weekly Review*, April 23, 1972.

[31] *Ibid.*, April 16, 1972. The 1971 Congress on Education and Culture also had called for internment in school workshops of "maladjusted minors" who commit offenses or display "antisocial behavior" (see the Congress Declaration in *ibid.*, May 9, 1971).

[32] See *ibid.*, June 13, 1971.

[33] *Latin America*, Feb. 2, 1973, p. 40.

[34] *Le Monde* (Paris), April 9, 1971.

[35] See his speeches in commemoration of the Bay of Pigs victory and inaugurating a junior high school in Jagüey (*Granma Weekly Review*, May 2, 1971).

[36] Padilla's statement of self-criticism was published in *Casa de las Américas* (Havana), March-June 1971, pp. 191-203.

[37] *Granma Weekly Review*, May 9, 1971.

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tionary credentials and the selection of the most revolutionary works. The Congress also called for stricter rules governing the invitation of foreign writers and intellectuals to Cuba, and it condemned both the signers of the letter to Castro and the foreign Marxists who had earlier criticized flaws in Cuba's revolution as "agents of imperialist culture" and "pseudorevolutionaries [who] masquerade as leftists but in reality uphold positions against socialism."

In his speech closing the Congress, Castro further announced that new controls would be placed on the selection of books for publication by the Book Institute (the nation's publishing house), and that Cuban magazines would henceforth be open only to revolutionary writers. The Prime Minister reiterated the charge that the foreign Marxists who had criticized Castro were agents of the CIA and stated that they would not be allowed to enter Cuba again.[38]

Sixty European and Latin American writers, filmmakers and artists responded with a second letter to Castro stating that Padilla's confession could only have been obtained through torture, and that this and other events in Cuba recalled "the most sordid moments of Stalinism" with its "dogmatic obscurantism," "cultural xenophobia" and "repressive system."[39] Castro promptly rejected these attacks on the revolution from "Communist, socialist, Marxist and leftist positions."[40] In the summer of 1971, several American scholars of Marxist or leftist leanings, many of whom had visited Cuba before and had expected to return, found their visas cancelled or never issued.[41] At the end of the year, Frank McDonald, an American specialist on Caribbean affairs who had published sympathic reports on the Cuban revolution and was then a guest lecturer at the University of Havana, was suddenly arrested, accused of being a spy, held incommunicado and subjected to interrogation by state-security officials. He was released three months later because of "lack of evidence" but was deported and his notes confiscated on the basis of alleged violation of "a ban on socio-political studies."[42] This same theme surfaced again in the spring of 1973 when the Cuban press leveled charges of espionage against "sociological research" conducted by US scholars in Latin America under sponsorship of such groups as the Ford Foundation and denounced what was termed US "cultural penetration" of Latin America.[43]

Shortly thereafter Cuban radio stations were ordered to stop playing records by US and British pop and folk singers because they "alienated" Cuban youth.[44]

Democratization *vs.* Central Control

This xenophobic campaign on the cultural front and the numerous other concrete measures undertaken by the Castro government in the last two years to mobilize and control the population make it abundantly clear that the promises of democratization and decentralization made in late 1970 have not been carried out. No traces of this liberalizing trend remain in mid-1973, and instead central control has become stronger and more articulated. One is prompted to ask what occasioned the promises in the first place and the contradictory direction of Cuban policy since.

It might be argued that Castro in 1970 had actually been convinced of his mistakes and had decided to follow the advice of his foreign Marxist critics. Most of the critical books and articles appeared prior to Castro's own exercise in "self-criticism," and many of the measures he proposed echoed suggestions of his critics. On the other hand, the whole affair might have been a fake, a temporizing device to compensate for grave mistakes, the erosion of Castro's charisma, and the disenchantment that followed the 1970 economic disaster. As noted earlier, it would not mark the first occasion in the brief "socialist" history of the island that a "participatory" movement had been launched only to be abruptly terminated.

Another possible factor in the peregrinations of Castro's policies might be the increasing influence of the Soviet Union in Cuban affairs—a trend which gained momentum in 1970. In this context, one might view the democratization movement as a case either of Castro yielding to this influence or of his initially resisting it. There is mounting evidence that

[38] *Ibid.*

[39] *Le Monde*, May 20, 1971.

[40] *Granma Weekly Review*, June 13, 1971.

[41] Personal information made available to the author during the period of June to December 1971.

[42] Frank McDonald, "Report from a Cuban Prison," in *Newsletter of the Institute of Current World Affairs* (New York), various issues from September 1972 to May 1973.

[43] See, for example, Augusto E. Benítez, "Marginality: A Case of Sociological Espionage," *Granma Weekly Review*, March 4, 1973, p. 10.

[44] "All Cuban Stations Ban US Music," *The New York Times*, April 22, 1973.

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since 1968 Cuba has revised a number of her cherished foreign policy principles in order to adapt to Soviet doctrine. Similarly, Cuba has appeared since 1970 to be moving away from Sino-Guevarism toward a more orthodox, Soviet-style policy in economic matters, and Castro's proposal to separate party and administrative functions might be interpreted as a response to Soviet advice and pressure on matters of political organization. Conversely, the democratization movement could have been a desperate final effort to mobilize the Cuban masses behind their charismatic leader in order to maintain independence of the Soviet Union, at least insofar as domestic policy was concerned. Indeed, most of Castro's proposed measures—*e.g.*, community organizations, collective management, supervision of the party by mass organizations—were "unorthodox" by Soviet standards.

Of the possible explanations just outlined, the first two seem less persuasive than the third. If Castro was genuinely convinced in 1970 that his Marxist critics were right, why did he subsequently end up by denouncing them as CIA agents? The cynical interpretation that the whole affair was a fake—that the 1970 promises of liberalization were made simply to restore Castro's damaged prestige and that, once he felt secure again, he promptly switched back to his previous policies of centralized authoritarianism—seems somewhat more plausible, but it, too, does not by itself appear wholly adequate. By and large, Soviet influence would seem to have been the most critical factor behind the 1971-73 reversal of direction. Whether Castro yielded to Soviet pressures from the outset or initially resisted them, the end result was a reversion to and strengthening of Soviet-type bureaucratic-administrative features.

Whatever, the causes of this paradoxical series of events, the concrete result is a Cuba in which the administration is more centralized, the labor force more regimented, the small farmers and rural workers more controlled, and the student body and intellectual milieu more closely supervised than they were at the inauguration of Cuba's Autumn three years ago.

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Political Socialization: Two Paths

EDITORS' NOTE: All societies have processes whereby their young people learn the traditions and working of the specific political system in which they live. In some cases, the process is highly unstructured and informal, the product of a myriad of influences; in others, there is at least an attempt to define and direct it centrally. The Communist states clearly fall into the latter category. Moreover, the ruling parties in these states originally came to power with the intention of reshaping socialization processes in order to bring about a transformation in the type of political participants that these processes turn out. The following two articles explore what the regimes of the two major Communist powers have tried to accomplish, and seek to evaluate the regimes' successes and failures in their endeavors. Mr. Schwartz looks at the situation in the USSR, concentrating on the political socialization efforts of the Soviet Young Communist League; Mr. Montaperto delineates the Maoist approach to political socialization and assesses the degree to which the Chinese Communist Youth League has implemented it.

The Elusive "New Soviet Man"

By Joel J. Schwartz

The Bolshevik Revolution has brought many changes to Russian society. Economically, industrially, and militarily, the USSR is a far more formidable nation today than it was in 1917. Assessments of progress made under Communist leadership usually rely upon economic and military indicators of this sort. But the Communists also cite other reasons to justify their political stewardship. From the Revolution's inception, the leadership has posted as a priority goal the rearing of a "New Man"—one whose values and behavior would be free of the pernicious influences of the Tsarist past.

Experience has shown that official rhetoric is not always an accurate reflection of Soviet intent. In this connection, Communist affairs analyst Robert C. Tucker has argued that Marxist movements tend to intensify their verbal adherence to revolutionary goals at the very time they are abandoning such goals in practice.[1] However, there is reason to believe that the leadership of the Communist Party

Mr. Schwartz is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill). His publications include Soviet Fathers vs. Soviet Sons: Is There a Conflict of Generations?, *1966, and articles on Soviet politics and socialization in* The American Political Science Review *and in Roger Kanet, Ed.,* The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies, *1971.*

[1] Robert C. Tucker, *The Marxian Revolutionary Idea*, New York, Norton, 1969, p. 192.

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of the Soviet Union is speaking in earnest when it emphasizes the creation of a New Soviet Man as a key objective of its socialization policies. Going beyond mere lip service, the regime expends substantial social and economic resources in its efforts to mold Communist character. Much of the activity engaged in by the schools, the youth organizations, the mass media, and the party itself is directed toward this purpose.

Both pragmatic and ideological considerations underlie the regime's commitment. On the practical side, the authorities undoubtedly recognize that abandoning this revolutionary goal—if indeed, they wanted to—would entail serious costs. Even the most fervent defenders of Soviet progress admit that alcoholic abuse, corruption, juvenile delinquency, crime, slovenly work habits, and many other undesirable behavior traits are still widespread among the peoples of the USSR. Unless the regime is prepared to accept the economic and social consequences of such "deviant" behavior as inevitable and permanent, rearing a New Man must remain an active, high-priority concern.

In terms of doctrinal implications, the leadership also has little alternative but to persist in its socialization efforts. The CPSU justifies its monopolistic political role on the grounds that it alone has access to a scientific social theory. Marxism-Leninism is said both to explain and to predict the evolution of man in society. The credibility of the doctrine therefore depends upon the support of historical evidence; events must unfold in accordance with ideological assumptions.

One basic assumption of Marxist-Leninist theory is, of course, that the economic substructure of any society determines the ideological superstructure. Marx decisively rejected the absoluteness and universality of human values. What men esteemed and how they behaved depended upon what their relationship was to the means of production and the exchange of goods at a given point in historical time. Altering man's economic and social environment meant altering his personality as well. Marx ascribed all the social ills and all destructive behavior of his time to the capitalist economic system. The transition to communism, he predicted, would put an end to the division of labor, alienation, war, crime, violence, corruption, greed, and the many other unsavory conditions of man's existence.

The USSR claims to have abolished capitalism and declares that it now stands on the threshold of full communism. Nevertheless, asocial behavior continues to plague the country. Why has Marx's eschatological vision not yet been realized Because, argues the CPSU, remnants of bourgeois consciousness still infect the popular mind. Capitalism as a form of production no longer exists, but capitalism as a state of mind still takes its toll. Fifty years have not been sufficient time to resocialize the Soviet citizen. Cultural lag keeps the population in bondage to prerevolutionary habits and attitudes. By attributing deviancy to remnants of the bourgeois past, party ideologists avoid explanations which would undermine the validity of Marxist theory and the legitimacy of Bolshevik power.[2] At the same time, the "remnants" thesis requires rigorous socialization efforts to sustain its credibility.

The Komsomol: Functions and Sanctions

The purpose of the present essay is to explore one dimension of the continuing Soviet socialization program—the role of the Komsomol, the Communist youth organization, in molding the New Soviet Man. Many other institutions, of course, perform important functions in the program, but space does not permit an adequate treatment of the entire Soviet socialization experience. The Komsomol has been singled out for attention because its membership ranges in age from 14 to 28, and its activities thus coincide with a critical time period in the human life-span—the years in which youths establish their independence from their families and assume their first adult roles. It is also a period of life when most Soviet youths are no longer under the influence of the public schools.[3] Hence, the Komsomol is the primary socializing agent upon which the regime must rely to influence these critical transitional years. To a certain extent, the Komsomol's success or failure determines the overall success or failure of the broader socialization effort.


[2] If asocial behavior was not attributed to "cultural lag," the CPSU would have to contend with alternative explanations—e.g., the suggestion that Marxist theory is unsound or that the Soviet system itself is responsible for at least some portion of deviant behavior. Obviously, the party prefers not to have to deal with these alternative possibilities.

[3] Soviet children, who begin school at the age of seven, must complete eight years of universal and compulsory education, usually by ages 15-16. Thereafter, youths take a full-time job, work part-time and study part-time in evening and correspondence secondary schools, enroll in various vocational or specialized secondary schools, or complete general secondary school. For the vast majority, full-time schooling thus comes to an end between the ages of 15 and 18.

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This educational responsibility is somewhat simplified because the Komsomol does not impart any new values. Rather, it supplements and reinforces the socialization lessons already taught in the schools. The content of those lessons may be summarized as follows: The New Soviet Man is an individual who subordinates his self-interests to those of the wider community. He is solicitous of other people's welfare, a vigilant guardian of state property, and diligent in his work habits. He eschews any ties with organized religion and unhesitatingly supports the party's position on all domestic and international issues. He is law-abiding and observant of conventional behavior standards as defined by authority. Pursuing an alternative life style or participating in a "counterculture" holds no attraction for him.

Through its educational program and organized activities, the Komsomol continually legitimizes these values. The primacy of communal interests, for example, is given concrete meaning through the Youth League's system of public work assignments. Every member is asked to devote a certain amount of his free time to socially useful tasks. That may include cleaning neighborhood streets of litter, helping nearby farmers bring in the harvest, assisting the local police in combatting hooliganism, or decorating public buildings in honor of a forthcoming holiday. While the tasks vary, the moral lesson behind them is always the same. The Soviet citizen's primary concern ought to be not self-indulgence but rather contribution to the collective welfare.



Members of the editorial staff of Komsomolskaia pravda *meet to map out the next issue of the newspaper geared to orient Soviet youth.*

—Sovfoto.

What if a young person does not adequately internalize these norms? What if he shirks public work assignments, violates labor discipline, destroys state property, or expresses politically unorthodox views? When these cases arise, the Komsomol has at its disposal a broad range of sanctions which it can use to encourage avoidance or modification of deviant behavior. The effectiveness of such sanctions rests upon the assumption that Soviet adolescents have developed an outer-directed personality by their teen years and are therefore sensitive to peer approval or disapproval. In other words, successful social control depends upon the Komsomol's ability to mobilize peer pressure against certain behavior patterns and upon the likelihood that the deviant will respond to such pressure.

Mobilization techniques may involve a comradely warning in private, censure and condemnation at a general meeting, or shaming and ridiculing the deviant in a public place.[4] Alternatively, the errant member may be brought before a "comrade's court." Since this quasi-judicial assembly is not bound by strict legal procedures, it may review behavior which is perfectly legal but not socially desirable from the regime's point of view. The court's proceedings are structured so as to encourage full participation of all who are present. The expectation is that those who live, work, and study with the accused will condemn his actions and demand that he mend his ways—a classic example of social opprobrium being mobilized to influence the outer-directed man. But if it deems necessary, the court can go beyond mere public disapproval: it can vote to sentence the guilty party to a corrective labor camp for short periods of time.[5]

As a final control measure, the Komsomol may expel the offender from the organization itself. Not only does exclusion carry the stigma of social ostracism; it can have quite serious consequences for the present and future life of the individual, especially in the case of students with career aspirations. Because the Komsomol is the only youth organization in the USSR, it exercises dominant control over the social, recreational, and cultural facilities available to this age group. By excluding an individual

[4] Shaming mechanisms include listing the offender's name and perhaps his picture on a dishonor roll. Caricatures of the individual may also be posted on a street billboard or at the place where he lives, works, or studies.

[5] When a comrade's court reaches such a decision, the proceedings are transferred to and reviewed by the regularly constituted court system. This provides some protection for the defendant against capricious and arbitrary actions.

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ЕГО ЖДАЛИ

Рисунок В. ЧИЖИКОВА

Cartoon strip satirizing the difficulty of getting kolkhoz youth to return to the farm after completing their studies at a big-city institute under kolkhoz scholarship. The cartoon, drawn by V. Chizhikova, is titled "They Waited for Him."

—From Krokodil (Moscow), No. 11, April 1972, pp. 8-9.

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from its ranks, it can also, in effect, exclude him from utilizing and enjoying such facilities. Later in life, a young person may seek admission to college, the opportunity to travel abroad, or promotion to a more responsible and rewarding job. A bad character reference from the Komsomol may complicate or prevent achievement of these goals.

Exclusion, of course, carries disadvantages for the Komsomol as well. Once a member is expelled, he is put beyond the potential influence of the organization. The utility of this particular sanction requires balanced use. It cannot be exercised too often, but it must be used often enough to sustain its deterrent effect. In the latter respect, peer criticism and disapproval might become less effective as a control mechanism if the member were to assume that more costly sanctions would not be invoked.

Patterns of Resistance

The previous discussion has mentioned only a few of the many resources employed by the Komsomol in its socialization program. The critical question, however, is how well these resources work. Although measuring success is a difficult problem, it seems reasonable to argue that the behavior of Soviet youth often falls considerably short of the New Man ideal. The following section will identify several behavior patterns which deviate from officially-prescribed standards. While it is impossible to ascertain the precise extent of such behavior because the Soviet Union does not publish the type of statistical data that would permit exact assessment, the extensive coverage that has been given such behavior problems in the official press makes it clear that they are profoundly disturbing to the Soviet leadership.

At all levels of the social hierarchy, Soviet youth have increasingly demonstrated their unwillingness to subordinate personal gratification to the collective welfare. Among college graduates this attitude frequently manifests itself in the avoidance of state labor assignments. Upon graduation, every student is required by law to work for three years in a job and in a place selected by the State Labor Commission. Normally, this means employment in an underdeveloped part of the country which cannot attract or maintain a stable labor force on a voluntary basis. A willingness to work under primitive and harsh conditions represents a repayment to society for the free education it has bestowed upon the student. Yet when confronted with this social obligation, many students either have failed to appear at their designated jobs or have deserted their work assignments before the three-year term expired.[6]

A different sort of refusal involves high school graduates who are rejected for higher schooling but who remain out of the industrial work force. In the world's first proletarian state, manual labor is viewed by children of the middle class as both dishonorable and degrading.[7] Such attitudes cause real problems for the regime. In the first place, they are a source of ideological embarrassment. A nation advertising itself as classless and governed in the interests of the proletariat cannot tolerate an elitist and contemptuous attitude toward manual labor. In the second place, the behavior of middle-class youth exacerbates an already critical labor shortage problem. Recent economic and demographic changes have created a demand for semi-skilled workers which far exceeds the available supply. High growth rates will be difficult to sustain unless the supply-demand imbalance narrows. Therefore, the regime must find a way to prevent large numbers of high school graduates from remaining idle, neither attending higher educational institutions nor joining in the labor force.

Another behavior pattern, common to working-class youth and bothersome to the party, is the high turnover rate in industry and agriculture. For many years, Soviet leaders, through the Komsomol, have encouraged young people to remain and work in the countryside. But the flight from rural areas has in no way diminished. A 1966 survey in the Smolensk region showed, for example, that the number of Komsomol members working on state farms had halved in five years. The drop had been even more precipitous on collective farms, declining from 21,043 to 8,778.[8] Among urban youth, the problem has been not so much abandonment of factory life as constant movement between jobs. According to a report of 1967,[9] in Moscow—a major industrial center as well as the capital city—nearly 65 percent of those categorized as job transients were under 30

[6] In some instances, reported refusal and desertion rates have run very high. For example, 30 percent of the 1962 graduating class of Yerevan State University and 60 percent of the graduates of the Yerevan Institute of Foreign Languages did not accept their assigned jobs. *Moskovskil komsomolets* (Moscow), July 10, 1963. For reports of similar mass refusals and desertions, see *Komsomolskaia pravda* (Moscow), July 11, 1957, and Feb. 15, 1962; and *Izvestia* (Moscow), April 23, 1972.

[7] For reports on these attitudes, see *Komsomolskaia pravda*, March 2, 1956, and Feb. 10, 1957; *Kommunist* (Moscow), Vol. 36, No. 4, 1960, p. 63; *Izvestia*, March 14, 1971.

[8] *Literaturnaia gazeta* (Moscow), July 23 and 26, 1966.

[9] *Komsomolskaia pravda*, Feb. 2, 1967.

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years of age. Campaigns to stabilize youthful labor mobility have been no more successful than attempts to keep young people "down on the farm."

To cite another problem area, the CPSU's unremitting assault on organized religion has not accomplished all that it intended. Today, many young people, particularly in rural areas, openly support and identify with the Russian Orthodox Church or with other religious denominations.

Perhaps most disconcerting of all to the regime is the growing incidence of crime, delinquency, and alcoholism in the USSR. The younger generation does not monopolize these forms of deviancy. But a recent study suggests that such behavior patterns are disproportionately concentrated in urban communities and involve a disproportionate percentage of the younger population.[10]

To argue that many young people do not behave exactly as the party and Komsomol would like is not, of course, to assert that the younger generation is massively alienated from the Soviet social and political system or that Soviet youth are generally rebellious, anti-social, or anti-Communist. What the evidence reveals is a very real gap, or slippage, between the goals and the accomplishments of the socialization program—between the New Soviet Man and the real Soviet man. What accounts for this slippage?

Some Underlying Explanations

Certainly one important factor is the Komsomol's inability to reach millions of young people. Although 23 million individuals are affiliated with the organization, its membership is not equally distributed among all youth sectors. In the countryside, where a third of the population still resides, the Komsomol is barely visible: despite quite vigorous recruiting efforts, there is evidence that the Youth League has attracted at most no more than 20 percent of the age-eligible members.[11] Representation among young industrial workers is considerably higher but does not constitute a majority.[12] Only in educational institutions can the Komsomol claim virtually universal membership.

Differential access to the younger generation imposes severe limitations on the Komsomol's effectiveness, for its organizational influence is weakest precisely where it should be strongest—among the sector of the population which is most likely to commit deviant acts. Soviet sources reveal that those youths typically involved in alcoholism, crime, and delinquency tend to be on the periphery of organized social life. They are not in school, or in the Komsomol, or in a work situation.[13]

But membership in the organization does not, in and of itself, guarantee social conformity. The previously cited Smolensk study did not document the flight of rural youth in general. It discussed the abandonment of agricultural work by Komsomol members in particular. In this specific instance, it is not difficult to explain why those individuals who belonged to the Youth League chose to repudiate one of its primary goals: the official value disseminated by the Komsomol was in fundamental conflict with the societal value adhered to by most of the population.

Movement from the countryside to the city has long been perceived as a means of occupational mobility and of raising one's standard of living. Hence, talented and ambitious rural youth have gravitated toward the urban centers. Today, the regime laments this attitude and tries to reverse the depopulation of the agricultural sector, but earlier decisions of the Soviet regime are largely responsible for young people's contempt for rural life. Industrialization and urbanization in the USSR occurred at the expense of the countryside. For decades, the CPSU depleted the

[10] Walter D. Connor, *Deviance in Soviet Society*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1972, pp. 83-93.

[11] This figure represents an educated, if probably overly generous, guess. Komsomol First Secretary Sergei P. Pavlov claimed in 1964 that there were 20 million boys and girls of Komsomol age working in the countryside (*Moskovskii komsomolets*, March 18, 1964). Rural Komsomol membership has averaged 2-3 million (as calculated from stenographic reports of the 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th Komsomol Congresses, held respectively in March 1954, April 1958, April 1962 and May 1966). Thus, Komsomol membership could run as low as 10 percent of the age-eligible group in rural areas.

[12] Again, this figure represents an educated guess. In 1965 Pavlov stated that there were 70 million Soviet citizens between the ages of 14 and 30 (*Partiinaia zhizn* [Moscow], No. 5, March 1965). As noted in footnote 11, about 20 million in this age category work in the countryside, leaving a balance of 50 million. Of these, some 4.5 million are students in higher educational institutions and an equal number are enrolled in general, vocational, and technical secondary schools (see Samuel Hendel, Ed., *The Soviet Crucible*, 4th edition, North Scituate, Mass., Duxbury, 1973, pp. 362-63). Subtracting several million more for the last two years of the eight-year school, one can assume an urban young labor force of 35-38 million.

According to the stenographic report of the 15th Komsomol Congress, total membership amounted to 23 million in 1966. About one-fourth of these have been estimated to be in student units, and another 2-3 million are in rural areas. Thus the number of members among young industrial workers could not be more than 14 or 15 million, or less than one-half of the age-eligible group.

[13] See Connor, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-113.

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A mood of anticipation reigns as prospective students assemble at the Admissions Commission of the Physics Faculty of Moscow State University.

—Photo by Y. Diakonov for TASS via Sovfoto.

rural sector of human and economic resources; it allowed these areas to stagnate in their development. Consequently, an enormous gulf now separates the quality of life in urban and rural areas. Recurrent food crises ultimately forced Soviet leaders to abandon their earlier posture of malign neglect, and official policy is now more solicituous of the peasant's welfare and supportive of rural development. Still, the countryside lags woefully behind the cities. That fact is well known to the younger generation and seriously undermines the Komsomol's campaign to keep youth on the farm. Elites can easily change value pronouncements, now extolling the virtues of agricultural life and deemphasizing the importance of industrial life. But mass values do not shift so quickly, especially when the new shift in official values is not matched by an adequate shift in allocative priorities.

For roughly the same reasons, it is difficult for the Komsomol to persuade high school graduates that a college education is not "the only path to life." In earlier decades, the Communist regime firmly implanted that view in the younger generation. Underdeveloped secondary school facilities, rapid industrialization, and reconstruction of a war-shattered economy combined to keep the demand for college-trained specialists considerably higher than the available supply.[14] Hence, the party encouraged students to seek as much schooling as possible and applauded the desire for higher education as a valuable contribution to the state. Stalinist incomes policy reinforced this point of view by closely linking the Soviet citizen's share of societal rewards to the amount and type of schooling he had received. The party's strong emphasis upon advanced schooling struck a responsive chord in parents, particularly those in urban areas who were themselves entering the ever-expanding white-collar class. In short, during the 1930's, 1940's, and early 1950's official values and social values coincided.

Now the two no longer operate in tandem. A rapid expansion of high school facilities and a shift in the skill requirements of the labor force have resulted in many more high school graduates than are needed or can be accommodated in higher educational institutions.[15] In response to this changed situation, the Soviet regime asks that children of the urban middle class reorient their career and educational aspirations. At the same time, however, the Communist Party has done very little to realign differential social rewards as a function of differential educational achievement.[16] Not surprisingly, both parents and children have balked at the shift in the official line, and the prospects for change in their attitudes do not seem bright. It is patently self-defeating for the party to demand that the Komsomol alter young people's occupational and educational preferences, while simultaneously continuing distributive policies which helped generate those preferences in the first place.

Nowhere is the gap between official and popular values wider than in the area of alcoholic consumption. For years, the Soviet regime has attempted to change the drinking habits of the population. Its obsession with this matter is understandable. According to official statements, a large share of the crime, delinquency, labor absenteeism, accidents, and interpersonal conflicts in the USSR is directly or indirectly traceable to alcoholic abuse. Given the enormous individual and social costs of this problem, it is natural that the regime exerts great effort

[14] See Nicholas Dewitt, *Education and Professional Employment in the USSR*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1961, pp. 140-53.

[15] In 1966, for example, only one-fourth of all applicants were accepted for study in higher and secondary specialized institutions of the RSFSR. *Izvestia*, Nov. 20, 1966.

[16] It is true, of course, that incomes policy in the post-Stalin period has moved in a more egalitarian direction, and it is also true that some manual jobs (coal mining) are better paid than some professional jobs (teaching, medicine). But in the aggregate, a college degree still leads to those jobs which are better paid, less hazardous, more satisfying, and socially more prestigious.

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to bring it under control. But the evidence suggests that anti-drunkenness campaigns have had little success so far.[17] The official view of the evils of vodka simply is not shared by the mass population. Hard drinking is a social norm learned in the home and reinforced in friendship circles. It has deep cultural and historical roots in the USSR, and even those individuals who abstain or are moderate drinkers tend to be very permissive toward the proverbial drunkard. In the face of such ingrained attitudes, the CPSU cannot mobilize sufficient opprobrium to "resocialize" the population.

Indians and Chiefs

So far this discussion has focused on the more obvious reasons for the failure of socialization policies—the inability of the Komsomol to involve a large part of working-class youth in its program and the dissemination of official values widely discrepant from those held by the target audience. There are, in addition, more subtle factors which undermine the potential effectiveness of the Soviet Communist youth program.

As previously noted, peer criticism of deviant behavior is the linchpin of Komsomol social control. Its success, however, depends on the willingness of the rank and file to play the role of collective disciplinarian. Evidence suggests that attempts to mobilize peer criticism have sometimes produced opposite results. Periodically in the post-Stalin era, articles in the youth press have claimed that Komsomol members judged before their organization peers have been let off with mild reproofs or have even been given "protection," and that "collective intercession for victims" is a common practice which over time has tended to subvert the Youth League's authority.[18]

It is not difficult to understand why the rank and file would protect one another. When disciplinary situations arise, Komsomol members feel a natural empathy for the "deviant," particularly if the behavior they are being asked to criticize relates in its impact to the adult, as opposed to the youth, community.[19] On such occasions, a "we-they" dichotomy becomes involved in the proceedings. The rank and file have a strong motivation to insulate themselves as much as possible from the incessant demands of authority. No doubt members also hope that by being lenient and understanding of others' transgressions, they will insure reciprocal treatment, should they themselves someday be subjected to collective criticism.

More complex than the peer-group outlook is the motivation which encourages Komsomol leaders to protect deviants. Western scholars have generally argued that the leadership stratum of the Youth League dutifully manipulates the rank and file to conform to the demands and expectations of the CPSU. This subservience has been considered inevitable since individuals who hold executive positions in the Komsomol do so at the pleasure of the party, and since many of these individuals aspire to later leadership roles in the CPSU. The relationship between the leaders and the led has been depicted as essentially coercive and antagonistic, as in the following statement:

The leading members of the Komsomol look upon the rank and file of the membership as their subjects on a lower plane of Soviet society, while the ordinary Komsomol member regards the leaders of Komsomol as party henchmen.[20]

In the writer's view, this analysis is overly simplistic. Any Komsomol leader who assumes the role of "party henchman" will inevitably alienate the rank and file. To be sure, he need not worry that an enraged constituency will vote him out of office. Neither his current nor any future position directly depends upon approval from below. But indirectly, he does need popular support. Dissatisfied members can and do vote with their feet: every year millions of Soviet youth leave the organization. While part of the turnover can be attributed to members' reaching the upper age limit (28), the largest percentage of

[17] See Connor, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-58.

[18] See *Moskovskii komsomolets*, Oct. 27, 1955; March 28, 1962; *Moskovskii universitet* (Moscow), Oct. 22, 1959; *Molodoi leninets* (Stalingrad-Volgograd), Feb. 23, 1955; Dec. 19, 1959; *Komsomolskaia pravda*, Nov. 24, 1957; Feb. 1, 1969.

[19] The difference here is suggested by the example of a young factory worker who arrives at work drunk and upsets the production process in his labor unit (an act which economically harms his adult co-employees), as compared to the example of a young factory worker who does not show up for his public work assignment or who expresses a politically unorthodox point of view.

[20] P. Kruzhin, "The Youth Movement in the Soviet Union," in *Youth in the Soviet Union*, Munich, Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1959, p. 7. For similar views, see Ralph T. Fisher, *Pattern for Soviet Youth*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1959; Allen Kassof, *The Soviet Youth Program: Regimentation and Rebellion*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1965.

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departures represents voluntary termination because of boredom and dissatisfaction.[21]

If leaders are to keep membership loss to a minimum, they must avoid giving the impression that they represent exclusively the interests of the party, the government, and adult authority. They must also identify with the needs and interests of the rank and file. One demonstration of the latter is the intercession of leaders on behalf of members whose behavior has violated prescribed standards. Even the CPSU must tolerate a certain amount of such intercession. It must recognize that a Komsomol leader is ineffective to the extent that he does not have the confidence of the rank and file; it must also recognize that an organizational transmission belt is of little value if the client group deserts.

Whether the Komsomol leaders in fact have the ability to inspire the confidence of the membership has been a subject of debate. Some outside scholars have expressed serious doubts on this score, holding that the organization's "official status" and its suppression of any spontaneous youth culture have imposed severe handicaps on the leadership. This may indeed be true. In any event, there are more prosaic and specific handicaps which undermine the Komsomol's effectiveness as a socializing agent.

The Komsomol in Industry

On the industrial front, to cite a crucial example, the Youth League has great difficulty establishing its visibility as an independent and indispensable functional unit. Trade unions are touted as the workers' major representative organization, and union responsibilities exactly parallel those of the Komsomol. The only way the Komsomol can escape the shadow of the trade unions is by rigorously advocating the rights and interests of the younger sector of the labor force.

Ideally, what this means is that the Youth League should protest any discriminatory hiring practices on the basis of age. It should insure that workers under 18 are not assigned to overtime or evening production shifts in violation of labor law. It should demand that young men and women be given time off the job at full or half pay to continue their education on a part-time basis.[22] It should actively lobby



Komsomol members of the Amursk Cellulose and Cardboard Combine show students from Amursk No. 4 secondary school around the factory—a step in the initiation of young workers into the combine.

—Photo by V. Voloshenko for Novosti via Sovfoto.

[21] This judgment is based upon the following data (taken from stenographic reports of the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th Komsomol Congresses). Between 1954 and 1958, 10 million new members entered the Komsomol, but total membership dropped 800,000; thus, 10.8 million members must have left the organization in these years. Between 1958 and 1962, another 10 million new members joined, while total membership registered a net increase of 1 million; thus, 9 million must have left. Between 1962 and 1966, 15 million new members joined for a net gain of 3.5 million; thus 11.5 million must have dropped out. Between 1966 and 1970, 15 million new members joined for a net gain of 4 million; thus 11 million must have left.

These losses could not have been wholly the consequence of removal from the rolls because of age, since that would mean the overwhelming majority of Komsomol members were in the 24-28 age category. Just the opposite has been true. At the 15th Congress in May 1966 Pavlov reported that the number of members between 14 and 17 had risen sharply, whereas the proportion of members between 18 and 25 had decreased by 23 percent. In light of this evidence, it seems reasonable to conclude that the loss of millions of members every four years was due primarily to voluntary resignations because of disinterest or dissatisfaction with the Komsomol program.

[22] The relevant law stipulates that students at higher and secondary evening and correspondence schools are entitled to an extra day off each week at half their average wages. If they wish, they can have one or two additional days off each week without pay. They also are entitled to between 10 and 30 days off with pay each year, depending upon their level of course study, for the purpose of preparing for examinations. Besides these paid leaves, students enrolled in senior courses at higher and secondary schools can have an additional month's leave without pay in order to do practice work in their future specialties or to gather material for their graduation papers.

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for improved dormitory, recreational, and in-service training facilities for young workers. And it should bring the legitimate grievances of every younger worker before the appropriate authorities. Needless to say, any Komsomol unit which conscientiously and effectively discharged these responsibilities would have no visibility or confidence problem among the rank and file.

But the Komsomol unit would just as surely antagonize the management of the particular firm involved. The overriding concern of any plant director is production output. His salary and career are closely tied to output performance; consequently, he abhors anything which slows production. The hiring of young workers is one such factor. If they are not yet 18, restrictive conditions govern their employment. If they have little or no previous work experience, the firm will have to train them, at a cost involving not only economic resources but also the time and energy of senior plant employees. After this training period ends, there is no guarantee that the firm will recoup its investment. The military draft, acceptance into higher education, or the constant mobility of young workers may deprive the factory of the skills which it developed and paid for. Not surprisingly, many managers have avoided these risks by not hiring such young workers in the first place.[23]

Another fact of Soviet industrial life is the faulty supply system. Parts are not always available when needed, creating bottlenecks in the production process. When the parts do finally arrive, Soviet managers traditionally introduce an intensive work schedule to compensate for the earlier slack period. In time of stress, the rights of young workers have counted for little. Managers have indiscriminately assigned them to evening or overtime shifts and have refused to release them for part-time study.[24]

How should Komsomol leaders respond to any or all of these situations? Protests may serve the interests of those youths adversely affected. But observing the law may actually complicate production output, and *a fundamental task of every factory Komsomol unit is to help the firm meet its production quotas.* In other words, the fulfillment of some organizational tasks may make difficult or impossible the realization of other organizational tasks. Which tasks and which factory constituency—the young worker or management—deserve priority support?

When forced to choose between contradictory tasks and separate constituencies, the Komsomol leadership has many reasons for siding with management. Aside from a general feeling that what is good for production is good for the Komsomol, Komsomol leaders may be buttressed in that point of view by personal considerations. Very few heads of industrial primary units draw their pay from the Youth League budget. The vast majority earn their living as workers in the factory and are therefore dependent upon management for their pay and promotion. In these circumstances, an adversary posture vis-à-vis the management could prove to be very costly.[25] Even when a Komsomol leader does dare to challenge a director's actions, the contestants are not equally matched. Managers can ignore such complaints as minor irritants, especially if their own illegal behavior produces economic gains.

For the Komsomol rank and file, it makes little difference why the youth organization failed to protect their interests—whether because the leadership did not wish to jeopardize its own cozy relationship with management or because management ignored the leadership's complaints with impunity. In both instances, the ordinary member can only conclude that the Youth League does not, or cannot, service his needs and thus does not deserve his affiliation. Recurrent conflicts of this sort are no doubt responsible for the fact that so many young workers wander in and out of the Komsomol every year.

The Komsomol on Campus

In educational institutions, the problems of youth work are not quite as severe. To begin with, the Komsomol does not have to compete for visibility. Most individuals connected with schools are the students themselves who are age-eligible for membership in Komsomol: the Youth League represents *the mass organization* in such institutional settings. Secondly, educational Komsomol units, unlike their counterparts in industry and agriculture, can count on a broader and relatively more stable member-

[23] See *Moskovskii komsomolets*, Nov. 17, 1957; *Molodoi leninets*, Sept. 22, 1957, and Oct. 22, 1957; *Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 25, 1957, and Dec. 1, 1967; *Izvestia*, June 26, 1965.

[24] See *Molodoi leninets*, May 13, 1959; Feb. 10, 1961; March 18, 1961; June 23, 1961; Feb. 21, 1962; *Komsomolskaia pravda*, Sept. 15, 1966.

[25] One obvious cost is loss of one's job at the firm, which appears to have been a common fate for those who have played their advocacy role too well. See *Molodoi leninets*, Feb. 3, 1960; *Moskovskii komsomolets*, Feb. 27, 1960; *Komsomolskaia pravda*, March 4, 1969.

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ship. Because of acute labor shortages, no worker in agriculture or industry needs to join the youth organization, or worry about quitting it, in order to get or keep a job. While he might be deprived of certain benefits and suffer some ostracism (as pointed out earlier in this paper), the youthful worker can be reasonably sure of ample employment options, regardless of what the Komsomol has to say about him. A student, on the other hand, may find a good character reference from the Komsomol beneficial when he seeks admission to higher education or a satisfactory job placement once he earns a college degree.[26] For these reasons, students cannot as easily resist pressure to affiliate with the organization. Nor can they readily quit the organization when dissatisfied, particularly since the Komsomol disapproves of resignations for reasons other than age.

But the advantages of student Komsomol units have their own drawbacks. When virtually everyone belongs, there is little distinction or pride attached to membership. In fact, many students have viewed their affiliation as a necessary onus and have participated only marginally in Komsomol activities.[27] Their indifference has undoubtedly had a demoralizing effect upon the enthusiasm and commitment of others. Although Komsomol leaders have indicated that they are aware of widespread apathy, there has been little evidence of purge-type measures to preserve zealousness and organizational dynamism.[28] Apparently, the Youth League is prepared to tolerate marginal participation on the part of students in return for a modicum of social control over future members of the elite class.

This tolerance of low participation levels is also necessary because other groups in educational institutions oppose excessive Komsomol demands upon students' time. Much of the Komsomol-sponsored work in the schools is devoted to raising the political and social consciousness of students. That involves public work assignments, political study groups, and various other extracurricular activities. An exceptionally able student will manage to satisfy his organizational obligations without ignoring his academic work. The vast majority of students, however, cannot manage to do both well. They must order their priorities and must decide where to expend maximum effort.

Those who resolve the dilemma in favor of academic work, at the expense of Komsomol involvement, can usually count on the support of school officials. In theory, the Youth League is assured of the full cooperation of a sympathetic academic and administrative staff. But in fact, there is often sharp disagreement as to how students should distribute their time and energy. Teachers and administrators approach this question with a special point of view: as educators, their primary concern is to impart knowledge to their students. Anything which interferes excessively with that goal arouses their opposition. Since the Komsomol's activities in the school have often had just that effect, educators have challenged its authority.[29]

Youth league officials cannot openly dispute the preemptive importance of academic work. At the same time, they cannot acquiesce in the view that overinvolvement in Komsomol activities is bad because it distracts the individual from his studies. Organizational pride alone would dictate a firm repudiation of that position. But there is an additional impetus as well. Many Komsomol activists do not share the teacher's high esteem for academic knowledge. A large percentage of them have already set their sights on a full-time career in the party apparatus or the state bureaucracy.[30] For them, school is not primarily a place to learn a "specialty" but an

[26] During the late 1950's and early 1960's, a character reference from an applicant's social organization was legally mandated, and admissions committees were told to give considerable weight to such references in making their acceptance decisions. There is also some evidence that good Komsomol connections can be helpful in enabling a college graduate to avoid assignment to the hinterlands for three years. See David Burg, *Oppozitsionnye nastroenia molodezhi v gody posle "ottepeli"* (Oppositional Moods of Youth in the Year after "the Thaw"), Munich, Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1960.

[27] A 20-percent rate of participation in Komsomol activities is considered normal in most school Komsomol units. See *Moskovskii universitet*, May 25, 1957; Nov. 2, 1960; and April 17, 1962; *Komsomolskaia pravda*, April 13, 1958; N. I. Panov, "Develop Active Methods of Educational Work," *Vestnik vysshei shkoly* (Moscow), October 1961; *Kommunist*, No. 10, 1966, pp. 34-42.

[28] During an exchange of Komsomol documents in 1967, the central leadership made it very clear that passive members were not to be expelled from the organization. Activism was to be encouraged by less drastic means. *Komsomolskaia pravda*, March 7, 1967.

[29] The Moscow University Komsomol newspaper summed up the essence of the conflict in this way: "At Komsomol meetings it is often possible to observe the same characteristic phenomenon. People in the academic sections tirelessly remind us that the basic duty of a student is his studies; they state that it is unwise to engage excessively in public work because it will harm one's studies. On the other hand, Komsomol leaders criticize individual students who study very well but engage in almost no Komsomol activities." *Moskovskii universitet*, Nov. 23, 1959; see also issues of June 19, 1956; Oct. 10, 1961; Feb. 13, 1962. Also, *Kommunist*, No. 10, 1966, pp. 34-42.

[30] During the 1950's and 1960's, about 3,000 Komsomol leaders transferred annually to directive work in party and state administrative units. See *Kommunist*, No. 4, 1959, p. 66; *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* (Moscow), November 1962, p. 40.

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arena in which to develop and to demonstrate their organizing and political skills. Consequently, Komsomol leaders and Soviet educators are often at odds not only because of incompatible goals but also because of dichotomous value systems. Understandably, these differences undermine the potential impact of youth work in the schools.

Conclusion

This essay has highlighted some of the major factors which limit Komsomol effectiveness as a socializing agent. Soviet leaders would not deny the argument presented in these pages—that the Youth League has failed to instill adequate social motivation in a substantial portion of the younger generation. Indeed, most press articles devoted to youth affairs emphasize this very point. However, there would be disagreement with respect to the root causes of the Komsomol's failure. Most often Soviet writers blame bureaucratic formalism, poor training of youth leaders, and consequent ineptitude among the leadership cadres in directing the energies of young people in a positive and constructive manner. All these shortcomings may, in fact, contribute to the ineffectiveness of the socialization program. But the Komsomol's difficulties have much deeper roots. They result from the infrastructure of the organization itself and from basic systemic features of the USSR. Thus, it seems clear that merely reducing bureaucratic formalism and improving leadership would not decisively alter the Komsomol's performance.

In fact, there may be very little that the Youth League can do to change the outcome of socialization efforts. Empirical research done in the West suggests that the value orientations and behavior inclinations of individuals are well developed by adolescence and highly resistant to change.[31] If this is true of the socialization process in the Soviet Union as well, then the Komsomol program can do little more than confirm and reinforce the effect of earlier socialization experiences on Soviet youth.

[31] See David Easton and Jack Dennis, *Children In the Political System*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1969; Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, *Political Socialization*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1969.

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The Maoist Approach

By Ronald N. Montaperto

The role of youth (individuals between the ages of 13 and 25) in the Chinese revolution has undergone many shifts and changes over the years. Perhaps the most dramatic of these occurred in 1949 when the newly installed Communist government called on China's young people to transfer their revolutionary effort from armed struggle to the more peaceful tasks of reconstructing the economy and increasing the output of the country's farms and factories. Since 1949, the political authorities have continuously redefined the specific functions of Chinese youth in the national revolution in response to different tactical needs. Accordingly, they have had to reformulate the revolutionary orthodoxy of one period in a way designed to ensure the continuity of overarching revolutionary goals.

From the standpoint of the Chinese government, therefore, a central problem of political socialization is how to instill in youth both an adaptability to changing requirements and dedication to the goal of ongoing revolution.

This problem constitutes the major focus of attention in the present article. Specifically, we shall explore the general nature of the role that Chinese youth have been expected to play as that role has evolved since 1949, and how, in Maoist terms, the process of socialization within that framework is suppose to occur. Then we shall endeavor to look at the socialization process as it has been going on in practice in China and to assess the degree to which it corresponds to Maoist theoretical conceptions.

Mr. Montaperto is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Indiana University and co-author of Red Guard: The Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai, *1971. He has also contributed articles on Chinese youth and youth politics to such publications as* Current Scene *(Hong Kong).*

In searching ideological literature of the Chinese revolution for a definitive statement of the role of youth, one finds two interesting phenomena. First, Mao tends to equate "youth" with intellectual youth of petty-bourgeois background almost to the exclusion of youthful representatives of other strata. More concretely, he seems most concerned with youth of college age or those recently graduated from colleges or universities. In discussing such young people he emphasizes their origins among

. . . those whose standard of living is falling. Many in this section, who originally belonged to better-off families, are undergoing a gradual change from a position of being barely able to manage to one of living in more and more reduced circumstances. . . . They are in great mental distress because there is such a contrast between their past and their present. Such people are quite important for the revolutionary movement; they form a mass of no small proportions and are the left wing of the petty bourgeoisie.[1]

This treatment stands in noticeable contrast to his analysis of other classes in Chinese society. Indeed, he seems not to recognize age differentials within other strata, but approaches them as homogeneous social groups. For example, his writings contain relatively little reference to young workers or young peasants.[2]

[1] "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (hereafter cited as *Selected Works*), Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1965, Vol. 1, p. 16.

[2] See especially the following items from the *Selected Works:* Vol. 1—"Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society" and "Why Is It that Red Political Power Can Exist in China"; Vol. 2— "The May 4th Movement," "The Orientation of the Youth Movement," "Recruit Large Numbers of Intellectuals," "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," "On New Democracy"; Vol. 3—"Reform Our Study," "Serve the People," "On Coalition Government"; Vol. 4—"Methods of Work of Party Committees" and "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship."

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Secondly, and more significantly, Mao regards this particular segment of Chinese society with deeply mixed emotions. On the one hand, he recognizes that Chinese youth has rendered substantial historical contributions to the revolution and that student-intellectuals comprise an essential component of the revolutionary forces. In fact, he holds that but for China's young people, the evolution of events during the period 1911-35 would probably not have been as favorable as it proved. To him, in short, Chinese youth has in many ways been conterminous with the Chinese revolution:

What role have China's young people played since the May Fourth Movement [of 1919]? In a way they have played a vanguard role—a fact recognized by everybody except the diehards. What is a vanguard role? It means taking the lead and marching in the forefront of the revolutionary ranks. In the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal ranks of the Chinese people, there is a contingent composed of the country's young intellectuals and students. It is a contingent of considerable size, and even if the many who have given their lives are not included, it now numbers several million. It is an army on one of the fronts against imperialism and feudalism, and an important army, too.[3]

However, Mao also waxes less than enthusiastic about some characteristics of China's students. He asserts that most student activists during the 1919-35 period stemmed from the middle and petty bourgeoisie, and he goes on to argue that such a class background seriously diminished their revolutionary potential because it limited not only their motivations for joining the revolutionary struggle but their ability and willingness to continue the struggle to the end as well.

[3] "The Orientation of the Youth Movement," *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 245.



Red Guards perform a dance in front of the Cultural Palace in Peking's Forbidden City; Mao's Little Red Book is carried in each hand.

—1967 photo by Scheler of Stern via Black Star.

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This mistrust is really that of a Marxist revolutionary activist with a peasant-proletarian orientation toward the middle and petty bourgeoisie. Mao contends that as conflict begins to touch intellectuals personally, they may resolve their tensions by dropping out of the movement and ultimately turning against it. Moreover, he perceives youth as being too individualistic and unwilling to submit themselves to discipline in pursuit of larger goals. Students, that is, tend to place excessive value on abstract freedom and do not recognize the need for an integrated and disciplined approach to the solution of China's problems. Finally, Mao finds student intellectuals guilty of subjectivism and pride. He feels that young people tend to analyze China's problems without reference to the scientific laws of Marxism-Leninism and then proceed to act upon their analyses in a largely unstructured and personal way. As they do so, they tend to invest their own personal assessments of the revolution with a quality of absoluteness which makes for a lack of flexibility and decreases the capacity for concerted effort. Attachment to such subjective views renders compromise—and therefore organization and leadership—impossible; in effect, pride becomes counter-revolutionary.[4]

Thus, it seems clear that while Mao recognizes the contribution of youth to the historical development of the Chinese revolution and the necessity of their continuing participation in its consolidation, he remains intensely suspicious of certain aspects of the traditional activism of China's young people. This suspicion, as we shall see later, greatly colors his conception of the process of political socialization.

Socialization and Revolutionary Stages

Before we proceed to examine that conception, however, we should note one further influence that has affected it. The role that Chinese youth is expected to perform is shaped in part by Mao's view of the development of the revolution itself. In his eyes, the values, attitudes, and behavior patterns of China's youth must always conform to the requirements of the revolution at any given moment, but since the revolution progresses by stages, these values, attitudes, and behavior patterns must change in accordance with that progression. Lest any misunderstanding arise on this point, let us briefly review the specifics of his outlook.

In "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," first presented as a speech in December 1939, Mao defined the nature of the Chinese revolution and sketched its history, its targets, its tasks, its motive forces, its character, and its perspectives. He later amplified and explained the ideas contained in this essay in two other articles, "On New Democracy" (1940) and "The People's Democratic Dictatorship" (1945). These three works taken together provide the requisite insights for present purposes.

Even a casual perusal of the three essays reveals that Mao holds that revolution takes place in various stages and that each successive stage is essential for the transition to the next.[5] For instance, he places China's development squarely in the context of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. That is, he classifies the Chinese revolution as a bourgeois-democratic revolution against feudalism and colonialism, not as a proletarian-socialist revolution.[6] However, Mao also distinguishes China's bourgeois-democratic revolution from past revolutions of this type. China's bourgeois-democratic revolution, while designed to resolve the contradiction between feudalism and imperialism on the one hand and capitalism on the other hand, will not result in the establishment of a purely capitalist system as did those in the United States, England, and elsewhere. Instead, it will bring about the creation of a social system which permits sufficient capitalist development to prepare the way for the transition to socialism, but which also prevents capitalism from developing to the point where capitalist exploitation of labor becomes the dominant characteristic of Chinese society. China's bourgeois-democratic revolution, then, will be one of a new special type—it will be a "new-democratic" revolution. The system to which it gives birth will not be a bourgeois democracy like that found in the United States and Western Europe but a "new democracy."

In "new democracy," anti-feudal and anti-imperialist social classes—*i.e.*, the proletariat, poor and middle peasants, rich peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, and elements of the middle or national bourgeoisie—will dominate China's political institutions and prevent anti-democratic forces—*i.e.*,

[4] See particularly " The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 321-22.

[5] "On Contradiction," *ibid.*, Vol. 1, pp. 328-30.

[6] "On New Democracy," *ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 341.

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the landlords, certain sections of the middle bourgeoisie, the big bourgeoisie, and bourgeois compradores—from transforming the revolution into the traditional capitalist mold. Thus, the place of China's revolutionary classes is written into the system, and their political role is thereby safeguarded.[7]

These revolutionary classes, in turn, will use their political power to guarantee the economic well-being of the Chinese masses through land reform, nationalization of basic industries, social welfare legislation, rent reduction, and provision of basic social services. While private capitalist enterprise will remain, the "abuses" of the capitalist system will be greatly reduced. As a result, the capitalist or bourgeois-democratic revolution will be completed, and the conditions for the socialist revolution will be fulfilled. Moreover, these conditions will be met in such a way that the transition to socialism can be accomplished with minimum difficulty.[8]

If China's revolution is to progress from the "new-democratic" stage, through the socialist stage, to the Communist stage, then the role of youth in the Chinese revolution will logically vary with the particular revolutionary stage that has been reached. For example, the role of youth in the "new-democratic" stage will differ from the role of youth in the socialist stage—as will the respective roles of all China's social classes.[9] Therefore, we must anticipate reflections of the notion of a multistage revolutionary process in Mao's view of the role of youth in the Chinese revolution.

The Role of Youth

What, then, does Mao deem this role to be? To begin with, Chinese young people are to serve as a revolutionary vanguard during the period of the "new-democratic" revolution. They constitute a force for confrontation with nonrevolutionary elements and an important link between social classes which affords a basis for mobilization, education, and recruitment for broadly-based revolutionary activity. Hence, they are to function as a cutting edge of the party as it seeks to implant roots at basic levels of society—as instruments through which the party disseminates, expands, and consolidates its programs and control throughout Chinese society. In short, youth as a group constitutes one of the mechanisms through which the Chinese Communist Party will establish and maintain firm control of the social system.

This instrumental role, of course, means that the specific functions of youth are what the party decrees, and these can alter considerably over time. During the period of armed struggle against Japan, and later during the period of civil war against the Kuomintang, for example, the party directed the activities of Chinese youth mainly toward the overt and obvious enemies, but its perspective changed in 1949 when the period of armed struggle of the "new-democratic" revolution ended. It then ordered Chinese youth to turn their energies to assisting in the consolidation of the gains of the "new-democratic" revolution in the countryside, the factories, and the classrooms through revolutionary nation-building.

However, there is another aspect to Mao's vision of the role of youth during the period of the "new-democratic" revolution. As we have seen, Mao regards the "new-democratic" revolution as but one stage in a continuing revolutionary process. It is the stage which permits the strengthening of China as a nation and, more important, which also prepares the ground for the transition to socialism. Youth are essential instruments in the process as they perform their vanguard role.

Yet, as noted earlier, Mao views the youth who have taken the lead in the movement since its inception with suspicion because of their petty-bourgeois class origins. To him, such young people are incapable of playing a vanguard role in the transition to socialism. Therefore, as the youth participate in armed struggle (as against the Japanese and the Kuomintang in the 1930's and 1940's), as they participate in land reform and economic reconstruction (as in the 1950's), and as they develop skills and expertise in the classroom—that is, as they fulfill their role as instruments of the "new-democratic" revolution—they are supposed to prepare themselves for continuing to play a vanguard role in the proletarian-socialist revolution. They are to overcome those shortcomings in attitudes and behavior which prevent development of the orthodox perception of the revolutionary process and which thus inhibit the development of the conditions necessary for the transition to socialism. In sum, as Chinese youth make revolution in the world around them, they are to experience a revolution in their

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 344.
[8] "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 326-29.
[9] "On New Democracy," *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 378 ff.

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own minds. Revolution in the head must accompany revolution in the street.

This viewpoint finds concrete expression in Mao's commentaries on the nature of "the relationship" between the world of mind and the world of matter and on the question of epistemology. In the first place, he holds that youth must develop a unified outlook from which they can proceed to analyze the conditions of Chinese society. Once they have achieved this, it will be possible for them to undertake concerted action to further the completion of the "new-democratic" revolution and the proletarian-socialist revolution. Mao, of course, wants to inculcate in China's young people a *particular* view of the world as well as a *particular* pattern of behavior rooted in that world view. Youth—indeed, all people who would serve the revolution—must develop knowledge or understanding of *the laws of development of the objective world.* It is only after this task is accomplished that the more important aspect of human endeavor, the application of knowledge to the world in order to change it, can begin.[10] Hence, an understanding of Mao's notion of the process by which Chinese youth are to achieve the desired unity of outlook requires an appreciation of his conception of the way in which human beings learn.

In line with his Marxist background and orientation, Mao maintains that the sources of knowledge lie in the objective world. Thus, the sources of knowledge about human social development lie in the social activity of man—*i.e.,* in his activity in economic production (producing the goods necessary for the maintenance of life), in scientific experimentation (trying new and different things to improve the level of physical livelihood), and in class struggle (interacting with fellow human beings in a conflictual way based on the pattern of control of the means of production).[11]

As man moves in the objective world, he comes into contact with discrete phenomena and commences to form sensory perceptions and impressions. This process of gathering impressions constitutes the first stage in the development of knowledge —the stage of perception.[12] Later, as man continues to engage in social activity, he is successively exposed to the same phenomena; that is, his perceptions are reinforced. As a result, he is able to link these discrete perceptions and to see their similarities and differences. He can see the relationships between different phenomena. In a word, he forms conceptions regarding classes of things and/or events. This process of refining and combining perceptions to form conceptions comprises the second stage in the development of knowledge.[13] Finally, man combines and analyzes his conceptions and begins to make judgments and inferences. He can generalize about social phenomena and grasp the essence of the relationship between things. When man reaches this stage, he attains rational knowledge (or logical knowledge) and so is able to generate theory.[14]

Thus, the process of developing knowledge consists of two distinct but integrated stages: perception and conception. Following from this, Mao argues that since perception is the starting point of knowledge, "whoever wants to know a thing has no way of doing so except by coming into contact with it, that is by living (practicing) in its environment."[15] Knowledge of the objective laws of the world can be gained only by engaging in social practice within the world:


If you want to know a certain thing or a certain class of things directly, you must personally participate in the practical struggle to change reality, to change that thing or class of things, for only thus can you come into contact with them as phenomena. . . . This is the path to knowledge which every man actually travels, though some people, deliberately distorting matters, argue to the contrary.[16]

But society is in a state of constant flux. The process of developing rational knowledge regarding social change must therefore continue as long as the process of social change continues. Yet how does one know whether one's rational knowledge is correct or not? How does one know whether one's theory corresponds to objective reality?

Again, in Mao's view, there is but one method. Any theory—which represents the end product of perception and conception derived from social practice—must be applied in the objective world. If it produces the desired result, it then corresponds to the objective reality it was designed to represent. As Mao puts matters:

[10] "On Practice," *Ibid.,* Vol. 1, p. 304.
[11] *Ibid.,* pp. 296-97.
[12] *Ibid.,* p. 297.
[13] *Ibid.,* p. 298.
[14] *Ibid.*
[15] *Ibid.,* p. 299.
[16] *Ibid.,* pp. 299-300.

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The Communist Youth League provides the manpower in 1959 for construction of the Communist Youth League Railway in the Lesser Hsingan Mountains of China's northeast.

—Photo from *China Reconstructs* (Peking), August 1959, p. 17.

Knowledge begins with practice, and theoretical knowledge is acquired through practice and must then return to practice. The active function of knowledge manifests itself not only in the active leap from perceptual to rational knowledge, but—and this is more important—it must manifest itself in the leap from rational knowledge to revolutionary practice. The knowledge which grasps the laws of the world must be redirected to the practice of changing the world, must be applied anew in the practice of production, in the practice of revolutionary class struggle, and in the practice of scientific experiment. This is the process of testing the developing theory, the continuation of the whole process of cognition.[17]

Furthermore, since the process of social movement does not stop, there is a constant necessity to continue the process of cognition to develop new and different theories which correspond to the ever-changing objective world. Accordingly, the need to test theory in practice becomes even more intense. This notion of knowledge and its development, in turn, places a special burden upon revolutionaries. Revolutionaries must be certain not only that their theories are correct but also that the plans and programs they propose are appropriate to changing conditions. Thus:

As far as social movements are concerned, true revolutionary leaders must not only be good at correcting their ideas, theories, plans or programs when errors are discovered as the revolutionary process has already progressed and changed from one stage of development to another; they must also be good at making themselves and all their fellow-revolutionaries progress and change in their subjective knowledge along with it—that is to say, they must ensure that the proposed new revolutionary tasks and new working programs correspond to new changes in the situation. In a revolutionary period, the situation changes very rapidly; if the knowledge of revolutionaries does not change rapidly in accordance with the changed situation, they will be unable to lead the revolution to victory.[18]

To sum up, then, Mao contends that in the "new-democratic" phase of the Chinese revolution youth must play an instrumental role in the evolution of that phase and prepare themselves for the continuation of such a role in the revolution's ensuing socialist phase. These two aspects of the prescribed role for Chinese young people constitute, in effect, the goals of political socialization from the Maoist standpoint. Such goals are, moreover, inextricably intertwined. That is, the activities of youth in the "new-

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 304.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 306.

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democratic" revolution are intended to provide an essential element of the social practice that youth must have in order to acquire the knowledge necessary for meaningful participation in the next stage of the revolution. Through constant involvement in the process of making revolution, Chinese young people are supposed to gain knowledge of the essence of the revolutionary process, and their knowledge is supposed to deepen as the revolutionary situation changes and conditions become appropriate for the implementation of the country's socialist revolution.

Problems of Socialization

In Mao's eyes, of course, the leadership of the revolution belongs to the proletariat and to the Chinese Communist Party. Hence, it is ultimately the party which bears the responsibility for structuring the socialization process in such a way as to achieve these goals, for ensuring constantly that "proposed new revolutionary tasks and new working programs correspond to the new changes in the situation." [19] Broadly speaking, this task entails the creation of the kind of environment in which youth can actively participate in the style of social practice requisite to the development of the kind of knowledge that Mao considers vital.

Such an undertaking has posed several crucial problems for the party since the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949. First, Mao's suspicion of the petty-bourgeois background of most activist youth and his belief that the youth movement lacked proper integration with the worker and peasant classes have implied a need for a major overhaul of the traditional youth movement. Not only does this include the establishment of new structures of leadership, control, and education; it also entails a revision of policies on membership recruitment, personnel, and intra-organizational advancement designed to expand the participation of youth from class backgrounds other than the petty bourgeoisie —particularly youth of proletarian and peasant origins. This revision, of course, encompasses measures to counter any resistance from those strata of youth who previously enjoyed dominant roles in youth politics.

Second, Mao emphasizes the need for a unity of view among youth. This virtually dictates that all young people be exposed to basically similar experiences and that some form of organization on a national basis be set up; however, the needs of youth from different social classes are, in many ways, different—at least with respect to specific detail. The petty-bourgeois majority within the movement must be educated, supervised, and led in such a manner that they will cease to distinguish between themselves and representatives of other social classes. They must replace their petty-bourgeois world outlook with the more revolutionary outlook of workers and peasants. That is, they must shed the individualism, subjectivism, and pride that characterized and even prompted their initial participation in the revolution, and they must come to view the process of social development from the same perspective that workers and peasants do.[20]

The situation with respect to the proletarian and peasant minority is not quite the same. In Mao's eyes, these strata alone possess the class consciousness and dedication necessary for the successful completion of both the "new-democratic" and socialist revolutions.[21] Thus, it is incumbent upon them to take the lead in the youth movement, under the direction of the party. But in order to do so, young people of worker and peasant origins must first overcome their innate mistrust of bourgeois youth and then provide the latter with guidance and education in order to develop a unity of viewpoint. In the process, worker and peasant youth will also broaden their own viewpoint, enhance and enrich their revolutionary experience, and hence render themselves better able to head the revolutionary struggle.[22]

These divergent needs and interests confront the party with a formidable task when it undertakes to fashion a suitable environment for the sort of political socialization that it desires. It must take account of the various differences, but it must at the same time maintain a general unity of approach, organization, and content.

Third, Mao insists that there must be a voluntaristic element in the acquisition of rational knowledge. As we have seen, he regards socialization as the product of an environment structured to afford

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] "The Orientation of the Youth Movement," *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 245-46, and "Recruit Large Numbers of Intellectuals," *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 302.

[21] "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 324-25.

[22] *Ibid.*, and "Recruit Large Numbers of Intellectuals," *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 301.

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Hsiao Hsuan-fang (left), Deputy Secretary of the Chiangan Locomotive Depot's Communist Youth League Committee, is an outstanding electric-welder.

—Photo from *China Pictorial*, No. 6, 1973, p. 5.

a particular kind of social practice and thereby to permit the development of a particular viewpoint and particular style of behavior, and he deems the party to be the only proper source of leadership in the construction of this environment. However, he holds that ultimately the acquisition of rational knowledge must be accomplished without coercion and with maximum independence. From the Maoist perspective, then, the organizational linkage between the party and the youth movement must allow for an appropriate mix of individual freedom of action and centralized, unified control.

Assessing Implementation of Theory

The foregoing discussion of the goals and methods of political socialization in China has been couched in terms of Chinese Communist ideology. The author has deliberately followed such a strategy in order to avoid the trap of applying Western concepts to a context in which they may not in fact be relevant. Within this general framework, we have seen that socialization can occur only by direct and active involvement in an environment so structured as to engender a certain set of perceptions, conceptualizations, and general theories. Further, we have noted that as young people participate in the activity of revolutionizing their objective environment, there is to occur a revolution in their own minds. Thought, in other words, must come to correspond to objective reality.

If this is so, the success or failure of the socialization process depends upon the extent to which involvement in the myriad aspects of the physical environment is explicitly linked to the broader goal of revolutionizing the mind. That is, young people should become aware that all that they do is connected in a concrete way with the higher goal of achieving a thoroughgoing revolution. Working in a factory to increase production, for example, must be viewed as an integral component of a wide range of revolutionizing experiences.

One method of evaluating the degree of linkage is to examine the kinds of things for which the Communist Youth League and its members have come under criticism from the body's top leadership (and thus the party). The Youth League constitutes the official training ground for "revolutionary successors" and the vanguard of the youth movement, and if these high-level criticisms of the League's operations and the actions of its members are directed mainly toward specific aspects of nation-building performance and not integrated into the type of revolutionizing framework required by official ideology, then it should be clear that political socialization as it has taken place in practice has failed to support efforts to achieve ideological goals and may in fact actually have subverted them.

To arrive at such an assessment, the author carried out a content analysis of the daily *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao* (China Youth News). This publication and the periodical *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien* (Chinese Youth), both published by the CYL's Propaganda Department, are the chief instruments of communication and distribution of information throughout the League system. All branches subscribe to *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao;* its content constitutes the major study material for nearly one-half of the League's branch and small-group meetings. Moreover, both League members and young people who do not belong to the League are expected to read it daily, and most youth do so.

The results of the content analysis appear in the table on pp. 60-61. Before we discuss them and their meaning, however, a few words of explanation regarding the character of the analysis and the table are in order. To begin with, in carrying out the investigation, the author focused on selected years—

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1955–61 and 1965. The 1955–61 period was chosen for two reasons. It covers a reasonably lengthy time span after the Youth League had completed its national organization and emerged as a mature body, and it embraces several distinctly different phases of Chinese politics—the relatively peaceful days of 1955; the stresses and strains of the Hundred Flowers movement in 1957 and the Great Leap Forward and the establishment of the communes in 1958; and finally, the retreat from the commune concept and the adoption, after about 1959, of policies more akin to those of 1955. The year 1965 was included to gain a picture of the orientation of the youth movement on the eve of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. During the Cultural Revolution, it should be noted, the *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao* ceased to appear, for the Youth League itself suffered disbandment and did not reemerge as a formal entity until 1971.

Second, the number of specific criticisms recorded bears no relationship to the number of issues or items read. Some issues of the daily contained no items with criticisms of the League and its members; on the other hand, other issues contained items with more than one criticism. In every case, only explicit criticisms were counted. If a criticism was directed to more than one aspect of the League's performance, that was so noted. Thus, one specific criticism may show up in different components of the breakdown in the table.

Third, the criticisms, as the table indicates, were classified on two bases—general subject matter and general targets of the criticism. In the former case, the criticisms were initially broken down into two broad categories—criticisms of ideological deficiencies and criticisms of deficiencies in performance as instruments of the party and state (essentially in connection with specific tasks, usually related to physical problems of nation-building). Both categories, in turn, were subdivided further. The subcategories for "ideological criticisms," derived from the ideological perspectives already described, included motivation (service to the people), class consciousness (awareness of one's class standing and its implications for human behavior), misapprehension of the relationship between theory and practice (a misunderstanding of the process by which knowledge is gained, of the interaction between concrete activity or revolution in the street and revolution in the mind), and failure to perceive the ongoing character of the revolutionary process. The subcategories for "instrumental criticisms," derived from the data themselves, were: inadequate attention to fulfillment of assignments, quotas and plans (a) in agriculture or (b) in industry; ineffectiveness in carrying out military functions; poor leadership in technical education and propaganda; bad organizational discipline and cohesion; and inadequate service to other sectors of society.

It is true that criticisms which fall under the various headings of "instrumental criticisms" could be treated as "ideological criticisms" too. For example, chastisement for failure to fulfill production quotas in industry could well be construed as an ideological criticism. Here, however, they are viewed as such only when they are directly related to the revolutionary environment. If working to increase production in industry is talked about as an integral aspect of the realization of larger ideological goals, then the criticism has been classified as connected with ideology. If, on the other hand, there is no direct tie-in with the revolutionizing aspect of such activity —*i.e.*, if improving industrial production is spoken of as essentially an end in itself—then the criticism has been classified as "instrumental."

In the case of the general targets of criticism, an effort was made, first, to distinguish between criticisms directed at League members and those directed at the League organization and cadres. Then, within each of these categories, the criticisms were classified further in terms of the particular level at which they were aimed—local, provincial-municipal, or national.

With these points in mind, let us now turn to a consideration of the data in the table. If one lumps the entire 1955–61 period and 1965 together, instrumental criticisms of the Youth League and its members enjoy a slight edge over ideological criticisms, though a rough balance does exist. The relatively greater frequency of instrumental criticisms is more pronounced when one examines the data by year. In only three of the eight years did ideological criticisms outnumber instrumental ones, and in several of the five other years instrumental criticisms were vastly preponderant. Moreover, the only years in which ideological criticisms heavily outweighed those of an instrumental nature (1957 and 1958) were years when the very fabric of society was under dramatic assault. Nearly all organizations, including the party, experienced ideological criticisms identical to those leveled at the Youth League. While one might possibly have expected that the Youth League, in light of its position as a political organization second only to the party

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in status, might have received somewhat different treatment than other less prestigious bodies, it in fact did not. It is conceivable, then, that Youth League leaders found themselves forced to change their line of criticism and that they might have preferred to continue to define the organization's role in more instrumental terms.

In short, though the Youth League leaders have been concerned to some extent with the ideological dimension of political socialization, they have by no means continuously emphasized the body's revolutionizing mission. This conclusion is reinforced by some of the other data set forth in the table. First of all, ideological criticisms tended to cluster around problems that had to do with class consciousness and the relationship between theory and practice. The emphasis on the latter is particularly interesting. As we have already observed, criticisms of this sort rest on the Maoist notion that one can learn only by participating in concrete actions and activities and, conversely, that such participation is intended to bring about a change in the level of individual

Criticisms Aimed at Communist Youth League Members:

	KIND				DIRECTED TOWARD			
	Ideological		Instrumental		General Membership		Organization and Cadres	
Year	*Content*	*No.*	*Content*	*No.*	*Level*	*No.*	*Level*	*No.*
1955	Motivation	3	Agriculture	5	Local	3	Local	9
	Class Consciousness	5	Industry	0	Provincial-Municipal	0	Provincial-Municipal	1
	Theory and Practice	6	Military	1	National	0	National	0
	Continuation of		Education and Propaganda	6	All	2	All	1
	Revolution	0	Organizational Discipline	3				
			Service	0				
	Total	14	Total	15	Total	5	Total	11
1956	Motivation	1	Agriculture	5	Local	0	Local	7
	Class Consciousness	2	Industry	2	Provincial-Municipal	0	Provincial-Municipal	1
	Theory and Practice	5	Military	0	National	0	National	1
	Continuation of		Education and Propaganda	4	All	0	All	7
	Revolution	0	Organizational Discipline	7				
			Service	2				
	Total	8	Total	20	Total	0	Total	16
1957	Motivation	2	Agriculture	0	Local	2	Local	1
	Class Consciousness	10	Industry	0	Provincial-Municipal	0	Provincial-Municipal	2
	Theory and Practice	0	Military	0	National	0	National	0
	Continuation of		Education and Propaganda	0	All	4	All	4
	Revolution	2	Organizational Discipline	6				
			Service	1				
	Total	14	Total	7	Total	6	Total	7
1958	Motivation	0	Agriculture	0	Local	0	Local	3
	Class Consciousness	4	Industry	0	Provincial-Municipal	0	Provincial-Municipal	0
	Theory and Practice	4	Military	1	National	0	National	1
	Continuation of		Education and Propaganda	1	All	1	All	3
	Revolution	1	Organizational Discipline	1				
			Service	1				
	Total	9	Total	4	Total	1	Total	7

SOURCES: Content analysis of *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao* (China Youth News).

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consciousness. Since this notion presupposes the existence of a concrete task, the criticisms themselves inevitably have an instrumental component to them; and in view of the general predominance of instrumental criticisms in the total volume of criticisms, it seems probable that the Youth League leaders have conveyed the impression to members that it is the instrumental aspects of criticisms involving the relationship between theory and practice which really count, while their ideological aspects constitute mere rhetorical flourishes.

Second, relatively few of the ideological criticisms concerned motivation. Thus, the dominant thrust of the criticisms had to do with the quality of execution of specific tasks and the fulfillment of specific roles rather than with stimulating Youth League members to think about why they did certain things. To put matters another way, Youth League members were confronted primarily with criticisms of role performance instead of role definition.


Third, instrumental criticisms tended to focus on issues connected with organizational problems and

An Analysis of the CYL Daily Organ, 1955-61 and 1965

	KIND (Cont.)				DIRECTED TOWARD (Cont.)			
	Ideological		Instrumental		General Membership		Organization and Cadres	
Year	*Content*	*No.*	*Content*	*No.*	*Level*	*No.*	*Level*	*No.*
1959	Motivation	1	Agriculture	2	Local	1	Local	5
	Class Consciousness	3	Industry	3	Provincial-Municipal	0	Provincial-Municipal	0
	Theory and Practice	3	Military	1	National	0	National	0
	Continuation of		Education and Propaganda	2	All	2	All	2
	Revolution	1	Organizational Discipline	1				
			Service	1				
	Total	8	Total	10	Total	3	Total	7
1960	Motivation	0	Agriculture	0	Local	0	Local	0
	Class Consciousness	2	Industry	0	Provincial-Municipal	0	Provincial-Municipal	0
	Theory and Practice	2	Military	0	National	0	National	0
	Continuation of		Education and Propaganda	0	All	2	All	2
	Revolution	0	Organizational Discipline	1				
			Service	0				
	Total	4	Total	1	Total	2	Total	2
1961	Motivation	0	Agriculture	1	Local	0	Local	5
	Class Consciousness	3	Industry	1	Provincial-Municipal	0	Provincial-Municipal	0
	Theory and Practice	1	Military	0	National	0	National	0
	Continuation of		Education and Propaganda	1	All	3	All	4
	Revolution	0	Organizational Discipline	5				
			Service	0				
	Total	4	Total	8	Total	3	Total	9
1965	Motivation	1	Agriculture	0	Local	3	Local	11
	Class Consciousness	2	Industry	1	Provincial-Municipal	0	Provincial-Municipal	0
	Theory and Practice	6	Military	0	National	0	National	0
	Continuation of		Education and Propaganda	2	All	5	All	3
	Revolution	1	Organizational Discipline	4				
			Service	4				
	Total	10	Total	11	Total	8	Total	14

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organizational discipline, while problems concerned with role performance in the realm of education and propaganda were relegated to second place. In short, although the Youth League's cutting-edge function would seem to dictate that the leadership should pay primary attention to education and propaganda efforts, it was clearly more concerned with the maintenance of discipline than with anything else. Furthermore, it appears to have treated education and propaganda undertakings as simply tasks to be accomplished instead of as integral parts of a revolutionizing process either for the members who participated in the process or for nonmembers. That is, it very seldom criticized such undertakings within the context of the revolutionizing of Chinese youth.



Young intellectuals settled in the Jenho No. 2 Brigade, Pienmen Commune, Fengcheng County, Liaoning Province, "accept reeducation by the poor and lower-middle peasants" and learn to quarry stone.

—Photo from *China Pictorial* (Peking), No. 9, 1969, p. 20.

Fourth, the preponderance of both the two broad types of criticisms was aimed at the basic levels of the Youth League rather than at the provincial-municipal or national levels. To some extent, of course, this situation no doubt reflected the fact that most problems are apt to arise at the local level, where relations between members and organizational units are closer and interactions more intense. In this connection, it is worth noting that the League leadership evidently went to some lengths to provide typical illustrations of concrete problems at the local level in published criticisms. Nonetheless, the dominance of criticisms of local units seems to go hand in hand with the stress on organization and discipline mentioned earlier.

Fifth, a great many of the criticisms in the two broad categories were directed vaguely at the organization as a whole. Frequently, for example, criticisms referred to "league branches" or to "many members" rather than to specific elements within the organizational structure. It is true that to some degree this phraseology may have been the leadership's method of addressing problems to many different units of the League—*i.e.*, a convenient code or tag intended to capture the attention of any local units to which the criticism applied. Indeed, such generalized criticisms often appeared in conjunction with more specific items and were thus probably meant to underscore the seriousness with which various units and members were supposed to consider the criticisms. However, the most important point about these criticisms is that they indicate a vital and constant concern on the part of the League leaders with maintaining the organizational discipline of the body's membership. The absence of theoretical and/or ideological justifications for this concern suggests that the leaders were preoccupied with completing tasks as opposed to expounding ideological reasons for undertaking certain tasks in the first place.

Looking Backward and Ahead

Additional confirmation of the shortcomings of the Youth League emerges from statements of the party leadership about the post-Cultural-Revolution reconstruction of the League. A series of feature articles in the national press between January 1970 and April 1971 set forth authoritative guidelines and methods for this task, and these were later

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compiled and reissued in book form for use by party bodies and revolutionary committees.[23] While the articles contain few specific criticisms of the "old" Youth League, they quite plainly lay the blame for the body's previous faults on its insufficient grasp of its ideological *raison d'être*. There are numerous references in the pieces to the "capitalist road" of Liu Shao-ch'i, with its alleged emphasis on rote memorization, the mindless reading of books, and entry into the Youth League in order to become an official, and its deemphasis of class struggle. Moreover, the reconstruction of the League is said to be possible only because the successful conclusion of the Cultural Revolution has brought an end to the negative trends and impulses that had previously characterized the organization. The League had become the preserve of persons who either failed to perceive or ignored its mission and role in the process of individual revolutionary transformation, who concerned themselves essentially with the physical aspects of nation-building and with personal advancement. Thus, the vanguard of the revolution had lost sight of its goals. It had forgotten that the act of nation-building was meaningless unless it enabled China's young people to experience a revolution in their own minds.

Similarly, the prescription for the future in these articles is crystal clear. The League must be reconstituted by a process of "open-door criticism." That is, the party and "the masses" must select as core members those who have evinced an understanding of the interrelatedness of the twin goals of nation-building and the revolutionizing of the individual, and—more important—who have demonstrated an awareness of this interrelatedness through their own behavior in concrete practical situations.

Besides suggesting that Youth League leaders had in the past regarded the body as fundamentally a bureaucratic instrument to support specific nation-building endeavors and had devoted primary attention to the accomplishment of these undertakings, the articles' guidelines and methods of reconstruction attest to the party leadership's determination to refashion the body into an organization dedicated above all to the mission of socializing China's young people so as to create in them an awareness of the continuing revolution. At present, it is still too early to judge how successful this effort has been, but the resolution of the problem will undoubtedly remain the central concern of the youth movement for the foreseeable future.

[23] *Yung Mao Tse-tung Szu-hsiang Chien-she Kung Ch'ing T'uan* (Use the Thought of Mao Tse-tung in Building the Communist Youth League), Peking, China Youth Publishing House, 1971, *passim.*

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Books
Soviet Political Economy

By John A. Armstrong

ABRAHAM KATZ: *The Politics of Economic Reform in the Soviet Union.* New York, Praeger, 1972.
WERNER G. HAHN: *The Politics of Soviet Agriculture, 1960-1970.* Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1972.

ON THE BASIS of their titles, one might suppose that the simultaneous appearance of these two substantial monographs would provide a comprehensive picture of the relation between Soviet politics and major aspects of economic policy in the recent past. But the books are not really that complementary; they serve better as an illustration of two kinds of investigation into Soviet policy-making, revealing the advantages and limitations of both approaches.

Abraham Katz' slimmer volume is in many ways the more satisfying. A career diplomat with considerable academic training in Soviet affairs, Katz acquired a sure feel for Soviet policy development during his two years (1964-66) as Counselor for Economic Affairs at the American Embassy in Moscow. His basic purpose, concisely explained in his introduction, is to examine the tension between "the totalitarian imperative and the need for rational economic relationships" (p. vi). Both economists and sociologists may find his definition of rationality ("objective constraints on the extent to which the basic proportions of various elements in the economy can be stretched") slightly simplistic, as the author himself implies. But to the reviewer, it seems an adequate working definition for his treatment, which emphasizes discussion of policy rather than assessment of economic attainments. To put the matter another way, Katz takes the *persistent* Soviet assertion of the overriding need to create a superior socioeconomic system, measured in terms of material output, as a given, and he tries to determine how compatible this requirement is with the equally persistent demand for highly centralized control.

The theme is an old one in Soviet studies, and it is scarcely surprising that Katz does more to confirm previous insights (particularly Alec Nove's) than to present new ones. In the process, he provides an up-to-date analysis of the fundamental economic policy debates since World War II (prefaced by a brief but helpful review of earlier Stalinist discussions). As a concise guide to the milestones in the evolution of Soviet economic policy, the book is marred only by the publisher's omission of an index. In contrast to some gingerly treatments of Soviet debates, Katz does not hesitate to interpret materials with the benefit of hindsight and new revelations, nor does he shrink from summary judgments when the evidence is clear (Khrushchev's *sovnarkhoz* experiment is emphatically labeled an "administrative monstrosity" from an economic viewpoint).

Katz is willing to venture to some extent into an assessment of individual leaders' views on basic economic issues during the Khrushchev period. He identifies M. S. Suslov, for example, as an exponent of the view that the party apparatus should "leave the daily tasks of the economy to the professionals" (p. 119). In the course of economic reforms since Khrushchev (to which half of Katz' book is devoted), signs of fundamental divergences on economic policies have persisted, but there has been less evidence to pinpoint where individual leaders have stood. In this situation, Katz has opted for an approach that emphasizes positions over personalities. In particular, he concentrates on a close analysis of the arguments aired in Soviet eco-

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nomic debate and their implications for his basic thesis of the dichotomy of "rational *vs.* totalitarian" tendencies. He strives for an indisputable identification of positions. For example, he finds that "mathematical economists" were early advocates of rational planning. On the other hand, he identifies as "conservative" those (whether writers, economists, or officials) who opposed a broad resort to market principles. Similarly, Katz considers an excessive concern for centralization at the expense of economic rationalization to be "bureaucratic." By identifying positions, rather than trying to find who held them or why, Katz has deliberately set limits on his analysis.

WERNER HAHN takes up where Katz cautiously stops. In his longer work, Hahn devotes almost three times as much space to the 1960's as does Katz. Hahn needs this space, for he has attempted nothing less than "to identify individual leaders' positions on issues through careful study and comparison of their statements through the years, to identify the role of these leaders and their viewpoints in disputes and decisions, and to compare personnel shifts and career patterns with policy changes and political disputes" (p. xii). In other words, where Katz provides a close analysis of evolving economic doctrine, Hahn presents a rather elaborate exercise in Kremlinology.

There is no doubt that identification of the positions of specific leaders is a significant aspect of Soviet studies, utilizing an array of special methods basically grouped under scrutiny of esoteric language and investigation of career associations. This kind of analysis was begun decades ago in a journalistic, often polemical vein by the great émigré critics of Stalin. During the Khrushchev era, Kremlinological methods were refined and logically expounded by systematic students like Robert Conquest and Myron Rush. These writers (and others who, like myself, occasionally dabbled in the art) possessed the enormous advantage that successive overt leadership struggles, with their accompanying revelations, provided much evidence to test Kremlinological hypotheses. Post-Khrushchev analysts usually lack this advantage; only "occasionally," as Katz remarks (p. 187), "will the curtain part to document real conflict within the government." On the other hand, contemporary Kremlinologists can rely on some time-tested rules of the game—*e.g.*, consistency in associations can generally be counted upon since it is clearly dangerous for Soviet officials to switch allegiance, especially during the course of power struggles. The unsolved question is whether, in a period of oligarchical solidarity and lowered penalties for defeat, the old rules continue to hold.

In one specific respect, Hahn's analysis provides some vindication for the Kremlinological approach: he is explicit in identifying G.I. Voronov as the persistent loser in controversies over agricultural policy and P. Ye. Shelest as a sometime opponent of ascendant policies. Within months after publication of Hahn's book, these men became the first two post-Khrushchev Politburo members to be ousted. But Hahn's double-winning ticket in the Kremlin prediction sweepstakes is largely devalued by his analytical approach, which is confined to intensive examination of a single policy issue. The whole truth of Shelest's ouster is unknown, but all available evidence indicates that his major sin was laxity on the nationality question rather than deviation on agricultural policy. In general, agricultural policy is only one of a series of major issues, including—in addition to the nationality question (which the reviewer would put at the top of the list, together with the connected problem of

Reviewers in This Issue

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG—Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin (Madison); author of *Ideology, Politics and Government in the Soviet Union: An Introduction*, 1967.

WAYNE S. SMITH—US Foreign Service Officer and Ph.D. candidate at George Washington University (Washington, DC); contributor of articles on Soviet Latin American policies to *Orbis* and other journals.

HAROLD J. NOAH—Professor of Economics and Education at Teachers' College, Columbia University; author of *Financing Soviet Schools*, 1966, and co-author of *Toward a Science of Comparative Education*, 1969.

JEFFREY W. HAHN—Assistant Professor of Political Science at Villanova University (Villanova, Pa.); contributor of articles to *Youth and Society* and other journals.

VICTOR C. FALKENHEIM—Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto (Canada); contributor of articles to *Asian Survey* and to Robert A. Scalapino, Ed., *Elites in the People's Republic of China*, 1972.

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satellite relations)—general foreign policy, defense policy, industrial development, and ideological control. All are interrelated, and no Politburo member can afford to neglect any of them. Consequently, his alignments will be heavily influenced by his perception of the effect that policy formation in any one of these areas will have upon his own specialized interests. Men farther down the bureaucratic ladder may not be able to analyze the effect of the whole range of policy disputes in this way; but *insofar as they do constitute stable personal followings,* they become entangled in the whole complex of issues. Even Katz' careful treatment of the well-documented dispute over the priority of consumer goods in 1954 suffers from failure to relate Soviet developments to Imre Nagy's "new course" in Hungary.

Hahn would certainly not deny this complexity. In fact, in the latter chapters of his work, he comes close to analyzing the broad range of issues dividing the post-Khrushchev leadership, especially in the economic field. At other points, though, his emphasis on agricultural policy is simplistic at best. For example, his treatment of Khrushchev's ouster at the November 1964 plenum could lead the less knowledgeable reader to believe that Khrushchev's apparent "opportunity to strike at his foes in agriculture" was lost because of his unpopular policies in this field. No one will question the importance of the "virgin lands" failures or of the opposition within party circles to the setting up of party committees for agriculture as contributing causes to the plenum's rejection of Khrushchev. But few dispute that the matter was vastly more complex, involving (as Katz' remarks on Suslov's position suggest) doubts about the industrial-control element of party bifurcation, repeated rebuffs in foreign policy, and concern over Khrushchev's endorsement of the anti-Stalin campaign. Except by fits and starts, Hahn cannot give adequate attention to the complexity of policy interactions, if only because explicating Kremlinological arguments requires so much space.

THERE ARE SEVERAL ways for an author who wants to pursue Kremlinology in depth to avoid this dilemma. One is to limit his analysis to a very brief chronological period in which a wide range of problems can be treated feasibly. A second solution is to accept authoritative general explanations propounded by other Kremlinologists, using his own specific policy analysis as a test of their general hypotheses for the period. A third way—notably repugnant to Kremlinologists—is division of labor in team studies.

There is a fourth way, but it represents a partial renunciation of the Kremlinological approach. One can discuss the positions of top leaders (generally Politburo members) whose broad involvement and frequent public pronouncements make it feasible to trace their positions in detail. But is it really feasible to extend this analysis, as Hahn attempts, to identification of personal followings on a single issue? When (as in the case of Zhores Medvedev's revelations on the Lysenko affair) special bodies of information are available, the author's exploration of lower levels of policy alignments is convincing. At other points, it seems to the reviewer, it would be preferable to move closer to Katz' approach—*i.e.,* to identify *policy positions* rather than personal adherence to them.

Increasingly abundant biographical data does make one additional level of analysis feasible, however. Instead of trying to identify individual positions far down the bureaucratic hierarchy, one might more prudently deal with statistical clusters of career patterns correlated to subsequent policy positions. Some of the most exciting analyses by younger scholars employ just this type of approach. Their emerging conclusions appear to suggest that the personal-alignment hypothesis is tenable only to a very limited extent. Doubtless this new wave of quantitative study can profit from Hahn's painstaking assemblage of Kremlinological data—if not always from his conclusions.

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Moscow's Latin Beat

By Wayne S. Smith

K.S. TARASOV: *SShA i Latinskaia Amerika* (The USA and Latin America). Moscow, Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1972.
B.I. GVOZDAREV, Ed.: *Neokolonializm SShA v Latinskoi Amerike* (Neocolonialism of the USA in Latin America). Publication of the Latin American Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences. Moscow, Izdatelstvo Nauka, 1970.
A.I. SIZONENKO: *Ocherki istorii Sovetsko-Latinoamerikanskikh otnoshenii* (An Outline of the History of Soviet-Latin American Relations). Publication of the Latin American Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences. Moscow, Izdatelstvo Nauka, 1971.

BEFORE 1960, few Soviet scholars directed their attention to Latin America. The number of books on the area published in the Soviet Union was unimpressive and consisted mostly of drab, uninformed tracts based on such one-sided sources as newspapers of Latin American Communist parties and passages from documents of the Soviet Communist Party. In 1962, however, an institute for the study of Latin America was founded in Moscow, and since that time the number of Soviet Latin Americanists and the volume of their work have increased dramatically.

In the final analysis, the impulse behind this upsurge can be reduced to one word: Cuba. Not that Soviet scholars have been interested so much in Cuba for its own merits; on the contrary, as Leon Gouré pointed out in a book review in the November-December 1972 issue of this magazine, surprisingly few works have been published in the USSR on Cuba itself. Rather, as numerous Soviet authors have insisted since 1960, the triumph of Castro's Revolution and Cuba's subsequent association with the Soviet Union have had the broader effect of undermining the "theory of geographic determinism," *i.e.*, the view that the proximity of Latin America to the United States effectively precluded the emergence there of a whole range of economic, social and political developments—domestic and international—deemed desirable by Moscow.[1]

Soviet writings have usually spoken of the dispelling of this theory as the result of a change in the perceptions of Latin Americans, of their growing awareness that even on the Yankee doorstep it is not impossible to throw off the "yoke of imperialism." In fact, however, the realization that geographic determinism is not an iron-clad law of history probably had a more profound impact on Soviet observers than on Latin Americans—and no less so on scholars than on political leaders of the USSR. They suddenly perceived that Latin America was no longer to be viewed as the remote and impenetrable US backyard, that it was an area in which there might be increasing economic and political opportunities for the Soviet Union, and in which, therefore, Soviet academicians might profitably interest themselves.[2] As a result, the past decade has seen not only an increase in the number of Soviet works on Latin America but also a discernible improvement in their quality. Increasingly, they have drawn not only upon Communist sources but also upon the research and writings of Western scholars—especially those in the US. This has tended to mute the characteristic one-dimensional approach of earlier treatises and to introduce an element of balance

[1] Indeed, two of the books herein reviewed, the Tarasov and Gvozdarev works, emphasize the role of the Cuban Revolution in this respect.

[2] It hardly need be pointed out that, for converse reasons, the Cuban Revolution had much the same effect in the United States. It brought home to American statesmen and scholars that Latin America could not be safely ignored. It was an area we understood all too little and to which we had devoted insufficient resources and attention. The Alliance for Progress was one result. Funds for new centers of Latin American studies and grants for individual research projects were another.

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into accounts of individual developments or events—even if the ultimate outcome is still deemed by the authors to be determined by the dialectical forces of history.

The books examined here are indicative, to a greater or lesser degree, of this increase in the scholarly objectivity of Soviet studies on Latin America. The Tarasov and Gvozdarev works both draw heavily on the works of North American specialists in the field. Tarasov, for example, cites Lisa North's study of *Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile and Peru,* the Seymour M. Lipset and Aldo Solari volume, *Elites in Latin America,* and the latest writings of Arthur Whitaker, Edwin Lieuwen, Robert Burr, Norman Bailey, and David Burks, to name but a few. The writers in the Gvozdarev volume also draw upon most of these as well as upon the works of other well-known North American specialists on Latin America, *e.g.,* Lincoln Gordon, Theodore Draper, Charles Anderson, Ernst Halperin, Ronald Schneider, and Karl Schmitt. Because of its subject matter—*i.e.,* Soviet relations with Latin America—the Sizonenko work relies more heavily on Soviet and Latin American Communist sources, although it, too, cites numerous independent Latin American newspapers in addition to those associated with the local Communist parties.

The Tarasov and Gvozdarev volumes are also indicative of the growing interest among Soviet scholars in the study of the policies and activities of the United States in Latin America, just as there is a growing reciprocal interest among US scholars in Soviet policies and activities in the region.[3] This development is not surprising and, in fact, is part of a single causal nexus. As Soviet official interest in the area was stimulated by the perception of possible gains there at the expense of traditional US predominance, so North American interest was heightened by manifestations of the increased Soviet attention to Latin America. It was to be expected, then, that specialists on each side would begin to address themselves more seriously to the study of the position of the other side and of their own posture in relation to that of the other, as well as to closer examination of the Latin American area itself.

AS STUDIES of US policy and actions in Latin America, the Tarasov and Gvozdarev books usefully complement one another, the first concentrating on US military policy in the region, the second on the Alliance for Progress and the associated "new look" in US policy.

Tarasov contends that "among the varied forms of US imperialist aggrandizement in Latin America, military policy occupies first place" (p. 328). That policy, he continues, has itself been modified and reshaped over the years, particularly in response to the changing demands and conditions of modern warfare, in which the exposure of virtually every spot on the globe to the threat of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles has rendered the terms "front" and "rear" obsolete. Hence, he suggests, the role of Latin America in the eyes of US strategists has changed from that of a "secure rear" to one of a "strategic reserve" or "inner front"—the latter having reference to the primary mission Tarasov believes the Pentagon to have assigned to Latin American armed forces, *i.e.,* that of guaranteeing stability and crushing partisan movements.

Traditional military concepts and definitions have indeed been revised radically over the past decade or more, and Tarasov is by no means the first to point out that, inexorably, Latin America's place in any strategic equation has also changed. Tarasov's interpretation of the direction, or nature, of the transformation, however, is puzzling indeed. Logically, the very conditions to which he alludes —that is, the global range of nuclear weapons—should render Latin America less rather than more significant strategically. Yet, Tarasov apparently assumes that a "strategic reserve" is a greater asset than a "secure rear," and he goes on to claim that one new US objective designed to meet the needs of the changed strategic situation is the establishment of military bases in Latin America, many of them to be used as missile launching sites. He even asserts that in 1957 the US acquired rights to construct a nuclear missile base in the Tierra del Fuego region of Argentina.

Tarasov apparently sees no inconsistency between this assertion and the changed strategic realities he emphasizes. However, a military policy emphasizing the acquisition of new bases would seem to belong more to the world of Alfred Thayer Mahan than to our own world of hardened silos and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's). One wonders why Tarasov thinks that the US would want missile bases in Latin America at all, inasmuch as

[3] Three books reviewed in the May-June 1971 issue of *Problems of Communism* are illustrative of the latter trend: J. Gregory Oswald and Anthony J. Strover, *The Soviet Union and Latin America;* Stephen Clissold, *Soviet Relations With Latin America;* and Robert G. Carlton, *Soviet Image of Contemporary Latin America.*

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launching pads there would be generally farther away from any likely targets than those in the United States itself would be. His suggestion of US interest in establishing missile launching sites in Tierra del Fuego is simply comical. What might be the target of such sites—the South Pole, the empty Pacific Ocean?

Perhaps more to the point, Tarasov interprets all US policies and programs in Latin America, including military policy, as designed to keep the region in the capitalist sphere and to strengthen US positions, and he sees indications that the US is beginning to fail in this objective. He claims in particular that military elements in Latin America are now seeking to break away from the grip of the Pentagon, and he cites the military rebellion of 1970 in Trinidad, the Dominican revolt of 1965, and recent developments among ruling military circles in Bolivia and Peru as evidence of such a trend.

But while he points to manifestations of growing nationalism in Latin American military establishments and other evidences of increasing estrangement from the United States, Tarasov is less certain when it comes to predicting where all this is likely to lead in terms of internal politics. He rejects the attempts of bourgeois reformers—*e.g.*, the Christian Democrats in Chile and the Peronists in Argentina—to devise a viable Latin American alternative to communism as a substitute for traditional forms of capitalism, but his evidence for arguing that Latin American nationalism is not leading in precisely that direction—*i.e.*, toward development of political models *sui generis* to the region or to individual countries in the region—is conspicuously thin. Apart from the obvious case of Cuba, he sees hope that the Peruvian revolution may eventually move in the right direction (*i.e.*, toward communism), although he admits that it still remains in the "bourgeois-democratic" stage. He grounds his optimism on speeches by leaders of the Peruvian Communist Party praising the anti-imperialist struggle of the present regime and on the observation of a visiting Soviet scholar that "the government of Velasco . . . is struggling to find its path to independent non-capitalist development" (pp. 168-69). Even this last statement, however, seems to suggest the development of a "third" model rather than eventual adoption of the Communist one.

TARASOV's uncertainty reflects the fact that the whole question of where Latin America stands and in what direction it is moving in its sociopolitical development is a difficult one for Soviet ideologists to handle. The Latin American countries simply do not fit the "third world" stereotype. Their independence is no recent occurrence as it is in the case of many of the countries of Asia and Africa; nor is the advent of industrialization and an entrepreneur class a very new development there. Where then does Latin America stand? Is it comprised of semi-feudal societies which might hopefully bypass capitalism on the way to socialism? Or is it an area of capitalist states in which the local Communist parties should be urging socialist revolution? Soviet ideologists have generally attempted to resolve the problem by arguing that Latin American states are a mixture of feudal and capitalist elements, and that the latter are not yet sufficiently dominant to make a direct transition to socialism ideologically feasible. For example, Viktor Volsky asserted in *Pravda* (Moscow) of June 27, 1970:

Socioeconomic backwardness in these countries, plus the domination by latifundism and the presence of strong precapitalist relations in the countryside, oppression by foreign monopolies—all this testifies to the fact that the road to socialism on the continent lies basically through a people's democratic revolution.

The approach of the Tarasov and Gvozdarev volumes to this question seems to differ somewhat from the customary Soviet formulation. The contributors to the latter, for example, complain that American ideologists tend to view Latin America's ills as the results of its feudal vestiges, and, then, to prove that this is not the case, they emphasize the extent of the area's capitalist development. This permits them to argue that most of the region's problems are produced, not by feudal vestiges, but by the internal contradictions of capitalism. Well and good. But if that is the case—*i.e.*, if the capitalist component is so clearly the dominant one in the Latin American edifice—what becomes of the other Soviet argument that direct transition to socialism would be historically premature in Latin America? One cannot, after all, have it both ways.

Leaving that question aside, one must note that the Gvozdarev study presents an interesting and at times surprisingly balanced view of the changing forms and methods of US policy in Latin America. It traces the revolution of US policy from the era of President Theodore Roosevelt's "big stick" to the Alliance for Progress,

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but the main focus is on the development of the Alliance in the early 1960's. The "new look" which came to characterize American policy at that time was, the authors correctly contend, the collective creation of a number of architects, many of them from academic circles. Lincoln Gordon, Arthur Whitaker, Robert Alexander, and a number of others are discussed in this role. The general thesis that these men sought to impress on US policy, it is explained, was that peaceful social revolution had to take place in Latin America if a more violent form of revolution was to be avoided. Vested interests would have to give up some of their riches and privileges or risk losing them all. The contributors to the Gvozdarev volume contend that this "evolution or chaos" theory[4] was basically anti-Communist in its inspiration—*i.e.*, that it was designed to forestall Communist-oriented revolution. Although most Americans would argue that the Alliance for Progress was primarily based on liberal-democratic motives, few would deny that it had something of an anti-Communist underpinning. This was not altogether surprising in the period just preceding and immediately following the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.

AS NOTED earlier, Sizonenko's broad survey of Soviet-Latin American relations from 1924 to 1970 is a somewhat different type of study, and one which is less indicative of the positive currents in Soviet scholarship on Latin America. The volume unfortunately adds very little to Viktor Volsky's earlier book on essentially the same subject.[5] Sizonenko avoids discussing Soviet-Cuban relations on the flimsy ground that it has been treated fully by others. He also does not delve deeply into recent Soviet-Chilean or Soviet-Peruvian relations.

In fact, the Sizonenko volume is little more than a chronicle of events and developments in state-to-state relations between the USSR and Latin American nations. If a trade agreement was signed in a given year, the author reports the fact; if a Soviet soccer team toured the area under government sponsorship, this is noted. Sizonenko chooses 1924 as the beginning of his coverage because it was the year in which formal diplomatic relations were established with Mexico, the Soviet Union's first official link with a Latin American state. He ignores earlier contacts between the Soviet and Mexican Communist Parties, the role of the Comintern in interparty affairs (including the visit of Comintern agent Mikhail Borodin to Mexico in 1919). Such an approach obviously presents an emasculated canvas of the early period of Soviet-Latin American relations.

Such an incomplete view of events can, of course, prove quite convenient. Sizonenko, for example, would have one believe that Soviet-Mexican relations developed quite normally from 1924 to 1929, and that it was only the US campaign of vilification of the USSR and pressure on Mexico by "US and British imperialism" which led to the souring of this budding relationship and the decision of the Mexican government to rupture relations with the USSR in January 1930. Even on the surface, this is an untenable thesis. The Mexican government was no less nationalistically inclined in 1929 than in 1924 and hence was no more likely to succumb to US pressure to sever relations than it had been to earlier pressures not to establish those relations. General Plutarco Elias Calles [who dominated Mexican politics from 1924-34, first as President and then as the "man behind the throne"] was not reluctant to stand up to the United States, as he demonstrated on a number of occasions. Had he believed that maintenance of relations with the Soviet Union was still in Mexico's interests, it is unlikely that the break would have been ordered, whatever the external pressures.

Why, then, did the rupture of Soviet-Mexican relations occur? One need look no further than the Sixth Comintern meeting in 1928 to find the answer. Prior to that meeting, the Comintern line had been one of working through popular fronts and cooperation with "progressive" bourgeois governments. So long as it followed that line, the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) did not run afoul of the Mexican government. In 1928, however, the line shifted abruptly to one of open struggle against bourgeois governments. Dutifully, the PCM went on the offensive. In 1929 it called for open opposition to the government of Portes Gil, and Communist-led peasant leagues were ordered to launch an insurrection. The uprising was suppressed almost as soon as it began, but not before bringing the wrath of the government down on the PCM. It was also a key

[4] The Soviet author, in fact, borrowed the expression directly from the Praeger publication of that title by Karl M. Schmitt and David Burks.

[5] Viktor Volsky, Ed., *SSSR i Latinsaya Amerika, 1917-67* (The USSR and Latin America, 1917-67), Moscow, International Relations Publishing House, 1967.

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factor in the embitterment of relations between Mexico and Moscow.

All this—the shifting Comintern line and the PCM's opposition to the Mexican government—is omitted from Sizonenko's study; hence, he can simply maintain that official relations developed normally from 1924 and that there were no problems between the two governments that could have justified the 1930 break in relations. In so saying, Sizonenko is in good company. This was exactly the line taken by Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov in commenting on the rupture back in 1930, and it has not changed over the past 43 years. It is evident that the breezes of objectivity which have freshened Soviet scholarship on Latin America in recent years have yet to reach this dusty corner.

Communist Schooling

By Harold J. Noah

JOHN I. THOMAS: *Education for Communism: School and State in the People's Republic of Albania.* Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1969.
NIGEL GRANT: *Society, Schools and Progress in Eastern Europe.* Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1969.
WASYL SHIMONIAK: *Communist Education: Its History, Philosophy and Politics.* Chicago, Rand McNally, 1970.
SEYMOUR M. ROSEN: *Education and Modernization in the USSR.* Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1971.

THERE IS now a substantial collection of books published outside the Communist countries discussing the origins, nature, structure and purpose of education under communism. The four volumes presently under review are valuable additions to that bibliography.

John I. Thomas' study is the narrowest in focus, dealing with educational developments in tiny Albania, with a population of only 2.1 million in 1970. Relying heavily upon Albanian and Soviet sources, and for the most part eschewing value judgements, Thomas provides a detailed view of how the present Albanian system of education rose on the ruins of Italian, French, Greek, and Turkish imports. He describes the familiar pattern of educational deprivation that still existed in Albania before World War II—a condition that spurred the Communists' subsequent commitment to extending educational opportunities, especially among women. In the space of less than 30 years, Albania has come a long way educationally—from a country that had not a single institution of higher education in 1945 to one that is now beginning to provide educational facilities on a par with those of its Greek and Yugoslav neighbors. Thomas' book is invaluable for its detailed account of this process of development.

Like the other Eastern European countries, Albania reconstructed its educational system in imitation of Soviet models, with only minor adjustments to adapt them to local conditions. Indeed, the strength of the Soviet example in Eastern Europe is nowhere evidenced more clearly than in Albania, notwithstanding the 1961 split with the Soviet Union. The transfer of Albania's allegiance to the Chinese branch of communism apparently did not mean that the usefulness and durability of Soviet models were at an end, at least in education. Although Thomas mentions these events, his book leaves the reader with a definite sense of incompleteness on this score. After all, the really interesting thing about Albania's educational development is that while Albania shifted its political allegiance from Yugoslavia to the Soviet Union, and then from the Soviet Union to China, its adherence to Soviet-based forms of education has endured. Why? That question Thomas does not raise.

Part of the answer is that the Soviet model has, in fact, proven very useful for countries, like Albania, which are seeking to effect extremely rapid transformations of their backward, predominantly agricultural societies, marked by traces of feudalism, into modern, industrialized, and mass-participatory states. This implies that it was not just a matter of the Soviet Union imposing its example by sheer force of military might and

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political power, but that the countries of Eastern Europe derived genuine assistance from the Soviet framework and philosophy of education. Is there justification for this belief? The conclusion offered by Nigel Grant's book is "Probably yes"; the answer from Wasyl Shimoniak is a resounding "No!"

GRANT has written a shrewdly perceptive and on the whole sympathetic book about the countries of Eastern Europe, their turbulent history, their pre-Communist educational development, and the schooling patterns adopted under communism. While tracing the common pattern underlying the changes in education that have taken place in eight countries (Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania), he also takes pains to explain how and why local variations have occurred. Writing a multinational, comparative book of this kind is a difficult task, and Grant has succeeded admirably.

The countries of Eastern Europe are in an interesting "love-hate" relationship with the Soviet Union. There is little in their histories (except perhaps for Bulgaria) to make them natural disciples of the Soviet Union; yet their military, economic, and perhaps ideological need for the Soviet Union is so great that, notwithstanding conflicts of varying gravity that arose on occasion in East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the allegiance of the East European states to the Soviet bloc has not been seriously in doubt. Writing from the perspective of education, Grant is able to show that the Soviet model does have a genuine functional meaning for countries as diverse as East Germany and, say, Romania. Secularization of education; tying schools more closely to the requirements of planned economic development; widening educational opportunities, particularly for women, rural youth, and the poor; replacing a formal classics-oriented curriculum with one emphasizing mathematics and the natural sciences for all; and introducing strong elements of work-study and practical training into school programs—all these basic features of the Soviet educational model the Eastern European countries have found exceptionally useful to their own development.

WASYL SHIMONIAK addresses an even wider canvas than does Grant, extending the scope of his study to include China, Cuba, the Mongolian People's Republic, North Korea and North Vietnam, although half of his long book is devoted to the development of education in Russia and the Soviet Union. For Shimoniak, the key to what has been going on in the Communist polities lies in the growth and consolidation of personal power in the hands of small groups of men, with education, too, being utilized to serve this purpose. Marxist-Leninist philosophy and sloganizing are seen as verbal cloaks for a powerful drive, both inside and outside the Soviet Union, to extend the sway of the Russian people and their culture and to extirpate (using violence, where necessary) the influence of organized religions. While Shimoniak is prepared to concede that some benefits have flowed from the establishment of Communist forms of government in and around the Soviet Union (emancipation of women, elimination of illiteracy, improvement in the material conditions of life), his judgment is that the price paid has been altogether too high. He also concedes that the Communist rulers of these nations have spent generously on education, but he views their motives as suspect. They needed schools to build economic power as a basis for military might, to facilitate the ideological indoctrination of the masses, and to establish the supremacy of Russian (or Chinese) culture as the only true socialist culture—and all this primarily for the sake of consolidating their personal power. Shimoniak concludes:

In brief, the language of communism cannot be trusted. Russian and Chinese communism are not the types of communism that were dreamed of for many centuries. As seen in every country where the Communists came to power, the individual lost his freedom not to the state, but to a few dictators, who were power-hungry individuals. There can be no two political parties, there can be no more than one representative in an "election," and there cannot be division of power between God and the ruler.

At the same time the Communists realized that the only way to stay in power is to educate their own intelligentsia, their own leaders and their own children. For this reason, the number of schools has increased in every country they have occupied.

This interpretation of events and motivations takes the "devil-theory" of communism much too far. While self-serving political behavior, arbitrary rule, oppression of national groups, and the suppression of national and religious aspirations have certainly occurred under communism, they

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are unfortunately no monopoly of the Communist world. Moreover, the Communist system, especially in the fields of education and social services, does have its positive aspects from the standpoint of harnessing national energies for the tasks of modernization and economic development.

A DISTINGUISHING mark of Communist states is their commitment to reforming the ideals and philosophy of their citizens along so-called Marxist-Leninist lines. In this task, the schools, the higher educational institutions, and the youth movement are expected to play major roles. It is not surprising that this is so, for such institutions are ideally adapted to centralized, bureaucratic forms of control and to the inculcation of officially prescribed ideas and norms. Thus, education in the Soviet Union and other Communist states serves a much wider purpose than merely insuring the perpetuation in power of a small clique of rulers. It is intended to be the instrument for bringing into being a new type of citizen as the basis of a new social order. To see Communist education *only* in the light of the abuses of state power that have taken place, as Shimoniak tends to do, may lead us both to misunderstand the appeal of the Communist system and to underrate its potential for survival.

It is in this respect that Seymour Rosen's book needs to be read in conjunction with Shimoniak's. Though much of what Rosen has to say is not new, it is helpful to have collected in one place details on curriculum, enrollment, and educational structure updated to the end of the 1960's. Useful statistical tables on the economy and the educational system are given in an appendix. Moreover, the author is scrupulously accurate in his citations of sources and his transliterations (unfortunately something which cannot be said of Shimoniak), as well as in his facts. Like Grant, Rosen is clear about the distortions and defects of Communist socio-cultural policies, but by looking at Soviet educational programs in the context of Russia's 250-year-old drive toward modernization, he achieves an objective analysis that serves as a counterweight to Shimoniak's one-sided interpretation.

WILL mass education prove in time to be a Trojan horse in the Communist societies? That is to say, will not a highly educated population eventually become unwilling to tolerate the political and ideological authoritarianism that has characterized the Soviet and other Communist societies? This is perhaps one of the most important questions that confront analysts of the Communist system, but unfortunately it is one to which none of the authors whose works are reviewed here gives any attention.

The evidence to date is, of course, not encouraging. As in the Western countries, the elimination of illiteracy in the USSR did not automatically produce an independently thinking, politically sophisticated electorate. Rather, mass literacy was used to insure that the ideas of the dominant ideology received the widest publicity. Universal primary and near-universal secondary education under communism has proved to be a splendid instrument for the inculcation of an intensely narrow view of the world and the Soviet Union's place in it. Higher education has been developed in a framework of rigorous specialization and is designed not to open young minds but to train them to perform certain well-defined professional tasks. So far, it must be conceded, the Soviet state has been able to reap the economic benefits flowing from its educational system without paying any appreciable price in terms of the emergence of a more intellectually curious and ideologically obdurate citizenry.

What of the future? Here, I am inclined to be more sanguine. Soviet leaders might do well to remember Marx's insistence that the laws of motion of societies can be understood best in terms of men's relationship to the means of production. Everywhere, but especially in Communist states, the amount of public educational investment in the citizenry is becoming so vast that it begins to rival investment in conventional physical capital. Those who embody that educational investment cannot be treated simply as if they were inanimate tools. Indeed, they begin to assume many of the characteristics of an independent peasantry, seeking to exploit to the best advantage their individual holding of capital—in this case, education. If so, Communist states may eventually find that they have cast out their agricultural peasantry only to create a replacement class of independently thinking, small-scale "capitalists"—the educated professionals.

The path to relaxed controls over intellectual inquiry and freedom of expression will no doubt be long and beset by many twists and turns, but the emergence of a highly educated population seems likely to present a growing challenge to the continuation of authoritarianism in politics as well as in culture.

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Messages and Miscreants

By Jeffrey W. Hahn

GAYLE DURHAM HOLLANDER: *Soviet Political Indoctrination.* New York, Praeger, 1972.
WALTER D. CONNOR: *Deviance in Soviet Society.* New York, Columbia University Press, 1972.

THE STUDY of political socialization has evolved with the application of comparative systems analysis to the study of political phenomena. It is concerned with the problem of how, in different societies, values, attitudes, and beliefs about the political system are transferred to those living within that society. System stability, it is felt, varies with the degree of consensus that exists among members of the society with respect to these behavioral norms. In the case of the Soviet Union, there is an officially sponsored set of norms which are ideally to be embodied in the so-called "New Soviet Man." As a model of desired behavior, the "New Soviet Man" is a paragon of Communist virtues: hardworking, sober, conscious of his social responsibility, polite, politically literate, disciplined, patriotic, honest, modest, and, above all, devoted to the cause of communism (as defined by the CPSU).[1]

The two books under review both attest to the growing interest in the process of political socialization in the USSR, though they look at the process from differing perspectives. Professor Hollander's work describes the post-Stalin evolution of the media as the "main agency of adult political socialization in the USSR." Her book devotes one chapter to each of the major Soviet media—newspapers and periodicals; books; radio and television; and films—and a chapter to the agitation and propaganda apparatus (Agitprop). In each chapter dealing with the individual media, she first examines the quantitative growth and institutional structure of that particular medium and then reviews audience surveys measuring the impact of the medium on the audience. The latter analysis is particularly valuable since it utilizes much new work done by Soviet social scientists, and it is brought all together in a single chapter at the end of the book.

While Professor Hollander's book examines how the official message is transmitted and suggests some of the consequences of media development for political socialization, Professor Connor's work adduces evidence that the official message is not equally internalized by all Soviet citizens. Outside observers of the socialization process in the Soviet Union might find it tempting to overemphasize the seemingly greater capability of the Soviet leaders to manipulate social values and attitudes, and from this might draw erroneous conclusions about the relative effectiveness of Soviet socialization practices. In fact, to take such a view is to ignore important "discontinuities," or alternative sources of values, which exist within Soviet society. Such discontinuities may influence an individual to behave in a manner inconsistent with the officially sponsored norms, that is to say, in a manner termed "deviant" from the point of view of society. It is with the phenomenon of deviance in Soviet society, and with its sources, that the Connor volume is concerned.

PROFESSOR CONNOR examines three types of what he terms "apolitical" or nonideological deviance in the USSR: alcoholism (and drunkenness), juvenile delinquency, and crime. The book accords two chapters to each of these forms of deviance, first describing the manifestations and amplitude of each (using such statistics as are available), and

[1] The model is perhaps most clearly delineated in the "Moral Code of the Builder of Communism," set forth in the *1961 Party Program of the CPSU.* For text, see Jan F. Triska, Ed., *Soviet Communism: Programs and Rules,* San Francisco, Chandler Publishing Co., 1962, pp. 112-13.

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then examining Soviet explanations for the deviant behavior (Soviet criminological theory continues to be dominated by the social-determinist approach, attributing deviance to "bourgeois survivals," institutional malfunctioning in the family, etc.). The following chapters review Soviet responses to deviance through various forms of correction or prevention.

Notwithstanding its focus on "apolitical" forms of deviance as distinguished from "principled" or politically nonconforming behavior, Professor Connor's study does have definite relevance for students of Soviet political socialization. After all, the "New Soviet Man," whose development is the objective of the socialization process, is a behavioral model that embraces the individual's total social behavior, including his political behavior. Thus, the prevalence in the USSR of the "apolitical" forms of deviance discussed by Connor can be said to suggest, in some sense, a failure to instill the values of the "New Soviet Man" *in toto,* political as well as social.

But it is above all in his analysis of the causes of deviance that Professor Connor makes a significant contribution to the study of political socialization in the USSR. He argues forcefully that modernization itself may be an important source of deviant attitudes and behavior. In his own words (p. 261),

. . . the legacy of coercive modernization is a large element in contemporary Soviet life. If one examines the forms that crime, delinquency, and alcohol problems assume, one can see the legacy reflected there as well. It would be disingenuous to ignore the impact of low living standards, crowded housing, and the pressures of an urban environment on the drinking behavior of working-class males.

If the "legacy of coercive modernization" is at least partly responsible for such forms of deviance as alcoholism, crime, and delinquency, may it not also be a source of attitudes and behavior undesirable from the regime's social and political standpoint? For example, the presence of manufactured consumer goods priced well above the abilities of the average consumer is not likely to encourage a socialist attitude toward property. Nor is the fierce competition among secondary-level graduates for entrance into the technical-scientific training provided by the universities conducive to cooperative attitudes toward one's fellow students. Examples could be multiplied, but the point is that both attitudes are inconsistent with the officially desired set of norms associated with the "New Soviet Man," and both are partly a consequence of Soviet modernization. Connor's argument, which does not necessarily negate Soviet explanations about "bourgeois survivals," does suggest that Soviet-type "coercive modernization," especially with its resultant industrialization and urbanization, leads to forms of deviance. It is a useful insight.

ANOTHER THEME with important implications for the Soviet political socialization process receives expression in both books—that is, the existence of a "dissensus" between the views of the public on the one hand and the state on the other. In the case of the media—especially radio and television, the fastest growing forms of communication—Professor Hollander sees such a dissensus in the fact that while the ruling elite views the media primarily as a powerful tool for political indoctrination, the popular audience is more interested in being entertained or in receiving practical information. The latter desire not being satisfied, the Soviet citizen turns to alternative sources, such as foreign radio broadcasts, which have the attraction of providing more objective news reportage (Hollander, pp. 125, 194). The resultant socialization discontinuities can, however, be minimized through greater sophistication in media usage. The author notes that such a change is indeed taking place in the USSR, and she expresses the view that the Soviet media can increase their potential effectiveness as an instrument of socialization by giving the public what it wants in terms of attractive packaging and more entertainment. After all, "apolitical" entertainment can also carry a political message, as anyone who has watched spy thrillers, detective stories, historical dramas, and World War II movies on American television can attest.

Professor Hollander observes that Soviet efforts to indoctrinate via the media confront a new problem resulting from what she calls the "privatization" of media use. By that she means that the great quantitative growth of the Soviet media has made it easier for the Soviet television viewer or radio listener to "tune out" what he does not want (straight propaganda) and "tune in" what he does want (entertainment, human interest items, etc.). She suggests, however, that increased media sophistication may also provide an answer to this problem. As American advertisers have learned, it is

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not so much what you are selling as how you go about selling it.

The dissensus which Professor Connor sees between state and public with respect to deviance is not so easily resolved. He convincingly argues that public tolerance toward heavy drinking especially and, to a lesser extent, toward juvenile delinquency and nonviolent crime has frustrated efforts by the regime to eliminate these forms of deviant behavior, and that their persistence, as well as the persistence of tolerant popular attitudes regarding them after fifty years of concerted effort to replace such attitudes with new ones, raises serious questions about when, if ever, the "New Soviet Man" will emerge. Connor views this phenomenon as further emphasizing the need to examine socialization discontinuity in the context of modernization. Is deviant behavior in the USSR the result of bourgeois "survivals" and traditions as the regime maintains, or should one look rather to industrialization and urbanization for the causes of behavior at variance with the official value system? If the latter is true, as Professor Connor suggests, what other forms of deviance—such, for example, as the development of a "consumer mentality"—can be attributed to the impact of these fundamental social processes?

In any event, students of Soviet political socialization can surely profit from Connor's illuminating analysis of dissensus, for it has significant implications for political as well as nonpolitical forms of deviant behavior.

SOME FINAL remarks may be appropriate with regard to the source material used in the books under review. Outside students of Soviet behavior tend to be overly apologetic in reporting their findings, largely because of the fact that they are as yet unable to carry out cross-cultural survey research inside the USSR. Obviously, this constitutes a substantial limitation, but it is not as serious as many make it out to be.

For one thing, as both these books make amply clear, indigenous survey research is gradually coming of age in the Soviet Union itself—in quality as well as in quantity. There is good reason for this: pragmatism in decision-making and problem-solving requires it, and pragmatism rather than ideological rigidity seems to characterize the present Soviet leadership. Thus, an increasing volume of survey research and other kinds of data is now appearing in Soviet professional journals and books dealing with social problems that were previously discussed only in ideological platitudes. It should be noted in this connection that the Hollander and Connor studies contain interesting statistical data tending to show an association between socio-economic status and behavior and suggesting, among other things, that lower socio-economic status may correlate positively with both lower media consumption and deviant behavior. Although data of this sort still remain tantalizingly incomplete, the fact that such information is becoming increasingly available is encouraging. Professors Connor and Hollander are both to be commended for digging into this valuable material and incorporating it in their works. Their books help to bring the study of Soviet society more nearly within the framework of modern comparative systems analysis, a development which this reviewer welcomes.

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Urbanization in China

By Victor C. Falkenheim

JOHN W. LEWIS, Ed.: *The City in Communist China.* Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1971.

THE STUDY of the urbanization process in the Third World has been accompanied in recent years by considerable theoretical confusion. This confusion stems in part from the dissatisfaction of researchers with models of urbanization drawn from the experience of the West during the industrial revolution. While scholars agree that the Third World is experiencing urban growth at a pace that outstrips that of early Western urbanization, they are uncertain about the causes and consequences of that phenomenon and have been calling increasingly for empirical models of urban change specifically related to Third World settings.

One such study by T. C. McGee, appropriately subtitled *Explorations in Search of a Theory,*[1] questions the relevance of two conventional Western views of the city to an understanding of Southeast Asian Cities. Neither the view of the city as "catalyst" of socio-economic change nor the image of the city as a parasitic enclave, he holds, is helpful to students of urban change in the Third World; and while recognizing that urbanization outruns industrialization in those areas, he sees new revolutionary consequences flowing from that fact. McGee's views are supported by Joan M. Nelson's study of urban migration and political instability, which comes to similar conclusions.[2]

For any effort to study Third World urbanization, China offers a fruitful area for comparative research. McGee excludes China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Cuba from his focus on the ground that "their problems of development are being tackled in a different manner." [3] However, such a distinction hinges narrowly on differences in urbanization *policy* and does not lessen the desirability and value of including China in the comparative study of the *dynamics* of urbanization. In common with much of Asia, for example, the primary functions of the traditional Chinese city were administrative and political. Strong efforts were made by the Confucian state to contain trends toward urban commercialization and social diversification by restricting city growth and city autonomy. These policies led to what Etienne Balasz has described as a pattern of "arrested" urban development in which the cities of China never became "magnets" for the countryside or catalysts of social change.[4]

This pattern of urban development changed in part after the 1840's with the growth of modern industrial cities in the foreign treaty ports. These cities were relatively autonomous and did serve to generate some limited political diversification and commercial and industrial growth. But, as the centers of foreign influence as well as of bourgeois power and Kuomintang support (after 1927), the cities earned the mistrust of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders who came to power in 1949.

The primary concern of the CCP after 1949 was to establish control over the cities, and then to direct the subsequent process of urban development within the framework of clearly established political, economic, and strategic priorities. The first priority was to alter the skewed pattern of urban development inherited in 1949. In 1948, only 18 cities in China could be classed as industrial

[1] *The Urbanization Process in the Third World: Explorations in Search of a Theory,* London, G. Bell & Sons, Ltd., 1971.

[2] *Migrants, Urban Poverty and Instability in Developing Nations,* Cambridge, Mass., Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1969.

[3] McGee, *op. cit.,* p. 10.

[4] *Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy,* New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1964, p. 78.

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cities. Seventy percent of industrial capacity was to be found in the cities of six coastal provinces. For political and strategic reasons, it was decided to encourage the growth of medium-sized cities in the interior and set limits on the subsequent growth of coastal urban centers.[5]

While the Chinese have had considerable success in building medium-sized industrial cities, they have had more difficulty in limiting the growth of the larger cities. Urban growth has been difficult to contain, and the conspicuous growth of the large metropolitan centers has widened disparities rather than narrowed them. The annual industrial capacity of Shanghai is more than five times that of Tientsin, the next largest center, and six times larger than the third largest complex, Wuhan.[6] The dynamics of urban growth and the problems of hyperurbanization seem to defy simple solutions in China as elsewhere. Similarly, efforts at blending political control of the cities and participation by the urban masses have not been entirely successful. Franz Schurmann concluded a study of Chinese cities with the judgment that while the CCP had learned to govern the cities of China, it had yet to create "effective social institutions to resolve the dilemma of community."[7]

For the student of comparative urbanization, there are thus marked similarities between the Chinese experience and that of other developing countries, and these similarities could be usefully explored. That little effort has been made along these lines reflects one of the weaknesses of the area approach in research. As Jerry Hough has pointed out in a recent symposium on comparative urbanization, area scholars have often failed to frame their research in comparative terms and thus have not only neglected the theoretical importance of their own findings but impeded the "proper incorporation" of their detailed knowledge "into Western theory on the subject."[8]

THE VOLUME under review, which is edited by John W. Lewis and presents the research findings of a number of specialists working on urban China, illustrates the difficulties which impede such comparison. The volume contains 11 essays, including eight papers by participants in the St. Croix conference of December 1968 on "The City in China," plus three additional essays especially commissioned for the book. Four of the chapters deal with specific cities, including John Lewis' study of economic and political development in Tangshan, Lynn White's study of Shanghai during the Cultural Revolution, Christopher Howe's research on employment in Shanghai in the 1950's, and Victor Li's study of the public security system in a local county (Hui-yang) and county town (Hui-chou) in Kwangtung Province. Other chapters examine selected issues of urban policy at the national level and include Ezra Vogel's work on law and social control, Jerome Cohen's study of mediation practices, Phillip Emerson's study of manpower and education policies, and John Gardner's work on urban-rural disparities. Three chapters focus on selected urban groups: Janet Salaff's study of residential communities before and after the Cultural Revolution, Ying-mao Kau's work on urban cadres, and Paul Harper's discussion of the role of trade unions.

All these essays are uniformly of high quality and represent substantial contributions to our knowledge of political institutions and processes in China. As such they are to be recommended to specialists in Chinese affairs. They are, however, of less direct utility to the comparative urbanist. Several of the essays are concerned with issues that are national in scope and give only peripheral emphasis to the urban dimension. Others, though dealing with urban matters, aim primarily at detailed description of a particular institution or process without much attention to theoretical concerns.

The result is a certain lack of conceptual unity, but this is neither surprising nor to be excessively deplored. In the first place, the volume had its origins in a conference, and it is notoriously difficult—and probably undesirable—to force conference participants into a single mold. Lewis wryly describes one of the conference's achievements as "interdisciplinary" diversity. Similarly, the nature of the data makes a unified urban focus difficult. As all working researchers on China are aware, and as Lewis himself points out (pp. vi-vii), the data often blur the "distinctions between national and local, urban and rural, propaganda and reality, and policy and results."

DESPITE THIS diversity, the book holds together as a volume on the

[5] Yuan-li Wu, *The Spatial Economy of Communist China*, New York, Praeger, 1967, pp. 11-17.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 31, 56-57.

[7] *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, rev. ed., Berkeley, University of California Press, 1968, p. 403.

[8] "Soviet Urban Politics and Comparative Urban Theory," *Journal of Comparative Administration* (Beverly Hills, Calif.), November 1972, pp. 313-14.

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Chinese city for several reasons. First, Lewis' introduction is a *tour de force*, managing to link disparate research efforts in a provocative discussion of urban development and policies in China. The introduction was designed both to fill in some of the major research gaps and to offer a framework for analyzing urban development in China, and it is an important contribution in its own right. Second, Lewis' application of his own developmental perspective to the study of politics in Tangshan city in North China generates a highly interesting and suggestive set of findings which can be usefully explored by other scholars working on the Chinese city. His approach, which analyzes Tangshan politics in terms of the tensions between state-building and revolution and between economic modernization and political development, is highly fruitful. Third, although many of the contributing authors do not apply the same conceptual approach, their findings are consistent with it and permit us to elaborate further a picture of urban processes in China that bears a striking resemblance to city politics and society in other parts of the world.

One interesting set of findings deals with the role of the city in the broader political system. The Chinese city is not a "sovereign" level of politics, as White points out in his essay on Shanghai, but an intermediate level of politics neither totally administered from above nor fully autonomous. Further, the relationship between the city and its administrative setting appears to have changed over time. Lewis, for example, traces the growing autonomy of Tangshan city in the 1960's back to the growth of a more natural set of local relationships. In the 1950's, he argues, the city was independent of its own hinterland and hence dependent on the center. In the 1960's, a "tacit alliance" developed between the city and surrounding villages, and this fostered a more independent base of power for the urban leaders.

One consequence of the changing relationship between the cities and the central government has been to make it increasingly difficult for scholars to determine whether individual urban decisions reflect local, regional, or central priorities. In discussing the impact of local priorities on policy, most of the contributors couch their analysis in terms of conflicting group interests. Lewis, White, and Salaff refer explicitly to the problems of adjusting competing urban interests. White analyzes the dynamics of the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai in terms of the varying roles of workers, students, and several different groups of military personnel. The heart of the political process in Tangshan, Lewis argues, involved bargaining and coalition formation. The role of the central government and the party in this setting was to establish the rules of the game, and to act as arbiter. If we want to know "who governs" China's cities, in the view of some of the contributors, we might profitably turn to the example of Floyd Hunter's Atlanta.[9]

Most of the analysts have related the emergence of active urban groups, in part, to the impact of modernization and political development. As Harper shows, the educational programs mounted by the trade unions have generated tensions between upwardly mobile workers and older technicians. Similarly, the impact of political institutionalization has been to create bureaucratic interests with their own clientele and constituencies. Victor Li, for example, has documented the growing independence of the Hui-yang (county) public security institutions both from their local party superiors and from the next higher echelon of public security administrators.

DESPITE THE tensions brought into focus by these studies, Chinese urban leaders have on the whole been successful in managing the problems accompanying rapid urbanization. In part, the policies they have pursued may account for relative urban stability. Vigorous programs of resettlement in rural areas—in particular, the relocation of educated youth for whom urban employment opportunities are limited—have effectively siphoned off part of the natural increase in urban population. Local industries managed by neighborhood committees have given a sense of purpose to those not absorbed by modern industry. McGee, in discussing the absence of revolutionary change in Southeast Asian cities, lays emphasis on the existence of tertiary employment opportunities which give a sense of productive participation to excess urban workers. Christopher Howe's data on nonagricultural employment in Shanghai suggests that similar factors may be at work in China as well.

Not all the contributors to the Lewis volume are equally impressed by Peking's urban policies. Emerson argues that the problems of unemployed students resulted from a failure to match educational programs to available

[9] Hunter's classic work, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill, N.C., University of North Carolina Press, 1953), uses Atlanta as a case study of local power distribution.

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Notice of Errata

TO OUR READERS: A portion of the print run of the May-June 1973 issue contained two footnote errors of some consequence in a chart on page 21:

1. In footnote a, the second source should have been listed as *Hsing-huo Liao-yuan,* Peking, 1958 *et seq.*

2. In footnote b, the first reference should have been listed as *Chung-ying tsai-chang ta-k'uei hui-p'ien,* Peking, 1957.

employment opportunities. He finds the remedy, involving the indiscriminate sending of valuable manpower to agricultural jobs that underutilize their skills, equally unsatisfactory. Kao is similarly critical of the alternation between boom and retrenchment in cadre policy, viewing it as inimical to rational bureaucratic growth. Further, Salaff argues that local institutions have failed to integrate many marginal groups into the local communities. Whatever the success or shortcomings of Peking's urban policies, however, the Chinese are managing at least as well as, if not better than, their Asian neighbors in a sphere in which the West has scarcely distinguished itself either.

In view of the problematic relationship between urbanization and social change in general, the view, implicit in this volume, of the relationship between modernization and urban politics in China should be taken as tentative. It seems worth pointing out that the authors were writing during the period of the Cultural Revolution, a period when group politics seemed the dominant mode of political interaction. Latent interests were allowed, and even encouraged, to surface during this period. The conflict paradigm of city politics shared by many of the contributors, though perhaps valid for the late 1960's, may however no longer be fully valid in the decade of the 1970's.

John Lewis, in characterizing the differences between the Chinese cities in the 1950's and in the 1960's, wrote that they had advanced from the role of simple administrators of central policy to become bureaucracies with some autonomy of their own. He noted, however, that Tangshan's relative autonomy was a function of central permissiveness and that continued autonomy was dependent in the long run on central policy. It may be that the pattern of city leadership in the 1970's, both in relation to the center and to its own constituency, may more closely resemble that which obtained in the 1950's than that which emerged in the period of the Cultural Revolution.

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
Nationalist Revival
Gary K. Bertsch

Postwar Migrations
George W. Hoffman

The USSR and East Asia
Thomas W. Robinson

Venezuelan Marxism
Benedict Cross

Book Reviews
John Erickson
Holland Hunter
Philip E. Uren
A. M. Halpern
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Problems of Communism

6

NOV-DEC 1973 VOL. XXII

Problems of Communism is a bimonthly publication. Its purpose is to provide analyses and significant background information on various aspects of world communism today. Opinions expressed by contributors (as well as geographical boundaries and names used in articles and illustrations) do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government. Communications on all matters *except* subscriptions should be addressed to the Editors, *Problems of Communism*, US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20547.

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MANAGING EDITOR: Marie T. House
ASSOCIATE EDITORS: Clarke H. Kawakami, Wayne Hall, David E. Albright
DESIGNER: Joseph D. Hockersmith

Currents in Yugoslavia

1 The Revival of Nationalisms
by Gary K. Bertsch

16 Migration and Social Change
by George W. Hoffman

32 Soviet Policy in East Asia
by Thomas W. Robinson

51 Marxism in Venezuela
by Benedict Cross

BOOKS

71 Marshal Zhukov and the Meaning of Soviet Military Memoirs
by John Erickson

75 The Soviet Economic Dilemma
by Holland Hunter

77 Commerce and Conciliation
by Philip E. Uren

79 China's Cultural Revolution: Personalities and Motivations
by A.M. Halpern

82 Hungary on a Seesaw
by Andrew Gyorgy

NOTES & VIEWS

84 Correspondence
86 Index to Volume XXII

Cover: Left, a young woman of Dubrovnik; right, a Sarajevo shopkeeper; Photos by Catherine Ursillo for Photoreporters, Kosheleff for FPG.

NOTE: The Editors regretfully announce a new rise in the rates to be charged by the US Government Printing Office for *Problems of Communism*, effective January 1, 1974. See subscription information in the left-hand column.

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Currents in Yugoslavia

EDITORS' NOTE: A factor of major importance in the complex postwar transformation of Yugoslav society has been the Communist regime's vision of a modern, industrialized, urbanized community in which the nation's diverse peoples would live together in productive harmony. While this ambitious program has clearly wrought significant social and economic changes, reality still remains short of the expectations nurtured by it—with important consequences, as the two articles below demonstrate. In the first selection, Mr. Bertsch presents the hypothesis that recent national tensions in Yugoslavia were triggered by various national elites who became disillusioned by the discovery that their capabilities for achieving social and economic progress within the Yugoslav federation were insufficient to satisfy burgeoning aspirations. In turn, Mr. Hoffman's study of postwar population migrations reveals how the program of industrialization-*cum*-modernization unleashed a flood of ambitious rural migrants which even a rapidly urbanizing Yugoslavia proved unable to accommodate fully.

The Revival of Nationalisms

By Gary K. Bertsch

The question of nationality continues to pose a serious challenge to leaders of multinational states who hope to mold political community in settings of ethno-cultural diversity.[1] Recent events resulting from the multinational condition in Yugoslavia suggest that this socialist state possesses no special immunity from the larger, worldwide pattern. For although the development of a Yugoslav socialist community (*Jugoslovenska socijalisticka zajednica*) has been a foremost goal of the Titoist regime, the recurrence of national-based conflict indicates persisting difficulties in the achievement of this ideal.[2]

The task of community-building in a diverse mul-

Mr. Bertsch is Associate Professor and Undergraduate Director in the Department of Political Science at the University of Georgia (Athens). He has published articles on Yugoslav politics in Comparative Political Studies, Comparative Politics, East European Quarterly, *and other journals, and he is the author of two forthcoming books,* Comparative Communism: The Chinese, Soviet, and Yugoslav Models *and* Attitudes and Community-Building in Multi-National Yugoslavia.

[1] In the foreword to a special issue of the *Journal of International Affairs* on "Political Integration in Multinational States," the editor writes: "If anyone should doubt that political integration in multinational states is far from being a given attribute on the world stage today, he need only reflect on some of the events of recent years." *Journal of International Affairs* (New York), No. 1, 1973.

[2] Community may be defined as a grouping of people who have learned to communicate and cooperate with one another and to understand one another beyond the normal interchange of goods and services. See Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1966, p. 78. Community-building is used in this essay to refer to any developments conducive to such communication, cooperation, and understanding. For a similar conception, see Kenneth Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development*, Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1971, p. 74.

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tinational society is not an easy one, and to criticize the Titoist strategy or to underemphasize or disparage Yugoslavia's progress would be patently unfair. Indeed, one might reasonably argue that Yugoslav achievements have been remarkable—particularly in view of the historical difficulties of presocialist Yugoslavia. Few of the atrocities committed before or during World War II, for example, have been repeated in the Titoist state. Moreover, the ethnic, religious, and/or racial violence evidenced in a number of so-called developed countries (*e.g.*, Canada, Great Britain, and the United States) and certainly in such less-developed countries as Nigeria or Sudan has been far more serious than in multinational Yugoslavia. At the same time, the fact remains that manifestations of nationalism are still being expressed in Yugoslavia over a quarter of a century after the establishment of a Marxist system that so fervidly sought to resolve the historical animosities by replacing them with "brotherhood and unity." [3] While recognizing and acknowledging that forms of nationalism exist within the country, the Yugoslav government has hoped to eradicate their more undesirable features in the interests of societal integration. Under these circumstances, the important question is why such manifestations of nationalism continue to appear. This article will endeavor to explore that question.

Historical Developments

A consideration of post-World War II developments shows a definite sensitivity on the part of the Titoist government to the conflict between nationalism and the development of a Yugoslav socialist community. In order to deal with the multinational condition and all the attendant difficulties in the early years of development, the postwar Communist regime emulated the federal structure of the Soviet state. Under the federal system, each of the major Slavic groups (Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, and Macedonians) was granted a republic within which its language and culture would predominate. An additional republic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, was established for the diverse Serb, Croat, and Slavic Moslem (or Bosniak) inhabitants of this mountainous inland region. Finally, two autonomous provinces were created for the largest non-Slavic minorities, the Hungarians in Vojvodina and the Albanians in Kosovo.

This regional structure, representing the federal political formula of the new state, was set out in Article 1 of the original Constitution:

The Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal people's state, republican in form, a community of peoples equal in rights who, on the basis of the right of self-determination, including the right of separation, have expressed their will to live together in a federative state.

The phrase "a community of peoples" in this article pointed up the special problem confronting the new Yugoslav state—namely, how to build an integrated community from a mosaic of diverse and often conflicting peoples, all of whom possessed distinct cultural traditions and separate national identities. At the same time, the article expressed the hope and ideal of a brighter South Slavic future in envisioning a wider community of peoples based upon equal rights, including—at least theoretically—the ultimate right of separation.

The new regime's initial community-building strategy was founded upon the idea of "Yugoslavism," a concept which tended to promote a policy of political and economic centralization.[4] During this temporary stage, which Yugoslavs refer to as the "administrative phase" of development, manifestations of nationalism were by and large repressed in the quest for a unified society. Under the "Yugoslavism" approach, the party leadership envisioned the rapid development of a higher-order, South Slavic identity and a sense of "Yugoslav nationhood," along with the consolidation of the anti-fascist, socialist state. The rationale underlying this strategy was that a new, supranational identity would evolve along with the dissolution of more traditional (*i.e.*, national, religious, cultural) and anti-socialist sentiments.

Through the 1950's and early 1960's, the Yugoslav leaders attempted to strike a delicate balance between unity and diversity, or centralism and federalism. While working toward the ideal of unity, they were cautious not to exhibit undue disrespect

[3] Besides the slogan *"bratsvo jedinstvo"* (brotherhood and unity), there exists *"bratsvo i jednakost"* (brotherhood and equality). Among the advocates of greater republic autonomy, the *"jedinstvo"* slogan smacks of unitarism and centralism, while the latter stresses the national autonomy that goes with genuine federalism.

[4] For an excellent analysis of the nationalities policies of the Titoist regime, including the various changes over the years, see Paul Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1968.

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The Presidium of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia approved constitutional amendments spelling out expanded rights for Yugoslavia's constituent republics within the Federation at this March 1971 meeting. Pictured, from left, are Edvard Kardelj, head of the commission which drafted the amendments, President Tito, and Miko Tripalo, then leader of the Croatian League of Communists.

—Photo by Borba, as reproduced in Review (Belgrade), March 1971, p. 7.

for the national units of which the multinational state was comprised. But because of the necessities of postwar development and a variety of external events of major import (*e.g.*, the battle over control of Trieste, the Cominform expulsion), the Titoist building strategy was inclined to tend toward centralism, with the League of Communists firmly in command.

By the middle of the 1960's, however, the idea of "Yugoslavism" and the more centralistic policy it implied were almost entirely discredited. It became increasingly apparent to the leadership that the former attachments to national cultures, traditions, and interests were not to be easily dissolved into the more abstract notion of a higher-order, Yugoslav identity. To some national groups, the centralist policy smacked of assimilation and constituted an overt threat to their own identities and cultures. In addition, most of the non-Serb groups tended to associate the more centralistic strategy with the idea of a "Greater Serbia." Hence, the policy of "Yugoslavism" was perceived by most groups as a threat, and it therefore often seemed to intensify rather than to attenuate national differences.

During the 1946-65 period, then, a variety of forces were undermining the centralistic "Yugoslavism" strategy. Perhaps the most significant was the reform policy of political and economic decentralization that allocated increasing power to the republics and lower-level political units. As one might anticipate, the centralism emphasized under the older policy and the decentralization of the new reforms proved contradictory, and by the early 1960's the former policy and any mention of "Yugoslavism" began to fade. In contrast to the largely "centralist-assimilationist" approach of the earlier strategy, the guidelines of the new phase seemed to be the "four D's" of contemporary Yugoslav development: decentralization, deétatization, depoliticization, and democratization. The resultant policy placed greater importance on national (*i.e.*, regional) autonomy and the decentralization of decision-making power.

The reform movement picked up steam through the late 1960's and culminated in the far-reaching set of constitutional amendments approved by the Federal Assembly on June 30, 1971.[5] According to many observers, these constitutional changes would in effect make the republics the key units of government and thus bring the Yugoslav political system close to a confederation. Although subsequent developments have rendered both implementation and interpretation of the amendments somewhat difficult, their major purpose was to delimit further the functions and responsibilities of the central government, while simultaneously expanding those of the regional and local authorities. With the new constitutional changes, in short, the system seemed to be entering its third structural phase of development—*i.e.*, from unitary (1946-65) to federal (1966-71) to confederal (1972-?).

Under the amendments, the republics were to gain the power to control the central government through a variety of constitutional guarantees, including the right to make appointments to leading governmental bodies at the federation level; however, the degree of uncertainty and debate regarding the amendments was high, and it was further heightened by what Tito and the "hardliners" perceived in 1971 as "nationalist deviations" within certain sectors of the populace and, more significant, within high or-

[5] See discussions of the amendments in Paul Shoup, "The National Question in Yugoslavia," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1972, pp. 25-27; and R. V. Burks, *The National Problem and the Future of Yugoslavia*, Santa Monica, Calif., The Rand Corporation, October 1971, pp. 31-39.

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gans of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). Tito's response to the "national excesses" was to force the resignation and replacement of the highest-level Croatian leaders (among them Miko Tripalo, Secretary of the Croatian League of Communists, and Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, President of the Croatian Central Committee) in December 1971.

What was initially viewed in some quarters as an anti-Croat campaign soon developed into a broader shakeup of the republic-level party leaderships. During 1972, the LCY leadership structure throughout the country underwent a major reshuffling, marked by the forced resignations of such highly-placed leaders as Marko Nikezic and Latinka Perovic, President and Secretary of the Serbian Central Committee, respectively. For the first time since the war, party leaders (including Tito) began to speak of a "national crisis" threatening the unity of socialist Yugoslavia. The initial LCY response to the national situation blossomed into a wider political movement against the "enemies" of Yugoslav socialism—"étatistic bureaucratism, technocratism, nationalism, and all anti-self-managing and anti-socialist tendencies." [6] Its main feature was an assault by Tito and the "hardliners" (notably Stane Dolanc, Jure Bilic, and others) on what they considered to be the revival of nationalism in some sectors of the society, particularly among high-ranking LCY officials in some of the constituent republics.

The serious concern accorded the national situation was evident from the attention that the Yugoslav Party Presidium devoted to it in 1972. For example, at the 34th Session of the Presidium held July 11 and 12 on the island of Brioni, five members of the Presidium (Todo Kurtovic, Edvard Kardelj, Latinka Perovic, Milka Planinc, and Veljko Vlahavic) lashed out at nationalistic tendencies of two major kinds. Their identification of two types was noteworthy in that it involved condemnation of the notion of "unitarism" as well as the idea of "separatism." The former, which had always been associated primarily with the Serbs and the policy of "Yugoslavism," had not been subject to open attack in the past. Criticisms of nationalist "excesses" had previously been directed exclusively at the "separatist" variety, which had been most closely linked with Croatian nationalism and foresaw a brighter future for Croatia outside the Yugoslav federation. The lumping together of the two varieties was at least in part intended to counter feelings that the central party leadership was carrying on an anti-Croat campaign.

Overall, the party's strategy was to break the power of the strong regional party organizations in the interests of greater unity and (re)centralization within the LCY structure. In the view of the central leadership, the excesses of decentralization and the concomitant revival of nationalism required a reassertion of antinationalist and pro-Yugoslav forces. Such forces were to be found in the revitalized ranks of the LCY.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, it is not unfair to say that nationality continues to be a major and irritating political force in conflict with the government's hope for unity.[7] To the credit of the LCY leaders, it should be noted that they have acknowledged that nationalism exists and are frank enough not to characterize it as simply a residue of the capitalist system. The important question of concern to this analysis, however, is why such manifestations of nationalism still occur in a Marxist society which has worked so zealously for their demise. Do they occur because the populace has been unwilling or unable to bury the animosities and differences of the past? That is, did ethnocentric attitudes among the various nationalities lead to the revival of nationalism in the late 1960's? To shed some light on this issue, it is necessary to examine the outlook of the populace during the 1960's.

Popular Attitudes and Nationalism

Many studies of society and politics assume an important relationship between the attitudes of the populace and certain sociopolitical characteristics of the society. For example, in a study of political culture in five nations, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba posit a correlation between individual attitudes and the democratic capabilities of the state.[8] In the same fashion, most studies of nationalism assume a fundamental relationship between the atti-

[6] *Borba* (Belgrade), June 28, 1972.

[7] In an article on the nationalities question in the Yugoslav journal *Gledista*, the Yugoslav scholar and party ideologist Stipe Suvar writes in his opening sentence: "There is no doubt that in Yugoslavia in 1971, the main theme in political life is the nationalities question." See his "Marginal Notes on the Nationalities Question," *Gledista* (Belgrade), No. 5-6, 1971, p. 47. This and three other articles by Yugoslav scholars in the same issue of *Gledista* have been translated and are reprinted in a special issue of the *International Journal of Politics*. See "The Nationalities Question in Yugoslavia," *International Journal of Politics* (White Plains, N.Y.), Vol. II, Spring 1972.

[8] *The Civic Culture*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1963.

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Table 1: Interethnic Relations in Yugoslavia, 1964

(percentage of respondents believing relations good or satisfactory)

By Nationality	%	By Republic or Province	%
Magyars	93.2	Macedonia	88.8
Macedonians	88.6	Bosnia-Herzegovina	86.7
Moslems	86.7	Vojvodina	82.8
Albanians	80.5	Croatia	82.6
Croats	79.1	Montenegro	78.1
Montenegrins	78.9	Kosovo	78.0
Slovenes	78.9	Serbia (proper)	76.8
Serbs	77.7	Slovenia	75.3
Yugoslav Average	**81.0**	**Yugoslav Average**	**81.0**

SOURCES: Data compiled from Sergije Pegan, "Opinions on Relations Between Nations in Yugoslavia," in Firdus Dzinic, Ed., *Yugoslav Public Opinion Concerning Current Political and Social Questions*, Belgrade, Institute of Social Sciences, 1964, translated by Joint Publications Research Service (Washington, DC), 1970; table adapted from R.V. Burks, *The National Problem and the Future of Yugoslavia*, Santa Monica, Calif., The Rand Corporation, October 1971, p. 43.

tudes of the populace and the presence or absence of nationalism within the society. With this postulation in mind, let us see what Yugoslav attitude surveys tell us about national sentiments before the "revival of nationalism" in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Can we, for example, tie the reputed Croatian variant of "separatism" to ethnocentric attitudes among members of this particular national group? Similarly, do we find any hint of "unitarist" inclinations among certain sectors of the Serbian nation?

Attitude surveys begun in the early 1960's by the Center for Public Opinion Research (Centar za Istrazivanje Javnog Mnenja) in Belgrade permit us to view relevant attitudes prior to the resurgence of nationalism.[9] Since one would logically expect nationalistic or ethnocentric attitudes to precede the rise of a national movement, it should be instructive to find out whether or not the attitudes of the various national groups during the middle 1960's might have served as an omen of the escalation of national conflict to follow.

In 1964, the Center ran a survey asking respondents whether they thought relations among the nationalities were good, satisfactory, or bad, and 81 percent of the 2,700 individuals interviewed considered national relations to be "good" or "satisfactory" (see the Yugoslav average in Table 1). On the basis of this wide-sweeping overview of the Yugoslav populace, there would seem to have been little basis for predicting the subsequent national crisis.

When one proceeds to break down the sample by nationality and by republic or province (as in Table 1), the picture still seems to be the same. For example, the responses of the Serbs and Croats gave little hint of the impending "separatist" or "unitarist" movements. Among members of Croat nationality, 79.1 percent considered national relations to be either "good" or "satisfactory." With respect to those of Serbian nationality, 77.7 percent viewed national relations in the same favorable fashion. Even though the Serbs did not evaluate national relations as positively as some other groups (*e.g.*, the Magyars and Macedonians), their responses could in no way be regarded as grounds for pessimism about the future of national relations. Overall, then, few analysts would have forecast the impending revival of nationalism on the basis of this survey.

But perhaps these data were not really indicative of national feelings in the country. Perhaps it was easier and more expedient for an individual to say that relations were good while he in fact remained ethnocentric in outlook and behavior.

Data gathered during 1966 in another study of ethnic relations confronted the issue of national rela-

Table 2: Ethnic Distance in Yugoslavia, 1966

(percentage of respondents manifesting very slight or negligible ethnic distance•)

By Nationality	%	By Republic or Province	%
Magyars	95.0	Vojvodina	93.5
Albanians	94.6	Bosnia-Herzegovina	85.2
Moslems	89.4	Croatia	83.1
Croats	85.3	Macedonia	81.2
Serbs	81.7	Serbia (proper)	78.9
Montenegrins	78.6	Kosovo	77.0
Macedonians	78.3	Montenegro	75.4
Slovenes	55.2	Slovenia	55.6
Yugoslav Average	**80.4**	**Yugoslav Average**	**80.4**

• These two categories comprise all respondents who answered 34 of the total 42 questions (seven nationalities x six relationships) positively.

SOURCES: Data compiled from Dragomir Pantic, *Ethnic Distance In Yugoslavia*, Belgrade, Institute of Social Sciences, 1967, translated by Joint Publications Research Service, 1970, pp. 12, 15-16; table adapted from Burks, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

[9] The Center for Public Opinion Research of the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade is staffed by highly trained scholars well-versed in the latest methods and techniques of survey analysis. Over the 1960's and early 1970's, their surveys and reported research have been of a uniformly high quality.

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Two Yugoslav peasants, one a Serb and the other a Moslem, engaged in friendly conversation near the town of Mostar, in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

—Photo by H. W. Sylvester for Rapho Guillumette.

tions more directly.[10] This countrywide survey of 2,600 persons focused on the types of social relationship (*e.g.*, marriage, friendship, etc.) that the respondents would be willing to accept with members of other nationalities, as a measure of "ethnic distance."[11]

Of the overall Yugoslav sample, nearly 60 percent exhibited no ethnic distance whatsoever—in short, they were willing to accept members of all the other designated nationalities in each of the six specified relationships (*e.g.*, marriage, friendship, etc.). Furthermore, 80.4 percent of the total respondents indicated "very slight" or "negligible" ethnic distance (see Table 2). While the Slovenes stand out as the least tolerant of the eight specified groups, the Serbs and Croats evince neglible ethnic distance. The overall pattern indicates surprisingly high levels of ethnic tolerance among the various groups and, once again, carries little portent of the nationalist revival that was to ensue.

Generally speaking, then, the attitude surveys of the middle 1960's painted a picture that boded well for the future of nationality relations in Yugoslavia. The attitudinal preconditions for greater cooperation and understanding seemed to be established, and sufficient evidence existed to merit discussion of the evolution of a genuine community of Yugoslav peoples.

There seemed to be even greater reason for talking in optimistic terms in light of signs of an apparent disengagement from the more parochial and particularistic attachments of traditional Yugoslav life. It has been suggested by one eminent theorist of nationalism, Karl Deutsch, that the forces of contemporary socioeconomic and demographic change tend to diminish the importance of ethnicity and nationality in interpersonal and intergroup relations.[12] That is, there is reason to believe that the former attachments to region, dialect, customs, and so forth are likely to diminish in modernizing societies, as higher-order, more impersonal attachments develop simultaneously. Such a trend did appear to be occurring in Yugoslavia, according to research conducted by this author.[13]

Using countrywide survey data gathered from 1,186 individuals in 1967—again by the Center for Public Opinion Research in Belgrade [14]—the author investigated the major components of Deutsch's theory in order to determine the nature of individual

[10] For the full report of these data, see Dragomir Pantic, *Ethnic Distance in Yugoslavia*, Belgrade, Institute of Social Sciences, 1967, translated by the Joint Publications Research Service, 1970.

[11] The measurement of "ethnic distance" followed the approach of the American sociologist E. S. Bogardus, who developed the so-called "Bogardus scale of social distance" to explore ethnic and racial attitudes in America. In this case, the scale of ethnic distance was constructed from six questions asked of all respondents. These were: (1) Are you (*e.g.*, a Slovene respondent) in favor of his (*e.g.*, a Macedonian) permanent residence in your republic? (2) Are you in favor of his employment in the organization where you are employed? (3) Would you accept him as a friend? (4) Would you agree to marry him or her? (5) Would you accept him as your manager at the place where you work? (6) Would you be in favor of his holding a leading office in your republic? The six questions were posed in regard to the following eight groups (excluding the respondent's own group): Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Albanians, Hungarians, and Moslems.

[12] Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*. For an incisive critique of Deutsch's major contributions, see Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?," *World Politics* (Princeton, N.J.), April 1972, pp. 321-28.

[13] Gary K. Bertsch, "A Cross-National Analysis of the Community-Building Process in Yugoslavia," *Comparative Political Studies* (Beverly Hills, Calif.), Vol. 4, January 1972, pp. 438-59.

[14] The data were collected by the Center for Professor M. George Zaninovich, Department of Political Science, University of Oregon. They were used for his study of "Value Change in Yugoslav Society."

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change and, more generally, to shed some light on the community-building process. Three basic indices —social mobilization, modernism, and cultural universalism—were developed from the survey data.[15] These three indices were then assessed as a possible "causal chain." That is, an effort was made to determine to what extent the degree of social mobilization and modernism affected the attitudes related to cultural particularism. On the basis of existing theory and research, one would expect individuals with higher levels of social mobilization and more modern values to exhibit more universalistic values; hence, one might hypothesize that mobilization and modernization within the Yugoslav populace would engender a society less attached to the particularistic sentiments historically important within the Yugoslav setting.

When examining the relationships among the three attributes of the 1,186 Yugoslavs, one finds Deutsch's postulation to hold true (see Figure 1). Positive correlations among the three attributes are indeed observable for every national and ethnic group within the Yugoslav context. In other words, the higher the level of social mobilization, the higher the level of modernism; the higher the level of modernism, the greater the advance toward cultural universalism and away from cultural particularism; and the higher the level of social mobilization, the greater the advance toward cultural universalism and away from cultural particularism. However, if one looks at the relationships among the subsamples of the four largest nations in the country, one discovers interesting differences across the groups. While an attempt to explore the causes and consequences of such differences lies outside the bounds of this article, it should be noted that the rate and scope of attitudinal change do appear to vary considerably from nationality to nationality.[16]

This study appears to suggest that popular attitudes would have grown even less particularistic in the future and would therefore have tended to become increasingly conducive, over time, to the evolution of a Yugoslav community—that is, if uni-

[15] The first index was arrived at by constructing a breakdown of respondents in terms of the frequency of their exposure to communication stimuli. The second was established by setting up a Guttman scale based on the answers of respondents to questions designed to evaluate their possession of modern, as opposed to traditional, values. The third was created by constructing another Guttman scale, this one derived from answers to questions intended to reveal how much importance respondents attached to five possible kinds of particularistic identification within the Yugoslav context.

[16] For a consideration of the differences across the four nationalities, see Bertsch, *loc. cit.*, pp. 448-55.

Figure 1: Degrees of Correlation Beween Social Mobilization, Modernism, and Cultural Universalism in Yugoslavia, 1967

(in gamma coefficients[a])

	(A) Social Mobilization → (B) Modernism	(B) Modernism → (C) Cultural Universalism
All respondents	.40	.41
Slovene	.31	.20[b]
Croat	.50	.40
Serb	.30	.41
Macedonian	.51	.45

	(A) Social Mobilization → (C) Cultural Universalism
All respondents	.27
Slovene	.12[b]
Croat	.29
Serb	.25
Macedonian	.46

[a] A gamma coefficient describes the extent of correlation between two sets of data—in this case, any two of the three indices (*i.e.*, A-B, B-C, and A-C). If the two sets of data correlated perfectly, the gamma coefficient would be + or −1.00. All gamma coefficients reported here are positive and significant at the .05 "level of confidence" (*i.e.*, the coefficients shown could have occurred less than one time in twenty as the result of chance) unless otherwise noted.

[b] This gamma coefficient is not significant at the .05 "level of confidence."

SOURCE: For discussion of the derivation of the data in this figure, see the author's "A Cross-National Analysis of the Community-Building Process in Yugoslavia," *Comparative Political Studies* (Beverly Hills, Calif.), Vol. 4, January 1972, pp. 438-59.

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versalistic values are indeed prerequisites for the understanding and cooperation upon which political communities are founded. Moreover, it seems to indicate that the mobilization and modernism normally brought about by industrialization and socio-economic development would aid in the community-building process. All this presupposes, however, that societal values do make a difference—that they do affect patterns of conflict and cooperation within a multinational state.

In light of the contradiction that appeared to characterize the Yugoslav scene during the late 1960's—that is, less particularistic popular attitudes and growing national crisis—that assumption must be called into question. To put things another way, if the popular attitudes of the mid-1960's reflected a substantial degree of interethnic understanding and tolerance and if projections into the future suggested that even higher levels of tolerance (universalism) would develop in the years to come, how does one explain the revival of nationalism and the subsequent national crisis that reached the boiling point in 1971?

Problems, Fears, and Frustrations

In approaching this complex issue, it is necessary to consider whether the revival of nationalism and the resultant tensions among nationalities stemmed directly from the attitudes of the society at large. Specifically, were the Yugoslav groups unable to overcome their past differences and historical animosities, and did this fact, in and of itself, produce the tensions of 1971? This writer's analysis of the attitudinal data gathered during the 1960's and previously described convinces him that the resurgence of nationalism did not emanate from the Yugoslav populace in general. Popular attitudes at the outset of the nationalist revival were of neither the character nor the intensity to have generated the subsequent unrest. Rather, the escalation of nationalism seems to have been due primarily to an elitist movement. This movement was composed of segments of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the intelligentsia, though it derived its justification from, and later capitalized upon, deep-seated frustrations within the Yugoslav populace. Not surprisingly, therefore, the attitude surveys concerning national relations during the mid-1960's provided little warning of the events that were to come.

In the author's estimation, then, the rise in nationalist sentiments within the general populace in the late 1960's was more of a consequence than a cause. Specifically, the escalation appeared to result from the following set of circumstances: Because of unresolved economic, political, and cultural problems in Yugoslavia, there was fairly widespread frustration throughout the population. Although initially latent, this frustration was seized upon by a number of political and cultural leaders and defined in national terms. Soon, expressions of national sentiment dominated the republic-based media—in particular, the Serbian and Croatian media. After the elites opened this release-mechanism for the venting of individual and mass frustration, some sectors of the populace began to "rationalize" their frustrations in a similar manner.

To an increasing degree, nationalist symbols and sentiments became vehicles used by various leaders and intellectuals in some of the constituent republics to account for the difficulties incurred in the Yugoslav developmental process—and perhaps, at times, to rationalize their own shortcomings. In the case of Croatia, for example, highly-placed leaders such as Miko Tripalo and Savka Dabcevic-Kucar played upon the underlying fears and insecurities of the Croatian populace (sometimes inadvertently and at other times intentionally) by explaining Croatia's developmental problems in national terms. Even more significant, perhaps, were the overtly nationalist analyses and appeals of Croatian scholars like Sime Djodan and Marko Veselica. They accounted for Croatia's troubles by attributing them to the republic's allegedly unfavorable and exploited position in the Yugoslav federation. A segment of elites in other republics employed similar analyses and appeals. Such activity evoked particularist sentiments among the public and eventually produced the setting in which a crisis in national relations developed.

The ease with which popular frustrations were converted into nationalism, of course, forces one to take another and more critical look at the national attitudes of the mid-1960's. It would not seem unreasonable to argue that the increasingly less particularistic attitudes revealed by the surveys at that time were only verbal opinions—that underlying animosities had never completely broken down and dissolved. In other words, while popular attitudes seemed to be growing more and more favorable to the establishment of a true Yugoslav community, the basic value structures of the populace

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still contained a considerable degree of ethnocentrism. Then when certain elites began to play upon various national themes in what increasingly became a crisis-type situation, latent nationalist sentiments within the population again surfaced.

To understand this whole development, it is necessary to appreciate the nature of the basic problems confronting the Yugoslav federation. Indeed, these problems are subject to an interpretation that can be easily tied to the question of nationality. What were these problems, how might they lead to frustrations, and how might these frustrations be rationalized in national terms?

One major problem area confronting Yugoslavia involves the difficulties and shortcomings of the Yugoslav economic model. A republic-based economic system, with all the fears and insecurities attendant upon it, has been a source of frustration and conflict fundamentally linked to the national question. The key point of controversy concerns the relative contribution that each of the national republics and provinces should make to the overall development of the federation. As one might expect, the more developed northern republics (Croatia and Slovenia) feel that they are carrying more than their fair share of the burden in the federation's attempt to develop the more southern regions. Consequently, socioeconomic shortcomings in the more developed republics are often attributed to these republics' "exploited" position.[17] The overall problem, however, is a multifaceted one and includes such additional but related issues as foreign-currency exchange, credit policy, and investment.

A second problem area has to do with the amount of political power and influence that the national units ought to enjoy within the Yugoslav federation. The basic controversy is whether there should be a party monopoly with power concentrated in the federal center or, on the other hand, greater political decentralization within a genuine system of self-management. Thus far, Yugoslavia has found this question insoluble. While preaching decentralization and openly acknowledging the benefits and superiority of the dispersion of power within a self-management system, the party has been unwilling to relinquish ultimate authority and to allow the development of a true federation. What has resulted is a high level of uncertainties, fears, and frustrations regarding the distribution of power within the Yugoslav political system.

A myriad of other issues are tied to this general political problem. They include such sensitive matters as the location of the federal capital in Serbia and the overrepresentation of Serbians in the federal bureaucracy that that location engenders. Also involved is the question of the succession—specifically, how the Collective State Presidency will perform upon the passing of Tito.

These and other issues of a political sort have given rise to frustrations among both elites and masses. Even a cursory reading of the newspapers and journals from the republics and provinces during the late 1960's and early 1970's makes the fact abundantly clear.[18] In one way or another, every national group finds some "injustice" with which to be concerned. While the Croats dislike the capital's placement in Belgrade, the Serbs tire of constant complaining on the part of the Croats. Sooner or later, the perceptions of political "injustice" take on a nationalistic tone.

The final problem area concerns the cultural and social status of various groups and individuals. Although the Yugoslav government has attempted to guarantee the equality and rights of the various national and minority groups through practical institutionalization far exceeding that of most other multinational states, certain insecurities still persist. For instance, the less populous nationalities and ethnic groups fear the power capabilities of the larger. The larger, on the other hand, are uneasy about the ultimate effects of higher rates of population growth among the smaller. On a less generalized level, the Croats perceive the assimilatory potential of the Serbian language and culture and undertake measures to preserve their own distinctiveness;[19] the Albanians of Kosovo chafe at their

[17] Perhaps the most outspoken critic of the exploited position of the developed republics, in particular Croatia, was the now imprisoned Sime Djodan. For his analysis of the nature of the economic problem—including the position of Croatia—see "The Evolution of the Economic System of Yugoslavia and the Economic Position of Croatia," *Hrvatski knjizevni zbornik* (Zagreb), Fall 1971, translated and reprinted in *Journal of Croatian Studies* (New York), Vol. 13, 1972, pp. 3-102.

[18] For an incisive analysis of insecurities, frustrations, and resultant nationalism connected with such issues, see Branko Horvat, "Nationalism and Nationality," *Gledista*, No. 5-6, 1971, reprinted in the *International Journal of Politics*, Spring 1972, pp. 19-46.

[19] In March 1967, for example, the Croatian literary and cultural society Matica Hrvatska published a manifesto demanding a constitutional change to insure better protection for the literary languages of Yugoslavia—in particular, the Croatian language. Among other things, the manifesto requested that the practice of speaking of "Serbo-Croatian" be ended and that Serbian and Croatian be considered separate languages. For a discussion of the manifesto, see Fritz Hondius, *The Yugoslav Community of Nations*, The Hague, Mouton, 1968, pp. 326-29.

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provincial status, at the relative backwardness of their social conditions, and at the comparative weakness of their sense of cultural identity. One could go on citing such specific examples almost *ad infinitum.*

Relative Deprivation

During the initial years of postwar development, the ideological outlook of the new Marxist government created high expectations among both leaders and followers about the state's ability to deal with these three problem areas. Economic development and material abundance were to be accomplished both efficiently and rapidly. (The impressive gains that the country subsequently registered during the 1950's and 1960's raised expectations in this regard even higher.) Political relationships and former power inequalities were to be resolved through the self-management system and through regional decentralization. Finally, a community of peoples with equal rights and status was to be established. At least in terms of intentions, the new Communist government was strongly resolved to end the national and social injustices of old.

As a result of the successes of the revolutionary movement during its early years and of the legitimacy and popularity that the Titoist government acquired after its experimentation with decentralized socialism, the Yugoslav populace as a whole appeared to have internalized or "taken to heart" a good part of the official perspective. Through the early 1960's, national attachments were said—and seemed—to have softened in accordance with ideological prescriptions. However, when difficulties in the three problem areas continued to persist, frustrations resulted, and these tended to make the individual citizen susceptible to nationalist forces that impelled him back toward his more traditional and particularistic attachments—*i.e.,* his nation, his religion, and his cultural heritage. Stipe Suvar, a high-ranking member of the Croatian League of Communists, a sociology professor at Zagreb University, and an outspoken critic of nationalism, describes the situation in this fashion:

After having been drunk on ideology, which was destroying everything that was old and which promised the rapid creation of happiness on earth, [then] *after having become disappointed by the results of such a radical ideology, people have started sobering up and trying to return to the old, lost values: the religious and ethnic communities.*[20]

He goes on to argue that when individuals lose their perspective on progress and become frustrated by their social problems, they seek refuge in their ethnic group—a state of affairs marked by ethnocentrism and hatred directed toward other nationalities.

Why did such frustrations develop, and why did they have the effect of driving individuals back to their religious and ethnic communities? In the author's opinion, the basic factor leading to high levels of individual and mass frustration in Yugoslavia lay in the discrepancy between what Yugoslav individuals and groups thought they deserved and what they felt capable of attaining within the context of the Yugoslav federation. Put another way, frustration resulted from the discrepancy between, first, expectations related to key values and, secondly, capabilities for fulfilling these expectations.

While the ideological program of the Titoist government promised economic growth, political equilibrium, and cultural and social equality—and in so doing inevitably heightened the anticipations of the populace—persistent and recurrent problems on the economic scene, in the self-management system, and in the social and cultural realms underscored the gap between theory and reality. Therefore, the individual was increasingly inclined to view the values that he deemed important (*i.e.,* economic security, political power, and social justice) as largely unattainable. In short, while his expectations were high and generally rising because of the ideological pronouncements of the state, he perceived decreasing capabilities to realize such values as many problems lingered on and looked more and more as if they might prove insoluble. Had anticipations not mounted so high, the levels of societal discontent might never have escalated. As W. G. Runciman puts it, "if people have no reason to expect or hope for more than they can achieve, they will be less discontented with what they have, or even be grateful simply to be able to hold on to it." [21]

The general mood expressed in the Yugoslav media throughout 1970 and 1971 suggested that there were few who felt grateful. On the contrary,

[20] Suvar, *loc. cit.*, p. 58.

[21] *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1966, p. 9.

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
there were many who had been led to expect far more than they were realistically going to receive. Upon perceiving the discrepancy between what they expected and what they were likely to receive, they felt deprived. This feeling of relative deprivation [22] resulted in frustration and, in the words of Branko Horvat, nationalism became the rationalization of frustration.[23] At that point, the latent nationalist sentiments hidden beneath the seemingly less particularistic attitudes evinced in surveys during the mid-1960's came back into play. Once again, nationalism energed as a dominant theme in Yugoslav politics.

In order to explicate more fully the applicability of the concept of relative deprivation to the Yugoslav nationalities, it might be instructive to explore in some depth two of the variants of nationalism purported to exist in the Yugoslav context. The Croatian example can be treated as typical of the "separatist" variant, and the Serbian example, of the "unitarist" variant.

The Croatian Example

To many other national groups in Eastern Europe —and even some in Yugoslavia for that matter—the improvement in the Croats' situation during the post-World War II years would be not merely gratifying but above and beyond what might be deemed acceptable. However, to the average Croat, whose judgments were colored by the promises of certain leaders, by what he had seen abroad, and by his assessment of Croatia's inherent capabiilties, the improvement was quite meager and often unacceptable. This perception became a source of frustration and discontent. In other words, while he entertained high expectations about what Croats deserved, his evaluation of Croat capabilities *within the Yugoslav federation* was low. The inevitable consequence was the development of individual and group frustrations, frustrations which national leaders such as Tripalo and Dabcevic-Kucar reflected and which led to the crisis in national relations.

Figure 2: Relative Deprivation—Croats



The sociopsychological dynamics of the state of affairs in Croatia during the postwar era can usefully be depicted in diagram form. Figure 2 represents an attempt to do so.[24] In constructing the vertical axis, the author concentrated on those values most relevant to members of the Croat nationality and to the Yugoslav populace in general. These values fall into the three problem areas discussed above;[25] therefore, the "collective value position" abstracts those economic, political, and status conditions which both elites and masses within the broader society deem important and strive to realize.[26]

Similarly, the term "value expectations" refers to the level of the average economic, political, and status values to which Croats *believe they are*

[22] A great deal has been written about the concept of relative deprivation, although it has never been applied—at least to this writer's knowledge—to national relations in East Central Europe. For some basic sources, see Runciman, *op. cit.*; Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1970; and Hadley Cantril, *The Pattern of Human Concerns*, New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1965. Cantril's empirical study of aspirations and frustrations in 13 countries, including Yugoslavia, sets out a useful methodology for further studies using the relative-deprivation approach.

[23] One of Yugoslavia's foremost economists, Horvat has made this statement on a number of occasions. See, for example, "Nationalism and Nationality," *loc. cit.*, and his speech at the symposium on "Culture and the New Constitution," as published in *Knjizevne novine* (Belgrade), May 8, 1971.

[24] It should be emphasized that while this diagram is a graphical presentation designed for heuristic and explanatory purposes, the figure has empirical roots in the previously-cited research of the author and of Cantril on Yugoslav value systems. In other words, it is a simplified representation of the expectations of Croats, their perceptions of their capabilities for achieving their values, and how both have changed over time.

[25] What values are most relevant to humans has been a subject of considerable discussion. Although some classifications are more detailed than others, Runciman and Gurr identify three basic sets: economic, political and status-related. See Runciman, *op. cit.*, Chap. 3; Gurr, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-26. These value sets correspond to the three problem areas identified above, and they also conform to Cantril's empirical findings concerning the three most important aspirations that the Yugoslav people had for their nation. See Cantril, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

[26] It is worth noting that Suvar identifies what are generally the same key sets of values among the Yugoslav populace: ". . . the first is linked to the natural striving of every nation or ethnic community whatever for self-determination and a struggle for an equal place in the contemporary world . . . the second is linked to the economic and cultural perspectives of the societies that are relevant not only for the national and ethnic communities as such but for people . . . and finally, the third is connected with the institutional network of relations among the nationalities." Suvar, *loc. cit.*, pp. 51-52.

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justifiably entitled. This level has varied over time and has reflected the general rise in Croat aspirations.[27] The designation itself means the sense that Croatians have of what is rightfully owed them as a collective national group. This judgment results from a variety of factors—including what rights they perceive history has bestowed on them, what their status is in comparison with that of other nationalities in the federation, and what their leaders have promised. In sum, the "value expectations" level constitutes a composite indicator of what Croatians feel is their due within the Yugoslav federation.

That brings us, finally, to "value capabilities." This term means the extent to which members of the Croat nation believe themselves able to achieve their economic, political, and status values. The "value capabilities" level, similar to the "value expectations" level, affords a composite picture of what Croatians perceive to be the possibilities for the attainment of their values within the Yugoslav federation.

As noted in the diagram, the decentralization policy and related developments of the 1960's engendered a rather marked rise in expectations among Croats, a rise which tended to coincide with an increase in the capabilities that they perceived. The growth in both increased progressively until the level of perceived capabilities dropped abruptly with the departure from power in 1971 of the Tripalo-Dabcevic-Kucar leadership.

Suvar observes that certain Croat nationalists view their economic, political, and status values as extremely important to the Croat nation but feel that the presently-constituted federation impedes attainment of these values. The nationalists, he writes, contend that

> . . . *the Croatian nation is* economically exploited *in the new Yugoslavia even more than it was in old Yugoslavia, and up until now pronounced Serbian pressure on Croatian* culture *has been manifest; there is Serbian penetration into Croatian ethnic territory and* political domination *of Serbs not only in Yugoslavia as a whole but also in the Republic of Croatia; because of the repression of its* national being *and the difficult* economic position *into which it has been brought, the Croatian people today is displaced and multiplies slowly.*[28]

Such feelings among Croat "nationalists," as well as the less articulate frustration evidenced by other members of the Croat nation, can be interpreted as the product of a sense of relative deprivation. This condition seemed to be brought on by the following circumstances: Ideological pronouncements and normal national aspirations caused Croat expectations to mount steadily over the postwar years, but the situation with respect to perceived capabilities was more problematical (see Figure 2). The policy of "Yugoslavism" induced a general decrease in what the Croats perceived as their capabilities through the early 1960's. After reaching a low in that period, however, the level of perceived capabilities turned upward as a result of Croat awareness of the potential effects of movement toward regional decentralization and of the economic reforms of 1965. They continued to rise and reached their apex at the time of the enactment of the far-reaching constitutional amendments already described in the summer of 1971. Had the discrepancy between expectations and capabilities gone on narrowing, nationalist sentiment among the Croats might have tended to moderate, and desires to establish a sovereign Croatia might have been put aside. But the reshuffling of the Croatian party in 1971 brought with it a sharp and sudden downswing in perceived capabilities. The result of this suddenly expanded gap was the open expression of hostility by many Croatian leaders, members of the intelligentsia, and even rank-and-file citizens.[29]

No better articulation of the kind of attitudes that ultimately became widespread in Croatia can be cited than the work of the Croatian economist Sime Djodan. In a number of his articles and writings, Djodan outlined the benefits which he believed the Croats justifiably deserved and then lamented that the federation had created obstacles to the achievement of such rewards. He contrasted the Croatian economic situation with that of Norway and other small European countries and maintained that Croa-

[27] Although many Croats have been skeptical over the years about the degree to which they could fulfill their values within the Yugoslav federation, their expectations with respect to the values to which they feel justifiably entitled have generally risen and have risen quite rapidly since the early 1960's.

[28] Suvar, *loc. cit.*, p. 50. Emphasis added.

[29] It was at this time that mass demonstrations took place in Zagreb. Shortly thereafter, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia commenced a reorganization of the party leadership in other republics—a move that seemed designed, among other things, to reduce the frustration and sense of relative deprivation among the Croats and the feeling of an anti-Croat campaign. Subsequent developments suggest that the policy did have practical effects.

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The League of Communists of Croatia meets in early 1972 to consider the causes of and remedies for the outbreak of nationalism in that republic. In the left foreground is Milka Planinc, who became President of the LCC in January 1972.

—Photo by Tanjug, as reproduced in *Review* (Belgrade), March-April 1972, p. 12.

tian development should and would compare favorably with that of these more developed countries if it were not for Croatia's "exploited" position within the federal republic. He also emphasized:

In the opinion of the Swedish economist Gunnar Mydral, smaller countries like Sweden, Norway, and Denmark have achieved optimal economic power, and if they were lumped into some great agglomeration, they would lose more than benefit.[30]

However, Djodan did go on to contend that if the new constitutional amendments designed to enhance the powers of the republics and provinces actually altered the "exploitative" nature of the federation, Croatia's future would be brighter:

If the financial power of our republic is brought up to the level of her productive strength, and if the announced changes are carried out in a really consequential and consistent manner, very beautiful vistas will open up for the further normal development of Croatia in many areas. . . . But in order for Croatia to develop normally, it is necessary that very radical changes be carried out in the economic system of the SFRY [Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia]. [31]

[30] Djodan, *loc. cit.*, p. 77.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

Repeatedly, Djodan's analysis expressed high expectations regarding the possibilities for Croatian development and, at the same time, low evaluations of the potential for achieving that end within the present federation. The federation, he claimed time after time, "blocked the development of Croatia." [32] And while the bulk of Djodan's work had to do with *economic* values, the writings and public utterances of others contained similar perceptions of deprivation with respect to *political* and *status* values.

It should be firmly stressed, of course, that Djodan was in no sense a spokesman for the collective will of the Croat people; nevertheless, he did reflect some of the sentiments prevalent among important sectors of the nation. Although less strident and less ideologically offensive, the public comments of the replaced Croatian party leaders mirrored similar if not identical points of view.

The crucial point for this discussion is that the views expressed publicly by the Croatian party leaders, certain sectors of the intelligentsia, and various social and cultural elites had begun to stir the national pride of the Croatian population. What had commenced as elite dissatisfaction with the federal arrangement and with perceived shortcomings of the SFRY had taken on a mass character.

This sequence of events explains why the attitude surveys cited earlier afforded little indication of the national movement that was to ensue. National feelings lay beneath the surface and did not reemerge until portions of the leadership seized upon deep-seated economic, political, and status frustrations and started to account for them in national terms. Since the elite interpretations of the situation seemed plausible, increasing numbers of people began to accept and use the national-based explanations as release mechanisms to vent their own frustrations. Rather than blaming their economic difficulties on themselves, they found it more acceptable to blame these difficulties on the "centralists" in Belgrade. The numerous manifestations of strong nationalist feelings in Croatia following the change in the regional leadership near the end of 1971 suggest that the national pronouncements and speeches of specific Croatian leaders evoked sufficient mass response to render the base of the national movement quite broad indeed.

It would be highly erroneous, of course, to assume that only members of the Croat nation have experienced frustrations. On the contrary, the shortcom-

[32] *Ibid.*

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ings and difficulties that have characterized life in Yugoslavia have given rise to frustrations among all national groups, frustrations which have in turn stimulated national sentiments of one sort or another.[33]

The Serbian Case

In this regard, it should be noted that certain elements of the Serbian nation have also perceived obstacles to the fulfillment of the values that they consider important and whose attainment they feel is their just due. For example, despite hopes and expectations in some quarters for the creation of a "Greater Serbian" state, the prospects for the realization of such an entity within the present Yugoslav federation have been minimal. The perceived discrepancy between these expectations and the capabilities for achieving them aroused a feeling of being wronged, and this sense of injustice produced frustrations which spawned the "unitarist" brand of nationalism.


The distinction here between "unitarism" and the earlier-mentioned "separatism" underlines the fact that nationalism can assume a variety of forms in multi-ethnic states. While it amounts to an oversimplification to say that Croatian frustrations tend to generate "separatist" feelings and Serbian frustrations tend to provide "unitarist" sentiments, such a proposition has some empirical basis and explanatory merit. The remedy favored by members of a nationality in order to alleviate their frustrations depends at least in part on the historical and environmental context in which they operate. Because Croatian "nationalists" are highly aware of Serbian domination during the interwar period and of present Serbian power, they by and large advocate separatism. On the other hand, their Serbian counterparts, conscious of Serbia's historical role in the Yugoslav state and convinced that increased authority for the federal government—dominated, of course, by the Serbian power center in Belgrade—could serve Serbian values more readily, normally lean toward a "unitaristic" (*i.e.*, unitary and centralist) approach.

The roots of "unitarism" in Serbia, like those of "separatism" in Croatia, appear to lie in the conditions of relative deprivation. In tracing the character of expectations among members of the Serbian nationality since World War II, one finds that they were always high but have generally climbed over the years (see Figure 3). Among the reasons for these mounting expectations have been Serbia's tradition as an independent state, its position of dominance in interwar Yugoslavia, the numerical strength of the Serbian nationality, and so on. Serbian perceptions of the possibilities for fulfilling key values within the Yugoslav federation, however, have been somewhat more problematic and have tended to vary with changes in Yugoslav nationalities policy. Generally speaking, the "Yugoslavism" (or centralist) approach of the early postwar years led to a rise in the capabilities that Serbs perceived for achieving their national values, but a decline set in during the 1960's as this policy came under growing criticism and was finally discredited. Perceived capabilities reached a postwar low with the adoption of the constitutional amendments of 1971, which greatly reduced the authority of the federal center in Belgrade. With the recentralization and reassertion of party control that ensued after the nationalist outbreak of 1971, however, those capabilities have evidenced a marked upswing. At the same time, the discrepancy between expectations and capabilities is still quite large and can therefore be expected to continue to spawn feelings of deprivation and, hence, mass and individual frustration.

Suvar has articulated the nature of the frustrations manifested by many Serbs in this fashion:

The Serbian people is injured and abused in the new Yugoslavia although it contributed most to its [*the state's*] *creation and is the most important force for its preservation; sins which are either mutual or the fruit of a conspiracy of members of other nationalities are blamed on the Serbian people; Croatian nationalism is engaged in a striking assault, and among the Croatian nation subversive and ruffian forces are again on the scene, threatening even the exist-*

Figure 3: Relative Deprivation—Serbs



[33] This is not to say, however, that the level of frustation and national sentiments has been the same for all national and minority groups

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ence of Yugoslavia and the Serbian people, which has outgrown nationalism and is characterized by general internationalism.[34]

In short, while the Serbian people evinced high and generally rising expectations with respect to the values that they could achieve within the new Yugoslavia, they discerned difficulties and obstacles in the way of attaining their expectations, and they attributed these difficulties and obstacles to the "subversive assaults" of other groups. This interpretation, in turn, constituted the basis for a "unitarist" movement which opposed a decentralized, fragmented state.

"Unitarism," however, proved to be no "sacred cow." When the central party leadership removed the Croatian nationalists from power in 1971 and restructured the Croatian party leadership, the "unitarists" temporarily saw themselves as the victors, but shortly thereafter the party declared that the "unitarists" were equally as dangerous as the "separatists."

The new Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Serbian Central Committee has observed: "One of the difficulties in the struggle against Greater Serbian nationalism has been the fact that in Serbia unitarism has never been considered as nationalism." [35] Now that it is, the assault on nationalism of all shades and hues continues.

[34] Suvar, *loc. cit.*, pp. 50-51.
[35] *Borba*, July 12, 1972.

ALTHOUGH THE Croatian and Serbian cases have been singled out for close attention in order to develop the argument of this essay, it should be underscored that the socio-psychological dynamics of perceived deprivation leading to frustration and ultimately resulting in a propensity toward nationalism are common to all groups within Yugoslavia. One ought to bear in mind, however, that it may only be natural for the nations and ethnic groups of Yugoslavia to see their positions as potentially threatened within the multinational union, for the experiences of a number of other ethnic groups in various multinational states suggest that fears of assimilation and attendant processes are not always unfounded. Under such circumstances, feelings of insecurity mount, and nationalist activity escalates as a defense of the group's threatened interests.

Experience indicates that the policy of "Yugoslavism," or centralism, did little to attenuate this kind of insecurity. At the same time, the contrasting alternative of a fragmented confederation defined along national lines—together with unpopular policies promulgated by the center—worked in such a way as to threaten the future of a united Yugoslavia. But these two extremes are not the sole options available. Currently, Yugoslav leaders are exploring a variety of alternatives, and they have actually begun to experiment with some of them. The ultimate test of the leaders' wisdom will be the effect of their new approach on the feelings of deprivation among the different sectors of the populace.

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Migration and Social Change

By George W. Hoffman

The introduction of a socialist model of development in Yugoslavia after World War II triggered an intense and rapid socioeconomic transformation of that multinational state. A salient feature of this metamorphosis has been the dynamic and complex migrations of large numbers of Yugoslav citizens both within the country and beyond its borders. The emphasis placed by the government on the rapid creation of an industrial society and economy served as a "pull factor," a magnet, which drew surplus agrarian labor reserves away from the limited supplies of arable land (on which farming was becoming increasingly unprofitable). Once activated, the desire of the excess agrarian population to improve its fortunes in city jobs became an autonomous push factor which exerted its own pressures on employment, housing, and other aspects of the emerging urban-industrial society. At the outset, the influx of manpower from labor-surplus rural locales facilitated the process of rapid industrialization and development of administrative, cultural and service facilities.[1] However, the unabated pressure of rural-urban migrations has come to complicate Yugoslavia's social and economic advance, particularly since the economic reforms of 1965, which by stressing industrial efficiency had the effect of reducing urban employment opportunities. As a consequence, an increasing number of Yugoslavs—a considerable portion of them skilled—have turned to temporary employment in foreign countries.

The impact of massive migrational movements upon the structure of Yugoslav society and, in particular, upon the urbanization of the country makes this phenomenon of great interest to all those studying the social transformation and modernization of developing societies. At the same time, one must also recognize that longstanding regional differences in cultural history and in social structures and values have placed a distinctive imprint on this process as it unfolded in multinational Yugoslavia. The present study will attempt to analyze the factors underlying the postwar migrations, to delineate their social consequences, and to trace in the broadest terms their future impact on the stability of Yugoslav society. It draws on the work of Yugoslav and Western scholars alike and also on early returns from the 1971 census, which—though still not completely analyzed—per-

Mr. Hoffman, Professor of Geography at the University of Texas at Austin, is author of Regional Development Strategy in Southeast Europe, *1972, and co-author, with Fred Warner Neal, of* Economic Policy in Socialist Yugoslavia, *1962.* *Draft versions of the present paper were read in January 1973 at the Institute of British Geographers and at a special meeting on Yugoslavia arranged by the British Association of Soviet and East European Studies—presentations made possible by travel grants from the National Science Foundation and the University of Texas at Austin.*

[1] An early analysis of the role of surplus rural manpower in the economic development of Southeast Europe was provided by Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan in *Agricultural Surplus Population in Eastern and Southeastern Europe*, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943, and in his "Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and Southeastern Europe," *The Economic Journal* (London), June-September 1943, pp. 202-11. See also George W. Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, *Yugoslavia and the New Communism*, New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1962; George W. Hoffman, *Regional Development Strategy in Southeast Europe*, New York, Praeger, 1972, pp. 76-84; and Rudolph Bicanic's posthumously published *Economic Policy in Socialist Yugoslavia*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973. The reader is also directed to Bicanic's fascinating but unpublished study of the prewar Yugoslav countryside, *Kako zivi narod. Zivot u passivnim krajevima* (How People Live. Life in the Passive Regions), Zagreb, 1936 (a 1941 translation by Stephen Clissold, London, is available only in mimeographed form).

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mit certain deductions concerning the long-term nature of social transformation in Yugoslavia.[2]

To place the discussion in clearer perspective, it may be useful to provide some summary statistics indicative of Yugoslavia's transformation from a predominantly agrarian society to a mixed one. From 1953 to 1970, the share of agricultural, food and tobacco production in Yugoslavia's gross social product declined from 49 percent to 24.6 percent, whereas industrial production has increased from 20.8 percent to 39.4 percent of the total over the same period.[3]

In social terms, the transformation has been equally dramatic. While *total* population increased by only 30 percent between 1948 (the date of the first postwar census) and 1971, the *nonagricultural* population more than doubled; agricultural population, on the other hand, declined by some 20 percent, and its share in the total dropped from 67.2 percent to 41.2 percent over that period.[4] Although the economically active population increased by 5.5 percent annually in the period 1961-71, agricultural employment decreased by 18 percent (with a slightly larger decrease among women).[5] In addition, in roughly the same period (1960-70) the number of members of agricultural households in nonfarm employment increased some 10 percent, reaching a total of more than 1.5 million persons in 1970. The combination of growing migration from the farms to the cities and increased nonagricultural employment of persons remaining in the countryside relieved pressures on the land and contributed to a rapid increase in per capita income of the rural population during the 1960's.[6]

In examining the shifts in employment brought about by internal migration, one discovers a sharp discontinuity in the year 1965, a shift clearly indicative of the impact of the economic reforms. Whereas nonfarm jobs absorbed some 140,000 new workers annually during 1948-64, only 29,000 such jobs opened up annually in the years 1966-70. Yet, some 115,000 youths, many of them rural, came of working age each year during the latter period. The options facing these young potential workers were unemployment, underemployment in agriculture (which still suffered from surplus manpower), or emigration. In fact, since only 13.6 percent of those seeking employment were able to find jobs within Yugoslavia between 1966 and 1970, the only alternative for the vast majority of Yugoslav job-seekers was emigration.[7] The openness of Yugoslavia's borders to the free flow of people and goods spurred recourse to this option.

The postwar internal migrations naturally had considerable impact on the urbanization process in Yugoslavia. Although the details of this process will be examined at greater length below, several salient figures should be presented here. Early returns from the 1971 census indicate that the "urban population" of Yugoslavia is somewhere in the range of 35 percent of the total as compared to 21.9 percent in 1953.[8] However, the process of "urbanization" has been more extensive than these simple statistics

[2] Basic to the present analysis are compilations from various Yugoslav censuses and publications of such Yugoslav research centers as the Center for Demographic Studies at the Social Science Institute, Belgrade; the Economic Institute, Belgrade; and the Department of Migration Studies at the Institute of Geography, University of Zagreb, as well as studies of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva, and the UN Social Development Division, Regional and Community Development Section, New York.

[3] All data used are taken from official Yugoslav sources: *e.g.*, relevant annual issues of *Statisticki godisnjak Jugoslavije* (Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia), Belgrade, Savenzni Zavod za Statistiku; articles in *Yugoslav Survey* (Belgrade), and various census publications.

[4] The first postwar census—though limited—was taken in 1948 and indicated a population of 15,901,000 compared with 20,554,000 in 1971. In the absence of final data from the 1971 census, the author uses the figures presented by Kosta Mikhailovic in his "Socioeconomic Aspects of Interregional Migration in Yugoslavia," *International Social Development Review* (United Nations), No. 4, 1972, p. 30. Official census data show a 24.8-percent decrease in the share of agricultural population, with the greatest declines in Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and the Vojvodina.

[5] See fn. 3 above.

[6] The amount of arable land available to each agricultural worker increased to 2.2 hectares as migration reduced the number of inhabitants per 100 hectares from 104 in 1953 to only 73 in 1970.

[7] See Ivo Baucic, *Origin and Structure of Yugoslav Workers in the German Federal Republic*, in Radovi Instituta za Geografiju Sveucilista u Zagrebu, Vol. 9, Serija: Migracije Radnika, Book 1, Zagreb, 1970; *The Effects of Emigration from Yugoslavia and the Problem of Returning Emigrant Workers*, European Demographic Monographs, II, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1972, p. 3; and "The Social and Economic Effects of Labor Emigration from Yugoslavia," *Geografski glasnik* (Zagreb), 1971-72, pp. 25-59.

[8] Estimates of the share of urban population in the total range from 32 to 38 percent. In the absence of definitive data from the 1971 census, the author has chosen 35 percent as the most realistic figure for purposes of this study. Problems of defining "urban" in the Yugoslav context are discussed by Joel Halpern in his "Yugoslavia; Modernization in an Ethnically Diverse State," in Wayne Vucinich, Ed., *Contemporary Yugoslavia: Twenty Years of Socialist Experiment*, Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1969, pp. 323-29. For statistical purposes, settlements are deemed rural settlements, towns, or mixed settlements according to a system developed by Milos Macura, who classes populated points on the basis of size and proportion of nonagricultural population. The minimum size of a town is set at 2,000, although some settlements of smaller size in the mountainous areas of northwest Slovenia may well be "urban."

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indicate. As implied above, more than 58 percent of the population in 1971 was "nonagricultural." The difference, 23 percent (or 58 minus 35), represents a large body of people who live in "rural" areas but do not participate in agriculture, many of them commuting to work in the cities and towns. These so-called "peasant/workers," have formed an important part of Yugoslavia's commuting labor force. The 1961 census listed 3,529,000 workers and employees (over 35 percent of total workers and employees) as "working outside the settlement where they lived." The proportion of such workers varied from republic to republic, ranging from 30 percent of workers and employees in Kosovo and Montenegro to 39 percent in Slovenia.[9]

The increase in urban population and in the number of rural residents engaged in nonagricultural work are only two facets of the broader deagrarianization and urbanization of Yugoslav society. "Urbanization" in this context involves something more than a mere expansion of existing cities and creation of new towns; it encompasses the creation of a whole "urban way of life," one which even spills over into the countryside and erases differences between rural and urban areas. This physical and functional transformation of Yugoslavia is visible in the development of a modern road network and of a dense pattern of settlement, and in the provision to the countryside of modern utilities, consumer goods, and other amenities usually associated with city life. (It should also be noted that there has been a reciprocal "ruralization" of many urban areas as a result of heavy and rapid migration to the cities from the countryside, but more on this later.)

The Stages of Migration

Yugoslavia's postwar migrations occurred in three stages, all of them reflecting the pressures of agrarian overpopulation and two of them responding to social and economic forces unleashed by the socialist program of industrialization. The first involved migration from marginal rural areas to more promising rural settings and occurred in the early postwar years in response to new opportunities opened by the dislocations of war and by the consolidation of Communist power. The second stage, which also began in the immediate postwar years and continues to the present, represented inter- and intraregional migration from the countryside to urban settlements in response to new employment opportunities in industry, administration, and the service sector. The most recent migratory stage has been the temporary (or in some cases, not so temporary) emigration from Yugoslavia in response to declining employment opportunities in the country's urban industrial centers.

The first migratory movement involved the colonization of the Pannonian region (Slavonia and Vojvodina) of Yugoslavia, a process which must be viewed in its own special historical, political and social context. The lands settled comprised those formerly held by Germans (expelled as a result of World War II), lands formerly farmed by seasonal workers, and medium-and large-sized estates nationalized and turned into state farms by the Communist government. The immigrants were mainly people from poor mountainous areas with a high natural population growth (particularly in Bosnia's northern border-



A harvest is wrested from a patch of arable soil in the Bosnian highlands, a traditional source of Yugoslav population migrations.

—Photo by Mladen Grevic in *Review* (Belgrade), July-August 1967, p. 31.

[9] Dusan Breznik, Ed., *Migracije stanovnistva Jugoslavije* (Population Migration in Yugoslavia), Belgrade, Institut Drustvenih Nauka, Centar za Demografska Istrazivanja, 1971, p. 365.

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lands), and included some who had formerly been employed as seasonal workers in the same areas they now colonized. This shift of some 350,000 people into new natural and cultural environments caused its own serious problems of economic and social adaptation, but inasmuch as this was basically a migration from agriculture to agriculture, these issues will not be examined here.[10]

The second and more significant migratory flow in postwar Yugoslavia has been the inter- and intra-regional movement from agriculture to industry.[11] There have been great regional differences in this process and in the associated patterns of urbanization—variations which have reflected the differing levels of regional economic development as well as cultural and historical factors.

As noted earlier, Yugoslavia entered the postwar period with a sizable surplus agricultural population.[12] This population was drawn to the cities and towns by various "pull factors," the most notable of which was the Communist government's commitment to a Soviet-type model of industrialization. In order to provide an adequate supply of labor for new industries, the regime took steps to draw upon the abundant supply of agricultural labor. Government restrictions and taxation on private landholdings, many of them of uneconomical size, exerted pressure on the rural population, causing many of them to seek employment in new jobs opening up in industry and in the administrative and service sectors. Besides finding higher and steadier income in the cities, rural dwellers were attracted to the better educational opportunities and other advantages offered by "urban life." An increasing flow of migrants began to move from low-employment, low-income areas with high rates of population growth to the cities and towns. Once started, this migration became an irresistible force with a momentum of its own, requiring further industrialization and urbanization.

This second stage of population movement swelled the industrial labor force and thereby spurred production growth. However, the whole society began to pay the costs of excess industrial employment. By the mid-1960's the Yugoslav leaders found it necessary to introduce wide-ranging economic reforms based on application of the market mechanism and designed to increase the efficiency of industrial operations. In place of the centrally planned and administered "command economy," there was to be decentralization. Productivity and profitability were introduced as performance criteria for managers, and special attention was given to the introduction of advanced technology rather than to the construction of new plants.

This radical policy shift also involved a break with the postwar principle that surplus agricultural labor had "a right to employment" in industry, administration or social services. The upshot was that the intake of new workers dramatically declined, while some existing workers were even dismissed or prematurely pensioned off. In spite of declining urban employment opportunities, however, the flow of population from rural to urban areas continued unabated. As a consequence, combined unemployment in the socialist and private sectors rose sharply, reaching 7 percent in 1966 and almost 9 percent by 1971. While this rise was fueled in part by the early postwar bulge in births, the main causal factor was the reduced ability of the urban-industrial economy to absorb surplus rural manpower.

It was the rise in unemployment within Yugoslavia that led to the third major stage of postwar Yugoslav migrational movements—a complex phase in which

[10] This process is discussed in D. Kostic, "Agrarian Reform and Changes in the Life of Postwar Settlers in Vojvodina," *Stanovnistvo* (Belgrade), No. 5, 1967; Vladimir Djuric, "Changes in the Structure of the Population in the Vojvodina," *Zbornik radova* (University of Belgrade, Institute of Geography), pp. 3-13 (in Serbo-Croatian with French summary); Milenko S. Filipovic, *Proucavanje naseljavanja Vojvodina* (Study of the Settlement of the Vojvodina), Novi Sad, Matica Srpska, 1958; and Mihailovic, "Socioeconomic Aspects . . .," *loc. cit.*, pp. 28-30. For an extremely interesting presentation in historical geography, see Josip Roglic, "Die Gebirge als die Wiege des Geschichtlichen Geschehens in Südosteuropa" (Mountains as the Cradle of Historical Existence in Southeast Europe), *Colloquium Geographicum, Argumenta Geographica*, Festzeitschrift Carl Troll, Vol. 12, Bonn, Ferd. Dümmlers Verlag, 1970, pp. 225-39.

[11] Among the most perceptive works by geographers, ethnographers and sociologists on population movements in Yugoslavia are: Dusan Breznik, *op. cit.* (fn. 9); Vladimir Djuric, "Contemporary Migrations of Population in Yugoslavia," *Przeglad geograficzny* (Warsaw), No. 35, 1964, pp. 670-89; Ivan Ginic, *Dinamika I struktura gradskog stanovnistva Jugoslavije* (Dynamics and Structures of the Urban Population of Yugoslavia), Belgrade, Institut Drustvenih Nauka, Centar za Demografska Istrazivanja, 1967, and "Dynamics of the Yugoslav Urban Population According to the First Results of the 1971 Population Census," *Stanovnistvo*, January-June 1971, pp. 25-39; Petar Markovic and Darinka Kostic, "Structural Changes in the Yugoslav Countryside in the Postwar Period, 1945-1962," *Sociologija* (Belgrade), Vol. 6, 1964, pp. 170-95; and Josip Roglic, "Some Characteristics of the Yugoslav Population Movement," *Matica iseljenicki kalendar* (Zagreb), 1966. See also three contributions in *Berichte zur Regionalforschung "WGI"* (Munich), No. 9, 1972, edited by J. Maier: Hermann Gross and W. Guppel on structural changes in Yugoslav agrarian population; Franze Ronneberger and Heinz Kontezki on agricultural cooperatives; and Karl Ruppert on deagrarianization.

[12] Rosenstein-Rodan, *Agricultural Surplus . . .*, and Rudolf Bicanic, *Agrarna prenapucenost* (Agrarian Overpopulation), Zagreb, 1940.

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a wave of emigration abroad in search of employment or personal betterment developed alongside the continuing domestic rural-urban migration. We shall return to the subject of emigration and its social impact later.


Patterns of Migration

Turning briefly to an examination of the patterns of interregional migration in postwar Yugoslavia, one discovers that decisions to migrate and the direction of movements of population have been influenced by a variety of factors—historical, cultural and economic.

Although the massive interregional migrations since World War II have encompassed literally every region of the country, a significant portion of the movement has followed established historical routes. The late Serbian geographer Jovan Cvijic identified three such migratory currents: 1) *the Dinaric stream,* originating in the mountains of Herzegovina; 2) *the Kosovo stream,* originating in the mountains of Kapaonik and Mount Saca; and 3) *the Vardar stream,* originating in South Morava and Upper Vardar. From these mountainous areas of the south and west excess population has historically migrated to the valleys and plains of the north and east—particularly to the Sumadija of Inner Serbia and into the Pannonian Basin, especially Vojvodina.[13]

Ethnicity has also had its effect on the patterns of migration. As a general rule, those ethnic groups having a distinctive language and culture of their own and a strong sense of group identity have been less disposed to migrate outside their native regions, and at the same time the regions inhabited by them have been less attractive to potential migrants from other regions of the country. Thus, Slovenia, Kosovo (with its predominant Albanian population), and regions settled by Hungarians (mostly in Vojvodina) received relatively few immigrants from other parts of the country—at least before 1965. Conversely, in spite of strong population pressures, there was very little movement out of Kosovo, at least until quite recently, because of the unique linguistic and religious characteristics of the region's Albanian majority (Slovenia and Vojvodina, with their own distinct languages, represented a particular obstacle to any such migration). Migration from Bosnia and Herzegovina—major origins of such movements—has generally been toward Serbia, Vojvodina, Croatia, and also toward the Central Bosnian industrial region along the Sarajevo-Zenica axis, again reflecting ethnic affinities. Until recently, Inner Serbia received large numbers of Serbian-speaking immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and parts of Croatia. In more recent years, Serbian-speaking migrants have also entered Inner Serbia from Kosovo under political pressure from the dominant Albanian population in the latter region (Albanians comprised 73 percent of Kosovo's population according to the 1971 census). Ethnic differences continue to play a role among Yugoslavs working abroad. Those from ethnically distinct regions such as Kosovo tend to keep closer together while abroad, to return sooner to their native regions, and to pass on jobs abroad to relatives.

Serbia's position through most of the postwar period as Yugoslavia's only area of net in-migration from other regions reflects not only historical and ethnic factors but also an important economic factor—the heavy investment of the federal government in the industrial development of advantageously located regional centers in this republic during the 1950's and early 1960's. This investment priority shifted during the 1960's, and for the decade as a whole per capita investment and income in the



The old and the new mix in Titograd, the rapidly growing capital of the Montenegrin Republic.

—Photo by Sonja Bullaty/Angelo Lomeo for Rapho Guillumette.

[13] See Cvijic's *La Péninsule Balkanique* (The Balkan Peninsula), Paris, Armand Colin, 1918. Josip Roglic has described the Dinaric mountains as a folk fortress, serving as a refuge in times of stress and as the source of migrants in more peaceful times (see "On the Geographical Position and Economic Development of Yugoslavia", *Geografski glasnik*, Vols. 11-12, 1950, pp. 11-26).

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republic were below the national averages. As a result, the flow of rural-urban migration shifted toward the two most advanced republics—Slovenia and Croatia—in part, to fill the gap caused by the emigration abroad of some 300,000 persons from these republics in the late 1960's. Recent travelers to Yugoslavia can attest to the large number of laborers from Kosovo, Macedonia and Bosnia working in Slovenia and Croatia on apartment and road-building projects. The less-developed regions suffered particularly under the 1965 reforms (especially in 1966-69) as the switch in economic decision-making toward cost consciousness rather than expansion of production at any cost impeded efforts to create employment for their surplus rural populations. At first migrants from these areas sought jobs in developed regions, but later the flow swung abroad.

Dynamics of Urbanization

As noted above, massive population movements and rapid urbanization were two intimately linked aspects of the dramatic socioeconomic transformation of postwar Yugoslavia. Under the impetus of the government's industrialization policies and largely fueled by immigrants from overpopulated rural areas, the growth of urban population accelerated sharply after World War II.[14] From 1921 to 1953, the share of urban population in the total population grew by only 5 percentage points, accounting for 21.9 percent of the total population in the latter year. Between 1953 and 1961, the urban population jumped to 28.3 percent, and by 1971 it accounted for 35 percent of total population. According to the 1961 census, the proportion of urban residents born outside the city in which they were then living was 58.7 percent, and this proportion was even slightly higher (58.9 percent) in the 1971 census. Of the 4,099,000 urban "immigrants" reported in 1971, more than half (2,146,000) came from rural communities, and another 421,000 from mixed communities. Furthermore, the extent of rural-urban migration is understated in such data inasmuch as the census counts as "immigrants" only those whose most recent move was from the country to the city, excluding many who moved from other urban areas but originally came from rural settings. Judging from the 1961 data, some of Yugoslavia's larger cities had an even lower percentage of native sons than the national average (41.3 percent). Only 30 percent of Belgrade residents in 1961 had been born in the city; the figures for Zagreb and Titograd were 36 and 38 percent, respectively.[15]

Two basic forms of development can be observed in Yugoslavia's urbanization: (1) migration directly from rural villages into towns, and more specifically into new residential areas which either had been planned or had spontaneously developed around old urban nuclei; and (2) the slow transformation of farming villages into urbanized settlements which in time developed into urbanized zones and regions. A considerable portion of Yugoslavia's postwar urbanization has been concentrated in the country's larger cities—from 1961 to 1971, the number of cities with more than 20,000 population grew from 59 to 80, and their share in total urban population rose from 18.7 to 26 percent. The growth in the network of small and medium-sized cities was slower, with important consequences for the overall transformation of society. Judging by the proportion of population still living in rural areas or in settlements with a population under 2,000 (59 percent in 1961, 1971 data not being available) and by the number of cities with a population over 100,000 (only nine as of 1971), Yugoslavia must be considered underurbanized. Thus the major postwar transformation of Yugoslav society occurred without the concurrent development of an integrated and adequate system of cities and towns.

The result has been an interpenetration of urban and rural social patterns, as suggested earlier. Dennison I. Rusinow has raised the question of "whether a combination of rapid urbanization (in


[14] From the rich and diversified Yugoslav literature on urban studies, the following are most useful: Dolfe Vogelnik, *Urbanizacija kao odraz privrednog razvoja FNRJ* (Urbanization in Yugoslavia as an Expression of Its Economic Development), Belgrade, Ekonomska Biblioteka 13, 1961; Igor Vriser, "The Urbanization of Yugoslavia," *Geografisk tijdschrift* (Denmark), September 1971, pp. 491-95; "Postwar Urban Geography in Yugoslavia," *Jugoslovanski simpozij o urbani geografiji* (Yugoslav Symposium on Urban Geography), Ljubljana, Oct. 5-7, 1970, pp. 13-23; "The Pattern of Central Places in Yugoslavia," *Tijdschrift voor Econ. en Soc. Geografie* (Rotterdam), September-October 1971, pp. 290-300; and *Vplivna obmocja Jugoslovanshih mest in drugih sredisc* (Areas of Influence of Yugoslav Towns and Other Centers), Ljubljana, Filozofska Fakulteta Univerza v Ljubljani, 1972; and Stanko Zuljic, "The Degree of Urbanization in Yugoslavia as an Important Characteristic and a Factor of Development," *Geografski glasnik*, No. 32, 1970, pp. 101-22, and "The Metropolitan Regions and Their Significance for Further Urbanization in Yugoslavia," *Jugoslovanski simpozij . . .*, pp. 27-38.

[15] Findings of the 1971 census in this regard are not yet available.


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YUGOSLAVIA:

Administrative Divisions



Urbanization Pattern



SOURCE: Adapted from Stanko Zuljić, "The Degree of Urbanization in Yugoslavia as an Important Characteristic and a Factor of Development," *Geografski glasnik* (Zagreb), No. 32, 1971, p. 120, by Jean T. Hannaford, Department of Geography, The University of Texas at Austin.

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the narrow sense of the growth of towns) with increased rapid deagrarianization is more likely to lead to the urbanization of rural areas (in the wider sense of the diffusion of the 'urban way of life') or to the 'peasantization' of the city . . ." His answer is that this is likely to depend on "historically derived attitudes and other psychological factors.[16] In any case, it is clear that urbanization is a long-term sociological process involving not only the slow adoption of the "urban way of life" by newcomers to the towns, but also the urbanization of villages and the ruralization of towns.

Obviously, the pace and extent of these transformations are affected by the size of the towns and by the proportion of urban workers who actually reside in the towns. Due to the serious housing shortages which developed in the cities and towns, industries often encouraged workers from rural areas to remain in their agricultural households and utilize company-provided transportation to urban work sites—a practice that is quite common in developing countries. In Yugoslavia, such "peasant-workers" are estimated to constitute as much as 30 to 40 percent of the total nonagricultural work force.[17] This contributes to the difficulty of drawing an exact line between rural and urban in this country. There are many small and medium-sized towns in the Pannonian Basin whose population is not predominantly engaged in agriculture. Yet many larger towns incorporate small villages, often preserving the latter's essentially rural character. Moreover, the largely unskilled rural labor which moved into the cities (either due to expansion of industrial employment or as replacements for emigrating skilled labor) adjusted only slowly to the requirements of modern urban industrial society.

Regional Variations

Patterns of urbanization have varied markedly from region to region, reflecting different historical experiences, cultural heterogeneity, great spatial differences, the federalized and decentralized administrative structure, and varying rates of economic development. The consequence of this variation has been a *polycentric* type of urbanization, which has proved insufficient to cope with the pressures of "deagrarianization."

Regional variations in urbanization can be expressed in terms of the share of urban population in the total population of the individual regions as of 1971. Macedonia, with 37 percent of its population living in its cities as of that date, is the most urbanized region. In second position was Vojvodina (31.3 percent), while Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro ranked lowest, with a 15-percent concentration of urban population.[18] When one examines the rate of growth of total urban population by region, the same general pattern emerges, with the exception of Montenegro, which—starting from a very low number of urban inhabitants—registered the fastest growth (241.4 percent) in urban population of any region between 1953 and 1971 (see Table 1).

One factor in these variations is the differing historical patterns of urban formation in Yugoslavia's individual regions. Jack Fisher has noted that the North (Slovenia, Croatia and Vojvodina), whose cities developed during the Hapsburg and Venetian domination of those regions, is generally more diversified and urban, with a "rank-size" distribution, *i.e.*, a great variety of different-size cities, whereas the cities of the South tend to be more "primate," *i.e.*, less developed, as manifested in a larger percentage of cities of less than 60,000 population and a dearth of middle-size cities (or those with populations of 60,000 to 150,000).[19]

Emphasis on the traditional historical divisions of the country and on decentralization further contributed to a polycentric development of urban places. Yugoslavia lacks a single metropolis, a true "national capital," which might serve as a major nucleus of urban growth. On the other hand, decisions concerning the establishment of regional administrative centers under the federal structure

[16] "Some Aspects of Migration and Urbanization in Yugoslavia," American Universities Field Staff, *Field Staff Report Southeast Europe Series*, Vol. 19, No. 2, DIR 2-72, p. 1. Joel Halpern has also written extensively on this topic—see his "Peasant Culture and Urbanization in Yugoslavia," *Human Organization* (Washington, DC), No. 24, 1965, pp. 162-74, and *A Serbian Village in Historical Perspective*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972.

[17] See Kosta Mihailovic, *Regional Development—Experience and Prospects in Eastern Europe*, Paris, Mouton, 1972, pp. 82-84, and "Socioeconomic Aspects . . .," *loc. cit.*, p. 33; also Vladimir Klemencic, "Social and Geographic Problems of the Worker-Peasant with Particular Attention to the Situation in Yugoslavia," in *Zum Standort der Sozialgeographie* (Social Geography on Its Home Grounds), Munich Studies on Social and Economic Geography, Vol. 4.

[18] Zagorka Anicic, "Population Changes in Yugoslavia," *Yugoslav Survey* (Belgrade), August 1971, p. 8.

[19] *Yugoslavia—Multinational State*, San Francisco, Chandler, 1966, p. 48. For example, he noted how the controlled and massive migration toward Skopje was tantamount to "planned restriction on the growth of middle-sized urban centers" in Macedonia.

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Table 1: Yugoslav Urban Population: 1953-71

	Urban Population			Rate of Growth		
	1953	1961	1971	1953-61	1961-71	1953-71
Bosnia-Herzegovina	466,901	640,081	933,006	137.1	145.8	199.8
Croatia	1,007,936	1,282,490	1,705,555	127.2	133.0	169.2
Macedonia	367,110	490,159	759,696	133.5	155.0	206.9
Montenegro	64,900	101,517	156,698	156.4	154.4	241.4
Serbia:	1,722,049	2,293,724	3,098,207	133.2	135.1	179.9
Serbia (proper)	976,478	1,382,683	1,928,538	141.6	139.5	197.5
Kosovo	138,790	192,430	308,365	138.6	160.2	222.2
Vojvodina	606,781	718,611	861,304	118.4	119.9	141.9
Slovenia	363,155	458,109	592,106	126.1	129.2	163.0
YUGOSLAVIA	**3,992,051**	**5,286,080**	**7,245,268**	**131.9**	**137.6**	**181.5**

SOURCE: Ivanka Ginic, "Dynamics of the Yugoslav Urban Population According to the First Results of the 1971 Population Census," *Stanovnistvo* (Belgrade), January-June 1971, p. 28.

adopted in Yugoslavia have contributed to the rapid growth of certain cities. Thus, the postwar selection of Titograd, Pristina, Skopje and Novi Sad as capitals of republics or autonomous provinces unquestionably accelerated their growth. Between 1948 and 1971, the population of Titograd increased fivefold (from 10,330 to 54,509); Skopje increased from 87,654 to 312,091; and Pristina grew from 19,631 to 69,424. The growth of Novi Sad was slower but still substantial (from 69,431 to 141,712).[20] However, the lack of a developed system of lesser-sized cities in the regions surrounding these new centers tended to prevent an even more rapid urbanization and transformation of life in those regions.[21]

Basically, however, industrialization has been the biggest factor responsible for the increasing flow of rural manpower into urban areas. Not only did this lead to the expansion of existing urban centers, but it also led to the establishment of new towns, *e.g.*, Novi Beograd, Velenje, and Novi Travnik. The process whereby industrial development and urbanization interact to promote economic growth and social transformation is a complex matter. To be most effective in their role as true poles of growth, towns and cities must spread the socioeconomic impulses they receive throughout the surrounding region. As Kosta Mihailovic has observed, the economic activity of a town taken as a whole must have sufficient strength to ensure "spread effects" over the entire structure to respond to the feedback effects.[22] The size and location of towns and regional centers and enterprises—as privileged development points from which spread effects must originate—determine the impact of such policies on the region.

Some indication of the varying way in which economic and spatial factors affected the process of urbanization and socioeconomic transformation in Yugoslavia can be seen from the cases of Slovenia and Montenegro. Slovenia, to start with, had a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises and entered the postwar period with a decentralized system of urban settlements of varying size. Many of these enterprises and towns have acted as development poles for their immediate environs, and today more than 90 percent of all settlements with a population over 2,000 are classified as urban. Yet the decentralized character of urban development in the republic has its drawbacks. There does not exist a single large enterprise which might serve as a development pole of sufficient strength to leave its mark on the structure of the republic as a whole.

[20] See the census data for 1971; also *Yugoslav Survey*, August 1971, p. 7.

[21] Jack Fisher, *op. cit.*, and Vriser, "The Pattern of Central Places in Yugoslavia," *loc. cit.*

[22] "The Dynamics of Structural Changes as Context for the Growth Pole Theory, with Special Reference to Yugoslavia," draft paper, Belgrade, February 1972. Mihailovic has indicated that this paper will be published in various forms in Yugoslavia, in the USSR, and with the UN. It should be noted here that Yugoslav regional development was not based on "growth pole theory," but instead reflected decisions made during the period of centralization in the multinational country.

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Only Ljubljana and Maribor have a population over 50,000; there are one town each in the 30,000-50,000 and 20,000-30,000 range, and five in the range of 10,000-20,000. A full 61 percent of the population resides in places with a population of less than 2,000. The result of this pattern of urbanization is that in 1969 some 38 percent of the work force was commuting an average distance of 20 kilometers daily—often by car or bicycle.

The situation in Montenegro, while different, proved to be hardly more conducive to the development of an adequate network of cities and towns. A large proportion (70 percent) of postwar investment in the republic was concentrated in three large enterprises of basic industry located in two cities. Without going into detail, it can be stated that these cities had relatively weak spread effects in furthering the socioeconomic transformation of the republic and the integration of its regions.[23]

Most industrial expansion occurred in developed parts of the country, in and around existing towns. This precipitated a relatively quick growth of urban population and a spontaneous and uncontrolled expansion of towns (either by absorption of surrounding rural settlements or by creation of new residential areas). Serious housing shortages, insufficient utilities, and failure to renew older urban neighborhoods resulted.

Contributing to this somewhat chaotic development was a boom in private single-family housing construction in the 1960's. In 1964, private construction accounted for 57.6 percent of all residential building, and the figure reached 77.4 percent in 1969. More recent reports indicate a still further rise in the proportion of private residential buildings, with public housing construction actually ceasing in some cities in 1970 and 1971. Earnings of Yugoslavs working abroad have contributed to the boom in private home building, with some undesirable results. The construction of homes in the temporary emigrants' original home locality, often on unsuitable and dispersed locations with insufficient or no basic health and utility installations, has not appreciably benefited the economy and has in fact often worked counter to current economic needs and long-term social plans.

Emigration—A Safety Valve?

Having examined the patterns of interregional migration and its impact on urbanization processes in Yugoslavia, let us now turn to the third major postwar migratory movement—the emigration of Yugoslav labor to Western Europe and beyond in search of jobs or a better livelihood. Prior to the economic reforms, only 7,000 Yugoslavs were formally registered with employment services as being employed abroad, although estimates compiled by the Federal Republic of Germany for 1964 indicated that some 115,000 (including 53,000 in the FRG



A young Macedonian woman, typical of many who have left house and farm to work in industry.

—Photo by Blagoje Drnkov in Review (Belgrade), June 1971, p. 16.

[23] For a more detailed discussion of the problems of location decisions in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, see F. E. Ian Hamilton, "The Spatial Development of Industry in East Europe: The Principles and Their Impact," *Economic Planning* (Canada), March 1970, pp. 3-6, and "Location Factors in the Yugoslav Iron and Steel Industry," *Economic Geography* (Worcester, Mass.), No. 40, January 1964, pp. 46-64. See also Dennison I. Rusinow, "Slovenia: Modernization without Urbanization?" American Universities Field Staff, *Southeast Europe Series*, Vol. 20, No. 1, DIR 1-73, and the present author's *Regional Development Strategy in Southeast Europe*, *op. cit.*, pp. 186-89.

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Table 2: Employment of Yugoslavs at Home and Abroad, 1971

	Total Population (1,000's)	(%)	Employed in Yugoslavia (1,000's)	(%)	Rate of Employment (%)	Yugoslav Workers Employed Abroad in 1971: 1971 Census (1,000's)	(%)	Independent Estimate * (1,000's)	(%)	Census Total (% pop.)	Est. Total (% pop.)	Census Total (% dom. emp.)	Total Est. (% dom. emp.)
Bosnia-Herzegovina	3,743	18.3	518	13.4	12.9	137	20.4	195	22.7	3.7	5.2	26.4	37.6
Croatia	4,423	21.6	966	25.1	21.2	225	33.4	330	38.4	5.2	7.5	23.3	34.2
Macedonia	1,647	8.0	259	6.7	15.5	54	8.1	57	6.6	3.4	3.5	20.8	22.0
Montenegro	530	2.6	78	2.0	13.8	8	1.2	8	0.9	3.7	5.2	10.2	10.2
Serbia:													
Serbia Proper	5,242	25.4	976	25.2	18.3	115	17.1	120	14.0	2.2	2.3	11.8	12.3
Kosovo	1,245	6.1	100	2.6	7.9	24	3.6	25	2.9	1.9	2.0	24.0	25.0
Vojvodina	1,950	9.5	406	10.8	20.6	61	9.0	65	7.5	3.2	3.3	15.0	16.0
Slovenia	1,725	8.4	547	14.2	30.9	48	7.2	60	7.0	2.9	3.5	8.8	11.0
YUGOSLAVIA	**20,505**	**100.0**	**3,850**	**100.0**	**18.2**	**672**	**100.0**	**860**	**100.0**	**3.3**	**4.2**	**17.5**	**22.3**

* These estimates of Yugoslavs employed abroad in 1971 were derived by Ivo Baucic in the referenced source.

SOURCE: Adapted from Ivo Baucic, *The Effects of Emigration from Yugoslavia and the Problems of Returning Emigrant Workers*, European Demographic Monographs II, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1972, p. 13.

itself) were working abroad in European countries.[24] After the economic reform, emigration accelerated rapidly, and by the March 1971 census there were reportedly some 671,908 Yugoslavs temporarily living and working abroad—amounting to some 3.3 percent of the total population and 15.2 percent of the total registered nonagricultural labor force.[25] One should probably add to this figure another 190,000 who have moved overseas and presumably cannot be considered "temporary workers abroad," bringing the total number of emigrants to some 860,000 (see Table 2). This indicated an emigration rate of 4.2 percent, the highest in Europe except for Portugal.[26] (Reports in 1972 and 1973 suggest that the number of Yugoslavs working abroad may now run as high as one million.[27] In a recent study the Yugoslav economist Kosta Mihailovic observed that the average number of Yugoslav workers finding employment abroad after 1965 has approximated the annual increments to domestic employment before 1964. This was an indication to him that the pressures of rural overpopulation had not diminished but had turned from Yugoslavia's cities to foreign countries for release.[28]

The picture that emerges from the 1971 census, however, suggests that the process was more complex than a mere diversion of rural-urban migration to foreign countries. While many of the emigrants were underskilled workers from traditional rural areas of high population growth and relative poverty, a majority (over 57 percent) were qualified and skilled workers, many of whom had already been employed in Yugoslavia before departing. A full 22.3 percent of the emigrants had completed technical school, high school or university training. These skilled workers amounted to about 8 percent of the

[24] See Ivo Baucic, *The Effects of Emigration from Yugoslavia and the Problem of Returning Emigrant Workers*, European Demographic Monographs, Vol. 2, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1972, p. 3; and "The Social and Economic Effects of Labor Emigration from Yugoslavia," *Geografski glasnik*, Vols. 33-34, 1971-72, pp. 25-59.

[25] See Miloje Nikolic, "Some Basic Features of Yugoslav External Migrants," *Yugoslav Survey* (Belgrade), February 1972, p. 4.

[26] Baucic, *The Effects of Emigration* . . ., p. 3.

[27] See, for example, "The One in 20 Who Prefers it Abroad," *The Economist* (London), Sept. 5, 1970; *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), Aug. 16, 1972, which speaks of some 600,000 Yugoslavs in West Germany out of one million in West Europe; and Radio Free Europe Research, "Problems of Manpower Export in Yugoslavia," *Yugoslavia: Economy*, Jan. 22, 1973, which quotes Ivo Jerkic, Chairman of the Federal Committee for External Migration, as stating in September 1972 that there were "about one million Yugoslav citizens working in the West: 800,000 in West European states and 200,000 in overseas countries."

[28] "Socioeconomic Aspects . . .," *loc. cit.*, p. 37; see also United Nations Economic and Social Council, *Ad Hoc* Committee of Experts, "Socioeconomic Implications of Agrarian Overpopulation," June-July 1970, E/CN.9/AC, 11/L.7, June 1970.

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country's total force of employed skilled labor (including both domestic and foreign employment). Moreover, half or perhaps even more of those working abroad came from the more developed republics and regions—Slovenia, Croatia and Vojvodina (see Table 2 for 1971 data and more recent estimates of the rate of emigration by region). In the case of Croatia, the data suggest that more than 20 percent of the republic's total nonagricultural labor force may be employed abroad. Thus, the number of persons emigrating abroad from a given region to find employment has tended to be higher the higher the level of the region's economic development, rather than lower as conventional wisdom might predict.[29] The distribution of emigration by regions is presented in the accompanying figure.

The 1971 census also reveals the surprising fact that the flow of emigration first originated in urban areas, among skilled workers of middle age (30-45), and only later spread to less skilled and younger people from mixed settlements and rural communities. For example, in the period 1965-69, somewhat more than half of the emigrants to West Germany came from urban areas of Yugoslavia. As of 1970, some 84 percent of the workers temporarily employed abroad were between the ages of 18 and 39 (one-third of the total below 25). The average age of the emigrants was 30.8 years; 71 percent were married; and 68.6 percent were male.[30]

Recent motivational studies conducted among Yugoslav emigrant workers in West Germany help to broaden our understanding of these unexpected statistical data. In one sample survey, nearly three-fourths of those questioned gave as their motivation for coming to work in West Germany the desire to find housing or employment or to secure higher pay. Fully 77 percent had been employed before emigrating, and roughly half were currently working in job categories similar to those in which they had worked in Yugoslavia. The survey concluded that the wish to increase income, rather than escape from unemployment, had been a major motivating force for a substantial portion of the emigrants. For example, the average personal income of workers from Croatia was 2.64 times as great as they had earned at home, which indicated that the individual, by working four and one-half months abroad, can earn roughly the same monetary income as he would if employed for twelve months in Croatia. Obviously, in terms of real income the differential is much less, but as the poll indicated, this reality plays a minor role in the perceptions of the emigrant workers.[31]

The employment of a sizable number of Yugoslavs outside the country does have some distinct short-term advantages for the society as well as for the individual emigrants. It has unquestionably served as a safety valve for potential social unrest during a period of increased domestic unemployment. Moreover, the 20 percent of their earnings which Yugoslav workers abroad remit or bring back home represents a not insignificant sum—amounting to $90 million in 1966, $441 million in 1970, and over $800 million in 1972. These funds tend to be invested in housing, taxis, restaurants and farm tractors, all of which presumably improve the life style of the individuals involved.[32]

However, in the long run, the negative side of the ledger may prove to be more significant both for the

[29] Nikolic, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-8.

[30] Ivo Baucic, *Origin and Structure of Yugoslav Workers in the German Federal Republic, op. cit.*

[31] *Ibid.* Volume 10 in this series discusses "The Return and Reemployment of External Migrants from the Socialist Republic of Croatia"; for a summary in English, see Mustafa Begtic, "Yugoslav Nationals Temporarily Working Abroad," *Yugoslav Survey*, February 1972, pp. 17-30. The author confirmed these findings in an informal polling of 74 Yugoslav emigrant workers in February 1972 at the Munich Hauptbahnhof, a major center for arrivals of such workers.

[32] See Ivo Baucic, "Some Economic Characteristics of the Yugoslav Foreign Migration of Workers," a paper presented at an international meeting on "Conditions for the Development of Countries in the Mediterranean Area," held at Cagliari-Nuoro (Sardinia, Italy) on Jan. 19-21, 1973.

Table 3: Population Growth by Region

(natural increase per 1,000)

	1950-54 •	1960-64 •	1971
Bosnia-Herzegovina	24.3	22.6	15.1
Croatia	11.5	7.5	4.4
Macedonia	23.9	19.7	15.6
Montenegro	22.1	19.6	13.2
Serbia:			
Serbia (proper)	14.8	7.9	6.2
Kosovo	25.5	28.6	29.1
Vojvodina	10.9	6.6	3.0
Slovenia	11.9	8.3	6.3
YUGOSLAVIA	**16.4**	**12.7**	**9.5**

• Rates shown for 1950-54 and for 1960-64 are averages of annual rates in those periods.

SOURCE: *Statisticki godisnjak Jugoslavije 1972* (Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia, 1972), Belgrade, 1972, p. 343.

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individuals and for the country as a whole. Even the investments made at home by the emigrant workers are not necessarily geared to meet the needs of the domestic economy. Thus, as Ivo Baucic has observed, of the areas of investment chosen, all but housing are already in oversupply. Moreover, "inadequate and often-changing tax policies and political positions toward private enterprises" tend to discourage long-term investment of skills and resources by returning workers in such essential occupations as the servicing and repair of automobiles, electric household appliances, and television sets.[33] Moreover, the temporary or permanent loss of qualified workers impedes the country's economic development. A further threat lies in the ever-present danger of a foreign recession, which could lead to a mass return of workers from abroad, aggravating the already serious unemployment at home.

The emigrant-worker phenomenon is also socially disruptive. A high proportion (71 percent of those "temporarily abroad" in 1971) of the workers are married,[34] and the separation of husbands and fathers from their wives and children in Yugoslavia places serious social and psychological pressures on families, and particularly on youth. Demographically, moreover, the emigration of workers has contributed to a reduction in the rate of natural increase of the population. As demonstrated in Table 3, this decrease has been most pronounced in the advanced regions—Croatia, Slovenia and Vojvodina (which have also been major sources of emigration)—whereas, by contrast, in the less-developed region of Kosovo, the rate of population increase has actually risen. In the ethnically diverse Yugoslav society, this combination of a high rate of population increase in the underdeveloped regions and decelerating population growth in the more advanced sections of the country has serious political as well as demographic repercussions and has contributed to the long-smoldering national question.

Yugoslavia's Dilemma

Let us now recapitulate our findings concerning the impact of postwar migrations on Yugoslav society as a basis for examining where the country can or might go from here. Like many developing nations seeking to transform themselves from agrarian into modern, industrialized societies, Yugoslavia has found itself unable to provide sufficient jobs, housing, transportation, services and utilities for the excess rural population flooding into the cities at least in part in response to those very development policies. The nation's cities grew with little regard for medium or even short-term economic and social objectives or, for that matter, for environmental impact (witness the continued proximity of an iron-and-steel works to the center of Skopje when the city was rebuilt following the 1963 earthquake).[35] At the same time rural migratory pressures continued to accumulate as a result of the lure of the cities and the relative neglect of agriculture and other aspects of rural life. Whole villages were abandoned, and valuable land went untilled as the most youthful and productive among the rural population concluded there was little future in agriculture and joined the trek to the cities.

Yugoslavia's migratory movements have been excessive and generally uncontrolled, giving rise to a social and political instability which will continue unless the process is somehow brought under effective control. Yet to do so—as we shall see below—may involve a rethinking of the dominant postwar developmental priorities, or at least a moderation of the pace at which the society moves toward the goals of industrialization and urbanization. All studies agree that deagrarianization and urbanization can be expected to continue. Some 41 percent of the active population is still in agriculture, and as matters stand, this represents a formidable reserve of underutilized manpower and hence of potential rural-urban migrants. Forecasts for 1975 see the urban population increasing to 36 percent of the total, and it is estimated that the proportion will rise to 42 percent by 1986.[36] In such circumstances, the country's large cities will show further increases in population, but the present pattern of numerous small and medium-sized towns and a sizable non-urban but nonagricultural population will likely persist—and perhaps should be encouraged (as we shall see below).

The question uppermost in the minds of the nation's planners, economists and politicians is how


[33] *Ibid.*

[34] See fn. 30.

[35] For discussion of urban problems, see Vladimir-Braco Music, "The Response of Yugoslav Urban Planning to Development of the Country," a paper presented at the Joint Institute on Comparative Urban and Grants Economics, University of Windsor, Canada, November 1972.

[36] Igor Vriser, "The Urbanization of Yugoslavia," mimeographed paper, Ljubljana, 1971, p. 14.

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SOURCE: Adapted from Ivo Baućić, *The Effects of Emigration from Yugoslavia and the Problems of Returning Emigrant Workers*, European Demographic Monographs II, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1972, p. 46.

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A group of Yugoslav workers in Switzerland get together for lunch in the factory cafeteria.

—Photo by *Politika*, as reproduced in *Review* (Belgrade), March 1969, p. 35.

to slow the steady stream of rural migrants, how best to accommodate this surplus population—in rural, urban, and/or foreign jobs and domiciles. A recent joint party-state resolution indicated a desire to effect "a gradual reduction in the departure of workers for employment abroad" and to create conditions for the return of experts and skilled workers in particular."[37] President Tito has spoken of the "hostile ideological influences" to which workers may be subjected abroad and of the loss of 300,000 potential conscripts for the armed forces —"three full armies"—represented by Yugoslav young men working abroad.[38] Only time will tell whether projected efforts to lure skilled labor back to Yugoslavia by providing better employment and remuneration conditions will prove successful. (That many emigrant workers actively wish to return has been evidenced by the fact that, of 170,000 Croatians employed abroad who spent the 1971 New Year's holiday at home, 126,000 expressed their hope to return to Yugoslavia after three-year work stints abroad.[39]

A recent study by a group of Belgrade demographers and economists indicated recognition of the need to take integrated actions to cope with the many consequences of excessive migration—depressed agricultural production, deficient urban planning, insufficient services and housing, etc.[40] One basis for such a comprehensive plan of social and economic development has emerged in the document "Fundamentals of a Policy of Urbanization and Spatial Planning, Theses" (*Temeliji politike urbanizacije in prostorske ureditve, Teze*), prepared by the Commission for Urban Planning at the Yugoslav Federal Parliament and published for public discussion.[41] Inasmuch as any such planning must be articulated on a regionally differentiated basis, it is heartening to note recent republic legislation on regional planning.[42] To be effective, such basic laws will need to be buttressed with adequate mechanisms for implementation of planned urban and spatial development.

Any solution to the complex problems posed by migration, urbanization and emigration in Yugoslavia will require major decisions concerning the type of socioeconomic development to be pursued. At present there is a debate in Yugoslavia—noted by the late Rudolf Bicanic, and by Branko Horvat, Kosta Mihailovic, and other Yugoslavian specialists —over whether to continue the polarized pattern of socioeconomic development (with advanced and underdeveloped regions) or to give higher priority to the less developed regions in an attempt to close the gap.[43] The underdeveloped regions have, for the most part, arrived at the stage of economic takeoff. If a decision were made to foster continued and accelerating economic growth in these regions, cities here might be able to attract a significant portion of local rural population which has tended to migrate to the cities of other, more developed regions. To achieve this, existing economic activities in the less-developed regions would have to be expanded—with a diversification of industries and dispersal of plants among small and medium-sized towns in such a

[37] Radio Free Europe Research, "Yugoslavia Curbs Labor Exports to Western Countries," *Yugoslavia: Economy*, Feb. 7, 1973.

[38] "Tito Voices Concern Over Influences on Young Workers Abroad," *The New York Times*, Dec. 9, 1972.

[39] Baucic, "Some Economic Characteristics . . ., *op. cit.*

[40] Breznik, *Migracije stanovnistva Jugoslavia*, *op. cit.*

[41] An English translation was published in Belgrade by Knjiznica Zvezne Skupstine, 1969.

[42] Slovenia has taken the initiative here, in part as a result of the very basic contributions of the American-Yugoslav Project in Regional and Urban Planning located originally at the Center for Urban Studies of Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan. See the Project's *International Collaboration in Planning Research: Summary Report of the Ljubljana Region. Demonstration Study*, April 1972; also Jack C. Fisher, "The Emergence of Regional Spatial Planning in Yugoslavia: The Slovenian Experience," in George W. Hoffman, Ed., *Eastern Europe: Essays in Geographical Problems*, London and New York, Methuen and Praeger, 1971, pp. 301-53 (with comments by Ivan Crkvencic and Joseph Velikonja and a summary of remarks, pp. 354-63).

[43] For a summary of the various viewpoints, see Hoffman, *Regional Development . . .*, pp. 209-14.

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way as to meet local as well as regional needs. In light of the possible adverse effect on economies of scale, this process would have to be carefully integrated on a regional, if not national, basis. Increased attention would have to be paid to development of existing, and creation of new, regional centers, both as key points in the network of central places for location of economic and noneconomic functions and as growth poles for tributary regions. Development of the needed administrative and service infrastructure would provide further employment opportunities. In addition, increased attention to consumer goods industries, tourism, and the private service sector might further help not only to increase opportunities for employment of surplus rural manpower but also to provide possible outlets for the talents and savings of Yugoslav workers now abroad.

While such steps would undoubtedly help to increase the ability of Yugoslavia's urban system to absorb more immigrants from the countryside (as well as to decrease emigration and further encourage the return of foreign workers), it seems likely that still other measures would be needed to cope with the problem of rural overpopulation. If the rural "push factor" is to be checked by means other than legal restrictions on changes of residence, revitalization of the countryside—through the reduction of existing differences between urban and rural areas with respect to income, social services, education, transportation, and the availability of consumer goods and services—would appear to be required.

One possible means of revitalizing the countryside, suggested recently by various Yugoslav planners, economists, and demographers, is to stimulate private agriculture—at present occupying about 80 percent of agricultural land—by raising the maximum permissible landholding and instituting other incentive measures. In return, these private farmers would be encouraged to produce labor-intensive items such as tobacco, fruits, and vegetables, which are in short supply in Yugoslavia.[44] Already private producers can purchase all kinds of agricultural equipment and receive loans at advantageous rates. Hence the restrictions on landholdings seem to satisfy ideological and psychological needs rather than rational economic purposes. In addition to eliminating this obstacle to profitable farming, the government might encourage private farming by reducing taxes on private agricultural production. Rural employment might also be increased by returning abandoned arable land to production, although caution would be required inasmuch as a considerable portion of this land is marginal and cannot be put into profitable production.

Finally, beyond improving the objective appeal of rural life, the government would have to reckon with deeply entrenched attitudes which view life in the city as preferable to life in the countryside. Joel Halpern has observed how the textbooks used in Yugoslav elementary schools reflect urban rather than rural values.[45] Presentation of a more balanced view of the relative advantages of rural and urban life in these formative years might alleviate some of the pressures of rural-urban migration in the future.

A major shift in the orientation of social development away from the former heavy commitment to an urban-industrial society toward a more balanced pattern of growth in which agrarian life plays an important part is obviously a long-term process fraught with serious economic and ideological questions. However, some such change may be required if the disrupting migratory tides are to be stemmed within a noncoercive framework. Any solution to this major dilemma will require a number of simultaneous, well-planned steps in all spheres of the social and economic life of the country. While integrated nationally, they will have to be differentiated regionally to reflect adequately the diversity of the multinational Yugoslav society.

[44] Discussions along these lines were prevalent among Yugoslav economists and politicians during 1969-71, but have not been evident since the internal upheavals of 1971-72.

[45] *Modernization* . . ., pp. 338-42; see also his study "Farming as a Way of Life: Yugoslav Peasant Attitutes," in Jerzy F. Karcz, Ed., *Soviet and East European Agriculture*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967 (with comments by the late Rudolf Bicanic, pp. 356-81, 382-84).

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Soviet Policy in East Asia

By Thomas W. Robinson

The Sino-Soviet border clashes of early 1969 signaled the beginning of a series of changes in major power relationships that, with surprising rapidity, have transformed the very essence of contemporary world politics. Having left the era of static East-West confrontation, we now find ourselves in an era of movement and dynamism. The People's Republic of China has emerged as a near superpower in the military sense. Japan has almost supplanted the Soviet Union as the world's second-ranking economic power. The United States has pulled its military forces out of the conflict in Southeast Asia. And a rapprochement of sorts has come about between the two erstwhile archenemies, the US and China.

East Asia has thus become the geographic center of world politics, in the sense that only in that region do the territorial, economic, and environmental interests of the major powers intersect directly. While developments in Europe and the Middle East possess great potential for causing rapid change in the contours of world politics, it is only in East Asia that all the great powers can exert pressure upon one another with ease. The Soviet Union is in a different situation from the others, however, in that it is the sole member of the group that not only is an economic and a military superpower but whose vital interests in East Asia are intimately linked with events in other regional "hotspots." It is thus essential to understand the motives, current directions, and anticipated changes in Soviet policy toward and in the East Asian regional power nexus.

There are at least three ways in which Soviet East Asian regional policy can be analyzed. One is to split the region into its political components and treat Soviet policy as if it were the simple product of the USSR's policy toward the individual nations in the area. The second way, simpler and in some ways more satisfying, is to approach the topic historically. In this approach, regional foreign policy is usually looked at on the basis of the activities of the state's foreign office—in other words, on the basis of diplomatic history. Finally, there is the topical approach: *i.e.*, treating Soviet policy as the product of Soviet attitudes and actions in such spheres as regional trade and aid, military strategy, and balance of power activities.

Each approach has its own merits and shortcomings. The state-to-state-relations approach offers the specificity, factualness, and neatness that comes from bringing together factors of historical development and national interests, but it risks missing the "big picture" that tends to emerge more clearly when regional policy is considered as a whole. The historical approach affords the same set of advantages but has the defect of making it impossible to inspect separable aspects of foreign policy in any but chronological context. The latter shortcoming is remedied by the topical approach, which however carries with it the presumption that a given policy is more rational, as well as less susceptible to contingent or exogenous factors, than may actually be the case.

Mr. Robinson is Visiting Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (New York), where he is working on a book on Chinese foreign policy. Formerly a member of the staff of the Rand Corp., he has written extensively on the external policies and internal politics of both the USSR and China. His major publications include The Cultural Revolution in China, *1971, of which he was editor and co-author, and the forthcoming* Lin Piao: A Chinese Military Politician. *An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Colloquium Series of the University of Connecticut.*

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No fully satisfactory solution to these dilemmas is discernible, for there apparently does not yet exist a single, best means of explicating and analyzing a nation's regional foreign policy.[1] This inquiry will therefore essay a watery compromise between all three approaches, generally following the topical approach but adding large infusions of the historical and state-to-state modes of analysis.

In the present case, the way is made a bit easier by the fact that East Asia is not only a well-defined geographic (if politically and economically variegated) entity but a region made up of a relatively small number of states.[2] Moreover, until quite recently, the Soviet Union's policy in and toward East Asia was somewhat less complex than its policies toward other regions, complicated as the latter were by the Kremlin's preoccupation with problems of administration in Eastern Europe, by security questions in Western Europe and the Middle East, and by the global competition with the United States. Finally, the very fact that the Soviet leaders view the pursuit and protection of their Asian interests through Marxist-Leninist eyeglasses, coupled with the presence in the region of two other Communist-led states, has tended to give a somewhat simpler cast to Soviet policy than would probably have been the case if, say, China were ruled by a non-Communist government. To be sure, the emergence of the Sino-Soviet split greatly complicated the Soviet leaders' task in East Asia, and in addition the economic resurgence of postwar Japan has posed major uncertainties for the future evolution of Asian politics in general. But during most of the postwar period, Soviet policy toward the five political entities in the region was relatively clear, simple, and direct.

Regional Interests: Historical

In seeking to delineate Soviet East Asian policy and its probable future development, it is first of all essential to define the range of Soviet interests in the region—ideological, security-related, economic, and so on—and how they have varied over the last two decades. Thinking in national-interest terms usually involves the assumption that a state's national interests, or at least the major elements thereof, tend to be invariable over time. But this is not true of all Soviet interests in East Asia. There are at least two kinds of interests that the Soviet Union can be perceived to have pursued in the region during recent times. The first might be termed "historic" interests, relatively invariable over time and therefore quite similar to Russian policy goals enunciated, say, during the Tsarist era. At least three such interests can be listed. First, there has been a historic security interest springing out of a vague Russian fear of China, and of the large Chinese population, dating back to the era of the Mongolian "hordes" and Genghis Khan's invasion of the Russian steppe from the east. With the rise of Japanese power after about 1880, this security interest was intensified by a felt need to safeguard Soviet territory against potential (and, in some instances, actual) threats of invasion. A sense of an urgent security need continues to move Moscow today, though the external danger is again perceived to come more from a nuclear-armed China than from a Japan presently oriented toward expanding its economic rather than its military power.

Another "historical" interest follows from Russian and Soviet involvement at the European and global levels. Over the long run, there has been an evident interest on Moscow's part in maintaining a quiescent Asia in the face of more important security concerns elsewhere. While some observers have noted a rhythmic long-term alternation of Russian interest and involvement between the Asian and the European (and, more recently, the global-strategic) arenas,[3] more often than not Soviet leaders have manifested an interest in avoiding conflicts in Asia in order to face the USSR's competitors in Europe, the Middle East, and North America. To be sure, the present situation might seem to argue for a reversal of these priorities, given Moscow's apparent primary concern with the "problem" of China. Nevertheless, over the long historical pull, Moscow has regarded Asian affairs as substantially secondary, and the

[1] For a recent series of efforts at approaching foreign policy in a variety of manners, see Wolfram Hanrieder, Ed., *Comparative Foreign Policy*, New York, McKay, 1971.

[2] As defined for the purposes of this study, East Asia embraces the two Koreas, Mongolia, China (including—geographically, if not politically—Taiwan), Japan, and the Soviet Union itself. The Philippines is, by and large, excluded, although geographically it can be considered as much a part of Eastern as of Southeastern Asia. Powers geographically external to the area but politically influential within it—*i.e.*, the United States and (to some extent) Great Britain—are also not included, although obviously Soviet East Asian policy cannot be discussed without considering, for example, US policy in Asia.

[3] *E.g.*, see Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Decline of Imperial Russia, 1855-1914*, New York, Praeger, 1952, and Michael T. Florinski, *Russia: A History and an Interpretation*, New York, Macmillan, 1955, Volume 2, Chaps. 25, 26 and 42.

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present emphasis on them may well be a temporary aberration. This historical allocation of priorities derives, in large part, from the very geographic and physical setting in which Russia finds herself. Because of the heavy concentration of population and industry in the European sector of the country, the high cost of transportation (even now) from European Russia to the Far East, and the forbidding nature of the Siberian terrain and weather, Russian interest in East Asia has necessarily been limited, at least until fairly recent years. By comparison, the Soviet Union has much quicker and easier access to Europe, the Middle East, and even the Western Hemisphere.

Regional Interests: Variable

The second set of Soviet interests in East Asia might be termed "variable," since, in contrast to the relatively stable historical interests just outlined, they are more susceptible to change over time. One way to determine the specific character of these interests is to survey the whole range of Soviet Asian interests at ten-year intervals, excluding only those in the historical category, and see which interests appear to change from one survey-point to the next, and to what degree.

Let us begin, then, by looking at what appeared to be Moscow's main nonhistorical interests in East Asia in 1950. First, the Soviet leaders evinced a negative interest in preventing the United States from using Japanese resources against the USSR and in forestalling American domination of the region as a whole. This interest led Moscow to conclude close military alliances with the two other Communist states in the region, China and North Korea, and also to support North Korea's invasion of the South with a view to filling the power vacuum that seemed likely to result from indications of American disinterest in the area.

The Soviet Union also manifested a revolutionary interest in East Asia in 1950, expressed essentially in a policy of encouraging, and to some degree supporting, "anti-imperialist" and anti-colonial revolutions and trying to bring former colonial as well as other noncolonial Asian states into the world socialist alliance under Soviet leadership. Thus, Moscow attempted, with some success, to dictate the policies of local Communist groups (*e.g.*, the Japanese Communist Party) and to influence the programs of revolutionary movements throughout East, Southeast, and South Asia.

There was little in the way of a Soviet economic interest in East Asia in 1950, since most of the area's resources were denied to Moscow. The exception was China itself, where the Soviet Union found it desirable for political reasons to extend economic aid to the new regime in Peking, and where the setting-up of joint Sino-Soviet stock com-



Signing of a Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the USSR and the Chinese People's Republic on Feb. 14, 1950, by Soviet Foreign Minister A. Ya. Vishinsky. Among those looking on (starting at second from left) are N.A. Bulganin, Chou En-lai, A.I. Mikoyan, N.S. Khrushchev, K.Ye. Voroshilov, V.M. Molotov, Josef Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, and (second from right) G.M. Malenkov.

—Sovfoto.

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panies was thought, for a time, to provide a means of enlisting Chinese resources to aid in rebuilding the postwar Soviet economy. But Chinese sensitivities and the USSR's commitment to supply military hardware to its Korean War allies short-circuited this and other attempts to pursue potentially profitable economic opportunities in the region.

BY 1960, TEN YEARS LATER, the interests of the USSR in East Asia had altered appreciably. In the realm of security, while Soviet interests continued to revolve around Japan and China and changing US involvement in the area, the Soviet leaders had become increasingly anxious to prevent the United States from using Japan and its now rapidly expanding industrial power against the USSR and to keep Japan out of active and independent involvement in the region.

At the same time, Moscow's interests vis-à-vis China began changing drastically because of the emerging ideological split with Peking. The Soviet leadership now wished to retard Chinese economic growth and to prevent the extension of Peking's political-ideological credo to other parts of Asia, especially to the other three major Communist-ruled states. This is not to say that the Soviet Union wished to break its military ties with China. A common defense against the "imperialist" camp was still in both powers' mutual interest, and the Sino-Soviet alliance assured, at least for the time being, that China would not be tempted to work toward a rapprochement with its greater enemy, the United States, or attempt to restore ties with Japan. In the Soviet view, the latter possibilities appeared likely to remain remote so long as Washington continued to adhere to its policy of containment and isolation vis-à-vis Peking and Japanese policy in this regard continued to be effectively determined in the US capital. A corollary was that Moscow had no vital interest in preserving Taiwan's independence from the PRC.

Another significant change was that by 1960 Moscow's interest in promoting revolutionary prospects in Asia, particularly in East Asia, had all but disappeared. For a variety of reasons, mostly associated with the differential character of Moscow's relations with Washington (slowly improving) and with Peking (rapidly worsening), the Soviet leaders saw greater advantage in developing good relations with the governments of newly-independent Asian states than in trying to bring about their overthrow by aiding local "liberation" movements.[4] Rather than insisting upon the universal applicability of the Soviet revolutionary model, as they had in 1950 and as Mao Tse-tung was now doing for the Chinese doctrine of revolution, the Russians fell back upon a policy of pointing to the presumed superiorities of Soviet society in the hope that the demonstration effect would influence public opinion and give rise to revolution by imitation.[5] By and large, the Soviet Union has since continued to evince little interest in promoting revolutionary movements in East Asia, although Moscow, to be sure, has not ceased efforts to influence the internal politics of several non-Communist Asian states by swaying the policies of local Communist parties (for example, in Japan) and has let itself be dragged by its Asian allies into situations that it would probably have rather avoided (*e.g.*, the North Korean seizure of the USS Pueblo and the North Vietnamese rekindling of the Vietnamese civil war).


In terms of Soviet economic interests in East Asia, 1960 represented something of a nadir. The Soviet Union withdrew economic aid and technicians from China in that year, and Sino-Soviet trade began its plunge to the near-zero mark. Soviet trade with Japan remained at a low level as Japan consciously sought to integrate itself with the Western economic system. For obvious political reasons, there never was any Soviet trade with Taiwan or South Korea, nor was the USSR interested in trading with the Philippines, which Moscow viewed as an appendage of American neocolonialism. That left only North Korea, where Soviet trade interests were essentially determined by emerging political competition with China for Pyongyang's favor. This is not to say that the Soviet Union in 1960 was without any economic aspirations in Asia, particularly vis-à-vis Japan, but prevailing political conditions made it impossible to realize them to any significant degree.

BY 1970, BOTH SOVIET overall policy and the entire international environment had altered so substantially as to entail a much more pronounced change

[4] On this change, see W. Raymond Duncan, Ed., *Soviet Policy in Developing Countries*, Waltham, Mass., Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970; G. F. Hudson *et al.*, *The Sino-Soviet Dispute*, New York, Praeger, 1961; Donald S. Zagoria, *Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi*, New York, Pegasus, 1967; and Harold C. Hinton, *China's Turbulent Quest*, New York, Macmillan, 1970.

[5] See Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Challenge of Soviet Foreign Policy," in Morton Kaplan, Ed., *The Revolution in World Politics*, New York, Wiley, 1962, pp. 209-32.

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THE USSR AND EAST ASIA

SOURCES: *The Times Atlas of the World* 2nd rev. ed., Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1971, plate 16; and *Atlas SSSR* (USSR Atlas), 2nd ed., Moscow, Glavnoe Upravlenie Geodezii i Kartografii, 1969, pp. 102-103.

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in Soviet interests in East Asia. In the security sphere, despite what Moscow had thought to be major gains at China's expense as a consequence of the Cultural Revolution, the Soviet Union found that it could well be faced with a hostile coalition of nearly all the powers of consequence in East Asia. With China and the US already moving toward a rapprochement (partly as a result of Soviet military threats against China following the Sino-Soviet border incidents of 1969), Moscow realized that if the rapprochement were to go beyond the mere settlement of outstanding differences, it might possibly lead to the emergence of a Washington-centered proto-coalition composed of the United States, China, and Japan, with Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines continuing to depend upon Washington for their security.[6] Henceforth, Soviet policy in the Far East revolved around the objective of forestalling the actual creation of such a group (or any anti-Soviet subcombination such as the US and China, the US and Japan, or Japan and China), or of breaking it up were it to materialize.

The linchpin of Soviet interests in the region, as in the two prior decades, continued to be China. If China continued to be hostile, the only course open to Moscow would be to maneuver to keep her away from the Americans and/or the Japanese, and to assure that Japan, as she moved away from the United States, did not combine with China against the USSR. Therefore the Soviet Union adopted a policy toward China which combined cautious restraint with measures to strengthen Soviet military defenses against presumed Chinese territorial ambitions in Siberia and Mongolia, and initiated a policy of negotiated concessions toward Japan. If China remained unfriendly while Japan maintained close ties with Washington, Moscow would have to concentrate its efforts on preventing the formation of a grand anti-Soviet coalition. If, on the other hand, China were to become more conciliatory (say, in the post-Mao period), then the Soviet Union could afford to treat Japan less solicitously, as East Asian international politics would probably tend to freeze once more into its Moscow-Peking *vs.* Tokyo-Washington configuration of the 1950's.[7] This, however, did not appear to be a likely development, given the existing level of Sino-Soviet enmity. In any event, Moscow appeared in 1970 to retain only a minimal degree of control over future developments in East Asia.

Under these uncertain circumstances, the Soviet Union since 1970 has evidenced a renewed interest in not becoming involved militarily in East Asia, principally out of fear that, with China now possessing a nuclear capability, any recurrence of fighting on the Sino-Soviet frontier might escalate to the nuclear level, but also because of continued or increasing Soviet involvement in other areas—especially South Asia and the Middle East—and in global-strategic competition with the United States. To be sure, the 1972 strategic arms limitation agreement and President Nixon's Moscow visit, the start of discussions concerning European security and settlement of the German problem, and the expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt have all lessened the probability of Soviet involvement in war in areas outside East Asia, while on the contrary the massive Soviet deployment of forces to the China border during 1969-72 has heightened the possibilities of misperception, confrontation, and conflict in Asia between the USSR and China. Nonetheless, in the judgment of this writer, the global range of Soviet interests and involvement, the apparently genuine defensive nature of the Soviet anti-Chinese build-up, and—perhaps most importantly—the military countermeasures which the Chinese themselves began taking in 1972 to bolster their security position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union [8] all argue for a Soviet

[6] "Washington-centered" in the sense that only the United States had treaties of alliance with all these states except the PRC. Hence, alliance commitments within the emerging anti-Soviet system were still determined largely by American attitudes and actions. This became even more true once Peking and Washington effectuated their rapprochement during 1971-72. The term "proto-coalition" is used here to mean a preliminary working arrangement which has some of the features of an unwritten agreement and which can be viewed by third parties as leading at some future time to a more explicit cooperative arrangement, written or unwritten.

[7] Since a partial rapprochement with post-Mao China was the best Moscow could hope for, Soviet policy toward Peking and Tokyo was shaped accordingly. With China, the USSR would attempt to improve state relations while at the same time building up its military defenses against a recurrence of incidents of the 1969 Ussuri style and trying to deter other Asian states from aligning themselves with Peking against Moscow (hence the Soviet proposals for a "collective security" arrangement in Asia). Vis-à-vis Japan, Soviet policy was directed toward averting Sino-Japanese cooperation in the short run, hopefully without having to make excessive concessions to Tokyo (such as the return of the northern islands).

[8] Although China, given the problems left by the Cultural Revolution, was in no position in 1969 to counter the massive Soviet military buildup on China's northern borders, she did begin slowly shifting units to the north and continued to produce and deploy nuclear weapons. The big shifts, however, came in 1971 and 1972. In 1971, China's inability to intervene militarily in the Bangladesh conflict meant, paradoxically, a lessening of her military requirements on her southwestern frontier, and in 1972 the Nixon visit to Peking resulted in *(continued on page 38)*

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interest in preserving peace in Asia. The very fluidity of the international situation in Asia since the Nixon trip to Peking has no doubt tended to accentuate this interest. More specifically, the opening-up of new opportunities for Soviet initiatives as a consequence of the end of large-scale fighting in Vietnam and incipient US military withdrawal from the Asian area, as well as Japan's new quest for an independent place in the Asian sun and the potential dangers associated with possible Japanese rearmament, would seem likely to convince Soviet policy-makers of their interest in avoiding conflict in Asia.

Domestic Factors in Foreign Policy

Such appear to be the "interests," both historical and variable, which shape Soviet policy in East Asia. But they are not the only determinants; of perhaps equal importance, though more difficult to gauge, are domestic factors. Some of these factors are not entirely separable from Soviet foreign policy interests. Thus, as indicated earlier, Russia's security interest in East Asia derives in part from a historic fear of China and her burgeoning population that has become ingrained in the psyche of every Russian citizen, as has also the memory of Russia's defeat at the hands of the Japanese in 1904-05.[9] These persistent and widespread attitudes among the Soviet population can be looked upon as one of the domestic determinants of Soviet policy toward China and Japan even today.[10]

There are other determinants of a purely internal nature. For instance, the Soviet leaders' awareness of the need to have a relatively free hand to deal with the USSR's many domestic problems is certainly one of the factors impelling them to favor quietude in East Asia. Another reason for a cautious Soviet policy toward China is the fact that the Sino-Soviet boundary artificially separates Soviet national minority peoples from their linguistic and cultural brethren across the border. Given the rise of local nationalism among some of the peoples of Soviet Central Asia, concern over possible Chinese efforts to exploit nationalist sentiments in the Soviet border regions has undoubtedly influenced Soviet Asian policy in recent years.

There is also the problem of Siberia's lack of self-sufficiency and its vulnerability to attack from the south, particularly where the trans-Siberian railroad runs close to the border. (The tundra line dividing habitable from nonhabitable areas generally lies just to the north of the railway and the population concentrations huddled along it.) Not being self-sufficient in food, Siberia must import grain and other products from Western Russia and Central Asia, and the rail links with these areas are therefore vital not only for military transport but also for food supply. Any military conflict that would result in the cutting of the trans-Siberian railway would effectively isolate Siberia and place it at the mercy of an invader. The implications of this situation for Sino-Soviet relations in an era of possible confrontation between the two powers are obvious and go far to explain both the enormous Soviet military reinforcement of the Far Eastern regions since the border conflict of 1969 and Moscow's current predilection toward a cautious Asian policy.

A final internal factor influencing the Soviet posture vis-à-vis China is Moscow's concern over the potential effect on domestic political stability of Chinese criticisms of the character and policies of the Soviet party leadership. While the excesses of the Cultural Revolution served temporarily to short-circuit Chinese propaganda attacks, the restoration of stable conditions in China, in juxtaposition to the apparent inability of the Soviet leadership to solve

an understanding to defuse military tensions in the Taiwan Straits, thus reducing Chinese military requirements on the Fukien sea frontier. These developments, coupled with the dramatic resolution of the Mao Tse-tung vs. Lin Piao leadership conflict in late 1971, meant that China could now afford to concentrate her resources against possible Soviet attack. In addition to troop shifts northward, the launching of a massive shelter-building program and the emplacement in 1972 of Chinese missiles capable of reaching Moscow underscored this trend. For details, see the annual volumes of *The Military Balance*, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, for 1969-70 through 1973-74; and Harry Gelber, "Nuclear Weapons and Chinese Policy," *Adelphi Papers* (London), No. 99, July 1973.

[9] In the view of Ernest R. May, Russia had what he terms an "axiomatic interest" in preventing a repetition of her defeat at the hands of Japan, or in seeking revenge if possible, and this desire underlay Stalin's declaration that Soviet territorial gains at Japan's expense at the end of World War II were just retribution for the 1904 Japanese defeat of the Imperial Russian forces. See May's "The Nature of Foreign Policy: The Calculated versus the Axiomatic," *Daedalus* (Cambridge, Mass.), Fall 1962, pp. 653-67.

[10] A qualification should probably be made, however, with respect to the importance of the Russian popular fear of Chinese numbers. While it may be a subconscious element in the Russian popular psyche, it is doubtful that it exerts a major influence on Soviet day-to-day policy toward China. During a visit to Moscow in 1972, the author asked Soviet China specialists what role fear of the size of the Chinese population played in Soviet political and military calculations, and the answer was uniformly: nearly none.

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An April 1972 training session in the Central Asian Border District of the Soviet Union.

—Photo by N. Zhiganov for TASS via Sovfoto.

recurrent economic and other problems at home,[11] has again heightened Moscow's sensitivity to the possible effects of Chinese criticism. Although there is as yet no evidence that mounting political dissidence in the USSR looks to China for inspiration, fear that it may be encouraged by the Chinese attacks makes it obviously necessary for Moscow to maintain a strong and uncompromising ideological front toward Peking. (It may also be true that, in reverse, the Chinese challenge has influenced Soviet internal policies. Recent reports of a general tightening of controls within the party and society at large, coupled with expressions of nostalgia for the "good old days" under Stalin's firm leadership,[12] suggest that the Politburo may be attempting to reinvigorate Soviet society from above, partly in order to prevent Chinese criticisms from reinforcing domestic political dissent.)

East Asia in Soviet Global Policy

In addition to Soviet regional interests and the domestic factors just outlined, another crucial determinant of Moscow's policies vis-à-vis the individual states of East Asia is the overall pattern of Soviet policy at the global-strategic level. Unlike China, the Soviet Union is able—indeed, forced—by virtue of its military power and geographic location to play a major role in several areas of the world. While China has no doubt become an increasingly serious problem for the Soviet leaders, they still have the freedom to involve themselves in European and Middle Eastern affairs and global-strategic rivalry with the United States without having to conduct their policy first and foremost so as to counter whatever the Chinese may be up to at the moment. By comparison, Chinese capabilities outside of East Asia have remained relatively inconsequential. Given this power relationship vis-à-vis China, Soviet global strategy since the end of World War II has posited the United States as the principal adversary, the US alone—at least until fairly recently—having the military capability to wreak vast and unpreventable destruction on Soviet territory. From the military standpoint, China until the mid-1960's figured hardly at all in Soviet defense considerations—except, perhaps, for having once been looked upon by Moscow as a fraternal Communist ally that the Soviet Union was committed by treaty to defend.

[11] These problems include shortages in domestic food production; inability to keep up with rising popular demand for consumer goods, resulting in declining levels of voluntary support for the regime; generational problems arising from the tendency among younger people to rebel against previously unquestioned principles of Soviet rule; and the contradictions between the aspirations for greater freedom generated by an economically modernizing society and the legacy of political repression stemming from traditional Communist modes of rule.

[12] For a report that some in Soviet society would like to see the reimposition of Stalinist-like rule, see *The New York Times*, March 5, 1973.

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The widening Sino-Soviet split and China's development of a steadily increasing nuclear capability after 1964 necessarily altered Soviet calculations. Henceforth, the Soviet Union faced the necessity of deterring two large and unfriendly states. Moreover, whereas the US military threat was exclusively nuclear, China confronted Soviet military planners with the problem of defending a 9,700-mile common border [13] against a very large and experienced Chinese land army as well as a growing arsenal of nuclear weapons. When, in 1969, China preemptively attacked a Soviet border patrol,[14] the Soviet Union was forced to effect a drastic reorientation of its military priorities. Soviet forces now had to be divided, and the Far East became a "front" even more difficult to defend, in terms of logistics and manpower and material requirements, than the Soviet Union's European frontiers. Although the Soviet leaders by no means lost interest in pursuing their objectives in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere, since the late 1960's East Asia—more particularly, the "China threat"—has claimed higher priority in Soviet thinking with respect to defense and foreign policy.

What Moscow has most to fear is a global combination of its two major adversaries, China and the US, and the fact that both are Asian powers is a major reason for the current level of Soviet interest in the Far East. Moreover, any change in relations between two of the three "superpowers" [15] necessarily means a change in relations among all three.[16] The sharpening of Sino-Soviet hostility after the border clashes of 1969 was the principal causative agent that led Peking to the conclusion that the greater immediate threat from the north made it advisable to compromise with the lesser (at least as perceived in Peking) American threat from the east and southeast. The result was the PRC's move toward reconciliation with a US government likewise disposed to resolve Sino-American differences.

The Soviet decision-makers could do nothing to stop the Sino-American rapprochement, but there were two things—aside from looking to their own military defenses [17]—that they could do to prevent their situation from deteriorating further. The first and perhaps more important of the two was to adopt a policy of patience and to appeal to the Chinese—while maintaining high levels of Soviet military strength and deterrence—for a reasonable settlement of outstanding disputes. Two corollaries of this policy suggest themselves. One was to seek, to the extent possible, to cultivate non-Maoist and post-Maoist Chinese political leaders, and Moscow appears to have done just that.[18] Another was to attempt to smooth over existing Sino-Soviet conflicts as far as possible in the interim before Mao dies, in order to set the stage for their eventual resolution after the Chinese party Chairman has left the scene, and to prevent Peking's present anti-Soviet course from becoming a permanent fixture of Chinese foreign policy. In actuality, Moscow entered into negotiations with Peking on border

[13] The Sino-Soviet border comprises three sectors: the Inner Asian sector (2,000 miles), the Mongolian sector (2,700 miles), and the Far Eastern sector (2,000 miles). The Sino-Mongolian boundary is included as part of the Sino-Soviet boundary not only because of the limited sovereignty of the Mongolian People's Republic but also because Soviet and Chinese military forces are ranged against each other across that border and because the Soviet Union is, for all intents and purposes, in charge of the defense of Mongolia.

[14] For a detailed study of that incident and of the Sino-Soviet border dispute in general, see the writer's "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes," *American Political Science Review* (Menasha, Wis.), Vol. 46, No. 4, December 1972, pp. 1175-202.

[15] The term "superpower," as used here, applies to any state that equals or exceeds a certain level of "power" on a series of generally-accepted scales. China is clearly more powerful than all other states save the US and USSR and in "the same league" with the latter two by the following measures: extent of territory; stock of deliverable nuclear weapons; and number of men under arms. She is among the top five nations in industrial production, gross national product, political stability, and degree of national integration, and is, of course, the world's most populous nation. Only in "modernity" and "accessibility to the external world" is she markedly deficient. These ten measures are justified and discussed in greater detail in the writer's "China in a Tri-polar World," unpublished paper for the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, October 1972.

[16] This has been true in earlier periods as well as the most recent one. Since the very inception of the PRC, the triangular relationship among China, the USSR, and the US has constituted a major determinant of the foreign policies of each of the three states. When Soviet-American and Sino-American relations were bad in the early and mid-1950's, Sino-Soviet relations were good. When Soviet-American relations improved in the late 1950's and early 1960's, Sino-Soviet relations declined. When Sino-American relations warmed in the late 1960's and early 1970's, the Soviet Union became suspicious of the tie, and Sino-Soviet relations worsened still further.

[17] Some details of the Soviet military buildup in the Far East are provided later. However, it should be noted here that the buildup actually began in 1964 after the breakdown of Sino-Soviet border negotiations and accelerated during the Cultural Revolution.

[18] Here, the names of three deposed Chinese military leaders—P'eng Te-huai, Lo Jui-ch'ing, and Lin Piao—come foremost to mind. All either were accused of maintaining "illicit relations" with the Soviet Union (P'eng and Lin) or apparently advocated compromising with Moscow in the face of the presumed US threat in Vietnam (Lo). Whether the accusations against the three men were strictly true or not, the important thing is that the politico-military struggles involving them (as well, perhaps, as the purge of Kao Kang in 1954) apparently all revolved around disputes over how to deal with the Russians.

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Soviet Premier A.N. Kosygin pays a surprise visit to Peking on September 11, 1969, to suggest negotiations on outstanding Sino-Soviet issues (including border disputes). He is greeted by Chinese Premier Chou En-lai.

—TASS via UPI.

issues (though evidently without any real hope of settlement as long as Mao remained), persuaded the Chinese to restore reciprocal diplomatic representation at the ambassadorial level, and encouraged agreement to increase the volume of Sino-Soviet trade. Not much could be done on the ideological front with Mao still at the helm; nevertheless, Moscow did propose (and Peking declined) to open discussions on ideological issues, and it occasionally moderated, if only slightly, the tone and volume of its anti-Chinese propaganda.[19]

The second tactic available to Moscow for heading off the threat of a Sino-American combine against the USSR was to take positive action to improve Soviet-American relations. While such developments as the US-Soviet agreements on Berlin and the German issue, the SALT I accord, the vast stepup of Soviet-American trade, enhanced scientific and cultural exchanges and cooperation, and the Nixon and Brezhnev exchange of visits may well have occurred without the impetus provided by Sino-American moves toward improved bilateral relations, there can be little doubt that these moves accelerated the process and, in part, fueled its continuation. For as the US and the PRC proceeded with step-by-step efforts to eliminate major sources of conflict between them, Moscow must have felt increasing pressure to "keep up" with the pace of these efforts. Without a commensurate set of Soviet-US agreements, a series of Sino-American accords—or even mutual decisions to put aside such previously divisive issues as Taiwan and Vietnam—would unquestionably have been viewed in Moscow as tantamount to the very Sino-American coalition that the Soviet rulers feared so much.

Soviet competition with the United States and China is closely linked to the relative power positions and geographic locations of the three superpowers. With the United States, the Soviets must compete globally and must above all be concerned about deterring US nuclear attack. On the other hand, the threat from China is regional, and Moscow is more concerned with defense against Chinese ground action, although the problem of Chinese nuclear strength grows with each passing year. Soviet decision-makers would no doubt like to have the freedom not to have to worry about East Asian, especially Chinese, problems. Soviet security would then improve, enabling the USSR to channel its energies into areas of the world affording more interesting possibilities for enhancing Soviet influence at the expense of its paramount rival, the US. Every increment of Soviet power invested in the management of Far Eastern international politics is lost to the pursuit of Soviet objectives, for example, in the Middle East, where there are major Soviet security interests, and Africa, where at least the potentialities for Soviet gains are great. In short, the Soviet Union finds it historically unnatural and politically inconvenient to be "pinned down" by the Chinese threat in Asia.

Japan and Korea

If that were not enough, the current situation confronting the Soviet Union in East Asia is complicated still further by the reemergence of Japan as a power of political as well as economic consequence in the region. Because of her growing power and her greater freedom to choose on whom to bestow her favor, Japan now occupies a pivotal position in the Asian power balance, and it is therefore natural that she should be courted by Moscow

[19] These abatements of Soviet anti-Chinese propaganda appeared in some cases to be related to anticipations of progress in the border talks or of important political developments in China. Several times following the resumption of border talks in October 1969, the Soviet Union ceased polemics, and in midsummer of 1971 there was a marked lessening of anti-Chinese diatribes that may have been linked with the events leading up to the ouster of Lin Piao.

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and Peking, as well as by Washington. What are Soviet policy goals vis-à-vis Japan? The most important of Moscow's aims is probably to keep Japan relatively disarmed, which means discouraging Tokyo from acquiring nuclear weapons. Soviet policy-makers, however, may well find themselves in a dilemma over this question. On the one hand, they need to convince Tokyo that Far Eastern security is stable and that Soviet policy in Asia is both disinterested and pro-Japanese. On the other hand, their every declaration spells worry over the China problem, and in addition they continue (at this writing) to withhold Soviet consent to return the four small islands off northern Hokkaido which the Japanese claim to have been illegally seized by the Soviet Union at the close of World War II, and whose retention in Soviet hands is seen in Tokyo as a potential threat to Japan itself.[20] Moreover, there are convincing reasons why Moscow will probably continue to have little positive influence on Japanese security arrangements. For one, the Japan-US security treaty will probably continue in force. For another, the historic anti-Russian and pro-Chinese attitudes of the Japanese are likely to persist. Finally, Moscow no longer exercises control over the Japanese Communist movement.[21]

Other probable Soviet objectives are to wean Japan away from her ties with the US and to prevent her from entering into too close a relationship with the Chinese. Here, the Soviet Union does possess some useful instruments of persuasion. It can, for instance, offer the Japanese a peace treaty that would include some concessions to Japan's claims to the northern islands. More important, Moscow can offer to cooperate economically with Japan by trading Soviet raw materials (especially oil) for Japanese industrial goods and investment in Siberian development. There are, however, some serious obstacles to Soviet success. Japanese political leaders, anxious to preserve an even balance between China and the USSR,[22] do not wish to anger Peking by assisting the Soviet Union to build up its power in the very regions where that power, enhanced by greater regional self-sufficiency and closer integration with the Soviet transportation net in the western part of the USSR, would most directly threaten Chinese territory. Hence the cautious slowness with which the Japanese have responded to Soviet proposals for cooperation in Siberian development.[23] This hesitancy may also reflect some lingering uncertainty in Tokyo as to whether Siberian development will prove to be in the long-term interest of Japan herself, not to mention the interests of China (or even the United States). If Japan aspires to regain the status of a world power in every sense of the term, her leaders may well have reservations about the wisdom of helping to strengthen the position of perhaps her greatest rival in Asia.

If Moscow policy-makers are frustrated with China and worried about Japan, they have no such worries about Korea. It is true, of course, that the degree of Soviet influence in Pyongyang has declined sharply since its high point at the beginning of the Korean

[20] The Soviet position has hitherto been that sovereignty over the islands was decided at the end of World War II and is non-negotiable. It is possible, however, that Moscow might move away from this position as the price for an agreement that would draw Japan into a close working relationship with the USSR and hence, hopefully, away from Peking. On the Japanese side, a *New York Times* report of March 8, 1973, indicated possible Japanese willingness to compromise on the northern islands issue in return for a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty and an agreement to move ahead on the proposed joint development of Siberian oil resources. But Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka's recent visit to Moscow for talks with the Soviet leaders resulted in no visible progress toward resolution of these issues.

[21] Historic relations between the Japanese and Soviet Communist Parties are covered in Robert A. Scalapino, *The Japanese Communist Movement*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967. For more recent developments, see Karl Dixon, "The Growth of a 'Popular' Japanese Communist Party," *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver, B.C.), Fall 1972, pp. 387-402; and Rinjiro Harako, "Prospects for Relations with the USSR," *Survey* (London), Autumn 1972, p. 53.

[22] On the general subject of Japanese foreign policy attitudes, see Donald C. Hellmann, *Japanese Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: The Peace Agreement with the Soviet Union*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969; also, the collection of articles entitled "Japan at the Crossroads," in *Survey*, Autumn 1972, pp. 30-159, and various issues of *Pacific Community* (Tokyo).

[23] Political pressure from Peking against the conclusion of a Soviet-Japanese agreement has probably been partially responsible for Japan's go-slow attitude in negotiating with the Russians. However, there have also been economic obstacles to an accord, primarily involving the terms of joint cooperation in Siberian development projects. A major stumbling block is the question of ownership of oil-producing facilities to be financed and constructed by Japan, once they are in place. The Japanese want to retain at least part-ownership, whereas the Russians want a "turnover" arrangement whereby they would take title upon completion of construction. Present indications are that, despite the pressure from Peking and Japan's anxiety not to offend the Chinese, some Soviet-Japanese economic agreements will eventually be concluded if mutually satisfactory terms can be agreed upon. For details of Soviet-Japanese relations in recent years, especially as they bear on Siberian development, see Violet Conolly, "Soviet-Japanese Economic Cooperation in Siberia," *Pacific Community*, October 1970, pp. 55-65; David I. Hitchcock, Jr., "Joint Development of Siberia: Decision-making in Japanese-Soviet Relations," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, Calif.), March 1971, pp. 279-300; T. C. Rhee, "Japan and the Soviet Union," *World Affairs* (Washington, DC), June 1970, pp. 240-57; Martin E. Weinstein, "Japan and the Continental Giants," *Current History* (Philadelphia), April 1971, pp. 193-99; and Kiichi Saeki, "Toward Japanese Cooperation in Siberian Development," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1972, pp. 1-11.

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Japanese Premier Kakuei Tanaka (second from left) is welcomed to the Kremlin by Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A.N. Kosygin, and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, at the start of Japanese-Soviet negotiations on Oct. 8, 1973.

—Photo by V. Masaelin for TASS via Sovfoto.

War [24]—and Moscow has never packed any weight, either political or economic, in Seoul. Nevertheless, North Korea's independent posture within the group of Communist states gives Moscow some assurance that Chinese influence there will be kept within bounds, and at the same time the opening of negotiations between the North and South Korean regimes in 1972 may hearten the Russians as a sign of some flexibility in the South's ties with the United States. Moscow probably welcomes the Korean negotiations, too, as a factor tending to diminish tensions in Northeast Asia, to keep North Korea away from too close a relationship with Peking, and to insure against a recurrence of hostilities between North and South which might lead to a confrontation of the major powers. Short of a North Korea firmly in the Soviet camp, an independent regime in Pyongyang looking toward peaceful unification with the South probably represents the next best situation for Moscow. If nothing else, it removes the Korean issue from the list of potential tension spots with the United States and reduces the likelihood of any firm North Korean alignment with Peking that could prove dangerous in the context of a severe exacerbation of Sino-Soviet conflict.

[24] For recent surveys of Soviet-North Korean relations, see Morton Abramowitz, "Moving the Glacier: The Two Koreas and the Powers," *Adelphi Papers*, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, No. 80, 1971; Chin O. Chung, *North Korea's Attitude in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1958-1967*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Nebraska, 1970; Joungwon A. Kim, "Soviet Policy in North Korea," *World Politics* (Princeton, N.J.), January 1970, pp. 237-54; Yong-Soo Kim, "North Korea's Relationship to the USSR: A Political and Economic Problem," *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR* (Munich), November 1971, pp. 34-38.

Moscow's Asian Security Scheme

While seeking to orchestrate its relations with individual East Asian states to its own advantage, the Soviet Union since 1969 has also made tentative efforts to promote the construction of a wider Asian system of "collective security," presumably calculated to bolster the USSR's strategic position in the area as a whole. Moscow has not been very forthcoming regarding the details of the arrangement it has in mind, and it is consequently difficult to evaluate the purposes and seriousness of the scheme. Moreover, since a generally unenthusiastic reception of the proposal by the Asian states has resulted in meager progress toward materialization, there is little empirical data to go by other than Soviet declarations.[25]

[25] For Brezhnev's original formulation of the proposal, see "Speech by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev" (to the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties), *Pravda* (Moscow), June 7, 1969, translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, Ohio—henceforth cited as CDSP), July 2, 1969, p. 16.



Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Foreign Minister of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, Kho Dam, confer in Moscow on Feb. 23, 1972.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

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In a speech delivered in March 1972, Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev declared that "collective security in Asia must . . . be based on such principles as renunciation of the use of force in relations between states, respect for the sovereignty and the inviolability of borders, noninterference in internal affairs, and the broad development of economic and other cooperation on the basis of full equality and mutual advantage." [26] This sounds very much like an enumeration of the principles of "peaceful coexistence" which form the basis of Soviet declaratory policy and which Moscow favors including in treaties of friendships with other states.[27] In fact, it seems likely that what the Soviet leaders envisage for Asia is not necessarily a single multilateral security pact, but perhaps a network of bilateral treaties between the USSR and individual Asian countries on the model of the Soviet-Indian Treaty of Friendship of August 1971. More recently, G. A. Arbatov, Director of the USA Institute in Moscow, indicated to the author that any new "collective security" arrangements in Asia would have to include China and Japan, and should take the place of existing military treaties and agreements in the area (*i.e.*, between the US and its Asian allies and between China and other Asian states). He further expressed the view that they might include provisions for arms limitation and perhaps even for nuclear-free zones, as well as for steps to expand trade and cultural relations.[28]

It would appear from the foregoing evidence that Moscow conceives of an Asian "collective security" system more in terms of a gradual process of working collectively (which can mean bilaterally or multilaterally) with Asian states to bring about conditions of enhanced all-round security in Asian international relations, rather than in terms of a clearly-defined, integrated system conforming to generally accepted Western concepts of collective security.[29] In any event, the Soviet scheme would seem to have three probable objectives:

1. To construct a Soviet-sponsored *cordon sanitaire* around China. Although Moscow has stated that China "could become a full member of this system," [30] what this really appears to mean is that once the rest of the system is already in being, Peking would be invited to join on terms set by the Soviet Union and its fellow partners. Meanwhile, it is very difficult to distinguish the Soviet scheme from an anti-Chinese alliance, and Peking has vehemently opposed it on that very ground. Certainly, there is no chance whatever that a Mao-led China would join.

2. To lay the groundwork for a Soviet presence in Asia filling the void, or near-void, left or assumed to be left by the decision of the US and Britain to greatly reduce their own military forces in the area.[31] Moscow, of course, vigorously opposes such exclusively non-Communist Asian groupings as the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and especially the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), all of which it would like to persuade the Asian states to scrap in favor of its own collective security scheme.[32]

3. To forestall the emergence of new alliances or groupings of Asian nations, Communist or non-Communist, that China, or even Japan, might seek to forge under its leadership. From the Soviet point of view, of course, nothing could be worse than the

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[26] See "Speech by Comrade Brezhnev" (to the 15th USSR Congress of Trade Unions), *Pravda*, March 21, 1972, translated in *CDSP*, April 19, 1972, p. 8.

[27] A similar version was also embodied in points 1, 2, and 3 of the joint US-Soviet "Declaration of Principles" issued during the Nixon visit to Moscow. See *Pravda* and *The New York Times*, May 30, 1972. For the version that was included in the Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty of Aug. 9, 1971, see *Pravda* or *The New York Times*, Aug. 10, 1971.

[28] Conversation with G. A. Arbatov, New York, March 27, 1973. Similar indications can also be gleaned from various Soviet radio broadcasts in early 1973—*e.g.*, Radio Moscow, March 11, and Radio Peace and Progress, March 12, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report, Soviet Union* (FBIS-SU), March 11, 1973, p. C8, and March 12, 1973, pp. C1 and C3, respectively.

[29] Inis L. Claude, Jr., the principal authority on collective security, defines the concept as "the proposition that aggressive and unlawful use of force by *any* nation against *any* nation will be met by the combined force of *all* other nations" (emphasis added). See *Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization*, New York, Random House, 1956, p. 251. In this sense, collective security implies the conclusion of a treaty among a number of nations requiring all the signatories (except the aggressor) to go to the immediate defense of any signatory attacked by another signatory (but not by a state not party to the treaty). Theoretically, all aggression would be deterred by the prospect of a massive and automatic coalition against it.

[30] Radio Moscow, March 7, 1973, tr. in *FBIS-SU*, March 9, p. D10.

[31] See V. V. Matveev, "A Filled 'Vacuum,'" *Izvestia* (Moscow), May 29, 1969, partially translated in *CDSP*, June 18, 1969, p. 14. Significantly, Soviet authorities cited this article when asked about the purpose of Brezhnev's Asian security proposal. This suggests that British and American announcements of impending troop withdrawals from Southeast and Northeast Asia triggered the insertion of the Asian collective security line in Brezhnev's speech of June 7, 1969. It is doubtful, however, that Moscow had really thought out the full potentialities of the proposal at that time.

[32] Along this line, see V. Pavlovsky, "Asia: Regional Cooperation and Collective Security," *New Times* (Moscow), July 8, 1972, pp. 18-20; and D. Pavlovsky, "Problems of Regionalism in Asia," *International Affairs* (Moscow), April 1969, pp. 46-51.

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creation of a Chinese-sponsored Asian security system directed against Moscow.


Recent statements from Moscow suggest that the Soviet leaders, in trying to achieve these objectives, may seek to utilize the 1971 friendship treaty with India as a springboard for selling their security ideas to other Asian states.[33] It would seem to follow from this that they intend to try to win converts first among the Southeast Asian countries on the strength of the Indian example, and that they will only later extend their efforts to East and Northeast Asia. But even if Moscow were to succeed in persuading some Southeast Asian states to accept its security proposals, there is every reason to expect that China will continue her bitter opposition, and that Japan will remain aloof in order to preserve her new, friendly relationship with Peking. It should be noted here that Moscow does not seem to include Mongolia and North Korea in its proposed Asian security network, presumably because the USSR already has full-fledged defense treaties with them and hence their participation in any wider security system would only mean a dilution of Soviet influence. In fact, Moscow's desire to avoid any such dilution is probably a major reason why it shows no interest in a real regional collective security system in which each member state would have a veto over collective response to aggression by any other member. In short, what Moscow appears to be aiming at is not a system of collective security in the accepted sense of the term, but rather a system of collective defense largely under its control and directed against China.[34]

Soviet Military Policy

Moscow's initiative for a new Asian security structure brings into clearer focus overall Soviet military policy in East Asia. The central component of that policy is, of course, the defense of Siberia against possible Chinese attack. This concern not only has a major influence on Soviet military policy throughout the area but also affects Moscow's military policy in other regions. It seems clear, for instance, that

[33] The Radio Moscow broadcast cited above (fn. 30) stated that Soviet-Indian relations could become "the foundation of the whole system of international relations in Asia."

[34] For statements differentiating between collective security and collective defense, see Claude, *op. cit.*, pp. 25 *ff.*; and Arnold Wolfers, "Collective Defense *versus* Collective Security," in Arnold Wolfers, Ed., *Alliance Policy in the Cold War*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1959, pp. 49-74.



A Chinese nuclear test filmed by the CPR, as viewed on Japanese television in early 1967.

—Wide World.

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the Soviet Union's willingness to sign the 1972 arms control treaties with the United States and to proceed with the SALT II negotiations, its agreement to settle the Berlin question and to move substantially ahead in its relations with West Germany, and its readiness to discuss reciprocal force reductions and general security matters in Europe have all been directly influenced by Soviet preoccupations with the perceived Chinese "threat." [35]

At present, the Soviet Union is reported to have the most powerful concentration of military force on the face of the earth deployed adjacent to China's northern borders—more than 45 infantry and armored divisions, backed by heavy logistical and air support and by units equipped with a wide variety of nuclear weapons. These forces face Chinese forces of roughly equal number but with significant relative deficiencies in equipment and weaponry.[36]

As long as the current state of tension in Sino-Soviet relations persists, it seems probable that the Soviet Union will do nothing in Asia as a whole that would adversely affect its military position vis-à-vis Peking. Thus, for instance, it is highly unlikely that Moscow would accede to any North Korean move to resume hostilities against the South (indeed, Moscow's encouragement of the joint decision by North and South Korea to attempt to resolve their differences peacefully may have augmented the points of conflict between Moscow and Peking). Similarly, Soviet military opposition to China is likely to moderate Moscow's opposition to the buildup of Japan's military forces. Peking, of course, is attempting to convince Tokyo that it favors such a buildup, perhaps in order to create the impression that China and Japan are moving into some common arrangement against Moscow (though this is certainly not Japan's intention, nor was it China's at least until 1972).[37] In another area, while Japan is hardly likely to resort to force against the USSR to regain the northern islands, the China problem perhaps makes the Soviet Union more amenable to compromise on this issue.

Militarily, of course, the Sino-American détente was highly disturbing to Moscow as one of its major effects was to greatly reduce tensions in the Taiwan Straits and Chinese concern over a possible Nationalist invasion from the sea, thus enabling Peking to move forces from the Fukien coastal regions to areas opposite the Soviet border. In a way, the end of large-scale American involvement in the Vietnam conflict and even the outcome of the Indo-Pakistan war over the independence of Bangladesh also contributed to a relative change in the Sino-Soviet military balance in China's favor. The former eliminated any potential American threat to China's territorial integrity from the south as well as the necessity to deploy air and ground forces in South China to defend North Vietnam against invasion. In the latter case, China's failure to go to the defense of her Pakistani ally paradoxically lessened the necessity to maintain forces threatening India for a contingency that would probably never again arise.[38]

Under these circumstances, it is probably safe to venture the general conclusion that the Soviet Union will not initiate military activity in East Asia—whether against China, toward whom the Soviet posture is, despite Chinese fears and accusations, essentially defensive; against Japan, who might be spurred by any threat of Soviet military action into an all-out rearmament that nobody wants; or in relation to Korea, where tensions have greatly lessened and where the United States would have to be faced directly in the event of a Soviet-supported North Korean threat to South Korean independence.

The situation would alter, of course, if one or more of several variables were to change. If the Soviet dispute with China were to be settled and Sino-Soviet tensions significantly reduced, if the scale and/or pace of Japanese rearmament were to be stepped up beyond presently contemplated levels, or if US force dispositions and policies in Asia were to change drastically, the Soviet Union

[35] This is not to say that the China factor was the sole or even the decisive motivating force behind the Soviet moves to reach an accommodation on the German and European security issues. However, it seems certain that Moscow's interest in resolving these issues was heightened by its concern over Soviet security vis-à-vis China.

[36] As of late 1972, the Soviet Union had deployed in the frontier areas about 44 divisions (including two in Mongolia), together with a large array of supporting artillery, air power, nuclear warhead storage sites, and missiles. These forces aggregate somewhere between 750,000 and 1,000,000 men, as compared to less than 450,000 men and 15 understrength divisions before 1969. China has about 55-60 divisions in the military regions adjacent to the Soviet border. But not all of these troops are detailed to border defense, and none are as heavily armed and well-equipped as the opposing Soviet forces. See *The Military Balance (1972-73)*, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972, pp. 7 and 43; and *The New York Times*, March 4 and 28, 1973. The Chinese reportedly have not yet moved the massive numbers of troops and equipment from East and South China that they could, probably because of the unsettled state of the Chinese military leadership following the purge of former Defense Minister Lin Piao.

[37] See *The New York Times*, March 28, 1973, for reports of such Chinese pressure.

[38] See fn. 8.

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would be faced with a quite different balance-of-power situation. From the Soviet point of view, the present situation in East Asia has one thing to commend it—namely, that despite the growing problem of China the situation is still under Moscow's control, at least militarily. In other words, there is a measure of stability in the East Asian political and military situation that is not inimical to Moscow's interests. Thus, while the Soviet leaders may be willing to make some sacrifices to settle the conflict with China, they may be quite content to live with the present status quo if a settlement cannot be reached.

Unpredictable Contingencies

This leads us to consideration of a final question: *i.e.*, the problem of "break-points," or unpredictable contingencies, that may suddenly intervene to make any projection based on a given status quo short-lived. At least four such contingencies come to mind. The first, which is unpredictable in the sense that no one knows exactly when it will occur, or what the political consequences will be, is the death of Mao-Tse-tung. The Chinese policy of total opposition to the Soviet Union has, ever since its beginning in the mid-1950's, been Mao's own policy. That policy has encountered internal opposition at least twice, and perhaps thrice,[39] since 1956, and it is probable that after Mao's death at least some of his successors will argue for an end to the confrontation with Moscow. Although the very passage of time tends to cause a hardening of views on both sides and thus to lessen the chances (and possible scope) of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement after Mao, this writer sees little doubt that one of the issues on Peking's agenda in the post-Mao era will be whether or not to improve relations with the Soviet Union.

The extent to which Sino-Soviet relations and hence Far Eastern international politics as a whole would be altered by a Sino-Soviet agreement to remove certain questions from the list of outstanding differences between Moscow and Peking would, of course, depend on the relative importance of the issues resolved and the length to which the two capitals would be willing to go to settle other questions. Even so, almost any softening of Peking's present intransigent anti-Soviet line would likely signify a profound change in the international relations of the region. The policies of all Asian states including Japan, and of the United States as well, are now predicated on continuation of the Sino-Soviet conflict. A scaling-down of that conflict would not necessarily mean that Japan, for example, would no longer be able to balance Moscow against Peking and would therefore be thrown back into the arms of the United States; much would depend on the character and extent of the amelioration in relations between the two Communist states. Still, a different basis upon which to ground the East Asian international political equilibrium would probably have to be found. That basis could well be both peaceful and multilateral if all parties acted with care. The danger would be, however, that rapprochement between Moscow and Peking would at least partially rekindle the Sino-Soviet ideological unity that split the world into two camps during the 1950's. Given the vastly increased power of a Soviet-Chinese combine in the 1970's, the consequences in terms of international politics would be that much more severe.

A second potential contingency that needs to be considered is a substantial change in the orientation of Japanese foreign policy. As in the case of Sino-Soviet relations after Mao, the probability of some modification in Japan's Asian policies is high. The questions are what sort of change it is likely to be, and how it may affect Soviet policy within the region. To gain some impression of what could lie ahead in this respect, it may be useful to extrapolate from present trends in Japan that are likely to affect Tokyo's external policies. There are four such trends: (1) toward increased independence from the United States; (2) toward greater attention to domestic social problems, which appears to be causing a leftward political trend;[40] (3) toward a buildup of military power capable of regional application, although

[39] See fn. 18. It is still not clear whether Lin Piao was personally opposed to Mao's anti-Soviet policy or whether the opposition came from some of Lin's high-level military subordinates whose views he felt he had partially to reflect. In any case, there is no primary evidence as yet that Lin was guilty of having contacts with the Russians (as Peking has charged), or that he advocated changing Peking's anti-Moscow stance and withdrawing the invitation to President Nixon to visit the Chinese capital.

[40] At the moment, the movement leftward stems from the efforts of the ruling Liberal-Democrats to restore their waning voter appeal by devoting a greater proportion of Japan's national resources to the solution of increasingly urgent urban and social problems. It should be noted that many polities faced with similar difficulties have often wound up opting either for a socialism of the left or for a nationalism of the right—both of which have tended to affect foreign policy. In *(continued on page 48)*

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the question of developing a nuclear capability will probably remain open; and (4) toward enhanced economic strength, making Japan the rival of the Soviet Union and the United States, and certainly more powerful in the overall economic sense than China.

It would seem to follow from the first two and the last of these four trends that Japan will expand the scope and degree of her involvement in Asia, and from the first and the third that she will change the content and direction of her present foreign policy. One possible result is that Japan will continue to move still closer to China than it already has in the past 14 months. While Tokyo's present policy is still one of balancing between Peking and Moscow within the context of the security treaty with the United States, were the trends outlined above to lead to a Japanese decision to let the treaty lapse, Japan might even choose to enter into some sort of defense arrangement with China against what both Peking and Tokyo might consider a common Soviet threat from the north. (To be sure, however, a Sino-Soviet reconciliation that appeared to be firm and lasting would short-circuit such a development and probably throw Tokyo back into a close relationship with Washington. This possibility might, indeed, restrain Japan from being too hasty in abandoning its present tie with the United States.)

Faced with the possibility that Japan could further solidify its ties with China, even perhaps to the point of entering into a bilateral defense arrangement against the USSR, Moscow might try to "buy off" Tokyo by compromising on the northern islands issue and offering more favorable terms for Japanese participation in the Siberian development venture. Whether Tokyo would be tempted to accept such a deal in spite of its obvious anti-Chinese political implications is impossible to say, but Japan's ever-increasing need for large and diversified supplies of raw materials might force her to make an unpalatable choice between economics and politics.

Japan's case, opting for the former would likely produce a shift toward anti-US and probably anti-Russian and pro-Chinese policies. Opting for rightist nationalism, on the other hand, would likely mean not only anti-US and anti-Russian but also anti-Chinese foreign policies.

To this writer, the continuation of a leftward trend in Japanese politics seems probable, and this is true regardless of which party or parties—the Liberal-Democrats, a coalition of the Liberal-Democrats and some other non-Marxist party, or a Socialist-Communist alliance—hold power in Japan. There are a number of reasons for such a judgment. First, Japan faces many domestic problems that only a government-directed program of reforms (in contrast to a market-oriented *laissez-faire*ism) can alleviate. Second, if the now-ruling Liberal-Democrats implement the reforms, their political program *ipso facto* moves leftward. Third, the Liberal-Democrats may be forced to shift to the left if for no other reason than to reconstitute their electoral base in the cities and thus take away potential (and actual) support from their opponents. Fourth, if the Liberal-Democratic Party as a whole does not move leftward, it may well stand to lose an upcoming election to some coalition of opposition parties appealing to the voters on the basis of a claimed superior ability to solve Japan's social problems.

Sino-Soviet War?

The last contingency, *i.e.*, Sino-Soviet war, is the one most talked about but, in the writer's opinion, one that is becoming increasingly unlikely. China is rightly fearful of the Soviet military might massed near her borders, and Moscow, whether rightly or wrongly, is also fearful of what it perceives as Peking's propensities toward military excesses and territorial revisionism. Admittedly, the military dispositions on both sides may seem to point to an increasing possibility of war, either intentional or accidental: the enormous forces facing each other and the fearsome nature of their weaponry, coupled with the degree of reciprocal misperceptions prevalent in both Moscow and Peking with regard to each other, inspire forebodings of the breakdown of a fragile peace and the outbreak of a tragic, unnecessary, and avoidable conflict. Nevertheless, a careful reading of the propaganda and the negotiating positions of the two sides and an inspection of the military balance itself lead to the conclusion that a conflict is becoming ever less likely.

When statements made purely for propaganda purposes are thrust aside, the intentions of both sides appear to be largely defensive. Even the military dispositions reflect this for the most part, although the Soviet troop deployments, necessarily so close to the border, are naturally perceived in Peking as an acute threat to Chinese territory. Most important of all, the military balance is gradually shifting toward rough equality as the Chinese provide themselves with advanced military hardware—ranging from radars and other early warning devices to nuclear weapons—in quantities more nearly adequate to deter Soviet attack. As long as Moscow is convinced that China possesses the capability to destroy one or more major Soviet population centers, no matter what Soviet preemptive or defensive measures are taken, the Soviet leaders will be deterred from any large-scale attack on Chinese territory or an attempt to "take out" Chinese nuclear installations. This, in fact, has already been the situation for the last several years, and with every passing month

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the Chinese nuclear retaliatory capability increases. Thus, unless misperceptions come to dominate thinking on both sides or some accident triggers a major exchange of military blows, it is unlikely that war will occur.

Nonetheless, Sino-Soviet armed conflict cannot be ruled out absolutely. Were it to occur, even on a relatively small scale, the impact on East Asian international politics and the policies of affected nonwarring states, especially Japan and the United States, would be extreme. Much would depend, however, on the duration of the conflict, external assessments of its cause, the level of violence, and the kinds of weapons used.

Most scenarios assume a Soviet initiative, although the possibility of a forestalling Chinese attack cannot be excluded. It is highly unlikely, however, that the Soviet Union would be so foolish as to let itself be drawn into a long land war in Asia. The more probable Soviet choices might be a lightning thrust aimed at seizing strategic segments of Chinese territory—such as Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, and parts of Heilungkiang—in order to create a buffer zone protecting Siberia; one or more punitive incursions across the frontier to destroy specific Chinese military units as an example and as a means of extracting political concessions from Peking; a quick nuclear strike either against Chinese nuclear installations or against specific industrial targets; or finally, military assistance (*e.g.*, supplies, armor, and air cover) to one or more of the Chinese military factions that might emerge in a post-Mao struggle for power. What the Chinese response would be to any of these is more difficult to predict, but if China found herself either losing badly or in desperate need of a concrete military success to "even the score," she might be tempted to launch a nuclear attack at Soviet military or civilian targets. As argued above, it is the likelihood of such a Chinese response that, more than anything else, deters the Soviet Union from initiating military action against China in the first place. If, however, Soviet military leaders were to perceive a very high probability of impending conflict, they might exert heavy pressure on the Politburo to sanction the launching of a preemptive nuclear strike; hence, the probability is high that if a Sino-Soviet war—however unlikely that may be—were to eventuate, it would be nuclear from the very outset.[41]

Any use of nuclear weapons by either or both antagonists would have two immediate effects. First, prevailing westerly winds would quickly spread poisonous fallout particles to Korea, Japan, and other neighboring East Asian countries, and eventually to US territory. There would thus be a strong compulsion on these countries to exert collective pressure on the belligerents for immediate cessation of nuclear hostilities, or—if only one side had resorted to nuclear warfare—to unite behind the state that did not. Second, if either belligerent were to gain a decisive advantage by a nuclear first-strike, this would massively threaten the balance of power in Asia and the world as a whole, probably causing the major nonbelligerent states to bring strong collective pressure to bear on the winning state to restore the *status quo ante*, or (because such a restoration would not be very likely) to form a firm alliance in defense of the defeated state—an alliance which could also encompass other geographic areas as well as matters other than defense. In either case, world politics and East Asian international relations would enter a new and more uncertain era as a consequence of the breaking of the nuclear barrier and the necessity of starting over again to forge a new Asian power balance on a more stable basis. Thus, if the USSR were to emerge the "winner" in such a conflict with China, it might find itself faced with a grand coalition of all the states vitally interested in Asia, with such countries as Japan and India possibly yielding to the compulsion to rearm, probably with nuclear weapons.

Outlook

To sum up, the past quarter-century has seen vast changes in Soviet policy in and toward East Asia as China and Japan have risen in power status, as US policy has altered, and as Soviet interests themselves have changed. In contrast to the situation in 1950, when the Soviet Union and China were partners in a common front against the United States and its Japanese ally, Moscow now feels the need to confront its Far Eastern neighbor with a formidable array of military force, fears a Sino-American-led proto-coalition against the USSR, worries about Sino-Japanese rapprochement, and ponders how to deal with regional Japanese (and, to some extent, Chinese) economic power. By 1973, Moscow's policy of

[41] For an extended discussion of these and other possibilities, see the author's *The Border Negotiations and the Future of Sino-Soviet-American Relations*, Santa Monica, Calif., Rand Corporation, August 1971. See also O. Ferdinand Miksche, "Sino-Soviet War 19xx?," in Raymond L. Garthoff, Ed., *Sino-Soviet Military Relations*, New York, Praeger, 1966, pp. 193-202.

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subordinating Asia to its primary European concerns —or, more recently, to global Soviet military and political competition with the United States—has been forcibly altered by the necessity to treat East Asia as an area of no less vital concern to the USSR than Europe or the Middle East. The central interests and objectives of the Soviet Union in the East Asian region are to defend Soviet territory against possible Chinese attack, to forestall the development of a Sino-American coalition, to break up the Japanese-American alliance, and to keep Japan both disarmed and away from close alignment with Peking.

Present Soviet military and political policies in East Asia are explicable in terms of these vital interests and objectives. In the realm of military or security policy, Moscow seeks to deter the Chinese from initiating military action to recover "lost" territory and at the same time deems it wise to refrain from anti-Chinese military moves that might trigger a major nuclear exchange; and it also seeks to prevent other states—specifically, North Korea—from precipitating a military conflict in which Soviet forces might become involved. In the political sphere (and in support of these security policies), Moscow seeks to forestall a further deterioration of the political situation by calling for a series of bilateral "friendship" treaties in the name of Asian collective security; by endeavoring to assuage Chinese hostility and thus set the stage for possible restoration of close Sino-Soviet ties after Mao passes; by tempting Japan, through economic inducements and hints at a compromise on the northern islands, not to move too close to China; and by coming to terms with the United States on security and other issues in order to keep pace with the rapprochement between Washington and Peking.

These policies would seem to carry a fairly high probability of success, barring the possible intervention of the imponderables we have pointed out above. While Sino-Soviet armed conflict appears increasingly unlikely, a leftward drift in Japanese domestic politics could lead to close Sino-Japanese ties that might have an anti-Soviet bias. On the other hand, a melioration of Sino-Soviet relations that might well follow upon Mao's eventual demise could lead to a new, if attenuated, bipolarity that does not now seem to be in Moscow's long-term interest.

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Marxism in Venezuela

By Benedict Cross

Over the forty-plus years since its founding, the Communist movement in Venezuela has pursued a checkered course that has failed—at least until very recently—to attract more than a miniscule following to its ranks. Yet a number of factors make the movement an interesting and important target for scrutiny. In the characterization of Venezuela's most famous Communist dissident, Teodoro Petkoff, the party organization has a "rare" profile that sets it apart from more conventional sterotypes.[1] It is one of the few Communist parties on the Latin American continent to have adopted armed struggle—*"lucha armada"*—as an active strategy during the first half of the 1960's, in the wake of Fidel Castro's victory in Cuba. Partly as a result of the latter, it has played an influential—if negative—role in modern Venezuelan history out of all proportion to its political strength. Internally, it has undergone numerous divisions in its history, including three major splits. Its continuous internal wrangling has reflected an absence of traditional Marxist-Leninist discipline and a very loose interpretation of "democratic centralism" on the part of factional groupings.

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of Venezuelan communism is the recent emergence of Petkoff's dissident group as a force to be reckoned with on the political scene. In an effort to undo—or at least to sidestep—the critical damage done to the popular image of the insurgent Left during the *lucha armada,* these Communist dissidents have formed a Marxist nationalist party which abjures all revolutionary models. It has struck a strongly anti-Stalinist stance, but at the same time it has shifted attention away from the politics of international communism to concentrate instead on purely national issues. Its obvious aim is to polarize the Venezuelan electorate, wooing elements of the military as well as the *marginados* (the poverty-stricken masses who, in Marxist terms, have been not so much "exploited" as left idle on the fringe of Venezuelan socioeconomic development). By the time the present article is in circulation, the strength of this new offspring of communism will have been tested in Venezuela's national elections of early December. While there is no expectation that it can seriously challenge the parties of the democratic Left that are the major contenders in the election, the indications are that it may manage to capture a larger vote than any Communist grouping has registered in the past.

In attempting to assess the impact of the Communist movement in Venezuela, it may be useful to review some of the highlights of the country's political, economic, and social evolution to the present day.

The Historical Background

In broad perspective, Venezuela presents the rather striking picture of a nation which has emerged from the "dark ages" of over a century of political tyranny, economic primitiveness and civil war to become—in a period of some 15 years since 1958—one of the few relatively stable democracies on the South American continent.

Historically, the course of Venezuela's political development was set in the era of Spanish colonial

Benedict Cross is the pen name of an American observer of Communist affairs who has recently lived in Latin America for several years.

[1] Teodoro Petkoff, "The Division of the Communist Party of Venezuela," *Libre 1* (a Spanish-language quarterly published in Paris), September-November 1972, pp. 19-36.

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dominance. Once the colonizers failed to find a city of gold—the fabled "El Dorado"—along the Orinoco River (the largest waterway in what is now Venezuela), the Spanish crown had little interest in the area and treated it as a second-class colonial outpost. As a result, it remained relatively isolated from European influence throughout the colonial period. In this vacuum, a number of small, independent power centers emerged, a pattern that continued to prevail after the Andean colonies—under the leadership of the venerated "Liberator" Simón Bolívar—won their independence from Spain (1821) and Venezuela was proclaimed a separate republic (1830). For the rest of the 19th century, the Venezuelan scene was characterized by an almost uninterrupted struggle for supremacy among independent *caudillos*—political dictators with their own armies and local seats of influence, who successively tried to dominate the country as a whole. While some dictators were more "benign" than others, their reigns were generally marked by authoritarian rule and widespread corruption.

Two consequences of this era were of particular importance in Venezuela's later social and political evolution. First, the *latifundista* system that is common in much of South America (under which the vast landholdings of a few rich owners are farmed by *campesinos*—peasants—on a tenant basis) did not become widespread in Venezuela because of continuing political instability. Partly as a result, the country did not develop a rigid social structure, and the population remained relatively free of class-consciousness—a fact reflected in contemporary social and political behavior. Secondly, in the wake of the most serious period of struggle, a liberal *caudillo* named Guzman Blanco broke the back of the Catholic Church in Venezuela, divesting it of its political power and properties, and exiling its archbishop; the Church has since remained a minor force socially and politically, although 90 percent of the population is nominally Catholic.

During the present century Venezuela's political development has fallen into four distinct periods: The years 1908 to 1935 saw the reign of the supreme *caudillo* of them all, Juan Vicente Gómez, known as the "tyrant of the Andes," who ruled the country with an absolute hand, picking henchmen to alternate with him in the presidential palace on the basis of indirect elections that were patently controlled from the top.

Gómez' death in December 1935 ushered in a dozen years of mixed political development: two initial successors—General Eleazar López Contreras, who ruled from 1936 through 1941, and General Isaías Medina Angarita, in power from 1941 to 1945—were still *bona fide* presidential dictators, but both started out their regimes by undertaking some limited liberalization of political life, allowing the recognition—for the first time in Venezuelan history—of legal opposition parties. Of the several principal parties which emerged, *Acción Democrática* (the Democratic Action Party) quickly established itself as the strongest force on the political Left under the leadership of Rómulo Betancourt. In a coup sparked by the issue of succession, the AD joined with a group of military officers to overthrow Medina in October 1945; Betancourt was declared Provisional President of the Republic, and for some three years his regime and a successor regime (elected by universal suffrage in 1947) made a determined effort to institute constitutional political democracy and to launch programs of economic development and agrarian and social reform.

This effort was abruptly aborted in November 1948, when a countercoup by a conservative military junta dominated by Colonel (later General) Marcos Pérez Jiménez plunged the country into another decade of strong-man rule. Pérez Jiménez, who formally assumed the presidency in the years 1952-58, proved to be one of the most corrupt military dictators in modern Latin American history.

A final and crucial coup, widely supported by the population (including many in the military), led to Pérez Jiménez' overthrow and exile in January 1958, paving the way for Venezuela's return to constitutional government. In the period since, three presidents have been elected to five-year terms in office: Rómulo Betancourt who served from 1959 through 1963; Raúl Leoni, also of the Democratic Action Party, from 1964 through 1968; and Rafael Caldera Rodríguez of the Social Christian Party (*Comité de Organización Politica y Electoral Independiente*—COPEI), from 1969 through the end of 1973. While these administrations have pursued different programs and policies, all have worked to strengthen popular allegiance to the democratic system.

Paralleling the pattern of political change, economic and social development has come late but dramatically to Venezuela. At the time of Gómez' death in 1935, the country was an isolated agrarian society; over two-thirds of the population were *campesinos*, and since there was very little industry of any kind, there was virtually no working class —in terms of a perceptible social force—in the

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urban population. The wartime and postwar periods have brought about great socioeconomic changes, owing—more than any other factor—to the development of rich petroleum deposits in the country. As a result of rapidly expanding extraction of its "black gold" (mainly by foreign companies), Venezuela has become one of the world's largest producers and exporters of oil and has come to boast one of the highest per capita incomes in Latin America. At the same time, the country's dependence on this source of wealth has served as a psychological deterrent to significant capital investment in industry and agriculture. There has been some growth of small industry and manufacturing, but stockraising and agriculture—potentially important sectors of the economy—have tended to lag. Continued economic diversification and growth have been among the major objectives of the regimes in power since 1958.

The course of the country's recent development has given rise to a number of difficult economic and social problems. The middle class in Venezuela—which is one of the largest on the continent—has generally prospered in the years since 1958, but poverty is still widespread among the masses. While even the poorest segment has a higher average income than in most countries of Latin America, the lower 50 percent of the population still receives less than 15 percent of the national income, and the lowest 20 percent less than 3 percent of the income. In the current hemispheric climate of nationalistic ferment, there has been increasing pressure in Venezuela for social reforms that would distribute the wealth more evenly. There has also been growing pressure for nationalization of the foreign-owned oil industry, creating complex and problematical decisions for whatever government comes to power following the December elections. Moreover, Venezuela faces critical problems of overpopulation and underemployment, to be discussed later in this paper.[2]

Several of the above aspects of Venezuela's evolution have directly affected the nature and course of the Communist movement, and a brief summary of these factors may provide a useful framework in which to discuss its haphazard history. First, the extended periods of dictatorship up to the turning point of 1958 meant that the Communist party organization (the *Partido Comunista de Venezuela*—PCV) operated underground or in exile through most of its early years. It thus had little chance to develop a political base among either the peasants or the workers and was forced to remain a small, embattled party. A more important limitation was the highly effective competition it faced on the democratic Left, particularly from *Acción Democrática*. As Robert Alexander has stated in a useful study of Venezuelan communism: "Throughout virtually its [the PVC's] entire existence, another party of the Left, AD, has appealed to exactly the same groups, has promised many of the same short-run achievements, and has had the advantage of seeming more likely to fulfill its promises within a relatively shorter time than the Communists."[3] In the 1960's, the COPEI emerged as another formidable competitor of the Communists, especially among university youth.

The years of dictatorship stifled political thought as well as political organization, with the result that most Venezuelan Communists were relatively ignorant in the area of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.[4] Moreover, the combination of late political development and the aforementioned absence of a rigid social structure led to a general lack of social and political discipline, producing, in the case of the Communists, a membership that did not easily bow to leadership dictates and that frequently became embroiled in infighting (one of the main subjects of controversy being how to deal with the AD).

This indiscipline also affected the Venezuelan Communists' foreign relations and contacts—in the first instance, with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Comintern. The PCV top leaders generally remained loyal to the Moscow line and obedient to CPSU dictates—with the notable exception of the period of party support for the *lucha armada*. (They were duly rewarded, it might be added, with a rather generous flow of support and subsidies from the Soviet comrades.) But the leadership was unable to instill the same fealty to

[2] For information on the Venezuelan economy, see economic bulletins published by the ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America), United Nations, New York.

[3] Robert J. Alexander, *The Communist Party of Venezuela*, Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1969, p. 213. For much of this brief background, the author has drawn on Mr. Alexander's study and his ideas.

[4] Teodoro Petkoff has been quoted as remarking: "The kind of Marxist formed in the 1930's and 1940's in Latin America is a very simple person, theoretically speaking, because he ignores the phenomena that do not fit into his theoretical preconceptions." See Norman Gall's series of interviews with Petkoff entitled, *Teodoro Petkoff: The Crisis of the Professional Revolutionary*, New York, American Universities Field Studies, 1972, p. 6.

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Moscow in the Communist flock, resulting over time in a proliferation of ideological views and political loyalties, as we shall see.

Against this broad background, let us examine the emergence of the Communist movement as a radical minority that has been as much frustrated by as frustrating to the rest of Venezuelan society.

The Early Years

The PCV enjoys the distinction of being Venezuela's oldest political party. It was founded clandestinely in May 1931 under the tutelage of the CPSU, admitted to the Comintern in 1935, and—during the brief respite of political permissiveness under López Contreras—held its first Congress in 1937, though it was still not legally recognized. A new period of crackdown circumscribed political activity during the late 1930's, but the Communists nevertheless managed to establish significant strength in local unions, particularly among the oil workers.

After the advent to power of President Medina, the Communists were allowed to form a legal front in 1942 under the name *Unión Popular Venezolana* (Venezuelan Popular Union), which in turn endorsed the President's slate of candidates in the congressional elections of that year. The latter act of endorsement paved the way for the party's first split. A faction led by Juan Bautista Fuenmayor which favored support of the Medina regime was expelled from the *Unión Popular* in 1944, but it quickly regrouped and was permitted by Medina to claim the title *Partido Comunista de Venezuela* (PCV). The remainder renamed themselves *Partido Comunista Unitario* (Unified Communist Party—PCVU). Following the overthrow of Medina and the establishment of the first Betancourt regime, the two parties at first cooperated fitfully but then ran separate candidates in the 1947 national elections. Since the new suffrage laws extended the vote to illiterates, all parties adopted identifying colors for the elections; as a result, the PCV became known as the "Red Communists," and the PCVU—once again changing its name to the *Partido Revolucionario Proletario/Comunista* (Revolutionary Proletarian Party/Communist), or PRPC—became known as the "Black Communists." The larger Red faction favored partial cooperation with the new democratic regime and generally supported it, even though the AD managed in this period to maneuver the Communists out of their hold on the labor movement.

After the restoration of dictatorship in November 1948, the "Reds" joined the AD in underground opposition to the military junta, and by May 1950 they were once again outlawed as a party. The "Blacks," having (correctly) identified the AD as the major enemy of communism, worked to harass the government in 1947-48 and then opted for cooperation with the junta; subsequently used by the new regime to counter AD's underground activity in the labor movement, the "Blacks" were eventually absorbed into the regime's unions and finally dissolved as a party in July 1952, leaving the "Reds" as the surviving CP organization.

The period of clandestine opposition to the Pérez Jiménez regime was characterized by a combination of cooperation and competition among several political parties which had been forced underground, including—besides the AD and the PCV—the *Unión Republicana Democrática* (Democratic Republican Union—URD) and the aforementioned COPEI, both of which had been formed in 1946. The underground movements of these parties generally collaborated on anti-regime strategy, but each was staking out areas of future influence and power. Within the PCV there was at first deep division over the tactic of cooperation with the AD. Fuenmayor, who had generally supported Betancourt in the 1947-48 period, did an about-face to urge cooperation with the military against AD, and as a result was again expelled from the PCV in 1951. Toward the end of this period, three men became dominant in the PCV leadership: Gustavo and Eduardo Machado, brothers and senior party members from a wealthy Caracas family; and Jesús Faría, originally an illiterate petroleum worker, whose political astuteness brought about his rapid rise in Communist ranks

In December 1957 a number of leaders of the AD, URD, COPEI and the PCV (represented by Gustavo Machado) met outside the country to plot the overthrow of Pérez Jiménez and to plan on a subsequent government. Within a month, the coup was successfully carried out, and a Provisional Government under shared civilian/military leadership was set up. Interestingly—and perhaps prophetically—another month passed before the PCV's decision to cooperate in the "patriotic junta" was formally approved by the party Central Committee.

The year 1958 proved to be a fateful turning point for the PCV, as it was for Venezuela as a whole. In the wake of Pérez Jiménez' overthrow, the Communists—though still an incohesive minority—

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Jesús Faría, an early leader of the PCV and its present Secretary General.

—Photo from *Elite* (Caracas), April 12, 1970, p. 66.

hit what was probably the peak period of political respectability and popular support in their history. Sharing in the acclaim that was accorded all the political parties which had worked to oust the dictator, they managed to reestablish a sizable following in the labor movement (amounting to 15-20 percent by the end of the year [5]). They also emerged in a relatively strong position in the *barrios* of Caracas—the slum sections of the capital city—owing mainly to the organizational abilities of young activists who had been recruited to help fight Pérez Jiménez.[6] In this situation, the leadership of the now legalized PCV was hopeful that the party would play a part in the coalition government that was to be formed on the basis of national elections in December 1958.

Unhappily for the Communists, this was not to be. The uneasy civilian/military relationship during the period of the Provisional Government showed the AD leadership that its democratic ambitions were still subject to challenge. In particular, a rightist effort by a senior general to dissolve the PCV and AD parties in mid-1958 must have signalled Betancourt that he had a long way to go to establish his party's credentials with the skeptical military and the wealthy Venezuelan conservatives, and that any pact with the relatively powerless Communists would constitute a folly with enormous and perhaps fatal consequences for democracy in Venezuela.[7] Soon after, the three major parties—AD, URD, and COPEI—agreed to the so-called "Pact of Punto Fijo," which committed them to a coalition government, excluding the Communists, under whichever of their candidates won the December elections.

Communist reactions to this exclusion were at first mixed. For several months the leadership was irresolute and split on how best to deal with the situation; but a number of factors combined to impel the party gradually but inexorably toward a course of violence after the election and installation of the Betancourt government.

The Onset of Violence: 1959-61

The record of events suggests that the Communist Party was drawn into a course of open struggle against the government by degrees, less as the result of leadership policy decisions than as a consequence of a process of radicalization that developed across a broad spectrum of the Left in the wake of Castro's victory in Cuba in 1959. While the PCV leadership assumed a posture of intrepid opposition to Betancourt from the start, it did not adopt a clear-cut policy of armed struggle until well

[5] Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

[6] See Talton R. Ray, *The Politics of the Barrios of Venezuela*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969.

[7] See Philip B. Taylor, *The Venezuelan Golpe de Estado of 1958: The Fall of Marcos Pérez Jiménez*, Washington, DC, Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1968. For a detailed study of the military threat to Betancourt in 1958-59, see Winfield J. Burggraaff, *The Venezuelan Armed Forces in Politics, 1935-59*, Columbia, University of Missouri Press, 1972.

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after civil strife had broken out—and even then vacillated in its line and its tactics.[8]

The radicalization of the Left first gathered momentum among the youth wings of the AD, the URD and the PCV. These groups had played a vital role in the urban resistance movement against Pérez Jiménez and felt somewhat alienated from the older political leaders, most of whom were returning from the relative comfort of exile. The youth organizations had strong ties to the universities, which had been the centers of radical thought and activity in the underground period, and they were highly impatient for dramatic social change following the backward years of the dictatorship. During 1959-60 their impatience combined with a fascination over the Castroite experience and a flowering of revolutionary romanticism to spark the emergence of a new party, causing major splits and realignments among the existing forces of the Left and paving the way for the eventual formation of a revolutionary front and guerrilla army.

The new party, *Movimiento Izquierdista Revolucionario* (the Left Revolutionary Movement—MIR) was formed in May 1960 primarily out of the left wings of the AD and URD parties. In a speech in Congress in late June, its chief founder, Domingo Alberto Rangel, a defector from AD, was frank to admit that MIR had been inspired by the events in Cuba. The formation of the party was a serious blow to the Betancourt government, since it won over from AD 15 parliamentary deputies and one Senator, as well as the vast majority of AD's youth wing and many of its leading intellectuals. At the same time, MIR confronted the Communists with the prospect of a rival which claimed to stand to the political left of the PCV. While the MIRistas declared themselves to be Marxist-Leninists, they had the advantage at the start of being unencumbered by ideological or organizational baggage or by ties to the international Communist movement. Most certainly, the romantic and radical challenge of MIR was one of the crucial factors that moved the PCV toward open adoption of the *lucha armada*.[9]

The first phase of the developing struggle against the regime can be dated from the spring of 1959 through 1961. During this period the rhetoric of the radical Left became increasingly harsh, but incidents of violence were sporadic up to the emergence of MIR.

In November and December 1960 MIR and the PCV collaborated for the first time in a series of demonstrations, with the leaders of both parties calling for general strikes and popular "rebellion." The government reacted by closing down the Communist newspaper, *Tribuna Popular,* raiding the headquarters of both parties, and suspending some of their activities.

According to available evidence, the year 1961 was marked by continuing disagreement within the PCV over the course it should take, with the leadership and its supporters facing increasing pressure from the younger ranks to abandon all pretense of constitutional behavior and openly proclaim war on the regime. (Three of the most outspoken proponents of struggle were Teodoro Petkoff, Douglas Bravo and Guillermo García Ponce, all of whom were to play key roles in the insurgent movement.) A PCV Congress in March and a party plenum in October both took an ambivalent stand that endorsed the *lucha armada* but held that the time was not yet ripe for an all-out struggle. Meantime the party began to organize cells for further street demonstrations, assigned funds for the development of guerrilla training camps in the countryside, and sent some of its young people to Cuba for training in urban and guerrilla warfare. Urban terrorism increased significantly in late 1961, though there is evidence that it was carried out by MIR and PCV extremists without party authorization.

Struggle and Political Strategy: 1962-63

The first important signs that the PCV leadership had yielded to the pressure for a sustained struggle against the government appeared in early 1962, and if violence ever had a real chance to destabilize the Betancourt regime, it was probably in this period. A succession of strikes and university disturbances marked the beginning of a systematic campaign of terror in the cities that was to continue throughout the rest of Betancourt's presidency. Meantime the MIR and the PCV got their first rural guerrilla groups into operation, respectively in January and April 1962. The radical Left also managed to infiltrate and develop some support within the armed forces, sparking two attempts at mutiny in the naval and

[8] For a useful study of this period, see *Castro-Communist Insurgency in Venezuela*, Washington, DC, US Department of Defense, Advanced Research Projects Agency, Project No. 4860, 1965.

[9] A second division within AD in 1961 resulted in its losing a majority in Congress, contributing further to the Communists' belief that popular opposition was mounting against the Betancourt government.

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marine corps in May and June 1962.[10] By May, Betancourt felt forced to take new countermeasures, suspending both the MIR and the CPV, seizing their records and properties, and prohibiting all their activities. Seemingly undaunted, MIR and the PCV moved in mid-1962 to organize a new revolutionary front, *Frente de Liberación Nacional* (National Liberation Front—FLN) and military arm, *Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional* (Armed Forces of National Liberation—FALN), charged respectively with directing and carrying out the campaign of violence.

At a December Central Committee plenum, the PCV leadership for the first time formally announced a strategy of armed struggle, but it was still hedging its bet. The policies of the PCV and MIR were obviously influenced at this juncture by the onset of the presidential election year. On the one hand, the insurrectionists were determined that if they could not effect the overthrow of the Betancourt regime, they would at least do everything in their power to disrupt the electoral campaign, discredit the democratic process, and create an atmosphere in which a peaceful transfer of power to a successor regime would be difficult. At the same time, leaders in both parties—though legally suspended from political activity during the campaign—pursued a secondary strategy of attempting to form a coalition behind the URD candidate for president so as to defeat the AD.[11] The government countered this two-pronged effort by standing firm in the face of increasing terrorism (including a particularly shocking attack on a passenger train in September) and by jailing a number of MIR and PCV leaders and congressional deputies for their illegal activities in advance of the election.

The results of the election represented an overwhelming repudiation of the strategy of violence. Despite last-minute terrorist efforts to frighten the public away from the polls, over 90 percent of Venezuela's registered voters turned out to elect the AD candidate, Raúl Leoni, to the presidency by a plurality vote of 33 percent; the *campesinos*—particularly loyal to the AD because of the party's past efforts at agrarian reform—cast a majority for Leoni, while the urban workers distributed their support more evenly among the democratic parties.[12]

Guerrilla Warfare: 1964-66

Unfortunately, the lessons of the 1963 election were lost upon the insurgents. After a brief respite, the CPV, MIR and FLN/FALN resumed the campaign of violence, now shifting the main focus of their struggle from urban terrorism to rural guerrilla warfare.

It is one of the ironies of the PCV's history that the Communists waited until a party plenum of April 1964 to issue their first unequivocal commitment to the *lucha armada,* espousing classical guerrilla warfare as their key strategy (albeit "without neglecting the struggle in the cities").[13] This stance was struck after the insurrectionists had clearly failed to weaken—let alone bring down—the developing democratic system. Indeed, Venezuela's democratic institutions seemed in a better position than ever to resist challenges from either the radical Left or the conservative Right. In this situation, the insurgents' shift to guerrilla war marked the abandonment of hope for the immediate downfall of the government and an effort instead to build a base in the countryside for a prolonged struggle.

This course was to prove just as unprofitable, however, as the campaign of urban terrorism. For some two years, various guerrilla bands engaged in hit-and-run fighting in the countryside, seeking to win over as much *campesino* support as they could and terrorizing those in the rural population who resisted. Guerrilla activity reached a peak in the first half of 1965; but the clear futility and high cost of this effort had meantime produced growing opposition within the ranks of both the MIR and the CPV to a continuation of the struggle. Some of the leaders of MIR, including its founder, Domingo Alberto Rangel, were the first to dissociate themselves from the violence, splitting off from MIR to form a dissident party in 1964. "Soft-line" spokesmen of the PCV soon voiced similar sentiments,

[10] According to Teodoro Petkoff, who was then a member of the party's "military command," the party tried to start uprisings in the armed forces twice in 1962 but failed. In his view, the PCV-inspired revolts in May and June at Puerto Cabello and Carupano came too late and were a serious mistake. From that time on, the possibilty of a successful armed struggle with help from the military was out of the question. See Gall, *loc. cit.*, p. 11.

[11] In Petkoff's view, the foundering insurgency movement made another mistake by failing to abandon its terrorist campaign at least temporarily during the 1963 electoral campaign. He argues that instead of "walking with one foot in the armed struggle and one in the elections," the party should have thrown its full support behind the URD candidate, Jovito Villalba. See Gall, *ibid,* p. 12.

[12] Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

[13] See Carlos Lopez, "The Communist Party of Venezuela and the Present Situation," *World Marxist Review* (Toronto), October 1964.

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calling for a diminution of the costly and wasteful guerrilla war and a new effort to pursue political as opposed to armed struggle. Infighting over this issue surfaced at a PCV plenum in April 1965 and continued to build up during the year, resulting in a waning of PCV authority over the insurgents and an estrangement of FALN leaders from the PCV. At the end of the year Douglas Bravo and other diehard insurgents undertook a revolt within the PCV, seeking to form a new Central Committee sympathetic to their cause. In reaction, the PCV leadership reformed ranks and in early 1966, without completely repudiating the armed struggle, called on the party to undertake a campaign of "democratic pacification." To the relief of Moscow and the despair of Havana, CPV chairman Jesús Faría thus set a course for the party's eventual return to legality.

Once the PCV leadership opted to reemphasize the political over the military struggle, the disengagement of the MIR and FLN/FALN forces from PCV policies was a foregone conclusion. In April 1966 the FALN/FLN chiefs reorganized their ranks without the approval of the PCV Politburo, which in retaliation suspended Bravo from the PCV leadership in May. On June 11, 1966, MIR and FALN leaders published a letter in Cuba's *Granma* newspaper and in the Caracas daily, *La Republica*, denouncing the Politburo's ouster of Bravo as a "revisionist" act, scoring their own dissidents, and reaffirming the policy of armed struggle. Soon afterward three PCV leaders who had once been among the most enthusiastic supporters of the *lucha armada*—Teodoro Petkoff, Pompeyo Márquez, and Freddy Muñoz—issued a rejoinder in the form of a statement supporting the end of guerrilla warfare.[14]



Antigovernment guerrillas Douglas Bravo, right, and Luben Petkoff (brother of Teodoro), left, pictured with Mexican journalist Mario Menendez in December 1966 in the mountains of Falcon State.

—UPI.

For the Communists, this act marked the unofficial termination of the era of armed struggle, though some loose ends remained to be tied. In March 1967 the PCV leadership, in denouncing the terrorist assassination of the Foreign Minister's brother in Caracas, publicly charged Cuba with interference in Venezuela's internal affairs.[15] Castro replied bitterly, accusing the PCV of selling out the guerrilla movement to regain its legitimacy. A month later the PCV Central Committee issued a formal statement of frank self-criticism, committed the party to return to a peaceful course, and expelled Bravo from the party altogether.[16] The second major split in the Communist Party was thus complete. Sporadic acts of rural and urban terrorism by the insurgent diehards were to continue for several years but without much discernible impact.

The Radical Left in Disarray

The Marxist Left that emerged from the *lucha armada* in 1966 was a very different phenomenon from what it had been in 1958, and it may be useful at this juncture to pause for an overview.

In 1958, there had been just one Marxist political party, the PCV. It could claim control of 15 or 20 percent of the labor movement; had strong support in the urban *barrios* as well as in the univerities and secondary schools; had indeed registered the second largest vote in Caracas in the December 1958 election, although it had won only 6.3 percent of the national vote; and—if of negligible importance outside the big cities—had at least earned national respectability as a result of its participation in the overthrow of Pérez Jiménez.

By 1966, there were at least three radical Leftist organizations—the PCV, MIR and FLN/FALN—already splintered and destined to split still further. Among them, they probably could not have claimed the support of 5 percent of the labor force, and they

[14] Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

[15] "The Reply of the Communist Party to Fidel Castro," *El Nacional* (Caracas), March 17, 1967.

[16] Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

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had immeasurably damaged their image among the poor of both the cities and the countryside by their terrorism. While MIR and the PCV still had a strong base in the universities, the revolutionary romanticism sparked by Castro, Ché Guevara, Régis Debray, *et al.*, was fast fading as more young people lost their lives in the futile struggle. Although it has been claimed that FALN's strength, including guerrillas and logistics support groups, ran to over 2,000 men at the peak of its activity,[17] the insurgents probably could not have mustered the backing of 200 people throughout Venezuela by 1966-67. In this situation, the radicals' attitude—in stark contrast to the outward and hopeful posture of the Communists in the beginning of 1958—was one of looking inward at their own mistakes, contemplating their future, and weighing their survival.

One of the striking characteristics of the Marxist Left by 1966 was the multiplicity of individual and group views that existed with respect to the revolutionary effort. Through trial and error, the various participants in the *lucha armada* had experimented with urban terrorism and guerrilla warfare, with organizational and logistical methods of supporting these operations, with smuggled weapons and homemade explosives. At another level of experimentation, they had been feeling their way in relations with the Soviets, the Cubans, the Chinese, and fellow Latin American Leftists.[18] They had debated ideology and studied various revolutionary writers from Debray to Leon Uris (whose *Exodus* was said to have provided some ideas about commando action). The result was that many individuals or small groups emerged from their experience in one part of the movement with differing concepts of how to conduct the struggle. Within each of the three main Marxist organizations, there were divergent views on violent *vs.* political activity, urban *vs.* rural terrorism, protracted *vs.* tactical conflict. Since in the end all methods seemed to fail, these debates became increasingly esoteric and irrelevant. From 1967 onward, those who clung to the pursuit of armed struggle were to convey the impression of being variously medieval debaters, irreconcilables, desperate revolutionaries, or just plain criminals and robbers.

At the same time, the dissipation of revolutionary élan did not mean that those who were now ready to turn to a peaceful political path had completely abandoned their revolutionary ideals. Within the PCV, a number of militants and radicals assumed the attitude, as good Marxist-Leninists, that the party's adoption of a peaceful course was only a temporary tactic and that armed struggle could eventually be resumed. The dominant mood can perhaps best be described as a revolutionary mentality in the Maoist sense: the Venezuelan Left had been through its "long march," the only difference from the Chinese precedent being that it had failed—and failed miserably. Among the survivors, there was still a certain camaraderie rooted in the shared experiences of the past and a continuing sense of alienation from the democratic system (and particularly from the AD).

Perhaps most important, many Marxists had come to see the folly of trying to adapt the teachings of Mao or Fidel to Venezuela—first because the country was overwhelmingly urban and increasingly nationalistic by 1966, and second, because the very system of government which they despised held out the promise of access to the media, to the Congress and to the people, subject to the Left's pursuit of a peaceful course. At the height of the armed struggle, the radicals may have taken some pride in providing the surrogate battlefield for ideological debates between the Soviets, the Chinese and the Cubans. But by 1966-67, their "foreign connections" had become more of a burden than an asset.

The Impact of Pacification

For some time after its formal renunciation of violence, the PCV remained under official suspension from political activity. But with a tolerance that is characteristically Venezuelan—and in this case particularly admirable, considering the aggravation the country had suffered—the Leoni government decided to permit the Communists to participate in the national elections of 1968, not under the PCV banner but as a front called *Unión Para Avanzar* (Union for Advancement—UPA) which had a red rooster as its unmistakable Communist symbol. The UPA ran candidates for Congress throughout the country, though it did not name a presidential runner, giving its unsolicited support to the presidential candidate

[17] Teodoro Petkoff has claimed that the FALN at one time had five 100-man brigades, each supported by a logistics group of 300 to 400 men. See Gall, *loc. cit.*, p. 15.

[18] The present paper has not dealt with the fascinating international aspects of this period in the development of the Venezuelan Left, since they are peripheral to the issues being discussed. For an illuminating study of the Left's international connections, see D. Bruce Jackson, *Castro, the Kremlin, and Communism*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969.

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of the *Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo* (People's Electoral Movement—MEP), a new leftwing splinter of the AD party.

The elections of 1968 went off smoothly, with no interference from the terrorist remnants isolated in the Venezuelan hills. Rafael Caldera of the Social Christian Party managed to win a narrow victory over the AD candidate, Gonzalo Barrios, in a four-way contest for the presidency, although the AD recaptured the largest number of seats in the congressional races.[19] Although the UPA (PCV) campaigned energetically, it won only 2.8 percent of the popular vote and sent only five deputies and one senator to the new Congress. This minimal vote for the only Marxist party running in the election was clear testimony to the impact on the Left of nearly a decade of violence. In retrospect, it seemed hard to imagine that such a miniscule political force could have managed to cause the predecessor AD governments so much concern over the possibility of a popular uprising. Certainly, the election seemed to confirm a strong anti-Communist bias in the Venezuelan electorate at large.

Virtually the first official act of the new government, taken in March 1969, was the legalization of the Communist Party and the announcement of a policy of "pacification"—an essential ingredient of the COPEI promise of a *cambio* (change) from the years of violence under AD. Pacification was to become the hallmark of Caldera's administration—a government of *dialogo* with all political factions of the Right or Left, at home and abroad. On the domestic front, the regime set out to encourage former guerrillas either to leave the country (on occasion with government support) or to turn themselves in with some hope of amnesty; to expand contacts and improve relations with Leftist political groups, particularly the PCV; and to discourage publicity about any counterinsurgent activity still necessary, minimizing the role of the military and giving the police a more benign image. In the field of foreign affairs, Caldera moved toward the establishment of diplomatic relations with all countries in Latin America, regardless of their forms of government, and toward the opening up of relations with the Communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Among other effects, the policy of pacification permitted the reentry of numerous former insurgents (returning from prison, exile, or the hills) into active political life; gave official sanction to legitimate Leftist activities; and resulted in a marked expansion of Marxist propaganda, particularly in the urban centers. This very emphasis on openness and legitimacy was to contribute to the further, extensive fracturing of the Marxist movement—leading by



Gustavo Machado, one of the founders of the Venezuelan Communist Party, pictured in 1967.

—Cover photo from G. Machado, *Ante El Consejo de Guerra* (Before the Court Martial), Caracas, Veneprint S. A., 1968.

[19] The COPEI party—with close ties to the Chilean Christian Democratic Party of Eduardo Frei—had managed during the two successive AD administrations not only to show increasing strength as the chief opposition party to AD but to compete effectively with the Communists in the universities and secondary schools. In particular, the COPEI youth movement, which was imbued with a spirit of Christian social reform without being tied to the Catholic Church, had provided ideological competition for the Marxist Left. Many of the youth leaders became members of Caldera's cabinet.

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1970 to a third major division within the PCV and by 1971-72 to the "Balkanization" of the rest of the radical Left into some 15 to 20 esoteric splinter groups.

From Debate to Debacle

The Communist Party—which resumed the PCV label within weeks of its legalization—was the first to show signs of new dissension. For some time, reactions to the Soviet invasion of Czecholovakia in 1968 had been simmering within the party. Among others, Teodoro Petkoff had emerged as an articulate critic whose troublesome questions had led to his removal from the party Politburo in January 1969. During the spring and summer of that year these simmerings developed into a profound dispute over the issues of PCV relations with the Soviet Union, the role of the party, and the nature of internal party democracy. The stage for the dispute was set in April, when the PCV leadership—acceding to pressures from within party ranks—took the unusual step of sanctioning a free exchange of views in the now open party press as a prelude to a PCV Congress scheduled for December 1970; as one source has put it, "everything was subject to debate except . . . [matters] affecting the security of the party." [20] Over the next months distinct factions emerged among the leaders, and discussion became increasingly acrimonious.

The spark that ignited open dissension—simultaneously catapulting the PCV into the international spotlight—was the publication in the summer of 1969 of a book by Petkoff entitled *Checoeslovaquia: Socialismo Como Problema* (Czechoslovakia: Socialism as a Problem.).[21] This book was less a study of Czechoslovakia than it was a highly critical history of the Soviet party and state and a scathing critique of Stalinism in all its forms. Petkoff's thesis was that the Soviet perversion of socialism over many decades had led inexorably to the decision to snuff out the Dubcek effort to humanize socialism. Few contemporary Communists—certainly in Latin America—have written such a forceful attack on the CPSU (only the French critic Roger Garaudy comes to mind in comparison, aside from the Chinese).

Petkoff's opinions about Soviet communism led him to certain conclusions about Venezuelan communism which he now began to publicize more openly, both inside and outside the party. First, he preached the need for ending the PCV's dependence on the Soviet Union and developing a truly Venezuelan Communist Party. Second, he advocated much greater internal party democracy and repudiated "democratic centralism," the classic term for control from the center as practiced in Marxist-Leninist parties. Third, he maintained that the major thrust of the party should be directed against Venezuela's capitalists and wealthy elite, and only secondarily against the "imperialist" North Americans who had always been the main target of orthodox Communist propaganda.

Understandably, Petkoff's ideas created a stir among anti-Communist forces and something of a scandal for the Soviets, leading to an attempt by the PCV Politburo in the fall of 1969 to place restrictions on the ongoing debate and thus put a lid on the Pandora's box they had opened. Despite some opposition from regional organizations, Communist intellectuals and youth elements, the PCV Central Committee backed up the Politburo's efforts, issuing a formal resolution in February 1970 that expressed disagreement with Petkoff's views and established more stringent limits on discussion.[22] But Petkoff refused to be silenced, and the fundamental issues that he had raised simply would not go away. He and his growing band of supporters—including, at the top level of leadership, Freddy Muñoz and Germán Lairet—now came to be regarded as the left wing of the PCV.

In diametric opposition to Petkoff, the right wing of the party—led by Guillermo García Ponce and the now aging Eduardo Machado—held firmly to the view that the PCV could only overcome the disastrous years of insurgency by retrenching, stressing party discipline, seeking increased support and assistance from the Soviet comrades, striking an anti-imperialist line as a means of making political friends and alliances, and avoiding excessive criticism of the powerful Venezuelan elite.

In between Petkoff's left faction and the PCV right wing stood a "compromise" group headed by Pompeyo Márquez and Eloy Torres which saw the need to diminish dependence on foreign parties,

[20] Eleazar Díaz Rangel, *Como Se Dividió El PCV* (How the PCV Split), Caracas, Editorial Domingo Fuentes, 1971, p. 16. Diaz Rangel's book, although biased toward MAS, is considered by most observers to be a rather accurate story of the internal PCV debates in this period, and it is the primary source used by the present writer in this part of the essay.

[21] Caracas, Editorial Domingo Fuentes, 1969.

[22] Díaz Rangel, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-24.

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Pompeyo Márquez, now Secretary General of MAS, denounces the PCV Politburo on December 10, 1970, days before a new rupture in the party.

—Photo from Eleazar Díaz Rangel, *Como Se Dividió el PCV* (How the PCV Split), Caracas, Editorial Domingo Fuentes, 1971, p. 98.

particularly the Soviet, and to develop a more nationalistic image, but wanted to avoid a split in the party. Lastly, there was an element in the leadership, including PCV Secretary General Jesús Faría, that remained neutral in the debate for as long as it felt able to do so.

While the issues of the debate were real, personalities and age also played a role in the alignment of forces. Petkoff clearly had the support of young people (including most of the party's semi-autonomous youth organization, intellectuals and many non-party Marxists). His arguments were "new Left," nationalist, and persuasively more relevant to modern Venezuela than the stale PCV sloganry. His insistence on open debate of all issues appealed to the instinctive anarchism of student radicals and to the antibureaucratic bias of the urban youth and intellectuals. The old guard in control of the Politburo, on the other hand, saw in Petkoff the epitome of undisciplined left-wing radicalism that they felt would wither outside the PCV. They became increasingly interested in isolating his group from the remainder of the party, and probably would have moved sooner to oust him if they had not feared loss of influence over the Communist youth wing.

Dissension in the party reached a new crescendo in the fall of 1970 after Petkoff published a second controversial volume, *Socialismo para Venezuela?* (Socialism for Venezuela?), reiterating many of the views of his first book.[23] According to Díaz Rangel, a Petkoff supporter, a furious debate also developed over the issue of what message the PCV should send the CPSU to mark the 53rd aniversity of the October Revolution.[24]

At this critical juncture, the powers-that-be in Moscow chose to sanction (if not indeed to order) the publication in *Pravda* of an article on the PCV which the Old Guard read as a clear recommendation to move against Petkoff. The article, written by one A. Mosinev and published on October 20, was pegged to the upcoming PCV Congress still scheduled for early December, but devoted most of its discussion to the "group with anti-Leninist positions" in the PCV. Criticizing Petkoff by name, the article charged him, *inter alia*, with renouncing the Leninist organizational principle of democratic centralism, maliciously distorting the process of the building of communism in the USSR, falsifying Soviet documents, denying the historic mission of the working class, speaking against the standard Comintern line in support of anti-Fascist popular fronts, and specifically rejecting the PCV's need to establish a broad anti-imperialist popular front at the present stage of its development. The article ended with a direct call upon the PCV membership and the youth organization to defend party unity by giving "fitting rebuffs" to Petkoff's "anti-party design."

Aside from this "indirect directive" from Moscow, as the Old Guard saw it, some very practical considerations influenced the leadership's course. During regional preparations for the party Congress, it became clear that Petkoff's left wing and Márquez' central group outnumbered supporters of the right wing in several key Venezuelan states. The conservatives then applied increasing pressure within the Politburo to change the rules for representation at the Congress. In this situation Secretary General Jesús Faría was swayed from his position of neutrality toward a rightist stance: at a Politburo meeting on November 24, he advocated that Petkoff be

[23] Caracas, Editorial Domingo Fuentes, 1970.
[24] Díaz Rangel, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.

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relieved of all leadership positions for a period of a year; that the party sections for Caracas and the adjoining Miranda State be revised by the Politburo (these were the largest and most important regional organizations, and in both the right was in a minority); that the party "debate" be cut off at once; and that the party Congress be postponed.[25] According to Díaz Rangel, Eduardo Machado insisted at this meeting that the *Pravda* article had been an order from Moscow either to punish or to expel Petkoff, and that the order should be obeyed.[26] Two weeks of fierce internal maneuvering for and against these proposals culminated in an open attack on the Petkoff and Márquez factions in the conservative-dominated PCV weekly, *Tribuna Popular*, on December 10 and a counterdenunciation of the Politburo by Márquez (who was still a member) in a press conference the same day. Four days later a truncated Central Committee met to announce that Petkoff, Márquez, and many of their followers—including some 20 members of the Central Committee itself—had left the party.

Thus, what had started out as a debate over the implications of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia mushroomed into the third and most serious division of the PCV in its history. Diversity had long existed within the PCV, and it might be argued that the division was unavoidable at this stage of the party's growth. Still, it is interesting that the final break was given a crucial boost from Moscow, whose spokesman in *Pravda* indeed seemed to summon a litany from a more monolithic era when he invoked the name of the Comintern to attack the PCV dissidents.[27] In Petkoff's words, the split-up of the PCV "became inevitable once the Soviet intervention, striking those sensitive chords reflecting the Stalinist condition, made any democratic solution impossible." [28] It is truistic to add that the Kremlin was motivated in the case of the PCV by the same concern that had led them to invade Czechoslovakia—their desire to keep intact the traditional authoritarian structure and role of the Marxist-Leninist party.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 49.


[26] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

[27] Another aspect of alleged interference by the Soviets is worth recounting, though the charge was never proved. Diplomatic relations between Venezuela and the USSR—which had been broken off by Pérez Jiménez in 1952 because of Soviet aid to the PCV—were reestablished in 1970 as a result of the Caldera government's overtures. By coincidence, an advance party of Soviet diplomats reopened the Soviet Embassy in Caracas just weeks before the split in Communist ranks, and there were widespread rumors that these diplomats had played an important part in influencing the course of the PCV leadership that led to the split. It was clear, however, that Petkoff's supporters were actively floating the rumors, and no substantiation ever surfaced.

[28] Petkoff article in *Libre 1*, p. 35.

MAS and the Masses: 1971-73

Out of the division of the PCV and the chaos on the Marxist Left in general, there emerged in January 1971 a new political party, *Movimiento Al Socialismo* (Movement Toward Socialism—MAS).



Teodoro Petkoff, founder and chief theoretician of MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo—*Movement Toward Socialism).*

—Photo from Eleazar Díaz Rangel, *Como Se Dividió El PCV* (How the PCV Split), Caracas, Editorial Domingo Fuentes, 1971, p. 27.

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A sample of the MAS electoral tactic of seeking mass support by focusing political attacks on Venezuelan public figures rather than abstract class enemies. Those individuals pictured in the lefthand panels are accused of being an exploiting, rich minority who live off their holdings in plants, raw materials and equipment, in contrast to the poor majority in the right panels, who live off their own labor.

—Photos courtesy of the author.

Built around the core of dissidents who broke from the PCV, MAS was based on the ideas of Petkoff (who became its Propaganda Secretary) and the organizational abilities of Márquez (who became its Secretary General). MAS managed to take with it nearly 60 percent of the old PCV, including the key regional organizations, most of the youth movement, the lion's share of the Communist intellectuals, and over one-half of the PCV's miniscule labor movement. The orthodox Communists retained the party name, the newspaper, the six seats in Congress, and the continued financial support of the Soviet Union. Today MAS has some 4,500 to 5,000 members, while the PCV probably has about 3,000 to 4,000 members.[29] While exact figures are not available, the MAS youth organization is clearly much larger and stronger than the Communist youth wing. MAS' strength is still greatest among university youth and the middle-class professional groups in the large cities, though it has made a determined effort to widen its appeal.

The MAS strategy has been not to expand membership or to develop a party structure but to work for massive popular support in the December 1973 elections. Organizational work has been *ad hoc*, and "Leninist principles" have been thrown to the wind. The MASistas' approach to the elections has been tailored to what the leaders see as the Venezuelan condition in 1973. First, in order not to offend other Marxists or potential Leftist voters, and to set the stage for what they hope will be their future role as Venezuela's chief Marxist party, the MAS leaders have deliberately played down polemics vis-à-vis their former colleagues in the PCV and other parties of the Left. Secondly, they have avoided the use of the words "Communist" or "Leninist" since both have an antinationalist flavor in Venezuela, at least in part because of lingering reaction to the insurgence of the 1960's. MASistas have also avoided the word "party" and kept discussion of the "movement's" organizational structure to a minimum, since they have estimated—probably correctly—that the voters who are the target of their appeals, in particular the *marginados* in the *barrios*, have become cynical about the promises of Venezuela's political "parties." Thirdly, MAS has undertaken a propaganda campaign against Venezuelan capitalism—and specifically against individual rich Venezuelan families. Instead of attributing the ills of society to illusive "imperialists" (as the Moscow-line Communists have traditionally done in Latin America), MAS propaganda has identified and circulated pictures of individual Venezuelans who are accused of being the "guilty" parties "responsible" for the poverty and miserable conditions of the *barrio* people. This approach has no precedent in Vene-

[29] See US State Department publication, *World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations*, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1973.

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zuelan political campaigns, and MAS leaders believe it has been the single most effective tactic they have adopted. Fourthly, MAS, in making organization a secondary concern, has taken in many new non-Communist Marxists and Leftists who have further helped to blur the Communist origins and aura of the movement.

The MAS effort to win over the poor masses in the *barrios* as well as elements of the military has reportedly led it to attempt a rapprochement with some forces on the Right. The *marginados* have never warmed to the major democratic parties, tending rather to be attracted to the political extremes. In the 1968 elections they had lent significant support to a comeback effort directed on behalf of Pérez Jiménez, helping to elect him as a senator even though he remained in Spain and his election was subsequently declared illegal.[30] A new effort to make him a presidential candidate in the 1973 elections was declared unconstitutional by legislative action. The MAS leaders have made no secret of the fact that they coveted the vote among the poor that might otherwise have gone to the ex-dictator. It has been reported that they suggested an alliance of forces with his supporters to "reject representative democracy" as practiced by the mutual enemies of MAS and Pérez Jiménez—the AD and COPEI parties—but no formal alliance was ever announced.

With respect to platform, MAS has advocated a radical program of social reform and state control of industry, although it has left room for a private sector. In particular, it has called for the "socialization" of the foreign-owned petroleum companies, meaning "nationalization" by a "socialist government." The MASistas have argued that nationalization by an AD or COPEI government would simply mean the transfer of control from foreign to domestic "capitalists," which could even be worse for the country. (Private polls have shown for years that over 70 percent of the Venezuelan population favors nationalization of the oil companies.) At the same time, MAS has been careful to make clear that if it gained a controlling voice in the government, it would continue to sell most of Venezuela's petroleum to the US and to try to remain on good terms with—though not dependent on—"Tío Sam."

Finally, as their presidential candidate the MASistas selected an independent Marxist, José Vicente Rangel (no relation to Domingo Alberto Rangel), who is young, handsome, a stirring if not a brilliant speaker, and an *andino*—a native of the Andes, long the birthplace of Venezuelan leaders. Rangel has portrayed himself, with some justification, as a sincere idealist who has fought as an independent in Congress to stem police repression and corruption. He has a gentle and convincing manner that has enabled the MAS propagandists to portray him in posters in a pose reminiscent of a beloved doctor of the early 20th century, José Gregorio Hernández, who is Venezuela's only candidate for sainthood before the Vatican.



Election material of MAS seeks to cast its 1973 presidential candidate, José Vicente Rangel (seen in the poster to the left), in the image of Dr. José Gregorio Hernández (seen in the newsclip to the right), a venerated early 20th-century physician.

—Photos courtesy of the author.

[30] Pérez Jiménez won a total throughout Venezuela of some 400,000 votes, a large portion of which came from the *marginados* in Caracas.

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The energy that has gone into the MAS electoral effort has apparently borne some fruit. Nationwide polls in recent months have shown Rangel getting the support of 7 to 12 percent of all voters, and 14 percent of those in the age-bracket from 18 to 24 years. If support on this scale in fact materializes in the election, the vote for MAS—not counting what the PCV picks up—will represent a dramatic increase over the Marxist vote of less than 3 percent in 1968.

The Longer-Range MAS Line

Looking beyond the MASistas' tactics in the electoral campaign, it seems fair to assert that MAS represents a new type of Marxist political movement, but one that could flourish only under rather special circumstances. MAS leaders have explained that they have no "models": they disclaim any allegiance or similarity to the Cuban regime, they have no attachments to Maoism, and while they have toned down their criticism of the CPSU, they have not retreated from their rejection of the Soviet Communist view of the party and state. Petkoff views the MAS as part of an ongoing "revolutionary movement" which should not be limited in any way by rigid views of "classes" but should rather draw on all groups of society useful to it—including such disparate elements as the left-wing Christians, the *barrio* population, and supporters in the military establishment.

Moreover, while the MASistas' emphasis to date has been on electoral activity, Petkoff preaches that the revolutionaries should not limit themselves to any single form of struggle but must stand ready to exploit any condition that will further the cause of an eventual accession to power.[31] On the subject of armed struggle, he has written: ". . . the military and police power of the [current Venezuelan governmental] system appear to give no chance to armed struggle. I insist, however, that experience has demonstrated that politically correct and cleverly directed armed struggle could take advantage of the fissures in the system and by means of these take it over."[32]

[31] Petkoff, *Socialismo Para Venezuela?* The last chapter contains the best explanation of Petkoff's view of revolutionary movements. It is worth noting that Petkoff has been a key figure both in the PCV and in MAS for making and maintaining contacts with young military officers.

[32] Petkoff's article in *Libre 1*, p. 37.

Petkoff and the MAS movement could be—and indeed in some respects have been—compared to other Marxist leaders and parties of the "New Left" in various countries of the world, but space limits prohibit a discussion of particulars here. It is more important to note what is unique about MAS—an amalgam of factors rooted in the specific Venezuelan conditions of an open society, a large poor sector, and a core of revolutionary leaders who have experimented with a variety of forms of struggle in the recent past. Rightly or wrongly, Petkoff and his followers believe that the present state of the Venezuelan economy, society and political environment afford the revolutionary movement an opportunity to develop mass support. Also, they appear sufficiently imbued with the "revolutionary spirit" to adopt new tactics after the December elections; it seems clear that they would not hesitate to return to violence to expand their influence should that appear to be the most profitable course.

The PCV: Survival and Realignment

While MAS emerged from the confusion on the Left as the most popular and creative of the Marxist movements, the PCV managed to hold on as a political force, along with various other mini-parties of the far left.

In broadest terms, the survival of the PCV—as well as the growth of MAS—could be attributed to changes on the Latin American scene after the turn of the decade that encouraged more extremist political positions throughout the hemisphere. In particular, the election of Salvador Allende in Chile and the near victory of the populist former dictator Rojas Pinilla in neighboring Colombia pointed up to the leaders of Venezuela's major democratic parties, AD and COPEI, that they risked losing power to forces of the populist Left or Right if they failed to develop vigorous new programs of social reform and to assume a convincing nationalist posture, especially in their approach to the foreign petroleum companies. In this situation, the climate ripened for radical rhetoric, and the Communist Party managed to hang onto enough of a following to survive as a political force.

A more concrete factor in the PCV's recuperation from the 1970 split was the continued support it received from the Soviet Union. Soviet subsidies allowed the PCV to turn its weekly *Tribuna Popular*

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*Two views of the electoral alliance between the PCV and the MEP (*Movimiento Electoral Popular*—People's Electoral Movement): the PCV money-raising poster to the left refers to the alliance as the "Popular Unity" (*Unidad Popular*), a phrase evoking Allende's Chile; the poster to the right attacks domestic issues: "This government has raised the cost of meat, eggs, etc. The solution is in the New Force (*Nueva Fuerza*). Vote the Red Rooster [symbol of the PCV]."*

—Photos courtesy of the author.

into a daily in 1972—making it the only political party that year to have a daily newspaper. (The MAS weekly *Bravo pueblo* became a daily named *Punto* in 1973.) Besides providing outright gifts of money, travel grants, etc., the Soviets lent encouragement and legitimacy to the PCV by continuing to recognize it as the established Communist party in Venezuela, thereby contributing to what small amount of political leverage it had with the governing party and helping its relations with various foreign Communist groups.

At the same time, the Soviet party and government were clearly intent on a low level of involvement in the political campaign in Venezuela. In fact, as the campaign progressed, the Soviets—who have always tended to be more concerned with "anti-imperialism" in Latin America than with social revolution—seemed less interested in how the PCV would fare in the elections than in whether the increasingly leftist-sounding COPEI could win a second electoral victory over AD.

In its search for new legitimacy, the PCV sought and won an alliance with the People's Electoral Movement (MEP), a social democratic offshoot of the AD, for the 1973 elections. The MEP-PCV coalition has campaigned under three names—the *Frente Nacionalista Popular* (National Popular Front), *Unidad Popular* (Popular Unity), and the *Nueva Fuerza* (New Force). The Communists have preferred the first two names since they were suggestive of the Allende coalition in Chile, while the stronger and larger MEP has preferred the latter name for the cosmetic reason that it downplayed the Communist role in the coalition. The assets of this coalition, clearly inspired by the Chilean example, are not negligible. MEP is strong in the labor movement, which the Communists have not managed to penetrate since the early years of their activity[33] (when MEP split off from AD in 1967, it took a major part of the powerful AD labor movement with it). The PCV survived its troubles with its organization intact, and MEP has rather even representation throughout the country; these factors combined have provided the coalition with a better electoral machine than that of MAS. MEP, which has moved much to the left during the last few years, hopes to emerge from the elections as the most coherent, it not the largest,

[33] The Communist labor federation (CUTV) had a few affiliates in 1970, but its membership amounted to less than 5 percent of the organized labor force, and even this small group divided in the PCV-MAS split.

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force on the Left—so the PCV may gain a stronger hold on its political life through its ally (polls have indicated that the coalition could win between 5 and 10 percent of the vote in the December elections). At the same time, there have been some signs of instability in the coalition, and it would be unwise to venture any bets on its long-range survival.

What's Left of the Left

The remainder of the radical Left was in shambles by 1973. While the Marxists and Left radicals had better access to the masses through the media than ever before in their history, the main result seems to have been the continuous splintering of existing groups and a proliferation of new groups to the left of MAS and the PCV. A radical fringe has continued to reject political action and to press for terrorist activity and strikes, including a series of student revolts that have at times paralyzed the main high schools and universities. The MIR, once the spark of the insurgent movement, has suffered from several further splits, while the FLN/FALN has become all but inoperative.

MIR. In 1970 the insurgent arm of the MIR split into two groups, both of which are still illegal and have been whittled down to insignificant strength. One group, under the leadership of Carlos Betancourt, a former MIR guerrilla (no relation to Rómulo), took the name *Bandera Roja* (Red Flag) and managed to retain an operating base in the Eastern Venezuelan hills until the middle of 1973. His faithfuls attacked occasional military convoys, but their number was gradually reduced to less than 20 irreconcilables. In mid-1973 he and his chief lieutenant were arrested and more of the band killed, leaving only a few guerrillas in the hills. *Bandera Roja* was more successful in developing an urban activist group in 1972-73, which—according to Teodoro Petkoff—is today the most effective organization working to radicalize secondary school students in Caracas.[34] (Other groups in the high schools continue to function under the banner of the MIR youth wing, but reportedly with little success.)

The second insurgent group, which was formed in June 1970 as a splinter from the Betancourt band, has operated under the name *Organización de Revolucionarios* (Organization of Revolutionaries—OR). Under the leadership of Julio Escalona, a former MIR youth activist, it has undertaken sporadic terrorist activities, but it also probably numbers no more than 20 members.

Finally, several former MIR leaders (including Moïses Moleiro, Símon Saez Merida and Américo Martin) took advantage of the Caldera pacification program to reemerge as political leaders and revive the MIR as a nonviolent political party, eventually legalized by the COPEI government in 1973. The MIR has since participated actively with MAS in the election campaign, but its following is miniscule and its role more symbolic than real.

FLN/FALN. Meantime the FLN/FALN had also disintegrated. Douglas Bravo and his chief lieutenant, Luben Petkoff (Teodoro's more erratic brother) parted ways, and Luben was eventually arrested and finally amnestied. Bravo's small band remained in the hills of Falcon State where, more like "the Hatfields and the McCoys" than like followers of Ché, they got involved in local family feuds, on occasion also harrassing villages and the military. The urban insurrectionist wing of the FALN conducted several bank robberies and other terrorist activities in 1969-70 but became less active after one of its key leaders, Freddy Carquez Márquez, chose exile under the pacification program in 1971. Another wing of the FALN was a group called *Punto Cero* (Hill Point), whose leaders apparently received some training in Cuba in the late 1960's and which conducted an active program of terrorism in Caracas in 1971-72; this group was nearly exterminated in a succession of shooting engagements with the Venezuelan police in 1972.

Other factions. In addition to the foregoing, a wide variety of groups have come and gone within the universities. *Poder Joven* (Youth Power) is a movement that seems less an organization than a ubiquitous anarchistic phenomenon attracting disgruntled university youth. Even Petkoff is called establishment by *Poder Joven*. There has also been a *Movimiento de Salvación Nacional* (Movement for National Salvation, or MOSAN), a *Partido de la Revolución Venezolana* (Party of the Venezuelan Revolution, or PRV), the *Izquierda Christiana* (Christian Left, an offshoot of COPEI that supports the ideas of the Colombian revolutionary, Camillo Torres), and many others. The most vocal Maoist, Victor Ochoa, has

[34] An interview with Petkoff published in the Dominican magazine, *Ahora!* (Santa Domingo), Jan. 15, 1973.

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thrown his personal support to the ruling Social Christian Party in the 1973 elections—an indication of the minimal seriousness of Maoism in the politics of the Venezuelan Left.

Marxism and the Future

As stated at the outset, by the time this article is in the reader's hands, the political campaign of 1973 will have culminated in the election of a new president and a new Congress. Most certainly the winning party will be either COPEI or AD, as in the three previous elections since 1958. No single third party has enough support to unseat these two strong democratic parties from control of Venezuelan political power at this juncture. While it is impossible to be exact, it seems likely that the aggregate vote of the two parties will amount to at least 60 percent of the electorate.

The remainder must go either to the left or to the right. On the right, there are several small parties and individuals desirous of attracting the support of those voters who would have cast their ballots for Pérez Jiménez had he not been barred from running by a constitutional amendment. The pull of Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela, with its overtones of the *caudillo* tradition, is not unlike the Peron phenomenon in Argentina. Certainly, there are a large number of Venezuelans who yearn for the tidier and less complex days of the dictatorship.

To the left of the democratic parties, MAS and the Nueva Fuerza combined could possibly gain between 10 and 15 percent of the vote. This would represent a significant expansion of popular support for the Marxist Left in Venezuela and would result in a significant increase and consolidation of Marxist forces in Congress, local government administrations and other institutions. Should this happen, the Marxists will have gone a long way toward overcoming the setbacks of the insurgency years.

Certainly, the current problems and prospects of the Venezuelan economy and the mounting need for social reform seem to augur well for a Leftist expansion. Official unemployment figures are around 6 percent,[35] but when underemployment is added to unemployment, the real figure is probably closer to 20 percent of the potential work force. Another serious problem is the strain created by a population expanding at a growth rate of over 3.5 percent a year—one of the highest in the world.[36] The university and secondary school system are so bogged down by political turmoil and overpopulation that this one situation alone could seriously jeopardize the efforts of whatever party wins the elections to establish and maintain a stable government. Still another critical problem is the fact that Venezuela's petroleum reserves are dwindling and its daily production will likely begin to decline significantly in the 1970's, perhaps by as much as one million barrels per day by the end of the decade, unless significant new reserves are developed. In this situation, the economic growth needed to keep up with population growth and industrial expansion will have to come from either dramatically increased petroleum prices (a real possibility) or significant new domestic savings—or both. Less than 2 percent of the Venezuelan population pays income tax, and less than 4 percent of the nonpetroleum GDP (gross domestic product) comes from income tax revenues.[37]

These problems notwithstanding, the fact remains that Venezuela is still an essentially conservative country whose relatively large middle class has prospered under the present system of democratic government. Certainly, the core of the political Left comes from that very middle class, and as it expands so will the Left. But there is serious doubt whether enough popular support could be mustered to permit a Communist or radical socialist alternative to the democratic system, at least in this decade.

To suppose for a moment, however, that the Marxists could pull off a victory at the polls, another basic question arises concerning how the military would react. In Venezuela, where the military has not had a tradition of keeping hands off the government (as it had in Chile prior to the recent coup), there seems little chance that the Marxists would be left free to establish a ruling regime in the wake of an electoral win—at least one that excluded military influence. No wonder, then, that Petkoff keeps his options open and stresses publicly and privately the need not only to develop mass support but to establish lines to the military.

In any case, a Marxist victory certainly could not be achieved unless the Venezuelan radical Left could

[35] Bureau of International Commerce, US Department of Commerce, *Foreign Economic Trends* (Washington, DC), Feb. 9, 1973.

[36] *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America*, Washington, DC, Inter-American Bank Annual Report, 1972.

[37] *International Monetary Fund Report (Consultation)*, Washington, DC, Document No. SM/70/207, Oct. 5, 1970, p. 6.

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learn to pull together, and—as has been underscored throughout this essay—there is little precedent for such cooperation. Instead the radicals have repeatedly exhibited a penchant for internal division and tactical blunders that have alienated rather than attracted followers. Whether MAS can maintain stability following the 1973 elections is in particular question, as differences that have been soft-pedalled during the campaign begin to surface and efforts are made to establish a more durable party organization. As already noted, the PCV/MEP relationship has not appeared to be very stable either.

In broader perspective, the recent bloody dénouement in Chile, the resurgence of and reaction to Peronism in Argentina, and the progressive decline of the democratic system in much of the South American continent leave little room for the Marxists of any country to look with optimism on their chances of winning and retaining power in Latin America by peaceful means. The dramatic impact of the Allende victory on Marxist radicals in Latin America should not be minimized: the Allende way certainly looked more sensible and logical than the Debray and Ché way. The question that is now being asked in desperation from the Left is: Can that way be traveled again?

The prospect of the combined Marxist political force in Venezuela emerging from the 1973 elections with 10 to 15 percent of the vote—but without much hope of achieving an eventual electoral victory—is sobering. Such a force could pose serious challenges to Venezuela's still youthful democracy. As an activist and critical Left, it could—with allies—further radicalize the youth population, press for extremist solutions, and gravely disrupt the programs of the ruling government and the Congress. On the other hand, if the AD and COPEI parties were mobilized by the challenge from the Left to move quickly toward a new and energetic phase of social reform and economic diversification, Venezuela's resilient political democracy might point the way toward a new alternative to extremism in Latin America.

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Books

Marshal Zhukov and the Meaning of Soviet Military Memoirs

By John Erickson

G. ZHUKOV: *The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov*. Translated by Novosti Press Agency. New York, Delacorte Press, 1971.
OTTO PRESTON CHANEY, JR.: *Zhukov*, Tulsa, University of Oklahoma Press, 1971.

THERE IS a time-honored British ballad with a consoling refrain to the effect that old soldiers never die, but simply fade away. Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov assuredly provides a vindication of this piece of popular maudlin, though he obviously is taking his time to fade away. Indeed, he has enlivened the process with a formidable barrage of "recollection and reminiscence," all brought together in a massive volume which first appeared in the Soviet Union in 1969 and has now been rendered into English (or rather into Soviet officialese—which is a pity). The lesser fry have already had their say; now it is the turn of the master to speak, without rancor, without mean and competitive spite, but with the full weight of authority acquired by virtue of his position as top Soviet military commander in World War II.

In terms of simple military statistics, Zhukov is the general who never lost a battle, the first Soviet commander to inflict a savage defeat on the Imperial Japanese Army in the 1939 fighting at Nomon-Han (the Khalkin-Gol) in Outer Mongolia, and the first to visit defeat on the *Wehrmacht* at the approaches to Moscow in 1941. In 1942, he became Deputy to the Soviet Supreme Commander (Stalin) and played a key role both as planner and as operational commander in the gigantic battles that followed—Stalingrad in 1942, Kursk in 1943, the massive offensive in Belorussia in 1944, and the Soviet assault on Berlin in 1945. Twice after the war he suffered at the hands of his political masters, first being banished by Stalin to the Urals Military District and later being dismissed from his post as Defense Minister by Khrushchev in 1957 for alleged "Bonapartist" tendencies. Abruptly retired, he took to fishing-rod but also to pen, painstakingly jotting down his reminiscences in a series of notebooks much after the fashion of British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery. These notebooks were later pieced together in the present memoirs, which are here reviewed in conjunction with an outside military historian's biography of Zhukov that takes in a period of the latter's career judiciously omitted from the memoirs.

Execrable though this English translation of the memoirs is, it does roughly duplicate the original Russian version and covers Zhukov's life and military career through World War II—his childhood, his service as a cavalryman with the Imperial Army in World War I, his entry into the Red Army and his subsequent career as a regular soldier, his Mongolian command in 1939, the period just before and during the German attack in 1941 when he was Chief of the General Staff, and the whole succession of swirling battles on the Soviet-German front. The latter sequence is familiar enough—the initial disasters in the frontier districts, the defense of Leningrad in September 1941 and the recovery before Moscow, the first Soviet counteroffensive in the winter of 1941-42, the ordeal of Stalingrad, the great cauldron of Kursk in 1943, the final expulsion of the German armies from Soviet territory in 1944, and the grand military finale of the Soviet attack on Berlin in 1945.

In point of fact, there was no major wartime command decision

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that was taken without Zhukov's cognizance or without his actual participation—even in a negative sense, as, for example, in July 1941 when he proposed the timely evacuation of Kiev, only to be rebuffed by Stalin and relieved as Chief of General Staff. Not surprisingly, it is the battle for Moscow that is most indelibly engraved on Zhukov's memory. Oddly enough, he is very sparing, not to say downright reticent, about his part in the defense of Leningrad, over which he was summarily placed in command by Stalin's order. On the other hand, he has offered something of a bonus in his first-hand account of the planning of the great Stalingrad counteroffensive of November 1942. That campaign has been much discussed but never really explained in terms of the transition from the Soviet forces' bloodily abortive "counterstroke" (*kontrudar*) to their dramatic three-front counteroffensive (*kontrnastuplenie*), with its double envelopment of the enemy—a maneuver never again repeated in this form.

MUCH OF THIS is grist for the military historian's special mill, but there is more to the Zhukov memoirs than mere military detail. For example, they are undoubtedly useful also as a commentary on Stalin's style and personality during this wartime period. At the time of publication, there were suggestions that the memoirs represented a deliberate effort at Stalin's rehabilitation, but close reading of the Russian text—a necessary precaution since the clichés and stilted style of this English version serve to obscure rather than elucidate the author's meaning—scarcely bears out this charge. Zhukov's portrayal of Stalin is less consciously sympathetic than overtly quizzical and not a little bemused at this extraordinary personality. He makes a special point of insisting that he studied the "military Stalin" very carefully (as indeed he had good cause to do), and what he says about Stalin's grasp of strategic ideas does not seem to differ markedly from the assessment of British Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, who dealt at close quarters with Stalin over some weighty issues of wartime strategy. What the memoirs make clear is that while Stalin in the early stages of the war confused tactical handling with strategic grasp and control, he later learned to distinguish between them, to good effect.

In every other respect, Zhukov's Stalin emerges complete with warts—stubborn, vengeful, domineering, and even rash, with a precipitate impatience at the wrong times, as in the winter of 1941-42. It is quite evident from these pages that Zhukov did not really like Stalin even though he seems to have arrived at a grudging respect for and accommodation with his Supreme Commander. For all the obfuscations of the text—and the integrity of this version is itself an intriguing theme, for there are now multiple versions of these writings in circulation—Zhukov's portrait of Stalin has the stamp of realism about it and could persist as an acceptable mean between savage denigration and that adulation which was larger than life.

All this simply reinforces the fact that Soviet military memoirs conform to very special laws, to which even Marshal Zhukov's are no exception. Not only are they about Soviet politics in the widest sense, but they are themselves a not unimportant part of these politics in that they are made to serve a variety of causes and reputations (hence the several editions and repeated emendations[1]). There is

[1] On this aspect of Soviet military memoirs published between 1966 and 1972, see Col. P. Ogarev, "The Great Patriotic War in the Recollections of Participants," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 5, 1972, pp. 101-09.

Reviewers in This Issue

JOHN ERICKSON—Professor of Defense Studies, University of Edinburgh (Scotland); author of *The Soviet High Command*, 1962, and *Soviet Soldiers and Soviet Society* (forthcoming).

HOLLAND HUNTER—Professor of Economics, Haverford College (Haverford, Pa.); author of *Soviet Transport Experience*, 1968, and other writings on the Soviet economy.

PHILIP E. UREN—Professor of Geography and Director of the School of International Affairs, Carleton University (Ottawa); editor of *East-West Trade*, 1966, and author of *The New Hungarian Agriculture* (forthcoming).

A. M. HALPERN—Visiting Professor and Acting Director of Asian Studies, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University (Washington, DC); editor of *Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents*, 1966.

ANDREW GYORGY—Professor of International Affairs and Political Science, Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University (Washington, DC); author of *Ideologies in World Affairs*, 1967, and *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, 1970.

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no better example than the memoir industry under Khrushchev, when the military-political myth-makers really got into stride. Whereas Stalin had manufactured his own myths, Khrushchev roped in the military to write expansively about his personal achievements —with the bonus of being able to extol their own talents. The most outrageous example, which raised furious protest in the Soviet military press, was the dramatic *mise en scène* which had Khrushchev and Marshal A. I. Yeremenko, the Soviet commander at Stalingrad, "think up" between themselves the design of the whole Stalingrad counteroffensive—a fictional passage rendered the more grotesque by the claim that this pair obligingly communicated their plan to Stalin, who naturally acted on it in a trice.[2]

Of the many scores of these memoirs, there are a few which defy all political vicissitudes and are of permanent value, such as Artillery Marshal N. N. Voronov's account of his wartime commands and connections, Marshal K. K. Rokossovksy's recounting of the Stalingrad campaign (half memoir, half history), Marshal J. Kh. Bagramian's recollections of the prelude to and early days of the war, or A. A. Lobachev's modest but human and harrowing account of his work as an army commissar, and one who was neither braggart nor bungler.[3] To this list must be added published extracts from an as yet unpublished work by the late Marshal M. V. Zakharov and yet another memoir which has so far seen the light of day only in fits and starts, namely Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky's account of the 1941-45 war.[4] As Chief of General Staff from 1942 to 1945, Vasilevsky was in many respects Zhukov's *alter ego*, and it will be impossible to make a truly accurate appraisal of the Zhukov memoirs until Vasilevsky's work appears in full. It is ready for printing —as indeed it has been for some time—but the passage of the years, coupled with probable political circumspection, may reduce it to something of an anticlimax that will shed additional light only on the details of Vasilevsky's prewar career. Thus it is that the historian must turn to a recondite work such as L. J. Suslov, Ed., *Radi zhizni na zemle 1941-1945* (For the Sake of Life on Earth, 1941-1945), published in Voronezh in 1970, to ascertain Vasilevsky's role in the important operations on the Voronezh front in 1942-43, and must perforce rake through back issues of *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* or *Istoriia USSR* for other insights.

FOR THE MOST PART, these are simple soldierly tales. But memoirs such as those of Marshal Zhukov represent much more than catalogues of martial achievement. While their dramatic interest may hinge on what they reveal about the personal wartime role of Stalin, the main issue they raise is the basic one of command and control in modern war. Yet another subliminal theme is the nature of the control—*i.e.*, political control—to be exercised over the Soviet armed forces. That there must be such control is not questioned, but there is a clash between two conflicting schools—those who believe in a less obtrusive party presence but a tight security-forces presence, as opposed to those who favor a proliferation of party organs within the armed forces but *without* too much of a KGB armlock. Stalin preferred the first mode, and so, apparently, did Zhukov, judging from his memoirs.

This divergence of views over political control is closely connected with the vexed question of *morale*, and it is here that military memoirs seem to be intended to serve not merely as cautionary tales but also as inspirational literature. It is also here that Marshal Zhukov's whole argument

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[2] This claim was made by Marshal Yeremenko in his book, *Stalingrad*, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1961, p. 325. Yeremenko asserts that the idea of a counteroffensive "first came to him" while he was in Moscow at the beginning of August, 1942.

[3] N. N. Voronov, *Na sluzhbe voennoi* (On Military Service), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1963; K. K. Rokossovsky, Ed., *Velikaia pobeda na Volge* (The Great Victory on the Volga), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1965; I. Kh. Bagramian, *Tak nachinalas voina* (Thus Began the War), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1971; A. A. Lobachev, *Trudnymi dorogami* (Along Difficult Paths), Moscow, Voenizdat, 1960.

[4] An extract from Marshal Zakharov's work appeared under the title, "Pages from the History of the Soviet Armed Forces on the Eve of the Great Patriotic War," in *Voprosy istorii* (Moscow), No. 5, 1970, pp. 28-48. The extract refers to a larger work entitled *Generalnyi Shtab v predvoennye gody* (The General Staff in the Prewar Period), but to the reviewer's knowledge this volume has not yet been published. As for Marshal Vasilevsky, he has published a long list of articles in various places, the major items including: "On the Question of the Direction of the Armed Struggle in the Great Patriotic War," *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 8, 1965, pp. 3-10; a series of three articles entitled "Unforgettable Days," *ibid.*, No. 10, 1965, pp. 13-25, No. 1, 1966, pp. 13-25, and No. 3, 1966, pp. 24-44; "The Liberation of the Donbas and the Left-bank Ukraine. The Struggle for the Dnieper," *Istoriia SSSR* (Moscow), No. 3, 1970, pp. 3-45; "The Strategic Planning of the Kursk Battle," in Major-General I. V. Parokhin, Ed., *Kurskaia bitva* (The Kursk Battle), Moscow, Nauka, 1970, pp. 66-83. Although the first of these articles was not identified as an excerpt from Vasilevsky's memoirs, the others have been so identified and clearly attest to the existence of a consecutive narrative. The central point that Marshal Vasilevsky seems to be making in these excerpts is the "underestimation" of the role of the General Staff in the war against Germany.

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seems to snap into place. The gist of it is that the technological complexity of modern warfare has not made the brave, efficient, and properly motivated soldier redundant, but at the same time has put a premium on leadership at all levels, not least at the national level. Hence the military homilies aimed in this direction. In that sense, too, Stalin must be taken as a symbol, presumably one implying strict social control and recognition of the primacy of national defense needs. It is true that some of this is extreme military conservatism, but it is not an unequivocal call for a return to Stalinism.

Thus, simple soldiers' tales turn out not to be simple at all. Marshal Zhukov's memoirs strike a balance in what proves to be an extremely sophisticated exercise—an exercise that entails speaking for the military elite but not disparaging the party and its leadership, exploring the respective limits of military competence and political authority, spelling out the *fundamental* issues of morale, and looking at the Soviet style of war in broad but cogent terms. Only Marshal Zhukov, with his prestige undimmed even now, could have undertaken a task of these proportions, and that is why his book, though demonstrably a personal record of vast military operations, will come to serve as a basic guideline on these difficult questions for a number of years to come. It has already taken its place in that complicated rubric of required quotation that accompanies both delicate discussion and patriotic exhortation—and that, by itself, is a tribute to the toughness of its texture. In sum, it is a book which not only records history but one which may contribute in its own singular way to the making of it.

UNFORTUNATELY, but perhaps inevitably, Marshal Zhukov draws his own narrative to a close with his return from Germany in April 1946. (There may well be a second volume as rumor has it, but even if there is, its chances of seeing the light of day are slim, for obvious political reasons.) Hence, to follow the fascinating and dramatic course of Zhukov's postwar career—his banishment by Stalin, his reappearance in 1952, his elevation to Defense Minister and later dismissal at the hands of Khrushchev—the reader must turn to Colonel Otto Preston Chaney's biography, which provides much-needed coverage of this stage of Zhukov's life. Not that Colonel Chaney's book is confined to these latter years; it covers the whole of Zhukov's career and, in its descriptions of the younger Zhukov, fills in much of his personal and professional background.

If anything, Colonel Chaney makes claims on behalf of Zhukov that are a little too expansive. There is really no solid or reputable evidence that Zhukov was sent to Germany in the 1920's to train and study in connection with secret Soviet accords with the *Reichswehr*, and the same has to be said about his rumored participation in the Spanish Civil War. Zhukov did not acquire his appreciation of tank warfare from these claimed external sources. Indeed, it remains something of a mystery exactly how he did acquire these insights, even allowing for the fact that he was basically a cavalryman and was involved from the outset in Soviet experimentation with "motor-mechanized" forces. To solve the mystery may require a closer inspection of Zhukov's contacts with the "brains" of the Red Army in the 1930's.

As for the postwar period, Colonel Chaney has produced a convincing portrait of a changed Zhukov whose toughness, while it got results, antagonized many (not all of them incompetents and buffoons) during his tenure as Defense Minister. Zhukov emerges here as a none too attractive person who, to the delight of his professional and political opponents, finally got his "come-uppance." All this and more Colonel Chaney has carefully chronicled in the valuable latter chapters of his book, thus adding greatly to our knowledge of the dimensions of Zhukov the man.

Zhukov has certainly earned a prominent place in military history as successor to a long line of distinguished Russian soldiers going back to Suvorov, Rumyantsev, and Kutuzov. His own "recollections and reminiscences" and Colonel Chaney's wide-ranging biography do much to fill out what has heretofore been either a shadowy picture or a simple stereotype, but all is still far from told or fully explained. From several quarters—be it the Kremlin, the Frunze Academy, or for that matter any quarter interested in the Soviet soldier and Soviet military performance—the cry must still be heard: Will the real Marshal Zhukov please stand up?

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The Soviet Economic Dilemma

By Holland Hunter

US CONGRESS, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE: *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies.* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1973.

THIS VOLUME is the fourth major survey of the Soviet economy prepared under the auspices of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress. It is a magnificient coliection of 30 papers, assembled under the able guidance of John P. Hardt of the Congressional Research Service. Together with a separate volume of hearings, published by the Government Printing Office in October, the collection provides a wide-ranging analysis of Soviet economic prospects, indispensable for anyone seriously interested in the subject.

The survey volume examines trends in the Soviet economy from the 1960's through the 1970's. After Hardt's nine-page summary introduction, the first group of seven papers deals with "plan and policy," analyzing the major problems now confronted in running the Soviet economy. The economic burden of Soviet defense efforts is then examined in four papers, which are followed by five papers evaluating prospects in the industrial sector. Two papers offer illuminating perspectives on current agricultural difficulties, and two others examine, respectively, the housing situation and trends in real per capita consumption. Four papers are devoted to the human resources area (population, labor force, and education), and the last six to Soviet external economic relations. Nearly all the papers represent the product of fresh research by well-known specialists in the field, and the collection as a whole offers both masses of background detail and nuggets of new knowledge.

The Joint Economic Committee hearings, chaired by Senator William Proxmire, involved three days of testimony by three-member panels, whose prepared statements generated spirited discussion. The issues touched upon included the wisdom of extending long-term credits to finance Soviet imports from the United States, the relation of such credits to altered Soviet domestic priorities, and the role of credits in overall relations between the United States and the USSR. Attention was also given to changes in institutional practice that would be necessary or desirable to facilitate ongoing normal trade. Past and prospective Soviet feedgrain imports were reviewed. The discussions generally reflected both the hopes and the uncertainties that surround these new developments.

For the reviewer (a participant in the hearings), this new survey of Soviet economic prospects brought into clearer focus a grand dilemma that now confronts the Soviet system. The dilemma stems from the emerging fact that the USSR, the second most powerful nation in the world, is finding it difficult to keep up with late 20th-century developments. Medium-sized powers all over the world are adapting to technological progress, raising their standards of living, trading increasingly sophisticated goods and services among themselves, and actively participating in further innovation; their societies are increasingly stressing quality rather than quantity. Meanwhile, although the USSR has "caught up with and surpassed" these countries in military strength, Soviet performance in other spheres has remained unimpressive. What has been holding the Soviet economy back? Why is it that the USSR, at a time when the economies of most Western and some Eastern countries are reaping the fruits of revolutionary new technological advances, has been lagging behind?

THE FORCES THAT govern the capacity of any economy to make full use of technological innovations are not completely understood or agreed upon by scholars. As for their operation in the USSR, the most that one can do

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at present is to describe those features of the Soviet political and economic system that are symptomatic of the basic problems. The magnitude of these problems has become increasingly evident in recent years. For some time, Soviet economic growth was spurred by a number of factors, *i.e.*, substantial absolute population growth and a more than proportionate expansion of the labor force; improvements in education and training; and the infusion of massive increments of fixed capital plant and equipment. Now, the USSR is experiencing tightness in the supply of skilled labor, and annual additions to capital plant, though larger than ever before, take as much as a decade to be built and often show low productivity after coming on stream. In short, Soviet management of both labor and capital resources has been inefficient by the standards characteristic of the world's advanced economies.

More importantly, qualitative gains in the overall effectiveness of productive activity have been modest for some time. Efforts to reform the management of the economy have been thwarted in practice. The agricultural sector, in spite of very large capital investments intended to modernize it, continues to hold the rest of the economy back. There is an appalling lack of infrastructure to support a modern housing sector: half the Soviet people still lack indoor plumbing, millions still carry water in pails suspended from wooden yokes, and paved roads are still a rarity outside the large cities. These deficiencies reflect longstanding neglect, but even where the authorities have seriously tried to make improvements, their efforts have been clumsy, and the results flawed.

Because the papers in this survey provide a remarkably clear picture of these linked dilemmas, the collection as a whole suggests a series of questions for further research. In narrow economic terms, for example, one needs to probe further into the precise location of bottlenecks in Soviet output expansion. This is a problem in interindustry analysis, and the Noren-Whitehouse paper in the present collection (pp. 206-45) contributes a pioneering test of the 1971-1975 Plan targets in this context. Further work could add a vital time dimension to such tests by seeking to ascertain whether projected additions to capital stock can be brought on stream in time to meet anticipated capacity requirements.

Overcoming bottlenecks frequently involves improvements in production methods that lower input-output ratios. In the West, this kind of technological progress spreads quite rapidly from firm to firm and industry to industry. In the USSR, by contrast, the spread of new technology has been notably sluggish—this in spite of the fact that the system admits of no commercial secrets and has long provided admirable arrangements for circulating scientific information. Thus, the persistence of bottlenecks in the economy poses a broader question that extends into the spheres of political science and public administration: What are the barriers to the diffusion of improved methods? If diffusion processes are already being fruitfully studied by geographers and sociologists, cannot non-diffusion also be profitably analyzed in similar ways? One case study that suggests itself is the marked contrast between the rapidity with which the USSR has built a large and technologically up-to-date merchant marine and the slowness which has marked the development of adequate modern residential housing. Why has the process of technology diffusion worked well in one case and badly in the other?

ALONG WITH such case studies, economists and political scientists might try to construct and test models of disincentives in action. The classic works of Joseph Berliner and David Granick long ago showed how the system of rewards and penalties in Soviet enterprises worked against overall economic efficiency.[1] Now perhaps, with a longer record of experience, it will be possible to look more closely into the question of how, specifically, the distorted structure of rewards and penalties inhibits technological progress and cost reduction. Our broadened understanding of the command economy should also permit us to construct systematic formal models showing how excessive pressures from above and defensive reactions from below mutually interact to form a rigid, inflexible system of economic administration.

The elaboration of such models, in turn, would no doubt spur the study of appropriate strategies of economic and administrative reform. One can readily imagine the greater use of simulation analysis in order to subject alternative means of depressurizing the command economy to quantitative testing. In several of the early East European attempts at economic reform, the transition toward a more efficient mechanism

[1] See Joseph S. Berliner, *Factory and Manager in the USSR*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1957; and David Granick, *Management of the Industrial Firm in the USSR*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1954.

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for resource allocation produced serious temporary imbalances, and the resultant shortages and gluts prompted reversion to the old system of administrative allocation. Under current Soviet conditions, one wonders what new strategies might be devised to minimize this formidable barrier to thorough reform.

In broader political and doctrinal terms, it would be instructive to see an attempt to sketch out a speculative and hypothetical application of "creative Marxism" which would anticipate changes in doctrine and procedure that might be grafted onto the Bolshevik heritage in order to pave the way for an acceptable scheme of reform. Just as Stalin "found the necessary quotations" in Lenin and Marx to support the institutions and outlook he imposed after 1928, might it not now be possible, while retaining basic Bolshevik concepts, to reinterpret them in such a way as to accommodate a flexible, adaptive, efficient Soviet economy and polity? Though the Joint Economic Committee compendium was not designed to respond to such questions, it does provide a foundation of evidence and analysis for their investigation.

Commerce and Conciliation

By Philip E. Uren

JOZEF WILCZYNSKI: *The Economics and Politics of East-West Trade.* New York, Praeger, 1969.
JAMES HENRY GIFFEN: *The Legal and Practical Aspects of Trade with the Soviet Union.* New York, Praeger, 1969.

THE QUESTIONS of whether and how to trade with the "enemy," "the other side," or a "different social and economic system" have been debated through the centuries. In 1802, when William Pitt suggested to the British Parliament that Napoleon could be weaned from his aggressive policies by conciliatory commercial gestures, Richard Sheridan made this sarcastic retort:

Let [France] have a good trade, that she may be afraid of war, says the Learned Member . . . that's the sure way to make Buonaparte love peace. He has had, to be sure, a military education. He has been abroad, and is rather rough company; but if you put him behind the counter a little, he will mend exceedingly. When I was reading the treaty, I thought of all the names of foreign places . . . Pondicherry, Chandenagore, Cochin, Martinico, etc., all cessions [to France].[1] *Not they . . . they are all so many traps and holes to catch this silly fellow in, and make a merchant of him! I really think the best way upon this principle would be this: let the merchants of London open a public subscription, and set him up at once. . . . Send all the money over to the First Consul, and give him what you talk of so much, capital, to begin trade with.*[2]

Now, the same questions are being intensively debated in the United States with respect to trading with the Soviet Union and other Communist states. Like Napoleon, Brezhnev, too, "has been abroad" and is also "rather rough company" in the eyes of many. Others, however, believe that he already shows signs of having "mended exceedingly." At any rate, there has been considerable change in both American and Soviet attitudes on the subject of trade relations—to such an extent, in fact, that many observers of recent Soviet-US relations are understandably confused.

One does not have to look very far back to find examples of official US opposition to trading with the Communist nations—even, ironically enough, to "Free World" importation of Soviet oil. On November 28, 1961, US Assistant Secretary of the Interior John M. Kelley wrote to Walter S. Hallanan, chairman of the US National Petroleum Council, in these terms:

The Department of the Interior views with concern the growing

[1] This is a reference to the Treaty of Amiens, concluded between Britain and France in 1802, which formalized the retrocession to France of several British conquests in India and the West Indies.

[2] Quoted in Leon A. Harris, *The Fine Art of Political Wit*, New York, Dutton, 1966, pp. 29-30.

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shipments of petroleum from the Soviet Bloc to the Free World. Because of the varied but widespread impact of these shipments upon Free World nations and upon international relationships between the United States and other nations, it is greatly in the interest of national security for this situation to be better understood.[3]

After extensive research, a committee studying this problem concluded:

In view of the above factors . . . continued expansion of Communist oil exports is a serious problem to the Free World. The impact of Soviet oil on Free World countries is far greater than the volume figures would indicate and goes beyond its immediate implication for the oil companies involved. . . . The seriousness of the Soviet economic offensive requires a concerted effort by the leading countries of the Free World to restrict further imports of Communist oil and the export of strategic materials to the Soviets. . . . The political alliances which Free World countries have formed to combat Soviet aggressions must now be extended fully to the equally important economic field. It is unrealistic to leave the Free World's economic flanks unprotected, particularly as the Soviets have clearly indicated that their trade is conducted "most for political purposes." [4]

Only a decade later, in 1972, the then US Secretary of Commerce Peter G. Peterson produced a paper on US-Soviet economic relations which envisaged not only a substantial US investment—about $10 billion—in the development of Soviet energy resources in West Siberia but also long-term agreements for exports of Soviet natural gas to the United States. Secretary Peterson saw these prospective economic ties as helping to forge peace:

As we work to realize the President's vision of a new era in commercial relations, we do so in the expectation that future generations—prosperous and secure—will look back on this era and be able to read in its record that the President negotiated, not only the reduction of nuclear weapons for war, but the production of commercial weapons for peace. . . .

It is this larger vision of peace —shared by both sides—that gives me confidence that we will succeed in our negotiations.[5]

THE GREAT swing that has occurred in both the US and Soviet attitudes toward mutual trade has, not surprisingly, given rise to a rash of publications on the subject. To offer the public anything along the lines of these studies would have been out of the question in the early 1950's when Stalin was speaking about parallel markets and COCOM[6] believed that to trade in strategic materials, such as copper wire, nickel and modern trawlers, would threaten the survival of Western civilization. Now, however, such writings are much in demand as both US government leaders and specialists seek to chart a viable and safe middle course between the Scylla of "no trading with the enemy" and the Charybdis of "trade for the sake of trade." Jozef Wilczynski's book provides much useful background material on both the economic and political aspects of East-West trade, while James Henry Giffen's study explores the legal and practical questions involved in trading with the Soviet Union once the basic decision to do so has been taken. Both are excellent and valuable additions to the growing bibliography on the subject, but unfortunately neither offers clear-cut answers to such larger and more crucial questions as what effects increased US-Soviet trade and economic ties are likely to have on East-West relations in general and upon Soviet society.

There are essentially three notions about East-West trade that need to be explored more carefully: first, that trade is intrinsically good and, furthermore, profitable; second, that enlarged trade with the West will lead to a modification of the Soviet system; and third, that increased trade not only reinforces East-West détente but is essential to it. The first of these notions is probably the most defensible. If money can be made, and the North American economy strengthened, so much the better —although one wonders whether the investment of $10 billion in Canada's Athabasca tar sands and the North American arctic might not have something approaching comparable merit. One might argue that Canadian nationalism, though on the rise, is at least more predictable than the Great Russian variety. The second notion is more questionable, and many well-informed observers from Communist countries believe

[3] National Petroleum Council, *The Impact of Oil Exports from the Soviet Bloc*, Washington, DC, 1962, p. 1.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 41.

[5] Peter G. Peterson, *US-Soviet Commercial Relations in a New Era*, Washington, DC, US Department of Commerce, 1972, p. 24.

[6] COCOM was the coordinating committee set up by the United States, its West European allies, and Japan to control trade in strategic goods with the Soviet-bloc countries.

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that Western investment in the USSR will have the effect of delaying reform of the Soviet system rather than of encouraging it. With regard to the third notion, it must be pointed out that the origins of the current US-Soviet détente predate the two countries' interest in trade and are largely unrelated to it. The détente stems more from such factors as fear of mutual destruction, the loosening of alliances, and the emergence of China than it does from commercial aspirations.

With all the changes of recent years, some of the old, disturbing fundamentals still remain. The United States retains an openness that is at once embarrassing and admirable, or—perhaps more correctly—admirable because it is often embarrassing. On the other hand, the USSR—whatever may be the virtues of some of its programs of domestic reform—continues to maintain a close and often brutal surveillance, if not of elusive thought, then of recordable utterance. It must seem to many that however much we sublimate our frustrations by condemning injustices occurring in small countries, the real problem lies in the incompatibility of the basic philosophies of the two great global powers.

Hopefully, Mr. Brezhnev can be "put behind the counter a little," although members of the nongovernmental community must be forgiven if all they can muster is a cynical and restrained optimism. Nevertheless, to paraphrase Sheridan, let the merchants of New York (and Texas) open a public subscription and set him up in business at once.

China's Cultural Revolution: Personalities and Motivations

By A. M. Halpern

THOMAS W. ROBINSON, Ed.: *The Cultural Revolution in China.* Berkeley, Calif., London, University of California Press, 1971.
RICHARD BAUM, Ed., with LOUISE B. BENNETT: *China in Ferment: Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1971.
ROBERT S. ELEGANT: *Mao's Great Revolution.* New York and Cleveland, The World Publishing Company, 1971.

IN THE RELATIVELY calm and businesslike atmosphere that currently prevails in China, it is sometimes hard—but always salutary—to recall the passion and turbulence that gripped the People's Republic at the height of the Cultural Revolution. The three books under review deal with that period from several standpoints.

Elegant's book covers the background and events of the Cultural Revolution as seen by an observer based in Hong Kong, with access to sources who directly witnessed some of the events; his account is at times discursive and always full of circumstantial detail. The Baum-Bennett book is a selection of analyses and essays prepared concurrently with the events, almost all by American observers. The Robinson book contains five monographic studies done in somewhat longer retrospect but making full use of the unusually detailed documentation which became available during the combat phase of the Cultural Revolution.

One point that these books recall to our attention is that, however much the Chinese Communists may retain the long view of things supposedly characteristic of a people whose cultural identity has persisted for millennia, they are not patient men. Their true patron saint is Heraclitus rather than Confucius. When faced with a situation in a state of flux, they leap into the midst of it rather than stand by as fatalistic observers. The Baum volume also serves to remind us that the Western analyses written contemporaneously with the Cultural Revolution, by concentrating on one or another facet of the conflict, at times gave the misleading impression that the whole process could be understood in terms of just one of its elements—that is, alternatively in

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terms of an ideological conflict, a simple struggle for power, contention over economic strategies, or whatever. Now, of course, the time for arguing single-factor explanations of the Cultural Revolution is long past, but the various studies, to the extent that they throw light on one or another aspect of the process, remain relevant to an understanding of current developments in China.

Whichever aspect of the Cultural Revolution one looks at, the high emotional charge behind the issues is immediately apparent. The question of what aroused the mass emotions and why they reached such a pitch has not been adequately answered by anyone. The subject is not intensively examined in the volumes under review, although the thoughtful articles by Tang Tsou and Richard M. Pfeffer (in the Baum volume) put popular resentment against the bureaucratic establishment in useful perspective. The Maoist ideological (essentially moral) appeal and the extent of, and reasons for, its successes and failures are only lightly touched upon. On the other hand, all three books contain much valuable analysis of motives and actions in the interpersonal conflicts within the ruling elite. These conflicts admittedly were a more important factor than mass impulses in the initiation of the Cultural Revolution, and they also had a great deal to do with later moves to control its course.

Nevertheless, given the intensity of feeling displayed by the major actors, there is every reason to postulate motives at a level deeper than the conscious. The Baum volume makes a stab at probing this obscure area, presenting in abridged form the well-known thesis of Robert J. Lifton that the craving for "revolutionary immortality" was the central impulse that shaped Mao's aims and behavior.[1] Lifton also implies that the same impulse animated the behavior of others who associated themselves with Mao. The thesis is inadequate, not just because it fails to illuminate major areas of action but also because Mao is a more protean character than Lifton's interpretation allows for. Moreover, no matter how dominant Mao's personality, the revolt against Liu and Liuism must necessarily have been conducted by a coalition, and several strong personalities within the coalition also had both conscious and unconscious motives of their own, as well as varying degrees of ability to affect events. In the longer run, indeed, the interests of the partners proved not to be compatible beyond the point of initial success in the power struggle.

This point is relevant not only to the Chinese Cultural Revolution but also to a number of other revolutionary situations. Especially in anticolonial revolutionary movements, the emergence of a single dominant and charismatic leader is a recurrent feature. Such charismatic leaders typically define the objectives of the movements they head in accordance with their personal solutions of their own life crises. They offer themselves as models to be emulated on a mass scale and thus attempt to translate their individual life-styles into political cultures. The factors which govern the success of such models, and which consequently determine whether or not the leader's revolutionary program will achieve legitimacy, are not fully understood. If Lifton falls short in measuring the impact of Mao's private motives on the Chinese social-political process, the failure of this one venture into psychohistory does not invalidate the approach.

ELEGANT'S BOOK is of particular interest for its sketches of various personalities and for its portrayal of the background events preceding the onset of the Cultural Revolution. While there are problems in evaluating the quasi-eyewitness accounts of such events as the 1959 Lushan conference, these accounts can by no means be discarded. Elegant's explanations, however, suffer from partisanship. They boil down to the thesis that P'eng Te-huai and others were authentic spokesmen for the popular will, while Mao and his cohorts consistently tried to impose on the people their own dogmatic vision. It is difficult to see how anyone could be more confident of the correctness of this formulation than of the Mao-Lin-Chou charges alleging that a bourgeois headquarters was conspiring to restore capitalism. William Dorrill's analysis (in the Robinson volume) effectively refutes the anti-Liu charges by demonstrating that many of Liu's policies were products of collective decisions in which his later adversaries took part. But Dorrill almost succeeds in proving what surely cannot be correct—namely that there was no real conflict between Mao and Liu over basic revolutionary strategy.

Robinson's analysis of Chou En-lai's activity stands out as a solid contribution in the area of elite interpersonal relations. His study of Chou's handling of crises retains its value even if some of the conclusions about Chou's political style may need a bit of rethinking. For example, Robinson

[1] Robert J. Lifton, *Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, New York, Random House, 1968.

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describes Chou's technique in dealing with attacks on his associates as one of shifting the ground of discussion from principle to procedure, raising alternatives, but finally, if all else fails, sacrificing those under attack in order to retain his own leverage. This analysis conforms to the once prevalent image of Chou as a man relatively lacking in initiative, an executive rather than a mover and shaker, and flexible almost to the point of being short on principles. Subsequent events, including the rehabilitations of men Chou was once thought to have abandoned, show him in a different light—as more canny, more forceful, and more determined than he had been given credit for.

These remarks are not intended to pick flaws in Robinson's admirable study. The least that can be said for it is that it sets a standard against which any reevaluation of Chou's political style must be measured. Similarly, it would be easy to fault Robinson for an estimate he shared with dozens of other observers, namely, that the bonds of mutual loyalty between Lin Piao and Chou were firm. In Robinson's case, it can be said that he detected Lin's propensity for the sudden, dramatic stroke as a factor of difference between Lin's and Chou's styles.

The articles dealing with the political struggle in the narrow sense stand up better than most. In the Baum volume, the articles by Charles Neuhauser and Philip Bridgham have not lost their value as accounts of the stages through which the struggle passed and of the structural or institutional reforms undertaken at different times. Similarly Ralph Powell's account of the rise to power of the People's Liberation Army in the central organizations is still worth reading despite a somewhat faulty projection of the future. Melvin Gurtov's analysis of the fight for control of the Foreign Ministry (in the Robinson volume) provides an illuminating case study of the political infighting that took place in virtually every area of the Cultural Revolution. This is by no means a negligible aspect of the conflict, for no political struggle takes place without resort to such tactics. Unfortunately, in this respect as in regard to the pattern of elite interpersonal relations, studies of the Cultural Revolution often highlight the importance of the matter without providing satisfying answers. While we can derive some notion of why Mao found it necessary to destroy Liu Shao-ch'i, or why Mao and Chou decided to destroy Lin Piao, we have yet to be shown convincingly how the result was achieved, who was mobilized to join in the effort, and by what inducements.

IT MUST ALSO BE said that these volumes, like much other writing on the Cultural Revolution, fall short in treating the policy issues involved. Although Dorrill's treatment of policy disputes prior to the onset of the struggle is outstanding, and Harry Harding (in the Robinson volume) presents an interesting framework for analyzing decision-making, most analysts of the Cultural Revolution, including those represented here, seem to feel that policy questions were overridden by the combined ideological-moral and power struggles. Yet it is not enough to describe the Cultural Revolution as a comprehensive effort at revolutionary reform. Such an effort necessarily entails a program for a redefinition of values and a redistribution of duties and rewards throughout the society. To be sure, a few of the writers involved here do touch on such matters. For example, Richard Baum's account (in the Robinson volume) of the impact of the revolution in the countryside makes good use of the sporadically available data and contains an ingenious analysis of the "ecology of conflict." Several of the authors also suggest that the original program of the Cultural Revolution would have been dysfunctional for a modernizing social order. But taking the volumes as a whole, we find that analyses which take a substantive policy question as their point of departure are regrettably few.

As time passes and new developments engage the attention of students, it becomes less and less likely that points left obscure in contemporaneous analyses of the Cultural Revolution will receive the reexamination one would ideally hope for. Hindsight tells us that some things were not quite what they were portrayed to be at the time, and not all of the obscurities are resolved in the volumes under review. On the whole, however, they do reflect credit on Western scholarship. With due allowance for the difficulty of dealing with systematically incomplete information, the scholars' insight into major trends, the overall thrust of the movement, and the roles of leading actors is not far off the mark. Of the three volumes, the Robinson book is of the most lasting value because of the authors' intensive use of details in documentary materials and the refinement of their critical apparatus. If there is any other area in which one would have hoped for more, it is in the always uncertain area of prediction. As Sino-American relations move into new spheres, it would be wise to bear this in mind.

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Hungary on a Seesaw

By Andrew Gyorgy

GYÖRGY MAROSÁN: *Az Úton Végig Kell Menni* (One Has to Complete the Trip). Budapest, Magvetö Könyvkiado, 1972.
JÁNOS RADVÁNYI: *Hungary and the Superpowers: The 1956 Revolution and Realpolitik.* Stanford, California, Hoover Institution Press, 1972.

THE POST-WORLD WAR II history of Hungary has been a landscape of alternating light and darkness. Détente has followed disaster, while periods of distress have often been succeeded by interludes of relaxation and liberalization in domestic and foreign policy. The terror of the Rákosi era of the late 1940's and early 1950's was followed by the promising "New Course" initiated by Imre Nagy. This "thaw" in turn led to the October 1956 revolution and its bloody suppression; yet only a few short years later the leadership of János Kádár was able to win a constructive base of public support and once again set a moderately liberal course in Hungarian domestic and foreign policies. By the late 1960's and early 1970's Hungarians could proudly claim that while they might have lost the "revolt" of 1956, they had managed in the long run to win their *national* revolution.

Both books reviewed here display the everchanging fortunes of Hungary and the Hungarians. Marosán paints a realistic and fascinating picture of the vicissitudes of Social Democratic party politics in the immediate postwar period, while Radványi successfully analyzes the intricate diplomatic maneuverings of a small Hungary caught between the two superpowers. The often exhilarating stories of both authors—themselves actors in the events they describe—inevitably end in failure: Marosán is fired from political office (twice) rather than rewarded, and Radványi chooses political asylum in the United States. Their two careers—reflecting a characteristic blend of Magyar exuberance and melancholy—are microcosms of the lives and political environment of ten million Hungarian citizens.

Marosán's lively study, first published in Budapest in the spring of 1972, describes in great detail the course of Hungarian domestic politics in the years 1944-49. The author, a colorful, opinionated and controversial figure, can best be described as the Grotewohl or Fierlinger of Hungary, that is, a Social Democratic politician who led his party, often almost singlehandedly, into the Communist camp.[1] His personalized account of the critical events of those early postwar years serves both as a personal apologia and as a retroactive justification of the role played by János Kádár in the Communist-planned destruction of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party. This may explain the decision of the Kádár regime to permit publication of this volume.

Beyond describing the intricate process of party merger, Marosán also offers case studies of Soviet-American-Hungarian relations. Thus the book provides useful first-hand insight into the politics of Eastern Europe in the years immediately following World War II. The author's evaluation of Josef Stalin as "the most outstanding Communist leader of international politics of any period" (p. 241) may seem incredible from the perspective of the 1970's, but it is indicative of a significant strand of political opinion among East Europeans in the early postwar period.

Marosán's inside view of intraparty politics on the eve of the artificial and involuntary merger of the Hungarian Communist and Social Democratic parties is well worth reading. The merger occurred in June 1948 with the formation of a new "Hungarian Workers' Party." The process was greatly aided by the efforts of the opportunistic Marosán, who clearly dominated his colleagues in the leadership of the Social Democratic Party. In retrospect, the au-

[1] Otto Grotewohl led the Social Democratic Party (SPD) of East Germany into merger with the German Communist Party to form the Socialist Unity Party (SED)—the Communist organization which rules East Germany today. Zdenek Fierlinger was Premier of Czechoslovakia in 1945 and engineered the absorption of his Social Democratic Party by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia after the coup of 1948.

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thor's emphasis on "independence and cooperation" between these two political movements smacks of tragicomedy and utter futility. Despite warnings by senior colleagues that he was "smashing the party" and "surrendering to the Communists," he persisted in his determination to guide Social Democracy toward communism. Having completed the fateful political transaction, Marosán received the usual reward: first, a brief moment in power, then arrest by the terror-inclined Rákosi regime. Subsequently, he spent many years in prison, where he was tortured and kept in solitary confinement. Finally, having served out his sentence, he was partially rehabilitated by the Kádár regime and now lives quietly in Budapest. His important documentary on Hungarian politics in the late 1940's deserves prompt translation into English to enable a wider audience to reflect on the incredible naiveté of Marosán and many of his contemporaries.

WHILE MAROSAN'S account provides new perspectives on early postwar domestic politics in Hungary, Janos Radványi's enriches our understanding of recent East European diplomacy as it operates in the context of big-power politics. As Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski points out in his Foreword, Radványi's book is an unusual combination of personal recollections and historical insight from a man who was for a time intimately involved in Hungary's relations with the superpowers. Radványi was Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires in Washington from 1962 until 1967, when he chose to remain in the United States. Previously he had served as Country Director for the USSR and Yugoslavia, and as Department Head for Western Europe and the US in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. Writing from this perspective, Radványi has not aimed his book at the general reading public. Instead he provides a microscopic, almost day-by-day analysis of the "thrust and parry" of diplomacy both within Eastern Europe and between Eastern Europe and the West.

Radványi's well - documented study poignantly depicts the perilous position of Hungary as a small country at the mercy of shifts in the precarious balance of power between East and West. The only recourse the author sees for Hungarian diplomacy in such an uncertain environment is to seek maximum "room to maneuver"—a phrase which he selected as the title of his concluding chapter. Yet it is patently clear that the room for maneuver is painfully small.

Neutrality for Hungary and increasing independence of that country from the USSR seem to be Radványi's *desiderata.* This quest curiously may have lain behind Hungary's insistence that the bloody suppression of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was an internal matter, not subject to international, and particularly United Nations, debate. Over protests of both Budapest and Moscow, the UN General Assembly and Security Council year after year discussed "the situation in Hungary," passing 16 resolutions in all condemning Soviet aggression and calling for a restoration of freedom to the Hungarian people. Finally, in June 1963, UN Secretary-General U Thant paid a three-day visit to Hungary, which

formally marked the end of a seven-year period of tension between the world organization and the Kádár regime. From this time onward the Secretary-General considered his mission on Hungary closed. The United States observed the tacit understanding worked out directly with Hungary and indirectly with the USSR, and the question of Hungary simply ceased to exist (p. 151).

Resolution of this painful issue may have given the Kádár government a greater sense of self-esteem, as well as a bit more political elbow room.

As Hungarians eye the future, Radványi emphasizes, they cannot predict with any confidence how the diverse great-power interests in the vital eastern third of Europe will respond to new political developments or crises, or whether this region will permanently remain part of a Soviet empire or sphere of influence. While such developments are of crucial importance to Hungary's future, control over them lies largely beyond her borders or means.

It is hardly surprising, then, that both books manifest a strong sense of historic inevitability. Hungary's difficult geopolitical location and turbulent past certainly justify this psychological syndrome. Marosán's assumption that the Social Democrats were bound to be swallowed up by the Communist Party (sooner or later) proved to be just as prophetic as Radványi's conviction that the "Hungarian Question" would eventually vanish from the world scene as a result of enormous Soviet pressures. Yet, while both writers failed personally in their attempts to alter the course of events, they have produced invaluable political handbooks for future navigators in the uncharted whirlpools of East European domestic and foreign politics.

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Notes & Views
Correspondence

NOTE: *Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC, 20547.*

SOLZHENITSYN

TO THE EDITORS: Mr. Ronald Hingley takes a dim view of Solzhenitsyn's *August, 1914*; "very little new in it," he says. If he means thematically—the ordeals of war and death and loyalty sorely tried—even Homer must have been aware that it had been done before. If he means formally, one may readily admit that Solzhenitsyn is neither Tolstoy nor James Joyce and that the use of a number of hastily adapted modernist devices is not one of the novel's happier features, without necessarily feeling that the Nobel Prize Committee made a big mistake, or that the book is unworthy of the author of *Cancer Ward*.

There are at least two vivid, fully created, resonant major characters in the novel: General Samsonov and Colonel Vorotyntsev. Mr. Hingley does not even mention the first, a historical figure, but a gray and shadowy figure in the historical documents, with a character entirely of Solzhenitsyn's creation, a masterpiece. He is meant to represent the best of the old Russia—the beauty of the kenotic tradition in religion, together with the loyalty, perseverance, and alert but subordinate intelligence that all too rarely, but sometimes quite spectacularly, manifested itself in the Petrine secular state. Surely the scene in which, realizing his defeat, Samsonov takes farewell of his troops and asks their forgiveness (the same Russian verb expresses both) is one of the more moving and at the same time grimly humorous sequences in modern literature. His confrontation with the deserter Lenartovich, who fully expects to be shot when discovered by the general, but who instead is asked for his forgiveness, is at least as good as anything in Gunter Grass. The whole sequence leading up to and including Samsonov's suicide is written in a Russian prose that can compare with the best.

Mr Hingley does mention Vorotyntsev, but only in passing. He seems to have no idea of the historical significance of this fictional character, out of the memoirs of Generals Shaposhnikov, Bonch-Bruevich and other general staff officers, the overwhelming majority of whom Trotsky later managed to recruit for the Red Army. Vorotyntsev poses the central problem of the novel. One has the sense of a lively, restless, alert, fully informed, secular intelligence, who, in the failure and collapse of the old regime, tries to find some emotional-ideological common ground with the primitive patriotism (perhaps "matriotism" is the better word) of the common soldiers, whose suffering and endurance and capacity in battle he takes as a token of future possibilities that should not be betrayed. As Samsonov represents the best of the old order the Tsar and his time-servers betray by their incompetence and irresponsibility, so Vorotynstsev represents the best of a new order that is in process of formation and refuses simply to lie down before the overwhelming fact of betrayal. The sequence in which Vorotyntsev leads a retreat of the defeated, including the deserter Lenartovich, through the German lines, back to their own troops, has an eerie and effective poetry to its prose.

Solzhenitsyn's argument with Tolstoy, upon which Mr. Hingley touches, is on the highest level and by no means boring. It has to do with the role of rational intelligence in history and the responsibility of individuals for their decisions in the conduct of events. As in Tolstoy, the argument is not limited to the discursive passages alone (which indeed need to be interpreted as a kind of commentary on the action—something like a Greek chorus) and cannot be done justice by reductive paraphrase. My point is simply that I hope Mr. Hingley would not be so philistine as to claim the argument is *per se* uninteresting because it is "not new."

What astounds me more than anything else is the accusation against Solzhenitsyn of infantile *narodism* and a kind of *kvas*-patriotism. Solzhenitsyn is certainly a *narodnik*. He admires a number of qualities he feels have traditionally manifested themselves in the Russian common people—a fact that should come as no surprise to the translator of *Ivan Denisovich*. Mr. Hingley seems to have little sympathy with this emotion, even when comparing Solzhenitsyn favorably with Tolstoy, as when he calls Tolstoy's Platon Karataev "a cardboard bumpkin." (An *emblematic* and therefore rather flat character Karataev

NOTICE OF ERRATUM

Michael Kaser, author of "East-West Trade: Comecon's Commerce," (*Problems of Communism*, July-August 1973) has called to the editors' attention a typographical error in the source cited for the tabular material in footnote 15 (p. 9): the citation should read *Zycie gospodarcze* (Warsaw), April 9, 1972.

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certainly is; but nobody who can, before going to sleep, pray God to "lie down like a stone and rise like new bread," can be said to be made out of cardboard!) There is, of course, no reason why Mr. Hingley should share Solzhenitsyn's *narodism*; but it is a fundamental mistake for him as a critic to confuse its manifestation in literature with tokens of idiocy and incompetence. The emotion of patriotism is not, in Solzhenitsyn's novel, presented as mere propaganda, as an emotional rallying cry meant to sweep the reader along in sympathetic two-step with the characters. It is, on the contrary, presented as something *problematic*. Vorotyntsev, for instance, whom Solzhenitsyn uses more than any other character as the central sensibility of the novel—the shaping mirror, in other words—*feels* it as a problem when he has to attempt to rally the shattered Russian troops. How can he appeal to the powerful, primitive, rather benign, potentially creative patriotism of "unwashed Russia" in a way that at the same time is true to his own alert, competent, up-to-date, secular intelligence, in a way that does not ring false and is not demagogic, while capable of reaching the powers of receptivity of his sorely tried and much put-upon audience? Solzhenitsyn does not suggest a simple or obvious solution, or even that there was a solution. Similarly, he poses the closely related problem of modernization and technology, and it is *not* solved, as some other critics have suggested, by "technocracy," though technocracy *is* a theme. In this connection, the East Prussian locale is used to rather powerful symbolic effect, and Solzhenitsyn is by no means as simple-minded in his approach to the theme as these critics have implied.

While Mr. Hingley accuses Solzhenitsyn of *kvas*-patriotism, the latter has been accused in the Soviet press of being pro-German. In a vicious article in *Literaturnaia Rossiia*,[1] Jerzy Romanowski not only accused Solzhenitsyn of preferring German virtues to those of "the Slavs," but concludes from this a secret sympathy with the Nazis. Romanowski, in an act of dubious generosity toward an American writer, compares Solzhenitsyn's novel very unfavorably with Barbara Tuchman's *Guns of August*, which, on a smaller scale and as nonfiction, tells of the same historical events and uses many of the same sources. The two books are indeed strikingly similar. Yet there is one crucial difference: whatever one may think of it, Ms. Tuchman's bias is distinctly anti-German; Solzhenitsyn's is not. His treatment of the Germans—including his rather sympathetic account of the "inspired" General von François—is almost unique in Russian literature. And yet it is as far from being pro-German as from being pro-technocrat. Toward the end of the novel, after the Russian rout and the German victory in East Prussia, it is pointed out rather quietly but ominously that the prisoners are being herded into what will prove to be the "first concentration camps."

The novel has many rough places and imperfections. So do many other great novels I admire: *The Possessed, Père Goriot, Lucien Leuwen, An American Tragedy*. It is, after all, only the first "*uzel*," the first package or tangle or *junction*, of a long epic work, the subsequent *uzly* of which have not yet appeared. (I like Solzhenitsyn's calling it an *uzel* and think it a pity the American edition has dropped that heading.) It has enough life to satisfy those of us who consider this the *first* criterion of a novel—those of us who feel reluctant to apply to a novel of such a scale formal standards more suitable for a short story or a lyric poem.

SIDNEY MONAS
Professor of Slavic Languages
University of Texas
Austin, Texas

[1] April 7, 1972, No. 15. The essay first appeared in Warsaw in the Polish Catholic Weekly, *WTK*, on March 26, 1972; an English version is available in *Soviet Studies in Literature* (White Plains, New York), Vol. 8, No. 4, Fall 1972.

MR. HINGLEY REPLIES: Solzhenitsyn's novel does of course, as Mr. Monas suggests, contain elements of documentary interest . . . as, indeed, do Dudintsev's *Not by Bread Alone* and Gladkov's *Cement*. But that does not, alas, make it a good novel. Whether it is or isn't must, in the last resort, remain a matter of personal taste.

RONALD HINGLEY
Lecturer on Russian Language and Literature
St. Antony's College
Oxford, England

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Index to Volume XXII

Annual indices for Volumes IV-XXI appear in the November-December issue (No. 6) for each year. A combined index to the first three volumes is contained in Vol. III, No. 6 (November-December 1954). Numbers appearing to the right of the columns below refer to bimonthly issues.

THE SOVIET UNION

Soviet Economic Perspectives
  Toward a New Growth Model
    by Abram Bergson 2
  Consumer Problems and Prospects
    by Gertrude E. Schroeder 2
  Comecon Integration
    by Z. M. Fallenbuchl 2
Dissent in a Complex Society: The Soviet Case
  by Walter D. Connor 2
West Siberia: The Quest for Energy
  by John P. Hardt 3
The Shaping of Soviet Religious Policy
  by Bohdan R. Bociurkiw 3
East-West Trade. Comecon's Commerce
  by Michael Kaser 4
Drug Abuse in Communist Europe
  by David E. Powell 4
Population Policy in the USSR
  by Helen Desfosses Colin 4
The Soviet Military
  Influence on Foreign Policy
    by Malcolm Mackintosh 5
  The Party Connection
    by William E. Odom 5
Political Socialization: Two Paths. The Elusive "New Soviet Man"
  by Joel J. Schwartz 5
Soviet Policy in East Asia
  by Thomas W. Robinson 6

EASTERN EUROPE

Soviet Economic Perspectives. Comecon Integration
  by Z. M. Fallenbuchl 2
East-West Trade. Comecon's Commerce
  by Michael Kaser 4
Drug Abuse in Communist Europe
  by David E. Powell 4
Currents in Yugoslavia
  The Revival of Nationalisms
    by Gary K. Bertsch 6
  Migration and Social Change
    by George W. Hoffman 6

CHINA

Looking Inside China
  An Economic Reappraisal
    by Dwight H. Perkins 3
  The Succession Problem
    by Ting Wang 3
East-West Trade. China's Quest for Technology
  by William W. Whitson 4
Political Socialization: Two Paths.
  The Maoist Approach
    by Ronald N. Montaperto 5
Soviet Policy in East Asia
  by Thomas W. Robinson 6

ASIA

Changing Perspectives in North Korea
  Approach to Economic Development
    by Ilpyong J. Kim 1
  Foreign and Reunification Policies
    by Rinn-sup Shinn 1
Soviet Policy in East Asia
  by Thomas W. Robinson 6

SOUTH ASIA

Communism in South Asia
  India's Rival Communist Models
    by Bhabani Sen Gupta 1
  Kerala and West Bengal
    by Donald S. Zagoria 1
  Sri Lanka's Marxists
    by Charles S. Blackton 1

THE AMERICAS

Castro's Domestic Course
  by Carmelo Mesa-Lago 5
Marxism in Venezuela
  by Benedict Cross 6

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COMPARATIVE STUDIES

Nonruling Parties and the "Peaceful Path" by George W. Rice 4
Political Socialization: Two Paths
The Elusive "New Soviet Man" by Joel J. Schwartz 5
The Maoist Approach by Ronald N. Montaperto 5

HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY

The Ideology of Althusser by Maurice Cranston 2

BOOK REVIEWS

Reading Capital, by Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar; *Marxism, Ideology and Myths*, by David Flakser; *Early Texts*, by Karl Marx, David McLellan, Ed.—Richard T. De George 1
The Medvedev Papers, by Zhorez A. Medvedev—Rudolf I. Tőkés 1
The Soviets in Asia, Norton T. Dodge, Ed..; *The Soviet Union and the Emerging Nations—A Case Study of Soviet Policy towards India*, by Harish Kapur; *India, Russia, China and Bangladesh*, by J. A. Naik—Geoffrey E. Wheeler 1
The Soviet Political Process: Aims, Techniques, and Examples of Analysis, Sidney L. Ploss, Ed.; *The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies: Applications of Behaviorally Oriented Research on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*, Roger E. Kanet, Ed.—Karl W. Ryavec 1
Investitionen in Österreich und in der Tschechoslowakei (Investments in Austria and in Czechoslovakia), by V. Nesvera; *Der technologische Fortschritt in Österreich und in der Tschechoslowakei* (Technological Progress in Austria and in Czechoslovakia), by H.G. Kosta, H. Kramer and J. Slama; *Organisationsprobleme der Wirtschaftsreformen in der USSR und der DDR in Lichte der Kybernetik und Graphentheorie* (Organizational Problems of Economic Reform in the USSR and the German Democratic Republic in the Light of Cybernetics and Graph Theory), by G. Kade, H.J. Zubrod and R. Hujer—Nicolas Spulber 2
Soviet and American Policies in the United Nations, Alvin Z. Rubinstein and George Ginsburg, Eds.; *Peking's UN Policy: Continuity and Change*, by Byron S.J. Weng—Lincoln P. Bloomfield 2
Russian Publications on Jews and Judaism in the Soviet Union, 1917-1967, Mordechai Altshuler, Ed.; *The Black Years of Soviet Jewry, 1939-1953*, by Yehoshua Gilboa; *Let My People Go!*, Richard Cohen, Ed.—Maurice Friedberg 2
The Commissariat of Enlightenment: Soviet Organization of Education and the Arts Under Lunacharsky, October 1917-1921, by Sheila Fitzpatrick; *Russian Literature Under Lenin and Stalin, 1917-1953*, by Gleb Struve—Ludmilla B. Turkevich 2
The Spoils of Progress: Environmental Pollution in the Soviet Union, by Marshall I. Goldman; *Conservation in the Soviet Union*, by Philip R. Pryde—Jack Perry .. 3
Die Ostpolitik Willy Brandts oder Die Kunst des Selbstverständlichen (Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik or the Art of the Self-Evident), by Peter Bender; *Honecker. Porträt eines Nachfolgers (Honecker. Portrait of a Successor)*, by Heinz Lippmann—Melvin Croan 3
Nationalism in Eastern Europe, Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, Eds.; *A History of the People's Democracies: Eastern Europe Since Stalin*, by Francois Fejtö—Anna M. Cienciala 3
Soviet Communism and Agrarian Revolution, by Roy D. and Betty A. Laird; *Men vs. Systems—Agriculture in the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia*, by Arthur E. and Jan S. Adams; *The Soviet Rural Community*, James R. Millar, Ed.; *Agrarian Policies and Problems in Communist and Non-Communist Countries*, W.A. Douglas Jackson, Ed.—Stephen Osofsky 3
Soviet Policy Towards India: From Stalin to Brezhnev, by J.A. Naik; *Soviet Relations with India and Pakistan*, by Devendra Kaushik—Surendra K. Gupta 3
Mao and China: From Revolution to Revolution, by Stanley Karnow; *Mao's Way*, by Edward E. Rice; *The Long Revolution*, by Edgar Snow—Allen S. Whiting 4
Eastern Europe and European Security, by William R. Kintner and Wolfgang Klaiber; *The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution*, by Robin Alison Remington—Roman Kolkowicz 4
Fifty Years of Russian Prose: From Pasternak to Solzhenitsyn, Krystyna Pomorska, Ed.; *Russia's Lost Literature of the Absurd: A Literary Discovery*, George Gibian, Tr. & Ed.; *Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn: The Major Novels*, by Abraham Rothberg; *Solzhenitsyn*, by George Lukács—Walter N. Vickery 4
Economic Methods and the Effectiveness of Production, by E.G. Liberman; *Soviet Planning Today: Proposals for an Optimally Functioning Economic System*, by Michael Ellman—Donald W. Green 4
Revolutionary Struggle, 1947-1958 (Vol. 1 of the Selected Works of Fidel Castro), Rolando E. Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdés, Eds.; *Revolutionary Change in Cuba*, Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Ed.—W. Raymond Duncan 4
The Politics of Economic Reform in the Soviet Union, by Abraham Katz; *The Politics of Soviet Agriculture, 1960-1970*, by Werner G. Hahn—John A. Armstrong 5
SShA i Latinskaia Amerika (The USA and Latin America), by K.S. Tarasov, *Neokolonializm SShA v Latinskoi Amerike* (Neocolonialism of the USA in Latin America), B.I. Gvozdarev, Ed.; *Ocherki istorii Sovetsko-Latinoamerikanskikh otnoshenii* (An Outline of the History of Soviet-Latin American Relations), by A.I. Sizonenko—Wayne S. Smith 5

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Education for Communism: School and State in the People's Republic of Albania, by John I. Thomas; *Society, Schools and Progress in Eastern Europe*, by Nigel Grant; *Communist Education: Its History, Philosophy and Politics*, by Wasyl Shimoniak; *Education and Modernization in the USSR*, by Seymour M. Rosen—Harold J. Noah 5
Soviet Political Indoctrination, by Gayle Durham Hollander; *Deviance in Soviet Society*, by Walter D. Connor—Jeffrey W. Hahn 5
The City in Communist China, John W. Lewis, Ed.—Victor C. Falkenheim 5
The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov, by G. Zhukov; *Zhukov*, by Otto Preston Chaney, Jr.—John Erickson 6
Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies, Joint Economic Committee, US Congress—Holland Hunter 6
The Economics and Politics of East-West Trade, by Jozef Wilczynski; *The Legal and Practical Aspects of Trade with the Soviet Union*, by James Henry Giffen—Philip E. Uren 6
The Cultural Revolution in China, Thomas W. Robinson, Ed.; *China in Ferment: Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution*, Richard Baum, Ed. with Louise B. Bennett; *Mao's Great Revolution*, by Robert S. Elegant—A.M. Halpern 6
Az Úton Végig Kell Menni (One Has to Complete the Trip), by György Marosán; *Hungary and the Superpowers: The 1956 Revolution and Realpolitik* by by János Radványi—Andrew Gyorgy 6

CONTRIBUTORS' INDEX

Armstrong, John A.—review 5
Bergson, Abram—Soviet Economic Perspectives: Toward a New Growth Model 2
Bertsch, Gary K.—Currents in Yugoslavia: The Revival of Nationalisms 6
Blackton, Charles S.—Communism in South Asia: Sri Lanka's Marxists 1
Bloomfield, Lincoln P.—review 2
Bociurkiw, Bohdan R.—The Shaping of Soviet Religious Policy 3
Cienciala, Anna M.—review 3
Cohn, Helen Desfosses—Population Policy in the USSR 4
Connor, Walter D.—Dissent in a Complex Society: The Soviet Case 2
Cranston, Maurice—The Ideology of Althusser 2
Croan, Melvin—review 3
Cross, Benedict—Marxism in Venezuela 6
De George, Richard T.—review 1
Duncan, W. Raymond—review 4
Erickson, John—review 6
Falkenheim, Victor C.—review 5
Fallenbuchl, Z.M.—Soviet Economic Perspectives: Comecon Integration 2
Friedberg, Maurice—review 2
Green, Donald W.—review 4
Gupta, Surendra K.—review 3
Gyorgy, Andrew—review 6
Hahn, Jeffrey W.—review 5
Halpern, A.M.—review 6
Hardt, John P.—West Siberia: The Quest for Energy ... 3
Hoffman, George W.—Currents in Yugoslavia: Migration and Social Change 6
Hunter, Holland—review 6
Kaser, Michael—East-West Trade: Comecon's Commerce 4
Kim, Ilpyong J.—Changing Perspectives in North Korea: Approach to Economic Development 1
Kolkowicz, Roman—review 4
Mackintosh, Malcolm—The Soviet Military: Influence on Foreign Policy 5
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo—Castro's Domestic Course 5
Montaperto, Ronald N.—Political Socialization: Two Paths. The Maoist Approach 5
Noah, Harold J.—review 5
Odom, William E.—The Soviet Military: The Party Connection 5
Osofsky, Stephen—review 3
Perkins, Dwight H.—Looking Inside China: An Economic Reappraisal 3
Perry, Jack—review 3
Powell, David E.—Drug Abuse in Communist Europe ... 4
Rice, George W.—Nonruling Parties and the "Peaceful Path" 4
Robinson, Thomas W.—Soviet Policy in East Asia 6
Ryavec, Karl W.—review 1
Schroeder, Gertrude E.—Soviet Economic Perspectives: Consumer Problems and Prospects 2
Schwartz, Joel J.—Political Socialization: Two Paths. The Elusive "New Soviet Man" 5
Sen Gupta, Bhabani—Communism in South Asia: India's Rival Communist Models 1
Shinn, Rinn-sup—Changing Perspectives in North Korea: Foreign and Reunification Policies 1
Smith, Wayne S.—review 5
Spulber, Nicolas—review 2
Tokes, Rudolf L.—review 1
Turkevich, Ludmilla B.—review 2
Uren, Philip E.—review 6
Vickery, Walter N.—review 4
Wang, Ting—Looking Inside China: The Succession Problem 3
Wheeler, Geoffrey E.—review 1
Whiting, Allen S.—review 4
Whitson, William W.—East-West Trade: China's Quest for Technology 4
Zagoria, Donald S.—Communism in South Asia: Kerala and West Bengal 1

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