Page 1
March
Our investigative economic, social a quences of recent ( crucial garment pro
An analysis of reas the Opposition as v plicity in the curren
Elections Commis issues in ensuring a f
An Overview of mi cluding recent impr relationship betwee political will in the today.
A leading US rese i Sri Lanka's econom South-East Asian no
Perspective.......................................... 3 Culture ............................................... 18 Images ............................................ 20 Viewpoint ...................................... 26 Tamil View......................... a o a no e o os as 29 Media Watch...................................... 33 Issues.......................... ........................ 35 Sports................................................. 40
- گي March 1993 - - --- f ఋణీడ
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

1993
美
report examines the hd political conseevelopments in the luction sector.
ons for the failure of ell as of their comt crisis.
sioner discusses key ree and fair election
litary capability, inovements, and the n this potential and North-East conflict
urch group predicts y could fall below ms by the year 2000
Credits:
Cover photo by Privanjan Suresh
Back Page Illustration by Chris Keleher
8 & చతో

Page 2
Comment
B e g in n
eginnings are always difficult to explain; hey are invariably misunderstood, inevitably defensive. A good way to pre-empt this would be to explain why we have selected Counterpoint as the name of our new news magazine.
We are aiming at an approach and an ideal that is alternative in the best sense of the term: not simply oppositional or contentious, not partisan or petty, but in genuine dialogue with the mainstream press of this country.
It is a telling irony that here in Sri Lanka "the mainstream” and "the alternative' press generally refer to papers read by the minority and the majority respectively. If the mainstream press encompasses the Lake House, Divaina and Times groups, and the alternatives comprise the rest such as the Ravaya, Yukthiya, Attha and Lakdiva, then the circulation of the latter category is outstripping the former despite inferior infrastructural and distribution networks, the absence of state patronage and SO On.
Elsewhere, most of the newspapers in both categories would be considered more or less mainstream, since “alternative" connotes esoteric interest-groups, marginal concerns and so on. Here, however, it is the alternative
Managing Editor: Victor Ivan
Editor : Waruna Karunatilleke Editorial Co-ordinator: Sunethra Rajakarunanayake Art Work: Asoka Padmasiri
K.W. Janaranjana Charitha Dissanayake Manubandu Vidyapathi
Circulation: J.D. Chandrasena
Daya Kaluarachchi Printer: m Lalitha Kala, Colombo.
Publisher: Ravaya Publishers (Guaranteed) Ltd.

in g S . . .
press that reports the key issues that the mainstream media is forced to ignore due to pressure from those in power.
However, the shortcoming of the alternative media, as we see it, is that it had failed to strike the necessary balance which requires that both the government and the opposition as well as all democratic institutions are called upon to account for their actions. Thus, where the mainstream press is guilty of not even attempting to take up burning issues of the day, let alone represent a whole spectrum of alternative views, the alternatives have become one-sided in their opposition.
Our attempt is, therefore, to provide this balance by insisting on the same accountability from all the key actors in the political scenario because we feel that this is what democracy is all about.
What Counterpoint has in common with the rest of the alternative press is our attempt to uphold the public's right to know the truth, and on this no one is above criticism, no issue is taboo. We hope that you will be our fellow travellers in this journey because ultimately it is you who have to judge whether we are on the right track, and we expect you to tell us clearly and bluntly when we are not.
*^يشمك
Head Office and \lailing Address
No.: 90, Pirivena Road, Ratmalana, Sri Lanka Tel 7229-43 Published monthly. All Rights Reserved. (O Ravaya Publishers. A wholly owned subsidiary of Ravaya Publishers.
Contents of Counterpoint are copyright. Reproduction of material in part or whole is not permitted in any form without the written authorization of the publisher, Counterpoint.
Mar Ch 1993

Page 3
T postponed in two years and the last time indefinitely, SAARC is in danger of becoming extinct in its infancy. Has this situation arisen because SAARC, though wellintentioned, was badly conceived or because SAARC is a potentially strong institution for regional partnership?
Regional organizations are largely founded upon the recognition that inter-state cooperation rather than conflict is a sound insurance policy for future prosperity. The process of European integration as the most successful inter-state regional enterprise illustrates this and many other factors.
It took two major wars in this century involving the rest of the world as well not to mention centuries of internecine quarrels before exhausted Europeans, and that too only Western Europeans, decided to embark upon regional cooperation. Moreover, it happened under the shadow of the cold war and within two armed camps headed by powers that weren't exclusively European in their military capability or strategic orientation. Finally, shared ideas about state, nation and industrialization provided basic stability for the exercise from the outset, and assured a reasonable degree of success.
Is this the tortuous bloody route for South Asian Regional Cooperation too: Circumstance and choice determine direction; circumstance represented by our colonial legacy of Euro-centric political and economic structures and choice by our leaders obsession with its centralized state, homogeneous nation and market economy. In the South Asian predicament as well, prejudice and pretensions compromise potential.
Though we call ourselves nationstates in South Asia and after all anything else would be demeaning, statenations are what in essence we belong to. State precedes nation in our multifaceted pluralistic region. More pertinently, the state is the principal instrument in forging nationhood unlike in the western European experience where the two went hand in hand. Overarching national loyalties are absent or under constant challenge on the grounds of race, religion and ethnicity, leading to the perception of an over - mighty state as predator rather than protector. Whilst ultimate loyalties are demanded within the territorial unit, in
SAARC: FAD, FACT OR FANTA
South Asia, loyaltic wise, spill over bo1 eral inter-state con tion-state perspect the enemy is both
What is especia South Asia apart fri ture and poverty, i geo-politics and it. ongoing nation an process. There is : the domestic politi New Delhi's neighb dimension to India
“SAARC is p, considering th. issues impedin operation. Do that the associa function at the the security ag
Consequently, t litical rationale of S, ception has been an bers' suspicions as m suspicion that pre power is far from be) if bilateral disputes erative potential cou a range of non-conte corresponding India to express amity thi and ensure, without nate, that the associa tradict Indian nation cannot be a meanin out India, but with i be too conspicuous because mutual susp the central political
This underlying irony is that SAARC that is pledged to ex putes is currently pa tic troubles in its mei respect all SAARC m mon problems and i scale.
Whilst discussi affairs of members at
MarC 1993
نام مسم)

- Perspective
Y?
ultimate or otherers and fuel bilat
ict. From the na
e or its inversion, ithin and without.
y distinctive about m population, culalso its particular impact upon the state - building n Indian factor in al equation of all ours and a regional internal conflicts.
evented from most crucial g regional coes this meam tion can only
periphery of emaa?"
he underlying poAARC from its inamalgam of memuch as their hopes: -eminent Indian ign and hope that tre avoided, coopd be exploited on htious issues. The attitude has been bugh membership ppearing to domition does not conal interest. There ful SAARC with, SAARC will not r a central player cions characterize clationship.
ension apart, the as an association lude bilateral dislysed by domesber states. In this mbers have comIndia on a larger
of the internal he regional level
would be suicidal for SAARC, there is
no insulation from them either. As it is prevented from considering the most crucial issues impeding regional cooperation, does this mean that the association can only function at the periphery of the security agenda - and that too at a low level of activity?
That religious intolerance and militant ethnicity are fundamental security threats cannot be denied. What must also be acknowledged, and here is the lifeline and hope for SAARC, is that poverty alleviation, basic needs and a development fund are also intrinsic to security. They are most effectively organized at the regional level and have a beneficial effect in neutralizing the former threats.
The paradox is that though the contemporary international balance of power is more conducive to SAARC’s good health, the dissipation of tension at this level has allowed a more vigorous expression of domestic grievance. The pre-eminent regional power India and the only superpower the US are moving closer and economic liberalization and regionalism have become conventional wisdom in the aftermath of the cold war. The definition of security too is expanding to acknowledge nonmilitary factors.
On the other hand, multiple disputes about nation and state abound. Secularism in India faces its worst challenge and repercussions on its neighbours, democracy in the other member states is far from secure and an end to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka yet to be identified.
The regional association should be employed to complement national efforts at resolving these conflicts. Given the context, the birth and survival of SAARC is an achievement in itself. Perhaps it will have its day in the future. However time is of the essence and regional cooperation on development will be an indispensable springboard to prosperity and security in the next century. There could come a time when, if SAARC did not exist, it would have to be re-invented. SAARC needs to be saved and sustained even as fad or fantasy.
Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu
عجي

Page 4
GARMENT C. MANY HANDSM
Τς Garment-related industry in Sri Lanka has been een as a rare success story. From its beginnings with the opening of the economy and the setting up of the Free Trade Zone in 1978, the industry has enjoyed a phenomenal three-digit growth rate for 3 years. It then settled down to an impressive average growth of around 30% per year, displacing tea and tourism as the highest gross foreign exchange earner.
The industry grew with little or no interferences support from the government other than in the allocation/regulation of quotas.
Despite competition from Bangladesh and China the sector adapted itself to the challenge and appeared to be set for continued growth.
The emphasis was shifted from the mere manufacture of garments to the production of - the raw material. This would have been essential to further strengthen the industry and to generate higher net earnings since fabrics and accessories comprise nearly 80% of the cost of manufacture.
The apparel manufacturing sector employed over 100,000 workers of which above 85%
were women. Though this sector
Fabrications instead of r was crucial in generating em- L C - -
“T,Zere seems, showever, to have been a collertive blind-spot lulled by the euphoria of the President's rhetoric.”
ployment in an otherwise sluggish period for the econony, it must be noted that without the manufacture of fabrics and accessories locally, it remained a low value added industry.
This was roughly the status' quo at the time when President Premadasa suddenly announced his 200 Garment Factory Programme in late 1991.
The reaction from the industry, by and large, was positive other than for a few, whose warnings were dismissed as alarmist.
The main incentive was the new ten-year tax holiday given to the factory just as the original concessions were coming to an end.
What, despite serious concerns for worker welfare etc., was undoubtedly a viable industry became virtually over
4 )الجسم
 

XTASTROPHE AKE LESS WORK
night a struggle for survival. Impressive growth figures were replaced with presidential rhetoric. Facts were deliberately distorted and hidden to camouflage what was clearly an ad hoc, spur of the moment announcement rehabilitated as presidential policy. Another of President Premadasa's quick-fix projects, this time to "solve' unemployment, was given respectability through an un precedented media blitz. Every once in a while we are reminded forcefully that truth
"The loss in foreign exchange earnings is appreciable and the decline in actual production of major categories of manufacture averages Qver 20%”
is stranger than fiction: for instance, who would have thought that the increase in garment factories would actually result in drastically reduced production and exports to the crucial and lucrative American market? This is exactly what has happened, however. The events leading up to
this bizarre situation are complex
and convoluted, but here we atas promises
tempt a brief summary which - will be followed by detailed analyses of the contributing factors.
To begin with, the time lag between signing the agreements and the operationality of these new factories (known as expansion units in the case of companies that are already in garment manufacture) resulted in delays in the commencement of production.
The first such factories were opened in August 1992. However, export quotas for the US market were allocated to these new factories with no consideration of these delays. The quotas themselves were opened up at the expense of manufacturers already in the market by halving their fulfilled allocations of the previous year as a temporary measure. The accumulated surplus thus arbitrarily available was distributed among the new factories coming under the "200 Garment Factory Programme”.
The issued quotas were determined by the Quota Board around August 19th, nearly 50 days after the quota period began. It need not be re-iterated that quotients to the new factories were generous by any yardstick.
In the garment export industry quotas must be matched with actual orders from the country concerned for manufac
*المشيمة
*WW.
--- March 1993

Page 5
he "200 Garment Factory Pro
g
by President Premadasa is widely known to have waffled on its targets. Two hundred agreements were indeed signed with prospective manufacturers during the course of that year but in most cases this remained merely words on the page.
The Minister of Textile Industries informed parliament on January 13, 1993 that 202 factories had started production, and that 225 agreements had been signed.
However, production on 23 of these factories could not commence "due to bad weather conditions such as heavy rain".
However, the President had opened only 62 upto December 31st and has been busy since the beginning of this year officially inspecting a few
ΠιΟΓε.
Of these factories ceremonially opened by the President, our investigations reveal that only about 40 factories, most of these extensions to existing companies are in full production.
The balance 22 personally opened by the President are in various stages of construction or are training workers.
Of those deemed in full production, none that we investigated had employed the stipulated 500 workers, with employee figures ranging from 200 to 350.
information about the Greater Co
lombo Economic Commission (GCEC) garment ventures are freely available from the Bureau Of Investments (BOI, formerly the GCEC) and from the Ministry of Textiles and Handlooms. For instance, at the BOH, both the Promotional and Information Departments are quick to respond to questions related to this category of the industry. In contrast, the Statistical Department of the same Bureau which handles the 200 Garment Programme is invariably caught scrambling to avoid answering even the most mundane questions put to them.
All we wanted to know was the number of factories in production, under construction and the people employed in each of them under the new programme, but from their amazement at our audacity and their flat denials afterwards, we knew
that this was no trivial matter.
ramme" initiated in January 1992
Keeping Up
Evidence of an C.
Other stipulate efits due to workers vided, but they dar
Then there is t where thc same set
more than one facto with Presidential de
Wasudeva Nan Member for Ratnap a question in parlia Lanka Apparels Lir quota due to EPF a talling 8 million rup at the owners did wa and open a new on under the 200 Garr gramme. 950 worke, as a result. The M reply to this ques
Their Mast
The Manager c denied us access to
basis that het did Counterpoint was a not. After much hesi that a letter of req Director General, B pose. When the lett over, the surpris Senerath, directed Manager, PM.A.J. S partment who statec consult the Directo
The outcome of clear the following tacted him. He could formation we requir fered the following Since the governmen factories are operatio its word. Moreover, c policy of this depart
MrCh 1993
 

he Big Lie...
Cover Story
pen and Shut case
and statutory benare hardly ever pro
n't complain.
he celebrated case of machines served ry, in order to meet cadlines! ayakkara, NSSP iura District, raised ment about Canada nited which lost its nd ETF arrears toees. He alleged that s to close the factory e in Anuradhapura ment Factories ProIs had lost their jobs inister in a strange tion, accepted Mr
er's Voice.
if this department information on the
not know whether Inti-government or tation he suggested test be sent to the OI stating our purer was duly handed od Manager, Mír. us to the Senior lva of the same deI that he needed to i Generał first.
his consultation was day when we con! not give us the ined, but instead of
KK
words of wisdom: thas stated that 200 nal, one should takc ontradiction is not a ment”.
self-interest ratifies lies, and how disturb
Nanayakkara's account but said that
there "is no connection between these
two events” though he could not pro
vide any justification for his claim.
However, if this were the biggest probi, lem with the scheme - that it was
over-ambitious and fell way short of ex
pectations - the government would have been able to salvage some selfrespect out of the jobs provided, and
the target of public criticism would undoubtedliy be disinformation - and bi
reaucratic double-speak [sce Box). Our
investigations have proved otherwise. So
much so that we are relieved that the
targets have not been reached because
the new-fangled propaganda and the old
fashioned lies are relatively, harmless
compared to the real catastrophe-thefall-out of this Presidcntial whim.
An official at the Ministry was even more explicit, albeit unwittingly. After informing us that statistical data was unavailable, he added that problems had arisen here too like anywhere else which they were trying to solvec. He likened the entire programme to a family dispute. “We don't discuss our family problems with our neighbours. We try to solve it among ourselves."
He went on to complain about the lack of balanced reporting on this programme.
Our investigative report shows just how important this notion of "a family of politicians and businessmen is in the garment industry where the silence of
ing its consequencës are to their "stepchildren”, the workers, as well as to their "dependants” the country at large.

Page 6
United States Quotas for Sri L
Categories Unit Description
338/339 12
340/360 12 Shirts not knit, M&B
345/845 12 Sweaters
347|348/847 12 Trousers etc.
347/8/847 T (SUB) 12 Long Trousers
350/650 12 Dressing Gowns, etc.
351/651 12 Nightwear
352/6.52 12 Underwear
359/659 C KGS Coveralls & Overalls
638/639/838 12 Knit Shirts
641 (SUB) 12 Shirts & Bls, N.K., W&G
ture to be viable. Unfortunately, by This would hav
the time the new factories were opera- tories to deal wit tional and their hand-picked Chinese into the Janasaviya employees were sufficiently trained, 1992 was drawing to a close, and lucrative orders from US buyers were hard to come by because the much sought after Chinese market had re-opened by then.
This situation could easily have been anticipated by the Quota Board which regulates the industry's export quotas. There seems, however, to have been a collective blind-spot lulled by the euphoria of the President's rhetoric. At the end of the year, frantic attempts were made to re-allocate this unutilised allocation, but by then most of it had become unutilisable because orders were not forthcoming. Moreo
ver, hardly five months remain before Potemkin. Fa these quotas cease to be valid since the US export year ends on June 30th. If the quota board was more flexible at least the es— Lanka as a destina tablished fac
tories would
“93. Some buyers
have been able to book orders in advance, even up to April 1993 since so
m a n y opportuinities were available then, especially in the categories where there is a major short
fall this year
see table).
The Clockwork Thocis - "Maugama”
۸مسم)
 
 
 
 
 

anka On Selected Items 92/93
Quota Balance Quota Utilisation (90
O3/12/920s/2/9
946858 626525 338. 49.2 902671 3.32529 63.2 N/A 127511 91610 28.2 35.1
102 1891 801988 21.5 42.2 61335 485100 20.9. 25.2 883703 62640 29. 32.4 235873 121.204 48é 59.7
1.009982 762317 24.5 30.9 972425 933064 莓 45.5 674710 517010 234 33.5 1000000 789206 2量。其 34.0
Source - IBERC Ouota Ionitoring Report, December 23, 1992. 2 enabled these fac- The loss in foreign exchange earnn the entry of the ings is appreciable and the decline in market in January actual production of major categories
7ze 77, Eő Szűk of Dező.
even cancelled Sri of manufacture averages over 20% see tion on their buying table.
trips as a di- These categories include such high
rect result of demand and high value added items
this situation. as shirts, trousers, overalls and cover
A quick alls.
comparis on
with 1990/91
and 1991/92
shows exactly
Canadian quotas (which are allocated by calendar year) were underutilised in 1992, but industry sources
lay the blame on a sluggish market how great this
shortfall is, de
rather than on local shortcomings. However, this loss is an added burden
spite the fact on the garment export trade which is
that we now in the throes of a major crisis. A quick
have in theory glance at the main export categories to and rhetoric at least, “200”
fact or i e S
Canada will serve to show the extent of the problem. In 1991, the export performance for "Pants, Shorts, Overalls (Category 02)" was 96% whereas upto December 1, 1992 only 30% of
more
MasCh 1993

Page 7
the quota had been utilised. "T-Shirts and Sweatshirts (Category 05)" de
clined from 73% in 1991 to 25% in
1992 upto December, and "Sweaters (Category 06)” dropped from 71% to 32%. The situation was similar in most other cases.
In fact, what the "200" factories has resulted in is not merely a decline in production but also a virtual wipe-out of the sub-contracting garment firms whose existence depended on the inability of some companies to meet export quotas. There are certain companies which have substantial foreign quotas though they haven't any
still others wishc skewed quotas the ceived.
To cut a long st that everyone in something that was even at the cost of phe. If there is a heres to all the r print, though we c one in our investig ing the company w nerable to delays i. sary banking facilit cess to the Quota
machines, much less a factory in operation.
An estimate of the number of sub-contracting factories in existence before the 200 factories programme is unavailable, but the fact that a single factory which opened an extension unit and had as
(9ne Fler Otter the Cuckoo's Wesif
many as 20 sub- - contractors, employing more than 2000 workers was closed down, is an indication of the large loss of employment.
This situation is quite preposterous and yet the industry remains quiet. This "official" silence is hardly a measure of agreement and acceptance of the new regime, if off-the-record harsh criticism is anything to go by. The reason for their reticence is a certain delicacy which owes more to getting caught cutting corners than to anything else.
Some manufacturers were exposed as not paying the mandatory EPF and ETF contributions on behalf of employees. Many businesses had notemployed the stipulated 500 workers, nor were they providing meals and other facilities as promised in their respective contracts. Others were worried that their perks such as duty free car imports would be in jeopardy, while
in quotas for the (which they could n other operational fa perks they receiv. these units.
Add to this the for establishing thi new factory was re ceived at the prefer ential 19% interes with no collatera and only persona guarantees of the di rectors, then i would seem tha even if the nev units never wen into production thi owners wouldn't b too badly off, espe cially if they wer able to skim some thing off the top o the loan.
March 1993
f.A.
 

d to protect the y had already re
pry short, it seems the business has well worth hiding, national catastrocompany that adles and the fine idn't come across ations, by protestould become vuln obtaining necesies, to limited acPool, to innumer
able delays at
customs, and if all this fails they would be subjected to the Π Ο I C direct methods often resorted to by
the government.
Basically, the owners of established factories stood to gain through the automatic exten
sion of tax free status for another 10 years, by the increase expansion units nake use of in their ctories), and by the cd for setting up
fact that the loan
Cover Story .
雛
Taro Faced Strategies
In some cases we are aware for in
stance, that old buildings were used
for the new factory premises though
the costing was
struction.
V.
NDB
DFCC
People's Bank
Bank of Ceylon Private Banks
Total Loans
based on new con
Rs. 833 million Rs. 530 million Not Known
Not Known
Finance Refused Rs 1.363 billion
Who lent the money?
The two main financiers of this
Time to count the factories
f
M
"صنيع.
project are the National Development Bank (NDB) and the Development Finance & Credit C or r or a ti on (DIFCC).
The NDB financed 49 factories at an average of Rs 17 million each. This amounted to 3 million rupees, a assive 140% increase to this sector over the previous year. The soon-to
be privatised NDB
7

Page 8
is near its a g r e e d maximum of
20% of total
loans to the garment and textile sec
1OT.
Although details of the DFCC fi na n ci ng
aC not
available,
what is known is that it had
reached the maximum of its total loan portfolio in this sector as of De
cember 31,
1992. Since the DFCC loan portfolio
at the end of September 1992 was 5.8 billion, the aggregate of loans given to the garment and textile sector can be estimated at just under 1.2 billion ru
pces.
The DFCC had given 670 million
rupees to this sector by 31st December, 1991 which means the bank had
given 530 million rupees for the new
factories. Though loans upto 30 million rupees were requested, the average loan appears to be under 20 million and the interest rate is 19%, considered to be highly preferential. No outside guarantors were required, and a large number of previous defaulters
(either in their present name or called
by another) received such loans from the very banks they had compromised their credibility with! (See Table. The grace period for beginning repayment of the capital component of the loan too was most favourable with the norm being around one year.
Cuckoo Clocks
The now ubiquitous clock tower is a sine qua non for prospective factory owners if they are to receive the President's inaugural blessings.
Half Past Six - In the Middle of Noachere
the roads had to to accommodate t ture of the Balang
The clock tow that the President specifications are preferred shape at In fact, it is not a geration to say tl clock tower comm least as much imp as the factory itsel though after the ta it remains an inc ous and useless : of superstition.
Today, in Bal: or Buttala, in Putt Padukka, its fou often show four ent times, sympt of the schizophre this entire progr that has conflatec with real develop
confused quantit
quality, couple ( ployment with trenchment, an
ated a comedy of
f
s
 
 

The cost of the tower
varies from
about Rs 150,000/- to 185,000/- with only three major competitors in the mar
ket.
Numer
ous reports h a v e
reached us
that the
OW C WaS constructed
at the expense of shops and
buildings in the smaller
towns since
be widened in order
he edifice. Our pic
goda town is typical.
er is the first thing
opens,
and detailed
provided as to its
nd size. exag; hat the
ands at
OTCC f, even umasha
ongruymbol
ngoda lam or
faces
differomatic
nia of
Η ΠIY C hype
ment, with
e
T C
CC
CTOrS.
Show On The Road
The opening ceremony is a media blitz costing the company o ver 300,000/- which includes a ready-made Tower Hall song and dance routine, two brass plaques as per GCEC specifications to commemorate the event, a pandal at the entrance and so on.
These opening ceremonies are now being called inspections because the
pretence is being maintained that they
are already in operation
The subsequent Jana Ham uwa held at the factory's expense is a grand political event with the institutionalised opposition bashing, media baiting and other popular pastimes.
The Janasaviya Merit
The GCEC provides the new factories with a list of 500 employees from among Janasaviya recipients whom they must employ. There are no extra names, nor are any exceptions tolerated.
A factory in Matugama that em
ployed 35 experienced workers living
Who is fooling chom !
March 1993

Page 9
in the area because some on their list were either unavailable or unsuitable, were ordered to send them packing and recruit instead from another list provided to them.
Every case we have examined has revealed that well under the stipulated 500 persons are employed, the norm being around 300. In addition, the statutory meals are hardly ever served free, nor are health benefits provided to employees.
The government press has itself highlighted one case where a factory
in Anuradhapura w workers sent pack dent intervened.
A Living Wage Fac
The main grou turers is that the crease announced year is unrealistic.
On the basis of of Rs 2000/- for an
ΤΕ is the title of a World Bank Research Paper published in 1981 on the collapse of the garment industry in Colombia in the 70's. Some of the causes identified in this paper are di
rectly relevant to the current crisis facing our garment sector.
It gives an ample warning as to what happens when the industry is expanded without careful planning. Colombia's garment exports which had never exceeded 1 million dolars until 1970 climbed to nearly 50 million US Dollars in 1974. However, after 1974 the country's exports of garments to Europe and the United States declined steadily never again to reach these levels.
The most important single reason for the rise of Colombia's clothing exports from 1970-75 is that the government's exchange rate and export incent tive policies had begun to make this industry profitable. The fall of Colombia's exports, especially to the USA, was due partly to the subsequent decline in the real cffective exchange rate.
In the Sri Lankan case, the rupce was devalued regularly since 1977, starting from Rs. 8.30 per dollar in 1977 to Rupees 42.00 per dollarin 1989.
The currency has been devalued only slightly since then despite doubledigit inflation as well as the high cost of capital. The 2000.00 minimum salary for the lowest labour grade not merely makes garment factories which have narrow profit margins (and most of them do) non-viable but also makes it
being offered by China, Bangladesh and now Vietnam. This report also points out that Japan’s garment manu
difficult to compete with the low prices
Why the Emperor's new clotl
facturing industry the rapid rise in liv meant an ever incre
This might fo Lanka some of th for Colombia's in with the then emer ment manufactur Kong, Taiwan and control and punctua the most importan bian firms met thes as well as those in t
tries.
However, the performance of sor panies gave the cou contributed to the the diffieukt marke edge of the Sri Lar try relies almost ei factors.
This sudden ex led to a shortage o agers as well as wo biggest single draw high standards of q labour force. Most complaining that o cruited under gove percentage stays av a couple of months ous personal reasol
Market gossip i. the return of 12,0 manufactured by a ist atone of his nev - Setting up factori without propet го and other infrastr invariably lead to c ers are already fac
March 1993
المسم0

as closed down and ng until the Presi
and the Dying tory
se of the manufacunilateral salary inin November last
his minimum wage unskilled worker, a
Vvut July
leading garment magnate is reported to have complained to the President that his expenditure was increased by 17 million rupees a month due to the increased wages.
Our investigations indicated that profitability of well-established factories declined from around 10 - 15% per annum in 1991 to about 5-8% in 1992, while many companies are showing losses for the first time in January this
year.
The salary increase is perceived as catastrophic because nearly 60% of
hes are not made in Colombia
disappeared due to ing standards which asing cost of labour.
breshadow for: Sri e non-price reasons ability to compete ging East Asian garers such as Hong
Singapore, quality lity of delivery were t. The best Colom
e two sets of criteria he East Asian coun
css than satisfactory ne Colombian com
ntry a bad name and
fall of its exports to ts. The competitive kan garment industirely on these two
pansion has already f experienced manrkers. However, the back to maintaining uality is the moving factory owners are f the initial 500 rernment order a large way from work after of training for vari
s
already referring to 00 dozens of shirts freputed industrialtly opened factories. es in distant areas lds, communication icture facilities will elays. Factory owning the problem of
having to take the entire month's sal to their distant factories from Colombo in cash. The World Bank report stress with examples how this particul ure by one firm to honou it. mitments can have impo cffects for other firms in the same
гу.
The report reiterates. productivity, one of the k the clothing industry, ten time through the implem many small improvements in duction process.
Its concluding re. phetic for us: "being goods at a competitive pri sary: condition for successful exporting, but it is by hoai cient. The potential exporter be able at a minimum to lo tial buyers, to produce g ceptable quality arid to gua livery on time." s
The danger facing Sri ment industry is that no requisites have b in implementing the so-calle ment programme which may doubtedly affect the reputati entire industry. :::::::::::
At the time of going heard that this very Co was distributed to key gov cials by the World Banka Ši warning about possible fu
for Sri Lanka.
In what has -- a government bureaucratic copies of this re thus appear to have "disappea
`°ኣ • "تجم

Page 10
LL LLL LLS LLCCLLLL LLLL LL LLLLL LaLLLLL LL aLLL LaLLLLLLLaLLaLS LL LL SLLLLLLGGLlllLLS LLLL LELS LmmaLLL LLaaaLLLL L LLL0LS SLLCtca LLLL La LLaLLLLL LLLLaaaaaaTLLL ttt LLLLL LLaLLLLLLlLLLLSLS LLLLC LLLLLLH LLLL LL LLLLLL SGLLGLlLLS LllHeLe LLLlLLLLLLL LL LLLLL LLTLLLLLLLLSLLHL GHllLS LHCCLLS pachy, "l'hey arc, hUYA': 'v':r, assured (af first-aici – kry: Imidę, LLLLLL LLLlHtLLH L LLullLLLS LLL LLLLaLaS LLkE cLLL LLL t tLLLaLLLLS LLLLLL LLmlaaaa aa L LLJS LLLalHaa LLLLLL LLLLH LLLLLL LLaaL LLLLL aaLLLaLL
mGaaLlLL ccL CCLLCLLLaLLC S LLLa LLLLLL TteLL LLL LLL LLLLLLa LLLLLLS
I'll FE IN
In hell one cannot co
The word :
T. is Julfu u Luday. Tu yIJш ишtsile Jaffnu Iliere may hcji is a single pict Lafc. Jaffna is fill of tigers - thic LaLLaaa ES0LLS S LLLSLL aLLLLLLS zS0LL L0LLLL LGLLaaaaLS LtHCL LLLS Ehecy" mairm and hic va arc MAIL for yolır bılcımd.
But inside Jaffri: tulay, Llı tere is a Teut. Eh:T id:Sp:Tit: civiliam human bicing whçi R Criggles daily, Crı sırv'i yc.
Nt petrul, diesel, engine oil or fuel are perITitted to ente:IT the penin SI :L. (Only 3 linnitect quantity of kerensenc is allowed in, and that it at irregular intervals. This has lict
perroll being s Tugglet in and si rall at Rs, 2)()- tɑ LLSLS s0LS L LLLLGLLS LLLLL LLaaaaLLLLL LL GGGLLaE T LLmmLGLLLgH agL LL Rs.25- to 300- it bottle, Willing with such a non availability
 

LL GSaaLaLL LLL LLLLL LaLLLLLLLlLLLLLLL LLLL LLLL Lttaaa LaLlLLS EÇI” mawi mot know chc pırpçoisc chicy arc fighting for. Thus, Sirhill. I illi lliurui] kids war-the Flk{הי y 11th
crislı ir 1 3 v, är fir vyli:h thı Ly :IT: T1c t T:s H 1Sible:.
1όγική
AFFNA
Dmplain of hardship'
says it all.
LL LLLLLLLLS LLLLL LLLLH LLLLL LLLLLLaHtLHHL LLLLLLLLS LLLLLLLlL a 0000 S frir thc: 1:List tvyrı ATLE : half ye:LT;.
Consttucntly, agriculture and industry in Jaffna have heen hacily affected, Farriers can no longer use their clic. trical or fuel drivem water pumps [o irriga e cheir a rid ficds, iT Lisc tracters to plough thern. Milchreover, the hanning of II;IIIsIEJTLirg fertilizi:Ts tij Jaffni, his siçvercly affccccd crip LLGLCLLLS LLL LLLLHHLLLLLLL LLL LLtltlLltHLGmCalS ttmLCLLlLL tLlGL GLL S sort cid (1 traditional Incthods of farming, using natural forritize:rk like: crw dung, bia- Tcfusc and lcaf-composts to fertiliz: thcirfields an I bulls (o Plough and ro irrigatc.
All small industrics such as incial welding shops, lithic workshops, tirIlbic:r and grin din g rmiills ctic', 'vA' hich IT: Llc -
8 SLSLS S S S S S SLSL SLS SLS S S S S S S S SLS S S S
METCF) | J93 " تشتمه،

Page 11
perdent 1 fu clor:lcctricity havc v irLilly comc to a SamLLLLLS LLLL LLL LLL LLLL LLLLLL LLaLLLLL LL LLLLLLLLSLLLLCLLLL LLLLSKKa lHLLLCLaL LLgma LLLLLL LLLC LLLLa LLLLL aGLLLLL LLaa0aE0LLLLLLL LLLLLL Itter overty, liest gig for their liv:lihrid, South, if then :ru: :Ingage:d in Im:11 II:1 i labou i II JI Lier to survivc.
LGLL LLLLLGLLL LLLLLL aaaL EELL LLmLLLLLLL LLrr aL GGG HLlLLLLLLL LLL as this activity is tanned by the Sri Lanka Navy. 'I his has rzd Iccd lisler:Ento a «icspici: te: r:light. Sui vivig mmly (in It cager rations privicted by the givernment, Those which DSELLLLLLL GLLL LLLLLLLSLLLL LLEJ GG LLLLLL LLltLGES LLLLL LLLLLa LLLLLL LL LSELLL
Jimly a fic: w pravurns,
LLL HaLLL LaEL LtLLLL LL LCmmuLLLLLLS LL LLL LLLLCLLL for H. Lntire Northern Provinge which is the Teaching LLLLLmmLLL LLL LLLL LEEEESSS LLCCLLLL LLLL SL SLHHLLLLLLL LLLLGLaLKS LL i Hot Ars, drugs | cv er la sic Unt:; like pa 1:3 di ol : nid 'em Ioiin, stressings, gascs likt" (xygen incl. Nitrogen, and lack of electrictly except for a single gcircr:rror rhat supplies thc Cartly" " ( lic:ra [ional" { pli oT: fing [hica Lireo.
LLLLLLLLS JLLLCaHSrS LGGKLLmllH LLLLLS LLLLLLaLLLL LLL LLLLLL pittients arc scent back until they become 'cmc.gc.cf:s. In LHHLLLCCL LLLLLL LLLL SLLLH LHEE EaaCGLLLa LLL LS LLLLL LL LLL LLLLLLLSLLLLLL LGLLGLLL SLLLLLLLLlll lllSLLLHHL LLaaLLLLLLLS tttLLLLLLL GGmH LaL LleesL LLLltCCmLLLL in Pt. Pedre) and the TCR (: Lirider wrthsc: iiicitection the Tcaching hospital is. It see that in a skil:rt in sericc is
II air Lisi Ilcd.
13ΓΕΠ : 33 f کنگھمسم
 

Tamil Wiew
\lost citizens of Jaffr; Isc bicycles for transport ini LLaLLLLLLL LL LLLLaLL LtE KL LlaaL LLGL DLLLLLLLS SS LLLL nuralJer of ixuscs. IliriTrik: si, rh rcc-whe: :lv:Ts and myterhikes rim siri kero5 cnc. Llıeir engine:s having harcm :Llapite i accordirigly, But Iransport L: ; rt; iirc lılıgılı, 4 incl hic Iranı sır) Tit:- ticin yf gitarls is mainly dt}rle çırı bullock t:LIts indi bicycles. Public II:LI isport is al la ing of thc : SL. AYITLyst all arfacT vehiclics i Tı Lisie: Such us tricks, y uns 3rd Ho:1jeros är: L Jeratci Ly : hic LTTE.
SLlLLL LLLLLaL LLLLLaLLLL LttLLLLLLL aaa LLLLLLSCCLLekeL LL LLLLLLLLS tales, swct:Is and jails, there isn't even crough food to aaLGLLGS LrrL GGCGLLttLLLLLSLLL CttSLL LLaaH LLLLLL LLLLL LLL LLLLaLL LLLLLL LLLLLLLES LLgLLLaGaaS LLtLSL GGLlL LLLCC LLL LGG GGgBOLLSS SLL LaLaLLLLL LL R3.45,-, brcad Rs.1 - Riçe: Rs, fyll / - pt: I kilo. 'E'hcre is inru mil k i stiwdicr, 36 lap, ba['t crit:5 ; nid candies.
The aidiary citizens' nights are dark Lill loud - filled with guitfire", shelling a till aerial E m hing frtin which thcy have protection only when they Папаge Lu Iшп iritu their yw'n gair dicr y link cr,
RестirПment to th: 1. TT1 is suci tlar people hcrkvicer : ''cm, ribit: yuyung age: çif |(} and 40 ha voc. grr*ar difficulty ir: LLltttLY LLLLLLLLS LLLLLLmLLLLLLL L LOL0L LLLLL LL LLLLLL GGG GLLLGLLLLL colli i . If Jaffnau is rir 34 o brigyll i sily difficult i Inless comic has 'prill' i 11 which Lake The vis: will bo giver in a Jay,

Page 12
Trade I. niопisп is banned within the EPA. factIII is, ;LIll the Jahirit (pliriçil, deriscal to facilitat: Çuri i ITALITication berween management Ind the workforcc. is anothic arrin of the hierarchy since the Yorkers in it irt III inina [cid hi', ch: mang.:T:n II, 5 i T:s Lulit of the suspension (if n. Erinal lah IIT avys frIT IF projects, Wyrker5 have: II) legll sccoLISC or ProIcciol from : Hıse İ:y cırıplayers. Tırnover is '''Ty high, the reasins for dismissal often friv Gilli Lus, and scicurity and sclf-ck nficle LLL : bf w'Corkcr5 aC al Iminimum, n
1987, for insanıc:, yw'r man vill i sackel relely fils publishing a poc In | inclicit hect cyw'n namic describing her life: il the Free Trie Wert.
Accidents at thc workplacc bring
1. Lhe "Lorst i llic Emillagemcm. struct LırL. A rcccra I study hy Profcssor ttia riclichi (tes Llti. Il ris: E3 crırtıpıcı3: Licin paid It acciden I 'ictims, li s:t. Lley Te ; le Lirnes expJL:L:LLE rry finis; H Ehe: iT L: LITTL: Tit shift (lcslitic Illic: injury, and Inedical leave is rarely grante:l. (:4sux E1: x Ľ bĽČT TcpoTĽcil of \l orkers losing their jilts due Lil sluying:Lt humc for 3 fcw days as a result Hof är :Cçilerint. Irı Litltlitir JITI, III: ILy c::Sie i are repTed rf wrkt:rs Sifferirg frr:T11 work-relittacid illnt:55 als : { Inscut: m ::, horrcndo Lu5 inciden is repCTIE: om S-inc|recember 22, 1996), whicracid yw'r prkicr a I a II ng King-wnt: ti.try who rin: is: a Thistaki' had hier head lang:d om th: machine: brv ii m iriite spaririiror ( whimse: yw'n hur Livo:Il di Lemls, in the v, cirkcr: porc Id, I c II, iI i iiliil 5.LIffcfcd l Scirious
a ferrhe: il rhriri:5 sepped in är; : T:s Lil of , ,'','Urk stoppiagų: beccatus: he la na gennn:llegel ha I th: 1ccidL:n II YA:s a Sicil lo h : iTjLIFL: LA JITTIiams. Incigligcn.cc.
Herc our harding hisc is like a curle shcl. 113 rusty Lin rarıfis likca sic''C. 'ın ybody carı kick. Kr. brc:ık, The l'L, y't Liidu:
link wallhi, I m slik of Lil: cucucs, bathing all d cooking (Lirns. I. alc at nigh wic don't :: L1 r 11 : LI) CIJçık, Š l ( ዄ'ነ‛ &- bı' h: if : lcı:If euf 13T:: ::Hrad :: iccc vyf jaggery fer (). Ir di TT1 er."
"I'w clwc girls liv, c in
Lur bı harcdiring hCILISE. It's very
SITIFall . . . buyut sleep, Critik ånd l l-Ingings irn Lhaix sde el cir I thin (ILIL raf ar tild fe
croir fil Tel:. . . . I
hlav": ti 'y',':' ), tv, col (T: Il si
Th: CF in ard for bolirding hC fir 35 vy"Tkçrs is a silional conte TI Wirkus :I child,
Sur cly. Ihc sh; among 25 pict plc W schelulos 111uld le hårdship? Nirithing that the full Llul -
St: 11irl& 'r' II of boili ding Karıtmayak c.
A typical factory gins at 4.10 a.r.l. qugu p for her l
llc lic:lls ils of iriiiill:cl II: Ċ., ', li ma' heing sick ht:List: ld to city of an
li hals bccn rcpIlia yw'rkicr; cf clic
vy'eT: ILLIL TITILLl lŁ l::gL: i fine:T:Il in
T’ lı
у r. II П. g. (III) in hill a legs dy dictid is a rc
51. f ''' ( king hit 51 ff:ring from http:1riti5,
It must
loc Ill Lecl., hi () yw'c',' ac r.
LlL:IL 21& -1 resi i Llt { if Llo litic imal patriarchal
l:1gc. Ih cs(c WYʼuE11 c:
է: Il T11 Լ: Tլն է: 15 || T է: II
vylichci l: 5:xu: cial (ir simply The
Inert. Ne Lhe: casil vi, maar arc E. hic', filmillic:lius Lulls
a rլ:51Ilt, the Arrյm
Tic5 ccm ul
شاعسہf
 

() x 1 (). We est, xcČj all či Lur hc
little sce. Il
Tı:Attricss. Talc r tili:5EI l1:ığg :I.ILul 1 rainy days wic I r heads with a
it."
imurn legal 5 tandluscs of Ont (oiler I Incas Lur: If the: in
*L; לאHit :H FH-וו תו חר
Iring çif (ing: rtıiler ht. I had a'i: Tigid yw'r Brk. *:ld IQ. IrcincndOLIs
moerc nced hit: Sail
Y el licos: 1rainimal mimaid by io
his c5 al roud
: Yvyrker"; id:y teyıcı ilhc his II
billiet LIII Il
Icn unhygicnic and g t i k l:Spit: th: :rt: nrtenti" kirid,
oric for instance, Smart Shirt factory
J '.'E. LI ELLE IT id eu cyl
1.
tion through Ingle Tanipulation of theš: "Cry fricČla ITNs. "I'lı : EET. ::::Silv': T13 Iure of the presisi Te; ırıld:IT vehich thesi: vi T11 : per T:te: c::Tn Hje: sie:Een even ri IT his descripti ir ly Lille & Tie, spat is clly syITap;thetic liit pa ri: Tchai, Tale sciologist cite earlier who lemans the lack fadcLate saic: ill their bariding hists fecause it has “l: to the ird: i': li l-purI 1 Tit cif riterTne: lug:- ha vil patt:Tris :Ling Wrkiri gil: yw:hi::h :IT: E1 och rılırı Ixi 41 : Ti «lectri1:T1 til ty their t. yy'T şHL:ial wellteir1 - - . . l'hey arc rcpcr Lcd LC, bc rcm ving Lheir clittlies a raid geL [sic] lrt:, Lcal ill frrITif eft:
:h rather without any sharic thu; lýsir!g all sexial iF1hibitiuris III: declim into which they were strialiyril rit: a leng period of timc,"
II :15 in Icilition IO chics: sorts of [radiciam malis [ acconium [s (of thc diccally of sucial ilulfs hit, v. L- 11: Luld, Llle President decided to pric-empt the disr Lipilium of Lbic li li, cs of li l-LI Eug ta' l-Eucrn hy dcccm Iraising chic locatiem of hic :g: 1 E1 eo II L ful:Li pri Es- Xx Yy lil Les to wo [kers Nኣፉነ 1e:I | L'h:111ge h:15 taken pl:LCe soir. Il (13e already wirking in the EPZ amcl clse
vyrill hic illic: YA’Cork fribrni li rific:.
wler, hw'', sii::lt: ar: It -ligilt: frr emplorren in the factori-5 13:Tcl im chcir villagets hic::141&L: E hic 1c "Y" fi CICOfics Ciri only hiric Jr):is:L'yiyo:
rctiբic rl Is.
Ieir le:uvoir 1g Lilie tr: -
cırımfim:5 (ifi Lhic wil
In halv" c : Lili i: Y el f in des cm dence, I, em Linl... fi:In
frcc.drt of Iry
նը: gauit is Haי"E 1. with LL ilegativac *18
:I Wirkers stimecr:abolc IIC cxploital
citil strict. LIris.
sidic from the nersis LCnt illlcgition of the |1:ITLi5:111 5ւ:- IF Lil Elitlidit, Lisi.
| ::tir. Tı
I h : s :
ħil I III t II L II -
tril
+1:
- "R" Tk. I this:
I TI -
; ; lı : || I l : preserilieel tiLCHuse: rhey have erher de Illes; Lic: LI HITrı ilirien ;. White: "L:T ( Ent: ČåLI ŠĽ, f’T IT thŁ: T: T1:4 gentneemt perspecLive Lh: 5:lectic ırı çif appropriatç: Workeri hı:H; prvoerd edisi:Lair Thus, while: frem Lhe we Prkers“ pHxim L (1f view Lllis er||1- lry Terit dics; Ticht sic LTT t, sit their
riteels.
سمA ۔ ۔ ۔
MTF || 3

Page 13
Exports for 1992 have gone down despi rics Programme" in the key regions, quota production is cxportcod to the
Thc mandatory increase in salarics an important steps in thc right direction. F hardly ever provided. Payment of the e The insistence on enploying Janasawiy pounds thc issue.
I).cccntralising the industry is cquitable togethics with the crcation of the essen resources), in a planned and methodica scctor should be carefully orch.cstratics jeopardiscd as in thc prics.cnt instance.
Quotas have been allocated in a haphaza Cainty which togethct with inexcusable the inability of manufacturers to maxi signs, however, that the Quo La Board is
The sudden changes in quotas have lcd
contracting factories which arc facing :
main companies who arc being retrenc
Many established garm.cnt manufacture under the new programme becausc of th ten years as well as for the import duty efits combined with the casy-tclims ba negligible.
To make matters worse, the crisis of th
following developincints:
Falschoods and double-spcak have bect the relcvant dcpartments, not to menti the failure of the Presidcnt's obsession
Jr (cr waste and incaningless expense arc of the programme such as the clock
Presidential inspection.
խել Լիի 1993 fمالمسم

Cover Story
ce or because of the "200 Garment FactoJSA and Canada. 60 percent of garment A.
the provision of Incals to workers are lowever, thc cality is that these mcals are nhanced salaries will lead to bankruptcies. a workers who are untraincd further com
and inccessary, but this must take place tial infrastructure (including management 1 Inanner. Thc cxpansion of thc garment so that the achievcIncInts so far are not
"d and arbitrary IIlan incr creating an uncerdelays in assigning quotas has resulted in Inisc cxport orders. There appear to be s getting more organiscd.
to far-reaching repercussions both to sub
annihilation, as well as to workers in thc hed.
Shawc acquicsced to opening cxtensions
erencwal of their tax holiday for a further " concessions madc available. These bcnnk loans makc their risk and investmcnt
2 industry has been compounded by the
in politicians, as a result of having to hide in this sector.
incurred in order to support the trappings ower and the Jana Hamuwa during the
13 فيسيبيس

Page 14
THE OPPOSITI
THE NEED FORNEW FO
I Ilic hegemony uf the two l o Po
* F'i':Tnric II:s hic:.l.: Id hy Presidcrut Jaya: waardice II il Prie:Inilai has hccra the major in inst nolis thcnic if the contemporary political discourse, not fath:hind has bc.cn th: iiiel Liness and clisarray of the Opposition, particularly is '3 rliiH rTne: mr. illi - ILg li thic: IG: Il
r: Erin Of
8 : I rrit: w:il (if thc (pILsiin. in circa sing i rt Errik:ri:lly and :ld '': il 1 g it Sm: - W'h :l. [ qiu:a dirñriv"cly. it can nor to: said tlh:4r rhe: (Oppositi II Flas I incci, cd :LTI I proprilic rele for itself. Thecsic Lyw'r
ffrirk ha 'c lugli le + d with the: lang y'iTrer ryf Sri Lanki’s chi5.co.[cil L.
lt AA'alis iri) mir:Il rh:ir rhic roLI L of L. line
Llifl? :) Lhıb. 1977 03:meral IELc{:Titırı
1rıcl Chic whırılır:5:1ç dcci rı:ıtiı yılı iyi çlır: LSSP : riki (CP” shuldha1vc li: til its ra xotis in thz hlığıc [ 'w cı rhirtdı5 majority Lht:sk: three partics receivcal in 1871 when this sic, thi: lills as the Ilicil l'son. siuLing thc NPlcd by }uiley Summary': ke:.
The UNP was reducul t a rump just as the SLFI was in 1977, Inti Xicated with their crwill clining power lic 1:rlil Then rarills (if the ll gat a rough Line tra till: f:w LN l' MI's in thc () positicum which tlh: LNP was te p:1y luck in dispri porcion:lt: rneas EIrc in the la ng Parliate in Augura (c. in 177.
This was thic guilesis of the politics if intolerance and chic lowering of the tric: if thic :Iri: The tary chaic which tric chic wri rinulin : haira cicristics of Lilitics of ICJ day.
lrı təkc:T:Int and aı Luth a brit: riakı
Lline i Lugh the limited Front was in rin any way's, i did pro vidt: a certain political spacc for the Opposition, This opporLunity was cleverly seized by chic Liller
1의
if F : Jay:ward cinc vrha
|ca dci
I 1ldley Scnariuya tнссинтe leadcT нf politici: ri, 41 in frrhid:lirg
:
J:ly L. ", "ELI Lid Լ" Tնվ: Il L::
Lhe very epitome &hığı Eld lik:',': legeı
kind sf miliältic
Thern II yw'hill: hy ci III: ni Laubblic stralitici:i:Ins indic: I1 de II:I:. "En Lim YA Fıçlı engram Ice I: Illiddle-lis dl:-class : le ment. i hiki Sc: ነ‛ Sa nga may: :nd :Y 5 cco Lt. J is of
Chic II || 1er I i1 i Ld cl T : class or in
fc55):Lls, piscal al li rט | {! נ: til 1 ווח chall cılge: Tri Ilie Grivc rn
which
growing
I rit
ፔኻ' ..] (
Ia dily II rıpırnı - lill
| vas prc. Lisely this politica
YA'hi:lı Jayewarden c irri
i: (":
:: terly class5.cd w, lıtert L
f^。志
 
 

ON TO BLAME:
DRMS OF MASS PROTEST
}pp 1 sition J.R. “... to mobilise the feofile sinrt: the dichthef
: in 1973 haldi alš rht: N l'. N. Th;ss Set With ffe host unexpected
::: id cntle YK"cel with a #asaris schi a irate ri| colul vi; a gc:,
dywl:Fideo Parliaria era f... is ideo
War y Cormi nyit fer II se/Wimpy w foran :Thicllcss cxleite« ሃሃ፭፻፹፩፻ gif
he fr1 is [ration fel L. ##e camerarmery Cazering
Jy growing sccticTLs your fhrotes/ Wien you take
if thic | occuple try - r
people foi file streets do Collert sigrivirids thc (iti vern- -
nent und Tobiliscd fu res againsf the PresiIlıcı Tı rhe: strccs (dent'
n a scies of sp:-
:ıcıılar 5:ty:4ğrı hi15
in Colombo,
(La II: g:ll:1 and Nuwara Eliya. It ride to power in 1977 and it scinains w": si Tı radoxical till:1 L clasicil I this cl:Hy.
I shchuld halve hcen Ille frustrations « of thc {}ppHisition
diis lison il pia flis L are [artly ririci rect in this conclition, II
Hilirgeois politician, was almost impossible: Lo The Emilis thic
if the Right, who people outsicle Parliament during the
resh insible for this Jaycwarde nç: Raj, l'orday it is not im in against il Govern- possible bitt is bcset with the most unind almost all the expected hazards such as irate railway of the since commuters setting upon the canctais limpicii Trn bilisia - men cov'crirmyg y ir procx L wohl era yuyu
passed the discon- takt to the streets to collecr sigar:
ics. hic li yw'er: r inmid- ug-lins th: Presidcrat
5 çif Llı te gTywing zik: §ද්වි- 1
This is the Trap in which rhc (Oppositican is cal Lught. Witlı
Lhe LXI having a reprindcrant in Lajority and with Tcccuit : le:ctions 1.JL eing frece: amall fair, how" da e s t lıc (p1 si rion rını o b i l ilk c the coplc LL least for an agit: ricon cimpuigi styr free: dnd fair clecticans? Wh: metli tad is availible Irı ırı bırır il calırıpaigra (If I T1:ss pressisc com hic (Gruvernmcn?
It:li
Ft. LNT A 13:I rit from Lac Lic:ıl problems: thc:
Oppe 'siticis is illss) heigged cl'wn in 111
*****ر
. . . . . r r*r

Page 15
icle: le gi'al moralss. () a res liitlicırı tr Llie National ucsin and on hc rint cle: Life::cin mic developine sit there are divergent icw's which have bifur'artel rh“ major oppositii11 par Ly, Lhe SLFP, apart from chc scrsonality Linflicts and chc comics, ser Lywer which plågues it, lun led hy S. W.R. T. Ekındırariilik c 15 il dcrıltıcı:iliç, ıtırıMarxis I alternăLivc If thc l Xl, the SLlo las Ilways leer claracteris: həy" "ı","İng, dacgirccs of r:ı Tir:) Ti:H lisi Tı :ını il à partialily lo » Il cur-YJ:LTxist de Thocratic $'Li:llism. B:1ndaranaikt: '18 á11 c:18ygoing Libc:li il Lill:LEIl whr elieved im scial Aclfaris CCIIIric LTII Sricii. LliciL: ZLJ I til 3r i pie II șJçi:ty" but his Ciclicctii: LÉı Iki 1; Tic: "L:T carriherred imrca a 11:ix Ler L ihil: x-l1', 'h: 8LFlo: :Lik, 1 if I rigs Hr II is, political içlc lcgy ryfrcon mild: i l \icLi11 1s Lh E les. II fart, it " :x l’aid:rs rc prcsc111 iTg th:L: left Yll ing in Llı : Sl.: F P ; IL : h : ; "I.B
IllinglflIIe arid 1.13. Siliz:3 Singh: wohl |ırı: 12cılırı Lield : pçılitik:al idcilig' hi 1", "- : '', ett in C: implic Lc, Tcl 1 H t r raf rhe: *İll*'s Lixais LÇıldı, ixi Llı:ı i ht: li: fı wing of th: p:ır['*"... i tanrı ic':Hill, e:rıH 3ılığıhı Ince'ı İclıJ%cr Llığurlı biz", "r t t \, liriş, iri Tılığı Falls: aiki, is witlicit si "h effcc
Liv : l :: i: rs.
Yltti. (hindrik: Kırılır:Lul: Lıııge is: 1 ( 1 } di ; , " ( i figlir: Fri 311 fin: T 11:1855e:S t, "hilic lıcı uEıtılı lig 3ıdlı LTLa rice I & III : If Th1t:
11. Ev. ti papilleçli i: »T13; Luf loc: t r I r 1 : ira: x roti:1 lis m
1:33; 3 err':| , y furrhr:-
id:1:1TL: ht:r. Ir is, i hii ::* hm Loxt , Lh II 1 Lilito rigli 1vlig lc: el II y Y T1, 11 F1 |3:1 Eid: Izırlı ike vi, il Fı lıis iridisguis: cl:Hirilir:Eric in Ar Ling: I 1-I r k : L. : : Lr1 HIILIL: Tic 14 d.: ha*, gairicid a sccri. Liit:y. Tlic list wig ras h. SL'|' will hav: c-think its id:lig in thic till 1 if Lla :chick i suff:rc lo scialism II. the formct Savit: (min and ELFrp is 1 L 1, I1 I at Li i lbiet: I1: Kittsii jlcct.
1h4: 5:4me problcm bc le , ils th4 ut hi:r upp siri im par Lics is well. Af Thed virh his World Balılık-Tescriile:d ciriII (Inis Programme cifrILLI-4:1pliTz1list lib L:ilisari: Brı rempcrcd 'ı, iLlı : dıslı tıflıis lo resident
ia "ri ri: Li' pipulism
I’r:Til:Icd:1:8:1 feels confīldu: LL LII Ligh Eo
talling: ch: Ita. riryTı Fet :I clie-l. Ys foi rest of the posit tcc inti T1 il policics: fully the l’Nlo pril rhere: is nrn justifica :Ilçiç, u di I th:y stil pr:gram T16 (f Stiltę 1:45 prgu; d li:TW. te: The SS did tl: l: clopments in The formcr social
is countrics Whart: ("L.II rr: ; Tining ; (I *çtırırımı failcd IC է:IյոLilim րIյրlular dis
CCII 118:III (c. Ar ul- "y 'g: LL: hack. It chic altırı'lı iç ççüncılı iç pljica "If I h 1:15, Or is thcre i skæial
il:Timi ; ; .:r: (it.: imçirilcil
Jt k:ucr:H[1H »Ii hiu: çle Y. eli pimen yli: ::II bc Offcci :: - uncri in I he cd:Picridcm cilippi I:li El INToo C; l
tlլւ: { *pp1+ 3si lic t-r1 |1:Irl
፲፬ |lቕ ነነ'‰ ` f
This ir til
N:lt
y y" Fili:
in
lyኗ: [ ኔኒ
ri::
፲ን፲ùናና w’Illis
հg rւ:
in h; ing Il
「1rew
Լ. Լ. Լ. I1
| II i
L: ','L:II tıL: ri:T11H #Ig:[W"
'l; r1 il it:çılar, ltn ",": "Tui; * H : ||
Y, TH1 ir rhif SIL" | (ht:1.5e: pu: Ils of the m: tr the problind'. |ili: ', A" ||izinca: W'lı lini: ; 1:1iR for I:
"I'llis w;l& the menst
nıtılı cYol'cd Lih suli if rhe: Tamil piccol. th: Esc iswho cinella hirse
ti:% like: ht: n:ı Tirir.
تأسسم)
 
 

der (if thic (phphrasithc SLFP in LF1
is om v Y'ha are their * 1. Lle ac::p. icy in which cast: Iio fur Llei exist
clic cil rh: rold : capi[iılisItı W'lıic:lı ::: ]]})-F? Hiyo: (I Like silk (if
L 11 del III: ty' "&: || II :: tirim8; wrthích
id:s h: , L: flict I.
5 :x Icnds 1. th: i 1 est i II h has ly::EL: yiliti
( :
rison cd r:l Liers L:rı ıhL tçırııırılırıi
for dicir:Ilch. Tłı:
Lr: flf-li: -
... Sirill:11: lorçk:s Crțilc :: tht: Tri:jyr lii pirlică iritlul1: riling l: N * all com c d lı : F Lenoidc1111 : 8. - Il y Fli Lili vi:ull accc.1: ll: T4: .ht : Է111ւ:IԱւ IIt't | if 31 slit.: y : " group * II: cle is a birds in a11i t'i:st4 8 E1E“:TT;ıirning g Tibera iragrarik: Pocruid:tı 3:LL'k: kl , lrs. or:silent il 1988,
far-TL:::hing for. sify thic a spirations c can sidering th:1. I it includictl parEllist NEP. WWE|-
- - سمي
می با అల్లా
FCHIDCSI
rhc LSSP (P and the NSSlo have tika:In LI pi ringricssive prisitions hin thi: III c. 5 qitors. Siılığı [: pre:35ır:ş lığı, w': mal: chic SI.Fl' taku up anhivalenr Insitions on lic issue. All these factors l:1',': pri:'.':m LCd che (ppositiLIT. 3rd The Sl.Fl' in purticuluT frem Luffering a LIllerLe 1 :lt:Tni Tiv': 'Tigrammc. La hic tant: Tursued by rhe Guveruu neut thf President Premadasa. Thc (pposition
ix :LL:L LI3:IIIy :; Lill grippacid hy thic clipb ori:I W'lı ittı. w:I: glor:lic:dby it st::- Tien taf Lo LINP Taking away from lill : H*F cırığı da s:
Cilm all th: 1cal ir I1 L1e:II: li 1 Time: rint II f hic To's csillcra L. RII lı t.I W li 31 igg L::L r r li:I cLupılıcıri:E l: 5r? E*:- I e f gif a T alt crna -
program mo: th : Slalo iTı particular
rig:
ä I c| * Tr:ILL g',
has lys: Lr ru:Luck II i ri txirring TCI :: seric::; cıf Threst go:5- Iures sich as IF L: I’d irri, rh: Rival Ya Ira, J.LTI: (tish and now a p)[Lule::% [. Hi lityrles ind i pris Leard fra LL st Lartip: 1 gil. N [ir :!ll rheo 5c: gcstui rcs :Lrc zuppr - |ti: il e! (ir synchronist: with thc: m:ss
trick gif I's irillial litics is is gT4s thic III:Iss
T 1 (I. Th: * Il Lesliful
Ting KH i 71 Tr Tcl:LLIC: L } L III el Tauit: in the:
II TEITLI m. ir Lili alcast i lle: illisi in ctf:1 11:44,8 pre ite:-87 is circa (cd ir Lle |1çılılar ITirkel thr IIIgh a Scrics ris proftest g:it 11rts. it it appcars 3 flle resert (psity. It is the nth fri:Straticaf lly being kept a plu'r rf H%"r for 80 l. 1: 3rd Ilsl. h:15 grywr| flably frim hrílding i:Ili:ITenr:1ry effice. with all its crquistics. They still think in terms ef the CorvLritional feltrins of ! opposition wlteTI new scrins « fTh:188 :giIziti om lfc 11 c: cle: d. They mnicu Llı ith: rheoloJiko : fr: clicalis IL to LI I show away frorui thic barri:ics. The ultimat: LI agedy of The PppçJIsiti ir L33TH YW':ll llic: Tha Lumablic I (run scend th: Ticicle: class politics iL has bcLure LL'custo Inc. It cycin while thc Crappigi cifrhryse politics arc Licing di E1:IIItle. I they Will Eccome chc risonCrs (f thc system chcy Opposc bill LH - no successfully resis,
f’rifer

Page 16
Ravaya Poll And
T, Rıvaya inici cull is thL:: only licly publish el spinior all in Sri Lanka. Evci deilocracy Ieels. Il 15:LTII1p ting vyf public. Cipinion IT majmr issues Lif Ihe time and triday ili fThcH dcrJn id.: I ıhc1cT:I.:i:s i :ly" ("T1 El1cm, l. Thfrr::ly, ir Sri Tika pili pols hi v': 'L II br: "riim: pipil:L althc:Lugh, i. is well krık / W Iı İi hzır il fil:ww pici ople: lı:Ly'c licen carrying : III private polli; tLi simul but pillic initi on H Varity if political social Hild cIII cricial subjects,
All pilin pulls arc subject to criti i:ism: the Ra ay: pill [o ringy be criticiscd i II many grunds. First, it till:1 % hic scen als l 51 Tiple that is Ion Small. Scconclls, it could bc sail that the proportiu:1 if SI.FI'ers whi answerud che pçalls was highe [h:1n Ihc ni Lillycr which calid S. Iolo at the las geTicral Lice rigin. The illimher of those who &IIp|}}II {1th cĩ par Lies wus less tham La Sic vylie stupro tu: id Thysic parties II the last recr:ll Liccion.
llenw'cwcir, the coll is; Lod grcat v':Lluc if one recognises the general message and daroх поп Пау ни пт11:h liced Tri tle exact figures ser rif. Certai impirLärt juesrins werc 3sked Lorrain imiç ir Lam T is*; Lucis yw'r:TL fais:cl und :ITswer cd in this copini bı poll.
'1'hıc first i II Jerr;ını arı 5 w:T redalı tcs ti pilolic de: Thand for (Oppositi 31 i Limity, lt is qtli I: çileur till:1 thc vist Thij brity c) f je i ple: cppciis c d L 3 lore: sidcn I lorcm:1lásas government want III set: :ıfı :[1.i t.g. i[ Th ri x Iggh gTe::LLer ()p]ycIsi - Lion inity. The 1.jority if the public LI Inlike somme « If thL:: lt:Lellers. Il re: ima - rie:rint with the is5III:s which terıld III divis le the: ( )pposition :Jad therchose strengthen the guy"critics.
lhe publico, ir app: rs EroTi Tic Rav"ay":L plis, vy’: I ı ılıc by Tri:Llics possiblic alignir cint { if partics. SSH I Luc pe: - lc'5 iclica ch: v. I cin ext:1Ilc (in T a mothcr political party dics Toll uppe: T to hii Y L. public" fu v'çur,
"The Ilıcısı için of lcadership çıf Che major ()pposition parties has als locen an sy'cred buy Llucsk: pinicom prills. Ilar those suppLJT ting the Sri Lank: Frecdrifth Party, Mrs. Banglaranaike still appears to he pre-clinent pers 11 in thc
Party. This is 'gi'), 'clic: Ecs leadership,
Siri TI1Iv J |alith An IIT: (Gamini (ha i Idriikil
) in sh Wickr:Lima. ໃນຈudexu * :iու:
As far as Llic | despite silvernier fions thialt Llitrc is a sion betw: i the [! that 'arty, this lit.:s irmiflucrncerd rhic buil kritidcid [h:it ;3 | 1 Ilic pri L.ali Lt. At hul: chmu :18, 8 wi:Ible le:uld cr,
The Ravily a pi to cl: (crimin: Lh: relative import trict: Parries. (...lcarly T) NF Eure the rina « Hmı The { }ppin sirliyi rthcr parties if ih: will only clair E 'ris fcrisid:bl
tier in tiny cler
rither hånd, frhey 5elwcs wir hi thic I'ma the risk of leising getticir is their shall t: be shrinking at ri:Ll elcction.
{}11: « »f tlhe: [ııu Lic is unswicret in the wishcs of ti: tյաբhւ Լձ be thic "The Public l33 Tl li rall mallik c Århulach nudali u postant options. () no com 4: clisc rccte:
suppl. II.
Flow: "ct, it is ; cial dissatisfictii siri in is held that hidrid : 12rcfcr:rıcı
جسمہf
 
 

Political Strategy
ic the Lt. Il cks (Ti
dilat. Wilca ir came tu secifid and Lhird chices, rhis ullscnce: cf. Inv pre
Opposition Presidential Candidate
SECO Preference
No. Of Wote
Pręference
of
፴ዕ ፵ኒ
Third Preference
No. Of We
ኳዕ
፰ኑና 1 5[1.4է: 335 13-18%ጁ 5 3.7.1%Ꮉ 74f1, 30.5% 528 3Ü. W8‰ጁ ¥ዙኀ y 1).51% 28, ... 4.三五好 15ť, ሐ. 1+8ጁ [1-1ድኛኗቾ 斗台1努 213 8.38ኟ F 3.!!ዞ]❖ 5-(). ፶፱3 1.53% Wኒ3፻፩ 27, 10,7-4 ፲፰ዽና 1 W.f,3%ጁ.3 לל [}.ol}ቧጁ . {]、 3. W},8ኞኗጁ () []. Wgኝ 55 3.13. 8. 芷、1喀 17 F.5% 75 15' 37.73%
【} 29.51懿
NF is crick:(l, I spinscricid allL:gitgr: ri ir diviL i iilialjr br fil Tucs in it appear to have: lic who have gle::5[c11E rirı1L.: i L 15 ¥, !r. dali who licy Sce
1ί. Ηη κll ills και και εις Πης qui est iom as t y Llac : if the Opposition |- Sl, F* :and tij1e jor political plave:r's scc.nl:, while the Wish tu gil alrrie: eir identity at the : li:55 in rւ:|} | thent:1- ral lody. () in he vu, circ I aligra Lihctm( :rics, thic flin th: iI identity LlcoL: Iyf its ኒ‛fነrፌ: ና ‰Ucc[ኸኗ lt:SC AT : I'residen
it iTlteristing Luis th : prill (Clats III pic(pl: as I whi Чупипни с1пdidatc. oms; il c c d XI ri. NII. T.; lith the two mit is illhic T tlıları Ilıc5c rw II, cd any significal
Teasure: (if thc gunir which the oppesignifican I LIITıbıter for : Ty LLIrrcnt t:11–
ferrcel cotion y as y ver whiclming. l'HII. 1 : T II:55ig from th: l'illis the lack of credibility Hrıcılıg th': 'w IIIcrs rç1wards Ihl: []]positi(IT.F. o of th: 3rd highest grip quicstic red did nit cfcr:Iny of th: ::Liididates. In a LourLiv wirt ci ver 8, li ta' rotcr Lu rr-1 Lu L. This j5 ;1, 5 r:ätcımcn E luy iL&clf. ʼ["lıc l:Luk rıl` :g coh: sive stif: Te-gy to I:uk: II : I govor: Trimcnt in powo:r fil I5 wel:::::: Tis could liber the: mai 11 ricas yn for this regal rive: Lireid. X irYT: ) v'er. Lc1 Lully imprir:Arm I is rh: css thin ırı’acce:Alblic: rccord of Llıcı individ LLalls whico Iru: the con It: Ticllcr S.
If this '& pel cat is to be 1 river by tluc opprisition, it will li:lyc rei cryTim.: L. L with : L: lical r pli pli: yo sl:Itc[11 er :L i sf the Illin iss Lics - such is dem.-- ir:1c, t:: omeomic pl.-II L - chat looks, lift :: T che nccls of the Ir and leasl priviLegcd. Il itima Cely prixviding : radical L'hang in the syste:T1 iras C give evcrygne: :L shas: of the picဒ္ဒါ
().mc of hic 5rartling re: vclatticiras of lis poll is that, although thc JWE' is for all purposes bann L: Il. ChcT: are still 1 ; rilaill bı IT TIL insignificalint n Imhcr who subscribe Lu the JVI's policies.
The Lip-shot of all this is that thc Rav:x: pinici pill dicipite di hts As to the exact proportionality Luf public: opinit II (In these issues) brings (i II vividly wl: Lilyhe dy stil i lying the siti IIILion rir the grurit :lt: cly knows. "l'Ilıc:re urc many cm:n tiders for Tı: F1 y posts, many partics vie for maiorial pụpulariLỵ, but in cach case crcidihiliry :1mci HĽccp Cance: Irc mint L:lca f-cLIT,
”v, *x سمہ آنجا ببینیان
dI-f1 || 3

Page 17
Пс of The abserolTimП5 апс саг milik is fit public: , pirit applic::T; LI bic : ht:1 if politial arries and their |:vi:Fs. '''h:I I atic ch: | Its Licins Ehe: Öpposition 1'iirric5 mısÇ Hacc no"' in ch: ligh I { if h: gitm-ra rex Iulis, if I hic R: , : , : i piliu prilli I liclick : till:1 the prill has giv'n : Filip II - (plisition III i Ly.
Ünce iş is krır:w'rı rhat Th: 12:4 yıl: uppse: d try the Prer 11:4d:Aş: IJver III lerı L varır rht: (),pırı yitirir, tı: gört th:ir act ght:T all frk is a le:III, the slicly it must at is :I Eric Flirt'T fir The 'L' in the (Tipusici III wille fie: th: 33I11: way. Sccondly, it is quire clear that ()ppi sitiin unity I::ls 5 II kiill us airligencini where the Sl. 1 P and its :lllicx (o : † fim: ei : mi : Traim g:mon L ' wirth :!l the other (pposition parties is at the HSaaLES LaaL llL LLLS L GLLLLS a aSaL s tre Englh of bc ) X lo is sil! no LaaaaLS LL L LaaLL aL LESL S LL ES ոլյուti5 to gain represcriritions in :i::- ric ridics. FLI thirt is knight: i. de 11.L. LIII II: ground thl in any ClCC LaSLa S SSLLLLLL HLL aaaaa S HHaL aL li tixlL li tiir IL LI Iiubcr of cricsc In Lil Liv'cs. Th l)| XF i:III ni linger bi cilsjicircd incrch 15 il splinter pi:Lity. It is drav, im KITI from th: TNT". (hic Sl. Fo. Lil fra 11 Llıcı:Sie w lır. Ih:Ly'e rıbey'er
у кrcui lu:fr.
|L is tile clear ll:1. Lhe NF has
T.ılı, "" : " ı : ' : ' ' :''' li:trğr: bir çıpırtın 311 !"
Ili: 1. lirikoral I". Po yytes. Folirates niły: v :IT:”.. *ltı: 1R:Iv':ly: figures if 8?'* II 1.2% III.1 L LTIII « BLIL 14 : le Lille 그l T:JLk:' rin: ri: it it is :T, -la: th: rh': l) l. NFF ilir: v, ir ag av y'; y' 1 : 1 Yo ',' çL:s is, myv," "e"-T. ITT I Ir H ligger rhı: r irT1:gri'1' : 'v': '1 yıl y six Thyrnt l'1% ; g.
lhe proxiri Il Pirri: ; 11:r cornJ.:IIra L: III ä f: issiil:3 tii i' this challene. In the cenning Provincial Fl::ti ns. th:% m is d:till: 'hat heii ; rraregy is. The Te : fe, hr::Idly spicak iпц, I . I nitians l'il:Ill:: - I пč, is tri LHHH S L LLaaLLL LLa EL gLLLlLa LLa
or:11:Ill:15il :Idminix Traris, T.L. (, * cxi-tiu [cs L i [.dcpclxlc[i] [io, :l: id « Iroc tilio spp siri in Partics, co | mt cd FigchcT Eh:Ly : Emiri: Llia El li:Ll llc 14:Il y CILL: I rad
Il circific imor : rhia Im llllf I lh I i I:al 'ie:1 LY, Irr II Age II e III:s fri sie Liigi, tupi i od J çi:Ali I i III a. Idırıiııir:Liçi 11 cc i lid Eic: ԼlitյIւgliւ մ.
I. Im 15. h.: rcmc Jerr Pro: Inadis piell I he "Orcs, and in election th: 1. No
ill "cs, ct miin:Ig:5 () Iik i :| LEC N* COI:s. Il
'il all is cr:iiil, in cyrcy" lorovincc t
JEL: | } [ " N, lo is II :Ivy :Iy fı ç HLIı tlı: l.N[ʼ
1.fccitage. Whac, ier, who Lligi : : il w", LNT kiing As ridic C1 tler letilding II: C 3: citan, ir i; irT1-rr:111 Ill: srategy, Ił1 ( Tit 1:r 1: lii: agroo:1:1 - rif it lıcı: ( 2pıpıHisirir. Hrtı Tı trh při ulic: ()
is is 'illist I hit (popli siti I m iri: l’ichiclcr: L Locrin: diis:
Lr:rigin.
Bאין
SFI II ***
'llo
|
%o
13%jo
NSS
N. Ni (i gyrcticrcticut fijf any Party
", r rhn F'T:1 k."iTK"i;
T: bull; slu rila i
Tili;rrari in his list
', inti: li li li l-uni, il-s, l pt. political IcInsions wi thmice deficited. Ili: sind ihl it is impJ:
Ih: Irl:31n11; 1II፲Iነ8 ; Liter eft 112 1,"
Ifirhr:: th:111 111 i irtill:
Li i r... 'llier l'ir: Aircru: ç:5%;iril: ; flç:L:t tHı: l’rc:: icd:rht’s positirari
3. f: T H H : HoT;
(c) Inc: Triq: Id, Iha: I AA' çlire; Th:1r :pl: r rt
իIIt Fi 13:
المسم)
 

mbered that Presi c nly 54),-433 inf the Parliamentary lld | ', ). 13
Tc. i Illic: ) NEF tix lil: I s 13. iiif :n M. Ir... l'ircimi klas: : lijst: his I Lmiljority hill hil ppera 5.
ošt ičlo rci tak: a \, tr, ուսւ:l lurt:r Ci sopLinn is chaLiLiL:il ForçJrıE Jr
ld crir l'arrics and
lexie fLe 1 lute elec:- 5 till:4 t i Ti pl: Ti Tiirug Dpi HCIs iii iiri li:II Lies lic: t:TTI 1: L l : "III Ithal is tiper pirily" t: Il Tıcır :ahııı i: :ırı
positici,
all the firries in kւ:1:T I) r:mt:1ւ է:
and his ; lilill is
Tcd Party
Tibeto Perce Lage
(}. 포
-4 T. (I. ኑ§I13 11.55 LL 1.33
33 ሰ.8ያ ! W}.፦፥? ; XWኑና 1()
f {M2 - .*!ኻ ;
..
호37 8.*፩ች
| iltrins il II
lic: 'r: II:(lis; ;-
[::{br 1 rr K| ..it [i: 1*ri" ht:r to im h:1|11ւ:Il rig: ll Il ceticss:Iriiix Iiixe i figi, crfiricit wili isible to continue.
ig i'r Ywin a'i:|| 1. I ****- i || 134: s: HT): hiringĘ Iry I'riivincial c:l::- | tel::rig#r1 ywʻilI T1:Kʼ
:ru:: lilility of rhe:
is fill cliccion is Oppositin canti3 have public Sup
L :r Mrs. ::::ik rid - Taich that him dai.
Si Irely, it is; Ticat ( J. TILL:ih , :.sk
thLg:Şg: rwy'r 2::Ins 1) : TTT - ITderslimlilig çif lıcıyı ılı Ly :ır: gırıg i'cı a h-Iolish thic Fxccliciwc Prcsidency, The Iljii L. l. Ele i Lluis Fury wan. It all lish lic ExcCL Lic Presi. clergy. They waE1L iLLI) i.e. clue Ely all th: ()ppositie Fri 1:Lrtie:s acting te gethici. l'hey all kinyw, Llı I Lluc common Ciançlidact Will crca C: il rally'ing, print and als creatic the background where eve:- TYhOdy knows LhäL Lhe OppH15irien Landida Lc is liki:ly to vyrir). Within the ki: Emiliarı I 'rıırıcı'dırk, all This TcspOnsiuilil y fils LulliIII: Lily Irl Llic Liv. C. major 1;trtics, the SI.F1° 31ld 1). Nlo, and :'''": 1 E 1 Ft III, IT thຢູ່ 1ኻፄ'ዛ} pre-erilirul II. fig II ritri in hija bir h t hits: 1: rrilrs. " I'lli: Il Li81 bç: calcal Lipt}r iTLIII1:(littoly E ( "ll" (Trk it out 5 cmc = 5[[:1 Tacigy, whicy & Thitty place the Italinal interest befTe: heil rivan'n. Fe'i rh re: experience: politi:i:arı; and & Lirly chL: II: sol: If This ' + 1, Ty arc cmriticd to cxpccr from them al mi
TuriТy, where “etnim tГy ћеfire self" liccomics important: "I'lics: two should yw'r erk. 4 LIL : h [ T:LL gy, which di : 5 T1 I Incircly sit tisfy their ow. In pcssonal lithlirisms.
Thin: () physil ibni parties rust screek LLL LLLL C SLHHHH HCCCLLLLCaL LLLL LLLLLL :ils li d: icicle: 'A' tal I 18 biccie: s Ilha: Ick 1 L Illino Il :::::Entdid: Ee: ; H : drd ; treek T3 imple:Therir I th: shirgs 15 Sille im L. Ih L. Porosix.com tiall C:lIldjdai [c will h:loc [O rc ligli i th1: la II e cof frc:.dk om in this :'''tıf '', S) he: fr:Lisition from Thc ull - [ ILF: Ti lor:sid:mi: || firm if ( 3 y'crimi --
men I Ia a nuel Ilir detari:Li diri of Parliamentary Government mist be 5ubiccI ICI : Linc-talulc. Y tu civir is Llic L. ImII{n L'IrllidäLL: Ih: Lrs in Im 18r at: Stiblic's IC 1 solid gr: ther rid : limidt rLiking Tr, r:I18 Lir: thi: it is: ; if it: cifiel Iserie H of III., th: :Isk f disIII:Litling the: Ext:"L1 it residency :Arti i II ple: Inc:n ting 4 vrhu:r grc:d decişi giriş ","rıillrl lıcı ::II Tic':Li 4 yılır.
Ilı: 3:4 slu: « »f thik cilm Irty' hav': ihri YA’ FI Through thic Ri, Yaya ()pini Plls that while pit litical iciclers. Thaly ; rill I have hlinkers. the people can sce
Lile:II. -
a 11rior
"علمية
"عية من =

Page 18
Critical Co. Is Art Follow
This u fJuill: truism about th:1 cins getting the politicians they dcs: Y E. W. varian I ccrtainly fir1 cd; it'; he me among th: "arts", and within the arts trl-tween writers/musicians:Artists' cc. is ris their critics. We, ii. Sri Lanka, Ice I L:Lirmly hawc ch c critics va, c cle:sk:r i'c; conscritic, small-ut) incle, cliquish, () th:Twisc A :'d havc lyhyt: rhem ou li li rig tirnet iggs,
This dominart critical scalp. I hıvc (hus lu belled indulgcx in chc açlJudicatic in of Iastic amid thit trrillsilgcIre: nr 4 ir disco Lur:generint { if artistic c mdeavours in th: basis ciftwry & Frts of icriteri:ı: Thec first. Irn d Hrı orti: iralıq» (artant "crick:rns th: "safety acts br" of thics: juicidgcmcrn Lis lazu seicl yn symlcthing likc Lh: follywing cri (cri: — ls the Writc.1 already acceptel anal well-known: Is tlh: drama List Cirke who + h;15 prcy it,Jusly wvʻcım ;aWY":1T«lis? -'A.ıL1 I L:ıking it. risk in 5;ay – ing this pract is go braç la Will I Ircad ir J collecaugue: Icı brnıs wı ilı. I will thicri 1 rL:Hid чуп пine in Lurn? Ili: »perati c rules in this case Ie al : quin Iance with the lrti8r Lorinterncd, I Ile 1werk f Innu Lully le:re:ficial Tclaicos in which C'r Inscrıs Lus is 155 li ricd L1 I ı ı II e l'adding cr: Live figures and critics : kind of k ciphis, Licat : « E11 ck-5cr: L Ll , and ad s Irong disin climatic in LC) ramck, tı: Hrvat in any way.
Wariations : » m this tai:Isi'r rhcmac iIclircle: rhie trip clicy yn rn Thermory lanc with it 4 incwita bl' m'ostalgi: fi Ir L goldlic Lige ilsscık i: Ted vitlı ıbıt Yı yılı lı yf the midille-ged in TicllcCILI:als; var h4 } functi II :H; Critic's and circillurs in Sri Lanka. Tr:day. FK er example:, che: Inst: ligi: il mong Ltıe linglish-spicakiulg kir:L i In: c (cric is for Lhe niversity frarns rac and elle grus Fld ld clay5 of Lydrwyck Julil, m t: Sinlı alta chearc millic: I this is rico luces ly an cquially uncritical vicarion of tle \läIlamu remaissarit: (ir of Jolui de Silvas particult nationalism.
"l'Illic: secrand princile, which ac Ilally wiks against the first Arid the refyre makes ir Keem that there's a vibralul clirim:LLE: af disse: nC. is tlıcr :xi; rence of clicile:; and cor crics Erised ny
cnn q Lilcox Li pr1s , ol pri] si mall fc latiti1nx, pri! pct. Ly. un ir nositics. H l:n I i ILacks agliñ5 Y4'ritcris i 3 tilra, Indis only salve les fronin carips. Filher on hLiddi:s virh thc o ur 1 Ivy: Tcl is iisx ircd. in Ladki ing re: TT15. Il LiriLicties är: ham | Starac-, genLincli Luci I i dtr iillt I ramicc!
Ir is cnf fundai I InteII I1 Le ihr in Terri8 it ta L: | retricial II:LirInew, li w;Fring factions cliff che crms of Llle cl:b T. «:; % isi T :s., N.: Wʼı" Critics all inekillinical Marxists. Newspapci tle - la I's bcL'« Ernt: qui [c hea Lecl only bk:(’: ils : claptr:1p and i 11 wedictiv'c blecomic litresly pcrxynul. Ill: Trivilege.tl para Inc [crs I e III in “high" cultural cines, and c . . ." ... Il t in a n: turtlism.rcuisit br trilici mal stylis: I r :InThe ng hic literati.
l'h: 1Y:1t: g1 miss cd as preLe: mitici LI uncritical 34::"Titanc. {'ll Lif: l scrvis r If y lles. (Titical r v"cilccl icle bla giuatl t I r Y : TI &Çıcı 3-lye liricall :
lı cılıcrı:t: Çerms
in 1°. sotme fairly r:Irogra
“adr" ccı:
mcnis, the repcircuss Lç çlı tub}, hic Ltıc: F th1:st: vallic, thırcı IgE: citi i, storics, paintin, Wollrig: arrists will.i. cca La Lee for thcif 5. the Star: Ibralma Fux
18
 

inservatism ing Politics?
cipli: buI r cırı [1eraltic histories antil ncc, cs: virucCrui 1 : ig is, but th:se: are li Jsic iri opposing | mimary is; II, 14; 31n c. in which cast: ir cli: cink: is no d Llucrı irigh: nius il mcd. llTll ta 'hi in II y III erit is of succ:-
lul iprinc: () critical tools in Irks III m. (f thc :r "e" much, lic <ic a roc still &&ct hwy
in rules the ricist
'dc is i flen diss, and rhcic: is :In od' lingEI istic and as thL: le: drock CITI S II e i hillycs. ilıını thlır: narrow" cruise of iduci lingwi.
in the : Siri l lnkall this resulred in lg :Tirit':ll :is::- Ins fwhich will, :-inforccınıcr: L + If future plays, lik}- S, sing5 cv cui lay re: cd critical acvival. In rcritis rf ival, Jr ins Lance,
"مشم.
."س".
the selection of Socratics is lics. I'lly l'as river «le (criminel, pçrh:1p:3 cycIl "ırıq" prinsip is liv: "... by the fact 1 li:ı ( fricnd IIn:Lindl Xl:Llerlaira vas i s allthur.
"This w: 11. differę fit from lic Sccu::Licuri rol Sarachchandris play" li hii y II Kadathi rii wa thic, cullefore. Socratcs is singularly incin-dra Tatia :ind deriv:L- tive: in thc ball seise of the (cfm, all cl hid it noL bcen frIT the prcs lige rif the author raid the charisma of its IT; in ut: tr. Xa mora Cinc, it w' tid hav : leerin clismisscd for h; it is -- a 1r1L:h- hypLI Waste of tiIThe Whill is tille ringsti;1 gc till:Lt. si Ic:lı :: (lcisi(’ın 5cıcls rıi IT ri y Cyın gcf actitutsi, writcrs. Lulietic:sf (II)n rhic Line han There: is 3 clu: r s Tamp of a dicrury III a fi: II work, and in thc Coting or therio:'s 31: Luninspirirıp; Tıtıdcl I. Lirii Lula, t : fr ) r hipv : rikli mmobilli L irn Lhe arts. My point, it makc whi: have cycra risked hyperhule, is rhar thic i'rm Lis is on thc cogn (istrati, the literary' ',':ınıgılard, [0 121 civ«: thcir hlana fides, to csLa hilisli rhı T thicy arc yw her: rih cv fc fer rc::List) is cyrhcr (th am 4, ht: it i yw'n sLuculexs.
l'hose issucs Lie noit un relatcd LC) th L. policity ofiscritus Incl rhought-? - vmk iiring films ii I urn ir 1 dustri, clin m I r II:Littri lay plot-tailers and firm Lillil lots, lt is mi : x'iridcnl tle:II thic llnlliam ricegirminal Link: Ina products more significant films for to III reality than our own! ln terms of literii ry output, Sunil Wijesiriwar cleria's warning of the conscquc nccs i Hf the dicciIII e of TT:ImslaI 1 T1s -- I the extern that ttı: Teo: 1 fc ory a handful : y car – Tlust tit hetic d. is is his argument that rhis is symptom:3 till: c1f in isoi: Led lite:T:LIL rc whosc self-aggrandiscmcılıt spells iI
(Ivy In doom.
M. 1993

Page 19
Yll tuld. I bad y': for bytt "är" : 1 lirs “:r:’i: tir whichi lei: ill ET LEI: I, IT', loJo Tark: d . :::::i taking efThe grrIIITil Linclirishn's Which Fill TT 1:tl: iridic::1. Il TLC-piiri5. Il creciariri," ; cd, nger, 15; in the pia; few cars. hut this inctl: was not graspex, This chi:illa:Tige. Yra si ni ir arcrick. Wirst still, his Tefusal to engauge: Y' illi llic: C Complcx. Socio politicill
Ti:Ilitics If tur tiI Ti pH:ig: nulis E tLIITTI 15 lly : Ilil larg. by th, Intent whii ht:l 'rt: T.i"%ʻ&: :li[1 lä ( : :LI1l it.s
Whıt Yur:Lix; T. cd 1 gi', 'T LIL'', ladcs illias Lilit CCsting lind i rL1p[: cirhc:r a rchas
I111 structuru: Jr. I
In The News
MINISTER WIII. IDE(III)IE | WII) " ; EN LI IN EE" J () IR NAIį I S'I'S ARE TO ISSE METOA
WCREDIT WIKTION CARTIOS
St: 1inistr for E.IIIl Lati III L. J. FILE: si Inghile y'ks. :rol: ; :::H% : 1 : Li i HII I FLIE ist at til 1(1st abill fiss builing LILI I heir IIIli: Hr:g:Igrlila Titul LIII i Ili“ y::IT wirkulrd i. Egivci iT1 duc Jurs.
Не пласic thц: аппашпLEплепт when ri:Hirters, sacried the Assistini is ccLor, lle:-pi: Tri:mt af draftırmar irri ithi1ur thic: ll: lily in th: is sic If 1 li li rads.
Bur hic: &ld bere chil "Wic: '','','|| darL:ieli: A hi r I lhi: ja L Ermalisti : Tr” - IIIc: rjim Icd rollJ I hilt more: hara lil a pcrs war: liking Jillilihil. iiii vs. (ill 'g:iii iTIL:" je Lufı1:liš iš will II: i Ytri LC:tr:dit:-
cEl rais, he said.
ľskum ť, ľermarr 29, ľ997.
A. J. R. NAS IN HE EA 145 "FWSPAPERS INTI SE PIEES:
[: x.tractiv; fr.: JG 11 11 itilt:Tvit: '','||
(): IEEE: gu yr era 11-e1L is i Lau L LLIN
what is sự:Ited in thụ: press, who Ire #1'1'- er El 11:nt lealer dı:arshly, teritical f :th::
incie perden press?
A. That is because of "չլ:llL"ւ յաւյrmillism".
C): (i:L 11 yr 11.1 krit: :Iau y specifrifir in
3:8 | Sul:8 Li:I: II il li:glti 11. al- lit. "yellow j if r:listin" irid "twisted : ՏԼtiri:h":
A: Hv:1y l:L iC:I.: 3.1: ir18L:Iic: l LaTil Lir alle. SUTT1r: 30-rallig nati Tial
1: ivo:jH:% Illish luego sturies eve
гу Шяу,
Ա: An Illing: sit-cific M: W si I said, evocTyzhing. ''hL: ;)- called natrimmati pre R3 alka disci it.
Ç): Çını yılı roll Lis wherhıcrrhi- pres5 hIs Lover er sc} sLycrgly Lizieler 4LTack
since independerice as it is Enday, in:li ling death, la Eh thrca 8 and a ETacks:
hi: Eul of thiIl: er'e elirler. 11t can't agrel with you. J: Fint gxample cof this, gav LTTILL CIL Ti seri Eil disap
N. Ng crly 18ich pc{pl: dix:1py::ITç). 1}: S: v 1:r: E Lot Ex: alstaat Lick Cid. Carl u gurl1 : Tisi I, II rig li: A: NI WITMI:ligill kill & ITIs:l Hil.
2: li tat maching E A: Everywh:Tg I
}; Bull Eu Hiis ulk,
ħ: I 1: a II: try %: til 14: I L: ;* I:AY N.E.S.Tilly critic g: Ym mhrifia'r 'ïwr, *r
E.II“,
S.F. E.N.I.
dire55. deire ccEE . . Jay awarlo: LI I lha: Tħ.I...
Why thլ: : WT:1181 It 1983-84: "H Erst Woll. I resorg. way th: S I'errirtkerEI Fil:Lk (sic) : Ii Ij III.: sancti LT ir II || 1 pF
1: Eli i t .
'1'h:Fւ: w:Lh :" iւiւ:
:Lill :::: l:LI11:lgic. t:Ill:Ils liv:: gu
I. F' HII : :la:
14' : ',' &ax:it: trailling Parlijnen: Ey IPL Turid dc11 cues Liu) is: i: Ic
The als. r14 ITIC c4 Ling Yidude Incu: h:3d
r i 5 e:15 rm Critis i l' v'iti II:
Evatri, e-flarr li;i li rsier'e rhée deme:rari
ci:tilly since: thc: spi:
Mar I
الأميعf

Ilc in Uthu:г Ill:Lп
W'H5 nrit :Lilt !T: soit:(l, : it crary stablishre: Thes: f1 LIT: Ilp:dridig (11s.
('til in that "as brith ::Lixthu tiri:Lly dcologically bilinkhing if old. forms
L'ull. L'allit:Jul of li JL
gi; hı:Hye lapp :: IL ed in thics: things,
.
thiring the ign titc. Richardd ydy: Ei hys:L circl:
Farid kd: Fkıyısı. FILL Hıy"
ja III E E :: Ilitx roku rc::Iliricill:rits peri E :LIlieri
: Sht:bold’o Tricid []
:ranspiricil in that.* hıcrı: :ırı iriticicriti.
Er: IO Ihis degfrit litlic: third class. E agitat&rd. &rur Y.-l. Waộ.
ነሡ :'ነ‛
:d by sprimer Fort: i. nic: rin Fcbaru: 1 +
Il IoT E': rlii FtI Ċri turi I I IsiF: Ele ts, ILEI Y WY":i:s la grad, blur uf the daty iE 1982, i 1 :d 'arli: Ticri EIT'
: th4: le lux: LiuJ1 du : ειτα ΑιigτεHη τ 1983.
*Fil:ır: qıf platnış [[ı kill Öı ılı: At turrı: El licits cif th. Igel in court S. an ad LTTI risti 'n-
ls., curl Ihu (Juncr:Hiti:Lilly, uvas The UILLE IiIII :: If Tori: - har seca:h:5 alivomh: mal.
:i5: di:lisiris ilk:1 scrill:y was in pcril. 1 ht: rrit cl: Lu pr: 6: S"Y"5[:rrh, . :ä1 1 l spp:- ::L'ik: I 11-il slut u ring
toll:-crlcnd Tacis Ah'ih raristi arid scxis I
thirts.
The fill Tc of l993 iš lytih črcativ': : Il citilill. This is ultil 1 sily hill hl:TL: Y4 :ru:: rnC) TIL:lt::rming feta ILIT: IL excerpris yn 5, but to emphasise this: graenLTill crenals Ind domin:Int Lendenrigs Cofia "car that I could haviac produccid 5:1 much "Il Csicdc hic civil var artili.
the 1983 o'r txikill:11 til 4:Irrı:aign by :it:T- tairli l-IFI' s gaki, cr: ivar Tag: r II rt spċcch3 th:L:L areo :L pppr1p1ri:IE c for al de IIuxt[al tio Electio.--
lf will arc a dim (Lir:l' (Lilly, we in List think the emple who at the 1982 rgferntum Led for:l Lenrin Ilariert If
I - I: Hriti- כם 83 לאיTH it flirt.
Αλαίν ή Σπ. Μεόντια τ δ ,
Hill:T (IF TIH TIMMISSON OF ELETETIONS ON TTIE 2N) PER STOF, NTT JA E TIEKTN. F. SRI LANK, HEL)
N J. E. S.S.
“= 385. . . In paras 48 and 4of Iny RLPLFrt IIT Ehe Pari-Irrenrary Genfill Electil if 1.4%. iii. i. It is list-L5
aLaaCC a S LLLLLLLlLLLaaa EEEa HEEEL LLLLLL iri l'#R2 Iri :x [w: Igl : EL: life: ulo ilho: Fixt Philiarrigri LLIglit the Scelind Relitali:::I ri i 313tik, Elico. LE TUILL - Ile II:t tlıat tlière v: İırı v4ıEici Te:Is ITI fır til: Lis: uf this IIIcchiris III, the IllanTIT THf chu: :lt:t mf rhis ReciferentLIIT itself. Ihı:Lc c:a in Trilh LLEC I4, wirdL T: nging crisicisill: 45 inf the Refferri ditu, hil, Euen. |LKecil fir al purposic: Qaf rhis maturc:...
F38, "Tlıe ılıcı ve assessFERefii w'ULıld li: Cually valil in th: g3xg Far :xt:T- gTLCCLLC L AL LLLLLL aL LLLLL LL LLL LLLLHHLLS l-rit tr ii I li li Ticaris tiffa Referendi TT | is uilderstill th: I the regul:Lily if clection3 5-ccified in Illt: H13ii II Liii. is a ricans by which lic Franchisc of Tlı: i:lict:1 stilti- iк E. Llr II Inted. E. Lh|LL gxin [cxi thc (:lci:tratic Hinurgth: pri vidical viwili hi. UpupHUI ELJIlity, C. ex.:Turis: il 5 Choict Lith FTI picrxon: Ind prilicies at 4:lt:L:2 ir Hr Hs. IL is precisely this chuic: C
HITTYI 12; Til Indicies that the ReferenLIII delies. In the EELtur:t. Hill. a
Referend LITT Cinnt be considered as a
wail alteratioLE ILI a lore Hilden Lial Eleтіоп-" |pр 253 - 254|
R.k. f.d Ffra familla file ilklar, formissioffer af Ffestfrans.
v་ , "نقي نسبيعية

Page 20

ImageS of La by Stephen Ch.
British photogr
been capturings L.
Since 1986, reSul
1985–1992. As er - - -
will Commence
British COUncil.
sw | 93

Page 21
Of Lanka en Champion
grapher Champion has
ng Si Lanka on film
Sulting in a book, Lanka
| exhibition of his WOrk
e Ori March 3, at the
 
 

Page 22
Pre-requisites For F
Counterpoint: In your three reports, most notably the Report on the Presidential Election of 1988 released recently, you have recommended certain corrective measures to streamline the clectoral system. What do you think should be done to correct the faults seen in the system?
Commissioner: To answer about whatever I have suggested there, I need the power to act upon it.
Counterpoint: Fine, but can you tell us why you suggested it?
Commissioner. It was discussed in the report. I have first to answer to the Select Committee. Apart from what I have said in the report, it is for the public to show their concern. They should come up with changes in the light of their own expectations, experiences etc. I should not postpone the right of the Parliament, the electorate, the Select Committee to have the liberty of discussing these, and coming out with their ideas. It's a necessity for the leaders & the officials to declare the necessary amendments, rules and
regulations for a free & fair election.
Counterpoint: To elect a popular, trustworthy government, isn't it necessary to hold the Parliamentary &
Presidential Elections together? Is
there any other way to act fairly and to create a peaceful, non-repressive atmosphere?
Commissioner: It's difficult to say.
R. K. Chane Silva, Com Elections in the past elev, that the best corrupt electi
UOfer filfm-0t
Mr. de Silky viewed by Waruma Kar
S' μ η e Rajakaruman
Counterpoint: W the basic needs (r process itself) to cri in the people that t is free & fair?
Commissioner should prevail to ment to all alike, a this the voter shou the polling station a free man. The po is the most crucial ers who function th to function without the exposure to ph is something whic lighted in the las Now if these are gu only that what you but people will also . . It’s a question ( in which all those filled. Your questio my answer has to b otherwise it has to nation, or an inves
Counterpoint: I'r the specific reform fact that reforms a sary - (a) to tighten create the credibil be lacking amongst
Commissioner: people. I can't sp Committee, what t report. About the c
22
الجسم)
 

ree & Fair Elections
rananda de missiomer of Sri Lanka for
n years, says control over
ons is a 98%
f
a was inter/ictor Ivan,
natilleke and ί ή η α ayake.
nati do you feel are lot considering the ate the confidence he electoral system
Law & Order 2nsure equal treatnd as an outcome of uld be free to go to and cast his vote as plling station which place and the offichere should be able exposure or fear of Lysical threats, that h has been hight couple of years. aranteed, then, not say will be realised have confidence.. if the environment guarantees are fulln is very broad and e somewhat broad, be a specific examiigation.
n not asking what s are, but isn't it a Fe urgently necesthe process, (b) to ty that appears to
the people?
can't speak for the
:ak for the Select hey feel is in their 'edibility question,
this comes up in all elections all over the world, it's a matter of degree.
Counterpoint: Do you think that the system of observation which was used in the '88 elections is a good thing and should be encouraged?
Commissioner: It's not something you can speak against, certainly not. There must be something wrong if you say so, but the question which looms large in everyone's mind is who are they? How objective and partial are they in observing an election? It's so sensitive, and when local people participate and help its more difficult because of connections, friendships, background.
Counterpoint: What about the other reasons you give against foreign observers such as lack of time, un preparedness, ignorance etc.
Commissioner: There are both positives and negatives. In other countries there may be ideal conditions, different from ours. So you tend to take a relative view of the whole thing, you can't help it.
Counterpoint: Do you think the observer groups in a sense create a better environment for the elections? On the day of the election, people will be more careful not to violate election laws because there are these observers, local as well as foreign.
Commissioner: If we can expect a
good 98% of the voters to turn up at
the polling stations, they would be the best observers.
Counterpoint: Let us consider the rampant allegations of election malpractice. Can you tell us, for instance, about the possible leaking and misuse of ballot papers? What is there to ensure that ballot papers are genuine?
Commissioner: There is nothing. If I go to a booth and get a ballot paper I wouldn't know if it was false or not ..That's the naked truth of it. If there are people in the country up to all kinds of rackets, printing false ballot pairs & all that, that's a different thing altogether; that is something beyond my control. If someone informs me that it is happening, then I can do
March 1993

Page 23
something about it. To see that it does
not happen, I can't do anything.
There's serious implications but I would like to say is that we are taking maximum precautions on the matter of all elections papers, and the ballot papers are the most important of these. We have a system that which they are safeguarded.
Counterpoint: What about the question of impersonation, and the safeguards against this kind of abuse?
Commissioner. This issue is fairly Let's consider the insistence on proof of identity or eligibility through production of the Polling Card. We have to see what al
intricate and serious.
ternatives are available to us, in case a voter is dispossessed of that card prior to his voting. It may be that this took place hours, days, months and weeks before it was lost, misplaced or otherwise dispossessed. been turned from a polling station just
because they don't have the card be
cause it is now compulsory, imagine just what our officers will have to face at the polling station. The law is one thing, but denial of that right, only because you fail to bring that little piece of paper is another thing, and The most crucial thing can be that a well
voting is a fundamental right.
known person can turn up and say I have lost it, and everyone will say, well, he is so and so. But because he does not have a card he will be asked to go home. That can be the highest degree
If people have
maximum 100 per c tion, those who hav tity cards do not ex now it may be more. Now, due to this security situation, large numbers of institutions have issued ID cards which are good enough. So I say can you give a privileged position
to 12% of the
electors aS against the other 88%
Counterpoint: You
then that since false inserted, polling ca
monitored etc., that
Commissioner. As say is that this systen balances. It works that does not mean names are not there. mistakes, and we across children belo
been listed.
Commissioner: T the system, is the 1 certain ideal level i and order. It must bi and order in which t vinced. That is the 1
for
of embarrassment to everyone , and a brazen denial of a fundamental right.
Then, what if the other card, the national ID, is made compulsory by law? There are other ID cards which suppos
a fri tion broa
in W
last
the
viou
tion
Wer
that
the
edly identify a person,
say, a passport or a postal identity card. Again I raise the issue whether it is correct to make it an effective alternative. If I remember correctly the figures (we made a very rough count) of a
like in the country. Just due to conduct an e have the 'where with pre-condition requir the whole social ord
March 1993
ماجسم)
 

nt voting popula2 the other ideneed 12%, though
that situation. So to the extent that it
prevailed, certainly we also had to feel
the effect of it, there was no question
about that.
But main question
the
asked was if that was all, or if there was anything going beyond that. In the sort of post facto analysis, it's observed that apart from the main real
son, there were
seem to Suggest names cannot be rds are carefully the system is fine.
a system - what I n has its checks & fairly alright, but that disqualified We all can make have also come w 18 who have
he main issue of maintenance of a f possible, of law that level of law he elector is conmain requirement is to identify it as ze and fair elec
When we refer dly to the period hich we had the
3 elections (not
ocal but the preS 3) the condiin the country different. To extent it affected clectoral process, everything else
DCCat SC V6 VCC ection, we don't all to bring that :d. It was left to cr to bring about
other things which affected the election (those things I have quoted here and there in my reports). Well, sometimes you can say that the opportunities for such occurrences were also provided by the prevalence of a general situation of lawlessness. You get to hide under that. -
Now, one of the simplest things you have is the response you get from voters who turn up at the polling stations. For some reason or other, what we saw at the last election is that the numbers that turn up are less. Then the main constraint for elections is good behaviour which is the social constraint. The electorate imposes a constraint. Now when the electorate is not turning up in full in public on the polling day, then there is a little of that social restraint, and perhaps it is exploited by some of us, so that absence of the public from the polling stations provides probably a cover.
Also, you cannot leave out the other reality. I'm not referring to anyone in particular: the other reality is the availability of arms in the hands of people. You have arms in the hands of people (for whatever purpose it has been given) trying to settle disputes, old scores. It requires a tre men dous amount of self restraint not to use them. The Police Dept. with difficulty . try to manage a certain level of law & Qrder, and that too was not possible at that time. No one blames the police
y * معجم
23

Page 24
REPORT OF THE COMMI
ON
SECOND PRESIDEN
"if 198. There has been an increase in the level of politicization of administration at the district level, more significantly over a secade and a half. The public were made to understand more and more, that decisions on administrative matters are no more the preserve of the administrators but rather that of political authorities." Page 94)
"it 249. With reference to Article 93 of the Constitution which has laid down that the election shall be free and equal and by secret ballot, they the International Observer Group observed that, the higher degree of intimidation in certain areas made it unequal, and a percentage of poll as low as 5% in some areas under threat, and disenfranchised the electorate.” Page 127 −
خنجب ها
274. Furthermore in their Group
of National Observers assessment, the election was held in conditions which were far from normal where contesting parties could not campaign freely. There were several infractions and malpractices at the election, wide spread intimidation resulting in a low poll of 55.3%. In this background they raised several questions of far reaching implications for the democratic process of Sri Lanka. Amongst them they raised the issue of options available at that time. - To the question whether the poll could have bcen postponed for better times they observed that -
It was inevitable that from the beginning the election would have suffered from several serious ctonstraints which would have adversely affected its democratic character. This was in fact what eventually occurred. Page 141
"# 286.2. Another District experienced a different kind of problem when for reasons never fully explained, there was an attempt to transfer the Returning Officer (Government Agent) on the cve of the clcction. Every time the Commissioner of Elections questioned and objected to this move, the transfer was cancelled. Finally when pressed for an explanation as to why the Returning Officer was being transferred so suddenly on the eve of this election,
SRI LA
HELD ON
the only explanatio that there were sor spect of another are: appeared to be a m dubious move. In suspicion spreads a done to satisfy some have found the Returning Officer, un a men a b e.
Page 147 .
“#468. Atten
tion has to be
drawn to two incidents which sur
faced at this elec
tion where it would appear that those responsible were different from
those who resisted the conduct of the elections by violent
(1) In Gar staff of a Polling S temple were mercil the night of Decem turning Officer repl ensured that the Pol schedule. In this i gang was alleged to double-cab and a v; to a business estab ship of this establ known. The Police to inquire into this repeated requests a this failure is suspc. nection of these pei cles to some politici officer endcod up in condition. He recov manent damage. injury and consequ the officcrs refrain complaint through In the context of su their fcars appcar t fied. They cannot b failure to lodge a co 283
“# 533. It is regre Report on the Parl Election of 1988 wa ferred to as a valuel
وكالاسم)
 

SIONER OF ELECTIONS
-
ANKA
9. 12. 1988
n forthcoming was he criticisms in re
of his work. This ost unwelcome and
such circumstances
to whether it was authority, who may
FIAL ELECTION OF
three years after the event without any possibility of verification of the matters referred to in such Report. If such comment is in reference to a petition inquiry it is true that the Report on an election is of no value to any Court ac
tion. It may also be valid to the extent
that it is not a Report
based on facts, all of which the writer has personally witnessed and experienced in a manner similar to the evidence of a witness in a Court of Law, where he speaks about an incident that he had personally seen or experienced.
In fact it is pre
cisely as a precaution
(1C3:S.
npaha District the tation located at a essly assaulted on ber 18th. The Reaced this staff and
was conducted on ncident the armed have arrived in a in which belonged lishment. Ownerishment was well Department failed incident in spite of nd the reason for
cted to be the con
sons and the vehi
an of the area. An hospital in a critical ered but with perspite of grievous cnt hospitalisation, :d from lodging a fear of their lives. psequent incidents 2 have een justie blamed for their Implaint. (pp 282 -
tted that when this amentary Gcineral s issued it was retess Report coming
against causing prejudice to the parties at such inquiry that a Report on an election is written only after the completion of Petition inquiries into such election. However, by the mere fact of the delay involved it does not leave the matters referred to in such Report, beyond a level of verification. More importantly the purpose of such a Report is to provide the factual position on the conduct of an election for the benefit of an electorate in general and a Select Committee in particular, and to focus attention on the vital issues to be considered in the revision of election laws. z
“if 537. some of which may be political, two main concerns of the electorate are in
Apart from other issues
relation to the establishment. One re
lates to the inability of the security of
ficers at some polling stations to effectively resist the offenders and take pre
ventive action against the invasion of polling stations. The other major con
cern is the inability of the State ma
chinery to conduct inquiries and pros
ecute election offenders. It is regretta
ble that the discussions on this subject
which commenced with the Report of the Referendum, appear to continue
aimlessly with no clear signs as yet, of any positive action." (pp 311 - 312
"لأضيع
March 1993

Page 25
for not being able to maintain that ideal situation, just because it was the day of elections.
Counterpoint: You can tell the Police I want 10 guards here, for instance. You have said in your report of 2 politicians who violated the election law. Now has anything happened about that, did the police prevent it.
Commissioner: No.
Counterpoint: So if it comes under an independent body, they can say someone violated the election law take him into custody. They are then answerable to this commission, not to the police department of the government. Wouldn't that (a) create a better environment to do your job better (b) even if there are problems, provide credibility to the process?
Commissioner: This
Counterpoint: H stances when the C
tion staff have bee
existing governme)
process had begun
Commissioner:
h
II
credibility, is it an absence of the commis
sion?
Counterpo in f: Yes, the politicians look the other way. On certain things powerful people are getting away with breaking the law despite the police being present Some time S. This is the i crux of the
Sk
credibility problem.
Commissioner. How . does the Commission get them to per
form their duties which they fail to do.
today?
Counterpoint: In a sense, if you take today, most of the police constables want to do their job honestly. When there are pressures from the top, from politicians for example, some can then say: What can I do, the Commission ordered me
Commissioner. It is not for lack of orders . . .
Counterpoint: Pressures from the top?
Commissioner: Correct.
Counterpoint: Still you're talking
about a system when the entire civil service has been politicised.
Commissioner: Sorry. I can't comment on your personal opinion.
Commissioner:
across such instan
come across Such a
- ous. Then it is lil
pening in the polli
Counterpoint. In
rumours are that in
the ballot boxes th
Commissioner: whom? Lots of things. . .
Counterpoint: T. lack of credibility.
Соттissioner:
serious matter.
Counterpoints: Te report that disturl place at the centre you do?
March 1993
سم)
 
 

ave there been in
.A.'s and your elec
n transferred by the ht after the election
محص
No. That will never appen. There are ansfers, but I can't ty why.
Co u n r e rp o i n r: hat I'm saying is hat when You call or elections, take ominations, and ou move in, then e G.A. is the chief ficer. He looks af:r all this work. In is time period have fficers been transirred for whatever :asons?
VV e have not come ces, but if we do situation it is seriKe something hapng Station.
one polling station,
o one came, but in
CIC W"CIC WOICS.
Who said it - to eople say lots of
hat just shows the
That's true. It's a
ill us, if there is a ances have taken of polling, what do
Commissioner: Well, police have to take action to prevent it. Where someone has violated the law, he has to be prosecuted and the poll is liable for cancelling.
Counterpoint: How do you decide on
that, if its liable or cancelling
Commissioner: On the report I receive.
Counterpoint: Has that happened
Commissioner: Yes.
Counterpoint: Did it happen in the last election? -
Commissioner: No. At the local election we did not. In the previours
elections we cancelled quite a few.
Counterpoint: Your report on the
election which you submit to Parlia
ment, the one in 88, came one-and-a- half years after the election. Do you have no legal restraint to issue it as Soon as it is ready? Does it matter whether there's an election petition, on or not
Commissioner: There is no legal binding
Counterpoint. So you could have re
leased it earlier?.
Commissioner. As Commissioner of Elections, first, of course, my account
goes to the Parliament, I don't have to wait until questions are asked, I just give the report, Also a report forms normally a base for the revision for the election laws, not that everything that you say must be accepted, but it forms the essential base for the public. So, it's notining but correct to give it out to all concerned, and in my opinion all the 10 million voters are concerned. We have an obligation, I don't know
how it was started - about 47 I think.
There is no legal compulsion nor legal period
"منيع سمني
25

Page 26
Odds Agains
The Provincial Council elections will fall due very soon. However disorganised the Opposition may be, and however lavish the President may be in distributing largesse from public funds to please the people, the government cannot hold Provincial Council elections with any confidence of success. On the surface the government appears to be in an advantageous position, but this appearance is deceptive.
The results of a Provincial Councils election cannot be favourable to the government at all. The government will most probably lose the elections for the Western and Southern Provincial Councils, which are of symbolic significance. The situation in the other Provincial Council areas is not very clear, but the government cannot be happy about it.
Even at the 1982 Presidential Election when the popularity of the UNP was at its peak, the conditions that prevailed in the Southern Province were unfavourable to the party. While the UNP got a total of 466,814 votes from the three districts of Gale, Matara and Hamban tota, the SLFPreceived 401,914. The UNP's majority was a mere 6-4,900 votes. If the opposition was united the UNP would have been defeated by 17,594 votes.
This difference between the I "Nß and SLFP vote changed to one favouring the SILFP at the Presidential Election of 1988. The figure for the SLFP was 2-46,382 while that for the UNP was only 211,509.
The situation in the Western Province was no different. At the 1982 Presidential Election when the UNP got 1,013,720 votes the SLFP got 76-4, 158, a difference of 2-49,562. If there had been a united front of the opposition parties the difference would have come down to 156,680.
lhe change that had occurred in the Western Province by 1988 was very sharp. The UNP's vote was 880,989 and the SLFP's vote had gone up to 875,202. If the United Left
ance then
Front's votes had SLFP's, the UNP 6-4,140 votes.
In the future e which comes forw, alternative to the C have an effect on Even the aliance which is already in ably be able to win the elections for them. If the DUNF too joins that alli
a SCW Cre defeat for the UNP is inevitable.
In assessing the future elections, t DUNF in them to taken into account. make a guess beca not faced an electi results of the Surv
Ravaya are utilised
limitations, the exte will influence the U
The total numb the survey was 25-42 had voted for Sirim. --15 for R. Premadas Abey gunasekera, at
Election of 1988, wh
not voted or had
V OtČ.
As many as 375 C voted for Mr. Prema voted for the DUN and 10 for the JVP, jected all parties.
lf the 1117 vote survey by Sirimavo compared with thc ceived at the Presic 1988, Mr. Premadas: 50.43% at that ele 1253. The 375 voti
26
المسم0
 

UNP Victory
een added to the ould have lost by
ction the DUNF "d as a right-wing NP will inevitably the UNP's vote. of the six parties xistence will prob
then, would amount to 29.92% of the total. The percentage of 29.92% works out to 768,704 of the total of the votes If this is expressed as the extent of the DUNF's support, the UNP which had 50.43% of the total in 1988 would get something like 37.71% today. This undoubtedly exceeds by far what it
takes to defeat
cast in the 1988 election.
the UNP at a w they voted at the last Presidential future elecElection tion. Even if the D UN F’S
Number Percentage
remadaSa
maVÖ Bandaranalike e Abeygunasekera Se WhO did mOt Or had opportunity to vote
Support is half this estimate,
445 17.50%
the national 1 117 46.31% ی۔
24.0% average of the 113 5.24% || U Np will drop to 41%. What 787 30.96%
this figure in2542 100.02%
dicates is that,
possible results of he effect of the o will have to be
It is difficult to ise this party has If the y carried out by
on So far.
, disregarding its nt that the DUNF NP vote is clear.
r of responses to out of which 1177 Ivo Bandaranaike,
and 33 for Ossie
the Presidential ile 787 had either o opportunity to
the 445 who had
iasa in 1988 have 25 for the SLFP while 22 have re
obtained at the Banda anaike are -45.95% she rential Election of who had received tion should get
for the DUN F, .
contrary to popular belief, the UNP will most probably suffer a devastating defeat at whatever election that will be held in the future.
Thus it is not difficult to understand why the government is contemplating holding a referendum about the acceptability of the Provincial Councils. The only purpose is to avoid How the opposition will respond to the gov
a severe defeat at an election.
crnment's strategy is not clear.
Whether the system of Provincial Councils is acceptable or not, if what the governmcnt seeks is to avoid a massive defeat, the opposition should not be trapped in this trick. Whatever differences of opinion there may be about the Provincial Councils, if the government's aim is to avoid an election the opposition should strive at ensuring the holding of such an election, and if the referendum is unavoidable, the opposition should turn it into a referendum on the Presidential system. If the opposition succeeds in winning it the government will, without doubt, face a serious crisis.
Victor Itam
壹。氧° ఖాళీ
March 993

Page 27
Creating An Environ For Implementing A Political Sol
Α". Sewel months
of relative inactivity the Army
懿
launch large-scale offensive operations
is preparing to
in the northern theatre. The Joint Operations Council headed by President Premadasa has reportedly approved an offensive battle plan forwarded by the Joint Operations Command. The detailed plan covers operations up to June this year and the first is expected to be launched by the end of February or the beginning of March.
The Army has finalised the setting up of a special fighting division to carry out most of the offensive. The division will be commanded by Brigadier Asoka Jayawardena who was appointed security forces commander for Vavuniya late last year. He is in charge
of all offensive operations in Vavuniya,
Anuradhapura, Mannar and Weli Oya, and is also expected to move into the peninsula with his troops when offensive operations begin there later this year. The division will have three brigades. The 15th Brigade will be commanded by Sa rath Munasinghe, till recently the military
Colonel
spokesman. The 16th Brigade will be led by Colonel M. D. Chandrapala and the 17th by Colonel Nihal Marambe.
Each brigade will have just over 3000 troops including support units. The concept is that the division will carry out offensive operations and move back to base to get ready for the next one, leaving defensive troops in the area under the command of area commanders to hold on to strategic ground if and when necessary.
The Army offensive in the north came to a standstill following the death of the late General Kobbekaduwa and 8 of his top commanders in the northern island of Kayts last August. The deaths occurred on the eve of another major offensive in the Jaffna peninSula. With the tigers on the run, military leaders at the time were confidently predicting the re-take of Jaffna
town itself by the c Army re-took large sula from the tige cutting off all lanc the peninsula an June.
With the de
Kobbekaduwa his vised by the securi ers but was finally when the respons changed hands onc Joint Operations September. Since officer commandin HamiltonvilNanasir ing to correct some problems facing ti to disastrous setb
months of 1992. T sive operations and mand gave the tige time to re-group strategy. The Arn aged 100 a month rying out a series ( ambushes and e some Army camps Army not only lost soldiers but also
weapons and amm
sive operations col the tigers hitting
morale among fr line troops fell to all-time low leadin an unprecedented crease in desertion
One of the key sons for the low
rale was the lack cohesive plan to f the tigers.
The military h command was
volved in a m: power struggle in lombo with the c
manders of the Ai Navy on one is Wanasinghe with Cyril Ranatunga, were receiving Sup
March 1993
أمسمf
 

Battle Lines
ment
ution
:nd of the year. The areas of the peninrs after successfully í routes connecting d the mainland in
eath of General battle plan was rety forces commandshelved completely ibility for the war ce again back to the Command in late then, the general g the JOC, General ìghe, has been tryof the fundamental he Army which led acks in the last 4 he halting of offenthe change in comrs the much needed
and re-think their
nv death toll aver
with the LTTE carof hugely successful
ven over-running ; in the north. The hundreds of trained
large numbers of unition. With offenming to an end and almost at will, the
-
a g to
in
S.
『C31ー
O
of a ight
Oir Force, Army and ide and General Defence Secretary, on the other, who port from the mod
erate generals in the Army. The government which has yet to give the military leaders a clear objective, looked content to play one side against the other.
The service commanders were given full responsibility to conduct the war last May, but just six months later the JOC was back in the saddle.
The request for more troops, better weapons and stocks of ammunition was denied by the government saying that they did not have money to pro
- vide them.
While the leadership was fighting one another the tired troops on the frontline were facing the brunt of the
tiger attacks. The much loved General Kobbekaduwa along with General
Wimalaratne, considered the best field commander in the Army, managed to keep the pressure on the tigers in the crucial northern theatre, despite the disarray in the military hierarchy, but their deaths brought the crisis to a head.
The fighting battalions have been engaged in operations without a break since June 1990, and some units are operating at just 50 percent of their strength. Troops, especially in the North, had been bogged down in difficult areas for years without receiving even the basic necessities.
The new year will see some of these shortcomings being corrected. The Army has received a large stock of ammunition while
the Air Force is taking delivery of the
controversial Pukara ground attack aircraft as well as MI-8 Soviet-built military helicopters.
Although the purchase of the Argenti ne - made Pukaras despite opposition from the Air Force
has sparked off a major
Commander
controversy, it is clear that they would be more effective than the Siamarchetti ground attack aircraft currently used by the Air Force.
జో , , , * مشعرهما
O7

Page 28
However, what is still lacking is a
Squadron of proper helicopter gunships which would give the Air Force an un precedented fire-power capability to support ground troops. The Navy has also been strengthened with new attack naval crafts and patrol crafts coming into operation, although its ability to provide facilities for sea operations has diminished almost to Zero due to the lack of landing crafts. The three armed forces have also launched a major recruiting drive to fill the vacancies created by the large number of casualties suffered since June 1990. However, the problem here is the lack of proper training which has been reduced to a mere three months. The Army is also drawing up plans to rotate troops from the operational areas more regularly but says that they are hampered by lack of troops.
All the new equipment will make
little difference unless the military .
commanders can improve morale and give clear-cut objectives and directives to the troops. Large numbers of senior officers disheartened by the favouritism and the lack of commitment from the hierarchy have left while more are about to do so. The three armed forces still have in key positions officers who have had little experience in the battle areas. Another contentious issue is the employment of retired officers on contract. Most of them are invariably
opinion between t Prabhakaran and t mand Mahattya hav One Prabhakaran's per
the open.
baby Subramaniar most of Mahattya'. bilities while Maha has been given to a notable absentee tion meeting V’adamarachchi. T problem for the. Ti nade attacks within own backyard. The Jaffna, Suresh, die and less than a mol man was seriously i cal attack. The to forced the Tiger strong security prec similar to what h Navy commander Colombo. The Lo
ammunition and a in February has not ened the tigers but rale as well. More t is the death of Ku pert on anti aircral plosives that has sh ership. The once among the cadres on the vane as the
recruit from a dim
place the large nun
28
سجسمبر0
 

favourites of
senior offi
cials and jobs are created for
them in Co
lombo with
al the
face value, the
will
Army
We
be in a better position than now to
take on the
Tigers fac
ing serious problems of their own.
The differ
CCCS of he Tiger supremo he second in comve finally come into time boss of
sonal bodyguards, m, has taken over s military responsitrya's political work Yogi. Mahattya was at the commemora
Kittu in he more worrying
for
gers is the two greone month in their : Military leader for d in the first blast, nth later Pottu Amnjured in an identiwo incidents have leadership to take :autions, a situation appened after the was assassinated in ss of a ship load of inti aircraft weapons only further weakt affected their mo
han Kittu’s death it ttisiri, their top exft weapons and exaken the tiger leadadmired discipline also appears to be tigers are forced to inishing pool to renber of casualties it
per k S. At
has suffered since June 1990. The Ti
gers have admitted to losing 5100 cadres last year alone.
Like all armies in the world, the Sri Lanka Army too will ask for more and more to fight the war, finding excuses as to why they cannot get the job done. Ten years into the war, neither the government nor the military high command has still come out with a comprehensive long-term plan to counter the Tigers. In place of that what one gets is a highly optimistic statement by the Prime Minister (also the Deputy Minister of Defence), who declared last year (and then changed his mind this year) that the bloodiest conflicts in the history of the island are mere skirmishes taking place on and off. The Military commanders for their part have routinely given six month deadlines which have come and gone. In fact, every time the Tigers appear to be on the run they are let off the hook by the sheer incompetence and bungling on the part of the authorities.
Unless this quick fix, populist approach to the war is replaced by detailed long term planning, this year the tenth anniversary of the 1983 ethnic riots will be no different from previous years. In place of verbal 'victories' what is needed is clear military and political objectives. While strengthening the military and approving their battle plans, the President makes repeated public announcements that the problem cannot be solved by violence. Even the most hard-line military officer will admit that there is no military victory in this war but all the Army can do is create the environment for the implementation of a political settlement. It has been the unfortunate experience of this country that politicians are only capable of creating problems and not solving them. An acceptable political package to the ethnic crisis in nowhere on the horizon and as longas that is so the military will continue to fight, not knowing what they are fighting for nor why they are fighting. Routine speeches praising the soldiers for laying down their lives for the unity of the nation is not going to hold water for long. In fact it has lost credibility already
as shown by the lack of enthusiasm
among the youth to enlist.
MarC 1993

Page 29
Whose W
I was standing on the pavement along Galle Road at Bambalapitiya last Friday. It was lunch time, and as usual, the traffic was heavy. Staff-officers and Businessexecutives were on their way back to office. There were buses crowded with children returning home from school.
There was, besides, a mini-bus blaring the music of trumpets, drums etc. and boys waving their school flag and loudly announcing their presence to all and sundry. That, I gathered, was the cheer-squad moving towards the annual cricket match between Royal and S. Thomas' - a silly reenactment of a duel between elitist schools in England.
In this moving assembly of vehicles of various sizes and shapes was a convoy of ambulances seeking to weave their way forward. With their sirens tooting non-stop, it appeared that they were virtually pleading to be allowed a passage to reach their destination as swiftly as possible.
To anyone familiar with the sight of ambulances speeding their way along Galle Road, the nature of their mission need not be explained. They are either on their way to the Airport at Ratmalana or returning with casualties to be rushed back to hospital for urgent treatment. They are the victims of a war that goes on in the North and East of Sri Lanka. On that particular day, I was able to observe the reactions of people around. I could see many feel concerned about the fate of the soldiers in the ambulances. Some were even seen directing the other vehicles to make way. To a few it was an interesting spectacle that satisfies curiosity. One or two, driving posh vehicles, were annoyed that they had to make way. To the young cheer
squad on their way to the "big match", it hardly attracted any attention.
As I witnessed the scene, I was reminded of the many Sinhala soldiers now stationed in the Wanni and the Eastern Province. As you know, I am a Tamil. To reach Colombo from the distant Vavuniya or Batticaloa, one has to get down at several check-points to have his baggage checked and his identity established. (Every Tamil citizen travelling to the capital to conduct legitimate business is held suspect, or so it appears.)
Some of these soldiers look wild or try to appear so. Harsh in speech too. Not so, the many. Most of them are young - just out of school. Some are yet to have their first shave. Their first employment perhaps, (if killed in war, it will also be their last. If maimed for life, they could never seek any other form of employment). Their innocent faces and the dangerous-looking guns they carry do not seem to match one another. Any parent with children of their age -
سمي | March 1993 fکا مسہ
 

Tamil View
aris this?
be they Tamil, Muslim or Sinhala, would certainly feel concerned. They are fighting a war, the purpose of which they may not understand. ܚ
The cheer-squad that was heading for the "big-match", or their parents, who would constitute the cheer-squad of those heading for the war-front, may not appreciate what I say. (How dare a Tamil speak up for Sinhala youth?)
Very often, these young boys in uniform, metal helmet and carrying a T-56, do respond to a smile. In a region strange to them, they yearn to see someone smile at them.
They would help me close my suitcase once they finish checking it. In the process, if they see an album with photographs of my wife and children, the young boy will look up at me. I could read his feelings. Me and my grey-hair would remind him of his father. And his feelings are that of my son. We part smiling - "look after yourself, dear son.”
I'd ask him for his name. Not the fashionable ones of the urban bred. His home and school - far, far removed from Colombo. And now, at Galle Road in Bambalapitiya, would he be one of those in the ambulance convoy? Is he conscious? If so, is he groaning in pain? Is he expecting me to stand by his side to console him? Does he want me to wipe his sweat and fan him - to say a few soothing words to cheer him up?
"I'm with you, dear son. I would like to wipe your Sweat, clean your wounds, fan you and say a few words to comfort you. But I am a Tamil. I'll not be allowed to reach you. I'm held suspect. My prayers and appeals are to God Kataragama, where your parents and I go to worship."
And far away, in the jungles of the Wanni, are heard the groans of another category of youth. Tamil youths also born
29 "منهجمة

Page 30
Magic Numbers
f you believe in numerology 1 astrol
gy the number three (3) stands for Jupiter, a beneficial planet. This is most congenial to rulers. Naturally, therefore, we are to be the beneficiaries of 300 hospitais, 300 fully-equipped Central Schools, and hold your breath, 300 bakeries after which bread prices will come down to earth! These are targets for the end of the year. With 1993 being an election year and with the media blitzkreig we are assured of patients although the question of doctors (shortage so acute that we are already forced to import them from Pakistan ) and other trained staff to man these hospitals must be left to a Presidential magic solution. The best part of the school plan is that it is as yet unclear whether three hundred new schools will be built of whether the existing systems will be upgraded and enhanced. In other words, we can still hope for sanity in the form of the latter. The 300 new
bakeries which, Evening Observer, i down the price of bi a new twist on Mari bread is beyond yo new bakery
Oops, we forgot got to tell the Fina Wijetunge, to allo funds for these pro Budget. Urgent adv NDB and the offici banks: Take your m
All this, despite laughing matter. T been announced w costs or from where be raised. If the project is anything again a case of giv while taking away N ironic that the med publicity to the fr failed to report the that same week, of cream Vitamilk pow up to one year. Wh
employees in a typical factory are un- Quota skilled and semi-skilled workers called helpers who had hitherto earned be
tween Rs 850 and 1200 per month,
This remains th as well as the most hardly a living wage. controlling the garr The new minimum marks, there- tas or export quan fore, an increase of over 100%, placing
these workers on par
with, say, trained teachers. On the other hand, overtime payments which are calculated as a quotient of the basic wage have become prohibitive, most factories dispensing with it altogether. .
Thus, the difference in the average salary earned by a helper before and after the
raise is not that much. What is affected is pro
Paans in a poicer game
duction. If orders have
been booked overtime is still profitable, but since,
then
allocated on an a
AO in general, orders are only sufficient to some companies r
- -- in excess 'eep factories running, overtime is a clearly xce potential, while oth ܢk
their regular outpu
۸.مجسمہf
luxury
 

according to the s aimed at bringing read, can be seen as e Antoinette: When bur means, build a
The President fornce Minister, İ. B. cate the necessary jects from the 1993 isory to the DFCC, ially insolvent state honey and run
our attempts, is no hese projects have rith no estimate of "how the money will free school uniform Logo by, this will be ing with one hand with the other. It is lia which gave wide ee uniform scheme withdrawal, effected the subsidy for halfJder given to infants ten the World Bank
insisted in 1978 that the existing subsidy on half-cream milk powder be withdrawn, the government brought in a new scheme entitling children under one year to four packets of CWEtimported Vitamilk a month at 12.50 each.
Every mother was given 50/- worth of stamps to buy this milk. 15 years later, the same week as the highly-publicised frce uniforms were distributed, with no prior warning the price of Vitamilk was standardised at 62.50. It would seem, therefore, that the infants were demied their milik in orader that their elder brothers and sisters should be ceremonially awarded a uniform each. We may atell be Aaying the foundation for a malnourished but well-dressed school-going population of fhe future. Since it is clear that no one would intentionally wish this iš to happen, what we are seeing is precisely the consequence of unplanned and ad hoc schemes announced on the spur of the moment and then implemented with maniacal obsession in order to protect the President's credibility.
Power
e most complicated misused method of ment industry. Quotities were initially
tion of quotas that favouritism and crony capitalism functions most blatantly.
Quotas are allocated so far only to
the USA (by far the largest and most
profitable market), Canada, Norway
and the EC.
Non-quota sales to other countries account for a much
smaller fraction of the
total market.
Hence, the competition for favourable quotas which could make or break a. gar
ment export company. USA quotas arc applicable from July to June each year while the others operate from January to December.
However, once
rbitrary basis with 2ceiving allocations of their production hers got a fraction of t. It is in the alloca
quotas are awarded, the company concerned has to canvass and receive orders up to this amount before it commences manufacture.
Otherwise, it cannot be sure that the product will match the require
MasCh 1993

Page 31
ments of the order. In any case, without specific orders no shipment can be made.
Theoretically at least, then, compamics with orders may not have quotas to match, while companies with quotas may have no orders.
There are two main types of orders in the market: FOB which involves the purchase of materials and accessories by the manufacturer, and NFE where the buyer provides all raw materials and only labour is required of the manufacturer. The latter type is the more lucrative, but these orders are more difficult to come by because the buyer is at greater risk. The ready availability of orders depends on proven performance, and this is particularly so in the case of NFE consignments.
The Quota Board headed by the ubiquitious Secretary of the Treasury R. Paskeralingam is solely responsible for the allocation of the US, EC, Norwegian and Canadian Quotas, with effect from January 01, 1993.
At the beginning of the quota period, each company is automatically allocated 50% of its fulfilled quotas for the previous year, pending a final decision by the board.
The orginal quota is the amount allocated at the beginning of the quota year: earlier this comprised 50% of the orginal quota plus 50% of the pool quota of the previous year.
However, in 92/ was based on 50% of
| only. Performance f
for the previous ye; ered because this q to the 200 factories v the quota cuts frc haven't paid EPF, I
Factories which booking orders und that thfey would be similiar to what the ous year were left h
As a result in or orders that they ha these factories we
quotas, even at a p 25.00 a piece, from
Evidence for th the adverisments th Daily Vea's during October 1992, askin; as today advertisme anyone interested. now the quotas ca with orders.
Pool quotas are
tive, providing bette since they were bas els (Cutting, Makin among application meant that compan CMIPO levels would tas from the pool.
The present situ troubling since pool for the US market
MafCh í 993
 

93, the allocation f the original quota rom the pool quota ar was not considuota was allocated
which also received
om factories that ETF, etc.
had commenced ler the impression receiving a quota y had in the previigh and dry.
der to honour the d already booked, re willing to buy rice as high as Rs. quota holders.
is can be seen in hat appeared in the [he period July to g for quotas, where nts offer quotas to This reveals that
nnot be matched
healthily competir chances of profit ed on CMPQ levg, Packing Quota) S received. This
ties with the best receive more quo
lation, however, is quota allocations were made by the
VU v tI SOLUI y
quota board only on December 31st,
1992. Given that there is in general a
three month lead time for F.O.B. orders, these quotas may never be translated into exports.
In addition the quota board requires bank guarantees of Rs. 24.00 per dozen items, another damper to prospective applicants. The rationale for this guarantee is that companies have accepted quotas and done nothing about them, but the guarantee itself is a case of far too much, far too late.
In addition, arbitrary quota levels had been fixed for new factories as an incentive to their being set up in rural locations. If a factory was established in what was deemed a "remote” area a quota of 50,000 dozens was automatically available, 25,000 for not so remote areas, and 10,000 for urban areas.
While there is no argument against the decentralisation of industries, the additional incentive for quick inauguaration of factories remains suspect since its only motivation appears to be the President's promise to establish 200 factories by December 1992. 100% of allocated quotas were available to new factories opened on or
before August 31, 1992, and thereafter
one twelfth of the quota was reduced
for each month's delay.
The Social Cost
Studies of the working and living conditions of women working in the garment sector have revealed an appalling picture. The young girls who comprise the overwhelming majority of workers in these factories are unable to save any money from their wages after paying for their meals and for the utterly over-priced yet unhygienic boardings.
They work long hours, are forced to come back at night for overtime when deadlines have to be met, and have no leave or other welfare benefits. The women are not allowed to unionise and, therefore, they have no one to negotiate on their behalf with
the management. ۔۔۔۔۔

Page 32
It is also exorbitantly expensive. Each person wanting to travel out has to pay two gold sovereigns or Rs.10,000/- in cash to the LTTE for his/her visa. That's not all. After one gets the visa, it requires a further Rs. 2500/- or 3000/- per person to journey to Colombo.
For those people who have managed to leave Jaffna temporarily for any one of a hundred crucial reasons, a similar odyssey awaits them on their return. At the time of writing this there are 4000 people presently stranded at Killinochi waiting to cross the cause-way.This may be difficult for a person outside Jaffna to understand. Why go back there? The fact remains, however, that for these people there is no other option but to go back to the only homes, friends, families and livelihoods they have.
The only institutions that have continued to function somewhat "normally despite the war and the innumerable constraints are the University of Jaffna and schools in the peninsula. The University of Jaffna remained open in fact even when other Universities in the country closed recently due to a wage dispute by
STRANGERT
TAMASHAS AN CARNWALS. WAWION” BE STOPPE) ----
Mallinnarachchi
The government will not stop tamashas or carnivals although there is a war in the North and the East, Food and Cooperatives and Janasaviya Minister Weerasinghe Mallimarachchi told Parliament yesterday.
"Normal life has to continue in other parts of the country while the war is being fought in the North and East,” he said.
Island, January 31, 1993
BID TO PROMOTE BREAST-FEEDING: NO MORE FREE, LOW OOST INFANTRORMULA
In a bid to promote breast-feeding in Sri Lanka the Minister of Health yesterday permanently ended the practice of accepting, using and distributing infantformula and breastmilk substitutes. An agreement between the Ministry, government and the manufacturers, distributors and suppliers, was signal sic to end the free and low cost supplies of infant formula and other breast milk substitutes, feeding bottles and teats to maternity hospitals and other health care institutions, coordinating secretary to the Minister of Health, Tilak Pelipola said.
L. Island. January 28, 1993
32 fنامسہ
 

academic staff. There has been a
tremendous brain drain from Jaffna and many good lecturers and school teachers have left. Despite this, the determination of those left behind produced 12 students who obtained four 'A's
in the last G.C.E.'A' level exam. This, by students who, while dodging bullets, study by oil lamp.
Traditional life in Jaffna has changed. Gone are the once familiar sights of shy, long haired girls, and joking, laughing and gossiping young men. Now young girls with hard faces, hair cut short, carrying guns are to be seen. They are “kalis”, ruthless, ready, alert and hawk eyed. Instead of the young, there are old faces to be seen - angry, hurt and vengeful. There is no forced con
scription of youth, but a major
voluntary enrollment in the LTTE persists - people see no alternative. Children study for an LTTE sponsored preG.C.E.'O' level exam before sitting for the island-wide exam, and study a LTTE-written textbook teaching Tamil national history. Cynics at 16, the youth of Jaffna are a generation without a childhood. Sivan
HAN FICTION
NEWSPAPERs TRYING To TOPPLE GovT. WITH FOREIGN HELP - PRESIDENT
He said it was difficult to publish a newspaper profitably without advertisments, but he said all essential equipment needed for the publication of these would have been supplied free by foreign forces with a view to discrediting his govern- : ment by spreading false stories.
Island, January 28, 1993
"Some advertisements masquerade as news, sometime masquerades as advertisements and some others do not know the difference” : ..', : : x <
Central Province Chief Minister W.M.P.B. Dissanayake said
that 90% of up-country people would support any move to make Mr. Premadasa the life-time President of Sri Lanka.
Island, January 28, 1993
1993 March • "أمشيمية

Page 33
Ranasinghe Reveals V
"... you quite ignore the fact that there are in circulation a large number of newspapers which espouse the cause of the Opposition. They are sponsored by various interests opposed to the Government. This includes a newspaper group owned by your own family." - President R. Premadasa in a letter to the Opposition Leader on the intended public debate.
DEF the Opposition into a debate on "The De bate” when its energies would be better used to ensure organisational unity and policy formulation in relation to current realities is the peculiar success of Mr. Premadasa's style of politics. Kudos to him for this latest exercise in Opposition baiting and, in fact, beginning the great debate even before the so-called modalities have been agreed upon, through his use of Ronnie de Mel's Budget Speech of 1978.
But, what bothers me is how, in just one casual statement about this debate, Mr. Premadasa has attempted to justify the Government's control over the mass media in this country and its conversion, by and large, into being the propaganda tool of the ruling political party.
One believed till now that the President left such political announcements to the other Ranasinghe, who in his inimitable fawning manner, would say how Radio and TV will never be available for use in Opposition conspiracies, to oppose or criticise in a democracy being part of a conspiracy. We now have the thinking come from the Master
himself. The thinking is so simple, but is not that of a
March 1993 Cأسمهم
 

What Premadasa Hides
simpleton. The meaning is not just frightening, but macabre. Mr. Premadasa is not unknown for mental jugglery, but this is sheer acrobatics of the mind.
The Opposition, allegedly, has so many newspapers to espouse its cause. Ergo, says the Master, I have control over Radio, TV and Lake House. After all why shouldn't both sides be matched; If politics were only a game, this would be ideal. But it means much more. It is in what remains unsaid that lies the danger. In one sweep he compares newspapers which are privately owned, with or without large circulation, critical of government policy, with the publicly-owned media which is being used to push propaganda for himself and his own policies. In the peculiar logic of autocracy, the comparison itself amounts to justification.
What the President has done is to give the impression of being at the receiving end of so much politically motivated criticism, that he seeks the sympathy of the public in his open abuse of the most powerful sections of the mass media. He ignores the basic issue of the right of the citizen to publish newspapers (or any other material) critical of the Government, whether it espouses any Opposition policy or
Ot.
He also suggests, rather mischievously, that a newspaper published by a relation of someone must always reflect political support for its kith and kin. Maybe Mr. Premadasa knows more today about favours within families that are peculiar to our society. Yet, none of this can justify the Government's total control and deliberate manipulation of

Page 34
the mass media in this country, towards party and personal political ends.
When the Government itself boasts so often about the divisions within the Opposition, one cannot be certain what the President means when he refers to a "large number of newspapers which espouse the cause of the Opposition”. What is this cause? Rather, is it not better said that there are several newspapers and magazines today which are critical of government policy and many of these are also critical of the Opposition's lack of policy and direction? Apart from the Opposition party journals, there is nothing in the marketplace that is uncritical of the Opposition parties for their lack of unity, lack of policy and undoubted lack of purpose. But, even if there were so many newspapers openly espousing the Opposition cause, does that give the right to a party in power to control the state-owned media in the manner it does today? This is an issue basic to the survival of democracy in Sri Lanka, or whatever is left of it.
“The concern today is mot the size of the screen that hides the ugly truth, but the truth itself. It is a truth the public must be made fully aware of for in its proper identification lies the ability to move towards a stronger, more stable, Aess threatened democracy. The achievement of that is, and should be, the real debate.”
It is cold comfort to say that whatever party which was supported in power by Lake House in the past, cruised to electoral defeat. That did not happen in any of the corrupt, manipulated, violence ridden elections which followed the last free election this country had, in 1977. We are not any more in the age of Lake House propaganda alone. We are now in the age of the Electronic Media, and Mr. Premadasa knows full well the reach and manipulative capacity of these media, although he may be a little unaware of the pitfalls of saturation propaganda.
If there is to be a public debate today, it must first address itself to the issue of the Media itself. A debate on development strategies and economic policy can have little purpose when the subject of democracy itself is ignered. For the crisis of the Media today is the crisis of democracy itself.
Hidden beneath the glib statement of the President about so many newspapers espousing the Opposition cause, is the fact that radio remains the medium with the widest reach in the island, and TV, albeit with its economic limitations, can reach in one instant a much wider audience than any newspaper could do in a day. He hides the fact that Lake House has one of the best organised and funded newspaper publishing and distribution facilities in the
34 fالمسہ

country, with the funds coming largely from Government or Government-led advertising allocated largely in a parti
Sal a CT.
The alleged surfeit of Opposition newspapers Mr. Premadasa refers to, comprises mainly those operating on shoe
"It is cold comfort to say that whatever party
which was supported in power by Lake House in the past, cruised to electoral defeat. That did not happen in any of the corrupt, manipulated, violence ridden elections which follflowed the last free election this country had, in 1977.’
string budgets (whatever the level of sponsorship by various interests opposed to the Government), denied any advertising by the Government, an example gladly followed by the private sector, limited in circulation by the size of printing plant, cost of newsprint, and often faced with thuggery and intimidation both at the point of printing and that of distribution. Add to this the economic pressures used through a Government manipulated banking system, emergency powers and the threats to journalists themselves. It all amounts to a tidy package of dangerous and threatening intervention by the State in what is essentially the exercise of a fundamental right of the citizen.
It is surprising that with the known arrogance of power, Mr. Premadasa has to even attempt explaining to the public the government's control over the mass media. Yet, the fact that he does it is some indication of the Government's own awareness of the sensitivity of the issue. All regimes that veer away from democracy are not at a loss to find excuses for the inroads into the rights of free speech, attacks on a free Press, and curtailment of the public's Right to Information. What Mr. Ranasinghe Premadasa has done is attempt to hide the nakedness of the government's control and manipulation of the Media, while Mr. A.J. Ranasinghe gladly reveals it all.
The concern today is not the size of the screen that hides the ugly truth, but the truth itself. It is a truth the public must be made fully aware of, for in its proper identification lies the ability to move towards a stronger, more stable, less threatened democracy. The achievement of that is, and should be, the real debate. Not the sterile banter over the rise in GNP which ignores the companion rise in the death toll up North, or whether our next need would be 300 fully equipped cemeteries after the 300 hospitals.
Lucien Rajakarumamayake
నోట్లతో March 1993

Page 35
Women 1ökenism C
WW) suffer not merely by be ing treated as objects, but, even more insidiously perhaps, within the "benevolent” gesture of special subject status, as if they were on par with “sports” or "politics”. In this “Women's Page”, for instance, is contained a certain politics of marginalisation which goes unnoticed. It is as if the rest of the magazine is about "issues” and this page is about a "special” issue called "women's issues'. As someone once said, "A man's book is a book, while a woman's book is a woman's
book”.
In addition, this women's page excludes men and sportsmen, politics and political men. What women, in this im
COCCS
plicit gesture, can
COCC WOC only. What concerns men, on the other hand, con
cerns everyone.
However, if we accept this critique of women's pages, we're then left with both a practical and
a theoretical problem.
The rejection of a Women's Page as politically suspect leaves us without a platform from which to oppose these male values which are camouflaged as cultural values. Like it or not, in popular public space today, the women's page-type phenomena give us the only voices we have. The crux, then, is not the outright dismissal of this stage, but rather the developing of a strategy by which they can be used against themselves.
The traditional subjects dealt with in traditional women's pages trivialise women and women's issues through an exclusive focus on, say, cooking, fash
In Search of Betterment
ion, handy househ activities, motherin this gesture the wo by the home and th forms within the world is circumscril
ties and her role is
that of housewife :
the indes pensable a
workplace.
women (called “gi
their age) are unde
sure to imitate the
terparts.
This does not m
we feel these activ demeaning. The p. these are deemed propriate tastes/ women. This can seen when even p are featured in won
who do not in an "womenly pursuit the manner in whi marginalised as wi and not profession:
March 1993
المسمf
 
 
 

s Pages:
r Resistance
old hints, leisure ig, sewing etc.. In man is constituted le services she perfamily unit. Her ped by these activifirst and foremost and/or helpmate in
Appearance is nd the working
y
rls' irrespective of
r tremendous pres
ir "western” coun
can in any way that ities to be trivial or
roblem arises when to be the only apskills/concerns of most powerfully be professional women men’s pages as those y way neglect the s'. More subtle is
Ich they are always
omen professionals als.
This raises the theoretical question whether we are going to reject it as contaminated or whether we are going to attempt to infuse it with a self-reflexivity and critical edge that makes the earlier kind of women's page im– possible in the future. The correct politics of the former solution is "safe" in that it does not engage with the dominant ethos, whereas the latter must walk a tightrope in order to resist being appropriated by sexism masquerading as benevolence.
Or is the solu
tion then to have women's space inflect the other
"mainstream” areas of magazines, newspapers etc.? It certainly makes sense to talk about the style and fashion of politics and a certain political leadership, or to infuse, not trivially but the public space
pervasively,
with what is traditionally considered to be the private, feminine. Not that we accept that certain dualities or ways of being are
essentially female, but that these socially determined qualities and ways of being must be used strategically to give women a voice.
Obviously, this involves a certain vision and a commitment on the part of the editorial board towards the subversion of the existing "male” exclusivity, and this is easier said than done, particularly as it is a long battle ahead.
Yet, what will all this achieve, finally? Other ways of appropriation, subordination, marginalisation? Perhaps. At any rate, this is a risk that must be taken. . . . Kali
. . A

Page 36
NIC STATUS BY ;
A study done in August 1992 by "Oxford Analytical”, a US - based commercial think-tank, predicts that there will be no significant economic development in Sri Lanka as long as the north-east var continues. Reproduced beloze is the entirety of their report. SIGNIFICANCE: Although it has the most liberalised economy in South Asia and enjoys strong external support, Sri Lanka's ambitions are impaired by the persistent civil war and rising military expenditure.
ANDRE Up to 1977, Sri Lanka pur ued an almost textbook policy of state-controlled economic management, but the electorał upheaval of that year paved the way for 15 years of government under the UNP wedded to economic liberalisation and market opening.
"Although the government still proclaims its ambition to attain NIC status by the end of this century, on current trends the economy could even fall below the South-east Asian norm by them.'
As a result, between 1977 to 1991, industrial exports rose from 6% of all exports to 60% (of which two-thirds were textiles and garments), and private investment rose from 12% of GNP to 19%. The UNP has enjoyed consistently favourable treatment from the international financial community as a reward for its anti-statism, but in terms of growth the results have been disappointing.
Per capita GNP rose by about 3% per annum over the past decade; and 2% per capita growth is forecast for this year. Since neighbours such as Thailand and Malaysia have grown more than twice as fast, Sri Lanka has
slipped down the ble. Its income pe higher than that of and is well behin perity the country of independence i
Although the g claims its ambitio tus by the end of t rent trends the ec
fall below the Sou: by then. Some C growth is due to a ditions, and some t
design and implem
nomic reform prog the most importar the UNP's ambitic cession of protract the south (now p. north and east, (sti years of warfare.
In the first pha eralisation, the ec well, until the oil and the ensuing trade, which preci payments and fist have contributed violence of 983 nalled the start of t To a degree, foreig UNP from this cr tional export secto coconut remained previously promisi ism went into reve
Foreign aid was into high-visibilit such as the Maha ment scheme, wł creased the UNP and opportunities which appears to poor investment standpoint. Mainly provision and sub ment has reined ba ture from about 4C to around 32% at public revenues ha similar proportion count remains in Whereas domestic
36
المسم)

2000 - A Pipe dream
regional league tal- .
head is now little India and Pakistan l, the relative pros2njoyed at the time
1948.
overnment still pro
to attain NHC stahis century, on curonomy could even th-east Asian norm f the shortfall in dverse market con) deficiencies in the entation of the ecoamme. But perhaps it factor frustrating ons fias been a suced civil conflicts in acified) and in the li raging) after nine
se of economic lib:onomy responded price hike of 1979 downturn in world bitated a balance of cal crisis that may to the inter-ethnic which in turn sighe current civil war. n aid cushioned the
isis, but the tradi
r - tea, rubber and sluggish, and the ng upsurge in tourrSc.
largely channelled i prestige projects weli river developnich evidently ins political support for patronage, but nave been a rather from a technical by cutting welfare sidies, the governck publi: expendi% of GDP in 1977 present. However, vc also fallen by a and the fiscal acsubstantial deficit. savings amount to
معنی
"After 15 years in power, the UNP’s economic liberalisation policies have yet to produce sustained growth. It is likely to remain elusive for as long as civil war endures in the North.”
about a third of GDP in Malaysia and Thailand, the level was only 11% in Sri Lanka in 1989 and recovered to only 13% last year.
In 1989-90, the government succeeded in crushing a major Sinhala - extremist rebellion in the South, but at the price of large increases in public employment and a relaxation of fiscal discipline. The conflict with the Tamil Tigers continues to rage, but is largely confined to the isolated Jaffna peninsula. According to the government's official line, the conditions now exist for a return to accelerated growth under the impetus of further pro-market reforms.
Certainly, the Colombo Stock
Market surged at the end of last year when restrictions on foreign equity investment were lifted, and at the beginning of this year, the 21- country "Aid Sri Lanka group overcame doubts concerning the government's human rights record and pledged a further 825 million dollars in assistance on top of the 1 billion dollars allocated last year. In 1991, the fiscal deficit reached 11.6% of GDP. However, inflation was contained because twothirds of this deficit was financed by such external loans and grants. On a per capita basis, Sri Lanka's aid inflow is currently the equivalent of providing about 40 billion dollars per year to India. -
- The conditions attached to this
latest instalment of aid arc that
the Premadasa administration Will: - practise greater fiscal and monetary
restraint; - maintain a competitive exchange
° Pኋ*` .
March 1993

Page 37
rate, and privatise state-owned banks and plantations; and - pursue a political settlement of the
conflict with the Tamils.
However, all-out war continues to
prevail and the government seems unable or unwilling to curb military spending, which has now risen to around 5% of GNP. Moreover, a drought has severely affected the tea, rubber and coconut harvests, the major traditional foreign exchange earners, and the financial sector has been affected by the collapse of some poorly regulated finance companies, aggravated by a backwash from the Bombay stock market scandal.
Consequently, even though textile
“On a per caft Lanka's aid rently the equi viding about 4 lars per year,
exports continue to ment is likely to agreed with the IM
Foreign donors, pressing for an acce of devaluation, and rates. Public utility rise quite sharply if maintained.
Of Bulls a
992 Could be classified as the year that the market came of age. It was in this year that the market had its all time high, was completely liberalised,
and recorded the highest ever loss of
market capitalisation.
It started in December, 1991 when in one month the index rose 16.2% and market capitalisation rose by 16.3%, but the dividend yield dropped by 8.9% which for the first time was lower than the cost of investment brokerage.
It was a job well done. The authorities concerned were happy with themselves, the foreign advisors were proud of their local students, and the stage was set for the new investment vehi
cle called a unit trust.
In 6 months the SEC had educated the public, and brought in every "Tom Dick and Harriet' with their extensive marketing campaign in the name of development of the capital market. Such an advertising campaign if carried out by a private person would no doubt have brought about the wrath of the SEC.
The month of January then saw unprecendented activity in the market where everyone became a fund manager, investment advisor and prophet.
Brokers who even in
caution were consic prophets of doom SHARE started the
the SENSITIVE capitalisation stood daily turnover on th Rs. 41.4 million, up ber 1991. The wee ary saw daily turnov while the CSE all climax at 896.01 a
tive to 1246.00 on t In five working day broker members h transactions accou shares.
Colombo Dry I top of the list with price variance of Bank traded 75957 variance of Rs.247-;
“In the rea/a
the CSE as a ket, the year u termed an his
March 1993
f. A

DUISE CSS co. Eu UU y
pita basis, Sri inflow) is curvalent of pro0 billiom dol
to India.”
surge, the governmiss fiscal targets
F.
for their part, are leration in the rate for higher interest prices may have to these pressures are
Thus, the immediate prospect is for a further deceleration of growth. Progress thereafter will depend on whether the government can project a more favourable international image and thus secure the large inflows of private foreign investment required for its plans. The Central Bank would like Sri Lanka to be the first country in South Asia completely to abolish controls on foreign exchange, but accepts that the time is not yet right.
CONCLUSION: After 15 years in power, the UNP's economic liberalisation policies have yet to produce sustained growth. It is likely to remain elusive for as long as civil war endures in the North.
ind Bears...
mentioned the word
ered inefficient or
l. The CSE ALL year at 837.79, and at 1198.65, market at 82.7 billion. The he market averaged
42% from Decem
k 6th to 10th Januler at Rs. 60 milion
share came to its nd the CSE Sensihe 10th of January. 's The CSE with 11
had executed 4465 nting for 5545656
Docks Ltd., was on 1458100 shares at a Rs. 1/75; Sampath 5 shares at a price Lanka Milk Foods,
evelopment of capital mar7992 could be
torical one.”
همشچمیه قم
598400 shares with a price variance of Rs. 4/50. Colombo Fort Land, C T Land, Hotel Developers, Taj Lanka, Pelwatte Sugar, Pugoda Textiles, Seylan Bank and Galadari were among the list of heavily traded shares. The total turnover of the market was Rs. 870 million for the month. .
The analysis of how this situation came about would prove interesting for emerging markets. Very briefly one
could summarise December 91 and
January 92 as being the result of a huge rise in the demand for shares by a group of financially illiterate investors probably enticed in by the successful
免
marketing campaign.
The whole market was motivated by market psychology and not on financial considerations. Also, the fact that the market had gone up continuously made brokers very confident in providing liberal credit extensions to clients. This free access to money and the marketing campaign culminated in January 1992.
However, behind the scenes the system was being stream red: Post trade documentation was being regulated, resales within the settlement period were being controlled and de
37

Page 38
livery of share transfers with broker delivery orders were abolished.
The CSE was enforcing these new rules with the threat of suspension and for. once the brokers and quoted companies were coming to terms with their documentation problems. Some were even suspended from trading.
The new computerised post trading documentation system was coming on-line faster. The system required the investor to have the certificate in hand. The buyers of December and January were finding it more and more difficult to liquidate their investments at the pe vailing high prices. Investor liquidity was being curtailed and this resulted in shares selling not on performance but on the availability of saleable docu
C.S.
Therefore, the 1st quarter of 1992 saw liquidity getting tighter all round. Brokers who had extended credit found themselves with clients who were big debtors but could not liquidate due to documentation constraints. The buying pressure was easing slowly but surely.
The 1st quarter also saw the 4 unit trusts collecting approximately Rs. 1.8 billion as capital. However, the consensus of the fund managers was that the market was too high for them to consider investing 80% of the funds in equities as expected. When this became evident the speculators got out of the market at any cost which fur
ther weakened it.
The first quarter ended with a market of 20.42 as against 21.08 at the beginning of the year. The CSE all share was down 114.49 points or 12.77% from its peak on the 10th of January 1992. The market lost approximately 6 billion of its capitalisation in 3 months.
The 2nd quarter began with the drought and its effect on the economy. Economists were re-forecasting their estimates for the year. The tea industry was beginning to feel the effects of
the drought and Go was reducing. The increased and the p
fecting productivity
were stable in the slowly moving up.
There was no economy was slowi liquidity was tighte market looked incre fund managers.
y
“The stocht played the pa portfolio ma
manager, cus sor all-in-on slowly discou
The so-called market and the put ing forums and stat was too expensive They were predicit dence level for this a price earnings ra 15 and not 20 as it ning of the 2nd qu
The CSE whic ing on market psyc financial conside found that the tre
38
 

VCTImmC[ht TCVCTL1C cost of energy had ower cuts were af
. Interest rates that
first quarter were
doubt that the ng down, and that r. The treasury bill casingly inviting for
broAer who irt of broker, Imager, fund todiam, advite should be raged.”
specialists of the
hdits were address
ing that the market for this region. ing that the confimarket should be
tio of around 14 to stood at the begin
atc.
n had been surviv:hology and not on rations suddenly end was reversing
from bull to bear. The common inves
tor who came into this market within
1991 could not understand this situa
tion.
(S)He was still feeling the hcat of December and January and was trading in the market even though the odds were stacked against him/her. The seasoned investor who stayed out of the psychology game was cautiously coming back into the market.
Selective buying was coming back with signs of price averaging in a dropping market. April saw turnovers stabilising once more. Average daily turnover was Rs. 24 million and the indices were approximately 1% higher. This was because it was the beginning of a new financial year and the grapevine brought information and speculation on corporate earnings.
April was the month of cautious optimism in the market. Earning expectancy was high and people were buying cheaper compared to the beginning of the year. The unseen factor, however, was that the brokers were holding debtors. Any price increase brought about sellers, sometimes voluntarily and sometimes not.
The month of May saw the market coming down mostly because of the pressure exerted on the brokers to re
duce their debtor position. The fact
that the larger stockbroking houses are also tea brokers had an effeet on market liquidity. The brokers could no longer carry the debtors indefinitely in the face of a severe cash crunch in the tea industry due to one of the worst droughts in recent history.
The SEC was also stepping in to curtail the debtor position as there were accusations of brokers giving credit to attract custom. The month of May ended with the All share down 5.03%. However, the turnovers were about the same or slightly higher than in April.
June saw the market indices holding even, but the daily average turno
March 1993

Page 39
ver was down to Rs... 18 milion, 35% lower than May. At the end of June the dividend yield was at 1.6%. Investors were beginning to feel the bear, and the market had come down by 2.5% in the 2nd quarter.
The 3rd quarter began with the market P/E ratio at 18.48 and analysts predicting that the real P/E would be 14 to 15 after adjusting for 91/92 earnings. Comparatively the market looked cheap with the low PIE, but the bear was still strongly in control. Added to the debtors' positions, now loomed the possibility of political uncertainty. The judgement in the Presidential Election Petition was expected during this quarter and market psychology was strongly negative bringing down the market.
The month of August saw the treasury bill market returning a yield of 19.5% on one year Bills, which contributed to reducing the CSE average daily turnover to Rs. 10 million. Everyone was waiting for the Presidential Election Petition result before moving in. Markets do not flourish in uncertainty. The beginning of September brought the Judgement in the election petition and some speculation in its wake. The CSE all share started at 720.05 and climbed 34 points This promise was short-lived, however and
approxiamately 5%. in 4 days.
September ended with the market lower than at the beginning by 2.57%, the 3rd quarter ended with the CSE all share down 7.7%, CSE sensitive down 7.8%, and market capitalisation lower by/to 5.3 billion rupees.
The last quarter did what was expected of it. New brokers with foreign collaboration started operations. Speculators bought in hope of new foreign investment. However, the market was not as strong as before and new foreign investment did not come
in the volume expected.
The 4th quarter ended with the market capitalisation down by rupees 6.4 billion and the all share closing 14% lower. Again, what was seen was Speculation on politics rather than the market. 1992 was a year that proved how little people understood the vicissitudes of Sri Lanka.
The market ca, close to 20 billion
this to the increase i supply (M2) during riod June 91 to Jur lion, and we are cc question as to who
paper.
In the real de CSE as a capital ma could be termed a The post trade aut line and has been full year. The sett and the documenta and now operates alone is a creditabl an emerging marke
“The SEC ma more transpa, quasi-judicial fustice must a be dome.”
The need for n
trained advisors ha However, the prese couragement of m The stockbroker w of broker, portfol manager, custodian should be slowly di
This is not to fi
broker who has the and thereby has t market. (S)he is the between the sa stockmarket. (S)he aged to develop services. This woul
that the cost of in brought down and efficient stock mark
The access to th market in the glob. been given a boost foreign broking ho However, one wond participation was th pared to a technical
March 1993

Business & Economy
pitalisation loss is
rupees. Compare In the broad money the 12 month pehe 92, Rs. 21.5 bilonfronted with the
is holding all that
velopment of the rket, the year 1992
s a historical one.
:omation came onin practice for one lement procedure tion is streamlined
efficiently. This e achievement for
t.
1st make itself rent, as it has powers and 1so be seen to
more professionally is been addressed.
nt need is the en
ore intermediaries.
ho played the part
io manager, fund , advisor all-in-one scouraged.
orget that it is the seat on the floor, he insight of the 2 sole intermediary avings and the
must be encourseparate financial d be the only way vestment could be a competitive and
ket developed.
he CSE as a capital al context has also by the entry of five uses in this year. ers whether equity e better idea com
service agreement
as in the insurance industry.
All in all, the year that went by has set the stage for a long term development plan to make the CSE a global market in the future. Issues must, however, be addressed properly and decisions taken after careful study, rather than in their present fashion. The SEC must make itself more transparent, as it has quasi-judicial powers and justice must also be seen to be done.
The fund managers should realise that the P/E ratio is only a tool by. which the confidence level of a market is gauged, and that they are the people who must decide what the confidence level for this market should
be.
Government policy should encourage the development of the market by way of more recognition to share investments through state-regulated institutions, such as the National Savings Bank, control of Insurance Act etc. Further, the issue of interest rates and Government policy towards it should be clearly spelt out. The Government should realise that the stockmarket comprises or two essential features: firstly, the financial performance of the comapanies, and, secondly, the market psychology, not necessarily in that order. The key factors that affect market psychology are in the hands of the Government even in free markets. Therefore, the year 1993 shifts the burden on the Government to build public confidence in the stock market. A matter that the government should give thought to is the removal of dividend tax which would bring about a wide spectrum of benefits to shareholders and to companies that wish to be quoted. As at present, the mentality of the owners of companies are "do not pay high dividends as they are double-taxed" or "why go public with our companies and open our books out when we do not show profits?'
Finally, in 1993 we must strive to bring the CSE in line with a capital market that provides a reasonable return to the sharehodler which is not solely dependant on bulls and bears.
Cassandra
محلي
ಫೆ. t్యభా
39

Page 40
THE FINE AR
Οι: of the highlights of 1992 was that after a break of five years Sri Lanka was able to host a foreign cricket team.
Aussies, but weit tunity against Ne
When Jayan name first appear
Allan Border's Australian team. which arrived in August was the first test-playing country to visit us after a bomb blast in the city of Colombo in April 1987 forced New Zealand to abandon their tour after just one Test.
Sri Lanka, unable to host sides at home, were then forced to accept any scraps thrown at them by the other testplaying countries. One-off tests with lit. tle or no preparation were offered by countries seeking to boost their own
flagging morales.
Sri Lanka, Wisden commented that no other team in the future should be made to suffer the indignity of the type
through.
Despite the lack of regular compe
clearly on the rise. Border's Australians appeared to be a fair challenge and our chances of recording only our third test win in 36 tests were good. A win seemed a mere formality in the first test when - as only Sri Lankans can - we made a right royal mess of things and ended up losing
After the Australians came New Zealand and history nearly repeated itself when a bomb blast in front of their Hotel almost aborted the tour. Only
"At least the Australian
tessons - zoe threw away all our opportunities against the Aussies, but we threw at every opportunity against New Zealands”
high-powered diplomacy and some economic arm-twisting saved the dayl
At least the Australian tour had taught us some lessons - we threw away all our opportunities against the
After the 1989 tour of Australia by
of itinerary Sri Lanka had to go
tition, our standard of cricket was iš
tour had taught as some
a cricket follower may. Warnaweera was always suspe known te delibeF
isional ball. It was
before i New Zea Crowe voiced h Warna weera | th chucker” he hadi
Naturally, of was met by right the local fans and were brought Warnaweera bowl land and India wi Isn't Crowe just
No one ment ini addition təbeir taker in the local ment, Warnawee *records” te his called five times pires | K.T. Fra Felsinger.
When Warnax he figured in just test against Indi; where we got thra just over three d cumstances it is h would complain ing action!
In New Ze
played in only th 99 where the Labrooy and Ra. bowled just 6 ov
In the second
overs and went w land's namanoth but rumblings h atter apts Were f bowling action.
A bowier w can never be“ch expert simply bo to chuck when scrutinised by a era. Take a clos dismissal in the second test an Look at the rea
their knowings
Almost all W acknowledge he
م)

OF WINNING
"ew at every oppor
Zealand
nda Warnaveera's in the squad many ook his head in dismode of delivery t and he has been
ely chuck the occa
nly a matter of time und captain Martin is concern calling : first "genuine GêCaCOSS
tourse, his comment eous indignation by the usuali defences to bear. Hadn't edige both New Zeahout being “caled"? poking for excuses?
oned, however, that g the leading wicker *first class” tournara had some other credit. He had been for chucking by umincis and i Herbe
veera played overseas
Ewo tests - the one-off in November 1990
shed by an innings in ays, and in such cir
ardly likely that India about anyone's bowl
a land, Warna weera
: first test in February heroics of Ratnayake,
nanayake ensured he
rs in the first innings. innings he bowled 34 icketless in New Zeatotal of 671 for four, d already begun and ade to videotape his
deliberately chucks
ared officially” by any cause he is not going te knows ze is being
oach or a video camlook at John Wright’s iš
second innings of the
judge for yourself.
ion of the players and iles!
'naweera's team mates chucks (some of them
I replaced by another fast bowler. How
Were those in power scared that his
the touring team and the secretary of
even go as far as to say they don't like winning matches this wayl). Sadly, no one will talk openly for obvious rea
Sons.
Why are we so desperate to win no matter how? With the talent at our disposal we don't need to have to resort to cheating. What has happened to our selectors? When fast bowler Champaka Ramanayake was injured he was not
can Dulip Liyanage be expected to maintain any pressure when he bowls in tandem with Asanka Gurusinha's gentle medium pacers?
'Why was umpire K.T. Francis not allowed to umpire in the second tes
forthrightness may embarass them? Was it correct that a delegation comprising the team manager, a senior Board official and some senior players should visit the Board Chief's home the night before the test with this request? Why did they auk for another umpire from out side the panel to be included?
For the benefit of everyone includsing our Cricket Board here are the rules governing the appointment of umpires:
a) The home authority shall appoint a committee for the purpose of nominating umpires to officiate in all test matches.
b) Test match umpires who will be nominated by this committee shall offi.-- ciate in matches against the visiting team, thus giving the visiting captain the opportunity to judge the umpires to be nominated. As long as possible before each Test match, the manager of
the home authority will be informed of the names of the umpires nominated for the particular test. Any objection against either umpire must be lodged within three days of the notice being received or at least seven days before the match, whichever is the later, will be dealt with by the committee or by a Special Committee appointed by the home authority, whose decision i shall be finał. 璽
d) while a captain is entitled to submit objections to a particular umpire nominated for a test, he may not ask for a particular umpire to be given pref ence over another.
Twixt slip and
తో , , ,
March 1993