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ཕྱི་
 

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ALAWWA AMBALANGODA AMPARA
ANURADHAPURA
BADULLA BALANGODA
BANDARAWELA
BATTICALOA CHILAW COLOMBO Bambalapitiya
Battara mulla BOrella
Dehiwela Fort
Union Place Homagama Ja Ela Kadawata Kandana Kiribathgoda Kollupitiya
Maharagama Maradana
MOratuwa Nugegoda
Pannipitiya
Nandanasiri Stores Royal Book Shop
Delicia Mahajana Picture Palace Sathsara
Mahinda's Sunil Book Shop Leelasena & Sons Udeni"S Mayura Book Shop
Charles Subasinghe Greenlands Hotel Lanka Traders Liyanage
Shanthi Vihar Pubudusiri Cream House Madhawa Book Shop Pushpa Stores Ketapatha Prakashana Supipi Book Shop Sadeepa Book Shop Lakmini Stores Catholic Book Shop Colombo Hilton Holiday Inn Taprobane Lake House Book Shop Lanka Oberoi Maclium Book Shop M.D. Gunasena Book Shop Salaka Geethani Grocery Perno Stationers Srimali Grocery Jayabima Samanala Book Shop Vijitha Yapa Book Shop Malee Book Shop A. Z. N. M. Marikar Sasiri Book Shop Godage Book Shop Dayawansa JayakOdy I. P. B. Book Shop McCallum Book Shop Wijesekera Grocery National Book Shop Sarasavi Book Shop Nimali Book Shop
 

Piliyandala Pitakotte Ratmalana
Thimbirigasyaya Wella Watte
EMBLIPITIYA GALLE
GAMPAHA
GAMPOLA HAPUTALE HORANA HIKKADUWA KADUGANNAWA KALUTARA KANDY
KULYAPTIYA KURUNEGALA MATARA MATALE MIRIGAMA MONERAGALA
N'ELIYA NEGAMBO
NIT TAMBUWA PANADURA PILIMATALAWA PUTTALAM RATNAPURA TRINCOMALEE VAVUNYA VEYAN,GODA WARAKAPOLA WELLAWAYA YAKKALA
New City
Pothgula Thusitha Book Shop Missaka Book Shop Windsor Book Shop Rohana Book Shop Vivian Traders Queens Hotel New Aradhana Traders Vijitha Yapa Book Shop Thaksala Nalanda Book Shop Hema's Book Shop Udaya Stores Davasa Centre Malikarachchi & Co. Jayathu Hotel Coral Garden Hotel Daya Traders New Owen Joseph Book Shop Guneratne Distributors Seevali Book Shop Vijitha Yapa Book Shop Sithumina Book Shop Malson Book Shop Central Book Shop Sastrodaya Book Shop Sampath Traders Nilmini Stores Malaka TraderS Gamage Stores Sumedha Book Shop Sri Ramya Stores Shop No. 3, (Opposite Municipal Council) Nayana Book Shop, Kandana British BOOK Center Negambo Printers Co-operative Sales Center Ganga Cool House Fernando'S Jayasekera Traders Lucky Newspaper Agency Pradeepa Book Shop 470, Navy Camp Road Kavidha Stores Somagiri Ranjith Book Shop Suhanda Traders Vidyodaya

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March 1996
COVER STORY 5
A Self-Defeating War
WEWPOINT 25
PERSPECTIVE
After the Lion Flag - what?
Departments
TAM WIEW առ«ուրճ9
 
 
 
 

Vol. 3 Issued,
LEGAL WATCH 14
Alost opportunity?
SPORTS 35
Well done - Let's consolidate now
Cover Layout Asoka Padmasiri
A. self-defeating
karh 1996 Afaarantand1

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Comment
rി.ടി.--
levelling the
NOW that the cricket's over, perhaps we can all get back to themoreurgentand telling matters beforeus This is not to deny Sri Lanka's moment of sporting glory, nor to represent some tired old argument about the "colonial game", but, on the contrary, to suggest that we can't run away from our problems successfully all the time.
Not that cricket doesn't have important and interesting lessons for usin other spheres of life. Take, for instance, the fact that one of the few things that the LTTEhierarchyand the Governmentseem to share is a desire for Sri Lanka to win. Karikalan has, on many an occasion, said that Arjuna Ranatunga is one of his heroes. MP Joseph Pararajasingham has expressed the view that the LTTE will not disrupt the World Cup matches because they are as fond of cricket as everyone else, and soon. Abroad, the only time that the hard-line Sinhalese and Tamils get togetheristocheer the Lankan cricket team, it seems, Does this mean that differences are only skin deep, and that both extremes sharea common sense of nationalism? Orisit that cricket is a trivial, even escapist, space where nothing is really at stake, and hencewhereasense of meaninglessbonhomiecan be achieved ッ, ・・、ー
Sportanaesthetises us to key issues, and there is a sense of equality and justice on the playing field which serves us vicariously as a substitute for the harsh inequities of life. The "solutions" offered by games cannot apply to contexts in which there is no "level playing field". Wein Sri Lanka have to face up to the burning issues of the North-East civil war and the ethnic crisis, to unemployment and underemployment, to spiralling inflation and increasing poverty, to rampant corruption and nepotism, to the muzzling of the free press and interference in the judiciary, to a bureaucracy that is debilitating to catastrophic changes in the agrarian and plantation sectors, and soon.
Cartoonist. KWanaranjana Photographer . . . . - Circutation is iš DayaKaluarachchi
Printer Anuru Graphics, Mount Lavinia
Publisher . . . . . Ravaya Publishers (Guarantee) Ltd.
 

playingfield
In this struggle, in this commitment to meaningful social change, we need democratic grassrootsinstitutions that arefiercely independent and non-partisan. The demand of the hour is for strongpeople's organisations, both urbanand rural, that arefundamentally democraticin outlookand structure. We must create and nurture a vibrant and sensitive public democratic culture that will become the platform for a new egalitarian participatory politics that will break away from thevice-likehegemony of the UNP-SLFPoligarchy. Until and unless the people participate fully and equally in determining their future and their present, until and unless the duly elected governments are held accountable to a wellorganised and articulate public, even the best intentioned individuals in power will soon be swallowed upor compromised by vested interests, power blocs and big business.
A banner at the Cricket World Cup read, Sri Lanka shows that there is justice in the world". We wish that justice in the world can bere-established by winning a cricket match or two, but that's pathetic wish-fulfilment. The fact of the matteris that in the same week that the World Cup is being won, or lost, hundreds can be rendered homeless, thousands remainin police custody, and many can be killed for no fault of their own.
Letus, therefore, band together and help create a new culture of awareness and participation in which democracy is not merely the vote bamboozled orhoodwinked out of the people at election time. This new participatory democracy which can only becreated through the continuous activism of credible and independent institutions must help usher in an era where governments do not have the freedom to do as they choose until the nextpolls. Once such mechanisms and institutions arein placewenay have moreimportant things to be proud of than simply cricket.
Head Office and ప్తి Mailing Address No: 83, Pitiyandala Road, MAharagama, Sri Lanka 蠶 ܗܝ Tet, 851572,85573 Fax, 8584 Published monthly.
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Conterts of Counterpoint are copyright Reproduction of material in partorwhole is not permitted in any form without the written authorisation of the publisher, Counterpoint

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notice that you choose to identify certain contributions to your magazine as the Tamil view'. This does not seem right to me and think that it has unhealthy implications. Firstly, the view of any Tamil is not a Tamil view' and secondly there is no view that can be described as a Tamil view in the way One identifies a Tamil nationalist view, a Sinhala nationalist view, a Trotskyist view, a Marxist view etc., even though each of these in itself represents a diversity of views. Certainly do not like any of my views to be labelled a Thamil view Or Sri Lankan view because I do not like to allow my nationality or any other identity to determine the validity of my views. Can Understanda Sinhala nationalist newspaper identifying the view of a Tamil as a Tamil view, because it sees the country and the word in terms of nationalist identity. expect something different from Counterpoint
| have been reading Rajan Hoole's writings on the situation in the North for Some time. Much of his views are Conditioned by his hostility to the LTTE. He is entitled to his view of the World and I am least likely to change it. What is worrying, however, is his attempt in the Counterpoint of September '95 to portray the Virakesari and Samimiliharas pro-LITTE papers. I think that Wakesaff aCCommodates Some views which help to balance the otherwise government-biased news that the Tamil reader is subjected to. Maathorupaahan is a columnist in that paper and he is entitled to his Opinion as much as Hoole and are to each of Ours. If Hoole had any serious objection to the views published in that paper, he should have firstly tried to communicate his objection to the editor. Hoole's letter tends to give the non-Tamil reader a
Completely wrong it
newspaper which h
itself fairly well throl turbulence. His atta
even more objectio remains the only op in the entire island.
contributed on politi find that it aCCOmmc range of opinions.
series by Ram Mani contributions by Mu: including those repr Muslim Congress, a the So-Called UTHR more in recent mOnt certainly not pro-LT has every right to qu sincerity of the UFg HOOle has to defend that Sainiharapplie censorship to article may not be the most under the Sun, but it the pro- government his demand that Sal Yukihivashould Spe voice, namely the Or that of MIRJE, is inf Sarinharto tailor its suit the Yukthiya. Ml political organization body that demands C. Official line. We ShOUk for the kind of editoria has allowed its two p time that it needs to ir either of its papers rei Other irregular journal USe a magazine read Sinhalese who are int national question and to vilify two newspape because they appear
to the LTTE than HOC
See, is very sad inde
 

erpretation of a S Conducted gh years of k On Sainiharis able. This paper n forum in Tamil have naively :al issues, but dates a wide have Seen along «kalingam, lim leaderS senting the Statement from J) and many hS, which are E. D. Sivaram estion the OVernment aS it. I do not think Sany form of SWritten to it. It perfect paper is a lot fairer than media. Hoole, in imiharand ak with One e that he SeeS as act, asking editorial policy to RJE is not a Ora religioUS Informity with its respect MIRJE freedom that it pers.The only ervene is when Orts to libel Or stic practices. To widely by rested in the dare with dignity S, Simply more Sympathetic 2 would like to d.
S.Sivasegaram
Civil War led me to ac
basic Creedin my politi
manof the lefttogether
met in 1947. Despitethese
and i

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" stis only natura/ that they ission measuringus with the arostick that they use for themse/ves, forgettig that the savages of time are mot the Samme foras, and that the quest of our dentity s jistasardious and bloodyforus as it was for them. 77e interpretationofourreally through patiens of our own serves only to make us ever nose unk/OWs, ever sess fee, ever more sositasy. " - 77/EF SO///U/DAF OAF LAV/W AMERICA'Gabria/Garcia Marquez TODAY in Sri Lanka, we are faced with numeroUS battles. The battle this article foCUSeS On is the battle for justice, a justice that emerges Out of love for life and love for the future of this WOrld. AS Sexual minorities Of this nation we are Organizing OUrselves to launch a battle for justice. We will seek to repeal bili 365 and 365A of the Sri Lankan Penal COde, which CriminalizeSnOnheterosexual behaviours. This Criminalization poses a serious threat to Organizing efforts which seek to find Solutions to the most deadly epidemic known to humanity - Acquired immune Deficiency Syndrome.
The statistics are clear. South Asia is in the midst of an epidemic, an epidemic that is caused by the most natural of human
NOONGE
NOLONG
behaviour(s) -- SEX. We are talking about AIDS/HIV, and it is clear that Sri Lanka is extremely vulnerable. It is
Currently estimated that
there are 1.5-2 million people living with HIV infection in South Asia. Within the next decade, this figure is likely to reach up to 20 million Such infections. South Asia has the fastest rate of infection in the world, and by year the 2020, we will have more people living with HIV than the Combined numbers of the rest of the world. These people will not be strangers, they will be known to us, they will be Our kin, Our loved Ones and US.
The 21st century, the year 2020, is around the COrner, and Our nation, like the rest Of the World, is in the midst of great change. These changes must prompt US to ask new questions. We need to re-formulate the way We think and shift those ancient paradigms. The reformulations must happen in Our personal lives first. The questions We must ask and answer can then be translated into a frameWork that can support the formulation of appropriate strategies to prevent the Consequences of a lethal epidemic.
ACrOSS this planet, scientific and political leaders are grappling with the questions that AIDS is posing. There are few
40 counterpaford March 1996

INVISIBLE,
ER SIEN
anSWerS. However, it has to be pointed Out that when Communities who are most affected and afflicted with this disease get involved in fighting it, the results are miraculous. We have seen how the Gay Communities the wgrid over have effectively stymied the spread of HIV. The lesson is a Crucial One for the Sri Lankan context, as the Gay Community here is now trying tograpple with the questions that will most affect Our lives. We are trying to Organize Ourselves S0 that We Can define Our problems and find the answers to the questions that this disease has posed.
Unfortunately, the path to Our Self-determination is blocked by ignorance, homophobia, sexophobia, and general fear. This fear has translated itself into many forms most of which are unfounded at best and barbaric at worst. The fact that We as Sexual minorities have no legal status is effectively stopping us from Organizing OUrselves and stopping the Creative forces that will help us strategize against this epidemic.
There has been much negative publicity about a Conference we are planning to address Sexual health issues. In fact, the campaign to silence and intimidate is very much afoot. Organizers have had to deal with death
Dialogue
threats, intimidation and all
Out physical violence. We realize that in this Country where questions of civil
liberties are still questions,
Communities Coming together can pose serious problems; however, Creativity and love will always win Out at the end of the day. We are Organizing Ourselves for love and respect of self. We are Organizing Ourselves for the future, for all Our tomorroWS.
- We are Organizing Ourselves
for the health and wellbeing Of all Communities, and the
law' of this land is posing an OminOUS threat.
The efforts of the Sexual minority communities will COntinue unabated. These efforts will bear fruit and will bear the anSWerSto questions that have eluded many. These answers will be accepted, although begrudgingly, by the experts' and professionals' as legitimate. The answers we will offer through Our coming together, will shed a much needed light to unanswered questions that will benefit all Communities and we as representatives of the Gay Community of this country will shoulder our responsibility, struggle for Our rights, and take Our rightful place in history.
Companions om a Journey

Page 7
A Self-Deft
THE Government has made a mess of things, and it has only itself to blame. On the one hand, it is pursuing a self-defeating and self-contradictory policy as regards the ethnic crisis. On alternate days it appears to be for war and peace, but its actions bespeak of an unshaken will to wage a brutal and merciless war, thus playing into the hands of its sworn enemy, the LTTE. On the other, the Government has chosen to pussyfoot its way through Scandalsandalleged fraudofhuge proportions, and there appears to be a systematic attempt to undermine the judiciary and perhaps to gag the press. All this byanadministration that received an overwhelming public mandate to wipe out corruption, usher in peace, and reconstellate a democratic framework in this country. All this too, in so short a space of time.
Is the Government Serious about
making the military accountable?
In the wake of the military offensive in the North and the taking of Jaffna, the Government mustre-establishitscredibility visa-vis the Tamil civilians who have been displaced, harassed and madetosuffergreatlyinmakeshift refugee camps. Whilenotdenying the fact that the LTTE is also responsible for the plight of ordinary citizens in the war zone, it must be reiterated that the legitimately elected government owes them greater responsibility and concern than the rebels. After all, it was the Government's plan thatresulted in therefugeeexodus, and any fool knows that a fullscale waris bound to be disastrous
for civilians living Government ofte LTTE doesnotrep people, and t dispensation, unl a clear distinctic guerrillas and t whenitcomestop where its mout notoriousand eve since in practice seen asapotential continuously esta innocence. Wha demonstrate to t affected that the not merely giving name" is the pro those found guil torturing, raping on the pretext o questionis, howe Government has to do this in the opposition from v other chauvinists The President write to the Arr directing him compulsory leav officers who had b of atrocities in th the JVPuprising. the hysterical exaggeration rais group of news claimed that 20 being sent on co many of whom the current war, been repeatedly military, while t has remained res If this is true, reasonto doubtit that the Presi Government) is l even the most str. disciplinary cc military without

Cover Story
ating War
in the area. The n says that the resent the Tamil hat the new ike the old, sees in between the he public. Yet, utting its money h is, there's a r-wideninggulf, every Tamil is Tiger who must blish his or her it's needed to he people most Government is g"bullshit a bad secution of all ty of harassing, or killing people if the war. The ver, whether the the political will face of obvious varmongers and
, it appears, did ny Commander to send on 'e a number of een foundguilty he South during Yet, in the face of outburst and ed by the Island papers, which 0 officers were mpulsory leave, Avere "heroes" of he directive has denied by the he Government olutely silent.
and there is no , what it meansis ient (and the tnable to enforce aight-forward of introl over the acinghysterical,
if orchestrated, opposition. One must note that the proposed action was against killings and brutality in the South whichisamuch"safer" issue than similar cases in the North-East. Another way of looking at this predicament is to decide that the People's Alliance Government has not got sufficient political will to ensure that justice is done. This implies that had the Government gone ahead with its plan to discipline the military, it would have been able to overcome the initial objections and rabblerousing of the chauvinist and partisan press and their allies. The point is, moreover, that the principle involved is too important and valuable to forsake without a fight as in the present case, if the Government really believes in it. This argument suggests that the Government is not really committed to the strict accountability of the military and police, but is merely making a token gesture, which it is quite willingtoforgetabout themoment there is some opposition.
The situation in the North-East arena is much more urgently in need of such measures, however, if the much-vaunted Governmentclaim that it is committed to separating the LTTE from the Tamil people is to have any credence at all the carnage and Wan tOn destruction at Kumarapuram hardly a month ago is a sombre witness to the fact that military massacres are not a thing of the past. In sheerbrutality and horror Kumarapuramrivalled the worst atrocities on both sides in the past. The fact that the Government has initiated a number of Commissions to investigate this incident, though welcome, does not hold up much
March 19960counterpolars

Page 8
promise of justice in the wake of the President's recent volte face outlined above. In addition, the military investigation has concluded that only 15 soldiers should be court-martialled. A wholly unsatisfactory finding since no officers have been held accountable for a situation that officers could clearly have prevented or at least minimised.
The crux of thematteris thatall the Government's claims to representing the Tamil people, all its song and dance about being different from the UNP regimeinshort,itscredibility and sincerity - depend, in large part, on the investigation and prosecution of those who have committed atrocities against the Tamils in the past. The rest is mere talk. For instance, the Kokkadicholai and Vantharamoolai massacres have been investigated and the guilty have been identified, but nothing further has happened. In the meantime, elements within the armed forces continue to operate with an immunity and irresponsibility that is mindboggling.
Thereasonforthemilitary being alawuntoitselfhasitsrecentorigins in the government's wareffortsand the propaganda hype surrounding it. The Ratwatte-driven military wingoftheGovernmentappearsto have won the day, much to the disgustofmanywhosupported the People's Allianceonitscommitment to a just peace in the North-East. Now, the administration is displaying a frightening schizophrenia which is both counter-productive and dishonest. On the one hand, the claim is still heard that a political solution is the only resolution of this crisis, and that the war is unwinnable. On the other, Minister Ratwatte regularly updates the public as to the timing of the totalannihilation of the LTTE: firstitwasRebruary,nowitis April, soon it will be August, no doubt.
The crux of the problem that Sri Lanka is facing at the present
juncture is pr
military logic is taking over the
governance of hopes are being pyrrhic victorie into the death tension and anx being fuelled, least, inter-com are being furthe setting the c opposition wi
The military but surely ta entire fall governance o False hopes a the people, py are being hy death knell tension and a South is being last but not community r being furth
majority being as as watchdogs o' neighbours. Adv notices openly dis apartments ar unknown Tamils Government ha hundreds of lodg city without substitute to tho come in to Color hundred legitim have no other pla
The time has theGovernmentt it really means w the distinctions b and the ordinar The point is th exigency and ex mention the invo opinion, is unacc
60 cousterpain March 1996

isely this. The lowly but surely htire fabric of the is country. False ed to the people, are being hyped ell of the LTTE, tyin the Southis hd, last but not munity relations eroded through mmunities in h the Sinhala
Ogic is slowly ing over the ric of the this country, e being fed to rhic victories ped'into the of the LTTE, nxiety in the fueled, and least, inter. elations are er eroded
ked to function ver their Tamil artisements and couragerenting d rooms to In addition, the i closed down nghouses in the roviding any e who have to bo for any of a te reasons but e to stay. zome, then, for decidewhether at it says about ween the LTTE Tamil people. t claims from diency, not to ation of public otable. What is
required, if the crisis is to be resolved, is not a set of fine-tuned excuses for inaction or the maintenance of the status quo, but, rather, a sustained and serious attempt to identify those responsible and to prosecute them to the fullest extent of the law. It is only then thata clear message will be sent out to the Tamil people who are the victims of these atrocities, as well as to the psychopathic minority within the military who are its perpetrators.
The post-bomb context
The January 31st bomb in the heart of Colombo destroyed more than thenation'smajor commercial area. The death toll reached a hundred and the wounded numbered well overa thousand in the city's worst ever disaster, but the ever-present repercussion to hundreds of thousands of innocent Tamils is a heightened tension, as well as an almost universal sense of suspicion and isolation from the Sinhala majority. Human rightsorganisationshavereported that thenumber of arrests of Tamils has doubled since the blast, with over 1100 being held in custody at present. In addition to this thereis the daily tally of arrests "on suspicion", which many observers liken to a quota system. Tamils whose national identity cards indicate that they were born in the North-Eastare subject to incessant checking, even harassment, though they may haveestablished their bona fides only the previous day. In the wordsofayoungTamil salesrepresentativein the city,"We have to prove our innocence continuously, every day, and sometimes even twice in a day. The fact that we have satisfied the authorities onceis nevertaken into account. Besides, when we are taken into custody, we are treated like common criminals and humiliated more than words can tell. There is no one we can appeal

Page 9
to, no one to listen to our side of the story, because whatever, the Governmentsays, themilitary and police behave as if all Tamils are Tigers and Tiger suicide bombers at that."
The vulnerability of the city has combined with the legitimate fear of another bomb attack to create a climatcoftense suspicion and mistrust between the two communities. Senior Sinhala government servants look upon their Tamil colleagues with paranoia which, unfortunately, is being legitimised by state mechanisms. For instance, all Tamils who were on leave on the day of the Central Bank bombing have been questioned by the Police, the implication being that there is a massive conspiracy shared by the city's 200,000Tamils. Institutionalised racism such as this cannot be explained away on the basis of statistical probability or expediency. At military checkpoints, the determining factor, made obvious to all and sundry, is whether a person is a Tamil or not. It is only if the Tamil identity of a personis established, or if there is some doubt in the mind of the security personnel as to the ethnicity of the individual, thatthequestioningandsearching begins in earnest. Can there be any doubt in anyone's mind that this process is discriminatory and that it will only engender further estrangement and dissatisfaction among an already alienated community?
The irony is that the desired result of minimising the threatofa suicide attack will not beachieved by this approach. In fact, it is only through winning the trust and cooperation of the overwhelming majority of innocent Tamils in the country that LTTE cadres can be identified. As long as the Tamil community's assistance is not sought in this process, the results are going to be "hit or miss". After all, the best information and tipoffs of suspicious persons can be
obtained from Ta be assured that another excuse
humiliate them.
Moreover,
Government's me about the need against LTTE su Colombo, nota si been articulate inconvenience ar irresponsible re cause to innocent
In fact, it is only t the trust and cooveruibleming innocent Tamils that LTTE ca, identified. Afe information a suspicious pe obtained by the 1 be assured tha another excuse bumiliat
the Army and P every lead, whet telephone call or li it appears clearth been motivated by faith. It is the ag that holds that a in jail for no reas even a single reb result. This was policy under til regime, even in th the JVP insur shocking consequi hoped that th Kumaratungadis be different.
The outcome costly realisat oppressive ins mechanisms thata more crucially ordinary people intentions of those

Cover Story
lmils who must all this is not to harass and
in all the dia propaganda for vigilance icide squads in ngle caution has ed about the ld damage that porting could Tanhills. In fact,
brough winning peration of the majority of in the country dres can be rall, the best
nd tip offs of sons can be amiils uwho must
all this is not to harass and e them,
olice follow-up her anonymous etter, even when at the tip-off has y maliceandbad ge-old principle hundred Tamils on is worth it if el is caught as a the self-avowed he Premadasa he South during rection, with tences. One had e Chandrika pensation would
of all this is the ion that the titutions and reinplace figure in the lives of
than the best who govern. In
this sense, continuous pressure must be exerted and systematic lobbying must be undertaken in order to ensure that these institutions and mechanisms are not allowed to "do business as usual". It is only through constant and consistent vigilance that real changescan takeplaceina context that has been riddled with corruption, racism and apathy. At any rate, the well-beingofallethnic groupsandall communitiesin this country is too important and too inter-connected a pre-requisite to be left entirely to the good offices of the state.
Taking advantage of the War
The Government's record outside of theethnicissue hasbeen even less heartening. The scandal involving Jeyaraj Fernandopulle and the Airport taxi service smacked of the UNPs worst days of thuggery and intimidation. The fact that President Kumaratunga saw fit to coveruptheentireaffair, or at least to turn a blind eye, by retaining her Deputy Minister is even more disillusioning. The use of extra-judicial force, the blatant and immediate transfer of police officers who had merely done their duty, has sent chills down the spines of all those who had hoped for better things from the PA administration.
Now, the latest reports of large-scale bribery and fraud concerning the privatisation of thePuttlam CementCompanyand of the Sevanagala Sugar Factory are all the more frightening since there appears to be some Cabinet members who are pointing the finger at others. The fact that Lakshman Kadirgamar backed down from his earlier stance is perhaps the surest measure that this administration does not take too kindly to the very framework of honesty and transparency that was its battle cry not so long ago.
March 19960counterpolar 7

Page 10
Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu
THE bombs in London, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and indeed the bomb in Colombo, focus attention on the role of violence and terror as saboteurs/ catalysts in revitalizing the peace process by re-investing it with a sense of urgent and immediate purpose.
In the Irish case, fortunately the commitment to peace has proved to be sufficiently deeprooted to withstand therecent horror, as illustrated by the strenuous efforts made to sustain themomentum of the peace process. In the Palestinian-Israeli situation, repeated violence has left the peace process poised precariously on the edge of suspension. In theSri Lankan case, violence is stilla central elementofconflictresolution on both sides and the attempts to move beyond, into a post-violencephase of peace making, have been short-lived.
Interms of peace-making in both Northern Ireland and in Sri Lanka, there is the common issue of giving up arms as an essential precondition for direct talks. This raises questions regarding the legitimacy of armed struggle that go to the very heart of the ideology of both the IRA and the LTTE and the continuing use of forceasa source of leverage in negotiations.
In the Irish situation, the
impasse betwee. government's wea the IRA's weapons threatened to stale process of dialogu the potential for pc monthlong IRA ce Active US involver the process produc the issue was pa three-personintern ission headed by Senator George report of this inter on the decommissi makes interesting peacemakingin tha
negotiating pro grounded in politi
The Mitchellrep British insistence o symbolically giv before talks co
80coursepoint March 1996
 
 

h the British pons first' and last positions, mate the whole 2 and dissipate ace that the 17 asefire offered. ment to sustain ed results and ssed onto the lational commthe former US Mitchell. The national body ioning of arms g reading for
כ
titmarks outa
impractical and as something that just would not happen. In doing so, the report acknowledged the basis on which the IRA declared its ceasefire i.e. without preconditions for all-party talks with all the parties concerned.
Mitchell and the commission have recognized what the British governmentandits Unionistallies refuse to, and that is the significance the Republican movement attaches to its acceptance as a key and legitimate player in the conflict. In rejecting decommissioning aS a precondition for all-party talks,
cess that is al realities.
ortrejected the in the IRA even ing up arms mmenced as
they have interpreted the IRA ceasefire in this spirit and as the only practicable way forward. A weapons first' insistence would have reinforced stalemate.
At the same time, the Mitchell

Page 11
report did not condone the use of violence for political ends. In calling on the parties to subscribe to a declaration of principles disavowing this, thereport aimed for a commitment by all parties to anexclusively peaceful resolution of the conflict without placing the responsibility for this upon the priorandunilateraldemonstration of a commitment to this end, by any one side.
In effect what the Mitchell report did was to undercut the very ideology of thIRA, bybinding it to a process of non-violent conflict resolution.
The Mitchell report outlined six principles that constitute the testofoommitment toademocratic and non-violent solution. Parties are called upon to make a "total and absolute commitment to democratic and exclusively peaceful means"and"to renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome for allparty negotiations". They are also called upon to accept the outcome of all-party talks or to use only peaceful means to try to alter them. The Mitchell report in its final pages also expressed the opinion that an "elective process could contribute to the building of confidence". To the dismay of many, the British government pounced on this and declared its willingnesstoexpeditemovement towards elections to a negotiating body, thus abandoning the parallel track " approach of gradual decommissioning and talks that the Mitchell commission endorsed. The argument forwarded by the British Government in support of this courseofaction was that the Ulster Unionists would only be persuaded to enter into all-party talks if together with gradual decommissioning, Sinn Fein obtained a fresh mandate.
Whilst Mr Majorwas placating his Unionistallies, who arecrucial
to the survival of in the Commons, h of the Mitchell re. being tantamou precondition bein on the commencer talks. Thereturn to IRA mustalsobes to thisin particula to the tardiness i all-party tal preconditions.
What has follo of the violence between the Bri governments on
Hamas and the extremists, like counterparts u Yitzak Rabi interest in the
whatsoever ap burning desire into the dusth,
all party talks c June.This will bep -party talks in Ma any party refusing theprinciplesofth will be excluded. the resumption of IRA has led to ade fixed for all-pa renunciation of v a stumbling 1 participation of th wing, Sinn Fein, i The Jerusalem near identical act: space of a w immediately by Aviv - are strictly variety. Hamasan extremists, like counterparts who Rabin, have noint process whatsoev burning desire to the dustbin Consequently, thi

his government isinterpretation port was read as nt to another gplaced by him mentofall-party violenceby the tenasaresponse randingeneral, in movement to KS without
wed in the wake
is agreement tish and Irish a time-table for
2 Palestinian their Jewish ho martyred п, bave то јеace process art from the to consign it in of history,
ommencing 10 receded by inter (rch from which to subscribe to
eMitchellreport
herefore, whilst violence by the finitedatebeing rty talks, the tolence remains block to the e IRA's political in those talks. bombings-two of terror in the eek followed another in Tel of the wrecking il the Palestinian their Jewish martyredYitzak restin the peace arapart from the consign it into of history. significance of
Cover Story
their terror is to be measured in
terms of its impact upon the peace constituency at large and upon the political actors engaged in the peace process.
The destinies of Peres and Arafat are now linked even more so than before. Each bomb, each act of terror, binds them closer in the common objective of bringing the peace process to fruition. However, each act of terror also opens the floodgates for mutual recriminations and turns the spotlighton the vulnerabilities on each side.
Up to the point at which the recent terror was unleashed, it appeared asif the configuration of forces could begenerally described as being in favour of the peace process. There have been warning signals however and what the bombings have accomplished is to ensure that these signals be taken more seriously in putting the breaks upon an acceleration of the peace process. The next round of talks were to deal with the key issue of the permanent status of the Palestinians.
On the Palestinian side, although Arafat and the PLO received a thumping mandate in theelections at the end of January, independent candidates openly critical of his autocratic style and of the self-rule accords were also elected.Thisunderpinsarguments for greater sensitivity on his part for carrying with him all shades of moderate Palestinian political opinion in the quest for peace and accommodation with Israel. Arafat cannot avoid the task of consolidating his huge mandate into asolid constituency forpeace. This will in turn, strengthen his hand in theinevitableshow-down with Hamas and the extremists.
There Canbeno doubt that the latter has to happen or else Israel will take matters into its hands and in doing so, compromise the independence and credibility of the Palestinian Authority. Either Arafat shows that he is effective
March 1996 Canterpolars

Page 12
and can ncu tralize Hamas or else he shows himself up as being too weak and unreliable a partner for peace. The peace process can only work if each side takes care of the threats within it and in a manner that does not undermine the other doing likewise.
Herein lies the real damage of the Jerusalemand Tel Aviv bombs. They have blown open the basic modus vivendi between Arafat and the Israeli governmenton their respective abilities to deliver the assurances each requires of the otherinthepeace process. Without delivery on those assurances, the support of their respective polities will be jeopardied and needless to say, this support is vital for a lasting peace.
Until the three bombs Were exploded in quick succession - two on the No. 18 bus in Jerusalem and the third in Tel Aviv, Shimon Peres seemed secure enough in office to advance the dà te of the general election scheduled for November, to late May. The Rabin martyrdom had produced a sympathy vote which reinforced the arguments for peaceand the Likud opposition had not been able to shake off the charge that it shared some responsibility for the climate of fear that culminated in the Rabin assassination.
In the aftermath of the bombings, Peres is now running neck and neck with the Likud leader Netanyahu (after having enjoyed a 15% poll lead), and his political career is injeopardy. The system of election that willoperate in May will give the electors two votes - one for the party of their choiceand theother for their choice of prime minister.
Peres now has to act tough. And this means with Arafat too, for not doing his bit to neutralize Hamas. Consequently, there is every
possibility of ei polarization betwe Palestinians or a war. Both outcom peaceprocessonhc From the Isra the selling poin process is the pr with security. Sec be Seen both in ter boundaries as wel every day acts obstruct the r. normalcy. Aware is devoted to blast of security into c surest way of so peace process.
For us in Sri La peace process institutionalize. V forms of terrorism action is still a bas will decisively cor resolution. The II negotiate with the and the governme LTTE to give symbolically if no before talks can cc since both sides are of the urgency of n the limited utility useofforce, the clin facilitation of diale
100 countepand March 1996
 

her a further en Israel and the alestinian civil es will put the ldforsometime. eli perspective,
of the peace mise of peace urity here is to ms of territorial as in an end to of terror that storation of of this, Hamas ng the promise blivion as the consigning the
promising.
The Sri Lankan situation has elements that are present in the other two. There is growing polarization, and to the extent that the select committee exercise is analogous to the all-party talks in Northern Ireland, the question arises as to whether that exercise will advance the peace process without the participation of a key protagonist unwilling or, indeed, unable to forswear violence. President Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Peres may both see their commitment to the peace process mangled into a tough stance against political violence
nka, there is no at hand to iolence in the and military ic process that dition conflict TTE will not army in Jaffna ht requires the up arms, substantially, mmence. And not convinced gotiations and of the further ateforexternal gue is also not
which considerably restricts their room for manoeuvre. The hardliners on both sides of the ethnic divide, in both Palestine and Sri Lanka, have succeeded in severely testing ethnic reconciliation.
The point has come at which the middle ground is being swept away to make room for Armageddon. Violence willdecide when peace will come and what form it will take. On current reckoning it will take more time and when it comes, it will be further away from the heart's desire.

Page 13
The Draft, the Bo their Repe
Wasa
AFTER each horrible calamity, thequestion thatinvariably springs to mind is as to whether we have moved any closer to a resolution of ourethnicconflict.Thatconflict will eventually end and that as each anxious daypasses we get closer to aconclusionthanfurtherawaymust also be the case, but it is not comforting. Whetherit beashortor long wait, the fear is that, on recent experience, it will be bloody and destructiveand that theend whenit comes will not be
significancelies. perpetrators to of horror, their I the message the by doing so. Ital: importantly, in response and e willingness to carnage and a enough in the government's cl conflict resolutic Mr. Prabhaka his bombing cam reply to Riviressa of the devolution
entirely satisfactory or desirable. Unless of course, more blood and destruction is an integral part of conflict resolution as currently conceived and that therefore, there is no pressing need for any re-consideration of options for it, as in the presentcircumstances.
How do conflicts end? Is there any clear
pattern of activity or tend that can be discerned as definitely militating towards this beyond the obvious, yet too general points, about political will and interests? What does the Central Bank bomb portend for the end of conflict?
To begin with, the bomb must beseen in the context of the conflict at a critical juncture and not as some have been disposed to seeit, as an isolated egregious act of terrorism. That it is an act of terrorism is beyond doubt, but its
government's conflict resolut either elimina marginalise ther nearer the he unarmed partne Itishis way of that there can be of conflict resolu as the key player ethnic divide an viable proces
resolution direct
 

Perspective
mb, the War and rCUSSİONS
in the ability of its xecute such acts need to do so and y want to convey Solies and no less he government's specially in our withstand such nxiety for long belief that the hosen course for bn will succeed. ran will not stop paign. This is his and thelegaldraft proposals -- the
ground from under his feet. On his grisly calculations, he must bomb to keep his chances high and to demonstrate to his constituency that as much as the government can take the war to the Tiger heartland, he can do likewise, in Colombo.
How desperate is Mr. Prabhakaran? Is he really boxed into a corner in which terroris the only option? Isn'titreally amatter of time before he realizes, as the rest of us already do that he and his brutal boys are history?
Mr. Prabhakaran is certainly not having it so good. He
has taken thepeople with him and has to now look after them in inauspiciousconditions. From what available reports there are, despite the efficiency of his organization, there is dissension at least amongst the more affluent middle-class sections of the refugees in Kilinochchi.They want to go home and he won't allow them to. Whilst the
two pronged ion strategy to te the LTTE,
or mold them
art's desire as 's in devolution. making the point no viable process ion without him on one side of the | accordingly, no s of ronflict ed to cu ng the
pcorer sections seem to be largely with him still, the lack of water in the Vanni could have its toll on them too. March/April could po ove decisive in ascertaini g how many badly want to vote with their feet.
There is also the challenge of the future of Jaffna. Is it politic for him to allow it to remain a hollow prize for te army, if the time is nigh when larger numbers of people want to go back? Or will he harass it out of army control by
March 19960counterpafarill

Page 14
hit and run guerilla attacks? Both options are not quick fixes if time is running out. Alter- natively, can he do more in the east to loosen the army's control of the one-third of the Jaffna peninsula in their possession?
On the other hand, Mr Prabhakaran is not havingitsobador more to the point, badly enough, either to bow out or behave. In any event, he has always relied upon the other side making mistakes and has always demonstrated a. enviable tactical acumen for making the best of a bad situation.
The same reports about dissension in Killinochchi do not speak of great civilian enthusiasm for the army, not least because Tiger propaganda about the far from gentlemanly excesses of that institution, is still
firmly embedded in enough minds to make them part of the faithful in the numbers game. And across the board, dissenters and faithful alike have a common dread of artillery barrages which appear to have been a key feature of Riviressa.
That most would rather be home than in the Vanni is beyond dispute. What is not clear is the extent to which this yearning has been translated into a political position that will finally cook Mr. Prabhakaran's goose. Again, reports indicate that when one enters political terrain, the boys, however bad, brutal and bloody, are still perceived as a source of leverage and as an insurance policy by too many for this to happen too soon. It is stillanethnic conflict in which the LTTE has not
yet lost th credentials it st singlemindedly Though the LT people to evacua governmentispel made that pa necessary and th for its travails.
There is also how adversely M military capab destroyed by Riv whether what he be effective for structuring the ag resolution.
He has demonstrate a inflicting dan government's wi thereby raised the
120 counterpoint0 March 1996
 

action against him. He still controls around two-thirds of the peninsula and an offensive to dislodge him will in all probability be costly and not especially helpful in winning hearts and minds. Accordingly, it will relieve him of the burden of having to cope with the rising discontent of the displaced. And the east will be no replay of Riviressa.
Taking care of him and his is going to take timeand it will cost. Mr. Prabhakaran's desperation is as damaging as his defiance. For how long will the majority keep faith with the government's strategy for conflict resolution, particularly when Mr. Prabhakaran manages to succeedin reminding the southern middleclass as well, that there is no escape from war?
2 nationalist
brutally and
appropriated. TE forced the e en masse, the ceivedashaving inful exodus erefore blamed
the question of '. Prabhakaran's lity has been ressa and as to has left can still he purpose of enda of conflict
ontinued to capability for age on the machine and osts of military
After the Central Bank bomb, the government has to contend with high anxiety and insecurity. A population that is not feeling good is not good for the government, unless that population believes that periodic loss of peace of mind is an acceptable price to pay for peace in a relatively short time.
It is not that Colombo middle class anxiety and apprehension willcombineintoanti-government feeling. Rather, there is the likelihood that there will be growing pressure upon the government to go for broke militarily, fora quick and decisive victory which will not be forthcoming. And as far as devolution is concerned, the all too insufficient space for it too, will be closed.

Page 15
We are facing a polarization of attitudes which could retardconflict resolution. When war ends it will endless to our liking and peace, not near enough to what we need and
the Central Bank prospect of mor furtherconfirm the we have reache devolution this
should seek.
Ido not think that the
defeat or marginaliza
tion of Mr. Prabhakaran
Does one support
should bepursued as the
exclusive goal of conflict package because: resolution or that it alone
is sufficient for it. The an improvement c goal of this exercise is to
define an enduring and or does one oppo honourablerelationship any event, the uva between the majority
and minority communi- and the problem c. ties in this island, so that
thereisdemocraticspace through a solution for both to pursue the the LTTE?
good life in peaceful coexistence.
As to why the legal draftfalls shortof whatisrequired has been dealt with elsewhere in this journal. However, to reiterate the point, some observations are inorderon the politics of theselect committeeprocess that is reflected in the substance of the draft and which could also arise from it, as the select committee process gets underway.
The draft has to contain the alternative to Eelam and accordingly demonstrate to the Tamil people that theiraspirations can be best met in an united Sri Lanka.
This looked like being on the cards with the publication of the August 3rd proposals and hopes were raised. They have now been suspended, if notdashed, because the legal draft incorporates the objections raised in theintervening fivemonths. All thathashappened since indicates that more will not be yielded through the select committee; less, is infinitely more likely.
Thelegal draftis disappointing because it is the most that a government riding high after Riviressa sees fit and able to offer. The hardening of positions after
likely to allow in the bettingis thati Tamil political rep asaresultimove fu: the governmentar of any alternal reliance upon Tig for leverage and r The substanced and the timing committee exel dilemma for thc more devolutic support a disappo because it is ne improvementont does one opposei event, the war ca) the problem can throughasolution the LTTE?The latt be extended furth point that a sel consensus that fal is required w government of t position that w conflict resolution more difficult in t
How close to goal of conflict re select committee
The centrality

bomb and the terrorism will s. In thisrespect, the limits of government is
a disappointing t is nevertheless in the status quo Se it because in 'r cam only end un only besolved negotiated with
its lifetime and twon't succeed. resentation will rtheraway from Idin theabsence tive, towards er force ofarms elevance. of the legal draft of the select rcise pose a se advocating n. Does one inting package vertheless an he status quo or because in any only end and only be solved negotiated with rargumentcan er to make the ect committee s short of what ill lock the he day into a ll only make With the LTTE le future. he heart of the solution is this xercise?
of the select
Perspective
committee exercise and of the success of the devolution proposalsas currently conceived, turns upon the defeat of the LTTE. Themilitary considerations aside, the government's prosecution of the war will have greater legitimacy in the eyes of the Tamil civilians, if devolution has been transformed from a promise to a policy. However, the process of defeating the LTTE will impact upon the select committee exercise and affect its outcome. And if the LTTE cannot be defeated, the select committee exercise may turnout to haveserved no greater purpose than to allow the government to demonstrate to the international community that it was serious about devolution.
Those who argue that the Central Bank bomb should not be seen as the catalyst for a reevaluation of the government's conflict resolution strategy, must be aware that they are pinning all theirhopes uponamilitary victory and a consensus on what Prof Peiris has referred to as the redefinition of the unitary state. And neither will solve the ethnic conflict.
Nevertheless, the legal draft should not be dismissed. It may not end up with sturdy goalposts for conflict resolution, but it could advance the kick-off point for the next time around, somewhat.
Whereverthereisroomtopush ahead and move forward with regard to power-sharing it must be grasped and the bottom line must be to resist any effort to reduce powersharing in this package.
We have come to the point at which thereisareal prospect of this conflict taking a turn for the worse, because the paradigm shift necessarytopreventtheworst from
happening has yet to happen.
March 19960Counterall

Page 16
THE LEGALDRAFT OF TH
A LOST OPP
KOhan Edrisimha
ONE of the most frustrating features of thepolitics of Sri Lanka is the stubborn refusal of our political and religious leadership to learn from the mistakes of the past. The political package released by the government in mid-January, despite containing several improvements when compared with the disastrous Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, reflects this tragic reality. Both the substance of the legal textand themannerin which the Government has sought to sell the package, leave much to be desired.
There are several positive provisions in the package. The deletion of Articles 2 and 76 of the Constitution, which entrench the unitary character of the Constitution, removes an
improvement c Thirteenth An Regional Cour greater revenuemajor weakness Amendment an Councils Act is th of the Governo finance. The ne not only clea mercifully, remo from this area all There are gla however, and clau that the complexit which were highli Premadasa All P
A cardinal defe of тесbaтisтi regional interes The absence
chamber and
unnecessary obstacle to Commission substantial devolution of power. The proposals, omissions.
however, fall far short of introducing a federal constitution, one of their several weaknesses.The proposals contain some imaginative clauses designed to allay the fears of sections of the community who consider devolution of power a stepping stone to secession. The abolition of the Concurrent List and the attempt to remove the ambiguity shrouding the division of powers must also be welcomed.
The provisions relating to finance are also a significant
and both withi Parliament, w Moonesinghestro aconsensusin the hechaired, havenC by the framers of cardinal defect is mechanisms to r interests at the cel of a second c DevolutionComin omissions.
140 countepolnst March 1996

EDEVOLUTIONPACKAGE
ORTUNITY
in those in the endment. The cils are given aisingpowers. A in the Thirteenth the Provincial 2ambiguous role in the area of w proposals are rer but also, ve the Governor ogether.
ring omissions, ses which suggest iesoftheproblem ghted dúring the arty Conference,
ct is the absence
s to represent its at the centre.
of a second a Devolution are glaring
The Need for a Second Chamber
The deliberations of the All Party Conference recognised the need for provincial/regional interests to be represented at the centre. The polarisation between thecentreand the provincesis one of the main reasons for the failure of the present Provincial Council system. An elected Senate, consisting primarily of Senators elected from the regions, would serve as a check on central governmental intrusion into the regions' legitimate sphere of authority and help prevent the comedy of errors which culminated in the enactment of the u n - con sti tuti o nal National Transport Commission Act. When the Bill was introduced in Parliament, hardly any concerns were raised as to whether its provisions violated the scheme of devolution spelled out in the Constitution. A House of Parliament whoseraison
and without hen Mangala 'esohardtofọrge electCommittee tbeenrecognised he proposals. A
the absence of present regional tre. The absence amber and a issionareglaring
d'etre is to represent regional interests at the centre will certainly be more vigilant than Parliament has been in the past eight years.
It must be recognised that the failure of the Provincial Council system and the widespread conviction that all it has done is create another tier of politician with "perks" without responsibility, will understandably cause scepticism about the creation of a

Page 17
Senate. The proposals must respond to this scepticism. Substantial devolution of power must entail a change in the role and therefore the composition of Parliament. Parliament must be the deliberative assembly where national policy, larger political and ideologicalquestions aredebated; politicians attracted by the lure of patronage, who are more at home engaging in grassroots politics, should move to the Regional Councils. Ideally there should be a difference in the type of politician attracted to Parliament and the Regional Council. Since Regional Councils should be vested with the responsibility of dealing with more mundane issues and issues of a more parochialnature, thecitizen should view the Member of the Regional Council as the person s/he meets to deal
with day to day problems, not the Member of Parliament.
Thus the number of Members of Parliament must be drastically reduced. Parliament can consist of a bi-cameral legislature consisting of a 120 member House of Representatives and a 60 member Senate. The net gain for the people in terms of the reduction of politicians is 45 (The present Parliament consists of 225 MPs.) Each region should elect an equal numberofSenators with the entire region constituting theelectorateso as to attract persons of regional stature.
The Devolution Commission
For some inexplicable reason, the idea of a Devolution Commission, which was contained in the August 1995 proposals, has been dropped. The
rationale for such must surely be tc highpowered bod the main politica country, both at regional level, wh to deal with dispu centre and the betweenregionsth and mediation. T could also provic coordination and
the centre and t between regions."
Arof. G.L.
Commission shou the President a Prime Minister, t) Opposition, th Finance, and the of the Regions.
The January
provide for a C Conference to :
 

Legal Watch
a Commission provide for a ly consisting of l actors in the he central and ich could meet tes between the
regions and rough dialogue he Commission ile a forum for liaison between he regions and The Devolution
between regions. What about disputes between the centre and the regions? Even with regard to disputes between regions, the presence of political clout from the centre will facilitate the resolution of suchdisputes.TheChief Ministers' Conference is an inadequate substitute for a powerful Devolution Commission.
The Entrenchment of
Majoritarianism
Affs
ild be chaired by hd include the he Leader of the e Minister of Chief Ministers
1996 proposals hief Ministers' settle disputes
It is dangerous, and indeed simplistic, to view the possible political solution to the ethnic conflict in this country as simply one of devolution of power. There is the equally importantissue of the nature of the Sri Lankan state and national identity. Since independence, the gradual entrenchment of major itarian democracy, where the language and religion of the majority community have been given priority, has exacerbated ethnic tensions and undermined the concept of a truly multi-ethnic, multireligious, plural society.
The Sinhala Only Act, theintroduction of thefirst Republican Constitution of 1972 where the Sinhala Language and Buddhism were given an exalted status in the Constitution, were landmarks in the slide to the vivisection of the country, which the Sri Lanka Ekeeya Sangvidhanaya must recognise, has already takenplace. There is a de facto separate state. There is a merged Northern an Eastern province. This has happened because organisations like the Ekeeya Sangvidhanaya and people like its leaders have is the 48 years since Independent
March 19960countepond15

Page 18
prevented a political solution to the crisis when it was relatively easy to solve.
Instead of bemoaning the fact that with the enactment of the devolution package, the central government willbeunabletobuild public latrines in the regions (So what? Are central government latrinessuperiortoregionalones?), the Ekeeya
place, it goes r establishing a
sanctioned ins cannot beabolish and which all G have to consult Council will not "religisation" of
the politicisation Government w
Sangvidhanaya should ask itself what is so sacred about the concept of a unitary state, which is after alla recent import into the history of the country. They should also understand that the brave young members of the armed forces are sacrificing their lives to preserve the UNITY of the country, not the unitary nature of
the constitution.
It is pathetic that persons and organisations who for years advocated Sinhala only and/or canvassed tomakeit possible only for Sinhala Buddhists to occupy certain important positions recognised in the Constitution, thereby creating the problem, now have the audacity to talk sanctimoniously aboutequality of all racesandarace-neutral Solution to the very problem that they helped create and nurture into the monster that now threatens to destroy the country.
The most retrogressive feature of the package which is supposed to address the grievances of minorities in the country, is that while addressing one aspect of their grievances, namely the need for autonomy, it further fortifies majoritarianism as well. Apart from retaining theprovision which gives Buddhism the foremost
SWALDABandaranalike
appoint monks On what basis? T be consulted " pertaining to the fostering of the E Who defines th phrase? Does this liquor licences, i abortion, the rig of other religions We need a S. but it must cor representatives Whether it is the church in Polanc clergy in Pakistan Sanghain Sri Lanll of religious institutions is modern liberal ( indeed ironic, column of the S Independence believed, tha
160 coursepolard March 1996
 

uch further by constitutionally itution, which edbyParliament overnments will
This Supreme only foster the politics, but also of religion. The ill presumably
Commissioner of the bastion of secularism and democracy in this region has been assigned the task of ensuring that the opposition to the further move away from the ideal of a secular state in Sri Lanka is muted
The sops to appease the Buddhist establishment are not only contained in the devolution proposals. Afurther
sop has been surreptitiously slipped into the chapter Ο Fund a men tal Rights.
Article 10 of the present Constitution provides that "every person is entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice." This
right and the
Sirimavo Banda/anafike
to this Council. he Council must in all matters protection and iuddha Sasana." 2 scope of this include tourism, nland fisheries, hts of adherents p
cond chamber; sist of elected of the people. Roman Catholic
, or the Islamic
, or the Buddhist a, theseparation and political issential for a emocracy. It is f the political 1nday Times of Day is to be
the High
freedom from torture or cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment, are the only absolute rights recognised in the Constitution. The freedom to manifest one's religion is subject to possible restrictions. The provision corresponding to Article 10 in the Draft Constitution, Article 15 (1), subjects the freedom of thought, conscience and religion to a host of possible restrictions. Why has this been done? Who asked for it to be done? Is it designed to facilitate the enactment of legislation prohibiting or restricting the right of a person to choose or change his/her religion? It isominous that in the weeks after the releaseofthe package, bookshave been banned and tuition classes prohibited in the name of religion.
What is most bizarre is that apart from the fact that these attempts to appease the Buddhist

Page 19
establishmentare objectionablein principle, they will also notachieve thedesired objective. TheBuddhist establishment will, in all likelihood, remain implacably opposed to the devolution package.
The Power of Dissolution
Another weakness in the devolution package is that there are inadequate checks on the possible abuse of the Central Government's power to intervene in a region in a situation of emergency. No one would argue that the central Government should not be permitted to intervene in a situation where the unity and sovereignty of the country are in jeopardy. The central government must be able to respond swiftly, decisively and effectively. But since this power of intervention has been abused so much in India and in Sri Lanka, the potential for abuse must be addressed in the proposals.
The provision fall short of the sa the Thirteenth Article 26 (4) ( proposals permit situation where and present dan and thesovereign by proclamatior herself/himself tl powers of the Go' Ministers, the R and any otheraut other authority iu lav? The Preside the power to diss Council in such Proclamation isti in effect for mor days, it must be resolution of Parl
The main sho. section is that th dissolvea Regiona the 14 day period Parliament were ratification of th the dissolution effect. Quite r provision h consternation al
 

Legal Watch II
s in the package feguardsevenin Amendiment. a) of the draft : President in a there is a clear ger to the unity yofthecountry, to assume to he functions and fernor, Board of gional Council hority. Does any clude courts of nt is also given olve a Regional a situation. If a ) continue to be 2 than fourteen approved by a ament. tcoming of this 2 President can lCouncil within and thus even if to withhold its Proclamation, will remain in aturally, this
S caused.
nong minority
parties, particularly in view of the dissolution of the two Provincial Councils in January. Furthermore, thefact that Article26(4)(f) makes it impossible for judicial review of
the Proclamation, renders nugatory the requirement that such a Proclamation should be made only in situations where there is a clearand present danger to the unity and sovereignty of the country.
Quite amazingly, even the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment contain better safeguards to prevent Provincial Councils from arbitrary dissolution! In a situation of emergency, the President may by Proclamation assume to herself the administration of the Province, while the powers of the Provincial Council are taken over by Parliament. The President has no power to dissolve a Provincial Council even in such a situation. The Provincial Councils (Amendment) Act of 1990, provides that whenmore than half the members of a Provincial Council expressly repudiate or
March 19960Canterminardi

Page 20
manifestly disavow obedience to the Constitution, or when the Council ceases to function, the Council shall stand dissolved.
The present provisions, therefore, which are tighter, more specific and yet enable the centre to respond in a crisis, are preferable to the provisions in the legal draft.
The provisions on dissolution should be radically revised. While it may be necessary for the President to be able to
would be free t own discretic Minister, the
Opposition, th President of the Minister nomina Ministers' Confer appellate court j by the Chief Justic the Govern Constitution prov to be nominated thus underminin
take over the administration of a Region in a emergency situation almost immediately, it is certainly not essential that she/he be in a position to dissolve the Council immediately. The ratification of the proclamation by a bicameral Parliament and the possibility of judicial review will also provide for checks and balances on a power which has the
potential for abuse.
Amarasit/0odangoda
The Constitutional Council
The Constitutional Council is expected to play animportant role in the new Constitution even with regard to institutions which have an impact on the devolution of power. The idea which was borrowed from the Constitution
of Nepal, seeks to ensure that a
non-partisan, independent approach is taken in appointing people to key positions and various bodies. A small committee of persons of stature hold office in the Constitutional Council ex officio. In the Sri Lankan context, it would make sense for the Council to consist of the President (thenominal Head of State elected by a bi-cameral Parliament), who in the excrcise of this function
that the politician hold office ex c partisan conside ideally not play decision making.
Is the Governme.
the Pac
Apart, from t weaknesses in ti the package, the attempts to sell th confused and a Cabinet of Minist to understand th: implications of Professor Peir redefining the un
180 counterpaint March 1996
 

act in his/her h, the Prime leader of the Speaker, the Senate, a Chief ed by the Chief nceandaretired idge nominated e. Unfortunately nent's draft ides for five MPs to the Council, g the principle
Ministers Dodango da and Gooneratne praise the package as the last chance to preserve the unitary character of the country. Various DUNF and LSSP leaders and Deputy Minister Kiriella have affirmed their commitment to a unitary state. President Kumaratunga's courageous speech to the Buddhist clergy at the conference at the BMICH seems inconsistent with the patheticattempts to appease them
in the Devo
lution Package and the chapter on Fundamental Rights.
If the Gover In ment is serious about pushing the package through Parliament, shouldn't it be reaching out to the UNP? There should be initiatives to declare a ceasefire between the Govern ment
and the UNPon
CW Gooneratne
s on the Council fficio and that rations should a part in their
it Serious about
kage?
he fundamental e legal draft of
Government's e package seem mateurish. The rsdoes not seem contents or the
the package. s talks about tary state, while
the issue of devolution of power, to share the credit for forging a consensus if it is reached. Surely the Government must take the lead in acting in a statesmanlike manner if it wants the UNP to act likewise.
It is disheartening, therefore, that the Government has failed to produce the best possible devolution package, building on the repudiation of the unitary principlein the Constitution. Such a package would have galvanised the support of the minority political parties, the pro-federal constituencies in the south, the peaceconstituency and moderates throughout the island. The Devolution Proposals of January 1996 could be a crucial lost opportunity.

Page 21
Translated by Catherine M-yu Cho και
 

19 March 19960catapalord

Page 22
Wiииiи5 tИ but losing th
 

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Page 23
SRI LANKA had more
sustained international coverage when it won the World Cup Cricket Championship than when its Central Bank was blown up, killing over a hundred people, a monthand-a-half earlier. Counterpoints pictures juxtapose these two incidents that seem to be worlds apart, but which taken together presenta telling aspect of the daily Contradiction that is Sri Lankan life today.
 
 

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March 19960counterpolar-21

Page 24
THE WARFOR
ASpecial Correspondent
THE LTTE's resort to war on 19th April gave rise to country after country condemning the LTTE and supporting the Government. Foreign support for theGovernment, particularly from the crucial western donor nations, has remained strong despite the Government. Key to this support is the Government's political package offering a solution to the ethnicproblemalongfederal lines. The donor nations are keen to see this implemented.
The Government's problems with its image began with the manner in which the war was
bombing of r Navalychurch. and the Foreign badly. The Go censorship on Barely 12 hours bombed Naga schoolchildren. added spice bombing with imposed that performance spokesman wh incident and a suggested that LTTE, left muci In the meanti that the West talked to the relations with t from an abysm
being conducted as regards civiliansecurity, and itsunrealistic determination to conceal the true extent of the damage to civilians. There was in July an unseemly quarrel with the ICRC over the
tremendously.
bid to take Jaffn October, the ( pledged not tod into the Jaffnan is clearnow. Alt
220counterpaint March 1996
 

GRATIONS
:fugees near the Both the President Minister came off enment imposed 21st September. later the Air Force rkovil killing 24 LTTE propaganda by linking the the censorship very day. The of the defence o first denied the a few days later the victims were
to be desired. me, it is now clear ern nations had Government and he ICRC, starting al level, improved
For its part, in its l, begininginearly Government had roporfiremissiles unicipal limits, as hough the civilians
did not know it, this appears to have had a significant impact in reducing civilian casualties - downto about 100 in October from over 170during the July operation. There was moreover hardly any fighting in July, while fighting during October was heavy.
A new crisisappeared when the LTTE threatened and forced civilians to leave Jaffna from 30th October and attempted to relocate them in the Wanni. On 3rd November concern was expressed by the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali who also appealed for aid to deal with the humanitarian crisis. Thelast thing the Government wanted was for the UN to move in and set up a massive settlement in the Wanni
which the LTTE would have liked
to make permanent. Had the Government allowed foreign journalists to visit the area, the crisis would have blown over faster, as it eventually did. For those forcibly displaced harboured bitter feelings against the LTTE.
The Western nations played an important role here. There was no support for the UN Secretary General's appeal. Foreign journalists who flocked into Colombo were consistently told by Western observers that the Government had been quite careful about minimising civilian casualties. Few questions were raised about the bombing and shelling in other parts of Jaffna. The visiting journalists were also quickly familiarised with the massacre by the LTTE of nearly 100 Sinhalese civilians along the border of the Eastern Province

Page 25
during the later days of October. Thus the LTTE's attempt to play the refugee card and buy time failed. By its chosen logicof trying to severely down-play civilian suffering, the Governmentraninto more blunders.
The Sri Lanka NGO Forum meeting
The Sri Lanka NGO Forum meeting comprising international NGOs and their local partners were to meet in a hotel in Bentota on 15th and 16th November. Most international agencies were being told by their governments that the situation with respect to law and order and human rights was improving significantly in Sri Lanka. They were also under pressure to curtail or freeze activities here. Many of the local partners had also been close to the Government.
It appears that the Government which was nervous, was also gullible. Propaganda emanating from Sri Lankan expatriates in London, who would have been considered a lunatic fringe here, had branded the Forum as being pro-LTTE. The Forum was also accused of having plans to ask the Government to unilaterally stop the war. The press too added to the frenzy.
On the 15th, demonstrators appeared at the venue in Bentota. Some of the organisers who went to talk to the demonstrators were mobbed and assaulted. Among those injured were Sunanda
Deshapriya, editor of the anti
communal Sinhalese weekly, the Yukthiya; and Walter Keller, editor of Sudasien, a German journal specialising in analytical articles and features on South Asia that was also very critical of the LTTE.
The organisers who went into the matter pointed a finger at the Government, or a section of it, for having initiated what became a fracas. It was also clear that antiTamil and anti-political settlement elements had jumped the
bandwagon and ( lengths. One of t the Yukthiya edi him of joining up (the President)a country to the Ta immediately inc the fact that the aid the victims telephone call fro: minister who hac
Attempts to hol in Ratmalana the were met by den included Dr.Nalil known hawk a ideologue. The p
It uvas late Governmen realise that it
party to mov
was being m and check. groups arит hysteria and, and implaca to the politica on uhi Government' hing
there maintainec noForeign Office the meeting. The with whom the amicably discus an understandi reached, started b obstructive.
It was later that came to realise th party to moves w manipulated and groups drummin and xenophobia, copposed to thepc

Politics
arried it to new he assailants of or had accused with Chandrika nd selling the mils. What was iminating was bolice moved to only after a magovernment
been alerted.
d the cenference following day onstrators who In de Silva, a well nd chauvinist olice who came
r that the
lit Came tO had become es uvhere it anipulated mated by ming up uvar xenophobia, bly opposed alsettlement ch the s credibility ed.
that there was clearance to hold Foreign Office matter had been sed earlier with g having been einginexplicably
the Government at it had become hereit was being check-mated by gup warhysteria and implacably litical settlement
on which the Government's credibility hinged. It did try to make some amends.
The last UNP Government with an incomparably poorer record
had its external public relations
ably managed by the likes of Bradman Weerakoon and Neville Jayaweera. At least, visiting NGO officials and Human Rights organisations felt that there was someone in the Government they could talk to rationally and reach some compromise. It is suprising that this Government with persons like G.L.Peiris, Lakshman Kadirgamar and the President herself, who ought to know the modern world better, could not make a judgement and handle the Forum without causing so much damage to themselves.
The LTTE
Another aspect of foreign backing for the Government is a series of actions by the LTTE that have branded it as a party with which one cannot enter into meaningful agreements and have dealings with. Within its framework of totalitarian politics, its actions reveal a fixed agenda, while words and agreements are only used to confuseand buy time. One instance was the hard way UNHCR discovered in 1993, after painfulnegotiations, that the LTTE would not allow civilians the safe Pooneryn route across Jaffna Lagoon. The Government rediscovered it earlier this year. To takesomeof thisyear's irritants: 1. When the Government and the LTTE signed a cessation of hostilitiesagreementin January, provision was made for foreign observers. Several observers were sent by Western countries. The LTTE obstructed their deployment, even though this was clearly beneficial to the Tamil people. 2. About March negotiations between the LTTE and the Government had reached a
March 19960countepolnr-23

Page 26
stalemate and both in principle accepted third party mediation. When France nominated a mediator, the LTTE had maintained since then in its propaganda that themediatoris a friend of President Kumaratunga's. Diplomatic sources are very clear that thisis totally false and the two never knew each other. 3. The LTTE and its supporters continue to maintain that the Governmentis not serious about a political solution because it has not given the LTTE the political package it had made public. Again there is clear testimony that the Government tried hard to give the package to the LTTE through diplomatic channels,asone would toaparty that broke off talks and went to war. But the LTTE never took it. 4. The LTTE propaganda line has been that its breaking the truce was only a pre-emptive measure against the Government that had decided to wage war. Again, the
Chanafrika 4
testimony i Government w restart talks. It missiles were down its Avro April that thi firmly committ 5. Once the LT
civilians to vaca October, it violating th concerning th around Jaffna forced the closul These also desperation of th strength has lit material basis. Tw was very little ac diplomatic comm
. of them were bo
resigned to along The Governme packagehasgiver to work towarc would happen if went back on its v the package, a s acknowledged th
20contain March 1996
 

sh Routhros Bouth/os-Gha/
s that the as trying hard to was only when used to bring aircraft in late 2 Government 2d itself to war. TE ordered the te Jaffna on 30th began openly 2 agreement e ICRC zone hospital, and eofthehospital. point to the e LTTE whose le political or yearsagothere vity within the inity and many ed. They were war of attrition. ht's political hem somegoal
. Asked what he government
ord concerning nior diplomat t there would
be a price to pay. He added, "we do got wish to run or be seen running things here. The people will have to decide".
On the European Union's resolutions condemning theLTTE, he said, "of course the European parliament does ngt have executive powers to make individual governments enforce them. But these resolutions are important because they represent a state of mind in Europe as a whole".
One may draw themessage that if the Government moves ahead with implementing the political solution, European governments would make an extra effort to curb the LTTE's fund raising and arms buying activities. If not, they would oncemore becomefatalistic and decide that there is not much they could do for a country bent on division. Then perhaps, after much more blood has flowed, UN troops would come in to cut corners, squarecircles and enforce the division.

Page 27
After the lion
Kethesh Loganathan
THE "fall of Jaffna" symbolizes, more than anything else, the contradictions in the behaviour and conduct of the state and the LTTE in a manner that belies reason and sanity.
On the one hand, the on-going propaganda blitz over the "fall of Jaffna", characterized by the state-sponsored publicity given to the hoisting of the Lion Flag, is a far cry from the Statement issued by the People's Alliance that the hoisting of the Lion Flag by itself is not a solution to the Ethnic Question and that more needs to be done to restore to the Tamil people their just rights. While these sentiments are to be
region. However certainly raise qu whether the Flag ceremony in Jaff appropriate. This so, when it is far
whether the Tam other minorities ( Lanka live of the equality and co-e proposed in the" Package", or cont "subjects" under of Sinhala chauvi exclusivism. It is
clear whether the succeeded in esta comprehensive a irreversibly milita stranglehold ovel
The on-going propagand
welcomed, they do not Jaffna", characterized by
quite correspond to the veiled jingoism that marked the Flag
publicity given to the hot is a far cry from the Sta.
hoisting ceremony. The People's Alliance that thi
"Nandhi" symbol
adopted by the Jaffna Flag by itself is mot a sa District Development Question and that more Council in 1981, did
oksed restore to the TamilPeo
down", surrounded by the Lion and the symbols of the Security Forces!
No one can deny the right of the state to express its gratitude to the Security Forces for its achievements in the war front, in particular, the expulsion of the LTTE leadership from the Jaffna peninsula and the pressure exerted on them to move their politico-military infrastructure to the mainland and the Vanni
necessary for brir into the negotiati eventually into th mainstream - or, to bring about its am inclined to fet of the above polit military conditio) satisfied by the "í and the hoisting It is, indeed, reas President Chand

Flag
Viewpoint
What
OES OA cognizant of this reality when estions as to she posited a sombre and a hoisting realistic "long way to go" theme a was at all in her Address to the Nation that is particularly followed the Flag-hoisting from clear ceremony. il people and The jingoism behind the f a unified Sri raising of the Lion Flag was no basis of less matched by the behaviour xistence, as and conduct of the selfDevolution proclaimed "sole inue as representatives" and "sole he hegemony protectors" of the Tamil people, nism and the LTTE, as it was withdrawing also far from from Jaffna. The forced State has expulsion of the people from blishing a Jaffna and the systematic nd an destruction of their houses, later ary justified by the LTTE as their * the LTTE, "historical duty", was more a
senseless act of nihilism y than a case of heroic abilitzovertbe Ifal qf resistance. It is, indeed, y the state-sponsored ironic that when Sinhala W and Tamil human rights iting of the Liom Flag activists and N# lement issued by the should justifiably » Inforf caution the state against
boisting of the Lion hurting the ' ་་་་་་་་་་ lution to the Ethnic Pride", that the LTTE needs to be done to should do precisely that
by reducing to rubble le their just rights, the homes of the people
of Jaffna, converting ging the LTTE their fertile lands and homeon process and gardens into a mine-field and e democratic relegating them to the status of failing which, refugees and a perpetual state of annihilation. I dependence on relief agencies. Is l that neither this an irony, a paradox - or, ical and the typical of the LTTE is have been phenomenon? all of Jaffna" Be that as it may, the pursuit of if the Lion Flag. a just and a durable peace cannot uring that ignore the above realities. These ika is are realities that must, firstly, be
March 19960Countepator 25

Page 28
recognized and then confronted, if there is to be a return to reason and sanity. Let us now look into the future - and see what could be salvaged and built upon.
On the positive side, President Chandrika and the PA Government continue to stand committed to the pursuit of a negotiated settlement - a principle position that even the LTTE cannot totally reject. More importantly, this is what the people want. When Sinhala soldiers offered an abandoned old woman in Jaffna their rations, and when that woman inquired from them as to whether they themselves had enough to eat, that was humanism in its purest form. (Based on what I saw in one of Rupavahini's video clippings.) This was an interaction at the human level that typifies the true sentiments of the broad sections of the Tamil and the Sinhala people. Neither the Sri Lankan state, the LTTE, nor the
On the posi President C and th Governmen to stand con the purs, negotiated, - a princip that even
CClMMOt tOita
chauvinist forces of the ethnic divi to ignore this real they do so, it will peril. Herein lies conditions for pe
But a peace cor the counter-disco not enough. If pe durable, it must a peace is to be self
260 counterpoint0 March 1996
 

itive side, handrika
e PA t continue mmitted to uit of a settlement le position the LTTE lly reject.
on both sides de, can afford lity. And, if
be at their own the objective
C. stituency and urse alone is ace is to be lso be just. If -sustaining,
then appropriate structures and institutions need to be built into the polity and civil society. It is in this context that it is clear that we have no option but to advance the political process in the direction of democracy, devolution and demilitarization.
What I wish to focus in this article, however, is the question of devolution and regional autonomy. It is clear that despite the delay in advancing the "Devolution Proposals" by the PA Government, and its incorporation into the "total package" on Constitutional Reform, it is just a matter of time before the Sri Lankan polity and civil society will have to decide on the form and content of a new Constitution that also includes the relevant provisions pertaining to the Ethnic Question. This is so whether at the level of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Constitutional Reform, the ongoing bilateral and multilateral

Page 29
talks (formal as well as informal) between and within political parties or at the National Referendum where the people will ultimately decide.
However, what is disturbing is that the form and content of the debate is being increasingly shaped and influenced by "extremist" positions from both side of the "ethnic divide". And, often, the debate degenerates into reactive responses to misperceptions and misconceptions - leading to a cycle of "high voltage" nationalism, where "nationalism" becomes an ideology for exclusion rather than coexistence. Let us briefly look into some of these issues - or non-issues.
That Sri Lanka comprises a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and a multi-religious society is a historical and a contemporary reality that no sane person can negate. To do so is to negate the very existence of the peoples who inhabit the island.
A problem doe however, when nationalists feel ( enter the realm o "inalienable righ determination", i a collective ident nationhood. It ca that given the co experience of the speaking people with institutiona almost every sph existence (i.e. llar
HOuvever disturbing form and
the debat increasing and influ "extremist from both "ethnic
 

Viewpoint II
Sarise,
amil ompelled to f the
: of selfin the context of ity based on nnot be denied lective
Tamillof Sri Lanka lized racism in ere of human
guage,
, what is is that the content of e is being
ly shaped enced by "positions side of the divide"
employment, education, civic rights, security etc.), the "inalienable right of self-esteem" and the land on which they toiled and which they inhabited for centuries (in present administrative terminology known as the North-East province) also became the "living symbol" of their identity, security and socio-economic advancement. It is therefore meaningless on the part of Sinhala nationalists to prolong the debate on the "Tamil homeland".
Similarly, I am also convinced that it is archaic and redundant on the part of Tamil nationalists to articulate proposals for the resolution of the Tamil Question by invoking claims of a "traditional homeland", - however valid it may be - if the task is to seek a negotiated settlement to the Ethnic Question within a unified Sri Lanka. It is sufficient to argue that any scheme pertaining to autonomy and power-sharing
March 19960counterpainr27

Page 30
requires a territorial unit. And, the unit that satisfies the criterion of historical residence, contiguity and concentration, economic viability as well as cultural and linguistic commonalities of the Tamilspeaking people broadly approximates the North-East Province.
Concepts and "ideological" constructs based on "nationality", "traditional homeland" and the "inalienable right of self-determination" are undoubtedly relevant and necessary under conditions of a national liberation struggle aimed at creating a separate nation state. And, if at the Thimpu peace Talks, for instance, these cardinal principles were invoked, it was precisely because the entire Tamil National Movement and the Tamil people were committed to a protracted, massbased struggle for an independent and a sovereign state of "Eelam".
The prevailing situation is different. The call of the LTTE and sections of the Tamil diaspora for the creation of an Independent, sovereign state of Tamil Eelam is no longer the call of the broad Tamil masses of Sri Lanka. The experience of living in the now defunct "quasi-state" of the LTTE, with all the ingredients that go towards the creation of a monolithic and a fascistic society, is certainly not seen by the broad Tamil masses as the only viable alternative to the problems of institutionalized racism and Sinhala chauvinism. In any event, other than the demonstration of military might and regimentation, punctuated by nihilism, the LTTE has so far nothing to demonstrate to the Tamil people of its capacity to create an Independent State of Eelam - leave alone a State that is humane, democratic and prosperous. The argument that
seeks to equate t with the Tiger ps but one which er Sinhala nationali negate any form and power shari people.
As a first step, imperative that t nationalists, whil the case for auto power sharing w Sri Lanka, do so
The experien the now def state" of the l the ingredi touards the
monolithical
society, is c See by the masses as th
alternati
proble
institutional
and Sinhala
invoking separat and inalienable r the Sinhala natio concede that the needs to be resol that addresses th grievances of the do not distort the autonomy and p just another step "Tamil Eelam".
Secondly, the II is a Movement f( Reconciliation. T nothing to do wi government" wit
280 counsepoint March 1996

he Tamil psyche yche is a mythables the sts to deny and of autonomy ng to the Tamil
therefore, it is he Tamil epresenting nomy and ithin a unified without
ce qfliving in unct"quasiLTTE, uvith all 2nts that go creation of a ada fascistic ertainly mot road Tamil
e only viable
've to the
ims of ized racism chauvinism,
e nationhood ights and that nalists, who Tamil Question ved in a manner elegitimate Tamil people, demand for ower-sharing as ping-stone to
Leed of the hour Dr National his has got th a "national h electoral and
power ambitions. The Movement for National Reconciliation should essentially. constitute the "Peace Constituency" and expand outward so as to influence all sections and to bridge the "ethnic divide".
Hence, I would consider the immediate task of the Movement for National Reconciliation (MNR) to be as follows: (a) Replacement of the war
psychosis and jingoism with a peace culture and a peace discourse; (b) Assist in the task of reconstruction and rehabilitation through the mobilization of "peace volunteers"; (c) Defend the "Devolution
Proposals" from any irrational dilutions and engage in masscontact campaigns for Democracy, Devolution and Demilitarization. It is imperative that the Movement for National Reconciliation (MNR) functions independently of party Formations. The MNR can either be an off-shoot of the existing peace Movements or a fresh initiative which will work closely with existing peace Movements and NGOs.
These are modalities which can be worked out by those who take the initiative. But, there is no denying that the only rational answer to the Question "After the Lion Flag-What?" is National Reconciliation where the Lion Flag becomes a symbol of coexistence rather than one of dominance. Or, if the "pseudopatriots", continue to hold aloft the Lion Flag to symbolize dominance, then one has to seriously consider including into the agenda of the Movement for National Reconciliation, the search for a new national flag which captures our collective visions for the future, while relegating the past to where it belongs!

Page 31
On Curbing Polic isturbin
Rajan Hoole
A popular theme in stories of the Tarzan genre is one where some scheming, unscrupulous men descend on relatively innocent jungle folk or peasants. The outsiders playing on the fears of the natives and having made promises of supernatural glory and eternal prosperity, goad the natives into violent actions suicidal to themselves but profitable to theschemers. That is how chauvinism of every variety usually operates. It needs to first render the people stupid, gullible and prone to delusions. One finds a good deal of it among Tamil and Sinhalese expatriates for whom it is either profitable or a hobby. But the people of this country in their struggle for life and sanity gave a strong verdict against chauvinism at last year's parliamentary and presidential polls. The Government's course has not been an easy one, given the highly organised and conspiratorial character of the chauvinist lobby in the South. They have lost no opportunity to capitalise on the war and the fear created by the LTTE's terror. In recent months some lapses in leadership on the part of the Government have played into their hands, placing the cause of peace in further jeopardy.
During the aftermath of the July 1983 holocaust, literary productions of this country's diplomatic corps, laced with selfpity and wild attacks on foreign journalists and media, brought
further ridicule c while winning accolades at hom much of the spirit the air in recent deal of unintellig
attitudes to Tami
been manipulatec frightened-peo encouraged to t into Mr. Plod and
DAG AKot
classic policeme fiction-whendea
The bluster of K recently replac Colombo area, is The Kenneth Mu the police harassr Forum gathering 16th Novemb continuing Sycophancy to tł rather than pc
 

Tam View
State Impulses: g Trends
in the country -
the authors 2. One senses too of those times in months. A good gent and hostile is have no doubt land let loose. A ple have been urn themselves Mr. Goon - the
kademiya
n of children's lingwithTamils. otakadeniya, the ed DIG of the a case in point. ulder affair and ment of the NGO at Ratmalana on er, reflect a radition of le ruling power licing that is
professional and intelligent. Both these were played up as being in the nature of global, Western/ Christian backed, anti-Sinhalese conspiracies. The state media too was credulous and undignified, after some early promise under the new government. The IslandDivaina group went to town on the NGO Forum affair. Much credibility was given to animplied suggestion by a group of Sri Lankan' expatriates in London of British government support for the LTTE. This was to be deduced from: the Sri Lanka NGO Forum is pro-LTTE, it has its office in the British Refugee Council building in London and the Refugee council receives support from the British government.
The attack on the NGO Forum was also editorially joined in by the state-owned Daily News which had a recent change of editor. The DailyNewshad lately carried pictures of Sri Lankans' demonstratinginforeign capitals. One picture of demonstrators in London called for an end to Tamil Terror'. The nuances of this game were mainly antiTamil. The fact that the NGO Forum had associated in it delegates from Amnesty International, -- Article XIX and Asia Watch which had also been very critical of the LTTE does not seem to have made an impact. Indulginginmindlesschauvinistic noises had become preferable to calm reflection. Worst of all was the failure of leadership on the part of the Government, where its actions seemed motivated towards appeasing the chauvinists or to
March 19960 counterpoint029

Page 32
indulge in some puerile impulse. It was after the NGO Forum fiasco that the Government was prodded into waking up to the dangers of the drift and making amends. The Deputy Minister of Defence threatening to send pseudo-patriots to the war-front did much good and was characteristically censored by the Island. Some of the damage could not be easily reversed. It is true that theSinhalesepeople have learnt since July 1983, but not so their leaders and editors.
The Mulder Affair
The deportation of Kenneth Mulder is an affair that reveals a good deal of intolerance and sycophancy, which also brings shame and ridicule on this country. Mulderisan American who was attached to the Justice and Peace Commission of the National Christian Council. I had occasion to get to know him reasonably well as a friendly, well-meaning person. I did not meet him this year. But it became clear to me that he had been making an honest effort at . understanding objectively the situation in this country, althoughoneneed not have agreed with everything he said. See his article in the Pravada ). Following a tip-off the police raided the NCC offices in late July, just after the abortive military operation in which over 150 civilians were killed in bombing and shelling. The only thing discovered that was immediately touted as incriminating evidence, was a fairly innocuous computer printout. A white lotus from which blood was drippingquestioned the sincerity of the President's white Lotus campaign, and raised questions about the war and civilian casualties.
Sycophancy then took over from judgement. Vague accusations of
subversion wer Mulder, includi broadcasting me of speculation in lack of substanc started it all b Mulder had
Excellency the P onein power dar
Are We
some d. whe technica Mulder's nationalil be used the discus
WaS CO to the go of the
as ridiculous as was. Mulder wa Tamilness of the perhaps stood in counsel, as Muld being pro-LTTE. Mulder repre rooted America student radicalis landmarkeventi was the shooting Guard of stud
300 coursepoint March 1996

made against ng in the state dia. The volume ade up for any 2. Someone had claiming that insulted Her 'esident, and no ed to question it,
iving in ark age
'e a lity like foreign y had to to shift ision that mfortable
Vernment
day?
he whole thing s deported. The oreign Minister the way of wiser r was accused of
sents a deeply n tradition of n and protest. A this movement by the National ent protesters
against the Vietnam war at Kent State University in the spring of 1970. Allison Krause, a female student, was killed. Twenty years later, a commemoration of that event addressed by Senator Mc Govern, the Democratic presidential candidate at the time of the protest, affirmed what in the course of time had become the verdict of the nation--that the student protesters had been right. Nearly everyone of us is confused about the current war in our country. I have several Sinhalese friends who have said much stronger things than Mulder did. They are aghast at the nature of bombing and shelling which makes sheer hypocrisy of the claim of liberating the Tamils from the Tigers. They see the impetus for a political settlement receding with the glorification of transient military success and a rise in war hysteria.
Arewellivinginosomedark age where a technicality like Mulder's foreign nationality had to be used to shift the discussion that was uncomfortable to the government of the day?Those who believed the dire things that were said about Mulder would have expected the deported Mulder to go on the binge attacking the government and canvassing the LTTE. Mulder's recent experience at a Tamil expatriate gathering in Canada shows him to be an honourableman serious about his anti-war convictions, and who harboured no bitterness towards those who treated him shabbily. Herepresentsanactivist tendency born out of the Vietnam war and has a firm place in American society, which views with deep suspicion all foreign military ventures by the US government. Mulder has earned the curious position of both the LTTE and the

Page 33
Sri Lankan police accusing the other of brainwashing him.
The deportation of Mulder also throws into question President Kumaratunge's commitment to those ideals which earried her a massive mandate from the people. She too had reached political maturity amidst the student radicalism of Paris of the 60s, which ought to have given her much that she shared with Mulder. Mulder is owed an apology by us all.
Theexperienceoffamils in theSouth
The rising mood in the south, by its very idiocy, both official and unofficial, was incapable of making distinctions among Tamils. Among those who had bad experiencesin this country during mid-November was Nirupama Subramaniam, who covers this part of South Asia for India Today, and her photographer (see box). Commenting on the experience, she said. "I realized during this visit to Sri Lanka that this is a very racist society". She is neither an LTTE sympathiser nor a Tamil nationalist, but just an Indian national who also happens to be an influential opinion maker. For
The two Tami side of the lava the main cell v four Sinhales criminal offer then a Sinh; walked in, S Tamils, and u lavatory bow level.
* A Tamil picked
later release Mahara prisc where he wa convicts. The imbibed the p outside, assal and stole hi pickings were jail guard. Suci many.
* Several police
Tamils detain picking up Ta basis (i.e. tw. more for th example, abus Hotel Ceylon The passers-b Tamils by the were loaded i taken away. TI reported in
following day suspects beir
The deportation of Mulder also throu's in President Kumaratunge's commitme ideals uphich earned her a massive ma the people. She too had reached politic amidst the student radicalism of Pari which ought to have given her mu
shared uith Mulder.
the local Tamils, Nirupama's experience was just the tip of the iceberg:
Two Tamils of hill-country origin randomly picked off theroads,
were made to spend the night
in the lavatory of the remand cell at Kohuwalapolice station.
questioning, i up the tande arrests. Such always end th investigative Island reader with the thousands c

Tam WeyW
ls sat on either torybowl, while was occupied by e taken in for nces. Now and alese prisoner tood over the rinated into the l sited at floor
off the road and d was sent to on for a week, as held among latter who had revailing mood ulted the Tamil s money. The shared with the nexperiencesare
stations, as the ed learnt, were imils on a quota enty three, two e day). As an wasparked near inns Wellawatte. by shown to be ir identity cards nto the bus and he incident was The Island the as one of LTTE ng taken in for
ntoquestion nt to those undate from cal maturity s of the 60s, ch that she
in a bid to cover m nature of the claims almost here without any follow-up. Many s would be left impression of »f LTTE cadres
Nirupama's Ordeal
ON 11th November two suicide bombers exploded themselves in Slave Island near Army HQ. Though several civilians were killed, it was a desperate move without purpose. Shortly afterwards commandos entered the nearby prestigious Hotel Taj Samudra, gothold of the guestlistand underlined the three Tamil names. Among the three were Nirupama Subramaniam and her photographer. The two were treated harshly. They were grilled, and their rooms and equipment were given a thorough search. The two had to move out. The photographer went to Hotel Oberoi where again he was harassed by armed men who came to his room. The two went the next day with some friends to a restaurant in Bentota (a seaside resort south of Colombo) where they had been before. The proprietress called in some officially accredited vigilantes. Nirupama showed them her official accredition and tried to explain that she was an Indian journalist. The vigilantes' response was that all Tamils are forgers. She asked to be taken to the police whom she thought knew better. Fortunately, before being taken, shegotiacall through toacolleague in Colombo. She spent about four hours at the policestation with the police doing nothing to verify her credential or clear her.
Her colleague whom she had phoned, had in the meantime contacted the IGP who said that his men were being very vigilant. The colleague who was anxious for Nirupama's release refrained from protesting at the absurdity of the remark. After her release, Nirupama observes that she felt this time that society here "was really racist". Her photographer, unable to take any more, took the next available flight to Madras.
March 19960counterpoint031

Page 34
roaming Colombo.
Assimilation of terror
The law-abiding Madrasi photographerof India Today found that his Tamilness rendered the atmosphere in Colombo so oppressive, that he flew away unable to take more than two days of it. It is a measure of what lies within the Tamil community here that they have adapted to this oppressiveness that is both external and internal with a deceptive passivity. To take two recent instances, the firston being internal, where on 30th October a threatening loudspeaker announcement by the LTTE resulted in hundreds of thousands of civilians streamingout of Jaffna to become vagrants, refugees and persons without an identity. The second on 5th November was
external. Severa civilians in Batt themselves to be shields by the ST word of protest. trying to relieve camps at Puthy Between 20 and civilians so used LTTE fire. This W struggle" in whic purposefully rep defiance among atomised passivit
Thepower oft manipulative il pervasive. It could use passing rifts t and son, of diffe manand wife. If co the trust and co normally healthy relationships. Th this passivity is th which children in bombers perfor
320countepand March 1996
 

ll busloads of icaloa allowed used as human F, with hardly a The STF were the embattled dkudiyiru ppu. 30 of the Tamil were killed by as a "liberation the LTTE had aced organised he people with V. he LTTE and its fluence were for itspurposes etween mother ences between uldevenexploit fidentiality in eacher-student other side of passivity with rms and suicide with terrible
effect tasks destined for them by
the LTTE leader.
In trying to match this with crudeexternal terror, the statehad rendered itself more odious to the Tamil people while providing further justification for the LTTE. One aspect of this thinking is the Prevention of Terrorism Act that has made failure to inform, or withholding of information on matters pertaining to the security of the state, an offence. Terror, particularly in its internal aspect, is a life and death issue for the Tamils which we need political space to deal within our own way. In many instances, it has to be dealt with as an intimate family problem. When the problem concerns a brother, a son, a friend ora student, one does not go to an alienstate, almost totally lacing in moral legitimacy. The latteryears of Rajani Thiranagama's life showed that dealing with this

Page 35
internal phenomenoninaway that is morally justifiable involves enormous risks. She had spent hours and hours counselling students and young persons whom she knew may one day be detailed to take her life.
The state's demanding through police action, what went against the grain of the Tamil people's feelings, asinthePTA, waspart of the process by which it became immersed in the psychology of terror. Recent vents do not suggest that thisproblemoftotalalienation is being addressed.
The Government's Role
What the government could achieve is therefore not liberating the Tamils from the Tigers, but enabling the Tamils to acquire political spacein which they could assert themselves againstall forms of oppression. Thisis why thenew PA Government's pledges in relation to respect for human rights and finding a political solution to the ethnic problem offered so much hope.
Militarily, the LTTE did place the Government in a difficult position whereithad to take Jaffna or abdicate. I believe the President herself is clear in her mind that this is a separate issues form implementingapolitical solution. The defeat of the LTTE lies not principally in military action, but in creating political conditions where thousands of cadre would desert its ranks. There could be liberation for the Tamil in which thousands of LTTE cadre who are victims of circumstances end up astheashesofmilitary defeat.Thus therisingmood ofchauvinism and mass hysteria in the South works against the very rationale for the government's existence. This is a tragedy because this is the first government in more than three decades that has shown a sense of purpose and still commands the ability to convince the people.
Among the casualties of the
present mood Government's c concerning respec rights. The Preside at a recent press c. hergovernment wo members of the forc of violations, but c action on the basis In this area the performance is vei The role of a numb gross violation documented. The F named several pers of them are stilloni should at least ha under observation where it is safe Operational areas lastplaces for them. to pretend that th white van terroranc corpses has been remanding so functionariesin the far too many peop. at higher levels, wi to see the back of thi and are only w slackening of vigila The Governme. very scrupulous a rules and proced persons, while civi to be punished. For
who are bombed, s as humans S international
guaranteeing their conflict are to all abeyance. This r positive public der the Government th the people courage to be used as huma The government keep its eyes firmly c made to give dignity citizen. This require vigilancesoasnottos theregrettableevent beginning. If not, we ourselves living in heading toward fragmentation.

Ta Wew
The Editor
are the ommitments Counterpoint t for human htsaid ineffect N onference that Dear Sir,
ဒီဋ္ဌိမျိုမှီ respond to S.Sivasegaram. The E. Tamil community today is one that
has been paralysed from within by
fallegations. ՀՀ:ՀՀ:8 ခို့(ရိုးဂုံလျှိို the systematic and brutal decimation y inadequate. of dissent. The people have been erofofficersin corneredby the politics to accept
death fatalistically. Unable to conceive or support alternatives, they can only think of escape or means to manage their private interests. Even the virtual conscription of children. and massacres of Sinhalese and Muslims have to be accepted in silence. This is not to question the struggle against the Sri Lankan state. But what we did to ourselves during the course of that struggle and how we came to such a weak position is mainly our responsibility. We Tamils know that.
At this point of danger, papers which give much weightage to opinion and analysis arecalled upon to be responsible. The issues have listed above, along with the forced expulsion of people from Jaffnaby the LTTE are life and death issues. If a paper cannot discussthese and systematically obfuscates issues that are key to the community's survival, it could only be regarded as balanced in some perverse sense. If they honestly say they are afraid, that too could be appreciated Buta commontrend among the Tamili
is is well HRTF has even ons. Nearly all the loose. They rve been kept in a capacity for others. should be the It is also foolish le prospect of i ofmysterious checked after me junior STF. There are le on the loose ho should like is Government 'aiting for a
C. nt seems to be bout applying lures to such lians continue these civilians helled, or used hields, the COWenants rights during purposes in equires some
nonstration by elite, as reflected in the two papersin չ, ՀՀ:
two give question, stogobeyond obfuscation RE" and articially blame all the so the
legs hearsaeng perish they need #: ce apaper adopts a line that is lideintosomeof lse, it needs to go even described at the oprotect the egos and
may soon find ations of the writers. What
have tried to show in my article . . referred to by Sivasegaram is that these papers regularly go beyond falsehood to mischief (i.e. trying to
a police state is inevitable
March 19960 countepair:3

Page 36
What bringso obfuscatingapprc papers and their
miminmini
340counterpain March 1996
 
 
 
 

at been from a moral st
at the debasing and
having nothing to lk. most clearly the hof the two bit of Self
should be the relationship be
communities. Sivasegaram is bein merely polemical indefining v
MIRJE and Sarinahar. I

Page 37
WEDIO
IETSCONSO
Twixt slip and gully'
SriLankancrickethasfinally hit the top spot! After years of flattering only to fail at crucial stages, we have finally matured into a truly champion team.
Following a succession of remarkable performances which saw us win seriesin New Zealand and Pakistan, the Sharjah trophy and some spirited efforts in Australia in difficult circumstances, we added the icing on the cake with one-day cricket's most prestigious prize.
Sri Lanka's record in the previous World Cups was so dismal that many would have considered reaching the semifinal of the tournament a major achievement.
Sri Lanka were always the minnows of the game-no team had lost more matches in the history of the World Cup and we had never been beyond the first round
The fact that we were able to put all the statistics behind us and play cricket of the highest quality to remain the only unbeaten team in the tournament is a proud achievement.
Wehadalready madewaves in the cricket scene with our performances prior to the world cup but were considered not consistent and professional enough to progress further.
We were easily the most experienced side in the World
Cup with five p figuredin over1 and two othersh games between
All those who emphatic six wi Zimbabwe on would have see maturity. Chasin is not too difficu professional mau wesetaboutireac was impressive. Eventhough v vital wickets of very early there at all and Arav and Asanka Gu consolidated loose to ensure huge 13 overs to The highlight mances in the to been the empha victory in every we played - no c gone through a
 

EDAE
ayers having '0 games each danother 180 hem.
witnessed our sket win over February 21 n the signs of gatotal of 228 it but the very nner in which hingthetarget
wellost the two
our openers was no panic inda de Silva rusinha first and then cut victory with a
spare. of our perforurnament has tic margins of r single game ther team has world cup in
Sports
such impressive style.
One of the keys to our success is that at long last our batsmen have have learnt the meaning of CONSISTENCY.
Every one of the top seven with the exception of Romesh Kaluvitharana had at least one fifty to his credit.
Aravinda de Silva in ful flight is worth all the Laras, Tendulkars and Waughsin this world and mercifully he has finally realised that scoring runseverytimehebatsisbetter than one big score and several disappointments.
Heisone of the few batsmen in the game today who is untroubled by any bowler and often is dismissed by his own carelessness rather than good bowling.
Sanath Jayasuriya, Aravinda deSilvaand Asanka Gurusinha stood out with their contributions, but Skipper
March 19960counterpoint035

Page 38
Arjuna Ranatunga, Hashan Tillekeratne and Roshan Mahanama played several crucial innings which made the difference between winning and losing.
Ranatunga ended the tournament with the staggering average of 120.50 and although he made just one fifty he had two scores of 46 not out and 47 not out against Zimbabwe and Australia and was dismissed only twice insix innings - both times being adjudged LBW.
The return of offspinner Muttiah Muralitharan and the sterling efforts of Chaminda Vaasgave ourbowling abetter image and the heroics of Jayasuriya, de Silva and Dharmasena with theball made up for the lack of proper fast bowling support for Vaas.
We must now build on this great triumph and carry our talentinto the testarena as well which is the true test of a champion side.
One of the bright spots of theone-day winis thatourteam will be much more "marketable' now and will attractbetter response from the senior cricketing nations.
We must distribution o all test-playing with its new one-day cham isbound to hav say at the annu too.
An area ofg us though is to bowling par whose effort undone by si bowling from
Kaluvithaı keeping has in andheshould b even in tests. hegainedbykr was assured i worked wonde keeping.
Sanath Jaya: groomed to o in tests too Mahanama’s Kaluvitharana the number se Ranatunga' the one-dayers he was expos times in the Australia with fields and wa when the chip, Thesides fi
360 coursepolno March 1996
 

ensure a fair f tests between 3 countries and found status as pions Sri Lanka eamuch bigger al ICC meetings
reat concern for find a good fast tner for Vaas is were often ome rank bad the other end.
ana's wicketmproved vastly lepersisted with The confidence lowinghisplace n the team has ers even with his
suriyashouldbe pen the innings ) as Roshan partner and should revert to ven slot. 's captaincy in is excellent but ed quite a few tests against ultra-defensive s less inspiring s were down. tness too will be
a key factor in the five-day games and the likes of Mahanama, Gurusinha and Wickremasinghe will have to shape up.
We are now the World Champions of one-day cricket and for the next four years we shall carry that tag with us in all our games. Whilst being a more marketable team now we simply cannot afford to reston our laurels.
All eyes will be on us as we
now setthestandards for others
to follow. We have an onerous duty to fulfil for the sportitself and we cannot at any stage afford to be complacent and let the side down.
It is good for our cricket to have people of the calibre of Marvan Attapattu and Ruwan Kalpage waiting in the wings. We should build a squad of around 25 with Manjula Munasinghe, Eric Upashanta, ChamaraDunusinghe, Sanjeeva Ranatunga and some schoolboyslike Anushka Polonowita, Yasawin Dharmaratne, Mahela Jayawardena, Tilan Samaraweera, Nimesh Perera and Aviska Gunawardena contracted to the Board with test cricket and the future in mind.

Page 39
THE ASSE
SRI LANKA'S acrimonious tour of Australia was over three whole months ago but the incidents that took place during that tour stunned the cricketing world and it is still the most talked about tour in recent test cricket history.
Australia has been by far the most friendly and accommodating of the "senior" test playing nations and apart from supporting our bid for full member status at the ICC, Australia has given us more test matches and tours than any of its counterparts.
What did go wrong then? It was just Australia's acknowledging that our cricket had come of age
and so we gotth Australian treatr usually reserved English teams in the Ashes.
Sri Lanka's re New Zealand, P. Sharjah obviousl Australians a tri they decided to On Our team.
The media as first salvos, inter members of the and crushed the by getting them their names slow generally makin Video tapes a
 

E T
ULES STYE)
e typical ment that is
for touring the battle for
cent heroics in akistan and ly had the Ele worried and pull out all stops
usual fired the viewing touring team
ir self confidence
to pronounce vily on TV and g fun of them. ure then shown
on TV concentrating on the bowling action of the key bowler in the team and doubts are now created in the minds of all viewers as the videos are replayed several times over. How the series would be played out was quite evident within the first few overs of the first test with Australian Captain Mark Taylor being ruled not out when trapped plumb in front of the wicket before he had scored. Taylor went on to make 96 in that innings and the value of that knock rose with each game as Taylor ended the series with a paltry 152 runs.
Fellow opener Michael Slater too had a similar reprieve and went on to make a massive 219. Mark Waugh trying to avoid his sixth successive duck against Sri Lanka was let off twice before he scored as Ranatunga's field placings and leadership looked out of sync.
Unfortunately, our team couldn't quite handle the situation and when the newspaper headlines screamed 'Cheats' after the ball tampering incident and Murali was no-balled for chucking; the
on-field verbalisations of a team
which had honed sledging into a fine art, was the last straw and we only let ourselves down by losing our cool.
Interestingly enough the player who had to bear the brunt of it all - Muralitharan appeared to be the only one who could still concentrate on the cricket as he turned in some incredible fielding displays.
There is absolutely no doubt that umpire Darrel Hair had
March 19960contepatro37

Page 40
made up his mind to no-ball Murali even before the second test began. There was talk about this in far away South Africa among the scribes covering the England-South Africa test series.
Former Australian captain Allan Border is on record saying that he believed the whole episode was preconceived and the Sri Lankans were been victimised.
Whether Hair acted on his own or on instructions remains to be proved but the sequence of events leading to the no-balling of Murali is interesting.
In early December,Hair was one of the "third country" umpires on duty in the test match between South Africa and England at Johannesburg and his umpiring was the topic of
380Counterpaint March 1996
discussion wher Graham Thorpe at a vital stage ir Hair took no the series and re Australia whereh to stand in the se between Sri Lan on Boxing Day.
Hair calls M. in three overs fr mary position of umpire - the firs a decision has be end.
Murali is Swi other end where without incident Hair who is now considered thei judge an illegal not call the bow does fellow ump The ICC whic
 

he adjudged caught behind
the game. further part in urned home to 2 was appointed cond test ca and the hosts
rali seven times m the uncustothe Head
time ever such en made at this
ched to the he bowls and umpire in what is eal position to alivery, does r and neither re Steve Dunn. had been very
slow to act on the ball tampering issue of the previous test produce a statement saying it had warned the Sri lankan cricket board earlier about Muralis action.
Despite it being Boxing Day holiday and almost impossible to contact anyone let alone the big-wigs of the ICC the august body came up with its statement virtually overnight giving credence to the story that Hair travelled down from Johannesburg with the statement already in his pocket!
Murali then bowls without incident in the next game a limited overs match against West Indies and Hair looks cornered as both umpires in the match are local umpires.
Umpire Ross Emerson standing in his first one-day international and just back on duty after being suspended for "mishandling" a previous test match comes to Hair's rescue and calls Murali seven times in three overs.
Emerson however is made to look foolish and incompetent as he falls into a carefully laid trap by the Sri Lankans and he calls Murali even after the bowler has clearly switched to bowling leg spin.
Cricket crazy Sri Lanka goes beserk and varying suggestions are made from recalling the team to appealing to the ICC to the conducting of medical checks on poor Murali.
The circus meanwhile continues and a shell shocked Sri Lankan team is thrashed by the home side in often cruel circumstances.
A struggling David Boon is palpably LBW before he scores but is reprieved and goes on to make a hundred.
Asanka Gurusinha and Chandika Hathurusinghe fight tenaciously with their backs to the wall to save a game when both perish to horrendous LBW

Page 41
decisions.
Shane Warne, the spoilt child of Australian cricket - earns an LBW decision against Hathurusinghe purely on histrionics and escapes cer sure from umpire and match referee.
Despite many pretests from the Sri Lankans the hosts persist with umpire Darrel Hair in all the remaining games thereby denying the visitors the basic courtesy of nominating umpires from the available panel.
The one-day series goes the same way. Aravinda de Silva leading the side in Ranatunga's absence has a heated exchange with umpire Hair whilst fielding and the umpire strikes back later in the day giving de Silva out LBW before he has scored
Umpire Steve Randall then gets into the act and appears not to see or hear anything whilst the Australians are batting but suddenly wakes up and Sri s Lanka's key batsman Romesh Kaluvitharana is out LBW to a ball swinging down the legside.
Almost all home sides have been known to benefit from close umpiring decisions and this trend will continue as long as there is even one local umpire standing in the game.
However, blatant bias towards the home side is just not cricket and the sooner the ICC make it compulsory that both umpires on duty in a test should be from "neutral' countries the better it is for the game.
The most popular sport in Australia today is Aussie Rules a combination of association and union rugby football - they can now boast of a new sportAussie Rules Cricket or cricket for Aussies only
There are two sides out there and one of them is trying to play cricket".
Australian captain
foodful during the famous bodyline series °魏
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Sports
RAPAY FOR PA
there was an overflow of emotions which clouded some of the more serious issues in the whole episode. 聳 3. Everyone was outraged th rid and is a bowler who had played 22
March 19960Counterpoint039

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Page 43


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