Page 1
3.
3 Issue:
Wol
June/July/August 1995
 

OEN
EPUE3 L_2 (CATP
Ao
A " RA\/A -
Rs, 25/

Page 2
ALAWWA AMBALANGODA AMPARA
ANURADHAPURA
BADULLA BALANGODA
BANDARAWELA
BATTCALOA CHILAW COLOMBO Bambalapitiya
Battaramulla BOrella
Dehiwela Fort
Union Place Homagama Ja Ela Kadawata Kandana Kiribathgoda Kollupitiya
Maharagama Maradana
MOratuwa Nugegoda
Pannipitiya
Nandanasiri Stores Royal Book Shop
Delicia Mahajana Picture Palace Sathsara
Mahinda'S Sunil Book Shop Leelasena & Sons Udeni"S Mayura Book Shop
Charles Subasinghe Greenlands Hotel Lanka Traders Liyanage
Shanthi Vihar Pubudusiri Cream House Madhawa Book Shop Pushpa Stores Ketapatha Prakashana Supipi Book Shop Sadeepa Book Shop Lakmini Stores Catholic Book Shop Colombo Hilton Holiday linn
Taprobane Lake House Book Shop Lanka Oberoi Maclium Book Shop M.D. Gunasena Book Shop Salaka Geethani Grocery Perno Stationers Srimali Grocery Jayabima Samanala Book Shop Vijitha Yapa Book Shop Malee book Shop A. Z. N. M. Marikar Sasiri Book Shop Godage Book Shop Dayawansa Jayakody I. P. B. Book Shop McCallur, Book Shop Wijesekera Grocery National Book Shop Sarasavi Book Shop Nimali Book Shop
 

Piliyandala Pitakotte Ratmalana Thimbirigasyaya WellaWatte
EMBILIPITIYA GALLE
GAMPAHA
GAMPOLA HAPUTALE HORANA HKKADUVVA KAD UGANNAWWA KALUTARA KANDY
KUL YAPITIYA KURUNEGALA MATARA MATALE MIRIGAMA MONERAGALA
N'ELIYA NEGAMBO
NIT TAMBUWA PANADURA PLMATALAWA PUT TALAM RATNAPURA TRINCOMALEE WAVUNYA VEYAN,GODA WARAKARPOLA WELLAWAYA YAKKAA
New City
Pothgula Thusitha Book Shop Missaka Book Shop Windsor Book Shop Rohana Book Shop Vivian Traders QueênS Hotel New Aradhana Traders Vijitha Yapa Book Shop Thaksala Nalanda Book Shop Hema's Book Shop Udaya Stores Davasa Centre Malikarachchi & Co. Jayathu Hotel Coral Garden Hotel Daya Traders New Owen Joseph Book Shop Guneratne Distributors Seevali Book Shop Vijitha Yapa Book Shop Sithumina Book Shop Malson Book Shop Central Book Shop Sastrodaya Book Shop Sampath Traders Nilmini Stores Malaka TraderS Gamage Stores Sumedha Book Shop Sri Ramya Stores Shop No. 3, (Opposite Municipal Council) Nayana Book Shop, Kandana British BOOK Center Negambo Printers Co-operative Sales Center Ganga Cool House Fernando'S Jayasekera Traders Lucky Newspaper Agency Pradeepa Book Shop 470, Navy Camp Road Kavidha Stores
Somagiri Ranjith Book Shop Suhanda Traders Vidyodaya

Page 3
August 1995
COVER STORY
A variety of perspectives and issues concerning the proposed constitutional amendments is examined with a view to providing our readers with an informed and accurate basis for making their own judgements of its merits.
CONSTITUTION 2.
The focus on the Government's devolution package must not detract from the all-important issue of the abolishing of the Presidency. Ou regular political columnist provides a prognosis or the fulfillment of government promises in this regard
Letters ....... SLCCLC00LL0L0LL CLLLLLCCLCLLCCCLL0LLLL LLCLLLCLL LLLS 03
ImageS .......... SSL LS L LLLL LLLLLS LL LLL LLL LLL LLLLLLLLSLLLLLLLL LLL LLSLLSL LLS LLLLLL LSL LLL LLL LLL LSLLSL20
Arts a . . . w a 36
August 1995
 
 
 
 

Vol. 3 Issue.j
6 33 TAMILWIEW
Our columnist poses the perennial question of individual responsibility in a climate of collective violence, made more poignant as it affects the personal value-system of a man who must remain in hiding because of his courage to expose such violence.
38SPORTS
Aravinda de Silvas outstanding performance in England is counterposed with the shoddy treatment Sri Lanka continues to receive from the international test
playing community.
Cover Layout Asoka Padmasiri
terpoint --

Page 4
Comment
Forget other Unite to resol
here appears to be a great deal of -- opposition to the Government's devolution proposals whipped up by the usual chauvinist elements and supported by newspapers such as The Divaina, The Island and The Sunday Leader. Many of the claims made by this vocal group arebased eitheronignorance or on the systematic distortion of the provisions of the package. In this issue we focus on the proposals themselves and our considered opinion is that this welcome effort by the Government must becritically supported, notwithstanding its shortcomings and ambiguities.
Counterpointhasalways weighed each issue confronting the Sri Lankan public on its own merits. We have opposed the present government on many crucial matters of principle so far, and we shall continue to do so in the future. We condemn the manner of the waging of the most recent military offensive, the Government's inability to keep its promises regarding theabolishing of the executivepresidency, the corruption and nepotism at the highestlevels, and soon. Our position, therefore, is that whatever other problems we may have with the PA government, this long
Managing Editor Victor van
Editor Waruna Kartinatiliake
Editoria Cordinator. Ymara De Amaida
Layout Charitha Dissanayake
Cartoonist KWJanaranjana Photographer Dexter Cruez
Circulation Daya Kaluarachchi
GBPandha Printer Anuru Graphics, Mount Lavinia Publisher Ravaya Publishers (Guarantee) Ltd.
Соитt

differences, ve this crisis
overdue move to devolve power to the provinces, and particularly to the NorthEast,is salutary and should be supported in the face of opportunistic and narrowly sectarian opposition by a privileged and vocal minority.
This is not to say that we feel that the Government's proposals are perfect. On the contrary, we reiterate that these proposals should serve as a basis for a meaningful dialogue involving all sections and all communities within the nation. The result of these deliberations would provide the consensus on which power can and must be devolved.
Dueprocessesshould be followed. The two-thirdsmajority in Parliament should precede a Referendum, and so on, and the support of all those who are nonracistand non-opportunist, all those who want to see an end to the carnage and brutality of this war, is crucial in Seeing this process to its fruition.
If ever there was a time to forget our petty differences and self-interests, this is it. If we fail to achieve a just and equitable settlement to the ethnic crisis by constitutional means this time round, history will judge our failure in blood and tears.
Head Office and Mailing Address No: 83, Piliyandala Road, Maharagama,
3.:::::::: Sri Lanka
Tel. (Editoria) 851672, 851814 Tel. (Circulation)851673 Fax.851814 : Published monthly.
All Rights Reserved, ORavaya Publishers. A wholly owned subsidiary of Ravaya Publishers. Contents of Counterpoint are copyright. Reproduction of material in part or whole is not permitted in any form without the written authorisation of the publisher, Counterpoint.
terpoint m
po August 1995

Page 5
lt!'ssa]|[[0[UI
NATIONAL newspapers have highlighted a speech given by Mr. N.Y. Casie Chetty, the new Headmaster of St. Thomas Preparatory School, Kollupitiya, at the Prize Giving of his School, announcing a ban on Corporal punishment at his School. As a Concerned parent, I wish to Congratulate Mr. Casie Chetty for taking this courageous and bold initiative in going against the received wisdom on this matter, an act which has been long Overdue.
Mr. Casie Chetty had fondly remenbered his Own School days when he was never subjected to Corporal punishment at home or in School. I am Sure most children of today would love to See the return of Such a golden era in bringing up children at home and School, without having parents or teachers pouncing upon children with violence for any minor violation of Order? This, unfortunately, has been the experience of the little Son of a friend of mine who at year I, at a well-known private preparatory School had the misfortune of Coming under an aggressive teacher who beat up these beginners in school frequently for the slightest excuse. The child was dead Scared of this teacher and as long as he was in this particular class, eveyday, for a few months, it was after much Coaxing that he Could be sent to School and that too with tears in his eyes. Even though, he was never beaten by this tercher, he could not simply settle down in the class in the face
of this teachers, beating of other children. Upon inquiry, it was found Out that many of the children in this class lived in a similar fear. The Headmaster of the School, despite the notoriety of the teacher, stubbornly refused to accommodate the child's request for a change of class. The other parents appeared to be happy that the School disciplined their children Over whom they did not have much time to spend. Fortunately for the child he got a chance to change his school, and eventhough he has settled down much better in his new School, even today he has not completely got Over his fear of School teacherS.
bring up this story of to emphasize the far-reaching Consequences of the decision Mr. Casie Chetty has taken to ban CorporalPunishment in his School. Thanks to the modern thinking in the fields of psychology and education, now We are aware that any form of physical disciplining of children, however mild it Could be, is a form of abuse which violates the COre of the self of the child, and that subjecting children to such punishment hasfar-reaching negative Consequences for their later life, from which most adults find it difficult to recover. Such thinking invites us to consider in violating the Self of Our children in such a manner, to what extent We aS adults in the family, school and society contribute to violence in Society.
Psychologists link high delinquency rates, dropping Out of School and anti-Social
Counte,
August 1995

Letters
poral Punishment
behaviour in general, mainly, if not entirely, to such violations of the Self of children through various types of violent abuse, mild Or strong. They argue that physical violation of children is not Conducive at all for Creative learning which requires a feeling of love for the World in which one lives. Resentment against adults and teachers who beat children up for reasons beyond the latter's Control turns children against the studies and lead them to internalise their anger,
Disciplinarians who use violence, Verbal or physical, prepare children to serve in regimented atmospheres whether as masters Or Servants and pass on the abuse to others, children or adults. However, it is kind and friendly teachers and adults who treat children as individuals whose little selves require respect, who can turn children into Creative, imaginary, thinking beings and thereby enrich the diversity and plurality of the human World. ‘Disciplining of children, when required, in the hands of Such teachers and adults may take place through reasoned discussions, persuasions, rewards, and non-abusive, non-physical measures.
It is heartbreaking to see how much trauma We put Our children through in Our Continuing adoption of the Victorian model of disciplining children. While it is agreed in general, that violence towards each other is not acceptable in human Society, We take it for granted that we
point
Could beat our children at Our wish, whether at home or in School; the existing laws in Sri Lanka do not protect children from such abuse. In this context, suggest that We should take measures to prohibit by law any form of child abuse whether by paarents, teachers or other adults. Instead of Corporal and other forms of physical punishment, We should have in our Schools Counsellers to help children with their problems in Coping with School work or behaviour in School and Society.
It is my personal belief that it is time that we follow wiser thinking and stop abusing our children in the family, school and society. We could instead give them care and love, make them feel Secure in the World so that they will become adults who love and take care of the World, and not destroy it. In pursuing this endeavour, I WOuld humbly Suggest that als educationists in Sri Lana should follow the path indica dby Mr. Casie Chetty and b, n Corporal punishment in their schools. WOuld also wish to appeal to the Hon. Minister of Education to take necessary steps to ban Corporal punishment in the Schools in Sri Lanka. It is enlightened educationists who have a major role to play in protecting Our children by initiating humane treatment of children in our society by banning Corporal and other forms of physical punishment in Our Schools.
COnCerned Parent

Page 6
Homophobia the Alternative
AS a publication of the alternative media and free press, the past two issues of Counterpoint have represented features of an English tabloid at the expense of providing interventionist political and Social analysis.
The publication of "So young and SO gay, the UNP's new way" by respected veteran journalist Lucien Rajakarunanyake highlights two main issues. First, a certain homophobic tendency of the author. Secondly, the Editor's tolerance to Such Overt expression of homophobia.
While the blatantly slanderOUS Sarcasm of the title captures the reader, the main narrative with traces of homophobia attempts to express a very meaningful statement. However, the significance of the statement that democracy needs to be institutionally re-established in both mass parties of Sri Lanka, is dissolved in his homophobic commentary on Ranil's persistence to select Dinesh Dodangoda into Parliament.
The article Seems to Convey that homosexuality is a "social mores of the upper layers of Society", and that Dodangoda may be the "appointment of a Token Gay into Parliament". While this position itself deserves to be commented upon, will refrain from an extended
psycho-Social analysis of it. Consequently, the author declares his Commitment to "political analysis", while being "intrigued" by this piece of gossip, neglected by "recent champions of free media".
For the Counterpoint editorial to publish this article represents a retreat from its - initial political idealism and progressive practice. In this time of SOcial Crisis, where alternative perspectives into Critical issues of ethnicity, gender, class and caste are marginalized, as another "champion" of free media Counterpoint needs to reevaluate its activist agenda. While our respected journalist may harbour some homophobic prejudices, the editors have fallen short of the slogan of free media Which also means responsible reporting or comment (which Mr. Rajakarunanayake himself has clearly espoused elsewhere.)
As Our respected journalist points out "some broadsheet newspapers are vying for the latest in the alleged Scandals of menu Card and titillative journalism". But, what was the difference between the last two issues of Counterpoint and those newspapers? In Counterpoints notion of a free media, Would any exhibitionist Fascist in the
Соит

and press
wings also get that privileged Space of publication in the "alternative" print media?
In celebrating two years in publication, Counterpointhas illustrated its vulnerability to engage in Sensationalist news production, neglecting responsible investigative reporting. If the aim is to represent an authentic, progressive publication, homophobia, along with other ideologies of Oppression Such as racism, Sexism, and elitism, needs to be addressed Critically and openly, More importantly, in the absence of such reflective Critical practice by a leading proponent of free media, othermore genuinely alternative publications also become branded as trivial social commentary. I hope many intellectuals, progressives, and rightthinking people would be horrified by this retrogressive tendency exemplified by Our repected journalist and Counterpoint. However, journalism is a SOcially Contingent practice. Are We Seeing, then, the backsliding that in a Society dominated by patriarchal heterOSexual males, results in homosexuality and feminism always remaining an elusive fiction or better yet, an imperialist Conspiracy?
Janaka Biyan Wela
Better Never Than late?
Counterpoint remains interesting reading, though I do not necessarily
endorse everything that
you say. However, as a regular subscribes feel strongly that you have a responsibility to publish the magazine on time each month. Many others know also feel the same way, and the quality and topicality of the magazine is seriously affected by these delays in publication.
I am Sture that subscription-renewals and Over-the-COUnter Sales too would be adversely affected by these delays. Moreover, regular readers feel let down when they cannot predict when your next issue will become available. When they look to you for information and Comment on Crucial issues, your magazine is not forthcoming,
Therefore, it is high time you became more professional in your Outlook. It is not enough merely to be "interesting", long after the urgency of a particular Crisis has past. You must also be timely and relevant, on the Cutting edge, and you can only achieve this if you publish, say, the June 1995 issue in June 1995, and not in September
The President is only hours late, sometimes days, perhaps. You are months behind the times
Àni Perera - Kurunegala
------------------
erpoint
August 1995

Page 7
JOUrnalistic eth otherironi
A box in Waruna Karunatilake's article -- presumably authored by the same -- in your April-May issue deems it "ironic" that "Some of those who had been livewires in the peace process... Were since April 19th involved in a Clandestine Committee entrusted with the task of assisting the government in its war effort". Among those named are Jayadeva Uyangoda and Charles Abeyesekera - two individuals with impeccable anti-racist, pro-peace Credentials.
Now, while a strong moral argument for the Current War can be made, wouldn't choose to do SO myself. I believe that the government can, and must, resort to other options, including enacting and implementing a federal Constitution, in Order to bring about peace - which Cannot be understood as the mere absence of War. But, if Messrs Uyangoda and Abeyesekera did indeed advise the government on how to improve its war effort, Wouldn't find their behavior ironic; it would, at best, be hypocritical. The fact of the matter is, though, that this charge has been denied: something known to, and ignored by, Mr Karunatilake -- who could at the very least have Carried the denial and stuck by his story.
This raises questions of
journalistic ethics that I don't want to explore here. I do, however, want to point Out that I find the tenor of Mr Karunatilake's entire article extremely ironic, given the box. Take, for instance, the following sentences in the main body of his piece:
1 "If the Navy Continues in its incompetent manner it will not be long before the Navy commander will be Commanding a landbased navy." 2 "Throughout the Eelam
war 2 period the Air Force did not, for reasons best known to themselves, acquire night-fighting capability." 3"...the Air Force should
have had a Counter plan ready years ago." 4. "It does not cost money to do a little bit of forward planning." The article also speaks of the "ideal Solution" and "most
Reply to
THE reaction by Dayan Thisaranee Gunasekera to my "Second and a half road" Wondering about their preser take them seriously? Do I ha argument (in "plain" English)? Some Snide Comment about the the article, Wondering whe excluded from that category?
if, as these writers Comment' speak louder than mere Words"
August 1995
Соит

Letters
CSand CS
effective Counter" to the LTTE's possession of missiles: and Complains, in several long and detailed paragraphs, about the lack of experienced, Competent and respected officers at the top ranks of the military. it does not take a trained literary critic to determine that all this adds up to advice to the forces on improving their military capability. In short, the ineScapable Conclusion one Comes to upon reading the peice is that Mr Karunatilake Seeks to advise/assist and enhance the government's War effort. This would of Course be ironic given his complaints above -- but only if he once desired peace.
Qadri ISItail
Dayan 8 Thisaranee
Jayatilleka and numbers transcend interpretation, they should critique of their have provided numeracy, and not literacy rates. thesis, left me Considering the level of (anti-intellectual) tation. Should discourse these authors have instigated, 'e to restate my addressing their response would be a waste of Should make the readers' time and a setbacktocritical cognitive literacy rates in development. Therefore, would encourage the her they were readers of "Counterpoint" to re-read my previous
article. Il
facts and figures which imply that వ్లో
Jinendra BaSnayake
erpoint

Page 8
No Wrapp the best
THIS issue of Counterpoint examines the various ramifications of the Government's devolution proposals as well as its acceleration of the North-East war after the LTTE unilaterally broke a hundred-day ceasefire in April this year. Counterpoint is openly and unabashedly in favour of the Government's proposals as a Starting Point for discussion and negotiation, as a crucial Preliminary Basis for the just and pragmatic resolution of over a decade of ethnic strife and over four decades of discrimination against minorities in this country. Counterpoint's Support for the package has nothing to do with the fact this government has produced it; nor does this critical acceptance of its merits have anything to do with the fear of the LTTE.
The crux of thematter here is the understanding that meaningful long-term peace and the just resolution of the ethnic crisis can only be achieved by political means. No military victory is going to restore equality among Sri Lanka's ethnic communities. The articulation of legitimate grievances may be crushed or silenced by sheer brute force, but this situation is not merely immoral, it is also very short-lived. Now, for the first time a government of this country is making a genuine effort to devolvepower, to redressethnicinequalities by constitutional means. This endeavour, fragile and precarious though it be, deserves the encouragement of all those who desire the collective well-being of the
Count
 

ing up of deal yet
diverse peoples of Sri Lanka. Moreover, the proposals themselves are a significant improvement on anything envisaged sofar:evenifone were to ignore the over-arching sociopolitical context for a moment, as a devolution package the proposedamendments are wellworth serious consideration by all those who believe in the meaningful democratization of power.
Articles and essays by concerned intellectuals and experts in the field examine the merits of the package, detail possiblescenarios if this attempt were to fail, discuss the Government's parallel war effort, and critique the politics of this dual strategy. The disturbing resurgence of "disappearances" and abductions of Tamils, allegedly undertaken by a clandestine "wing" of military intelligence, and the appearance of a large number of bodies in Colombo are also highlighted with a view to preventing such atrocities in the future and bringing the culprits to book. It must be reiterated here that theparanoia of LTTE suicide bombers in the city cannot be an alibi for such crimes against humanity, and such excuses only serve to reinforce the obvious parallels with the height of the UNP's reign of terror. The promised full-scale investigation of these horrendous acts must produce concrete results soon-arrests and prosecutions -- if the Government's political endeavours are to achieve credibility among the Tamils of this country.
タ
point
August 1995

Page 9
THE Government has presented to the publicatlong lastits "political package", or more precisely its proposed constitutional amendments that have been designed to address the vexed questionofthedevolutionofpower. The mechanism chosen by the Governmentisasystem of Regional Councils, and there is no doubt that the current proposals go well beyond the so-called Indo-Lanka Agreement of 1987 in keeping with legitimate and justifiable Tamil concerns for ensuring a sufficient degree of regional autonomy and, therefore, of real devolution as opposed to mere deceatralization of power. Many of the items contained in the Concurrent List as well assomeofthosein the Reserved List in the dead-letter amendment of 1987 have been provided for in the Regional List under the new proposals. This means, forinstance, that the Regional Councils will be able to alienate land as well as to collect local taxes and have a police force for the maintenance of law and order. Moreover, what is true of the redrawn North-East (by whatever name it is to be called) will also be true for the rest of the country, affording, for example, citizens of the deep South their first opportunity of genuine powersharing with the Centre for the first time in the recent history of this country.
Finance
The amendments allow for the regions to undertakedomesticand international borrowings (up to a specified limit) which is a big step ahead of the Provincial Councils where local borrowings were subjected to Parliamentary sanctions. In addition, "the regulation and promotion of foreign direct investment, international grants and development assistance to the region" will, for the first time, provide a genuine measure of financial independence to the
Regions, and, in the North-Eas rehabilitation an the devastation by the war as w remedy the yea omission andneg governments. establish region credit instituti crucial improve legislation.
This measure C financial indeper strident objection but the proposed borrowings prov against misuse. In be recognised viability is the devolution, since dependence on t override all otl Moreover, in the c Eastlarge-scalein developmental urgentandimper to become compe of the countr opposition to thes based on paranc (international T. will be brought North-East the ei regions. If we a objections serious to being mere ol mischief-monge another reflecti insecurity and its "inferiority comp
Lal
The provision: perhaps provok censure, and it is the devolution of land that is at t matter here. Undi Councils set up as Lanka Agreeme remained in the Government. In amendments the disposal of stat entrusted to t
Соитte.
August 1995

Cover Story
nespecial case of t, enable the development of wreaked upon it all as attempt to 's of systematic ect by successive Provision to l financial and ons is another ment On Current
f autonomy and dence has raised s from the South, eiling on foreign ides a safeguard addition, it must that financial key to effective otherwise fiscal he centre would ner legislation. rase of the Northfrastructuraland investment is ative, evenifonly arable to the rest y. Hysterical se provisions are ia that massive amil) resources in to make the nvy of the other e to take these sly -- as opposed portunism and ring -- this is on of Sinhala attendant ethnic lex".
d
on land have ed the widest the question of the control over he heart of the er the Provincial part of the Indont, state land control of the the proposed alienation and land is to be he respective
Regional Councils, and this is a fundamental premise for the viability of de facto devolution. however, the new proposals make land a devolved subject with the following crucial proviso: "State land within a region required for thepurpose of the Centre in respect of a reserved subject may be utilised by the Centre in consultation with the relevant Regional Council". The Sinhala lobby sees the devolving of land as the beginning of the end of the Sinhala people. The Tamil lobby sees the possibility for the state to utilise land for a reserved subject as the nullifying of this devolution since the state need only consult the regional councils, not obtain their concurrence. After all, nothing prevents the state from claiming crucial tracts of land in the name of any number of reserved subjects. Though it is true that "consultation" is merely a courtesy without any power behind it, the insistence on "concurrence" at this stage would certainly stymie the proposals.
Education
The inclusion of universities other than national universities undertheregional administrations is an important change from the Thirteenth Amendment which had Higher Education in its entirety in the Concurrent List. Of course, the devilisin the definition of what constitutes a "national university", but there is certainly great room for a region to control the focus and emphasis of higher education within its boundaries, taking account of specialized needs and priorities. National Schools remain under the control of the Centre.
in General
The proposed amendments consistently provide more space and opportunity for regions to
point

Page 10
exercise control over their development. Whether it be in matters of regional planning, irrigation, the formingofaregional police force, the establishmentofa regional Public Service Commission, the permission to institute regional mass media including broadcasting and television, and so on, the powers oftherespectiveregionshavebeen expanded. Regional media, in particular, can bemade conducive to the creation of a healthy democratic tradition whichin turn will nurture a climate of free and responsible expression in the country as a whole. In this way the regions can lead the way to reestablishing the democratic traditions that 17-years of misrule have whittled away to negligibility. The inclusion of control of minor ports and harbours as well as the responsibility for industrial development is of signal importance in creating viable and vibrant regions within the unitary nation.
On the negative side is, for instance, the gratuitous inclusion of "Buddhism" as coming under the Centre. There is no doubt that this in part reflects the inherited problems of previous constitutions, but, nonetheless, this should either be deleted altogether (preferable) in keeping with the principle of a secular Sri Lanka, or that all religions should be given equality in this respect as well. These sorts of "concessions" which seek to pre-empt anticipated Sinhala chauvinist opposition are actually selfdefeating in that they, in turn, strengthen the extremists' hand in demanding further concessions from a position of power.
It would appearingeneral, then, that pragmatically at least, the key to effective devolution lies in the creation of a culture of mutual respectandminimum interference between the Centre and the Regions. The difficulty of creating
viable regiona promulgating a protects both rel as well as even a nature, is the utt distrust and anin between/among In this sense, it is workable, thoug perfect, constitut that can pave the system in the fut It is in this cont bend overbackw atmosphere of t respect, to erasea war and inhum Government's ol its proposals to that allows the C the Regional Co viewed with alar context, the imn would be to provision at provocation, ther the real world" gains made by the If Indiais to be tak this maneuver "errant" state a lends itself to despotism, orat li from the centre. to the amendme) nomorethana me the vocal Sinhala. and if this is the process of whit heart of the packa outcome may be
"Arguments" ag
Southern Sinh as manifested in organs of the c centre around the this devolutio. separation in the fact that there separation in pla that genuine dev long way to all Tamil grievance workin the intere Sri Lanka's unita
Count

l units and in constitution that ative autonomy minimal unitary er and complete nosity that exists the protagonists. only time and a h not necessarily ional mechanism way for an ideal
8. ext of the need to ards to create an ust and mutual decade of bloody anity, that the wn "revision" of include a clause entre to dissolve ouncils must be m. In the present ediate tendency invoke such a the slightest eby nullifying"in the fundamental ese amendments. enas anexample, of dissolving dministrations abuse through east arbitrariness This amendment hts appears to be 2asure to appease chauvinist lobby, 2 beginning of a tling down the age, then the final unrecognizable.
ainst DeW0lution
ala fears, at least the media and in hauvinist elites, issue of whether n will lead to near future. The
is a de facto ce even now, and olution will go a aying legitimate is and therefore 2sts of preserving y status has been
ignored. For instance, the 

Page 11
Regionis allowed tonegotiatewith foreign sources for finances, there will be no stopping them. This resurfaces the sense of isolation and insecurity of the Sinhalaelites who feel that the Tamils have access to external wealth and powerwhereas they have only this country to depend upon.
The Democratic People's Alliance (DPA) Manifesto which was signed and subscribed to by opposition parties in 1989, provides an inkling to what is going on in the political sphere in this country. Dinesh Gunewardena's MEP is now vociferously opposed to a devolution package which comes very close to that pledged by the DPA under Gunawardena’s own imprimatur. The DPA Manifesto accepted "the concept of devolution" and stated categorically that "there shall be a predominantly Tamil unit comprising of what is the combined Northern and Eastern Provinces but excluding the area covered by the predominantly Muslim unit." Even the vexed questions of land and financial independence are comparable, if not identical, to the current proposals. The most important deviationis that "Parliamentshall, however, be able to override legislation of the regions by a 2/3 majority of its whole membership." This too can be viewed as analogous to the power to dissolve the Regional Councils as introduced by the Government as an amendment to its own proposals in the wake of widespread protest.
The point, moreover, is that the MEP and some other signatories to this DPA Manifesto are now Screaming blue murder about the Government's proposals without acknowledging that, when it was politically expedient to doso, they too held similar views. Now political expediency - a greater chance to buildup their minuscule votebanks-has changed and they
have turned coat. therabid Sinhala exemplified
Amarasekera an are easierto und
they are consist
not opportunisti The opposition is hardly innot Money for post similar propagar Take for instar Shishya Balave Students' Force) of Colombo, a which has no h membership in which appears tc Janatha Mithurc leaflets must ha thousands of rup things, this lea "though the Go that these prop submitted to grievances, Government r intercede on beł chauvinist haves are. Some focus official language Act, university and racial riots a grievance), but fields it is the Sin been subjected t hard to believe, e. times when any that this stuff c cream of the nat future leaders of
UNPOpp
All this was tobe What is more disi capitalist logic of southern protago stubborn refusal wither one way or Manifesto for the Election echoes th and is a clear en substance of the Yet, for narrow political gains, th remains immun
Соитt
August 1995

Cover Story
In this senseonly Buddhistenclave by Gunadasa d Nalin de Silva erstand. At least ently racist and cally so!
to the proposals ent and naive. ers, leaflets and da is not lacking. ce the "Sinhala gaya" (Sinhala of the University n organisation istory or official the campus but be a front for the , whose printed ave cost tens of ees. Amongother aflet avers that Vernment States osals have been address Tamil neither the or those who half of the Tamil hown what these on colonisation, , the Citizenship standardization is these areas of in each of these halese who have o injustice." It is ven in these awful hing is possible, omes from "the ion's youth", the
the country!
OrtuniSm
expected, of course. urbing within the the so-called main hists is the UNP's to commit itself he other. The UNP
1994 Presidential ie DPA Manifesto dorsement of the urrent proposals.
and short-term 2 UNP leadership ' to the need to
respond expeditiously to these suggested amendments. The UNP leader Ranil Wickremasingheismore than usually full of platitudes and hollow phrases, but has resolutely refused to say anything concreteabout the measures proposed. He has most recently gone on record saying that the UNP wants the Government to submit the proposals as a Bill before Parliament so that the UNP can respond to it officially. Surely this is politicking in the cheapest sense of the term, since the dispensing of the consultative stages where all parties have the opportunity to provide insights and input is fundamentally necessary in a matter as important and as sensitive as this? The UNP would no doubt like the package to come before Parliament in its present form so that they could vote againstit on the basis that they were not consulted, thereby preventing its passage by a two-thirds majority and irrevocably discrediting the Government. The rationale for this, of course, is that everything is fair in love, war and politics! Yet, the human costof the UNP'sblatantopportunism and gratuitous racism is mindboggling.
The question remains whether the Kumara tunga administration can weather the storm of chauvinist rhetoric, whether it can close its ranks and make sure that errant members do not try to grandstand on this one, and whetherit can avoid the watering down beyond recognition of the proposals in the name of a consensus. In the final analysis, then, all of this may come down to the machinations of striking a horse deal with a dozen or so members of the UNP (what's a few more ministries after all!) in order toachieve thatall-importanttwo-third majority. Of course, this means that another amendment allowing a member to vote with her/his conscience will be necessary. Yet, this means that the UNP is free to do its own horse-trading as well. In such a climate, a simple double-cross (as opposed to, say, a double doublecross) would probably the most straight-forward of scenarios!
point


Page 12
Offensive to di
fromPr
Waruna Karunatilake
other fighting paying adequate
THE 12,000 strong ceremonial Army which was in place at the start of the Eelam war in 1983 is
now close to 100,000 strong. With an average of 15 billion rupees a year spent on the war since then, the Army has changed beyond recognition as far as manpowerandarmament are concerned. However, the fundamental problem facing the Army has now become its inability to provide the crucial logistical support necessary for large Scale military offensives. At the end of "Eelam War One' in 1987 the Army's strength had grown to 48,000 and by the beginning of Eelam War Two in mid June 1990 late General Ranjan Wijeratine had got government approval for a 100,000 man army. However, financial constraints restricted recruitment to around 80,000. With fresh funds being made available after the outbreak of “Eelam War3' the Army is now filling its vacancies to bring its strength up to the 100,000 mark.
Themistakesucceeding Army Commanders and
Defence Ministers made was to concentrate on increasing the manpower in the infantry and
logistical arm of accepted ratio ir army for what til refer to as the 'te
LLLSCSCSCSSLSLSSLSLSSLSLSSLSL
Peputy Defence Minister Anur
7 to 3. In laymal you need 3 sol fighting men wh
IO
Соит
 

Vert attention HsidenEy
units without bayonets. Howeverbecause of the attention to the lop sided recruitment in the past : the Army. The ten years and the urgent need for a conventional fighting units to counter the LTTE, he military types this ratio in the Sri Lankan Army 2th to tail ratio' is is estimated presently at 6bayonets
Woodha Aatwaffe in ft/Aattle dress
been serviced by one
soldier. This is considered the main a SO for the
embarrassing debacle in Jaffna with "Operation Leap Forward". The Operation was delayed by 72 hours because the minimum logistical requirements were not in place. Even when the operation was launched three days behind schedule the entire logistical requirement was not in place, and once the operation was completed the army found that it was out of ammunition and other essentials to defend the newly acquired 78 square kilometre land area. The army faced similar problems in major offensives launched earlier but no corrective measures have been taken. For instance during the operation to destroy Kilali, the boat landing point in Jaffna Lagoon the Third Brigade was still in the Elephant Pass camp waiting for its ammunition and other
terms it means requirements while the first two liers to service 7 brigades had already moved ichthe Army calls forward breaking the link with
terpoint
August 1995


Page 13
the camp. However, the third brigade managed to catch up before the LTTE figured it out and reestablished the vital linkup with Elephant Pass. The logistical problem with "Leap Forward" was further compounded by poor strategic planning. The plan was to defend the area by setting up a bunker line similar to that which protects Palali. However, once the rebels launched its "Tiger Leap' on the fifth day the ground commanders panicked realising that it was impossible to secure such a bunker line and withdrew quickly behind the security of Palali. Some military officials are amazed that the commanders did not realise the difference in requirements and ground conditions. Palali has to be defended with a bunker line to secure the airport, the lifeline of the military in the North. The price the Army pays for this is by tieing down thousands of troops which otherwise could be used effectively to carry out more offensive operations both in the North and the East. The mobile defence system which has proved to be successful was a desperate measure rather thana thought out strategy. With the mobile defence system proving to be successful the Army is now expected to refine it and put it in place in the next phase of the operation.
The Navy was once again the biggest villain in the logistical bungling that took place. 90% of the logistical requirements are shipped to the North by sea and the Navy was way behind
schedule in transporting the food,
ammunition and men. It compounded the problem by allowing the LTTE to blow up one of its biggest ships inside the KKS harbour. Why the Navy did not take the obvious step of taking the ship into the deep sea in the night since unloading at KKS is done only during the day can only be explained by the Navy Commander specially after the
LTTE launched attempt to infiltra the beginning of Pathetic damage national media tl anyway going to the end of the yea image of the Nav result has been hire a ship at US day to transport lo for the phase Forward'
Perhaps the ne hear from the Na half its fleet to the mid 1990 is a ble since the Navy cai ships because of The shortage of partly the f inexperienced commanders who by the army hie crucial operatio commanders had of the major larg launched by th Northern theatre appeared to hav Army's fire pow their lack of strat is it pure fear? heavy artillery w five days: perh quantum of artil Armyinan operal of the conflict. low resistanceen troops. The seco Army encounter the indiscrimina troops. Although says that a soldi kill or pin downt
others can mano
soldiers have got firing at every b fearing that the hiding behind it lay the blame f training and lac despite the Arn General Gerr emphasising the training since he end result of thi
Counte
August 1995

Cover Story
d an abortive te the harbour at
"Eelam War 3". control by telling hat the ship was be scrapped at ar only made the y worse. The end for the Navy to S Dollars 7000 a gistics necessary
two of "Leap
xt thing one will vy is that losing :Sea Tigers since ssing in disguise ngetnewer faster it. ammunition was ault of the brigade were appointed 2rarchy for this n. None of the taken partin any ascale offensives e Army in the previously and fe overused the ver to cover up egic thinking, or 6000 rounds of ere fired in just aps the highest lery fired by the tion in the history This despite the countered by the nd problem the s in operations is te firing by the military theory er fires either to he enemy so that euvre into place, into the habit of ush on the way enemy may be . Senior officials or this on poor k of experience, ny Commander y de Silva need for better took over. The S is that a huge
amount of ammunition is wasted and the already hard pressed logistical lifeline being further strained.
Once the troops withdrew, both the Army Commander and Deputy Minister of Defence quickly distanced themselves from the decision leaving the Northern Commander General Rohan Daluwatta holding the baby. Counterpoint reliably understands that both the army Commander and the Deputy Minister of Defence Anuruddha Ratwatte were fully briefed on logistical problems and the necessity to pull back but niether the President who is also the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces nor the Kitchen cabinet that masterminded the propaganda offensive were informed of it. When the President at the Security Council blasted the military for misleading her, both of them kept quiet pretending that they were kept in the dark as well, leaving General Daluwatte to face the full wrath of the President,
The military is facing the same logistical problems in its preparation for 'Leap Forward 2" which by all accounts will be the biggest military offensive in the history of the country. At least the army has learned from one of the mistakes of the first operation and posted battle hardened, experienced commanders to command the troops in this operation. It is abundantly clear that the timing of 'Operation Leap Forward' was political rather than military and the debacle can be
partly explained by this. The Army
was pushed into carrying out the operation to deflect expected criticism for the Government not honouring the July 15th deadline to abolish the Presidency. If political expediency dictates the timetable for the all crucial second phase and the Army is forced to launch the operation before it is fully prepared, the end result will
be a much bigger disaster than
one can comprehend nowy.
point f
II


Page 14
ww.
Details of the Arme
(Source Europa Year book 1994 and updated
St.
100,000 men
O3 divisional commands
04 taskforce
09 infantry brigades 11 operations brigade groups 01 independent special forces brigade
Strength
8800 men
O2Surveillance commandships (containersh 35inshore patrol crafts of varying types. 05 landing craft 10 Israeli-built Dhora and Super Dhora fasti 06 Korean-built fast attack craft 01 locally-built off-shore patrol craft 06 Chinese built gunboats.
Main bases
Trincomalee, Colombo, Karainagar
Strength
6000 men
03 AN
32 Transporters 04 Squadrons Comprising O7Italian-built SF260 04 Chinese-built F-7 combat jets 02 Chinese-built F-7 trainers 04 Cessna 150/152 trainers 08 Chinese built Y-12s O2Chinese built Y-8 (AN12)s 01 Super King Air 03 Cessna Skymasters
Соит
12

IForces'strength
y Counterpoint with purchases and losses)
length
01 armoured brigade 02 reconnaissance 04 field artillery and 04 field engineer regiments 20 T-54/55 main battle tanks 3. '
30T-85Chinese-built armoured personnelcarriers
ps fitted with armour and radar)
attack naval craft
2ہے
01 Cessna 421 01 Cessna cardinal 09 Bell 212s 04 Bell 412s . 08jet rangers : ...: 06 Mi-17s
03.AVr0S
03Argentine-built Pucaragroundattackaircraft.
Flying bases
Ratmalana, Katunayake, Anuradhapura, Vavuniya, Palali, Amparai,Trincomalee, Batticaloa
erpoint
pol August 1995


Page 15
TTE units an
Supreme Commander Velupillai Pi Counter Intelligence and Internal Intelligence (
Deputy Military Comr Bal
Special Co.
Sea Tigers Intelligence/Immigration Ordinance
Black Tigers Military intelligence/Surve Military Planning Women's Wing Charles anthony brigade
Regional military leaders (Holdin
Batticaloa/Ampara Trincomalee Jaffna Mannar
Vavuniya Weli Oya Kilinochchi
Vavuniya
Estimated number of Total with recruits a (figures: Military in
Elite Charles Anthony brigade, Black Tigers, Underwater at Intelligence unit. Black Tigers carry out suicide missions
Head of Civilian Affairs (rank as sa Finance Justice
(former Member of Parliament of Eelam Revolutionary O. Parliamient when Eelam Win
Police Economic Affairs Education and Tamil Lang Political Affairs Cultural Affairs International secretariat
Please note that the LTTE leaders lise only
Count
August 1995

Cover Story
1structure
and National Leader abhakaran. leaded by Bosco) heads report directly to him.
hander Thamil Eelam
3)
mmanders
Soosai, Potti Amman Shanker Name not known illance Gaddafi
not known Jothy Sornann
g the rank of special commander)
Karuna Sudharan Selvaraj Lakshman Spoti Robert Ellakayan Anwan
fighting cadres 14,000 nd supporters 22,000 telligence estinates)
units tackgroups, Sea Tigers, Surveillance Units, Black Tiger for the LTTE. Sea Tigers too have a Black Sea Tiger unit.
sections ine as Special Commanders) Thamilenthi : Parajasingham ganisation of Students (EROS) 1989-1990. Resigned from
two broke out in June 1990)
Nadesan
Ravi guage Affairs Baby Subramaniam
Thamil Chelvann
Puthuvai Rathnathurai Thilahar-based in Paris
f one name which is generally a code name.
apoint
I3


Page 16
The Union
Blueprint fora
Land uill be a regional lista required by th reserve list subjec by the centre in c the regionu
Vya Sa
BELATEDLY perhaps, but boldly nevertheless, a government of Sri Lanka has finally recognised that federalismis the best, if not the last chance for national unity. Courageously and cogently, through her government's proposals for apolitical solution to the ethnic conflict, President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga has articulated a vision of genuine democratic powersharing and conflict resolution for our multi-ethnic society. She is to be especially commended for what are the most radical proposals for conflict resolution and constitutional reform in our post-independence history and for not ducking the challenge to present them at this crucial, critical juncture of our nation and statebuilding travails.
Although the word federalis not used, an omission no doubt thought to be politically necessary given the distorted chauvinist bogey of federalism as a precursor of secession, what is being proposed is healthily federal in substance. In the delineation and exercise of powers envisaged, powersharing in a partnership in governance is the dominant theme. On key issues, the creation of democratic space and the objective of unity in diversity, are well served.
The current Art 2 of the constitution declaring Sri Lanka to be an unitary state, will be amended to read that Sri Lanka will be an Union of Regions. One of the regions will be constituted from a redemarcation of the existing boundaries of the Northeast
Province and so designed to reconcile the interests of the Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim communities.
In the Union of Regions, the executive power of the People will be exercised by the President of the Republic acting on the advice
Counte
14
 

of Regions
nited Srilanka
subject on the mdstate land e centre for a t may be utilized Consultation uwith all council.
of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet of Ministers and the Governors acting on the advice of the respective Chief Ministers and the Regional Boards of Ministers. The legislative power of the People will be exercised by Parliament, Regional Councils and the People ata Referendum. So longas a chiefminister commands the confidence of the majority in the regional council s/he cannot be dismissed by the centre. A permanent commission of devolution will beestablished by the constitutional council to mediate and adjudicatedisputes between regions and between the centre and a region.
Land will be a subject on the regional list and state land required by the centre for a reserve list subject may be utilized by the centre in consultation with the regional council. Priority in land settlement will be given to persons first of the district and then of the region. Whilst there will be a national police service, there will also be regional police services headed by regional police commissioners functioning under the control of the chief minister. There will be no concurrent list.
Regional Councils will have powers of taxation in certain areas and be allowed to establish their own financial institutions. International borrowing above a prescribed limit, however, will require the
concurrence of the centre.
These proposals will have to go through the parliamentary select committee process before they are voted on by parliament. Once the requisite2/3 majority is obtained they will be voted upon by the country at a referendum. Furthermore, it is unclear as to whether the proposals that emerge from the select committee process will be presented to parliament - and to the people separately oras an integral part of a new constitution. Accordingly, the path to acceptance is fraught with risk and compromise and
point
August 1995


Page 17
The danger
committee pro
pouers to the
uvhittled douvn
most they will a
quasi-fede
comSti implementation could be a long haul replete with stubborn resistance and uncertainty.
What may emerge from the select committee process may be quantitatively, even qualitatively different from these proposals. It is not inconceivable that there will be amendments to tilt the balance of powers back in favour of the centre and thereby dilute the principle of partnership and powersharing. The proposals are so robustly federal in character from the outset that thisis a distinct possibility. There is no real scope for increasing the powers of the regions but rather a lot of room for scaling down those powers, if the select committee so desires. The federal principle will have to be staunchly defended against those who wish to seeiteroded if the conflict resolution essence of these proposals are to be effective.
Indeed the battle for acceptance will have to be fought through the select committee process and in the hearts and minds of the people. The battle for implementation will invariably have to be waged on . the ground with the LTTE and in this battle, needless to say, otherTamil political representation and civilian opinion will be crucial.
So far the proposals have been welcomed and opposition muted, relative to that anticipated for such radical reform. It should not be forgotten that the BCPact provoked satyagrahas, protest marches and communal riots and had to be torn up. The Indo-Lanka Accord was ushered in under, curfew, emergency and nearanarchy. Opinion has shifted. Ithas, hopefully, come along way. These are nevertheless early days and both within parliament and in the country at large, more opposition can be expected, ranging from outright chauvinism, defenceoftheunitary state and arguments about needlessly capitulating to Mr Prabhakaran's force majeure.
The constituent parties of the
Соитte
August 1995
 

Cover Story II
in the select
cess is that the
egions will be
and that at the
pproximate the
ral Indian
ution.
PA too will no doubt express reservations in the select committee and the UNP can be relied upon to drag that process out in the clarification of detail. Apart from the range of powers, there is of course the key issue of redemarcation and the position of the Muslims. There is also the Tamil demand for asymmetrical federalism on the grounds that it is the Tamil community that has fought and sacrificed for federalism. It would be politically suicidal for any Tamil politician in the northeast region to end up with the same powers as the chief minister of any region in the south who, rather than agitating for federalism, has looked upon it as anathema.
The danger in the select committee process is that the powers to the regions will be whittled down and that at the most they will approximate the quasifederal Indian constitution. Alternatively, if the Tamil parties were to succeed in their demand for asymmetrical federalism, it possible that the powers of the northeast region will be equivalent to that of an Indian state and that the present provincial council system will be retained for the rest of the country. Another alternative would be to merge existing provinces in the south into larger regions along the lines that Mr Thondaman has suggested. Any form of compromise will be hazardous.
The marketing strategy for the present proposals is based on the thesis that in order to make the Tamil demand for federalism in substance acceptable to the Sinhalese, the Sinhalese too must get the same powers. Asymmetrical federalism has been jettisoned to neutralise the chauvinist argument that the Tamils are being rewarded at the expense of the Sinhalese majority. Were the government to be unmoved on this, it would have to accept that the powers of the regional councils should be determined by the demands of the Tamil minority, if that
at


Page 18
That federalism is an argument be met by tabul of ular, in the pa future in terms
and material a
prosperity.
community is to support the proposals at all.
The rightmarketingstrategy, it goes without saying, is indispensable for any conflict resolution proposal that has to be ratified by the people and their representatives. Were the government to succeed in galvanising public opinion behind federalism, this opinion would have a positive bearing on the select committee process and the vote in parliament.
There is evidence to indicate that the current leadership of the UNP without whose support the proposals cannot be accepted, are prone to a wait and See approach to ascertain public opinion, before revealing their political position on these conflict resolution proposals.
In galvanising public opinion there are number of factors that need to be borne in mind and a number of arguments that need reiterating forcefully and lucidly to allay misplaced fears about federalism.
There must be no reticence in presenting the argument that political proposals are fundamental to an end to the ethnic conflict and that ethnic conflict cannot be resolved without genuine powersharing. The corollary to this, that the real alternative to powersharing is indefinite and fatally debilitating war, must also be stressed. Moreover, it must also be emphasised, that if war is unavoidable because without it genuine powersharing cannot be realised, the demonstrable commitment to powersharing is nevertheless absolutely necessary as the legitimation of the resort to
IS, These arguments in turn will be greatly augmented by the unapologetic statement of democratic powersharing as a fundamental precondition for a prosperous Sri Lanka in the 21st century.
The indispensable contribution of federalism for unity indiversity in a multi-ethnic Society must also be firmly rooted in the public psyche. The deeply flawed and spurious expedient of holding up the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia
Counte
I6
 

is expensive, that can only tting the costs st, present and ofтет, тотеу тd есототic foregone.
as examples of federalism must be demolished. This is a grossly misinformed exercise in inciting fear by analogy. There can be no federalism, which is in essence democratic powersharing, under an overarching totalitarian and hegemonistic ideology. Quite simply, there can be no federalism without liberal democracy to underpin it. Federalism will sustain good governance. With it there can be no almighty executive presidency, with it there have to be democratic checks and balances on the exercise of
power.
That the concentration of powerin the unitary state and in a single institution, office or person has contributed substantially to the current situation in which a quasi-state exists in the northeast of this island and terrorism hangs over our heads as a Damoclean sword, must be forcefully elaborated. In the face of our contemporary political and constitutional history, the hysterical characterisation of federalism as a sure fire guarantee of secession, is either deeply mischievous, woefully misinformed or absurdly disingenuous.
That federalism is expensive, is an argument that can only be met by tabulating the costs of war, in the past, present and future in terms of men, money and material and economic prosperity foregone. We have paid in blood and bucks for the status quo; the future demands that we discard expensive and obnoxious paradigms as the price of national unity.
All this must be presented in simplecomprehensible language and in an attractive format. Whilst it is important to expose the public to the learned discourse of academics about the principle and practice of federalism, its various models and minutiae, it won't do to canvass popular support for these proposals through an exercise akin to an islandwide open university course on devolution.
The involvement of public figures from all walks of life in
point
August 1995


Page 19
The fight him argument util costs, uphilst the
he wants' thesi politically perm uith it one ri potentially, possih
the projection of these proposals as basic to a prosperous and peaceful future is tremendously important. A popular film star or sports personality, a housewife ora student, have greatercredibility and persuasiveness in attracting mass support for powersharing especially on the electronic media, than a tedious excess of university professors or politicians. The debate needs to be widened and new entrants encouraged. The fears " and misunderstandings of average citizens need to be allayed and their hopes and aspirations projected. Civil society groups must take the initiative in the event that the government fails to acknowledge and utilise their potential in this respect.
There is one tough and basic issue that needs to be ultimately addressed in the conflict resolution process and that is the objective and the viability of war and its effect on the acceptance and implementation of a political solution of pwersharing. This relates directly to the role of the LTTE as well as to Tamil civilian support for the government's conflict resolution efforts.
Is the war necessary to implement this or any other powersharing package? Can power be shared with the LTTE and if not, should the Government prosecute a war against them until they are defeated? Does the government and the country have the will and the ability to continue to prosecute a war against the LTTE for how ever long it takes? Won't war alienate the Tamils? Should the governmentallow the Tamil people in the northeast to be subjugated by the LTTE under the guise of conflict resolution ? They are our people and this government is their government. Politically, the President cannot afford to be taken or seen to be taken for a ride by Mr Prabhakaran. Once bitten twice shy is a deeply embedded piece of elementary political craft and one the President must beacutely aware of after the 19th of April. At the same time however, she
\
Counte.
August 1995
 

Cover Story
to the finish' entail grave give him what s, if that were issible, carries sky and one bromising ility.
must also be aware that support for the package could dwindle if the war has to be intensified and if it produces setbacks.
The way out of this is to marshal support for powersharing as the only legitimate basis on which Sri Lankans can fight Sri Lankans for the unity, peace and prosperity of Sri Lanka. Were this to be deemed 'thepath to hellis paved with good intentions' option and dismissed accordingly, then what is leftistalking to Mr Prabhakaran. Talking to Mr Prabhakaran, it seems clear, will only bear fruit if you give him what he wants. After all talking will constituteanadmission of defeat in the effort to defeat him, which is also still a stubborn reality of this war.
The President has taken one big bold step in proposing federalism, this would entail another in quick succession, along the lines of Mr Thondaman's suggestion that Mr Prabhakaran be given control of the northeast for a period of five years, before any lasting arrangement is effected. What would happen to the Muslims in the northeast and Mr Ashraff's response to this, would seriously compound the president's political woes.
The fight him to the finish' argument will entail grave costs, whilst the give him what he wants' thesis, if that were politically permissible, carries with it one risky and one potentially promising possibility. The risk is that Mr Prabhakaran would then push for a separate state of Eelam and war will have to be resumed; the promise is that he won't and that the people of the northeast will be given a greater opportunity to clarify their relationship with him and the LTTE in a context devoid of hostilities.
The President has to decide as to whether she is going to be able to decide the fate of Mr Prabhakaran oras to whethershe should facilitate a situation in which the people of the northeast will do so. It is they in the end who will seal his fate and decide their own.
I7


Page 20
No need to fe
Chanaka Amaratunga
A rose would smellas Sweet, by whatever name. Trite, and not even always true. It is far more sensible that the true meanings of political concepts should beclearly identified and understood. With therevelation of the Governments package of devolution, to be included in the draft constitution that, I hope, will be adopted before the end of 1995, three little words come into sharp focus: unitary, federal and united.
Among the nationalists there is a widespread belief that a nation cannot be united if it is not unitary. The similarity between the words unitary and united in English and the like similarity of their Sinhala substitutes, ekeeya and eksath have tended to obscure for many Sri Lankans, the reality that as concepts these are very distinct and even different things.
The first conceptrelates to atype of constitutional arrangement in relation to the division of power, the second to the state of political health of a country.
Before I explain the distinction between a unitary and a united state further, I must also emphasize that much of our confusion regarding these two concepts and our attendant fear offederalism, is part of our inherited historical baggage.Thereisaprofoundirony here, for various Sinhalanationalists or organizations who proclaim their devotion to the unitary state, holdit to be axiomatic that a united Sri Lanka cannot exist without it, and believe with passionate intensity that federalism is the thin end of the wedge that will end in the triumph of separatism, show how profoundly their minds have been
colonized by tr attitudes on these hysterical hostili the British Conse. demonstratestov
as a nOWe to Wal ment of a federal makes clear the cion that many B federal idea.
Sri Lanka, devolution PrÓVinCia C
has been un means Of th Amendim COinStitutiOr unitary State Kingdom, F Zealand an examples demoCracie unitary
Lennox Boyd, w ited Sri Lanka n Under Secretary Foreign Office, d conversation wi sumed that a u was in fact a uni So Whata uniti it different from it possible that united state that Could there be a is not united ?
I repeat, to de beingunitary ist stitutional chari
Соит
I8

arthe F Word
aditional British eissues. The nearty that a wing of rvative Party now wards what itsees rds the establishWestern Europe profound suspiritons have of the Equally, Mark
despite the of power to Duncils which dertaken, by le Thirteenth ent t0 the l, remainS a 2. The United ranCe, New di ISrael are ; Of libera S Which are
| StateS.
rho when he vislot long ago was of State at the lemonstrated in a th me that he asnitary Sri Lanka ted Sri Lanka.
ary state? How is a united state? Is there could be a was not unitary? unitary state that
scribe a state as
o describeitsconacter in relation
terpoint
to the division of power within that state. In the conventional classification of constitutions in relation to the division of power there exist only two forms, unitary and federal. A unitary state is one in which all legislative and executive authority is vested in a single legislature and a single government that may then delegate a proportion of its authority to other bodies at a local level. The essential feature of a unitary state is a single source of legislative and executive authority which enables powers devolved to be withdrawn and locally elected administrations or legislatures to be dissolved or abolished at the whim of the legislature and/or the executive. Sri Lanka, despite the devolution of power to Provincial Councils which has been undertaken, by means of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, remains a unitary state. The United Kingdom, France, New Zealand and Israel are examples of liberal democracies which are unitary states. To describe a country as united is to make no statement about the division of power asset out within its constitution. It is rather, a statement about whether a country is a single political entity and whether it is held together by a real sense of political unity. Thus, the United Kingdom, France, New Zealand and Israel, my examples of liberal democratic unitary states are indeed united states or countries. However, the United States of America, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland and Belgium are also united countries but they are not unitary states.
To describe a nation as a federal state is, like to describe one as a unitary state, to make a statement
August 1995


Page 21
aboutits constitution in relation to the division of power. The essential feature of a federal constitution is that it has a clearly defined division of legislative and executive authority. Whereas a unitary state has only one government, a federal state contains a central or federal government and several provincial or regional governments. The powers of the legislature and the executive are clearly divided in the constitution between the central or federal authorities and the provincial or regional authorities. In view of the central feature of a federal constitution being a clear
these countries a the Sense that ea single political ei ples share a co identity.
It is patently o in order to be a (such as German one need not be Equally, it shoul that although Si today a unitary st in legal Sense, it country, in reali from being a un the contrary, sig Of Sri Lankas te
division of power between several institutions of governance, federal constitutions arealways written, and are documents of some detail and complexity. It is also an essential feature of federal constitutions that the rules of the political game are deemed to have been established upon the common agreement of the federal authorities and the provincial
ళ
it is not neCeSSar
be a unitary One. It
Inited StateS are in
federal StateS. It is
Lanka under it
Constitution has C.
country in a me
orregional authorities. It is also a characteristic feature of a federal state that the federal or central government does not have the power to dismiss the provincial or regional governments or to dissolve the provincial or regional legislatures. The United States of America, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Australia, Argentina, Switzerland and Belgium are examples of liberal democratic federal states.
Any person who understands the meaning of a united state will have no doubt that if the United Kingdom and France are united states so are the United States of America, Canada or Germany. All
the Northern Pr areas of the East outside the con mate governmei It is not neces state to be a uni dent that many not unitary states It is clear also tha its current unitar
ceased to be a ur
meaningful sens
It is evident t democratic fede amples cited by break up of Yu Soviet Union are were prior to the
Count
August 1995

ՆՍvԵI sւUI) :
e united States in nch of them is a ntity whose peommon national
bvious then that
united country y or Canada are) a unitary state. d be recognized i Lanka is even ate and although may be a united ty it is very far ited country. On nificant portions rritory, much of
tarian Communist states which concentrated, not divided, power) has ever broken up. The popular misconception of nationalist opponents of federalismin Sri Lanka, that a federal constitution would permit provinces or regions to secede from the country to which they belong and would make the federal or central government of such a country powerless to resist such a secession, is based upon a total ignorance of the facts. No federal state would permit the secession of one of its sub-national units and it is almost impossible to find historical examples of such occurrences. On
y for a united State to is evident that many
Ot initary States but
S Clear also that Sri
S Current unitary
aSed to be a united
aningful sense.'
the contrary, the United States of America, one of the most federal of nations, fought a civil war, during the presidency of Abraham Lincoln on precisely the principle that the union was indivisible and that no state of the United States could secede from it.
It is also evident that not only large federal states like the United States and Canada but
ovince and some ern Province, are rol of the legitiht of Sri Lanka.
sary for a united ary one. It is eviunited states are but federal states. t Sri Lanka under y constitution has ited country in a e. bo that no liberal ral state (the exnationalists of the goslavia and the not valid as they irbreak up totali
apoint
even small federal states such as Switzerland and Belgium where ethnic and linguistic diversity exists, have maintained their unity, prosperity and freedom by adopting and successfully working federalism.
When a new constitutional order is now being discussedlet not confusion and misunderstanding about the three little words united, federal and unitary be our undoing. Sri Lanka should not sacrifice its only chance for unity upon the decrepit alter of the unitary state. It should not throw away its only chance for unity as well as peace, by a morbid fear of federalism.
I9


Page 22
A moment in the life of the military offensive, Operatio which caused so much damage in so short a time consequence gained from it.
Counte 20
 

leap Forward, th. So little of
int
August 1995


Page 23
Laid out in exploded near C. hand Cart th
Counter August 1995
 

Cruel line are the accidental victims of a bomb that Ombo's Independence Square, allegedly hidden in a intended target of which was the Deputy Minister of
Defence.
bint
27


Page 24
Public Eye
DISAPEARANCES of Tamil youth on a large scle in the South last took place in October 1993under the UNP Government. Investigations by journalists brought out several features of operation. A report in the Counterpoint implicated a DIG Police and also some officers in the NIB. About four corpses appeared in the Negombo area. But once the operation was blown, most of those taken in were released and further activity was halted. Following the breakdown of the ceasefire on 19th April, this phenomenonhasmanifested itself in a more sinister manner under a new Government which made Human Rights an issueatelections
last year.
A number of dis with heads shave in lakes and wa South. Corpses w identified appear Tamils. Para phenomenon is disappearances o is nothing to ind persons were suspicion of work Two among thi suggest that there to believe that thes up are connected that have been ap those responsibl within the Armec What followsgi the kind of pe circumstances in
picked up.
22
Counte
 

figured corpses have appeared terways in the hich have been
to be those of lleling this a series of f Tamils. There icate that these icked up on ng for theLTTE. cases below is strong reason eTamilspicked vith the corpses bearing and that 2 are a group
Forces. /essomeidea of sons and the hich they were
8th May 1995
Anton Krishanthan of Gnanasuriam Square, Batticaloa, who has been a refugee in Wellawatte, disappeared when he went to buy a dinner parcel. His mother, Mrs. Sebamalai, informed the ICRC & approached the TULF office a month later.
4th June
Marcelline Michael Collins (21) taken as he was leaving St. Anthony's Church, Kochchikade, after worship, by persons who came in a white van.
8th June
Mahendran Sathiyaseelan of Mathagal, Jaffna, picked up at the Fort Railway Station while returning to the North.
point
August 1995


Page 25
14th June
Aiyavu Shanmuganathan (26) of Nanaattan, Mannar District, and Kittnapillai Thuruparan (27) of Karaveddy, Jaffna (employee of Vasala Communication Centre, Vasala Road, Kotahena, were having breakfast at Soma Cafe opposite Mariamman Temple, Kotahena. The two were taken by armed men who came in a Land Rover.
17th June
Vaithilingam Vilvarajah of Kovilkulam, Vavuniya, missing in Colombo.
22nd June
Sinnathurai Baskaran (26) was travelling in an auto with Rs. 54,000/- in cash in his
26th June
Thuraisingham M Jaffna detained Selvarasa ( Poovarasanku kulam, detainec
29th June
Thambippillai V. and Ratnam N detained in Hav
19th July
Ajanthan, a brillia leading school, a former TULF Batticaloa. Distri opposite the Pet A van stopped in occupantąsked address writtel which point persuaded to bo.
possession at about 11.30 a.m., when he was detained in front of the Elphinstone Theatre, Maradana by uniformed men identified as being from the STF. The auto driver being his friend directly informed Baskaran's wife living in Hussainia Street. The two of them proceeded to the Maligawatte Police Station and made a report.
These MPS als0 Saidt nor leading members know who is respOn independent investi said to be working
have Only COme up has been Suggestec Sections of the forces With violations Over
investigators thems some leads to protect
27th June During the day some
persons came to Sun Video Shop where he worked in a white pickup truck with government markings. This shop is next to Vivekananda College. These men left behind an envelope on which Baskaran's name and address were typed in Sinhalese and went away. The envelope was found to contain a wristwatch wrapped in a handkerchief, bothidentified by his wife as belonging to Baskaran. No further information has been received.
then discovered
occupants he
women's were a women cloth evidently verifie Tamil he was
something that consciousness. V up he found his and around hil shavenprisoners were bleeding f the meantime contacted leadii
August 1995
Counter

issues
rino of Uduvil, Mattakkuliya. hristian of am, MadhunDematagoda.
ratharajah (24) ethirajah (23) lock Road.
nt student of a nd nephew of a
MP in the it, was waiting ah Bus station. 2ar him, and an directions to an in Tamil, at the boy was ard the van. He
who reportedly complained to the IGP and the Army Commander. Ajanthan's abductors told him that he appeared to be influential since several inquiries about his wellbeing were made from high levels. On the 20th morning Ajanthan was asked toget into a van and was dropped off in the Pettah area from where he returned home. Tamil MPs questioned on the matter are generally convinced that all indications are that the operation is being carried out either by a section within the forces, or a rogue group having the blessings of powerful elements in the Forces. Shaven heads, they said, are also an indication of the links between the disappearances and the floating bodies shaving making identification more defficult. These MPs also said that neither the
hatneither the IGP GPding members of the G0Vernment of the Government know sible although two Y.S.SENSE
gating teams are hard. So far, they With dead ends. It that since large have been tainted dozen years, the lves may ignore ertain individuals.
hat two of the mistook for tually men in es. Having l that he was dministered lade him lose hen he woke head shaven were other ome ofwhom m torture. In his father TULF MPs
ከf
although two independent investigating teams are said to be working hard. Sofar, they have only come up with dead ends. It has been suggested that since large sections of the forces have been tainted with violations over a dozen years, the investigators themselves may ignore some leadstoprotectcertain individuals. The fact thatin the last case the IGP took a personal interest and had his subordinates running around and the message got through, has obvious implications.
There is also the question whether the disappeared were picked up on suspicion or merely because they were Tamil? An MP suggested that the latterispossible in some cases, but also that it is likely that several of those picked up were shadowed because their friends had been previously held on suspicion.
A 3


Page 26
The PA and the abolition (
A case of the Spiri the bodyb
Vyasа
WHILST cynics would have said, even before the 17th of August 1994 when the PA government came into office, that its promise to abolish the Executive Presidency and change the Constitution by the 15 of July 1995 would never be kept, after the 17th of August 1994, even the more optimistic were aware that it could not be done given the existing parliamentary arithmetic. By repeating their promise, the President and the relevant minister nevertheless did their best to sustain expectations that they would deliver. In the meantime, and not politically inconveniently, Mr Prabhakran had launched the Third Eelam War unilaterally and the Mahanayake of the Malwatte Chapter had been moved to pronounce that constitutional reform should be deferred in the face of the grave and present danger posed by him.
Consequently, the 15th of July came and went, amidst Operation Leap Forward into LTTE territory, timed it would seem to ensure that considerations of constitutional reform and election promises would be relegated to second place if not forgotten, in the anxious climate generated by the military offensive and the anticipation of victory. Predictable politics perhaps, but what of the promise? Is the presidency here to stay for the
foreseeable futu is so contingent is in turn contin ironically its like eternal life.
For instance, t comfortable par majority that wo Government ina ! once the preside cannot be obtair fresh General El crossover clause hasn't yet seen t
ols the pre
to stay
fOreSeeable
abolition is S
O SO UC
turn COnti
ironically it
COuld be et
A fresh General may hinge upor in the ethnic cor the metamorpho Prabhakaran.
The former is realm of probab within that of pi than a certainty; certainly highly not im-possible. Jayewardene's c PA talking fooli
24
Соит

f the Executive Presidency
tbeing Willing and
ing Weak?
re? Its abolition on so much that gent that ly fate could be
he requisite liamentary suld buttress the he legislature ncy is abolished, led without a ection or a
for MPs which he light of day.
sidency here
for the
» futureP ItS
30 Contingent
h that is in
ngent that
S likely fate
erna life. 389
Election, in turn, military victory flict and / or
sis of Mr
outside the lity and just issibility, rather the latter is improbable if Mr J.R. omment on the hly and acting
point
wisely on this issue could well turn out to be vintage Macchiavelli on the squalidly Macchiavelliam!
The Government's commitment to abolish the Executive Presidency and promulgate a new constitution nonetheless stands reaffirmed at present. There are no deadlines this time around and no one seems to be really asking for Oe.
The DUNF Lalith wing, the constituent party of the PA for whom abolition is effectively its political raison d'etre, has pointed out that it was not bound by a particular deadline but by a particular commitment to abolition and that commitment still stands. Mr Batty Werakoon of the LSSP, another constituent party of the PA, remains wedded to his private motion to proceed with abolition ahead of root and branch constitutional reform. Mr Weerakoon does not waver from his belief that abolition in the lifetime of this parliament is possible, and is determined to prove it if the Speaker allows him to.
The UNP has on two occasions in the last year, under the leadership of Mr Dissanayake and Mr Wickremesinghe respectively, offered the Government its support to abolish the Executive Presidency and has been twice rebuffed. The Government has argued that constitutional reform cannot be parcelled out piece meal; a new
August 1995


Page 27
constitution must be considered as a comprehensive and integrated package, the component parts of which cannot be viewed separately.
This stands as the Government's favoured explanation for its
failure to abolish the Executive Presidency. In the week leading up to the deadline there were reports that the conduct of the war necessitated its retention and even reports that the minister was dismissing this but conceding unfavourable parliamentary arithmetic in the . event of abolition, as the cause of its retention.
Finally we got the official version from the minister. According to Professor Pieris the delay is "attributable primarily to one consideration. This has to
do with the palpa a variety of facets Constitution are i intertwined, so th be disentangled a piecemeal and in another with any coherence".
Fine, but is this story of the much promise to abolis Presidency and re new constitution July? Did it take whole year to dis consideration " a discovered much wasn't the proces constitutional ref Indeed, if that toc possible why did the last moments deadline to tell th there would be n
August 1995
Counte,
 

Constitution
ble reality that
of the new nextricably at they cannot nd dealt with isolation of one degree of
the end of the vaunted
the Executive place it with a py the 15th of well near a over this 'One ld if it was earlier why
of rm expedited? WaS not it take up to of that fateful country that show except
Joint
the status quo from there to ..... ?
The real issue here is the failure of the Government to fulfill a promise it made so much of at successive electoral contests and capriciously affixed a definite date to. This was identified in the communication to the JVP from the current President as Prime - Minister and presidential candidate and was the basis upon which the JVP candidate withdrew from that election.
The issue as a political one is also a moral one and if the cynics are right about the timing of Leap Forward, the President also stands accused of ordering military action to distract from inability and/or unwillingness to abolish the Executive Presidency. Cynics and critics alike argue that soldiers were
25


Page 28
sent into battle primarily to bail Her Excellency out of acute political embarrassment and this was a very shabby thing to do.
Her Excellency who made the promise, has yet to give the country her explanation. It is after all an important enough an issue going right to the heart of the nature and structure of the Sri Lankan state, for the chief executive to directly communicate her doubts and difficulties to the Sri Lankan people? It is also, after all, one of the main planks upon which her thumping 62% mandate reStS.
Professor Pieris did not make the original promise; he only repeated it. He nevertheless has to explain away the broken promise and maybe he does relish the challenge and is immune to cynics and critics alike. Nevertheless, in explaining the broken promise he is also exposing his political naivete about the complexities of constitutional reform or again as the cynics and critics would have it, he is allowing his bona fides on this issue, willy nilly, to be besmirched.
History will judge, and morality does not delineate detailed policy but provide sign posts in the storm of politics. The government had to respond militarily to the LTTE resumption of hostilities and the timing may have been due to factors other than the cynical. The whole episode however can look different without too much dis-belief or difficulty and perceptions matter in politics a great deal. "-
The Govern-ment's failure to abolish the executive Presidency and the manner they seem to have gone about the political damage limita-tion exercise with
respect to it, hav than edifying. C Her Excellency's reputation for hc and good goverr sullied. Most un
“The Executive abolished and th
depend upon a
House from the
thereafter, if a
package is also
the ethnic
has contributed cynicism about the irresistible al a time when whi needed is a reaff liberal democrat virtues and valu because this was desired and eag It may be argu masses really do damn about con reform. Perhaps a large extent ab an isolated one. not be forgotten broken promise credibility of the and contributes of faith in the pc leadership that i body politic. Thi affairs from whi politics and gov deliver us. Cons matter. Promise made to be kept seriously. This is alter the cost of price of a pound Broken, it could significant as tha which ushered i power like there tomorrow.
Let us give the
M
Соит

e been a lot less onsequently,
excelent onest politics hance has been fortunately, this
Presidency can be
e GOVernment Can
majority in the
minority parties
federal political
Offered to reSOve
C0nflict. 99
to societal politicians and lure of power at at is sadly irmation of ic political es —not least
fervently arly anticipated. led that the not give a stitutional
this is correct to out the issue as However, let it that every such erodes the
Government to the corrosion litical Sheld in the is is a state of ch democratic
ernanCe mu St titutions do s should be and taken sn't one that will living like the
of bread. be as ominously at referendum in the abuse of
was no
e IPA the benefit
of the doubt and expect, if not the abolition of the Executive Presidency and a new constitution in the course of the PA's first term in office, at least demonstrably sincere efforts on their part to realise this.
The Executive Presidency can be abolished and the Government can depend upon a majority in the House from the minority parties thereafter, if a federal political package is also offered to resolve the ethnic conflict. It is not merely the facets of the constitution that are linked but, importantly, constitutional reform and conflict resolution too. There can be no meaningful powersharing with the Executive Presidency, short of a US style constitution with a rigid separation of powers and this is not on offer.
There has to be a clear objective and a coherent strategy to achieve it. The Government must decide on what it wants to do and on what it wants to be Seen to be doing. It cannot be in the national interest to have a fine constitution on paper without a whisper of an intention to implement it or the ghost of a chance of actually succeeding in doing so.
Maybe Macchiavelli should be re-read and this time with a view to seeking instruction on how things should be done, rather than whether they ought to be. All cliches contain a measure of truth and the one about politics being the art of the possible is no exception. On this issue, this column suspects that the problem is not one of means So much as motive.
Quite simply, I don't think this Government wants to abolish the Executive Presidency just yet. Or badly enough, whenever.
terpoint
August 1995


Page 29
N. Vanan
FEW would have failed to notice the irony that runs through the position of liberal/leftists in the current crisis--oneyearago, many of us carried an unqualified opposition to war, appalled at any military calculus involving civilian lives, etc. Now, living under a government that professes a commitment to peace and a political solution, many of us are getting comfortable with war with the familiar preamble that we have to come to terms with the "inevitability of war.
The body count from the North makes it imperative that we stop to reconsider exactly what license is provided under the banner of "inevitability'.
It is perhaps uncontroversial to point out that the LTTE's unilateral decision to resume the carnage cynically contravened the aspirations of the Tamil people of the North and the East. The political ethics surrounding the PA Government's military operation may be less clear cut. It is true that the PA Government, which took over power on a mandate for peace, was closest to representing the people when it initiated the peace process. For the first time since independence, we have a head of state who made a good faith commitment to resolving the ethnicproblem. Yet, today the state is engaged in a military offensive resulting in the loss of hundreds of civilian lives. Having made those difficult steps towards directing discussion towards alternative political programs for resolution of the ethnic crisis, in a matter of weeks we have slid back into war with dizzying speed. There has been little discussion on
how we can i
structures that ei accountability th of the war and til direct the modali the wareffortope and criticism. T liberal's embrace Commitment to et been a near blank war in the name
lS Warine
Yos
This question couched in the military solutio) solution. The pre limited war to er fora political solu! situation indicate (i) The LTTE ha: marginalised a that could have Tamils. As evic hostile respons people's emb President's pea LTTE is determi any deviation line. Brutally popular protes being treated representatives (ii) Ithas repeatedl in deeds, its in accepting anyth separate state - actions they h resisted all alter self-determinati vision of Ta Recently, it thw serious of atte about peace. As cadres die compromises harder to justif Im OVement increasingly separatist rheto
August 1995
Counte,
 

Cover Story
nstitutionalise sure avenues of tmake the goals e decisions that ies surrounding to public debate he cost of the of the President's Innic fairness has check to "wage of peace."
vitable ?
is no longer opposition of h and political sident talks of a lable conditions ion. The ground s the following: s eliminated or any movement represented the lenced by their e to the Tamil prace of the ce initiative, the ned to suppress from the party uppressing all t, it insists on as the sole of the Tamils. y demonstrated, transigence in ing less than a Through their ave insistently lative visions of on to attain their mil Eelam ‘-- arted the most mpts to bring more and more for Eelam, will become and the whole
(iii) The LTTE refuses to recognise the futility of a military solution. Yes, there have been temporary military advantages (such as SAM missiles, Sea mines, etc.). However, instead of bringing the LTTE closer to military victory, these have served only to escalate the scale of war and thereby, to increase the intensity of human suffering. Based on these facts, we see the enormity of the obstacle the LTTE poses toanyattempt tobringabout peace. From this ground situation, many conclude that a government seriously interested in peace will be forced into a war. Formulating the problem in this way leads to a conclusion that was being advocated by the Sinhala Chauvinists from the very first day. In fact, since peace was too risky an enterprise for them, it was precisely this calculation that the LTTE was probably counting on in their effort to provoke the government into the kind of war that ensures the LTTE's survival
When Southern hawks make this calculation and argue for war, Tamil hardliners cite this as proof that the state structure is chronically racist and make a parallel argument for the inevitability of war.
Recognising that "it seems impossible to deal with theTigers" or that "the State is structurally chauvinistic" is one step in the analysis -- not the conclusion. In fact, decisive conclusions seem elusive in the current situation. The overwhelming mandate for peace offered by the Southern electorate is qualified by the continued resilience of chauvinist elements: the Sri Lankan State - from the defense forces to the parliamentary and electoral system to the media- has been
vill become rapped in a ic.
oínt
うケ


Page 30
nurtured in chauvinistic traditions. The President's commitment to apolitical solution stands in precarious tension with the military campaign called for by hard-liners, both in the government and outside. At least one consequence of this is that there is a continued attempt to elide and confuse the distinction between an attack on the LTTE and an attack on the civilian populations of the North and East.
66
CCountability
must be underSt00 in terms of the underlying
political Commitments
that inform Our approach
to the War. ThuS, We See
accountability as
fundamentally grounded
in S0Cial COntextS and
democratic objectives.
Thus even "inevitability' c LTTE does not our vigilance r war poses to c North and t democratic pol everywhere.
From inevitabili
One could rea here as merely debate to a c moving from inevitability of of accountabi argued that "accountability war becomes those who fudg with war wi disclaimer reg responsibility c Un doubted number of sp government ca fraction of the by the civilian North and East: on essential f supplies; facili international ri as the ICRC; op to internatio) eliminating sh. strategy; tr personnel on with provocat ways that respe holding promp of the state f atrocities; em committees ar with direct acc the South, etc. These are s save thousanc mitigate the su these initia important. Ho urge that it discourse of 'a critical that w proposals suc Accountab
2ዳ
Co

cognising the
war against the allow us to relax garding the risks ilian lives in the e East and to tical engagement
y to accountability
dourintervention shifting the same ifferent register, nvocations of the war to invocations tity. It could be the call for in the conduct of he safe refuge of e their discomfort h a convenient arding the moral f war. ly, there are a ecific things the n do to ease some hardship suffered populations of the lifting the embargo ood and medical tating the work of alief agencies such ening the arena up hal news media; elling as a military aining defense strategies to deal on by militants in ct civilian interests; it trials of members orces committing powering citizens d providing them ess to the media in
eps which would s of lives and help fering of the living; ves are vitally wever, we would unpacking the :countability", it is go beyond policy as these.
lity must be
understood in terms of the underlying political commitments that inform our approach to the war. Thus, we see accountability as fundamentally grounded in social contexts and democratic objectives. For instance, an
analysis that includes in its
calculus the interests and aspirations of the people of the North and East may come up with different ways of looking at the problemandformulatinganswers. In the dominant framework, the policy proposals listed above are seen as political concessions that have to be weighted against the war effort. Instead, respecting the interests and aspirations of the people of the North and East would produce these policy proposals as part of the political commitments that provide the touchstone for all decision making, including the military campaign against the LTTE. This- is not to say that an anti-embargo position would automatically follow from democratic principles. The same political commitment to the democratic aspirations of the people would produce a proembargo position in South Africa of the Apartheid years (in response to the ANC call for a boycott), and an anti- embargo position in Sri Lanka (in response to popular sentiment in the North). The relevant question we ask of ourselves is, then: what are the concrete actions through which the government can establish that the State's fight against the LTTE does not undermine its commitment to the rights of the Tamil people?
Here politicizing accountability is not a formula that will give us a neatanswer about the appropriate course of actionatany givenpoint. At the same time, it is not a statement of our principles and ideals in the abstract. Instead, it is a political touchstone that comes to terms with the tensions that relate our principles to social context in some complex and ambivalent way.
nterpoint
August 1995


Page 31
This discussionofaccountability should not be misunderstood as one that individualizes moral responsibility to situate it in the realm of personal integrity. Moreover, we also see the discourse of accountability as relevant not only to the exercise of State power, but also to the community at large. In pushing the democratic content of the discourse of accountability, weare calling foran insistent vigilance-a vigilance in reminding us that every decision to perpetuate, shape or limit war is a political decision with responsibilities to the community. These are political commitments that refuse the reduction of decisions about war to military strategy (such as the state's campaign to "Take Jaffna") divorced from political content (such as the racist ideological apparatus of the state, etc.). Similarly, these are commitments that refuse the abstraction of military objectives to goals (such as the LTTE's aim to achieve Eelam) divorced from social consequences (the brutal dismemberment of society).
Realising the democraticcontent of the discourse of accountability means a critical questioning of the background assumptions that inform our analysis, actions and goals regarding the war.
Beyond the politics of War
In the context of a military campaign the discourse of accountability underscores the responsibility to envision and build alternative political programs for pluralism and participatory democracy, not as Some longterm goalpost-war, but
as a day to day process of
institution building.
Taking into account ground conditions without being circumscribed by it, we recognize that the ground situation in the Southis such thatnotwithstanding the 'good intentions' of some
members of th Southern cons institutional arral State remain entre and exclusionary context, being ac commitment to society would mea "good intentions changes in the arrangements of would range fri measures (such proposals noted term structural cl the devolution ofs provide the politic towards realizing pluralist democra Thus, devolutio not as a balu implemented pos ongoing process til the release of th proposals. It is r request that the p be released. We political culture th to democratic p defining the arrangements of state. Thus, thenee that shrouded t package raises se regarding a openness, parti Similarly, it is dis the government c victory to the Sin forces in the Sout cash in on milita "sell" the devolut democratic course have been to cont popular supportf all levels - from th village level; a promote and de involved. Here, be to the commitme and democracy involve devolutic alternative to war
COnclu
Framing the cl
August 1995
Соитte

Cover Story
e IPA and the tituency, the gements of the nched in a racist structure. In this countable to the a mutli-ethnic ngoing beyond, " to structural institutional the state. This pm short-term as the policy above), to longhanges (such as tatepower) that 'al space to work , the ideal of a су. n should beseen eprint to be t-war, but as an hat goesbeyond e government's lot adequate to olitical package need to build a hat is committed articipation in institutional a decentralised dforthesecrecy he devolution rious questions ccountability, cipation, etc. appointing that hose to concede nala Chauvinist h, and, opted to ry successes to ion package. A 'ofaction would inue to mobilise or devolution at enational to the campaign to pate the issues ing accountable nt to pluralism would have to on as the lived
Sion
hoices available
point
huS, deV0luti0n
Should be Seen not as a
blueprint to be
implemented post-War, but as an Ongoing process that goes beyond
the release of the government's proposals. It is not adequate to
request that the political package be released. Wρ need to build a political culture that is committed to democratic participation in defining
the institutional
arrangements of a
deCentralised State.
99
to us in terms of war oranti-waris a dangerous short cut we cannot afford. The democraticaspirations of the people in the North and East should figure in how we define the crisis. The commitment to participatory democracythroughout Sri Lanka should critically inform our analysis, just as it should guide the way we arrive at solutions - broader public debate on alternative institutions for peace and inter-ethnic justice.
29


Page 32
Jaffna 6 the Les
WHEN the new Government was voted into power at the end of last year, there was widespread expectation of peace and also that the country would move ahead with Human Rights on a firm footing. With the current intensification of the war in Jaffna, these hopes seem like dying embers. The worst affected have been Tamil civilians in the NorthEast, whose agony is described elsewhere in this journal. Moves to hold miscreant officers in the forces to account, in keeping with the new Government's pledge, are now forgotten. Corpses, mainly if not exclusively, of Tamils have been turning up in waterways and lakes in the South. The Yukthiya’ hasin a lead itempointed its finger at a group within the Armed Forces. Since the resumption of war on 19th April, the Government did try, mainly it appears on the personal initiative of President Kumaratunga, to control violations by the Armed Forces. But much of this seems to have come a cropper Since the current operation was launched in Jaffna. This is not surprising as in the months available nothing was done to change the character of the Armed Forces or to re-evaluate the military thinking whose application since 1983 has left a record of disasters. Even after the new Government assumed power, basic impunity has remained. A series of serious violations by the Forces remain uninvestigated. The
most notable re complaints has some offending the most scandal which the Army the one of Septem party from the Val took away more from the Eastern then disappearec some of those involved is pul although any ac taken. On the Eve
in Jaffna, the Brig
in this incident ha the sensitive Join in Anura dhap brigadier (then
known to hav Kalmunai-Akk during the mas
just after mid
posted to a bris
30
Count
 

Ons of impunity
sponse to local peen to transfer bersons. Among ous of events in was involved is ber 1990 when a laichenai Brigade han 150 persons University who l. The identity of prominently plic knowledge tion is yet to be of the operation
gadier concerned ad been posted to t Operations HQ pura. Another colonel) who is e been in the araipattu area sacres of Tamils June 1990 was gade HQ in the
North. Given the overall culture of the Sri Lankan Forces, such individuals however may not make things much worse.
With the commencement of the operation on 9th July, the Forces were very much back into old form. The last thing thought about were the civilians. Although the Deputy Defence Minister claimed that leaflets had been dropped to warn civilians to vacate certain areas, the first thing most civilians
knew was that they were being
shelled. Radio announcements
asking civilians to shelter in churches, temples and schools had no meaning when shelling was indiscriminate with stray shells falling welloutside the operational area including near Kokkuvil Hindu College which had a large refugee population and one inside the Manipay Hospital premises
erpoint
August 1995


Page 33
(an extension of Jaffna Hospital). The tragedy of the bombing of the precinets of the church of St.Peter and St. Paul on the 9th evening, which at Naraly was two miles south of the new army-controlled territory, exposed the hollowness of the Government's claim that it was taking maximum precautions' to protect civilians. According to eyewitnesses several bombs were dropped, killingscores of refugees who had taken shelter there. Given the fact that the actual fighting during the first few days was
minimal, the civilian casualties,
mainly from shelling, was - dispro-portionately large (more than 100 according to the ICRCandother reports). The ICRC on 10th July issued a statement in which it referred to the bombing of the church, civilian casualties, intensive shelling, air strikes and massive displacement of civilians. The Government's response to this statement was a reflection on the operation itself and how much the civilians mattered. The Military Spokesman's first reaction was to suggest that the dead may be LTTE cadre and later that the LTTE may have fired missiles at the church. On the bombing of the church, a letter from the RC Bishop of Jaffna was sent to the President through the
President
y
ICRC. The communicated with the Archbishop in Colombo,
expressed her regrets and asked if he had any authenticinformation. She repeated the Military's position that they were unable to say anything further since the church was in the area under LTTE control and they were unable to investigate. She did subsequently call for an inquiry. Strangely, we were never told what the GA who represented the Government in Jaffna had to say.
The appeal to for authentic in superfluous, si authentic source of Jaffna who communicated wi She would have bi position if the G the Military had a in investigating by the latter. But which was close significantlyimpr a year of the PAC
The story behir of the Navaly Chu
complicated th revealed so far. B has done things li over again. Som Thurkkai Am. Tellipalai, in July Church, Jaffna in Maternity ward Hospitalin Nove which claimed ca: two were place civilians. St. Th Killinochchi, has repeatedly, at leas when the school
Counte
August 1995
 
 

he Archbishop formation was nce his own was the Bishop had already th the President. een in astronger overnment and credible record misdemeanours this credibility to zero, has not oved afternearly Government. nd the bombing rch may bemore
s::s:
but fortunately withoutcasualties. Whenever the Air Force condescended to offer an excuse, it has been along the lines that some moving or stationary LTTE target was nearby. The Methodist Mission at Murunkan had been bombed about five times in the course of the year 1993 in place of a former LTTE establishment some miles away. Repeated complaints to the authorities in Colombo and Anuradhapura never seemed to get to the right place.
Apart from the routine callousness and ineptitude of the
han has been ut the Air Force ke this over and e instances are man Temple, 1992; St. James' November 1993; of Killinochchi mber 1993, all of sualties. The first s of refuge for eresa's School, been attacked ton one occasion was in session,
Forces, the LTTE too is known for its provocation the Forces such as by directing ground fireat passing aircraft from near civilian establishments or refugee camps and withdrawing from the scene. One gathers from the results of the currentoffensive that despite more than ten years of fighting a war, the Government and the top brass in the Forces never sat down and spent time to think and re-evaluate the use of bombing and shelling. Administrative restraints have always been weak considering that
point
31


Page 34
over the last few years shells had repeatedly fallen into the ICRC protected Jaffna Hospital zone.
All these loose ends combined to make a parody of the Government's stated aims of Liberating the Tamils' with Maximum protection for the civilians'.
The ICRC
The Government's reaction to the ICRCstatement did not do the Government much credit. The Foreign Minister in his briefing to the diplomatic community seemed to attach more importance to the ICRC's alleged breach of protocol than to the grave events the statement described. If there was good reason to believe that the events were indeed true, then the breach of protocol issue would best have been handled through direct dialogue with the ICRC rather than aired publicly. Remarks in the press by un-named foreign ministry officials chiding the ICRC for its misuse of the Government's accomodativeness' are besides the point. An important part of the problem is after all about governments, being accomodative' to donor nations and other foreign powers rather than to the Tamil people who live in this country.
The ICRC is after all the chief institution on the ground through which measures to protect the civilian population during the offensive could have been co-ordinated. If the Government was serious about giving effect to its stated intention of maximum protection' for the civilians it shouldnever have allowed its relations with the ICRC to drop to such a low ebb.
Military
The Military S. prevarication w bombing of the was broken, giv of what chance have when confi official in a pro demanding just approach to civ bred by more tha of impunity. In brings with it power, has als catastrophic in decline and failu Not having to actions leads to decline and ci Army's Mandat in the first insta respond admi intelligence r impending attac
Take anotherin
LTTE firing from five soldiers in morning of 3rd J.
Соитt
32
 

Attitudes
okesman's initial hen news of the church precincts es us a good idea a citizen would onting a military incial town and ce. This clumsy ilians is a habit na dozen ofyears npunity, which a false sense of o been a most trument of the ure of the Forces. Inswer for one's ) administrative orruption. The vu debacle was ince a failure to nistratively to 2ceived of an
k.
stance where the a church killed Mannar on the une. Atone level
the Army's reaction was an improvement on the previous record. The bodies of the dead soldiers were removed in a dignified manner and there were no reprisals. But later, in the afternoon, drunken soldiers in a camp outside town, tortured more than a dozen civilians detained in public view. The first complaint to the Brigadier was greeted with denial. Although he later admitted some misdemeanour, the matter was largely hushed up. As a result the confidence of the public in the Army was shaken, although the Brigadier was generally rated as good. A number of youth who felt insecure crossed over to the LTTEcontrolled mainland to live with relatives. Several such incidents finally add up to a debacle such as at Mandativu.
This also illustrates how
impunity combined with lack of
political measures to give confidence to the Tamil population resulted in a dangerous mix.
point
August 1995


Page 35
War 6 the challeng
Rajan Hoole
WITH the current war gaining in intensity of violence, particularly against noncombatants, the unfolding drama is one where thepotential forgood is being suppressed and that for evil given tremendous opportunity. Is therea role for nonviolence in a situation where public and private life are increasingly infused with violence? In such a world, the claim of having nothing to do with violencecould only be the pretence of a privileged class, sustained by others condemned to violent lives. It is far from honourable to live a passive non-violent' life under a regime that sustains itself by forcing children and sons of the poor into violent lives. One could still choose to act by means that are non-violent, because violence is abhorrentin itself and the end of a non-violent world cannot come about through violence. I believe that a consistent programme of non-violence should also strive to end the hurt and pain caused to Animals, even if that is bound to remain a dream in one's lifetime.
One is often a prisoner of choices already made. Such is generally the case when an army is given marching orders. In such situations the only choice one may be allowed is a modest course of action that would preserve or enable healthier and less violent choices in the future. It was in this spirit that some of us wrote the Broken Palmyrah" in the latter part of 1987 during the Indian Army's onslaughton Jaffna. It was nota conscious actofcourage, but a small act of defiance in the face of despair, when freedom was non-existent and life was cheap.
We were as a hypocrisy and co leading sections o who fiddled and
long before the
helpless ordinary reduced to a di dehumanised ma time before the c having written
dawned on us. A Rajani Thiranaga the LTTE. In a cu hackneyed term in become a bywor Rajanineverident it. Unconsciously, those years in Jal ideal for a non-vio greater the vic surrounded with, suffering, the gre non-violent activi take, regardless o
War & Dile
interve
In the event of confronted with and institutions w most part out of c individual's pe workings are bar grasp and way power. We now Government ple standards lapsing associated with again points of ref quickly lost. Pec bombed and she gone by. One fi believe that the cannot get to the mystery of mainl that have been a month. Too oft actions guided by have the opposite
August 1995
Countel

Tam Wiew
e of Non-Violence
gry with the wardice among the community ied while, since actual war, the folk were being ectionless and SS. It took some onsequences of the book fully \ co-author Dr. ma was killed by lture where the on-violence had d for escapism, fied herself with perhaps, during fna, she set the lentactivist: The blence one is the greater the ater the risks a st is enjoined to f the price.
mmas Of
ntion
a war, one is a flux of forces hich are for the ontrol. From an rspective the ly within one's beyond one's see the new lged to higher into habits long he state. Once rence are being ple have been led as in years nds it hard to Government bottom of the Tamil corpses ppearing for a 2n one's own entimentalone effect intended.
A personal experience would serve to illustrate the dilemma confronting Tamils livingoverseas when news of current misbehaviour by the Armed Forces is carried abroad, which includesbombing and shelling in the North and a rising tendency towards indiscipline in the East. It also illustrates how misdirected personal actions could be. During the dark days of July 1983, when I was an expatriate, there was a total blackout of news from Jaffna. About two weeks later we heard that scores of civilians had been killed by the Sri Lankan Army running amok in Jaffna, many on the streets and some even in their homes. We felt rather angry about the events, and several of my friends felt that the best they could do was to help the militant groups financially. A close friend-Idoubt he would regard me a friend now-with personal connections in the LTTE became a fund raiser. Though I dissented in view of my belief in non-violence, he accepted my position and our friendship continued. We often discussed the isolation of Jaffna in a crisis and the need for an efficient system of communication between Jaffna and South India, to ensure that news of Government atrocities is transmitted without delay. Later my friend wanted to purchase communication equipment for the LTTE. I never doubted his sincerity to his beliefs. In view of the concern just expressed, Ivoluntarily made a modest contribution.
Looking back I doubt it ever served the purpose of news that was true and accurate. The equipmentifanything did perhaps help the LTTE to conduct efficiently the Anuradhapura massacre in May 1985 and the massacre of TELO cadre a year
Joint
33


Page 36
A particular danger that is Courted by peace activity that is not rooted among the ordinary people is that it COuld lose a Sense of history, and thereby be driven to increasingly indefensible positions like the Tamil
LTTE backers. Following
the Outbreak of War there
have been statements issued by groupS Concerned with peace Calling upon the
GOvernment and the TTE
to stop the War and
resume negotiations. Such may pass for an
evenhanded liberal
p0Sition- both sides are to blame"-taken up by those looking for a role in negotiating between the
GOvernment and the
LTTE. But it does offend history as Well as a basic
Sense of justice.
later. Both these bookonatrocities by a dissenting PLOTE, marked the Tamil liberati showed a domina was frightening
however chose t
this and back the group from Dece. also the beginnin character breakd Tamil commun rationalisation m with all points of
By and large lobbying and ac overseas did noth effect of protectin We were left with leading sections : Eelam' for surviv Westward Ho!
We are now in a the Government itsgrip on contro Forces. Members ment and those who were b backwards to sho credible negotiat feel impelled to s Forces, while pre what is happenir The Tamil elite Ol play a game of survival, remaini the LTTE repea healthier course: cornered the meaningless tra missing is a fo articulate the i ordinary people. could make an becoming a tool ( party. Such a unfulfilled drean Palmyrah "
In the present c peace movement suited to play su the necessary task expose the pret parties, demand establish points ( preserve some S
Count
34
 

, together with within the group section of the a watershed in on struggle, that inttendency that . Many Tamils o rationalise all LTTE-the sole mber 1986. It was g of widespread own within the ity, as further eant dispensing
reference. the intensified tivity of Tamils ave the intended gTamils at home. a society whose shouted Thamil al and practised
situation where has lost much of lling the Armed of the Governoart of the circle ending over )w the LTTE as a ing partner now speak up for the varicating about ng to the people. in the other hand half-truths and ng silent on how atedly spurned s of action and people into gedies. What is rce that could interests of the It is a force that impact without of either warring force was the h of the Broken
'ontext a vibrant would be best ch a role. One of
sisto constantly
insions of both
accountability, of reference and pace for sanity.
point
Building such a force requires qualities of depth of under standing, collective discipline and long-term commitment of the kind individual sentiment by itself cannot Sustain.
Preserving a sense of history
A particular danger that is courted by peace activity that is not rooted among the ordinary people is that it could lose a sense of history, and thereby be driven to increasingly indefensible positions like the Tamil LTTE backers. Following the outbreak of war there have been statements issued by groups concerned with peace calling upon the Government and the LTTE to stop the war and resume negotiations. Such may pass for an evenhanded liberal position-both sides are to blame"-taken up by those looking for a role in negotiating between the Government and the LTTE. But it does offend history as well as a basic sense of justice.
Such statements are bound to raise among ordinary Sinhalese the basic questions, such as who broke off negotiations? Who started the war? Here the truth needs to be constantly acknowledged. The Sinhalese majority gave the new Government a mandate for peace and, despite their doubts about this group, to negotiate with the LTTE.The general spirit of the Government's actions demonstrated its sincerity and seriousness in securing the peace despite the accumulated inertia and communalism of the state machinery. This spirit of generosity should not beforgotten. On the other hand the LTTE did nothing to reciprocate the gesture and give confidence to the people of this country that it was serious about peace. It used suicide operatives to blow up a naval vessel in September 94,
August 1995


Page 37
assassinate se the following the end of pea up two moren this period it m to democracy relaxing its dra the Tamils, or recruiting chil breaking off obviously spun remained cons destructive wi for the Tamil
The main Government appreciation c LTTE and its C its lack of serio the promise
six
measures, whi the Armed F. and its failure choices in time principles of th before the Ta the war broke desperate sit catastrophe of from Palaly seemed a
possibility. Co
Сои
August 1995
 

veral UNP leaders month and marked re talks by blowing valvessels. During adeno concessions pr human rights by conianregime over by refraining from liren. Its reasons for negotiations were ious. Its agendahas istent, warlike, and thout any concern eople.
faults of the were its lack of f the nature of the wn Armed Forces, usnessin instituting d human rights
Tam Wiew
people ebbed as state institutions brutalised and communalised over past decades took the initiative. Had the Government been more alert to the liabilities posed by the characterofits Forces, it should have been more serious about human rights measures months ahead.
The Government alone cannot be blamed for unleashing these long brutalised forces on the Tamils. The LTTE and the Tamil lobby that backed it knew the consequences and wanted it to happen. That is the only way they could survive, and to this end they tried to frustrate every gesture of goodwill coming from the South. Main sections of the Tamil press never ceased from
ch included making orces accountable, to make the right such as placing the e political package mil people. When out, it reacted to a uation where the an Army pullout Base in the North not-too-distant ncern for the Tamil
denigrating the President, the Movements and other leaders from the South who tried to articulate this good will. The potential forgood was always under attack. They no doubt get some perverse pleasure in drawing CartOOnS representing Chandrika Kumara tunga as a murderess. These are survival and career games played at the expense of ordinary Tamil people by a few.
This is the historical reality. The aim of a peace movement should be to preserve and build on the goodwill and good sense shown in the South as well as in sections of the Government and the Opposition. Institutionally the LTTE does not allow room for such qualities.
When issuing statements which are supposedly even-handed, one should not sweep underthecarpet those positive developmentsin the South and leave open the means for constant vilification of the Sinhalese. Such would be unconstructive, alienating and unhelpful.
nterpoint
35


Page 38
Smell the
Richard Simon
I'M sorry to say I found Shehan Madawela's paintings somewhat lacking in anguish. This sort of thing always disturbs reviewers especially when they happen to be friends, discharging an unfriendly office and wondering what to say. Anguishis dead easy, you can't go wrong with anguish. Just get yourself worked up, use a few ponderous outdated words, quote Kafka: nothing to it. Reviewing anguish, you can rattle the metaphorical thunder-sheet as much as you like.
But how much stormy rhetoric can you whip up over a big broad grin? That grin, a characteristic expression of the artist himself, is rarely off the face of the canvas at Shehan Madawela's one-man show, self-deprecatingly entitled Bindu. The name is only too apt: on the gallery walls are bindus aplenty, shaped and surrounded by brightpatches of colourin vivid geometric designs, bouncing energetically up and down like beach balls. In one composition, "Reluctant Reunion," you can almost hear the bedsprings go boing as the bindus bumpbellies. Socheck yourangstat the door. This is a happy exhibition. No convoluted nightmare visions here, no obsessive tweaking and fiddling either. The canvases are mostly big and painted in broad bold patches. Line is forceful and confident. Most effects are achieved by contrasting flat areas of color with one another; gradation is subtle or absent, texture is used decoratively if at all. Don't strain your brain, the pictures seem to say. Relax. Enjoy. Breathe deep. Don't worry.
I suspect most people would be quite happy to comply, and ask no
further question intellectually de wonder if Shehar of an escapist. V terror, mad bus amok, and Worlc nicely to the bo. surely one cannot In these days upheaval, moral environmental cc anyone take it ea;
If one is to take words at face v. many intellect would seem to a that one can Perhaps they arer But when you walked long enc among such folk will come to rea that, conceal it hov will, the intellectl greatest anxiety is about the Tig Bosnia, oil spillso plight of the home Just like the r intellectual's bigg sex life, or non-lif When one has cc most intellectual the sexual whinin a relief to encount clearly has no ha this department. content of Shehar diffused or obscu The meat of them pardon the in elsewhere. * Bin cheerful virility: o artist resting in the Ease, waited upc beauties. Arounc paintings, trophi the field of experi after canvas, theo bindus repeat the message: life is go the balls for it.
Counte
36

ference
... Others, more manding, may isn't being a bit hat with Tiger irivers running War III coming | up in Bosnia, help but worry?
of economic atastrophe and llapse, how can
уOu : lize whe ual's not
erS, r the less. est of us, the est worry is his e. me to recognize fulmination for git really is, it is er someone who ng-ups at all in The intellectual 's work may be Ire; who cares? atter, if you will ielicacy, lies du exudes a ne imagines the asana of Kingly n by laughing him hang his S gained upon
nce. On canvas
cillating paired ame exuberant od, if you've got
Shehan Madawa
True, the artist sometimes lapses : by obtruding his darker, more introspective side. This happens mostly in the red-and-black compositions: Burning Sun like a solar eclipse seen from inside a furnace, Capricorn with its articulated glyphs encased in crimson like flies in amber. The messy border surrounding the bindus in Black on Wine Red reveals a hint of disturbance but no more than a hint. It is left to the six acrylic-onacrylic Faces, peering through the gaps between the larger canvases like u n in v i t e d onlookers at a revel, and to the faceless but St r a ng e ly affecting Balloon Seller, to remind us of the multitude of men and women 'wounded in their sex. Starvelings at the feast, they obviously can't stomach the sensual riches on offer here. Poor Sods, you hear yourself thinking Smugly, high on vicarious teStOSterOne.
In the crowd at the opening, one or two living faces wore expressions similar to those embalmed in acrylic. Tough luck, chaps. Fortherestofus...well, the women were unusually brighteyed and bushy-tailed all evening at the Lionel Wendt, and above the chattering crowd floated a faint but distinct odour of musk. Good stuff, if you've got the balls for it.
Bindu': an exhibition of paintings
by Shehan Madauvela. At the Lionel Wendt Art Gallery, 1-4 June 1995.
point
August 1995


Page 39
Seeing Bindu t
Charitha Dissanayake
SHEHAN Madawea's Art Exhibition held recently at the Lionel Wendt Gallery turned out to be a popular one. Though most art exhibitions held nowadays arebeyond apprehension to many, "Bindu' had been able to captivate the minds of most of its viewers.
With the exception of a few sketches, all Shehan's other drawings Wee based comparatively on the symbol "Bindu" (a dot?). The shapes he
"Binduwa' orth to it is not anyt Most of our de creations are b reason behind simplicity. The (dot) lines, squal of it are very muc forms and colou fixed in the mind very first glance
Our hereditary such as the 'A Binduwa', the "Depota Lanuwa are based on th they hav
arts of ol Furthu consider
COnStru Dagaba, plain sha made us circle, th basal cil circle a viewdfr may ben from the the "Sandaka In wor
drew were of a simple nature and the colours used were dark and unlimited.
A viewer's eyes are easily drawn towards a drawing in black on wine colour or on a red background. However, if we take our thoughts a little beyond what reaches our mind at firsthand are the drawings of the early African era. Their quality of permanancy is retained in our memories.
While a variety of colour and technical effect is found in this collection of drawings, priority has been given to areas which are relevant to 'Bindu'. How could we select these sensitively?
tree We V circular path. Ir items that are fou the ordinary hou We COeaCOSS are not very c threshing floorol thepaddy toobea Even up to drawings found of houses in "Raj. a similarity to thi of Shehan.
If next we take in to considerati the replica of relative to "Kola
In our childho an impression
Соитt
August 1995
 
 

MAN
rough Tradition
eshapes relevant hing new to us. signs and other ased on it. The it lies in its circle, "Binduwa' 'es and such likes sh simple. Simple is become deeply s of the fans at the
ancestral designs Arimbuwa' 'Gal "Thanipota' and ' and the 'Comb' e 'Binduwa, and e become eternal ur inheritance. ermore, if we an architectural ction such as a there too it is the ape that has been se of The semieplain line, at the cumference, the tgain - when om a higherangle oticed. Returning Dagaba we meet semi-circular dapahana'. 'shipping the Bowalk round it in a addition to the ndin the temples,
sehold items that
in our houses too omplicated. The n which we thresh ars simpleshapes.
this day, the on the outer wall arata" (NCP) bear eartistic sketches
the Tamil culture on, we could see simple shapes m". od we had made of a moon by
arpoint
embedding the sole of the foot in sand and turning the toes configurally. Sometimes an attempt was made to create a design with a collection of such
OOS. Myintentioninpointing out the above facts is to show that these creations of Art made by utilising simple shapes do not seem somethingextraordinarytous. We who have valued the simplicity that existed in the past wentfurther on to embrace an unrealistic and complex art form but have now returned to the point from where we began. Some people try to exaggerate events and band this to a great miracle. In addition, we cannot forget the abundance of simple shapes associated with artistic creations of African, Egyptian and Mesopotamian early civilisations.
Looking backinto the past, from where we stand today, after the dissemination of Art, there is still a. attraction which is so great that it cannot be believed.
The "Bindu' Exhibition of Shehan Madawela has gained popularity amonga majority of its viewers. He achieved this through the use of colours and shapes in the most simplistic ways.
37


Page 40
'Twixt slip & Gully
OUR ICC team returned from the recently concluded annual
meeting at Cricket's
headquarters after been duped
yet again with a lopsided allocation of test matches.
Seemingly quite unaware of the injustice perpetrated on them the Board of Control for
Cricket issued a sta
proudly claiming tl would play as man in the next five yea:
Adding insult to have once again be the honour' of AN solitary test against This will mean sinc elevation to test sta till the year 2000 we played England ON
Aravinda and Star PerfOrmerS in Eng
ENGLISH cricket is game complete with p going thro' a welcome white ball and coloured th resurgence this year. A clothing. The county new wave of games usually begin on co enthusiasm has a Thursday after 03 p resulted in even the days play, the 2 sides tC
county matches being engage in a one day total sell outs. At the game on Sunday. The b; end of August the county match is then S county championship continued on Monday, S. still has no clear cut the fourth and last day. h. winner with 4 counties: One area in which ci Warwickshire the English cricket b Lancashire, authorities may have th Middlesex and erred is the total ban of a
Northamptonshire still overseas players
in the running. representing countries, se The English Cricket The ban is due to take al authorities seem to effect in 1998 and this is b have at long last settled certain to bring down K on a proper domestic the standard of the format, which other game. Ir countries would be Every season, the р well advised to follow. overseas playersAll county matches are most of them with their n now played over 4 experience -- have T days, and in figured prominently in cc
conjunction, with 3. the county averages other limited over and have played key A tournaments of 60, 55 roles for their sides. fr and 40 overs duration - This year is no - the last, a real pyjama exception except th
Соиттерс
38
 

ement times in 20 years - each at Sri Lanka encounter being a one-off match. 7 as 26 tests The excuse that the ICC
S. calendar is already drawn up njury, we and it is difficult to fit in new in accorded countries, requests is now a load OTHER of rubbish which we are still England! swallowing at every single ICC
OU “ meeting! The excuse is valid us in 1981 only when the country itself has would have just been admitted as a full | LY five member of ICC but today it is 15
| Kumble
jlish COunty Cricket
erhaps the fact that he overseas players taking waves on the bunty scene are the layers least expected
do well. Sri Lanka's star atsman Aravinda de lva and Indias leg oinner Anil Kumble ave taken the county rcuit by storm and
oth seem set to head e batting and bowling erages this season. Yet, at the start of the ason, both de Silva di Kumble had not }en popular choices! ent seeking a placement for West dian Carl Hooper, cked De Silva after uch deliberation as y other Sri Lankan est Cap had played unty cricket. For all his efforts avinda can be ustrating, predictable, often rowing his wicket in
a fit of rashness. He may set a unique record in county cricket in being the batsman with the most centuries and the most ducks in one season
At the beginning of August we were deliberating whether to travel to Canterbury to watch him play when he made the decision for us with a second ball 'duck'. Aravinda then hit 2 hundreds in consecutive days in the Sunday limited over game and in Kent's second innings.
Against Lancashire it was the same story. A 'duck' on Saturday, 124 on Sunday and 89 on Monday in Kent's 2nd innings.
When playing Somerset, Aravinda decided to take on their leading bowler -- Pakistani leg spinner Mustaq Ahamed. He
August 1995


Page 41
years since Sri Lanka's numbers of te
admission and it is time were each country. stopped being satisfied with say that the is crumbs off the table nothing was (
Ironically, whilst one of the necessary tha main items on the agenda at this with other co year's meeting was the situations anc standardisation of test playing registered at conditions around the world, About a yea not much notice has been this issue in til
accorded to the crying need to standardise the
hit him for 9 fours in i record time before
falling to the bowler for 42. In the 2nd innings, Mustaq had Aravinda out for yet another
duck'.
Kumble, too had an indifferent start to the season taking time to settle down. He is now regularly claiming ten wickets every match and playing a key role in Northamptonshire's bid for the county championships. Kumble's batting too has been useful and his gutty performances have rescued his side on more than one occasion.
At the start of the
season, Allen Lamb had Northamptonshire set Kumble a target of captain then insisted o: 100 wickets for the Anil Kumble. season - with 88 wickets already in the championship, Kumble is certain to achieve this goal and his captain may be prompted to increase the target for next year to around 125 -- which is what Kumble is likely to end
up with this year!
Northamptonshire had wanted Australiar "Leggie' Shane Warne, but for obvious reason: the Australian Cricket Board did not give Warne the green light. Allan Lamb, the
Incidentally, Lamb was Kumble's first victim in test cricket.
Both players began the season poorly taking time to acclimatize themselves After a patchy start, Aravinda de Silva suddenly exploded int
Co.
August 1995
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Sports
noftestmatches
sts allocated to calling for equitable distribution It is not enough to of test matches and a system of sue was raised but grading of all the test playing
lone about it, it is countries. We suggested that the tlobbying is done nine countries be divided into untries in similar two groups with the top five in
a strong protest is Group A and the others in uch meetings. Group B. Countries in Group A
rago we spoke of would then play a MINIMUM of nese same columns FIVE-TEST series againsteach
action, slamming two double centuries and 4 centuries in just three weeks. The first batsman to reach 1000 runs for the season, de Silva also recorded the highest score for the season of 225 and set yet another record when he became one of the few batsman ever to score a double century and a century in two innings of the same game.
In between these knocks he scored 112 for Kent against Lancashire in the Benson and Hedges final, and was deservedly named 'man
other while those in
Group B were assured of
of the match' despite being on the losing side. His innings was only the 3rd hundred in the Benson and Hedges final, and ranked by many as the greatest innings in limited overs cricket.
"Arra" as he is known to his Kent teammates, has also scored 3 blistering centuries in the Sunday 40 overs game and his county Kent are on top of the table and tipped to clinch the AXA Equity trophy awarded for the tournament.
De Silva has also been accorded the honour of captaining Kent when regular Skipper Mark Benson and stand in Captain Steve Marsh were unavailable.
After becoming the first player to reach 1000 runs this season, de Silva is now the book makers favourite to score the most runs this season. He was not even quoted by the bookies at the start of the season
Interpoint
39


Page 42
SUMMARY OF Ailil it
SEPTEMBER 1982 AN
TESTS ENG AUS SAF
England 122 净x、 34 03 Australia 114 34 x-x- 06 South Africa 17. 03 06 ※ West Indies 94 29 25 O1 New Zealand 81 22 17 00 India. . . 9114 1104 Pakistan 91 16 14 00 Sri Lanka 51 04 07 O3 Zimbabwe 07 00 00 00
SLSSLSLSSLSLSSLSLSSLSLSSLSLSSLSLSSLSLS
a minimum of THREE tests in four years at the against each other and against Until then Sri La: the Group A members. to be content with
In this way it can be ensured unusual records lik that any country would have former skipper Rar played all the other eight Madugalle holds. N Countries in at least three tests in stranded on 997 run a two-year period and would umpteen days befo. guarantee ALL test playing score the balance th countries a MINIMUM of 24 needed to reach 10C
tests in two years. The grading test career. This wa of the sides could be done once
Counter 40 p
 

S ” LA ; :: ij i E i
: i i-',' : ', ii,*v f
) SEPTEMBER 1994
WI NZ N s PK SL ZB
29 22 14 16 04 00 25 17 11 14 O7 00 01. 00 04 OO O3 200 s 07 19 12 O1 00 O7 岑※ O7 15 11 O2 19 07 岑外 20 14 O2 12 15 20 11 03 01. 11 14 11 岑 00 00 O2 O2 O3 00 ※※
ug:-
ICC meeting nika will have
list of e the one
jan Madugalle ns had to wait re he could
e62 US 10 runs in his s because Sri
Lanka had so few matches allocated to it during those years.
The present captain Arjuna Ranatunga has been playing test cricket since 1982 but has played in just 51 tests whilst those who began playing for other countries long after him have now played almost double that number of matches.
August 1995


Page 43



Page 44
Air L Flies Yo Modern I
Enjoy the quiet comfort and natural hospi
world's most advanced, long range passenge
video screen with six video channels on Fi
Only on Air Lanka, the airline of paradise
Contact your Travel Agent or Air Lanka C
 

anka
In Th
ality on board Air Lanka's first, and the
r aircraft. And your Very Own arm re t
st and Business classes.
ARLAN >
ffice. Tel: 421161. It's a taste of Paradise