Page 1


Page 2
AAWWA AMBALANGODA AMPARA
ANURADHAPURA
BADULLA BALANGODA
BANDARAWELA
BATTICALOA CHLAW COLOMBO Bambalapitiya
Battaramulla BOrella
Dehiwela Fort
Union Place Homagama Ja Ela Kadawata Kandana Kiribathgoda Kollupitiya o
Maharagama Maradana
Moratuwa Nugegoda
Pannipitiya
Nandanasiri Stores Royal Book Shop
Delicia Mahajana Picture Palace Sathsara
Mahinda's Sunil Book Shop Leelasena & Sons Udeni"S Mayura Book Shop
Charles Subasinghe Greenlands Hotel Lanka Traders Liyanage
Shanthi Vihar Pubudusiri Cream House Madhawa Book Shop Pushpa Stores Ketapatha Prakashana SupipiBook Shop Sadeepa Book Shop Lakmini Stores Catholic Book Shop Colombo Hilton Holiday Inn
Taprobane Lake House 8ook Shop
anka OberO Maclium Book Shop M.D. Gunasena Book Shop Salaka Geethani Grocery Perno Stationers Srimali Grocery Jayabima Samanala Book Shop Vijitha Yapa Book Shop Malee Book Shop A. Z. N. M. Marikar Sasiri Book Shop Godage Book Shop Dayawansa Jayakody I. P. B. Book Shop McCallur, Book Shop Wijesekera Grocery National Book Shop Sarasavi Book Shop Nimali Book Shop
 

Piliyandala PitakOtte Ratmalana Thimbirigasyaya Wellawatte
EMBLPTIYA GALLE
GAMPAHA
*** GAMPOLA
HAPUTALE HORANA HKKADUVA KADUGANNAWA KALUTARA KANDY
KULYAPITIYA KURUNEGALA MATARA MATALE MIRIGAMA MONERAGALA
N'ELAYA NEGAMBO
NI TAMBUWA PANADURA PILIMATALAWA PUT TALAM RATNAPURA TRINCOMALEE VAWUNIYA VEYAN,GODA WARAKAPOLA WELLAWAYA YAKKALA
New City
Pothgula Thusitha Book Shop Missaka Book Shop Windsor Book Shop Rohana Book Shop Vivian Traders Queêns Hotel New Aradhana Traders Vijitha Yapa Book Shop Thaksala Nalanda Book Shop Hema's Book Shop Udaya Stores Davasa Centre Mallikarachchi & Co. Jayathu Hotel Coral Garden Hotel Daya Traders New Owen Joseph Book Shop Guneratne DistributorS Seevali Book Shop Vijitha Yapa Book Shop Sithumina Book Shop Maison Book Shop Central Book Shop Sastrodaya Book Shop Sampath Traders Nilmini Stores Malaka TraderS Gamage Stores Sumedha Book Shop Sri Ramya Stores Shop No. 3, (Opposite Municipal Council) Nayana Book Shop, Kandana British BOOK Center Negambo Printers Co-operative Sales Center Ganga Cool House Fernando's Jayasekera Traders Lucky Newspaper Agency Pradeepa Book Shop 470, Navy Camp Road Kavidha Stores Somagiri Ranjith Book Shop Suhanda Traders Vidyodaya

Page 3
April - May 1995
COVER STORY 7
This month's Cover Story explores diverse perspectives of the current North-East context, ranging from a military analysis and an assessment of the impact of Eelam War 3 on civilians in the area, to prospects for the future.
IMAGES 20
A recent snapshot opinion poll on the North-East crisis shows a drastic change in the mainstream view on a political solution, but presents a less intransigent populace than many analysts would
allow.
s Departments
Response .................................... 15
TamilView .......................................32 Culture . 35 Review .38
Counte
April-May 1995
 
 

Vol: 3 Issue:2
12 STRAIGHTTALK
Air Vice Marshall Harry Gunatilleke, a former Air Force Commander comments on the current war, its modalities and consequences, including the startling revelation that his late son Warned against the very sort of missile attack that claimed him and so many others as victims, but the authorities refused to listen.
Shyam Selvadurai author of Funny Boy discusses the politics of the Lankan reception of his book, as well as its twin themes of sexual awareness and ethnic identity.
Cover 宽 Layout
Asoka Padmasiri
Doint -

Page 4
| if SEI E the Ligly real
ry that immediately locates
DI-HERTH П
r
ing intellectual, for ex
--
வே
Frgin-lurra priceinbloodai -T3 Sreality, so therht
of schoolboys
===
استخدم تنضم له SS accountb
FTT
EFTER
Slayout
S. CartODrist
is Photographer S. Circulation "ליל־"" - בהם
--
Primèr . 日 Publisher 三 下
IT -- Fra
三 تحية
2 —Соитte
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

war. ther, j5. navoidable
ngles Whether the long-term
st peace fort 1є I efore, 2 political SS
- emonstrated by the ch the military must to the LTTE or other groups so S as to the ordinary Tamil #*- ition differs from Schauvinists
ause it sees the Warneither as a 2. nors as a crucial Copportunity for re:SinhalayTamili hegemony, which
ght of the ordinary people be they's
ܛܒ ܬܐܒ ܒ
n. It has been said that
y to the people remains S
e War entirely to the :ՀՀ:
로
cesis toab
du:
F H thei
4. itir solut n, and tl
Eion ED hysterical
:*.7:: Di Ledbo
ar ППЕ and contra history S.
dylt may besE '॥೬೬yಿ]ayogs ----- ernment which first sought
v seeking to appease the SS
eral Tamil public? It is for this S.
advocate a democratic process of vigilance, systematic and organized, which can
isolatethechauvir stforces and prepar the ground:ՀՀ
P ce whilenotshutting its eyes S ==
"point
All-MW 99.5

Page 5
I have read an article which appeared in The Sunday 77mes of 16th April 1995 with great interest, and wish to draw your attention to the following:
Firstly, consider the letter which Lanka Power Projects (LPP) has Written to CEB Chairman under the signature of Mr SS Siddambaranathan in which Mr Siddambaranathan SayS in Para 6 "They have indicated that given the special circumstances they are prepared at the request of Her Excellency, The President of Sri Lanka to Considerably reduce this time by diverting an existing order to meet our urgent needs". It is extremely funny that the President of Sri Lanka is speaking to a foreign Collaborator to deliver the equipment on an urgent basis withoutfloating an international tender and without stating in the international tender that weightage will be given to a foreign Colobarator who would install the equipment in the shortest possible timeframe.
Secondly, as a leading businessmen in Sri Lanka, wish to point out that this Company Would be approved under BO! status. Therefore, all equipment Would be imported duty free. The local Coloborator could request Midland Electricity of UK to give them a Commission of upto 20%, in this case amounting to US$30 Million or Sri Lanka RS 1.5 Billion. This money would, of Course, be kept abroad. The Bank of Ceylon has no way
of verifying the true cost of the equipment. Thus, the Bank of Ceylon WOuld be funding the project by getting the machinery as its Security, whilst the realiseable COst of the power generating equipment WOuld be only 80% of what the Bank of Ceylon has financed. The 20% which is syphoned off will be the equity of the local partners.
In other Words, the local partners would not have to invest even One Dollar On this project technically, as On the one hand they claim they are investing 20% equity, and on the other hand, they are syphoning Out 20% by over-invoicing the purchase of equipment. Thus, they have no Stake in the venture. The Government has accepted the fact that it is losing billions of rupees due to over-invoicing and, therefore, it has given a Commitment to the World Bank that it would be bringing international surveyors to assist Customs to ascertain the value of all imported goods to Sri Lanka.
Please note that the promoters could sell their
Couni
April-May 1995
 

shares in the local Stock exchange Once the Company is publicly quoted. They can make a killing on this and offload all their shares and disappear into thin air. The Bank of Ceylon is then left with a shell Company with holdings scattered amongst many shareholders whilst the promoters of the venture have vanished. The Bank of Ceylon security for their financing which is the equity value Would only be 80% of the true COSt.
Thirdly, what is most horrifying in this entire deal is that under the caption project Company structure is the clause to "() provide that GOSL guarantee the obligations of Organisations and their succeessors to the Project Company in a form acceptable to Secure project finance from international lenders." What this means is that the Company has requested the Government of Sri Lanka to guarantee the loans which would be available under ECGD Credit (i.e. British Export Credit). Thus, the Government would guarantee this loan which Would benifit the joint
Letters
venture. In a BOO (Built Operator Owned) project, it is the private sector which takes the risk by investing venture capital. There is no government guarantee. In this instance the risk for the international lenderS is a sovereign risk on the government of Sri Lanka. In such instances this is a sham which nullifies the whole concept of BOO.
It should also be noted that this project is based on Naptha. Naptha is to be purchased from the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation. One of Harry Jayawardena's Company Directors is Raj Obeysekera, a cousin of Anil Obeysekera, Chairman of CPC. The promoters of this project are already negotiating with CPC to have a long-term agreement for the purchase of Naptha at a price below the World market. This agreement if entered into WOud bind CPC and its SuCCeSSOrS.
If the project is feasible, then We are at a loSS to understand why Merchant Banks in UK are not Coming forward to finance this project. What happened during the previous government when state banks COughed up millions On the dictates of politicians appears now to be repeated by the PA Government which promised us the dawn of a new era. Ils the dream Of President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga no different from the dream of the UNP regime?
LA Lanerolle Dehiwela
'rpoint

Page 6
reply to Prof. K.M. de Silva's response to my first two articles Con the Homeland issue, had COTSider Cid (G, H, Peiris' and K. M. de Silvas paperstogether, as the latter had commended the former without reservation and had quoted from it generously in his conclusions. What I had principally Fargued agairst Were their conclusions that were reinforced by creating a new myth: Wiz" . . . . the interior, at least of the eastern parts of the island...remained throughouta traditional homeland of the Sinhalese peasantry". This point Was also eloquently stressed by K. M. de Silva. Their conclusion Was that colonisation of parts of the North-East, that has caused SO TILPCh paim lo the minorities, Was just and necessary, with no ewid ence of discrin Timation against Sri Lanka Tamils". Ewg the local accountability in Colonisation envisagedunderthe B-CPact was described by K. M. de Silva as dubious historicity elevated to the level of a funda Tentally importan principle." These connections are importart.
The bulk of Tryfirst two articles SLITTlarised the two papersand another document, presented Carefully researched facts to the contrary, and put forward HrgŲTills baSÉd 31 |ha later. K.M. de Silva had nothing to say Om the SE. H3 HS rather CFC Gam topour ridicule on meandon Ty articles. One means adopted is to pick on my use of Governor in reference to wan Sendenasa demonstration of my alleged incompetence, asserting that there Was no Governor im Trincomalee under the Dutch.. ..? This is the One tangible point in his letter that admits of a
950mse.
The diary in question of June 1786 describes the author as OnderkOopsTan De: Jacques Fabrice wa Sendem WaermeerTende het gezachte Trinkomale". This had been rendered "Junior Merchart Jaques Fabrice War Serden, Governor of Trincomalee" in a
The history people in
translation issued by the early British Administration, A free translation of "Watern Camerde." reads "Taking care of the governance authority) of Trincomalee". The rendering Governor of Trincomalee is evidently justified in view of the Content of his duties as appearing in the diary and the Commonsense premise that Ihe reader Would distinguish between a 'Governor of Ceylon" arıda 'Governor of Tricamalee", Another authority Could cile is
11 ET INär SiT ES Tennant, Colonial Secretary, in hĖ 1840S, WFC il W II of Filis Celebrated book on Ceylon, has On p.938 referred to Wan Serde as GowrDr.
With his considerable Brudition, Prof. de Siwa should m[[TTlalWhawÉ kT10Wmbetter thăm 10 Take än issue of Whalis, after all, a Common dilemma of translators. A classic instance is the case of Pontius Pilate, Praefactus Iudaeae. The latter is normally rendered Governor of Judaea. This is adequate for his administrative role and his role in the Crucifixion story. But other infor ITlation is lost. For example, the praefectus or prefect is normally a member of the Equestrian rather than the higher Senatorial order; and the Praefectus Iudaea Was Lundèr the Supervision of the Legatus Pro Praetore in Syria. Where this context is required, such as in discussing theaspect of an event thält impinges om the imlernal politics of the Imperial Roman Administration, it is supplicid by
Writer. One Would have thought that the content of what War Serden had to say in Correction with a Subject of acknowledged fESearch interest to K.M. de Silva. WDLuld hawe been of far greater
Counter

Reply
of Ordinary the East
Concer to hirT than the nuances of his rank!
I had made a remark on K.M. de Silva lack of clarity on the territory ceded to the Dutch in the treaty of 1766. Had he exercised Some patience, he WOuld hawe foLunditunnecessary to reproduce a passage from his paper to demonstrate my lack of comprehension. The confusion, a5 had indicated, li85 in".„ard Some of the border territories" as described by K.M. de Silva, and the LS of "districts" and "Batticaloa, Trincomalee with the places appertaining thereto", in Bell's translation of the treaty quoted by me. If one has made up one's mind that the East Was nearly always the homeland of the Sirhalese Withår urfortumale Coastal presence of Muslims and Tamils, very Tuch like a blight Or lhe surface, the diference bECOMės irrigwamt.
If, on the other hand, one allows these people the benefit of a history, and traditions going back several centuries that are deeply rooted in the land, then the (difference beCOITig5 alimportant. For example, the longobser'Wed ʼLaWS & CLIsta}T1s' in 1Ւit: Warriats ThäTıpalakāmam, Cottiar and Kalt Lukula mpāttu (wide H.W. Tambiah) hawe KOMÉSwaram Temple as their focus. Thus, if orie talks of Trinçomalee With places appertaining thereto' it is quite Something else.
Kingship in Ceylon, as | understand it, was a highly Sophisticated institution Whose legilirmacy depended om respecting, Supporting and Sustaining the local traditions, Customs and the individuality of the different provinces that were, in an important sense, sovereign territories. There is a strong hint of this in the reception and
popinZro —
distribution of Bosaplings during the reign of Devanampiya Tissa, and Was very much part of the psychology of Kandyan kings. If bOrdär demascalion involwed Carwing Up indiwidual Waminiates. the Kandyan authorities Would hawe beëṁ Very reluClärt to be part of it, and this may explain, in part, their refusal to co-operate, Academic enterprise that seeks to deny a section of the people thë right to their history also needs to, as a corollary, do the office of kingship in Ceylon, the grave injustice of rendering it Crude and vulgar, merely focussing or military prowess and giant tanks.
Prof. K. M. da Silva, qualifies his respect for The Broken Palmyrah, a book I had the privilege of co-authoring, by adding that its positive attributes Could not hawe COME froTi Tie. Our motivation for writing the book was to document and discuss how the Ordinary people Coped with the forces ranged against thern, My OWr interest in history has little to do with kings, nations, races, treaties between pOWEers, the greatard tha good, ln y recentarticles tried lo explore how people lived in this COLNitry a Tid [articularly in the East. What tried to show was that the story was complex, intertwined, but also having Continuity, aCCOmrodation and a Sls Ing respeCl lor träditiOS. Far from putting forward ethnic clainTIS, mime was a plea lo respË C1 and preserwe 1 hig healthier and pluralistic aspects of the pas, Ick) feelangry When Scholars with little fggling for how people lived and died in the East, in Went a history | ha | is Concomitant with the ideology of the government of the day. I also feel was right to expressit,
For the rest, the reader is best left to make his own inquiries and judge between what K.M. de Silva är Idrothers hawe Writtem, and whal | hawe Written. The issLucas are themselves too important to be Side-trackedard perSCaliSedinto Orgs between ProfeSSOr K. M. de Silva and Ore Mr. Hoole.
Rajan Hoole
Air-MI, 99

Page 7
THE PREMA
A
READING Mr Jinendra Basnayake's reply (Premadasa, A Third Path -- Counterpoint Jan/Feb '95) to Our Lanka Guardian Series, "The Crisis of Alternatives and the Second and a Half Road" was an extremely bewildering and humbling experience. Bewildering, because Wading through Mr Basnayake's masterpiece was like being lost in a maze of Words: humbling, because it forced us to a realization of the gross inadequacies of Our vocabulary and Cognitive process.
Even after much
Herculean labour we only
Succeeded in understanding the general drift of Mr Basnayake's reply. Firstly, the unknown gentleman doesn't like US (but are we'local Marxists', 'bOurgeois intellectuals' Or'petty bourgeois apologists"?). Secondly, he is no fan of President Premadasa (who is oft castigated as a 'reactionary populist).
That moment of clarity apart, we found Ourselves in a most unenviable position, similar to that of the unfortunate Sisyphus - - the more We read the more unintelligible the article became. To mix historical metaphors, We have finally met our
R E J
Waterloo.
We reproduce the following sentences from Mr Basnayake's reply, picked at random (one from each page) for the purpose of securing the sympathy of Our readers for Our predicament: "Illustrating the prevalent
superficial tendency, the authorS extract a re. cleansed economic VerSiOn Of "Premadasism' in a Western Marxist flavour of flirting with idealism and punctuating history". (p. 36) "Dissolving continuity and
evolving nature of society, the interruption of history is fundamental to the benevolentpositioning of Premadasa". (p. 37) "To retaliate any
Opposition against State repression was an enduring elaborate system of patronage". (p. 38) Not having the powers of the Delphic Oracle, the deciphering of Mr Basnayake's reply is a
task that is completely
beyond us. We therefore mosthumbly request Mr Basnayake to translate his article into simple (intelligible) English, thereby providing uS an opportunity and replying it.
Counte
April-May 1995

ASA PATH
Since facts and figures speak louder than mere Words, We WOuld like to end this brief note with Some Statistics which can be of assistance in understanding the impact of Premadasa's propeople programmes.
distribution became more equal (the best performance in 12 years). it should also be noted that the relative income of the richest segment of the populace declined, from 49.3% in 85/86 to 40.58% in 90/91. A this
Income Distribution
Decile 85/86 90/91
LOWest 0.4 Second 1.10 Third 2.0 Fourth န္တိမ္ပိ 3.6 魏 Highest (10th) . Gini Coefficient (Source: Dé! of censusé Statistics)
This clearly proves that a real and tangible improvement in the living standards of the poorest
demonstrates that during the Premadasa years a significant redistribution of income in favour of the poor took place - a clear
segments of Society took indication of the SUCCeSS place during the of the Premadasa Premadasa Years. The policies. significant improvement in A number of other the Gini C0efficient indicators Confirm this demonstrates that income trend.
Unemployment Aate 1973 7879 8182 8586 93(
14.5%
32.1%. 20.7%. 14.2% 19.5%
(Source: Sri Lanka LabourForce Survey)
point

Page 8
参姆示 封 Ĥ| || 雅|遗言, 魔毯雕驾 邻三虾姆三趾 榕三 鹰 及三野 |-E: 一) 와 LLI sosシ 三笠舰三明 三虾助三贩 ŋ 脚注言魏 圈概三磁
巨言
ёr Fiлалce & Socio Eсололт/с5илгиgy t
ZFé SFZá
& South Economic Survey, Depic
2urforce
Count
 
 

三
ܒܫܒܬܐ
| - LF Survey 三甲
95
869%三
array Ei
"f Census and Statistics)
What all this data conclusively . proves is that the living standards of the Lankan people in general and the poor in particular irTipTOWed significantly during the PETladaSa period, thereby Causinga decisiwer reversal of the negative trend evident during 81/82-'85/86. Since these improvements C0Luld not hawe COTITenCed during the turbulent period of '87-89 (and in fact it is. seasonable to aSSUThe that the situation deteriorated even further) it is obvious that the turning point Cane during the Premädasa
period as a direct result of his Warious pro-people programmes.
It is important to bear in mind the Context in Which these impressive improvements took place - - i.e. in the aftermath of Se Weral years Of War in the North East ad thig Popotist JWP's bloody and destructive attempt at capturing power, both of Which caused Colossal damage to the Country and the economy. We must also remember that these improvements took place in a wery short time- Within the space of about 4 years. It's a performance that is remarkable by any international standards.
These irrefutable statistics clearly prove that our article Was "mot am attempt al romanticising the reactionary past" (one of the Tiany accusations levelled against us by Mr Basnayake) but a neCeSSary attemptat analysing and understanding the most pro-people and pro-poor experiments not only in this country but also in the rest of the dependent capitalist Third World. We challenge Mr Basnayake (and others of his ilk) to provide an example of a more Successful attempt at Creating alternative (pro-people, pro-poor) development strategies anyWhere in the nonSocialist Third World.
Tisaranee Gunasekera 8 Dayan Jayati|leka
April-May 1995

Page 9
One yearmore for
Waruna Karunatilake
THEthird and perhaps the most crucial phase of the Eelam war has begun with a "bang". The LTTE as usual appears to be holding all the aces, at least at the start of hostilities while the military and the Government were caught flat footed once again.
The crucial differences in this phase of the war-perhaps it'll go down in history as "Eelam War 3" - is that now the LTTE is a fullyfledged conventional military machine. In Eelam War 1 from 1981 to 1987 the LTTE as well as the numerous other Tamil militant groups were mere guerrilla forces engaging in hit and run operations against the Army. The armed forces had total control over the air and much of the sea. The militants did use sea routes to operate from their bases in Tamil Nadu but had no offensive capability in the air or sea. Although the militants controlled most of the North after the Army was sent back to barracks during the 1985 ceasefire, the militants failed to overrun a single camp and did not pose a serious threat of being able to push the military out of the North altogether. Their weaknesses were exposed by Operation Vadamarachchi when then Brigadier Denzil Kobbekaduwa and Colonel Wijaya Wimalaratne broke through the LTTE defences and recaptured the area in just seven days with 3000 troops. The Navy and the Air Force gave the Army an edge which the militants could not counter.
In the face of the massive firepower of the Indian Army the LTTE again was essentially a
guerrilla force fro 1990. In Eelam. W r' velopment wa fledgling sea-arm. using suicide cadr armed fast speed major threat to the of the seas. Thereb it was crucial tc Government's nav, they were topusht the Northern thea was to block the N move freely and logistical lines to camps in the Nor food and milita
necessary to mair the North are tran Operation Balaveg Elephant Pass arm
-- the single bigg carried out by thei have been imposs total dominance C air.
The importa attaches to this w the blowing up of in Trincomalee
Anri-Marv 1995
Counte
 

Cover Story
nilitary offensive
h late 1987 to r 2 the main ; the LTTE'S The Sea Tigers es and heavily boats posed a Navy's control ls realised that counter the Il dominance if he Army out of tre. Their aim avy's ability to threaten the the military th. 90% of the ry hardware tain troops in sported by sea. aya to save the y camp in 1992
announcing their pulling out of the peace process. While every single war expert was predicting
that the Navy would be the first
target in Eelam War 3, the sheer incompetence of the Navy itself to move quickly to secure its ships in the harbours of Trincomalee and Kankasanthurai surpassed all other disasters in the war. The Navy can be thankful that the two otherships anchored close by were not also targeted and that an alert sentry prevented a similar attack taking place in KKS. If the Navy continues in its incompetent manner it will not be long before the Navy Commander will be commanding a land-based navy. The sinking of the two ships and one just before the cessation of
est sea-landing lilitary--would ble without the the sea and the
ce the LTTE as indicated by wonavalships ithin hours of
hostilities has weakened the Navy but certainly not crippled it. − The Navy has lost half of its fleet costing over a billion rupees since the Sea Tigers were formed. The psychological damage done to the confidence and morale of the sailors who were already shaken by a series of successful suicide
pointн

Page 10
attacks on their ships would have a more lasting effect. Whatis most worrying is that none of the top rankers in the Navy has distinguished himself during this crisis. Although there are some bright prospects at the level of Captain there is nothing much to chcocosc from wher it cabilmes to appointing area commanders. In these circumstances there is little evidence that the Navy will bounce back from the recent reversals and come up with new tactics to counter the LTTE threat and take the fight to the rebels,
When the Peace process began in September 1994 the military had only one Inajor advantage - its control of the air -- and that advantage was crucial for the Army in both defensive and offensive situations. This airpower was so effective that the LTTE was forced to launch its attacks on camps in the night when the Air Force was grounded due to the lack of night capability. Throughout the entire Eelam War 2 period the Air Force did not, for reasons best knownto themselves, acquire night-fighting capability. However, the LTTE which, unlike the military, plans ahead taking into consideration the threat factor of each force, has in a single incident (whether one cor two planes were shot down by missiles is still being debated by the Air Force) evened the scale to such an extent that it is the military that is facing the biggest crisis since the war began.
The damage caused by the blowing up of the Avro has many dimensions. Among those killed were the two most capable officers in the Air Force-Group Captains Roger Weerasuriya and Shirantha Gunetillake. Roger Weerasuriya was the Northern Area Commander and Shirantha Guinetillake was deputy to Wing Connlaider Sunil Cabral who left the Air Force in disgust after being overlooked for promotion by the former Air Force Commander. It
8
was Sunil Cabo out the strategy in all operatiot General Kobbek Cabral as the b] Force had. The commanded abs their pilots, a c when undertal operations such the Jaffna Fort dı 1991. Their im effectiveness oft be gauged whe military equate til the deaths Kobblickaduwa Wimalara tine, T unlike the Navy, off in this respect lumber of offi potential to repla Gagan Bula this: Jayampathу, Gurusingha are leaders who are cri potential. Howev have the exper maturity to appointments yet The Air Force I with its biggest cri: of its best officers. military still does the type of miss attacksaysa lot ab intelligence agenci have a clue that even acquired Imissies. This intelligence failur to the Air Force I in place to counter has been common a long time that doing its best to a and the Air Forces a counter plan re The argument th funds available i buy weapons fore is true, but what c. is that the Air F come up with a operation whenre not cost money to forward planning
Cante

who mapped or the Air Force conducted by uwa who rated st Iran the Air three officers ute respect from ucial ingredient ng dangerous s the landing in ring the seige of ortance to the e Air Force call in some in the eir loss to that of of General and Brigadier he Air Force. s slightly better because it has a cers with the e these officers. nhala, Kapilaard Ranil all squadron 2dited with most er, they do not ience and the hold crucial
how has to deal is without three The fact that the not even know le LIScd in the ut the country's as which did not the LTTE had anti-aircraft disastrous is only second thaving a plan such a threat.It. knowledge for the LTTE was quire missiles, ould have had dy years ago. with limited is difficult to 2ryeventuality mes as a shock "Ce had never an to put into uired. (Itdocs o a little bit of The Air Force
oil -
should have worked out possible scenarios and counter plans for each of these scenarios with the necessary weapon systems and Possible buying sourcesidentified. In fact, as the Interview with Air Wice Marshall Harry Gunalilleke the Air Force did know about the missile-threat but did nothing about an urgent secret repeat fur overl 'years before sending it to the Defence Ministry. Instead, the country gets an Air Force Commander speaking flawed Sinhala putting on a pathetic per formance on national television. If the performance was to calm the nation and give confidence, the result was the exact opposite.
The problem for the Air Force is that there are no quick-fix solutions to the problem. The ideal solution would be to have ground-based radar monitoring missile launchings and have all the aircraft and the helicopters equipped with anti-missile defences. No doubt the sheer cost of these systems would hamper the Air Force which will be forced use less expensive and less effective methods such as drooping aluminium shauss (heated metal) and firing magnesium flares to divertheatseeking missiles. The most effective counter to the missiles as far as helicopters are concerned is to fly low and carry out certain manoeuvres, but when flying low helicopters are vulnerable to small arms fire and .50 heavy machine guns. The five zeros were the main anti-aircraft weapons used by the LTTE which introduced antiaircraft cannon during the Elephant Pass seige. These weapons have not been not used since that operation.
The sorry state the Air Force is in today is due to the lack of forward planning. The Air Force has only been interested in acquiring more and more planes and helicopters from whatever source possible without takinginto account its structure or conducting
April-May 1995

Page 11
any kind of study into the future threat factors. This, after all, is the same Air Force which bought Chinese built F-7 Supersonic intercepters in 1990 to defend our air space when the military was involved in a major war within the country. Once the planes were ordered and delivered -- just like Air Lanka's air buses -- no one could explain why 1970s generation intercepters were
bought without even weapons
systems. It is ironic that the same unarmed 'planes which were supposed to scare away the ultramodern fighter aircraft of the Indian Air Force are now being used as bombers in the Eelam War and the Sri Lankan government is trying to get military help from India - the once perceived enemy against whom millions of dollars were spent to buy intercepters (unless of course in the eyes of the Air Force the planes were to counter a possible invasion from the Maldives).
While both the Navy and the Air Force are struggling to face the new challenges, the Army is perhaps the only force of the three that came out of the peace talks with little damage done. Compared to the ground situation in June 1990 when the LTTE effectively controlled the entire North and East and the Army was scattered in the South, today the Army has been affected only marginally. The Army did not have to give up any areas it controlled before the ceasefire in the North or East although the LTTE was able to infiltrate hundreds of cadres into the East and re-establish their camps in the jungles. The LTTE will continue to be restricted to guerrilla tactics in the East and the Army willstabilise the area sooner than later.
However, it is in the North that
the LTTE will fully exploit its newly acquired conventional military capability. With antiaircraft missiles keeping the Air Force at bay and the Sea Tigers
harassing the cadres have ami of not only overcamps but also f occupy those are the Army in the The military wil and for the next to launch rescue Elephant Pass Pooneryn in 199. Army will be defend their p Peninsula and offensive on Jaff a minimum of s
The Arm depending armoured fier
and battle through LTTI the speed of Out manOeuv will have to diyo SeaSO beginning Q) before thinkin Such an offe time the Air I to get their because air
crucial få
ofје
longer.
The Governm little choice butt arms purchase wanted for such face of oppositi to any weapo peace talks wer Government mounting critic quarters for not while discus government w pushing for p should not jeop although it disadvantage i again. It is to
April-May 1995
Соит

lavy, the LTTE ch better chance unning military r the first time to as captured from affna Peninsula. be hard pressed fear or so unable operations like in
in 1992 . Moreoever, the hard pressed to ositions in the he all-importent na itself will take ix months if not
y which is I on track SOnnel CarrierS tanks to rip 2 defences and the armour to 're the LTTE
wait for the in -- at the
February -- g of launching nsive. By this orce will have act together cover will be or Such an
Sive.
ent certainly had o delay the crucial s that the forces an offenive in the n from the LTTE is buying when on. Although the is now facing ism from various preparing for war Sing peace, a hich is seriously eace cannot and rdise such moves is at a major war breaks out he Government's
terpoint
and,
VOver Story I
credit that it did not give in to LTTE pressure to withdraw the Pooneryn camp and allow its cadres to carry arms in the East. If those two concessions had also been given the ground situation would have been much much worse. However, what it had done is to delay an offensive on the peninsula. The Army will need at least six to eight months to take delivery of the new equipmentand train soldiers to use them. It will also need a couple of months to put these in place in camps in the peninsula for the operation. If the clock is ticking now it will still be later this year that the Army will
be ready for such an offensive. By
then the Northeast monsoon would have set in. The Army which is depending on track armoured personnel carriers and battle tanks to rip through LTTE defences and the speed of the armour to out manoeuvre the LTTE will have to wait for the dry season -- at the beginning of February -- before thinking of launching such an offensive. By this time the Air Force will have to get their act together because air cover will be crucial for such an offensive. Without fear of air strikes the LTTE will not find it difficult to take on the tanks and the APCs with their rocketpropelled guns and landmines.
Essentially, then, the Army will be carrying out a holding operation in the North for the next year or so while regaining control over the East. To do that the Army has to have their most experienced officers in the field and not in the South, pushing paper. Brigadier Anton Wijendra, considered by many as the best field commander after Generals Kobbekaduwa and Wimalratne is now the Commandant of the Military Academy. Brigadiers Lohan Gunewardene, Shantha Kottegoda, Wasantha Perera, Angammana and - Sarath Munasinghe are all in Colombo. The only officer of brigadier rank

Page 12
Summary of security Forces Pe North/East from 19
三
Years Army S Navy
SS KIA SWIAS MIA SKIÁ Si981.S 3 SO S O
三n三 蠶量 를를 0. 三“三 三 1984 ན་ག་ས་ག་ས་ག་ས་ག་ས་ག་ལ་ 25ག་ག་ང་། 0 3 ¬ ܢ¬ܢ 1985 St.00 S72 S16
S. 1986萱78彗6
1987 S231 S184
理를행를 g를35를g출5 1990 469 S476 S182 S 17
1992 S975 S1060 S48 S.20
உ 1993 S605 Si293 S282S28
1994 Si78S 558 S7 S10.
-
390 112
TE 巨 SES 琵
三 エ三エー ... SKIA SWIAS MIAS KIA = |理를李를
1983S 選義奏 O 1984 S67 S55S- O
ss 1986 S 42 18O == S0
1987 STS-108 SS 16 1988 S28 S18 S3 S4
1989 S-53 S 32 S 3 S2O
萎三 三、三 1990SS 438SS 113S O 1991 S-49 s 69 S15 三斋三 ______ - ܐ - ܒ -
----
1993 S57 S45 S-SO 翡彗邸 1995 S4S5 S1-S-
.54 ܬ ܒܓܒ ܩܛ
三汞三 .¬.¬÷¬ 5 구
11165 910 12 68.
--OoIInfι
 
 
 

rsonal, Civilians and Casualties 81 to 26 April 1995
SAir Force SE-WIA ES MIA BIS KIA SES WIA ESE MIA
, is
30 - 65 82 - T 82 106 6 6 0 三33 24 S3 2s. SO
.¬¬ 21 巨 - 크
三 -- 255 S 130 Si21 S-103 O - ...ܕ ܥ ܒܪܡܬܐ ܒ -- - 一 |-
조 三 HomeGuards S
SS WIA ES MIA SE KIA SES WIA
O O O EO OSO O OSO
O OSO O 0 0
ܒ ܕ ܒ
를
3.
6
三 三 ==
---- 크 8
O 3. SE 6 O 0S 9 s5 S5
-드----I
1. ¬ ¬ܕ ¬.; OS 179 S29 S5
April-May 1995

Page 13
with vast field experience in the battle area is Brigadier Sarath Fonseka who is out of favour with the current military leadership because of his close links to the former Army Commander General Waidyaratne. It is true that all these officers have served in the battle zoneduringmostofthelast 11 years.
Yet, theirexperienceandtherespect
themenhave for them will becrucial if the Army is to come through the next difficult 12 months. Another crucual aspect of the "Eelam War 3" will be whether the Army could bury its internal factional fighting and unite as a fighting force. Whether the Army Commander General Gerry de Silva can rise above this plague that has affected the effectivenes of the Army for over a decade will be closely watched. The forced retirement of General Algama can only be
excused if it will unify the Army.
Otherwise, the retirement of the general who has proved that he can deliver (whether one agrees on the cost is a different argument) will only weaken theability of the Army
to counter the LT indications are goi offensive to push North.
The LTTE has to 12 month windo the military is re-a to achieve this obj new ships are d
IT is indeed ironic processover the the resumption intolved ina clt Government in ceasefire. The C Balapatabendi, Military Spokes Defence, and Committee was strategy. Specif localandforeig and allied area Secretariat but
finally a cast
Counte
April-May 1995
 
 
 
 
 

TE who by all Navy and the Air Force is ng for an all out equipped with anti-missile them out of the systems and the Army had taken delivery of new equipment, the make use of the scale will be back in the favour of w it has before the military. Therefore, one can rmed and ready expect the LTTE to take maximum ective. Once the advantage of their current elivered to the superiority.
that some of those who had been livewires in the peace 'past three months, and who have gone on record to say that t of the war is only a temporary setback to peace, were indestine committee entrusted with the taskofassisting the its war effort, hardly a week after the LTTE violation of the ommittee which was headed by Presidential Secretary, Mr. included Dr. Jayadevaluyangoda, Mr. Charles Abeyesekera, man BrigadierSarathMunasinghe, the Assistant Secretary, the Additional Secretary, Presidential Secretariat. The mandated to coverallaspects of the warother than military icareas of concern to the committee were propaganda, both 1, political matters, psychological operations, rehabilitation is. The committee met a few times at the Presidential has since been superseded by other committees, and is now natters pertaining to the Rehabilitation of the East. Is it all's well that ends well, since no one can complain about
ಜಪಣಾ 2 Theinescapablefact, however, that oponents of peace were, even for a sho s a telling indictment on our times.

Page 14
Srilankan airman
CP: What is yourassessnerit of the current situation? What do o tirkis rostirporta "If about the receif developments. particularly with referenice fo fie NorfII-Est:
HG: I would start off by calling this Eelam War 111 which is going to end at the very least with the containment of the LTTE or it's going to be Eelam.
CP. This firears fif you don't agree with tlı dose vrlo believe til at tre LTTE is interess tard ir sa Ilir rifer yr Ural, a Prad tlı saf a full-scale var is not in freir interesf. HG: Events hawe proved that position wrong even from Thimpu days. The LTTE let down J.R Jayewardene in Thimpu (Interestingly, JR's brother was involved in that, and I don't know how he came to be there). . . . Then we had the Perhadasa episode for 14 months up to June 1990. Then we have this young lady [sic] who of all of them has done the most towards this peace process and it is clear even to the international community that she went every inch of the way for peace.
CP: Now, the charge levelled by many is that she had no backing eiffier in her Cabinetor in the Party. Do you agree with fΗίς μήριμP
HG; She took the limelight, and as Executive President she had to, ... And I think she believed so firmly that the peace process would work, so in that sense she did not pay too much attention to what others had to
Harry GL former, COrr7 mar7de
of Wing C Si'ar Gur
WaS among ir1 tk7e - SAM Or7 tiK7e Segco AVRO plane
say. She saw her Presidential Elec mandate for pea itas also a mand but more so a de a corrupt regime power for 17 yea misread that sig Certain extent sll that was it the
–Coumf
2
 

oresees his death?
Jrnatilleke, Air FOF"Ce
and father Ommander a tieke WK7O t105e Kied ris Sile attack Pld Air Force on April 29th.
62% wote at the tion as a ce, whereas I see ate for peace sire to get rid of : that was in rs. She probably hala bit....To 2 was right but only reason that
зrpoint
Governments are changed. . .
CP: On the other hand, do you feel that the reside it of the Cabir ef ger L'e her ardaergrate sapport, or were they shiffling their feet?
HG: The Test of the Cabinet Wanted her to be very cautious, but probably having got this II lessage acToss to her indirectly
they stayed very quiet. I don't think that they were allowed to play a role in the peace process. After all, who was it who went to the North für negotiations? It was said that "President's pals went." No Ministers were allowed. ... I am sorry to say this but the right people didn't go. . . . Ta III liilchelwam, for instance, is supposed to be a military strategist as well as a political strategist. Who is the military strategist who welt for the three rounds of talks? As I Said, there were actors and bankers and architects -- and I have no doubt that they a Te very good in their professions -- but I don't think that they know much about the war,
HG: You see, by апу standards anywhere in the world the LTTE is a formidable force. So you can see the kind of enemy that you are facing.... But given the right equipment and the right training and things fall into place -- and there is the time factor also here, these things can't be done overnightthey can get the better of the LTTE. Of course, I know that if there's an all-out war tomorrow they cannot win it because they are not ready. They are six months behind in preparation
April-May 1995

Page 15
for war because of the talks. As you know there was a major offensive planned for October last year, but he previous regime was not interested because it was election time, and this regime felt that it had a mandate for peace. As a result the services also became complacent. The theme during the peace talks was "if you are attacked defend yourself" or, at most, limited operations.
I am a great believer that attack is the best form of defence, so when the orders are not to jeopardize the peace process, our chaps would see these fellows roaming around but they couldn't do anything. CP: At the same time how does one protect against atrocities by the Forces?
HG: As you know I have talked about my four stage plan, of which I have made public the first three stages. . . . Certainly, I am not a war-monger. I firmly believe that war is a last resort, but if you go to war it has to be with a vengeance. If I am put in charge of all operations I will ensure that there is no question of attacks on civilians or reprisal attacks like those that happened in Batticaloa recently. The Tamil civilians must be safeguarded. The Tamil and the Terrorist are two entirely different things. I am only going after the terrorists. Because they people can be used as a human shield we've got to put our thinking caps on and ensure that lives are protected. Residual attack from bombing and so on cannot be helped in war.
We still have the international community with us, but if there's reprisal attacks - just because a comrade has died you go and destroy a village - that has to stop. There is no question of allowing those to take place. I would even advocate field court martials on the spot as a deterrent. . . .
But in ter hypothetic you were t to get att among th where the i not allowed if its only a the hou destroyed ti bad, but if lives are at call off the and think
i meth
CP: To be agai attacks is fairly about the more a argument from s probability or ea the hypothetical there's a commu. know there are t LTTE cadres hid twenty youth an because you don 20 are the Tigers
HG: If you knc say, in which the hiding, and if th protection by the are 20 others, yo through leaflets saying "get out o we're coming the because we're go this house"If yol an office or that for terrorist activ appeal to them t surrounding are:
CP: The proble will not be allou
HG: This is a p plan which I can later.... But that situation can be has to be a state you a really wan there's only one to be a political c
Counte
April-May 1995

ms of the al case, jf o say that hese three 2 twenty,
nocent are to go, and question of e being
ats mot so the other stake, then
operation, Jfanother 1od.
inst reprisal safe. What videspread tatistical pediency? Take ! case uhere nity which you wo or three ing. You arrest 'd kill then 't which of the
ow the house,
Tigers are sy're getting
fact that there u need to appeal and what not f the place, re. Please go ing to destroy u know that it's t's being used ity. You need to ) leave the
. . . . m is that they ved to leave. art of my battle only talk about
kind of ackled, but it idecision. ... If t to solve this way, but it has lecision. . . . But,
Straight Talk
in terms of the hypothetical case, if you were to say that to get at these three among the twenty, where the innocent are not allowed to go, and if it's only a question of the house being destroyed that's not so bad, but if the other lives are at stake, then call off the operation, and think of another method. But that's exactly what I have a plan for - to get over the LTTE using the Tamils as hostages or human shields which, however, I can only reveal later. . . .
You see, it is very important to keep this image we have earned with the international community which will help us in the long run.
CP: Also the image among the ordinary people that this Sinhala government unlike the others is genuinely interested in their welfare. ...
HG: I think the Tamil people know ... that the best chance for a just peace is through her. She has worked so hard. ... So probably there is a little bit of disappointment among the Tamil community with that the LTTE is not making an effort to talk with Chandrika who believes so passionately in peace.
CP: What about the atrocities and reprisals that have been reported in the East, then? And the bombings?
HG: The atrocities have been only in the recent past, from April 19th. There have been a couple of incidents, and if this is true it should not be allowed to happen, whatever the provocation or the pressure. It should be firmly controlled.... Actually, you see, I don't know that we have the accuracy for pinpoint bombing. The Chinese F7s which are being used is like using asledgehammer to kill a fly. For large concentrations of bunkers and so on it can be deadly, but not for strafing. After all, they fly at Mark 1
rpoint
I3

Page 16
speed (above the speed of sound) at an altitude of about 15,000-20,000 feet. ... One thing you need to remember about the reprisal attacks is the psychology of the persons responsible. I think that one of the crucial factors in the past is the view held by the soldiers that "the Government is not concerned about us so we must take care of ourselves. We must protect our lives at ny cost." The way th - themselves isby razing tne surrounding villages to the ground. If they can see a proper plan, if the can seen a direction, if they can see the light at the end of the tunnel, this sort of thing will be minimsed. You ask the soldiers to be in the bunkers at night, and tell them if you are attacked defend yourself: surely, that's an idiotic philosophy?
CP: There are many who believe that it is impossible to even begin meaningful devolution and so on while Jaffna is held by the LTTE, particularly from the point of view of the morale and living conditions of the Tamils resident there. What do you feel about this? Do you think that the taking of Jaffna is crucial to solving this crisis?
HG: Yes, the dislodging of the terrorists from Jaffna is crucial and also feasible, and this is where I am proposing a plan. ... CP: What about the political package?
HG. As I said in my four stage plan. The first is about the defence structure which I have spoke bout elsewhere; the second is putting the country on a war footing. The third one is that the political package must be announced to the Tamil people, and the international community. The international community could then force the LTTE to discuss this by bringing world opinion to bear on them. . ... If the package is good all
My respons left battle p military för years, since and nothing , it, so let the and say what plans are. The talk about b and Secret there's nothing don't think t
want to know
details,
moderate Tamils - CP: Is it the cas
that peace is inim LTTE? The LTTE peace, can they?
HG: This is wha Chandrika has ex LTTE. JR didn't ex Prabhakaran, nor Premadasa. Butsł this man as a war. not a peace-mong world community seems him that wi CP: What do yo of Mr. Thondama about Mr Prabha freedom fighter?
HG: I think that uncalled for.
CP: In terms of plan, would you f government for nc implementing nun country is not on
HG: The Gover show the business international com: things are not so b business is as usu
Counter
14
 
 
 
 

's that we ns to the he last 13 luly 1983, S come Qf come Out hese battle : es a lot Qf title plans lans, but
concrete. I at people operational
when the joing to be how long afore this ngS peace |
must say so. e, however, ical to the can't cope with
t I say. In fact posed the pose
did le has exposed monger and r. . . . The also now
y. I think, then, 's statement aran being a
t was quite
our four stage ult the
ver tuvo? The war-footing.
ment WantS tO nd the unity that d, that
life is going
pint
on. The UNP government did the same thing. ... In trying to get across that image they can't put the country on a war footing, but I think that this is a mu St.
I am not asking that my plan be the only one considered, but even if Sey reject my plan they must have a plan. The people and the military want to see light at the end of the tunnel. ... You are also asking the same question, "What next?"
The Deputy Defence Minister said that there was a secret plan. We don't want to know the details since this is obviously a military matter, but tell us whether this is going to finish in three months, three years, or thirty years! They owe it to the people, the fighters, our men. 4300 men have died; 1200 IPKF people from another country have died. We have 20,000 casualties and the IPKF had 3000. Of the 20,000 casualties 10,000 have lost a limb at least. Ata wedding I met a service chief, whose name I won't mention, and he had heard about my battle plan. He said, "battle plans are best done by us." My response is that we left battle plans to the military for the last 12 years, since July 1983, and nothing has come of it, so let them come out and say what these battle plans are. There's a lot of talk about battle plans and secret plans, but there's nothing concrete. I don't think that people want to know operational details, but they have a right to know when the secret plan is going to be launched and how long will it take before this secret plan brings peace to this country.
CP: On the other hand there's irresponsible reporting which endangers lives, like the account which mentioned that a top level team would fly out the next day to investigate the first Avro crash, on which your son
April-May 1995

Page 17
was to serve. They would surely have been sitting ducks, then, if the LTTE had SAM capability. HG: You are right. My son was the President of the Court of Inquiry.... But I would not like to comment on what the Air Force Commander did. . . . Incidentally, I have with me a document written by my son before he died. A Top Secret Report where he had warned about the missiles in September 1993. He had said that they would use the missiles only on important targets such as those carrying top brass. I am waiting to call a press conference and give the details. He put up a paper and the Air Force took more than one year to refer this to the Defence Ministry. After October 1994 the Defence Ministry must take the rap for the inexcusable delay.
CP: What is India's role in this crisis?
HG: I have always maintained that there is an India Factor to this situation. I still remember Indira Gandhi's statement that India cannot remain unaffected by events occurring in Sri Lanka. To that extent there is an India Factor. The signs are better now than before, after Rajiv Gandhi's death, because Madras was a haven for the LTTE before this.. ... I went to the Madras University a few years ago to give a lecture tot he academic community on this issue, and when I mentioned that the Tamil Nadu people were sympathetic to the LTTE, and they said that I was wrong. After Rajiv Gandhi died this support had stopped. The sympathy factor for the LTTE has disappeared from Tamil Nadu after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, they said.
Let's face it. India has proscribed the LTTE, but Sri Lanka hasn't. A lot will depend on the case in Madras.... I don't think India would want a
terrorist organisa possession of mis backyard. No col want it, least of a CP: What do y story that the LT submarine?
HG: I find it ve believe.
CP: The increas technological cap LTTE is going to detrimental vis-a relationship to Ir
HG: Yes. If the story is true, Indi its way to help in defence, for insta control of the sea. up to a few mont there anymore. T LTTE is somewha the Indian coast, in these waters as maritime force bu still do it. They ar think, to 4 ships r Douglas Devanar telling the Gover shipload of arms April, and I know the LTTE was rea
For instance, talks that F had with t woman w responsibl Maradana
released Government.
be going for Busstand or Airport (This was recorded So it ha, disquietingly resonating t warming ofh; LTTE: know have to cr
psychology Colon
April-May 1995

tion in siles in her untry would l India. ou think of the TE has a small
ry difficultto
:e in the ability of the prove -vis their dia? submarine a will go out of
maritime nce. . . . The s that we had hs ago is not o this extent the at freer to visit but the Navy is
is the Indian ut the LTTE can e down, I
OW. . . . da has been nment that a came in around for a fact that dy with its
during the remadasa hem, the ho was 2 for the 2Omb was by the They could the Pettah maybe the
interview - On May 21,
been prophetic,
Straight Talk
missiles, the moment they trained on it and were ready, they resumed hostilities and began Eelam War 111. . . . Even the JVP was very quickly quelled because of air attacks using our helicopters which they did not expect and could not deal with, so air power has always proved crucial. . . .
CP: What about the LTTE having planes or gliders?
HG: I asked the Air Force Commander. He said they were apparently trying to clear a strip for taking off and landing. They were unable to confirm this. But it's not difficult after all, the Kilinochchi area has a lot of
jungle. ... If I were Prabhakaran
I would equip myself with suicide planes. You know in World War 11 the Germans attacked Britain very successfully. This may be what the LTTE is trying to do. ... Yes, they are ingenious militarily, but now they must be concerned about international opinion. If you can work on the Tamil people through the political package, informing them of it by dropping thousands and thousands of leaflets by air, so that it reaches every home in the North. Having created an international opinion in your favour, you now need to create a similar climate among the Tamil people. They are not allowed to receive any information from the state, they are somewhat brainwashed, so the only way you can do this is through airdrops.
CP: The LTTE seems to be paranoid about infiltration by the Indian RAW. What do you think about this?
HG: This may be possible but there's no way of knowing.... CP: What about the East? HG: It's a different ball game
here, and they don't have the
kind of hearts and minds control as they do in the North. Up to the time of the commencement
15

Page 18
of the peace talks they were to some extent sidelined in areas such as Batticaloa and Trincomalee town, in Amparai and so on, within a radius of 3-5 miles of the town areas the writ of authority of the Government prevailed unlike in Jaffna. But during the peace talks everyone knows what happened. They were asking to move around with their weapons but this wasn't allowed. Then they put up an LTTE camp between two Army camps. To that extent they got mileage during the talks. They were roaming all over the countryside with impunity.
CP: In fact, uavhen I uvas in Batticaloa Isaw the checking of Tamil civilians at the various checkpoints whereas armed LTTE cadres were allowed to move around guite freely. What an irony
HG: Quite right. If you were known to be an LTTE cadre you were allowed to proceed.
CP: What is the possible scenario for the future?
HG: If the LTTE is threatened in the North and the East, all they have to dois planta bomb in Colombo, like they did in Maradana. For instance, during the talks that Premadasa had with them, the woman who was responsible for the Maradana bomb was released by the Government. They could be going for the Pettah Busstand or maybe the Airport This interview was recorded on May 21, soit has been disquietingly prophetic, resonating the terrible warning of his son). The LTTE know that they have to create this psychology of fear in Colombo. So they may concentrate their entire effortin Colombo....This is why I suggested Vigilance Committees and so on.
CP: What about the harassment of Tamil civilians in the city?
HG: That should not happen
Iam Sayii because I hc lost one som another in the have a grea the warth because I har
at all. ... Localiz Committees can this sort of thing neighbourhoods themselves, but law into their ha have to do is rep persons, activity authorities.
CP: Any final hou the current handled?
HG: Well, I ha recommended til War Council wh partisan, and wł of the Oppositio member. In this people that here will be broughti mainstream of d ... A War Count that the country functioning. Aft Ca ceaseat, say, recommence at 4 must cut out the the ceremonies." many people, or who are willing
Count
 
 
 

gall this ve already and I have
Air Force. I er Stake in an others le tWO-SOnS. know that sidents and sters and
Army : and Navy and these ivilians have wain. SOif : that I am of emotion ue. It has with emotion e, its a ment.
ed Vigilance protect against ... Where
look after don't take the nds. All they ort suspicious or objects to the
Continents on crisis should be
ve he formation of a ich is nonere the Leader n too is a way, the 35% of presents too nto the ecision-making.
til doesn't mean
war effort, but who have not been asked to contribute their mite. For instance, I had two people who visited me during my bereavement who said that they wanted to help, one with repairing vehicles of the Forces and the other with any electrical work (he is an electrician), but they have no opportunity to do so. If you do not put the country on a war footing and enlist all the support that you can get, and have a carefully thought out plan, this ar will go on for another twelve years. ... Let me give you an example from World War 11 in England. The Queen who was then the heir to the throne was a driver with the fire brigade, I think. Each family had to give one member to the war effort. Not to the battle front, but to undertake civic jobs, like the Queen of England did. That was World War 11, and this is Eelam War 111 which is as deadly for us. 20% of our revenue budget is on defence. 30,000 civilians have died and so many soldiers.... 10,000 deserters is pretty high by any standard anywhere in the world, and they become lawless elements roaming the country... . An amnesty can help, but they
may come back on their own if
you put the country on a war footing and establish a plan which will end the war in a fixed timeframe. ... I am saying all this because I have already lost one son and I have another in the Air Force. I have a greater stake in the war than others because I have two sons. And I want to know that all these Presidents and Prime Ministers and potential Army Commanders and Navy
stops Commanders and these soldiers rall, activity and civilians have not died in 10 pm and vain. SO if people think that I .00am. You am talking out of emotion that's tamashas and not true. It has nothing to do here are so with emotion any more, it's a linary people, commitment.
o help in the
rpoint
April-May 1995

Page 19
The use of force
Vyasa
WITH Mr Prabhakaran's fateful decision of 19 April, the question of a just and durable resolution to the ethnic conflict without the further use of force, has to be answered. The Sri Lankan government has tried war and failed and now it has tried negotiations, direct, transparent and unconditional and failed again. It is now time to usemilitary force in the service of a generous political solution.
Indeed, the Government does not have many options and is very badly in need of a policy in the debris of Prabhakaran's decision and its own naivete. It is still committed to the peace process it initiated eight months ago and according to the Deputy Minister of Defence, it does haveaplanthat requires the greatest confidentiality, before it is unfolded in the near future.
Whatever the plan is, certain
factors should Government an crucial than a cog the political obje force. Quite simo services and the need to know wh for. Without a co: to that question solution to the Defeating the Ti; enough; defeatin to be a means tow to make sense a political solutio conflict to which principal obstacl Given the nai systematic p lackadaisicalimp characterised th approach to ne; period of six mo security forces a equipped to hai hard enough Prabhakaran negotiating table this is at , all
Counte
April-May 1995
 

vover Story
to share power
be clear to the
d none is more gent statement of ctives of military ply, the armed country at large atisbeingfought mpelling answer there will be no ethnic conflict. gers alone is not g the Tigers has fard an end if it is nd that end is a n to the ethnic the LTTE is the
e. vete, the lack of lanning and lementation that e Government's gotiations, for a nths at least the are woefully illmmer the LTTE
to force Mr back to the 2. And, that is, if
possible. The
commitment to the peace process and Colonel Ratwatte's secretplan -- for that is what it is in effect - will have to be taken on trust and good faith. It is a macabre Micawberish situation for the country to be in, but it seems to be what the Government expects of us in response to its Panglossian panacea.
In the meantime, Mr Prabhakaran will continue to wreak his deadly havoc and register daily fatalities in double figures as if it were a matter of course. With his missile capability and deadly resolve he is setting the agenda, literally calling the shots to force the Government into eventual massive retaliation as a faitaccompli. Hellbenton soaking the President's hands in innocent civilian blood, Mr Prabhakaran is keen to establish his hegemony over the Northeast in perpetuity. According to him, he has to fight to liberate his people against successive governments, who have gleefully demonstrated their
rpoint
17

Page 20
penchant for merciless military force, as opposed to generous powersharing.
Highly debatable, even patently untrue no doubt, but all the same, badly in need of being shown up unequivocally as such. In the six orso months that Mr Prabhakaran has as his military lead time, the Government has no option but to seize the political initiative.
This also means, the principles and package of powersharing apart, that thesecurity procedures outside the North are not conducted in a manner that is tantamount to humiliation or harassmentof Tamil citizens. Basic decency and civility must be observed in dealing with law abiding citizens who accept the need for vigilance against violence. It should not be forgotten that Tigerpropaganda and recruitment feeds off the spectacle of hapless civilians, manhandled and massacred, by officers of the Sri Lankan state. The state must always strive to be sensitive to the sensitivities of its citizens.
Federalism as the Way Out
This columnist argued, even before the PA President initiated the peace process, that the priority and measure of success of the whole exercise had to be agreement on the principles upon which peace was to be founded. This has always meant a recognition by the government in Colombo that there is an ethnic conflict and Tamil problem and that it could only be solved by genuine powersharing through a federal system of government. Everythingelse could follow from
this as the vital, essential core of a
settlement.
Unfortunately, we never got to this in the lasteightmonths. When the Tigers said they were ready, the Government did not seem to be and when the Government said it was, the Tigers were just not interested. Instead, they piled
precondition up confident th unacceptable oft in the resumption eSue the postponement c of a political solu Now is the Government tog political package to still persist that ought to peruse th it should becomr with a respond b it will be show political parties.( the Governmer engage in th explaining and support in the proposals. sig
The package federal and ther equivocation or account of somec or some ultra-co bank that will hou office. Let these there exist, con alternative that t find convincing. met head on in the conflict resoluti foremost a politic all battles, requir foresight.
Federalism will as the only mecha resolution an constitutional acceptable to the after all one of th agreement bar the Tamil groups, incl in their erstw conciliatory mom Federalism mu constitutional fra best prospects of united Sri Lanka. as well, as a framework that e powersharing al meets the demanc checksandbalanc so sorely lac governance. The
Counte
18

on precondition, t the most em would result of hostilities and indefinite the discussion tion.
time for the o public with its Were the belief Mr.Prabhakaran edocument first, hunicated to him y' date by which n to the other Dnce this is done, t will have to 2 exercise of rallying solid country for its
will have to be e should be no this point on hauvinist bogey inservative vote ind the IPA out of forces, such as he up with an he country will They should be e realisation that on is first and albattle and like es courage and
have to be sold tnism of conflict d the only formulation minorities. It is e few points of merger, that all uding the Tigers hile shrew dly ents, agree on. it be sold as the nework with the maintaining an It must be sold constitutional nsures genuine d accordingly sfor democratic is that have been cing in our point will have
to be made and must be made, time and time again, that federalism isn't going to facilitate secession. Secession has succeeded to the point of the stultifyingTiger quasi-state, because of the obsession with the unitary state and its encapsulation of majoritarian democracy.
Finally, it is only on the basis of a federal solution that fighting the Tigers without losing civilian supportin droves will be possible. It should not be forgotten that as of now no Sri Lankangovernment, including the present one, has offered the Tamil people anything meaningful in terms of a political or constitutional settlement of their grievances. Anyone who thinks the Thirteenth Amendment is meaningful should ask the President or read the UNP candidate's manifesto at the last Presidential Election.
Hawks and DOves
One can envisage a chorus of protest against the above approach from both right and left, hawk and dove, on many grounds.
The hawks will argue that there is no need to risk popular support in this hour of national crisis on a political package. And as far as a federal one is concerned, they will exclaim, that to nail one's colours to the dreaded F word" is simply idiotic and self-destructive. All energies must be concentrated on the military effort. The Tigers can be defeated militarily. There is a
military solution, if only the
military are allowed to pursue it unfettered. This is a cardinal assumption of the hawks along with the thesis that there is no ethnic conflict, apart from the transparent camouflage it provides Mr Prabhakaran's drive for hegemony.
The doves will intone that it is not the time, as yet. Of course, it is to apolitical solution that we must travel and a federal one to boot,
but there are other priorities in the
point
April-May 1995

Page 21
process of conflict resolution that must be first attended to. Somewhat chastened by their experience at the forefront of negotiations with Prabhakaran and his manifest disinclination to share in their belief in peace qua peace, the doves are looking, first and foremost, for a way out of war. There are good reasons too for this.
The use of force will entail civilian casualties and if the logic for the use of force is to hit Mr Prabhakaran hard to force him to the table, the greater these casualties. There is no assurance too of good behaviour on the part of the forces and no accounting for the political damage as well, that air strikes would wreak. Is it not better for the Government to investigate the prospects of a mediator and resume a dialogue with the LTTE, despite the resumption of hostilities?
The key question here, of course, is as to whether Mr Prabhakaran will agree to a resumption of negotiations. His outstanding demands are on the table and the very most the Government could concede now is to lift the embargo it reimposed in the aftermath of the resumption of hostilities. Moreover, it is unlikely that Mr Prabha karan will consider negotiations before he has fully exploited his military advantage. The dove position in the negotiations hinged on the argument that Mr Prabhakaran wanted peace and that if his psychological need for respect as the head of the quasi-state was fed, he would play ball according to mutually agreed ground rules. When this was dented, the argument was expanded to include the thesis that Mr Prabhakaran had to be trapped into accepting peace through negotiations.
There is a great deal of merit in this argumentif it is anchored in a realistic appreciation of the LTTE raison d'etre and raison d'etat. The
doves un fortun discover this on th and by then the ga be up, from Prabhakaran was the doves their were in the asc duration of the ta Prabhakaran trap Sut were insuffic about his determi Once he startec started believingt so because he alw The Governme. can talk about tal the same time. The theconclusion, ho now has to beami to the leverage ex peace process ba From the perspective, some parity will have The Government be ducking the ta Mr.Prabhakaran's intimidated b Prabhakaran, on must have milita secure in terms o and political goa civilian casualties the government f unilateral decisic makes no bloody The doves area on the horns of a the Government v position to its log they will beparaly and without a po
A National
The only cohe that of the 1 underpinned by a of a political obje one that makes true to the ci Northeast, in par in their interests a at large, as being interest. Therefo alternativebutto establish a federa
Counte
April-May 1995

Cover Story
ately began to he job, as it were, me was going to where Mr
sitting. To give due, since they endant for the lks, they had Mr ped into talking, iently solicitous nation to escape. i talking, they hathewas doing vays wanted to. nt and the LTTE king and fight at reis no escaping wever, thatthere litary dimension certed to put the ck on the tracks. Government's form of military to be restored. can't be seen to sk of countering missilesorbeing y them. Mr the other hand, ury objectives to f military camps als measured in s at the hands of orces. Orelse his on to go to war
sense. Salways, caught dilemma and if were to take their gical conclusion, ised into inaction licy.
COnSensus
rent position is use of force, and in the service ctive. It must be sense and rings vilians in the ticular, as being nd to the country in the national
ore, there is no
fight the LTTE to al Sri Lanka.
rpoint
Both the opposition UNP and the Tamil parties have to rally round the Government in this endeavour. They have to jettison fear and narrow partisan interest to achieve a truly national consensus on conflict resolution.
To this end, the President must restrain her naturalimpulse tolash out at her predecessors and their seventeen years of misrule. She must discipline herself to meet the profound challenge ahead. Were she to behave more like an embittered opposition politician than a statesperson, the greater the prospect of the UNP being silly as well. In this regard, the UNP proposal to move an impeachment motion against her on the grounds that her secretary negotiated under the Tiger flag, has all the makings of a puerile schoolboy attempt to get the headgirl when she is in trouble !
The position of some of the Tamil parties is unenviable, given the spectre of Tiger vengeance that haunts them. Easier said than done, but these are exceptional times. Moderate Tamil leadership must take the initiative and throw its weight, publicly, behind meaningful powersharing, if the Government is sensible and magnanimous. Tobetoosolicitous of LTTE sensitivities and ire and to take refuge in an argument about the proper time and circumstances now, will only impede the formation of a national consensus on conflict resolution.
The time has come for a sober assessment of what should be done. Difficult questions have to be confronted, entrenched prejudices critically reexamined in terms of their contribution to conflict resolution, and fear overcome. Our conflict is unique in many ways, but it has one thing in common with all others. It is inherently political. It cannot be resolved without the people or fought for any otherpurpose, than their liberation.
19

Page 22
Poll indicates opening political Settleme
THIS is a most interesting survey of publicopinionata crucial political juncture, and the nature of the districts considered would ensure thatitis, ifatall, skewed in favour of Sinhala respondents since the Jaffna, Vavuniya and Mannardistrictshave been left out. Given the obvious limitations spelled outin the survey report, therefore, this means that the general (Sinhala) public is less against the possibility of peace and a political settlement than is generally believed. A substantial of the public, it would appear from this poll, is still in favour of a negotiated peace, notwithstanding the visibility and outspokenness of the chauvinist lobby.
The change in the views held by respondents when compared over time indicates a significant decline since March 1995 in those who wish that the negotiations with the LTTE continue despite the unilateral breaking of the ceasefire by them. Even if one were to further reduce the percentage on account of the acceleration of hostilities and the increasing toll of casualties, there still remains over a fourth of the country that wishes to actively pursue a political solution. Moreover, the removal of the embargo on restricted items in January was endorsed by the respondents, contrary to whatissaid in the mainstream Sinhala press as general public opinion. Perhaps the most significant answer provided in the survey is in response to the question of the government's commitment and dedication vis-a- vis peace. Here 42% hold the view that the Government lacked commitment, while 49% thought that the Government acted appropriately. This implies that there was some responsibility on the part of the Government for the breakdown of the peace process; it indicates that nearly half the people
feel that there wi have been done other hand, the under no illusion the LTTE in th overwhelming 7 were trying Government, v thought that committed to pe: In summary, t
r
Of course, the drags On, and casualties, the option to win This polican be despite its limit and scope, to
the addressin Tamil grieva package of de urgent as ever b not be confu exigencies and
the Currer
that the public is to a negotiated set the renewed outl Hence, the imp political package as many political think. Even fur with the LTTE, different circums appear to be the a held to be. Of cou war drags on, ar casualties, the less to win public sup be read, theref limitations of timi a signal that th legitimate Tamil package of devolu everbefore, andm with theexigencie of the current con
Count
20

|s nt
is more that could ut the time. On the respondents are is as to the role of e process, as an 7% felt that they o deceive the while only 10% the LTTE was
Ce. nen, this indicates
longer the war the greater the ess likely is this Dublic Support.
read, therefore, ations of timing pe a signal that g of legitimate nces and the volution is as efore, and must Ised with the inevitabilities of it conflict.
not entirely averse tlementeven after preak of violence. lementation of a cannot be as taboo
analysts seem to her negotiations under drastically tances, does not nathema that it is rse, the longer the td the greater the likely is this option port. This poll can ore, despite its ng and scope,tobe e addressing of rievances and the tion is as urgent as ust not beconfused and inevitabilities lict.
г.
"Snapshot" Opinion Poll On the North-East issue (May 1995)
: THE following are the results of 5
questions from a "snapshot" Opinion Poll conducted by Research international (Pvt) Ltd
(RI), regarding public opinion on
the latest developments on the
North-East issue. Following our
islandwide (except Northern Province) policonducted in March 1995, we decided to do this
"snapshot" poll to see the trendin publicopinion regarding the North
East issue after the violation of
the cessation of hostilities by the
LTTE on April 19, 1995,
This poll was conducted in major
cities in all districts except the districts in the Northern province. In this report we analysed data in the following districts: Colombo, Kalutara, Kandy, Matale, Niya, Galle, Hambantota, Kurunegala, Puttalam, Trincomalee, Ampara, Moneragala, Anuradhapura and Badula
The survey covered 618 people
above 18 years of age and it consisted of 309 females. 352 people (57%) were between 1830 years of age and 266 (43%) people over 30 years of age,
it must be noted that this is the first time that R has attempted to do | Suchaquickpoll, and there areno previous pollsto Compare with to gauge the error in these results.
The reader should also be
cautioned that the interviews were
conducted during April 28 - May 1, 1995, during which time the LTTE's first eversurface to the air
missile attack on an Air Force AVRO took place, and hence the
inclination of the public opinion
towards a military solution may
have been high during these particular days.
2rpoint
April-May 1995

Page 23
Snapshot Opinion Poll on the North-Eas
1. With regard to the conflict in the North-East, do you with the LTTE and look for a military option or co, operations?
Abandon Talks and go for Military Option Percentage 57%
Thefollowing table a comparison of the results for the que East issue from 4 previous polls conducted by Research In
Do yои think the government should defeat the LTTE groups, or do you think they should continue negot
ঃঃ
April '94,
Continue negotiations with LTTE 57.8% (political solution) First defeat them at war, then negotiate 16.1% with other groups No answer 26.1%
2. Was the government correct in allowing the transp
year, in view of the ceasefire?
Approve ر Percentage 47%
3. Do you think it was correct for the government to r items after the violation of the ceasefire on April 19?
Approve Percentage 71 *جنر%
κύκλωνικών
4. Do you think that there was a lack of commitmen conducting the peace talks, or do you think the gover
Lack of commitment శ్లే 孪 from the government Percentage 42%
5. Do you think the LTTE acted with real commi commencement of the ceasefire, or did they try to dec
LTTE was
really committed to peace
10%
April-May 1995
 
 

Images
tissue (May 1995)
think the governmentshould abandon the peace talks tinue the talks while limiting the forces to defensive
Continue Talks - Other / No with only defensive Answer
military actions :
33% 10%
stion on the type of solution that people want for the Northernational (Pvt) Ltd.
at war and then negotiate with the democratic Tamil
iations with the LTTE?
July Nov March 畿 May '94 '94 '95 '95
52.1%. 65.9% 53.8%. 33%
2.5% 21.0%. 30.6% 57%
35.4%. 13.1% 15.6%. 10%
ort ofessentiali tems to the North in January of this
Disapprove Other/No Answer
40% 1.3%
eimpose restricted Isic food, fuel and other essential
Disapprove Other/ No Answer
19%. 10%
it or dedication on the part of the government avhen nment acted appropriately?
Government 8 Other/No acted appropriately Answer
49% శ్లే 9%
ment to peace during the last 3 months after the eive the government?
LTTE was . Other/No. trying to deceive the
government
rpoint

Page 24
Demanding milit
ML
against LTTE
Public Eye
THE recommencement of war, unforeseen only by those who persistently refused to acknowledge the LTTE for what it is, has now been with us forty days. Whatever the LTTE did was predictable and entirely unmindful of the civilians. These were in part aimed at increasing insecurity among the Tamils, by inviting reprisals, deepening Tamil-Muslim animosity and by attacking Sinhalese villages. The deadliest in the last category was the attack on traditional Sinhalese fisherfolk of Kallaru,30 miles north of Trincomalee, in which 42 civilians were killed. As a number ofanalysts have been saying, what would be crucial in making this bout of war different from what has obtained over the past 12 years since early 1983, would be the ability of the state and the forces to demonstrate that they have the interests of the Tamil people at heart, andare capable ofreversing the communalism with which the state has been identified for more than 40 years.
It is now 40 days into the fresh bout of war with a new PA government at the helm, and we could map out some tendencies with a view to seeing what needs to be done to minimise the proposals of deterioration and to build on positive aspects that are discernible.
If one compares these 40 days with the first 40 days of Eelam
ད་ ༢
22
War 2 which co June 1990, there
to be thankful foi days of 1990, ar. civilians were n forces and the sp continued into O the tide began t East was compl and any Tamilatt did so at great approaching tha this time. Amon; this are no do pressure brous vigilance of inten rights agencic
reappraisal wit
forces themselve must credit the the part of the ne steer away fr misdemeanors c previous 17 years amply demonstr violence that w motivated, the si player.
Again, it must forces did go or number of times, for the worst continually in e were civilian fat less on more thar One took place or LTTE killed five Muslim village c miles north of Soldiers then we and killed five civ an old lady and t the night of 22 attacked Jayant
Соитt
 
 
 

ry aCCOUntability provocation
mmenced on 11 s certainly much . During those 40 und 2000 Tamil assacred by the ate of massacres ctober 1990, until O ebb. Then the etely paralysed, empting to travel risk. Nothing t has happened ; the reasons for )ubt continual ght on by the national human es and some hin the armed S. Most of all, one political will on w government to pm the worst f the past. The of the UNP rule ated that in any as communally ate was the key
station, a refugee widow from Pullumalai and mother of two was killed. The following morning the police took three youths, whose dead bodies were later found. A mother who objected to the removal of her son by the police was shot dead, although her son was subsequently released. During early May in Chenkalady two youths were killed by the Army. One, a schoolboy who shied away from an army patrol was followed into his house and killed. The other, taking food for his father working in the fields, was shot deadby soldiers who thought him carrying food for the LTTE. Another is the case of the policemen runningamok, burning huts in Pottu vil following reportedly an accidental discharge from the policeman's gun. The Army had also regularly beaten uppeople during routine searches around Batticaloa, and about the end of April an old lady in Batticaloa who was mistakenly shot, bled to death, because the Army was in a nasty mood and refused permission for the lady to be taken to hospital.
Despite this alarming picture, a key difference reported by Tamil MPs, is that both the service chiefs at local levels, and the Government at presidential level are readily responsive to complaints made by
be said that the
the rampage a und the potential eXCeSS6S WaS vidence. There lities of five or three occasions. 6 May when the oldiers near the f Pulmoddai 25
Trincomalee. them. To be more specific, an MP tinto the village for Batticaloa said that a boy of 18 lians, including had complained to him that he vo children. On had been taken into an army post May the LTTE and assaulted and was willing to
ipuram police
point
go before the military authorities.
April-May 1995

Page 25
The matter was taken to the Brigadier, following which an officer and some men were punished. In another instance he said that following his complaint to DIG/STF, the STF stopped the forced use of civilians for jungle clearing work near its camp in Kokkadichcholai. He also said that the general practice of beating civilians duringarmy searches that was alienating a large number of youths and been very much reduced following complaints made. A similar picture of responsiveness was given by an MP for Trincomalee. Following the home guard killings in Mutur, the DIG/Police and SP in Trincomalee had ordered a full investigation and arrest of the culprits. Following the massacre of Sinhalese fisherfolk by the LTTE in Kallaru, the same officers had instructed individual police stations to ensure that the situation remained calm and that there was no communal reprisals. Despite some immediate anxiety, the public peace was maintained. Although the forces had suffered some heavy casualties in the East, there have been no general reprisals.
The STF, which had a very bad record until 1991 had suffered 19 dead in a recent ambush, has also independently come in for some commendation. During the police rampage in Pottuvil, calm was restored by STF action. On 24 May the LTTE fired at a passenger
vehicle in Tha Batticaloa killing women passen misbehaviour wa The picture t therefore very m over that which the UNP regi Jayewardene use brute and abra; power, and see pleasurein humil and showing then before their consti Premadasa list leaders very promised action, was seen to happe At present, the measure of conf could go through Some remedial ac short of accour ordinary civiliar the danger lies. Th below suggests a the same tender investigation awkward it stops much going th through a Briga orders for a re President's off dependent on po in Colomboandi It is still a far cry officers in the institution, becor the basic rights o has been no syst to change the outl One needs to
Counte
April-May 1995
 

Cover Story
alanku da near 2 STF men and 3 gers. Again no as reported. hat emerges is luch an advance prevailed under me. President d his forces in a sive display of med to derive iatingTamil MPs nup as powerless tuents. President ened to Tamil courteously, , and very little an on the ground. re is at least a idence that one n an MP and get ction. Yet, it falls htability to the . This is where he first case given continuation of cy -- when the begins to be s. There is far too rough an MP, dier, a DIG or port from the ice; too much litical exigencies n the Parliament. from individual forces, as an ning sensitive to f civilians. There ematic overhaul ook of the forces. ask, why, for
rpoint
instance, did the Army start beating up civilians in Batticaloa simply because the LTTE resumed hostilities as was expected of it? For one, neither the forces nor the Government did any serious thinking to prepare for this most evident of eventualities. for the rest one needs to also question Tamil politics, the NGOsectorand also the peace movement.
Other Factors
As to the vulnerability of Tamil civilians, the Tamil politicians too have a case to answer. The TULF was in many respects, for example the political package, working closely with the PA governmentit supported in Parliament. But what was coming out in the public statements of some members were pro-LTTE noises with the usual hints that the main problem lay with the Sinhalese armed force and government. Even while the LTTE was brazenly going against thespirit of the ceasefire and using it, as all could very well see, to gain a position that was militarily advantageous, a leading MP stated that the main difficulties of the civilians resulted from army movements and army camps. These were far from the desires and sentiments of the ordinary people. Yet the result of the double talk would have increased the feeling among service personnel that they were being cornered from
23

Page 26
every direction, although the game was well understood among the Southern elite.
The NGOs and others engaged in peace activity too refused in general to prepare for a fresh outbreak of war. Contrary to their grass-rootspretensions, too much capital was invested in the belief that with the right concessions the LTTE could be persuaded to talk. Little thought was given to the people, particularly in the East. With 40 days into the war hardly any group has gone into the East to obtain precise information and express Solidarity by marking a presence. It only requires some of the NGOs to pool their resources and to release a few from their routine commitments. NGOs too have come a long way from the 70s when activists used bicycles and public transport. On occasions like this, even when people travel about freely, security for vehicles couldactas asignificant deterrent to the NGOs.
On the question of TamilMuslim relations again, what the LTTE would do was predictable, such as takingpotshots at Muslim home guards, as happened in Mutur. What the home guards would in turn do was predictable. The TULF leaders again enjoy excellent personal relations with their counterparts in the Muslim Congress. But their political posturing does not allow them to extend these excellent relations to their respective followings. Only this would have enabled them to discuss what needed to be done in the event of the LTTE action and take pre-emptive measures by involving the people.
Some incidents
2 May, Karadipooval, Vellaimanal,China Bay-Alankerni Ferry Road, Trincomalee District:
Asirwatham Mariathas(Barber, police amonghis customers) father of four, and V.Sivalingam (Fisherman), father of one, were
taken from their by men who cal vehicle. Neighb abductors as Air from a camp ne made by the ri Mehala and U Thangathurai M raised it with S Latter promised released. Mariat out was well knc and had good rel Action taken: Results: to date, 20 May, Mut District: LTTE Sh Muslim home gu guards Subseq Tamil civilians and Kattaiparieh whom managed following thre Pakiarajah F Kattaiparichch Thambirajah of Nagarajah of Paci camps. A. Thang
* visited Mutur
reports in the V further 24 civili could not be subs is missing fro neighbouring M But confirmatic further interi persons regularl on business, W days. On representations SP/Trincomal ASP/Mutur tc investigation ar culprits. Result 23 May, Batticaloa: Incid The three you were found aft the police a Pararajasinga Ragunathan ( Mariathas(37). police chief in E that the first na helper, so-ca Mamangam', supposedly
Coun
24

omes at 2.00 am e in an official purs identified Force Personnel rby. Complaint spective wives madevi to A. P, who in turn P/Trincomalee. have detainees as as it turned wn to the Police tions with them. Not known, nil. tr, Trincomalee ot dead Karim, a ard. Other home lently stopped between Mutur chan, several of to run away. The e were killed: avindran of an, Alagiah Sampur and K. inchanoor refugee athurai MP who said that press /irakesari that a ans are missing tantiated. No one m the villages [utur, he added. in from villages or from where y come to Mutur ould take some he basis of made, he said the Ye has ordered conduct a full d apprehend the : not yet known. ayanthi puram, entrelated above. ths whose bodies r being taken by re: Nadarajah n (21), Ravi 20) and Rasiah Vpali Hewage, the atticaloa had said ned was an LTTE led 'leader for who had led a pro-LTTE
demonstration. Joseph Pararajasingam, MP said that following complaints made, 2 platoons of policemen were transferred out of Batticaloa.
This together with the case of killing by the Army of two boys in Chenkalady, shows that although
the new government is publicly
committed to the rule of the law, the substance of impunity remains.
Colombo District
Here too the harassment of Tamil civilians in the name of security checks often takes on nightmare proportions. Even the most irresponsible anonymous tip-off is acted upon, causing great inconvenience to many Tamils in the city. A hurriedly drawn sketch map, given to a newcomer to the city, indicating the shortest route from Liberty Plaza to Union Place resulted in a youth being in custody for one week, which lost him his job. In some cases no female officers have been on hand to frisk theyoungwomenrounded up on Suspicion, who are, then, subjected to the indignity of abody search by men, as in the Maradana Police Station in early May. For instance, 200Tamils were arrested in a round-up in Pettah on May 3, of whom 75 were young women. The women complained of manhandling, even slight torture, while 2 of them were detained without even the most basic of amenities. In fact, the females had to spend the night with the men who were detained.
In general, the modus operandi of security personnel is designed to cause the maximum aggravation and pain of mind. The crucial question posed is "Are you Sinhala or Tamil?" the answer to which determines whether a search will be conducted in earnest or not. The horrendously simple dictum, "Don't trustaTamil, living or dead", comprises the totality of instructions given to those who man checkpoints or conduct searches/round-ups.
erpoint
April-May 1995

Page 27
Could the Talk a Differe
Ram Manikkalingam
WHAT could the government and the Tigers have done differently to keep the peace process going?
In the case of the Tigers there is simply one thing. Assuming they wanted peace, they could have continued negotiating and not violated the cessation of hostilities. If it is clear to any political novice that the PA Government needed peace politically and economically, it must be clear to the Tigers. Moreover, even if the PA Government was reluctant about peace, it was the duty of the Tigers, who claim to represent the interests of the Tamil people, to go that extra mile to achieve it. After all, can there be any doubt the Tamil people want peace?
The Government could have done three things differently. First they could have ignored theTigers and taken a series of unilateral steps that addressed the problems of the Tamil people. These steps could have begun with the lifting of the embargo, continued with the transport of food and medicine, and eventually led to the unveiling of a political package and its eventual passage through Parliament and a referendum.
All of this could have been done without communicating a single word to the Tigers. At this point, the Government could have sent the package to the Tigers for their consideration and begun negotiations for peace. These negotiations would have been from a position of political and military strength. The government was doing best when it was setting
and following its Second, even if had to negotiate they could ha cessation ofhosti the cessation agreement was si 8th, hostilities w. level. This trend maintained with with an agreeme party could have situation on theg their bargaini Ultimatums al ceasefires would the contextofneg ceasefires, so wou demands -- th Pooneryn and armed Tigers int) tothecollapse oft Moreover, many civilians in the Ea opposed toacease knew from past they would be th its collapse.
There woul considerable pres a ceasefire. After would go, how peace process wi (ignoring the fac a number of cas Salvador, wherei negotiations tha for a comprehe not vice versa).
Thirdly, if the compelled to ag they could have political packag ideal moment f policy statement January 6th. TI could have with for negotiations
April-May 1995
Count

Cover Story
Shave Taken nt lack
own agenda. the Government with the LTTE, ve avoided a ities. By the time of hostilities gned on January 2re at a very low could have been out formalisingit nt. Thus neither used themilitary round to enhance ng positions. pout breaking be irrelevant in otiations without ld the final Tiger he removal of he presence of he East -- that led hepeace process. ordinary Tamil 1st were strongly firebecause they experience that e first victims of
have been Sure to enterinto all, the argument can you have a thout a ceasefire there have been es, including El was the political paved the way isive peace and
overnment was ee to a ceasefire, still released the
early on. The r this was the o Parliament on he Government held the details with the LTTE,
point
while presenting the outlines of the political package. At the very least, it could have used the words federalism and merger, and there would have been no backlash at that time. Polling data suggests that in March more than 50% of Sinhalese supported merger, while
afargreater percentagesupported
federalism.
Unfortunately, the Government succumbed to the view that even revealingan outline of the package without first giving the LTTE the opportunity to examine it, would be considered unfriendly in the context of ongoing negotiations. And since the Tigers were not ready to consider a political package, it could not be revealed. Once the Government agreed to negotiate, to ceasefire and to wait for the LTTE to discuss a political package, it foreclosed all other political options. Instead of a broad political program, the peace process then became confined to talks with the LTTE.
The Balance Sheet
Where do the two parties stand politically and militarily now that the peace talkshave collapsed and war has resumed? It is clear that all the Tiger's gains are military ones, while all the governments gains are political.
The Tigers will now try to translate their military advantages on the ground into political advantages internationally, among the Tamil people and at the negotiating table, if talks ever begin again. The Government will seek to turnits political advantage, internationally and with the Tamil
25

Page 28
people, into military advantages on the ground that can either cripple the Tigers and/or force them to the negotiating table.
Militarily, the Tigers reinfiltrated the East (but with nowhere near the same control they had in 1990). They recruited new cadres and trained them. They had three months to restand regroup. And they acquired newer and more sophisticated weapons (SAMs). All of these are important military advantages, though it is unlikely they will be able to alter the military balance on the ground in any significant way. The East will continue to be a contested area with the army having the upper hand. The North will continue to be primarily in the hands of the Tigers.
Politically, the Government has completely turned around the position of the international community. TheTigers have now taken the place of the Sri Lankan Government in the international doghouse. The government has maintained support for peace in the South despite severe provocation by the Tigers, including the massacres of innocent Sinhala villagers and the killing of the Dimbulagala monk. And most importantly they have created a crack in the Tamil support for the Tigers.
If this crack is pried open, it can lead to pressure on the Tigers to negotiate a settlement or lead to their political isolation. If the crack cannot be pried open, the Tigers will continue to have the political power to wage a bloody war indefinitely. Whether or not the government succeeds in prying open this crack, depends on how the government handles two immediate dangers.
Twin Dangers
First, despite the government's commitment to peace, it may be compelled to revert back to militarism and Sinhala
nationalism to c threat. This government is b a war for whichi militarily ill-pre be tempted to go least resistanc government ma shelve or dilute powersharing V now that hostil: rather than take of mobilising Si it.
The first dan addressed by ei rights of civilian
Whether Kumaratunge Tamils in the will judge her on the beh{ Army, the Police. The T Only too wel their very be the Armed retaliator
. . . . . are protected in As faras Tamilc
ZO ES are CO ( representative come into con soldier. Whe Kumaratunge Tamils in the N judge her since behaviour of th and the Police. this only too v their very besi Armed Forces attacks. As Cor President Kuma to ensure the carefully monit men who engag of violence m Those who di problems in a understanding rewarded. Toe
—Соит
2A

onfront the Tiger s because the ing dragged into is politically and pared, and may down the path of 2. Second the f find it easier to its proposals for 7ith the Tamils, ties have begun, up the challenge hala support for
ger can only be suring the basic s in the Northeast
President likes it or not, Worth and East sincerity based Iviour of the STFand the gers know this l, and will ty st to provoke
Forces into y attacks.
the midst of war. ivilians in the war erned, the only of the state they tact with is the ther President likes it or not, orth and East will rity based on the e Army, the STF The Tigers know vell, and will try
to provoke the
into retaliatory mander in Chief, ratunge will have armed forces are »red. Officers and einegregious acts ust be punished. 'al with civilian sympathetic and manner must be sure that civilians
are protected, monitoring committees that include the commanding officers of the area, government officers, NGOs and citizens must beset up with formal authority. Their reports and concerns must be taken into consideration when carrying out operations.
The reports from the East so far are mixed. While the number of civilian casualties has been small when compared with past operations, thereislittledoubt that abuses continue to occur. Three main incidents that come to mind are the burning of Tamil homes by the Police in Pottuvil, the killing of three Muslim civilians in Arafatnagar and the shooting of three civilians at Jayanthipuram. In Pottuvil, the Police went on a rampage, but the Special Task Force rushed to the scene, fired in the air and forced the police to return to the police station. In the Jayanthipuram incident, the officer concerned was transferred pending an inquiry. It is critical the armed forces act swiftly and openly to deal with transgressors.
The second danger can only bé addressed by initiating a political campaign in support of a political package of devolution for the Tamil people. The President must argue that devolving power to the Tamil peopleispartofherprogram of peace, prosperity and democracy. Thus the constitutional reforms can include the changes in the Presidential system, the transformation of the electoral system and the devolution of power to the Tamil people. No doubt Sinhala extremists will argue the President has a mandate for peace, not one to devolve power (as if peace is possible with the centralisation of power).
It is only by addressing these twin dangers forcefully and confidently that the PA government can engage the entire country in a peace process that will marginaliseSinhala and Tamil extremists.
terpoint
April-May 1995

Page 29
Wg, Car. Mark Seneviratne. Retd
AROUND mid 1991, an year after Eelam Two War had begun, Frontline a South Indian magazine, described details of a sproposed peace process between the Government and the LTTE. That peace plan, evidently initiated in India, was programmed for a 100 day peace negotiation, followed by a 180 day Provincial administration of the North-Eastprovinceduring which time necessary amendments would beeffected to theSri Lankan Constitution. Nextwastobeasixty dayperiod whereinelections were to be held for the Provincial Council, and finally theinstallation of the North-East Provincial Council, tentatively fixed for 15th May 1992.
The first30th day of the 100 day of peace negotiations were earmarked for the settling of preliminaries and modalities. It was to be initiated by President Premadasa inviting the LTTE for peace talks, and followed by both declaring a cessation of hostilities. That was to be followed by a Negotiator, accepted by both parties, conveying to the LTTE, the Government's documented proposals for the North and East. Those proposals were to have included an expanded provincial lists, proposals for a provincial police force, the absorption of the LTTE cadres into the armed forces and police, the vesting of land in the Provincial Council, as well as all financial arrangements.
By the 20th day, the negotiator was to have obtained the LTTE's response to the Government's proposal, and if favorable, negotiations would have begun
on day 31. Meanv both sides would ceasefire.
The first 30 day negotiations, schi on day 31, was to discussions ondev next 30 day round was to be cent Provincial Cour restoration of During the final ti peace nęgoti Government and to make their Agreement prior arriving at a comr The President was LTTE leader on th on the last day, th sign the agreeme
Unfortunately, assassination of R: prevented that p. implemented. Th approach and the of that peaceproce highly professic sentimentality an conspicuousbyth. a businesslike pr peace process, jus have been.
Professionalism something lackin process of the P. and as such, it col be described in ti those of the pr negotiations in 1 this peace process, was seen to be er lesser extent, he The emotion wa after the peace pr sent to the rocks, when the Go denouncing the Eelam Lobby explaining the
Counter
April-May 1995
 

Cover Story
hile on day 26, have declared a
round of peace 'duled to begin have included olution, etc. The of negotiations ed round the cils, elections, normalcy etc. 2n day round of ations, the the LTTE were separate draft to moving on to non agreement. ; to have met the he 98th day and ey were both to nt.
however, the ajiv Gandhi had ace plan being le concept, the 2 programming ss was evidently nal. Emotion, d suchlike were eabsence. It was ogramme for a t what it should
was however g in that peace A. Government uld not possibly arms similar to oposed peace 291, because in the major factor notion and to a adline-seeking. evident even ocess had been
nt Trincomalee,-
vernment in International propaganda TTE's action,
point
stated that, "As an earnest of the President's and the Government's sincerity of purpose in this regard,
the Government has itself embarked upon a course of action aimed at resolving the physical hardships suffered by the Tamil community in the Jaffna peninsula....."
Unfortunately, however, that' earnest of the President's and sincerity of purpose of the Government, turned out to be the only feature in the eight month long peace process. Hardly anything else was achieved other than, using the government's very words, "lifting the embargoplaced by the previous regime on a wide range of consumer items; supplying urgently needed food, medical supplies and fuel also placed by the previous regime."
Perhaps initially the Government's intention may have been to collect more votes. Then the President's unprecedented majority at the Presidential elections as well as the effusive enthusiasm with which her personally nominated peace delegation to Jaffna was received, possibly lured Mrs Kumaratunga to become more emotionally involved in the peace process, and thus further release banned goods to the North. She should, however, have known that emotion does not score at all when dealing with guerrilla and liberation groups.
That became evident when the Tiger pounced om that manifested weakness, and decided to get the most they could get out of it by using the northern people's dayto-day difficulties as a ploy to feed the emotion already set rolling by the President. This could be seen in the LTTE's Political Committee statement, issued in London after
27

Page 30
breakdown in the peace process, saying that, "When the peace process talks begun, it was understood that priority would begiven to the human needs of the peoples in the North...In fact the initiative for the agendain the talks came from the government itself" (the emphasis is mine). There lay one major weakness which contributed to the collapse of the peace talks.
It is very unlikely that the Government would have created any worthwhile degree of confidence among the LTTE, in the Government, which element is no doubt a Sine Qua Non for the success of any peace process. The Government could possibly not have done so considering the statements made by the President both internationally and nationally. For instance, she has told one of her foreigninterviewers that Prabhakaran could not be extradited to India because the Government could notapprehend him. That would not have in any way been reassuring to the top Tigernor the otherTigers, because they were already involved in a peace process which if successful would have required Prabhakaran to meet the Government.
At the same interview Mrs Kumaratunga had also compared the LTTE with the PLO as a basis for her assertion that the peace process would succeed. The top Tigers would no doubt have been bemused and reflected on how little she had prepared herself for the peace talks. The inadequacy of the President's preparation for
such a serious matter as peace.
talks, was also seen in her claim to a large assemblage of SLFPers that LTTE ideologue Balasingham's statement that they were prepared to drop their claim for an Eelamin favour of extensive devolution, was the biggest victory so far in hergovernment's march for peace. Obviously the Sorbonneeducated lady had not done her homework because she evidently was not
aware that in Jul the Indo-Lankad Unit of devoluti had told his inte R Singh of THE framework is wo the political asp people and if
through a refere
are prepared to basic position - Eelam."
No small won LTTE kept on thr monthsonlydem more for their peo could not hav confidence in th peace process, b statements from But that howeve Mrs Kumaratun lack of knowled and the Tamil March she clai people in the Nor our side whatev We have won t minds." What al. have provided th For years the TI distrustful of governments. Th and also, that the North have been the younger o brainwashed tha been oppressed, and massacred, a destroyed, by suc governments an forces, for no ot that they were T those years it ha that they have loc saviours. And in come the P.A. G lifts the economi north and expect forget their inh the Sinhalese go' as the horrible thi done by them, t like hot potatoes hearts and I government! The if such naivete v
Count
28

he 1986, prior to iscussions on the on, Balasingham viewer Bagwan WEEK, "...if a rked out to meet irations of our it is endorsed ndum, then we
reconsider our the demand for
der then that the ough those eight anding more and ple, because they e gained any e success of the because of such he Government. 'r was not all of 3a's display of a ge of the Tigers people. In early
med that, "the
thare already on er the LTTE do. heir hearts and augh that would heTigers! amils have been the Sinhalese at is known to us older ones in the convinced while nes have been t the Tamils have tortured, raped nd their property cessive Sinhalese d their security her reason than
amils. In most of
S. been the LTTE ked upon as their o such ascenario overnment, who cembargo on the s those people to
erent distrust of.
fernment as well ngs thathad been drop the LTTE and to give their ninds to the LTTE's cynicism vas expressed in
their statement on the disrupted peace process, which they stated, "One can understand a ruling party trying to woo the Tamil people over the heads of the liberation movement, fighting for their rights. It can be a useful ploy worth attempting..."
To cap it all, after the peace process had been shattered, Mrs Kumaratunga declared at Matara, that the Government will achieve peace, with or without the LTTE.
That may have sounded ridiculous
to many people because it had been the Presidentherself whojust a few months earlier had replied her foreign interviewer's questions, "...But you feel that the LTTE should be the principal intermediary in the peace process? Is there no other way out, in terms of relying on the people in the north themselves?" with, "Tell us any other way out. We need to see the possibility". Also later in that interview she said, "Yes, but to make the package work we have to first go in with the LTTE's agreement. They are in total control of that part of the country..." and also, "The basic premise is that we are the government; we are the government of the entire country; but whether we like it or not, there is another group of people who are in physical control of one part of the country for which we are the government".
And yet Mrs Kumaratunga claimed at Matara that her government will achieve peace with or without the LTTE. Unless what she meant that she would go far to achieve peace, how much confidence in her government would such a statement engender in the LTTE, the people in the North, and even in the International community?
From even before the inception of the peace process the government spoke of, what appeared to be a predetermined solution of extensive devolution or the people of the North. One
'rpoint
April-May 1995

Page 31
would have imagined from that, that the ethnic war had begun because the people of the North did notenjoyextensivedevolution and not yet because they had been discriminated against, and oppressed formany years without any hope of redress. Most of us however know thatit was the latter that caused the ethnic conflict. The LTTE themselves confirmed it in their Political Programme where they stated, "The history of the Freedom struggles of the oppressed people of the world shows that revolutionary armed resistance as a radical mode of political struggle arises when nonviolent, peaceful forms of political agitations are violently repressed. When Constitutional paths are blocked, when the oppressor shows callous disregard to the legitimate aspirations of the oppressed and to the spiritual and human values underlying nonviolent struggles. The Tamil nationalistindependencestruggle underwent a similar historical course."
The Government should thereforehave first addressed itself to satisfying the basic aspirations of the Tamils, by redressing their grievances which are claimed by them were:- a. The Tamil language not being brought on par with Sinhala, both by legislation and implementation, b. The Standardisation laws for
entry into Universities, c. Denial of equal opportunity to
Tamil in education and employment, d. State aided aggressive
colonisation of Tamil land e. Isolation Tamil areas from national and economic development projects, f. Permitting and unleashing communal violence against Tamil like those in 1956, 1958, 1961, 1974, 1977, 1979, 1981 and
h. Giving Budd place under th i. Imposing Constitutions clauses on the Should the g redressed those before getting or thepeace proces: the initial lifting items, they woul the goodwill, acceptance, not c in the north and the Tamils els country, and o
Even in this m and minids, th badly misjudge the people in th embarked upo
steal their heart
the LTTE, essentially winn and minds, Stea, intrinsically havi putting the peo LT
International CoI failing to do that, a for a devolutio. government con distrust of the Ta] Sinhalese gover thereby enhancir the peace process Even in this ma minds, the gov misjudgedthepsy in the North, ar. upon a scheme to and minds for til than essentially hearts and mind would intrinsic aimedajtputting til the LTTE. But knowledge of
in July 1983, liberation movem g. Terrorising, torturing and tried such a thing imprisoning Tamil youth, controlled metho
-Counte
A nriiiMMima Il C00

lism a foremost
Constitution
unacceptable und Conditional Tamils. vernment have amil grievances to other stages of and maybe after of the 28 banned surely have won support and nly of the Tamils east, but also of ewhere in the course of the
atter Qfhearts 2 government i the psyche of e North, and SO n a Scheme to S and minds for ather than ing their hearts ling them would e been aimed at ple against the TE
mmunity too. By indinstead going h package, the inued to let the nil people in the ments remain, g the chances of failing. ter of hearts and 2rnment badly cheofthepeople d so embarked teal their hearts e LTTE, rather winning their . Stealing them lly have been epeople against Lo one with a uerrillas and ints would have y using remote s such as lifting
point
embargoes, radio and press propaganda, because they would have seen the futility of it.
The Government should have embarkedupona directcampaign to win hearts and minds of the people in the North, and thus bein a position to persuade them to influence or even pressurise the LTTE, to get on to discussing the political solution. That the Government had only aimed at stealing the hearts and minds of the people from the LTTE became quite evident when it promptly reimposed the economic embargo and the ban on fishing, after the LTTE breached the cessation of hostilities. That unfortunately was indicative of the Government not really caring about the sufferings of the people in the North.
We could now see that the collapse of the peace process was inevitable. In fact it could have been seen from the time the LTTE leadership asked the President to refrain from uttering statements of mistrust. -
It would have been normal for the LTTE, just like other guerrilla and liberation groups, to have constantly felt threatened, because they were pitted against the entire gamut of the government and its superior advantages. To that was added gradually, the Government's getting the International community in support of its peace effort. That would naturally have made theTigers' feeling threatened, even more ominous. In such a situation however, if the Government had done everything possible to allay those fears, the peaceprocess may havestill been in progress. But as we have seen, the Government by their statements and attitude, only contradicted those fears of the Tigers.
It was in that context, not surprising when the LTTE, acting characteristically and naturally, broke the agreement to cease hostilities, before the threat that they perceived could overwhelm them.

Page 32
| DEMU
A Special Correspondent
ARMY camps and police stations under attack across the eastern province, as hundreds are killed within the space of a few weeks. Last ditch efforts to rescue peacetalkscontinueas the fighting begins to escalate. Each side
a matter of weeks role in the crushi probably sincere own rhetoric. Th government, on t trying to be more its approach,evel OVertures Seen rejected.
It is far more c
pe
W
cha
blames the other for not being serious about peace, as the country -- after a brief respite - prepares for another resumption of war.
That was June 1990- and at first sight, not a lot seems to have changed in the last five years. But make no mistake, this is a new phasein thenorth-eastern conflict, not a return to square one.
Five years ago Ranjan Wijeratine
was promising to wipe the "Baby Brigade" off the face of the earthin
dealings with the
The Governme scored points constituencies -- ! community, and caught in the cond
Count
2f
 
 
 

s. Fresh from his ng of the JVP, he ly believed his e Kumaratunga he other hand, is sophisticated in n after its peace
to have been
lifficult to wage ace than to wage ar, and the oices the vernmentmakes
the coming eeks will reveala t about its true tentions. It has to xits military and litical responses refully, and eCOe the e v i t a b le cusations that it is simply been rive in its
been an inaccurate perception in Colombo that the international community is somehow excessively sympathetic to the LTTE. That's never really been the case, but the actions of the Sri Lankan military in attacking civilians in the past has coloured the international response.
Since the latest resumption of hostilities by the LTTE, though, the international community has come down firmly in the government's favour. From Washington and London, from Delhi and Canberra, have come statements of admiration for the Kumaratunga government'speace efforts.
That's one reason why the Government must ensure that it is seen to clamp down quickly on any excesses, whether committed by soldiers or politicians. No one should need reminding thatevents such as the burning down of Tamil
LTTE.
snt has certainly with two vital the international
Tamil civilians lict. There's long
shops in Galle are a gift for the
LTTE propaganda machine.
The second important shift in
perception is that, for perhaps the
first time since before 1983, large
sections of the Tamil community
arpoint
April-May 1995

Page 33
-in the North and Eastas well as in the south".- believe that the governmentofthedayisinterested in a genuinepolitical solution. The rapturous welcome accorded to government peace negotiators who visited Jaffna was one visible symbol of that feeling.
Those are changes for the better. What hasn't changed, it seems, is the attitude of the LTTE, especially that of Vellupillai Prabhakaran. Take a look at the few published interviews the LTTE leader has granted over the years. The language hasn't changed a bit. Leave the short term manouevring to others is the message, Prabhakaran the purist is still going for gold.
The problem with the Tiger leadership is that it continues to suffer from an extreme form of bunker mentality. It doesn't seem to have realised -- or perhaps it knows, but doesn't care - that the world outside the Jaffna peninsula has changed.
The one senior Tiger leader who broke free to some extent from this collective paranoia was Kittu -- who committed suicide in 1993 to avoid capture by the Indian Navy ashetried to return to Jaffna. His enforced absence from the country had given him a perspective which those holed up in the peninsula still notably lack. In that respect, India's formal request at the beginning of June for the extradition of Prabhakaran and othersisabitter-sweetmoment. The extradition request is another encouraging sign for theSriLankan government of how isolated the LTTE has become internationally, but it will also make eventual negotiations more difficult. What, it may be argued, has Prabhakaran possibly got to gain from peace?
Given all these factors, how should the Government now proceed? Clearly there has to be a continuing military response of some kind. Fighting force with force is perhaps the only language the LTTE understands, and the
offensives again: the eastern jung logical way to be But the militar be carefully Remember the s by the late G Kobbekaduwa. DC into built up area continue a hea campaign (realni to win the trust c If the LTTE wa them in the jungl. and destroy. An Jaffna might s attractiveproposi but it could wi productive. Foro destroy any I civilians in Jaffna which is "onours might encoura, among armchair South that thereis solution to this col That's why, sounding repetitiv must be publicly c again between th civilian populati the Government' remain politicalpublishing the political packa, possible. No mc more delays.
One of Prabha strengths has alwa of a viable alterna
a courageous p( doesn't mean givil It means givingh community which life turned upside than a decade. Th would beamorep against LTTE int any amount of equipment. It w destroy their pc within.
As with any political proposal to be parts whic like. But Presider needs to have thi
April-May 1995
s Counte.

t Tiger camps in es are the most gin.
campaign must
considered. rategy outlined neral Denizil on't take the fight s, he argued, but rts and minds tjust rhetorical) f civilians. hts to fight, fight es -- try to isolate ffensive against eem to be an tion at this stage, ell be counterething, it would notion among of a government ide". Secondly, it ge the feeling strategists in the a purely military nflict. There isn't. at the risk of re,the distinction
irawn again and
e LTTE and the on. The basis of s strategy has to and that means
details of its ge as soon as bre excuses, no
karan's greatest ys been absence tive. Producing litical package ginto theLTTE ope to a civilian has seen normal down for more at sense of hope owerful weapon ansigence than
new military ould begin to wer base from
controversial there arebound h people don't t Kumaratunga courage of her
point
Cover Story
convictions. Far better to have Sri Lankans arguing about the real issues, than to let rumour and innuendo dominate political discourse.
Of course, the package needs to besold as carefully in the Southasit is in the North. But it should be done positively and enthusiastically, rnOt apologetically. People need to be reminded over and again about what could be achieved -- for the whole country's benefit--with the billions of rupees which are being spent on the war.
Above all, the Government mustn't bescared offbylinguistics. Use the F word. Federal. It doesn't hurt. And it's about time to dispense with the absurd notion that a federal constitution would somehow destroy the concept of the Sri Lankan state. There's been far too much reliance on distorted, mythology on both sides of this argument for far too long.
One more point. The only realistic solution at the moment is one which includes the LTTE. That may seem a deeply unpalatable prospect; but look around the world at Israel and the PLO, or Britain and the IRA -- it can happen, although no one should pretend it is easy. The challenge will be to tempt the Tigers to enter the political process. Once that happens, the LTTE willeitherhave to change radically, or face selfdestruction.
So, despite the disappointments of the past few months, the political initiative remains with President Kumaratunga. On the ethnicissue she has emerged as the most formidable challenge to the status quo -- in the North and South -- since the conflict began.
Chandrika still has a chance to move decisively away from the policies of the past. Will she prove to be a true stateswoman, prepared to go the extra mile for peace? Or willshebecomejust thelatestvictim of Sri Lanka's destructive political paralysis? Only time will tell.
31

Page 34
Sustaining the gains
Rajan Hoole
WITH the resumption of war, the enthusiasm built up for the peaceinthesouthstands in danger of giving way to despair. On the otherhand the Tamils in the NorthEast who are voiceless in thematter brace themselves to be crushed between Tiger machinations on one side, and the irrational anger and moronic predictability of the
Sri Lankan Forces,extremelyadept.
at dancing to the Tigers' tune, on the other. Also unhelpful has been the confusion created about the nature of the LTTE, calculatedly by a Tamil elite lobby, and also by a section among peace activists willing to take the bait. All of a sudden we were being treated to a series of claims which should have normally looked bizarre-viz. the suggestion that the Tamils wanted Peace with Democracy was obscene and opportunistic; Despite their struggle over decades for a political solution what the Tamils now wanted was a normalization of flow of materials into Jaffna, etc. While tardiness on the part of the Government was being highlighted as bad faith, not so the warlike preparations of the LTTE, including extortion and virtual conscription. When purely military demands were also pressed, such as the removal of the Pooneryn camp, acknowledging the right for LTTE cadre to move about in the East with arms and the right to fish near naval establishments, the obvious implication was often missed.
The Peace Process-1 was a necessary and courageous step, to open up minds, to establish the
Government's b take the issues t Government w insist that the LT on the political
would have be
followed by d
begin with, the confusion about moral bankrup order that hasm its regime.
Liberation throu
When we wer Jaffna, our eld used to tell us: "I after School, gc "Bewareofstran on the road", "Di vehicles of stral We are told that folk who caught in sacks and too sacrificed to cer
In turn, th indulgence Qfs to resume the u items sucha, solve this probi (1 00ህ§ፀ 0ህፀከ pe0ple's ch whether it
used in magica In recent times, such advice h; by the author stopped on the to join the whisked away that the paren shout at the sc
Сои
32
s

if the peace process
na fides, and to the people. The is also right to TE come for talks ackage. If not, it in a long picnic saster. Now, to e should be no the LTTE and the cy of the social shroomed under
Biru
h Child Snatching
elittle children in ers and teachers Do not loiter about straight home"; gers who stop you o not accept lifts in ngers" and so on. there were wicked children, put them k them away to be tain gods or to be
that brought any comfort, and then give up. If they traced the child to a camp, they were often told not to become traitors to the cause.
Among the senior boys recruitment is often something of a joke. They may laughingly tell the recruiters to try their luck with the juniors. During the ceasefire, an A Level boy in a leading school in a government-controlled area went a step further. While having no intention of joining himself, he tried to recruit some juniors. On one occasion he beat up four tenyear-olds who refused to join. The parents of the latter then went to his parents and shouted at them, and then reported the matter to the Principal. Now, the LTTE has left, the senior boy continues in school and the Principal is faced with getting into trouble whether he takes disciplinary action or not. One might instinctively regard this senior boy with the strongest
2 LTTE's apologists... expect the world to give them the eing sense in their explanation that the Tamils were forced arbecause the Government was slow in sending unbanned petrol. They must also answer whethergoing to war will m of materials or help the people in anyway; whether it is which one is justified in throwing away the lives of other ldren who could hardly know what they are doing and
sa cause for which they would use their own children, LSLSLSSLSLSSLSLSSLSLSSLSLSSLSLSSLSLSSLSLSSLLLLLL
rituals or potions. teachers who gave d been pulled up ies. Children are treets, persuaded' ruggle and are without a trace. All could do was to tool authorities, if
contempt. Yet, on the other hand, that is a good description of how the Tamil social hierarchy operates, under the paralysis induced and sustained by the LTTE. Everything adds up to a huge child-catching machine - whether it is speeches made by senior dons on Tiger platforms,
terpoint
April-May 1995

Page 35
whose children are exempt; Bishop Savundaranayagam of Jaffna turning a blind eye on the systematic strangling of common morality and piously pronouncing the LTTE's position that what Tamils want first is not Democratic Rights, but Fundamental Rights (meaning the easing of material restrictions by the Government, but not those, including restrictions on travel by the LTTE); Fr. Emmanuel, Vicar General of Jaffna, claiming that the new resort to war was a step the Tamil people, collective, were forced to take; Dr Sathanathan railing that Peace with Democracy was an opportunistic slogan to divide the Tamils from the Tigers, and speaking glibly about "the LTTE's successful armed resistance and the sacrifices of the Tanils"; or "Ananthy" of the BBC Tamil Service who has allowed the listeners few hints of the reality in Jaffna, but has allowed LTTE spokesmen long slots to read out tutorial answers over the BBC.
Such cold callousness towards their own people has become a career compulsion of somc. The nurtureandwell-being ofchildren is the Imost fundancintal concern of any society and of any parent. How can a force which institutionally adopts such a deceitful approach to children so as to play with their life and limb, while denying basicaccountability to parents, be even remotely identified as leaders and representatives of the people? This is, Inoreover, accomplished behind a phenomenon of repression and torture, showing that human rights a Te far from abstract. In the name of his Tamil heritage Fr. Emmanuel appears to even find theological justification for the cult of suicide - not of himself but of other people's children amidst moral emptiness, meaninglessness and often despair.
I ask those legitimizing the LTTE, Sone of whom have named
above, to writt lying, and if t reality is. Obv. choices have b
Being a UE LTTE found the reality baye made about the intellectual oнe to dilje. and the iris and the M material taking into
The LTTE w institutional international already geare direction. It can but is trapped trapped in its rhe the Eelam notico recruits, trapped of a surviving ca the dead died trapped in the murdet,
But becau disillusionmenti one thing it cann who are health willing. It, there put away the la mask of benevol. virtual child-catc be hidden awa secret places in night. But not amounts to child. the LTTE's apc compelled to unc and soar to newl They expect the w the indulgence C their explanatioI were forced to because the Gove in sending unba as petrol. They r
CoIιητι
April-May 1995

Tamil View
In and say if I am in, say what the usly, their moral in made.
whether going to war will solve this problem of materials or help the people in any way; whetherit is a cause over which one is
y eficient organisation, the Bishop suggested, the | difficult to understand the slouness at this end. If as not convincing enough then, subsequent events t much clearer that this was a gross misjudgement ature of the LTTE. One need not be a sophisticated fust a modicum of moral judgement should enable 2ntiate between friendly hand-shaking individuals itutional nature of the LTTE. Moreover, the church G0s have badaccess to an enorious anyozunt qof 'bout the LTTE which they have no excuse for not account, and no excuse for fudging moral issues,
th its powerful inks with the underworld is d in a certain get its weaponry,
in its choices, 2toric, trapped in in drummed into
in the emotions dre who believe for Eelam, and karma of mass
ኛ to of the : has created, the it get are recruits y, mature and ore, is forced to st vestiges of a nce and become ters. Tortu Tecan " and done in he dead of the so with what atching. In turn, ogists too are wer their masks vels of insanity. rld to give them seeing sense in hat the Tamils suite the War I ment wasslow cd items such st also answer
οίτι -
justified in throwing away the lives of other people's children who could hardly know what they are doing; and whether it is a cause for which they would use their own children.
Those like Bishop Kenneth Fernando and others whose judgements have influenced the role of the NGOs and churches in thesearch for peace have also some explaining to do. For this is not the last time they are going to make judgements. The Bishop in a television interview was close to saying that had the goods in the North been sent speedily the war could have been averted. Being a very efficient organisation, the Bishop suggested, the LTTE found it difficult to understand the slowness at this end. If the reality was not convincing enough then, subsequent events have made it much clearer that this was a gross misjudgement about the nature of the LTTE. One need not be a sophisticated intellectual, just a modicum of moral judgement should enable one to differentiate between friendly hand-shaking individuals and the institutional nature of the LTTE. Moreover, the church and the NGOs have had access to an enormous amount of

Page 36
material about the LTTE which they have no excuse for not taking into account, and no excuse for fudging moral issues.
As for the LTTE, it is a phenomenon that by its own nature cannot find rest untilitdestroysitself, as was said most powerfully by Rajani Thiranagama in The Broken Palmyrah; The challengenow is to save the Tamil people from the fate envisaged for them by the LTTE, as far back as Yogi's May Day speech of 1987.
The Challenge
There may be little immediate prospect of ending the war. Yet, the mass movements which came to life during the peace process have an important role to play. Organisations like the LTTE which are lacking in any liberating outlook E thrive purely on the alienation of the people. That is also their weakness. The causes of alienation have been long understood. But the pace of change has been slow and indecisive. Tackling thecauses of alienation requires a more activist approach. Take a few issues like the humiliatingmanner in which Tamils are detained and questioned in Colombo; the renewed beating or worse of civilians, who had no choice in dealing with the LTTE, by the forces in the East; and the hideous shame of Wellioya which is as unfair by the Tamil civilians evicted asby the Sinhalese civilians
cornered and settled there. The
Government knows all these extremely well, but has its own
short-term compulsions. Little is
going to be done without activist pressure and exposure. I have heard some good ideas from
thoughtful acti insisting that Tar taken for questic brought to com] and not police questioned by offi voluntary social workers being pr see to their welf heard sugges
maintaining hot
and some reliabl the North, so tha misbehaviour statements could and the author account. When i forces, the Gover trusted to do the
Counte
 

Vists, such as, mils in Colombo ning should be munity centres,
Stations, and icers in civil with
and religious esent in shifts to are. I have also stions about lines to the East e channels with t in the event of by the farces, be quickly made ities taken to it comes to the nment cannot be right thing. On
11th October 1994, two days before the first peace talks, in response to an LTTE provocation, the Army ran amok in Mannar, beating up civilians, even children, and killing the only Sinhalese civilian living in Mannar. The Government had all the facts, and nothing was done. In their preoccupation with talking to the LTTE, the people were forgotten. There has been no reevaluation of the conduct of the forces over the last many years by an independent body, and no reorganisation for the forces to play a politically sensitive role. This is an 3 I Քa where the Government needs to be constantly pressurised. Official lies are already eroding the Government's position among the Tamils.
The other area is the political solution. In my last article I gave my perception of the question of borders. Districts, like Trincomalee for instance, have their historic associations in a pluralistic tradition. In suggesting that we should carve it up on ethinc lines we are destroying some of the older and healthier traditions of our history going back centuries. In place of it we are accepting and giving legal form to a notion that we cannot live together except in an adversarial context.
Most of all, we should realise that if we came to legitimise bombing, shelling and massacres of civilians to fightabankrupt force like the LTTE, which has shown its weakness by the manner in which it uses children, that in itself is defeat. We also need then to accept our own moral ineptitude and prepare for the worst.
rpoint
April-May 1995

Page 37
CP: Now, in a sense, Funny Boy has been acclaimed by Colombo's upper-middle class as a successful novel, Given the content of the book, can you explain why you have become the darling of Colombo's elite?
SS: One of the reasons is the international recognition which seems to override other considerations... I think also there are other reasons that are very complex. For instance, within a single room, different people accept me for different reasons. Some people say outright that the theme is great, but others accept me mainly because of the international acclaim. I was iust discussing with a friend, how different the reaction would be if it had been a lesbian writing. Honestly, my reception here is still at such a beginning stage, that I can't even judge it yet.
CP: In terms of "coming out" and being openly gay, has Colombo changed very much in the last ten years?
SS: Yes. And the reason I say so is that I have been talking to other gay people who have been "out" and they confirm that there has been a marked change in attitude. I think Colombo is much less homophobic than it was ten years ago. This is so because there is much greater exposure, through Video for instance. Hollywood itself has taken up this issue in a limited way with films like "Philadelphia", "Longtime Companion", and even films such as "Mrs Doubtfire" which is presented as family entertainment with stars like Robin Williams featuring a happily married gay couple. So there has been a far greater exposure through video.
Соитterpoin Shyam Selvadu
Funny Boy, Shortlisted fo Prize in
CP: Even thougl say that attitudes drastically, it is st for, say, a politici " or for lesbians to it?
SS: Yes, of cours CP: Could it be certain complacen that is 'classed"? members of the up urban milieu can f homosexuality wi euren a certain tren
Counte
April-May 1995
 
 
 

Culture
ർe leal,
2
interviews rai, author of which was * the BOOker
1994.
in the middle and underclass, there is a massive backlash. Take the newspapers as guardians of public morality: a few days ago, there was an editorial about child prostitution and homosexuality in the same breath. There is a constant linking of being gay with crimes such as child prostitution and pederasty.
SS: I agree with you that there is a clear class distinction in this arena. I feel this very strongly... There is also an idea in the upper
class that "if I'm O.K., it's O.K." This does not relate only to the
issue of sexuality, but to others as well, such as the women's issue. I'm reading about the Women's Franchise debates in England, where this becomes very clear; the upper class women were very happy to get the vote for
themselves, but were not really
interested in the others. This hasn't changed, I think.
CP: Toget back to your book, because you deal with the ethnic issue and your treatment is what I call liberal--it is not radical in the sense that you are confined to your class and milieu, for whom
identity and Tamilness is tied to L being threatened (July 1983); one is
it is pleasing to have changed 'll unthinkable nto "come out be open, isn't
Y
at there is a ly about gayness s it that er class in an aunt their
impunity, 'iness, avhereas
point
a member of Colombo's
cosmopolitan society until one is
threatened and challenged in July 1983 and then one's Tamilness is something one has to run away from--so it is not radical, whereas your dealing with the experience of "coming out" is radical.
Is it the case that the liberal
treatment of the ethnic issue allows people to claim this as an eye-opener of their complicity with July '83, as a wonderful account of the problem and so on, and then, not coming to terms with the
35

Page 38
exploration of sexuality in the book? Whereas those who are interested in the "coming out" can ignore the ethnic issue. Firstly, do you agree that your treatment of ethnicity and Tamil identity is not the main focus of this book?
SS: I think there are two main focuses to the book. On the one hand, there is the awakening to one's ethnicity and on the other, the awakening to one's sexuality. I don't think either is stronger than the other. For me they ran together as themes in the book.
CP: In terms of the central problematic of the text as you have explained it -- the awakening to one's ethnicity and the awakening to one's sexuality -- the former is very powerfully expressed, but the latter is narrowly classed. To put it very simply, the boy realizing that he is different may cut across class, though the repercussions would not be the same...but for the young Tamil, the implications of being Tamil would be different depending upon where he is, his class, and so on... One's sexuality is something one becomes aware of in, perhaps, one's early teens, so the word "awakening" is appropriate. But hov would one say that one "awakens" to one's ethnicity?
SS: In the context and milieu that I was writing about, among the urban upper class Tamils who considered themselves very Colombo people, their ethnicity impinges upon them... If I were to take my own case, I considered myself Sri Lankan really, from Colombo and had close contact with all races within my social Stratum...
CP: So could it be that to be "awakened" to one's ethnicity, is a luxury only available to the urban upper class; so if one were not, of the urbanized upper class, one avould be, as it avere, thrustinto one's ethnicity at birth so to speak.
SS: Yes. CP: Clearly, parts of the book are autobiographical, just as other parts of the book are nonautobiographical. Is this deliberate fusion a comment on the fact/ fiction binary?
SS: I think you say that this char roughly fits into grows up in a ve from mine, and a conservative one dynamic of my f. different by virtu marriage of my p fact that my mot woman... I think blend in very inti this book in term events and their characters. I kno' fascinated me in Taking the '77, '8 tortures in Jaffna schools, and ima things impinge o characters....Som characters are pu Jegan is a good e there is no one ir remotely resemb to explore the di privileged and n Tamil men, as w would join them purely out of this preoccupation th CP: Many of til efforts by Sri La1 those living abro an idyllic, at tim Sri Lanka and/o; class milieu whi cannot transcent deal with issues and contexts ou hoavever diffide comments, if an offer about thes SS: I think the responsibility to canvas of a part within his or he For myself as a important to sta my milieu. I hav write about the think it is authe write either abo family, or a Mu in Galle Fort, o Tamil family liv very reluctant t within my mili pull them in, in that I have an c them in...
2a
Oοι

ould have to cter only very my slot". The boy 7 different family much more The whole mily was
of the mixed rents and the er was a working act and fiction resting ways in
of using factual mpact on fictional I that's what his attempt. , '83 riots, the ...the brutality in ;ining how these n fictional times the rely fictional. cample because, my life who even les him. I wanted ference between on-privileged ell as why boys ovement. So it is
intellectual at Jegan grew... 'he recent creative kans, especially iad, seem to posit es even a pastoral,
an urban upper ch the authors i. You are trying to and individuals side your milieu, tly. What (, do you have to other authors? writer has the bring in the total cular context
specific milieu. writer, it is very | fixed or true to e no desire to rillage life, nor do I tic to do so. I can't ut a Burgher lim family living for that matter a ng in Jaffna. I feel do that, but u, I feel I have to ome way. I feel ligation to pull
terpoint
CP: On the one hand then you have a position which values personal experience above all else, while on the other you mention the need for research. Would you explain this to our readers?
SS: Let's talk of research in terms of Funny Boy. I wrote a novel before I wrote Funny Boy, a novel which was about ethnicity starting in the fifties and coming to the present. At that time I had not read many books on the question of ethnicity, and having gone to books by people like, say, Kumari Jayawardena, I felt ashamed, because I had also unconsciously perpetuated the myths about ethnicity that Kumari and others had been questioning and debunking. I had to get beyond my own limits about Tamil superiority and Sinhala jealousy, for instance. The notions of "hardworking Tamils swatting it out, while those Sinhala buggers sit in the shade." I had to get past that, I had to see the issues more clearly. Research is also for me, a way out of the almost inevitable complacency that comes out of living in the West.
CP: Does this mean that the writer who deals with complexity as opposed to those who present sinplistic unchanging idyllic scenes loses out in terms of Western readership? There are quite a few exotic texts, not only about Sri Lanka, coming out, aren't there?
SS: Yes, there is a lot of exotic stuff coming out, but side by side there seems to be to be a growing desire for another type of book as well. My book has done well, for instance... I think there is a change going on in the West by the nonwhite community, a change which is impinging on the whites in terms of the debates on, say, the appropriation of voice. These are debates that a white lecturer in post-colonial literature is exposed to. They have become very aware and sensitive to these issues... There are still books, however, which are unresearched and so on, which are read and accepted by conservative whites. The pendulum swings one way, then the other. I don't think there is a
April-May 1995

Page 39
complete victory for either side. It is a continuing debate... I also think that Canada is in a particularly advantageous position in this regard. The structure of Multiculturalism has brought about some really interesting critical work. And this had led to the "discovery" in the '70s of a Canadianness. The established Canadian writers had to undergo the same struggles that I had when they had to work against American and British domination. As a result they are very supportive and encouraging.
CP: In a sense, however, for this text, your critical audience is Sri Lankan. Have you received any critical insights and comments locally, or has it been only praise?
SS: I have had lots of praise, but some criticism too. This story about a response from a gay Lankan reader is instructive. He had come all the way from the outstations to listen to me speak at the British Council, but told a friend of mine there "Why does he have to talk about this gay. stuff? We were doing fine until he came and stirred up a hornet's nest". The contradiction between this attitude and his coming all the way to listen to me is important, isn't it? There is a very interesting push-pull happening in the gay community here.
CP: The visible gay community in Colombo appears to be extremely conservative politically. Has there been no antagonism to your treatment of the ethnic issue from this or any other quarter?
SS: Nothing directly, but how could people tell me such a thing to my face? One only hears things on the grapevine. Many Sinhala readers have told me that they never saw July '83 from this perspective... I think I have shaken up some Tamils too who had grown complacent after July '83. Someone who is Tamil was telling me that he read the book during the recent election campaign and it resonated for him very concretely... I also plan to translate the book into Sinhala, to start with, and later into Tamil.
CP: There is the your book, you pe political, that you the carnage and ti do you say to this
SS: I think it's v do this. What I di
was massive accou
carnage, because til represented in the "200 people killed two hundred peop names or faces. I th focus on one famil grandmother is kil house is destroyed house, so you feel more potently thar pages and pages a people. I think it's powerful this way CP: Then what a Journal"? Was tha un initiated reader, of what avent on? that it was necess. SS: It was neces was what the who leading to. I think climaxes in the bo( sexuality climax at fifth story, and the ethnic climax whic Journal...The reasc is that the riot itsel into the conventio)
Counte,
A - MA, J0 s) &
 

comment that in somalize the individualize e horror. What
2ry powerful to n't want to have
ints of the his is what is
western media: in Pakistan"; the le have no hink it's better to y. So when the led and that , you live in that its destruction if I'd written pout unknown much more
bout the "Riot t more for the a kind of index Why did you feel try? ary because it e book was here are two k. One is the the end of the other is the n is the Riot h it is at the end
does not fit al categories of
beginning, middle, end, epiphany, climax, or resolution, or any one of those things. I tried it in the conventional story structure and couldn't; it didn't work.
CP: Which leads me to a question about the structure of your novel. What I find interesting about the Riot Journal is precisely that it refuses to fit into the conventional model. Even though your subject matter may be radical, the structure of Funny Boy remains within the conventional well-made novel. If you look at the more important post-colonial interventions in the novel form, they have dispensed with linear narrative structure, chronological sequence of events, uniform single narrative voice, and conventional form. How do you see your novel in the light of this phenomenon of postcoloniality?
SS: I wasn't self-conscious about the way in which the Riot Journal broke with the conventional narrative structure, nor, with this as a symptom of post-coloniality. I just used this as the best available option. The task that I wanted the text to perform was not structurally possible within the conventional confines.
CP: What do you see as the role of the writer within the social crisis that you described in your novel?
SS: I feel that if I had anything more to add to what has already been said, it's up to me to do so. In this case, I didn't think I had anything to add. I think what's interesting is what you don't realise you had to say, which comes out of the voice of your characters... Yes I think there is a sense in which your characters do take over, and they express a part of you that you may not yet be conscious of. In this sense there may be something mystical about the writing process, but when you publish it, you have to take responsibility for what you have written.
point

Page 40
Qadri /Smai/
THIRTY years ago the party and the people united to kick the colonizer out. Thirty years ago, together, they danced in the souk.
Whenever things got bad thereafter, the party reminded the people of that magic moment. Patience, it said, things will improve. But as prices rose and jobs froze the people eventually rioted, forced an election. At the polls they said go, party. Which replied: hellino, we won't -- asking, instead, the army to take over. The generals obliged and promptly annulled the vote.
Yet another sorry third world story? No. It was the left this time, not the right, which executed the Algerian coup. At the election last December, the fundamentalist Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) poleaxed the National Liberation Front (FLN), the socialist party that led the anti-colonial struggle against France and had ruled Algeria since 1962. The FIS then brought out the daggers from under its cloaks. When a regime in power for decades gets defeated electorally, one might expect three Allahu Akbars for democracy from the opposition. Not this time. Soon after the vote, FISideologuesheikh Abdelkader Moghni told the world: "The Algerian people have given victory to Islam and defeated democracy, which is nothing but apostasy." What ? After going through hell to make sure they
;یح محہ
Changes in Alg UttsDFWO
|| Islaman
Aar Oft
by Fatiña
Addis0n
$24.95
Women, Apartme
by Assia Universit
$19.95
could - choo: government th voted to end Abdelkader, decrease. The A as much a nege against the c dictatorial FLN which benefit only organized as the rhaps younger men.
Since the mi year ago, the A increasingly caught betwe the fundame choose and lo game, especia world accord public sphere
Co
V

ria, NG
/Democracy ì9/Moder7 W0/70/
Mernissi,
Wesley,
of Algiers in their
Djebar, yof Virginia Press,
e their own Algerian people ll votes ? Sheikh may your tribe gerian verdict was ive one, delivered irrupt and often , as it was pro FIS, d from being the alternative, as well dic support of
tary marched in a gerian people have »und themselves the officers and talmen. Making the name of the y for women. The g to FIS has the male-order: where
terpoint
women remain inside, looking after the kids, kitchen and clothes; all w omen except widows and divorcees, who alone can work outside the home. And yes, compulsory veiling will enforced.
Oh Islam, what sins are committed in thy name 'Not justin Algeria but all over the Muslim world, where fundis are gushing out the ground quicker than petrodollars these days. Every long beard, of course, does not speak the same language: Iranian theocrats, Saudi monarchists and Pakistani republicans have, as it were, dialectical differences. But they do sound alike on the related questions of women and democracy.
The Moroccansociologist Fatima Mernissi is best known in this country for her Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Muslim Society. Through the category of woman, she enters into a discussion of Islam and democracy inherlatestwork, Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World. But, after being invoked at the beginning, women get erased its middle sections, despite Mernissi's feminist convictions and avowed desire to examine the "nuances" and "ambiguities" in the relationship between the two constructs. Her argument isn't nuanced or sophisticated, simply pits two monolithic subjects against each other. One, the West, is good; the other, bad: classic Orientalism, where everything "wrong" between Tunisia and Iraq can be explained by one word: Islam.
Fundamentalism, as the Syrian critic Sadiq al-Azm has argued, is the other side of Orientalism. Mernissi, though adamantly antifundi, strays often into that kind of logic:
"When we speak of the conflict between Islam and democracy, we are in fact talking about an eminently legal conflict. If the basic reference for Islam is the Koran [sic], for democracy it is effectively
April-May 1995

Page 41
the United Nations Charter, which is above all a superlaw." .
I looked carefully, Mernissi's tongue is nowhere near her cheek. Boutros Ghali might be pleased by this exalted status for the U.N. Charter, but reducing Islam to the Quran is precisely what the fundis do. This text is a product - a sordid symptom, perhaps - of post-Gulf War Arab demoralization, where the choiceseemspolarized between pro and anti-West. But, if everybody takes on the long-beards this way, the battle will be lost before it even begins.
In her better moments, Mernissi sees the weaknesses of such a strategy. Early in her text, she shows how Islam could be interpreted not just as compatible with, but as almost compelling democracy. Elsewhere, she even reveals some understanding of politicized Islam's appeal to many disaffected young men in the postGulf War Arab world: the "call for Islamin the 1990s expresses diverse needs that are not always archaic and are certainly not always of a spiritual nature." But such insights are never followed up, the analysis is never complicated so doing would not only upset the binary structure of the book, but its political project. Mernissi must represent Islam as essentially antidemocraticin order to beg the West to save the Arab masses:
"It isagiven that the West.bears responsibility for the future of humanity...It alone decides if satellites will be used to educate Arabs or to drop bombs on them." West equals the United States: a Camelot where everyone enjoys freedom of expression and there
ain't no racism, sexism, poverty,
homelessness, etc. Mernissi's descriptions of Islam and of the West make V.S. Naipaul sound SàIl6.
In Islam and Democracy, the entire dynamic within the contemporary Arab world boils down to fear: the fundis fear modernity; they also fear the present, the past, the West,
individualism an explanation, bu doesn't see the growth of funda third world-wic The contradictio world "fundam "modernity," popshrink Ashis) about fear but the and belonging: longer the ideo minority...Man society around t scope for a com the old and thene
nOW COme tO modernity which and, even in th religion-as-faith "religion-as-idec pushed to the col fanaticism and vi with religion co the sense of defea from their feelin and from their fre Nandy, like M place for cap international div his narrative; un see nativist ideol Hindu variant he as an attempt alternative moc whom ? The W. doesn't appear ir chance. The funda whether Islamic Hindu as in Indi by mostly pettyworld men who by the (capitalist enraged.
Third world West, are the pr this rage. Recall the FIScal probler jobs, so we'll sa Mernissis previo Beyond the Veil, commitment to fe text. Which. Su Mernissi, the w isn't implicated in of "democracy. unable to erase t she concludes by
A nr. AM Yr wy i Q00 K
Counte

d so on. This ain't t rant. Mernissi contemporary mentalisms as a le phenomenon. n between third entalisms" and as the Indian Nandy notes, isn't need forcertainty modernity is no logy of a small y Indians...see the hem...leaving no promise between w...They)...have sense that it is h rules the world is subcontinent,
as opposed to ology" is being rner. Much of the olence associated mes today from it of the believers, gs of impotence, e-floatinganger... Mernissi, has no pital and the ision of labor in like her, he does ogies -- for whose ! is an apologisttO COn Struct an lernity. But for ord "impotence" that passage by mentalist project, as in Algeria or a, is spearheaded
bourgeois third feel emasculated ) West and react
women, not the imary victims of how they solved m: men don't have ck the women. us work, notably
showed a deep 'minism. Not this ggests that, to omen's question the "larger" issue Nevertheless, hem completely, falling back on
Review
that old essentialist shibboleth, "a woman's intuition." Despite all the shit thrown at Arab women by these pigs, fundamentalist or otherwise, she finds that "Women have already taken flight...are performing the pilgrimage that their grandmothers dreamed of for so long: to dance without a mask..." In The Wretched of the Earth, which owed substantially to his Algerian experience, Frantz Fanon described the colonized native's dream of freedom thirty years ago: "The first thing which a native learns is to stay in his place, and not to go beyond certain limits. Thisis why the dreams of thenative are always of muscular prowess; his dreams are of action and of aggression. I dream I am jumping, swimming, running, climbing; I dream that I burst out laughing, that I span a river in one stride."
Freedom as unrestricted access to the public sphere; as dancing with or without a mask, anywhere, alone or with anyone, dancing without fear. This was the freedom Fanon's native achieved at independence. With one crucial catch: the native, Fanon's national agent, is gendered. The fact that Algerian women, many of whom played heroic roles during the struggle, couldn't dance publicly after the victory is amply illustrated in Assia Djebar's collection of stories, Women of Algiers in their Apartment, now available in English.
Anybody intopo-cofiction won't find better alternatives, even on a sunny day, than reading Djebar. Her novel Fantasia, first part of the projected "Algeria quartet, explodes official history with quiet anger. Most narratives of national liberation present the experience of one gender as that of the nation. What might the history of the nation look like, this all too rare novel asks, if examined from the other side of the gender divide, from the perspective of women participants, victims and on lookers.
Women of Algiers is a collection
rpoint
IRQ

Page 42
of three brilliant longer stories, three goodshortones, a theoretical postface and an "Afterword' by Clarise Zimra which also serves as an introduction to Djebar's work, Written between 1958 and 1978, dealing with therevolutionary and post-independence periods, these pieces are located in an almost exclusively female and domestic- "restricted" -- setting. The first thing a woman learns, Djebar suggests, is to stay in her place and not go beyond certain limits.
In the 'Overture, Djebar calls thesestories "alisteningin,"situates herself as spy-cum-interpreter of other women's experiences, a theme that recurs in her work. A writer in French, she's listening to people speaking Arabic, people whose world doesn't always overlap with hers. This stance also highlights a different point: that, denied a public and published history, "never having appeared in the sunlight," women only have word of mouth to keep their stories alive. Many women, seated, lying down or ill - that is, in passive positions, tell their tales in Women of Algiers. In "Nostalgia of the Horde,' we hear a greatgrandmother, a woman forced to lie, contain her dreams and conform to apatriarchal order; who had five sons but no daughters. "There is no Exile' looks at how women must maintain and repdroduce the nation, even when abroad. At 25, its narrator has divorced and losther two children. Though living abroad, her parents force her to marry again:
"I was thinking how everything had changed and that, still, in some way everything remained the same. They were still concerned with marrying me off. And why exactly ?...Just so I could have worries that never change whether it's peace or wartime, so I could wake up in the middle of the night and question myself on what it is that sleeps in the heart of the man sharing my bed....Just so I could give birth and weep, for life never comes unaccompanied to a woman..."
The fact that sh in re-marriage is in exile women with the same olc The tone, if any the titlestory, whe their wounds to c only each other t the masseuse, thirteen to a drun fled him, had to and, when too o legs, worked at th revolutionary he refuge in narcoti isn't room for revolutionary Al man who has tim the battle is over Sarah, the protag of Algiers, doesn responds:
"For Arabic w one single wa everything: tal stopping, about today, talk amon, the women's traditional ones a the housing proje voice of female they imprison in melodies...But til never heard, unknown and 1 occur before she' In moments lik Algiers becomesa however pessim unknown and nev here include v together, formi
without which th
dance. A point postface, where from Eugen obtrusively trans ofcolonial Algeri harem which giv its title. Namir "thief...spy...voye is the "right to prerogative" ? TI back, turning til inquisition - of n female subjugati Inherlong and Clarisse Zimra, s
Count

he has no interest irrelevant. Even have to contend
shit. thing, is darkerin are women reveal pne another, have o hear and listen: married off at ken soldier, who turn prostitute ld to spread her ebaths; Leila, the roine who seeks cs because there her in postgeria. (The only e for her now that is a gay painter.) ionist of "Women 't only listen; she
omen I see only ay to unblock k, talk without yesterday and gourselves, in all quarters, the is well as those in cts. Talk...Not the vocalists whom their sugar-sweet he voice they've because many new things will s able to sing..." :e this, Women of text of resistance, istic in tone. The withingsheralded women coming ng community, ey cannot Sing, or reinforced in the Djebar takes off e Delacroix's gressive painting an women in their res this collection ng Delacroix as ur," Djebar asks, stare...a male hen stares right he gaze into an nale complicity in
O useful afterword, says that Djebar's
"regressive feminism" has been found fault with by some critics who demand inspiration. Read in the precarious context of contemporary Algerian women, Djebar's pessimism doesn't seem in the least out of place. The Dead Speak,' for instance, sounds. remarkably predictive. It's set at the wake of Hadda, a rural Algerian grandmother who tookher life into her own hands, moving to the city after her second husband proved tobesleeping around. Symbolically enough, Hadda dies one weekafter independence. Aicha, who lived with Hadda after losing her own husband some years before, sits by the body as the "nation" embarks on "liberation,"pondering her own empty future and that of other
WOmmen:
"Those whose destiny it had always been to be the ears and the rumors of the city, whose vocation it has been to crouch down at the feet of the husband coming home in the evening and to undo his shoes and who, for the most part, had anything to undo but their anguish."
Djebar's prose reads sinuously, is exacting and exact, even in translation. At times, however, it halts; which makes one wonder why Gayatri Spivak's sixty pages of comments on improving it weren't taken into account.
"The Dead Speak' ends with Hadda's war-hero grandson Hassan at the independence celebrations, unable to conceive that women may be responding differently to the music and fireworks; meanwhile Aicha, at a nearby cemetary, tends the grave of the grandmother, with only memories to anticipate. Theyoung woman once gave refuge to Hassan during the war, fell in love. But he had no time for her then, has none now. Women, these stories suggest, won't be inheriting the postrevolutionary future.
Thirty years later, everything has changed in Algeria. For the women, however, things have remained the same.
erpoint
A nri May 1995

Page 43


Page 44
ష్ర
Enjoy the quiet comfort and natural h
world's most advanced, long range pass
video screen with six video channels or
Only on Air Lanka, the airline of pare
Contact your Travel Agent or Air Lan
 
 
 

ospitality on board Air Lanka's first, and the
enger aircraft. And your very own arm rest
First and Business classes
dise.
<ܬܘܢ݈ܬܩܙܩܙܩ
la office. Tel: 421161 It's a taste of Paradise