கவனிக்க: இந்த மின்னூலைத் தனிப்பட்ட வாசிப்பு, உசாத்துணைத் தேவைகளுக்கு மட்டுமே பயன்படுத்தலாம். வேறு பயன்பாடுகளுக்கு ஆசிரியரின்/பதிப்புரிமையாளரின் அனுமதி பெறப்பட வேண்டும்.
இது கூகிள் எழுத்துணரியால் தானியக்கமாக உருவாக்கப்பட்ட கோப்பு. இந்த மின்னூல் மெய்ப்புப் பார்க்கப்படவில்லை.
இந்தப் படைப்பின் நூலகப் பக்கத்தினை பார்வையிட பின்வரும் இணைப்புக்குச் செல்லவும்: Counterpoint 1997.03

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ELE
 


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March 1997
COVER STORY 4
Counterpoint focuses this month on the countdownto the Local Government Elections with Statistical tables and an analysis that bears witness to a campaign fashioned by violence. In addition, the long-term possibilities of constitutional reform are discussed as they form the backdrop to the elections,
ISSUES O 27
A look at the forces behind the arbitrary excommunication of Fr. Tissa Balasuriya and the absence of due process in the Institutional Catholic Church.
Departments
POLITICS 31 THE ECONOMY 33 -
THENORTH-EAST 36 PERSPECTIVE 43
MEDIA 47
 
 

Vol.4 Issue: I
LEGAL WATCH 24
Our columnist asseses how the main players finally came off in the Shirani Bandaranayake fiasco,
STRAIGHT TALK 39
Dr. Guillermo Bertoletti, Country Director for Medicins Sans Frontiers, Sri Lanka, talkSto Counterpoint about the lack of coordination among governmental bodies that obstruct effective medical missions in the North and East.
Cover Cartoon K.W. Janaranjana Layout Asoka Padmasiri

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20Counterpoint0 March 1997
 


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March 19970Counterpoint03

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cNREFORMONOR
Report of Election-Related Vic of Local Government Election Car
40counterpoint0 March 1997
Overview
he period Fe Police Divisi have been Sc number has been al Threat (152) and Th Attempted Murder complaints of Hurt,
Table I).
Reliable data Centre for the peric this time frame Sup 227 acts of violence Independent Group the aSSailants have 1 II).
Interms oft Ratnapura Police Di Kandy (77), Matale (32 each), Kuruneg Colombo Central ar 4 and 3 incidents re elections are being 30 Police Divisions duration of 11 days political party has b
 

lence During the First Month mpaigning (Feb 5 - Mar 5, 1997)
b5-Mar 5, 1997 has seen 731 incidents of violence in 30 ons covering all areas where local government elections heduled for March 21st. Of these incidents, the highest legations of Assault (159), closely followed by Mischief (153), reat & Intimidation (147). Four reports each of Murder and have been received by the Centre so far, as well as 17 9 of Robbery, 26 of Arson and 44 of Damage to Property
concerning the alleged perpetrators are only available at the dFeb 23-Mar 5, and of the 471 incidents reported during porters of the People's Alliance are allegedly responsible for
those of the UNP for 115, the JVP for 9, the Police for 8, is for 6, the MEP for 3, the NSSP and UPF for 1 each, while lot been identified by party affiliation in 102 incidents (Table
he geographical-distribution of these alleged incidents, the vision has recorded the highest number (93), followed by 57), Anuradhapura (52), Matara, Gampaha and Kuliyapitiya la (31) and Chilaw (29). In the metropolis, Mount Lavinia, dColombo South have remained relatively peaceful with 4, Corded respectively, and these are the only areas where held that have reported under 5 complaints Table IV). In the inder consideration, for the period Feb 23-Mar 5, 1997- a - the highest number of incidents reported against a 2en 31 allegations against the PA in Anuradhapura, followed

Page 7
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60Counterpoint0 March 1997
by 25 against the PA in Complaints against the which they are beingh relatively peaceful divis Polonnaruwa.
In the classifica by party affiliates forth accountable for approx reported, over 47% of: as nearly 60% of incide responsible for nearly Intimidation, Mischief,
Trends
Election-relatec under review. In fact, t incidents reported is o 202 incidents while the roughly equivalent to t the carnage in the Rats late PAMP Nalanda Ell; the complaints in the violence recorded at th far in the first month O and-a-halfweeks rema
In terms of the appreciable deteriorati alleged damage to pro than on any preceding reports of Murder, Att in the first phase, whic More reports of Threa the perpetrators of vic proving sufficiently eff
Reporting of Inci
The PA and the incidents reported or Mar5, 1997. This figur these two parties fort recorded so far. If one contesting the electio reports made/made ag could also be support that the PA + UNPCO the figure represented
The PA has be violence reported, but reporting the alleged i between Feb23andM the PA is the alleged p

Matale and 22 against the PA in Kandy (Table III). UNP are highest in Kandy (17), and the only areas in eld responsible for more incidents than the PA are the ions of Badulla, Colombo North, Elpitiya and
tion of allegations of violence by type allegedly committed e period Feb 23rd-Mar 5th, the PA has been held imately 46% of all Assaults and Threats & Intimidation ill Threats, 50% of all acts of Mischief and Arson, as well nts of Damage to Property. The UNP is being held 40% of Assaults, but only around 20% of Threats & and Threats reported Table V).
violence has continued unabated during the month he most recent trends indicate that the number of n the rise, with the last five days of February recording
first five days of March recorded 249, and this figure is he initial two-and-a-halfweek period which even included lapura Police Division subsequent to the murder of the awela and a bodyguard on February 11th See Table I). Of ast five days, the tally of 93 allegations of election-related he Centre on March 5 is the highest number reported so foampaigning. This trend does not bode well for the twoining for the March 21 polls. types of incident recorded, however, there is no ion of the situation, except for the high incidence of perty on March 5th which is orders of magnitude greater days. Acts of assault too seem to be on the rise, but empted Murder, Hurt, Robbery and Arson are fewer than h was characterised by the conflageration in Ratnapura. ts are coming into the Centre, and this may reflect that lence are better"organised" in that simple threats are ective to stifle and debilitate the opposition.
dents & the PA-UNPNexus
: UNP between themselves allegedly account for 242 of the nearly 73% of the total recorded for the period Feb 23e is mirrored in the combined number of reports made by he entire month fi591 in which is 80% of the total considers that some of the Independent Groups is have PA or UNP affiliations, as well as the fact that some ainst individuals whose party affiliations are unknown ars of one of these groups, the inescapable conclusion is tribution to the escalation of violence in even higher than | in Table II. an held responsible for the majority of incidents of
this cannot be dismissed merely as a reflection of those incidents. For instance, of the 471 incidents recorded lar 5, 177 were reported by the PA, and of the balance 294 erpetrator in 227 or approximately 77% of the complaints

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冬
Source: Centre for Monitoring Election Violence (CMEV)
| * 45|-1|-112 63----91145 98113|-122 ! 162|-14-173 315|-9-3113 회훼447 | 9 || 153 || 26 | 154鱷
80Counterpoint0 March 1997
 
 

* TABLE I DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENTS REPORTED(5TH FEBRUARY TO 5TH MARCH 1997)
| Murder Attempted Hurt Assault Threat &Robbery 퍼헌T헌비T귀처制퍼니Damage to 위R이(TOTAL
:: • Murder- - ----Intimidation----·Property- - - - -----
{33153984781213 s22 260
*--|-2711-711_20
2---34-4-61|-†8 25th Fèbruar|-•-157|-72112549 |26th February 1--63|-*5-1281 27th February) -1 .-1113-31472
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寫 電*懿畢 臺夢導字鼻。
100Counterpoint0 March 1997
made by all other partie Independent Groups an allegations against the P
instances the JVP (4) har
the largest number of vi Overwhelming majority
The followingst two main protagonists fi perpetrator. Of 51 incid against the PA, and ther the PA's 33 reports on th were unknown and 3 (9. of the incidents appeart engendered its own inte number of allegations m or 10% of the complaint party, as compared to or
Classification by Ty
The classification in all categories excludin as many acts as any othel display similar statistics a under review. This mean the number of acts of Mi number of acts of Damag Threat & Intimidation th: almost even in terms of a in the statistics, comparal Threat.
Measures of Contail
The danger, there intensification up to elect threat of violence is forth curb such tendencies witl complaints at least to be a Police authorities do not complaints. However, stal taken significant action in rhetoricofpolitical partie parties are now placing th Opponents.
The Centre for . set up by the Centrefol public policy institute, Multi-mwember NGO Co
Dr. P. Saravanau Executive Director Centre for Policy A

individuals. Members of the MEP, the JVP, as well as those without any party affiliation have also made , whereas of registered parties only the PA and in a few e alleged violence by the UNP. The UNP has reported lations (211 for the same period) and the f these (164 or 78%) allege PA involvement. istic is fairly typical of the dominant trend in which the ature first as complainant and then as alleged ints reported by the UNP on March 5th, 41 or 80% were est against persons with unknown party affiliation. Of is day 23 or 69% were against the UNP, while 6 (18%) $) were against party colleagues. Thus, though the bulk
reflect PA-UNPrivalry, the PA appears to have nal competition and schisms as evidenced by the ide against PA members by their fellows. In 19 instances made, PA affiliates have accused colleagues in the ly 2 analogous reports (or under 1%) by the UNP.
pe of0ffence
of offences by party affiliation (TableV) indicates that g Assault the PA has allegedly committed at least twice group. In the case of Assault, however, the UNP and PA nd have done so consistently throughout the period s that though the PA allegedly committed nearly thrice schief, twice the number of Threats, six times the e to Property, nearly two-and-a-halftimes the acts of in the UNP in the past 11 days, the two parties are cts of Assault. As a result Assaults are consistently high ble only with the relatively less serious offence of
ment and Control
fore, is that a similar profile of violence will continue in ion day on March 21st. The only way to contain the he leaders of political parties to take immediate steps to hin their respective parties, and for the more scrious Icted upon by the law enforcement authoritics. The have current figures of arrests made on these tistics available at the Centre indicate that Police have less than 01% of the cases reported. Nor has the s been matched by concrete results, and both major e responsibility for stopping the violence on their
fonitoring Election Violence (CMEW) has been r Policy Alternatives (CPA), an independent The Free Media Movement (FMM) and the
alition Against Political Violence.
muttu Waruna Karunatilake
Convenor - The Free Media
lternatives Movement & The Coalition
Against Political Violence

Page 13
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March 1997.0Counterpoint011

Page 14
THE YEAR
Political Violence Thre Constitutional Refor
VYASA
he President has declared 1997
the year of action and hinted at
the possibility of a constitutional revolution. The stated raison d'etre for Suchoverhaul, even upheaval, is adurable framework for national unity and democratic governance--a Constitution which will go along way in resolving the ethnic conflict and establish the Structures and mechanisms for a return to full-fledged parliamentary democracy.
As always, means will condition ends and the way things are done will determine what is to be done. Accordingly, along with therisk of missed opportunities and botched potential, we also face the prospect of a new political alignment and the promise of a fresh start. All of this will hinge upon the conduct and verdict of a number of electoral contests which the government has identified as its modus operandi for change.
The Scourge of Political
Wiolence
None of this will be safely and securely accomplished however, if it is fashioned by violence. Political violence is an impediment to the realization of the democratic will of the people. The violence that has taken place in the first month of the current Local Government
Election campaign and the inability and/
orunwillingness of the two main political parties to take effective action against it within their ranks, threatens to return electoralverdicts that are suspect because
they have been shaped by murder,
attempted murder, threat and intimidation, arson, assault and assorted
120Counterpoint0 March 1997
acts of mischief. Th elections which C keeping the city cl cleaning up the pol
The figures political violence ir published by the C Election Violence ( the bulk of the inci bitter rivalry betwe UNP. The appalling EllaWala and a b0 mayhem in Ratnapu
to the extent to w violence isdeeplyen and is So much of a PAVUNP relationshi
Whilst thear of weapons distrib terror has been ex clear indication that weapons officially returned by noon ( the all-party appe violence made afte Speaker, lacks th metaphorically sp candidates, activists
 

OF ACTION
atens Electoral Leverage for m and Conflict Resolution
le local government ught to be about ean are now about ity.
of the incidents of the local elections entre for Monitoring CMEV), indicate that dents arise from the en the PA and the murder of Nalanda dy guard, and the rathereafter, attests
local nment is which be about the city renow 'aning up olity.
hich the culture of
hbedded in the polity hintegral part of the
), mnestyforthereturn ited during the JVP tended, there is no even the 3,000 Odd recorded will be bn March 15th. And al against political an initiative by the e kind of punch, eaking, that party and Supporters are,
literallyspeaking, dispensing against their opponents on the campaign trail.
Whilst individual appeals have been made by party leaders, what is absent is a clear acknowledgement of their primary responsibility to stamp out political violence and a recognition that effective measures to do so must transcend narrow partisan politics.
For example, the all-party appeal is directed at everyone in public life. A Sectionofit is directed at party Secretaries to COOperate in expediting the return of firearms. There is no mention of parties disassociating themselves from Supporters, activists and candidates alike who are implicated in acts of violence or a clear message to them to desist from acts of revengeandretaliation. The point, after all, is that the perpetrators of violence regularly use the justification of revenge, retaliation and self-defence for their bad practices. Consequently a vicious spiral of violence is Sustained and the bad practice perpetuated.
Indeed, instead of displaying maturity and seriousness of purpose against political violence, the tendency has been Sofar to make as much political capitaloutofitas possible. Thepresident, whose PA combine is accused of the most incidents of violence by far, has Said that the attempts by the Leader of the Opposition to cooperate in this matter are a "joke". The UNP on the Other hand is crying foul and doing its damnest to present itself as the poor, helpless victim of PA storm troopers. There are allegations that each side still harbours known and suspected perpetrators of violence and that some of them held and others now hold, high office in the party and even in the government.

Page 15
What is clear is that the political leaders who are supposed to direct the Search for a national consensus and its institutionalization, are singularly illequipped for the task. It is almost as if they are hell bent on proving that consensus cannot be reached and that the gravity of the national crisis notwithstanding, the political process will always be a zero-sum one.
Wanted: A Clean Mandate For Change
The President's rationale for employing direct electoral leverage for change, stems from a combination of paranoia, populism and the perception of possible paralysis. The perverse method by which she has pursued a bipartisan consensus on her Devolution Package has forced the Government to go for broke. And in doing so, the President wants to let out that it is her, the PA and the people vs. the rest. The rest, in turn, are made up of any number ofvested interests in society determined to frustrate her agenda for change which mirrors thepopular will. Therefore when stuck, appeal to the people to facilitate therealization of their will. Alternatively, threaten to do so. Even threaten whilst doing SO.
She knows full well that the success of her government depends on her ability to end the conflict. People did not vote for her or her party in the expectation of any economic miracles, but rather in the belief that she was the only national leader willing and able to bring peace. Internationally, her Support and image has been buttressed by this perception and the unprecedented Devolution Package which gives expression to it. She knows and has averred repeatedly, that there has to be a political solution. The collapse of the package would rob her of her own preferred Solution, the flagship policy of her government and the basic building blockfor alongstintasthechiefexecutive of the country.
In this government electio for security reasons, opinion to decideas opinion could be implement the gove
the popular will. Wel
to confirm that the behind the govern confidence may dot unto the governm majority necessary Constitution,
In this instan constitutional revolu one, heralding inant politics in which ni could be transcende Moreover that there the transcendenceof is also "good" politic This is not going to h
opinion could again to imp government f the pop
violence is Sullying and distorting Consequently, alotis Government Electio and educative insigh the polity and as restructuring the pli power.
The devil is detail, ormore to the returned on 21 March of the local bodies ar UNP and the results more balanced divis
 

ense the local S, twice postponed Lreatestofpopular O whether popular sted yet again to nment's version of 2 the local elections people are indeed hent, their vote of he trick and deliver nt the two-thirds to pass the new
ceit would not bea tion but a political wage ofSri Lankan arrow partisanship for national unity. areissues on which harrowpartisanship , narrowly defined. appen yet. Political
rpopular
lement the 's version
he whole process the objective. riding on the Local S as an instructive into the nature of an exercise in litical balance of
oing to be in the oint, in the figures, The vast majority controlled by the vill surely reflect a on of the spoils.
Cover Story
The governing party will make gains. What isofespecial interest though, is the proportion of the popular votecaptured by both sides in the context of violence. It is quite unlikely that the PAwill pollanywhere near the president's 62%. At the same time it must be 50+1% metaphorically, rather than literally speaking, if it is to pave the way for a new Constitution and confirm the PA article of faith that the people are firmly convinced and even more so after Ratnapura, that the UNP is irretrievably violent.
As far as the UNP is concerned,
anything below 45% has to be very
worrying at a time at which the party insists that government is not working and this one, pathologicallyincapable of doingso.The UNPmustalsodemonstrate that PA violence will ensure that their party faithful will not desert or stay away from the polls and that enough of the rest will vote UNP precisely becauseofit.
Ambiguity and the Acid Test for the UNP
The local elections are going to test the organizational strength of the one party in this country that can lay claim to beingamodern political party. It is of considerable interest as to whether the UNP party machine can deliver for the first time in 19 years without the full apparatus of the state and forces of law and order to reinforce it. To this can be added the absence of charismatic
leadership to inspire and galvanize
organizational Strength and the horrendous reminder in Ratnapura, of the beast that lurks in the bosom of the party.
Although the PA favours identification of itself and the people vs. the rest, on the ground, it may well turn out be more of a case of the PA and the rest vs. the UNP. This will be the case unless the UNP propaganda and PR machine succeeds in blitzing us with evidence of PA violence to counteract the effect of the Ratnapura murders on its electoral fortunes. The UNP's ability
March 19970Counterpoint013

Page 16
to do this of course, is crucially dependent upon the PA reversing the penchant for violence it is currently displaying and the success in turn, of the PA propaganda and PR machine.
The danger for the UNP, aside from its track recordonpolitical violence, is of being painted into a corner as the obstacle to devolution and peace. There is also the additional danger that the need to clarify the party's position on theseissues at the hustings could deepen the divisions that already exist in the party on conflict resolution and constitutional reform.
It appears that the UNP is campaigning on PAviolenceandon local issues with local candidates who exemplify the new "clean and competent" image of the party. The calculation could be that the cumulative attractions of these individuals and the distaste for political violence will be enough to keep the party's vote bank intact, denythe PAasubstantialmandate and keep options open with regard to conflict resolution and constitutional reform.
Whilst the PA goes into the election with an agenda, it is unclear as to whether the UNPissimilarlydisposed. Consequently, the PA is going to the polls to lay the ground for a popular mandate for change. As for the UNP, it seems to begoing to the polls to find out what its position ought to be on change. The ambivalence that characterises its participation in theselect committeereinforces the view that there are deep divisions within the party on devolution and the politics thereof. This provides the PA with an opening to deepen those divisions by forcing the UNP to clarify once and for all, its stand on the key issue of the day.
The UNP's ambivalence - no to merger, no to the union of regions plus a helpful question here and a helpful suggestion there, a la the Choksy proposaland the more recent Ronniede Mel idea to introduce the executive committee system in the regional
140Counterpoint0 March 1997
legislatures--preyso in the governmente consensus and blunt negativity and obs section of the PAtha the acceptance o Package, is more tha to and incorporate individual UNPers to veneer of consensus it also provides an that side of the UNF
i devolution, offagain
The PAgetti dependent upon togetherasitison its And as far as the li
party discipline to e any other electoral are both free and fai is of the utmost imp The use of e effect durable natio which is what this is be corrupted by vic otherform of electo thuggish elements had one outing to months, mustbeke else the proces constitutionalrevolu could precipitate : disastrous proportic available for the forc "foul" will only re progress towards sustainable develop
 

nthedesireofthose gerfora bipartisan s the charge of total cructiveness. That thas a lot riding on if the Devolution nwilling to latch on any suggestion by give the package a . At the same time, bpportunity to play which is liberal on st that which is not. g its Way is as much the UNP holding ownability todoso, atter is concerned,
insure that this and
contest envisaged rand seen to be so,
OtaCC. lectoral leverage to hand State building, all about, must not lence, fraud or any cal malpractice. The of the PA who have o many in recent pton a tight leashor s by which the Itionis to beenacted political crisis of ns. Anyspacemade es ofreaction tocry tard this country's national unity and
hest.
The Constitutionality of Change
Beyond the local government election and contingent upon that result,
is the issue of a consultative referendum
to force the UNP into supporting the new Constitution through Parliament with the requisite two-thirds majority. Thereisapoliticalaswell aslegal problem here.
The UNP will probably challenge the constitutionality of a non-binding consultative referendumonthegrounds that the 1978 constitution explicitly lays out the procedure for constitutional amendment - two-thirds majority in parliament plus ratificationbythe people at a referendum. The Supreme Court will have to decide as to whether the provision allowing the president to consult the people on a question of "national importance" applies as far as the constitution is concerned.
The political problem follows from this. Were the consultative referendum allowed and then won by the Government, will the Government promulgate a new Constitution by
recourse to mandate theory in the face
of persisting UNP opposition to Such a move? What percentage of the popular vote and how comprised, will justify the promulgation of a new Constitution by recourse tomandate theory? Will 50+1%, literally speaking, constitute a legitimizing mandate to underpin the overarching law of the country? Will 50+1% of the votes of the majority community in itselfserve this objective? There is a very worrying aspect to all of this. The new Constitution with its particular provisions on devolution is supposed to provide the indispensable political solution for the ethnic conflict. As such, it must contain guarantees for minority rights that unequivocally make the case for national unity and reconciliation.
A Constitution enacted by mandate theory and one which is based upon a slim, as opposed to substantial mandate, will be a very tentative

Page 17
document indeed and a tenuous basis for nation and state building. The next government can repeat the whole processandchange the Constitution yet again, jettisoning the provisions for minority rights and devolution of power in the bargain.
The PA may content itself with the belief that if it were to enact a new Constitution, itsstintinoffice willsurpass its predecessor's and in that period the basisfornational unityandreconciliation will be well cemented. This is still a dubious basis for constitution making.
Therecordshows thatapart from the 1948 Constitution which lasted for two decades under the stewardship of both major parties, our autochthonous versions of 1972 and 1978 have had a shorter and highly controversial shelf
life. In any event, the seriousness of this
business should not be measured by its contribution to prolonging any one political party's periodinoffice, but in its utility for national unity and democratic governance well into the future.
The PA's political imperative is that the new Constitution must go through so that the Government can lay to rest the accusations that it is both unwilling and unable to redeem the promises it made in the 1994 elections. Accordingly, a general or Presidential election cannot be ruled out to cap the whole process of consolidating the PA's hold on power.
The LTTE Wild Card
Always present as an ominous shadow overall of this is the LTTE. Will the Devolution Package marginalize them into irrelevance or metamorphose them into reliable partners for peace?
The rhetoric emanating from Prof. Peirissuggests that the government is not interested in the latter, but in the former, UNPattempts toderail the whole process by calling for negotiations with the LTTE came inforsharp rebuttal from the minister. This was disingenuous of
the UNP, to say the least. Given their
opposition to the package, what in
heaven's name were talk to the LTTEabo
TheGujralvis the Indian Governm this approachofexclu a finalsettlement.Th. whether this is possi
Were it no Government is still military operationsag consolation would b of those operations proposals as the acc alternative to seces against the LTTE with the Government's be the way in winning th
of the civilian pc Government's cause depends on how handles the return whom it entrusts thi
This is where andbona fides ofMr. self-defined "half-d central importance. council in the nort continuously presse element in isolating reward for his suppor in Parliament, Mr. I other Tamil ex-milit will be in the forefr fight against Mr. Government will ha
 

they proposing to lt?
italso confirms that ent is at one with dingtheLTTEfrom ecrucial questionis ble?
t to be and the forced to conduct ainst them, theonly e the legitimization by the devolution eptable and viable sion. Operations the package under lt must go some of lehearts and minds
opulation to the Therestoftheway the government o normalcy and to stask. thegoodbehaviour Dewanandaandhis emocrats" are of With the interim heast that he has
d for as a necessary
the LTTE and as a toftheGovernment )evananda and the ants who join him ont of the political Prabhakaran. The e to support them
(over Story
to the hilt to shore up their credibility as the alternative to the Tiger leadership. Theyin turn will have toprove themselves as the only available and worthwhile investment in civilian Tamil political leadership.
Mr. Devananda is insisting that the local polls in the northeast be preceded by a referendum on the new Constitution. No preconditions are attached to the Interim Council. He is as keen to hold the government to its bona fides as the Governmentistohold him to good behaviour.
The point though about the Interim Council is that if it is a success, it can be used as a telling argument in the south against the package. Why vote for more devolution if what is already on offerin the Thirteenth Amendment and the Provincial Council System is acceptable as sufficient and satisfactory? Once Mr. Devananda has his council, he would be unlikely to let go, devolution package or not.
In the event that the Government's electoral gambit on the new Constitution does not come off, it will be back to the Thirteenth Amendment and the Provincial Council system which the UNP could claim is their baby and the only one with any realistic chance of survival. In the tenth anniversaryyearofits signing, New Delhi too will get satisfaction out of the continuingefficacyofa mechanism made possible by the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. Andas for Mr. Prabhakaran, it would be left to him to continue to make the case for why so much blood has been shed over this last decade and why he will continue to do so to prove that the Thirteenth Amendmentishalf-baked and halfa loaf.
Conclusion
Formostofthisyear, theprincipal political battleground will be the south. And the South will have to send a clear message as to what it wants the future of this country to be.
March 19970Counterpoint015

Page 18
NATIONAL POL
160Gounterpoint0 March 1997
VICTOR IV
hat the (
the new forward for a p while Oppositi thirds majority depend largely without the Su in Parliament.
C
2
t
once Stated th Federal system was completel the good of th Chandrika's fa Sabha) system
 

ICY FRAMEWORK ITAL
/AN
Sovernment has little faith in the support of the UNP for Resolutions is clearby its plan to put the Resolutions ublic referendum instead of presenting it in Parliament. But On backing is an essential prerequisite for gaining the two
in Parliament, the Outcome of a public referendum will also 7 on the UNP, for even if the PA wins a public referendum pport of the UNP, the referendum results need to be ratified It is unlikely, however, that a party which publicly ampaigned against the referendum earlier on, will give their Onsent to Such a Set of resolutions at this Stage.
The Government's preference to put the resolution to referendum instead of presenting it in Parliament has tlready met with protests from the Opposition Leader. Ranil Wickremasinghe's stand is that while the UNP remains greeable to a distribution of power, that it will certainly not olerate any resolution that means a division of the nation. Even though conflict is an essential component of a multi-party System, it is crucial that parties are able to work O-peratively on matters of national importance. But from the tery onset, the conflict between these two parties has been Inproductive, and lacking in the discipline required for Ooperation, however important the issue. This was a ommon feature not only to be seen in Ranil Wickremasinghe's predecessors, but also in Chandrika's.
In 1948, the Indian plantation workers were Stripped of their citizenship rights by DS Senanayake, one of Ranil Wickremasinghe's grandfathers. This step was not taken for iny national benefit, but merely to weaken the Leftist parties which were at the time becoming a considerable political hallenge to him. Again it was political expedience when, 40 fears on, JRJayewardene, another of Ranil's grandpas, huffed und puffed to enfranchise the Indian plantation WorkerS. Chandrika's father, SWRD Bandaranaike, who had at the most suitable form of Government for Sri Lanka was a
later acquiesced to a Sinhala-only language policy which y antithetical to his own proposed language policy not for e nation, but as an easy course to power. And when ther put forward the pact with Chelvanayagam on a Rata
to appease the flames of a country on fire because of these

Page 19
short-sigh the pact n Again, wh forward a Chandrika not in COn NO that is Cha Chandrika forward a no doubt
It is plan by the against any
then the Ru parties hav equal pOWe COSCSUS
This as long as t But, if, like parties in th GOvernmer hindrance (
In th Opposition forces too v formulate a implement. parties whic Presidency votes, the S Second mo:
 

(over Story
d language policies, Ranil's "grandpa" (JR) lead marches against t for the betterment of the nation, but for narrow political ends. h Ranil's uncle's (Dudley Senanayake) Government brought act to legalize the reasonable use of the Tamil language,
mother (Mrs Bandaranaike) led marches against this proposal ideration of the nation, but for political benefit. , the UNP leader's behaviour in the next and perhaps final step drika's proposals well fits the actions of their predecessors. If was the Leader of the Opposition and if Ranil had brought milar set of proposals at the time, Chandrika's response WOuld ave been similar, clear that the Sri Lanka Freedom Party has worked against any UNP to redress the ethnic crisis, and that the UNP has worked such plans by the SLFP. Isn't what's to come predictable? tever the plus points and drawbacks of the two parties, a olution without the blessings of both groups will not work. If a ractical settlement is to be found for this crisis, the most urgent ecessity now is to find a means by which to create Solidarity etween these two parties.
The way I see it, what has become the prime cause of ontention is not the proposals themselves, but political reasons: he Opposition sees such steps towards a solution by the Ruling arty as a step that will create political strength for that party. So, hile obstructing its implementation with all his strength, the pposition Leader tries to come into power as soon as possible as to present his own solution to the crisis, and to strengthen is own political hand.
This is Ranil's train of thought right now, and So it would ave been Chandrika's if she had been the Opposition Leader at is juncture,
The conclusion to be drawn here is that as long as one arty rules and the other is in the Opposition, a consensus will aver be reached on this issue. And if the cooperation of these 70 parties are essential for an effective Solution to the crisis, ling-Opposition distinction has to be broken down and the two
to be brought within a framework that accords them both - r, at least for a short time period. Only then will an inter-party on the issue be possible. keen struggle for power between the two parties is likely only ey remain within the Ruling Party-Opposition Party framework. n South Africa, these two parties and the other main political e country are combined to form a short-term National t, the issue can be addressed constructively without the fpetty power struggles. - 2 example of South Africa, the two main parties which were in o each other were united. Thereafter, other major political ere integrated within the framework. And so they were able to
agreement on national reconstruction and the basis for its tion. Thereafter, they entered elections separately and the n won were integrated into one National Government. The tas given to the Leader of the Party who obtained the most cond Presidency was given to the Leader of the Party with the number of votes, and the Third Presidency was given to the
March 19970sounterpoint017

Page 20
Leader of the Party other Government of votes received by blood became peac We need not need a similar syste But such a st to come to anagree Thereafter, minority Such as the Janatha Peramuna (MEP) ca can agree on wheth Even though we must not forget needed as well. In i framework containi we have nothen a As a result, Governs each sector accordi levelopment of thc has to be a continui should not be subje
in this way, each pa country. This also C. Solution of complex
I am not Sayi step. Even in count dynamic leader Sucl were forged amidst shed in the meantin nation to pursue a C than resorting to ea
The few who country left to be m opportunity for a SC regression of the sit
180Counterpoint0 March 1997
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

with the third most number of votes. Cabinet and positions were distributed in proportion to the number each party. And SO, a nation that was once engulfed in eful.
follow South Africa every step of the way, but we do m toget Our COuntry Out of this rut. ep will be successful only if the PA and the UNP are able ment on the issue of a National Government.
parties and Other parties in the democratic process Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), and the Mahajana Eksath n also be integrated within the framework. Then they er and how the LTTE fitS in.
the ethnic crisis is foremost in the agenda right now, that there are other issues on which a consensus is ndustrialized Countries, there exists a national policy ng all important proposals for the various sectors. But ble to formulate Such a framework since independence. ments in power have been able to conduct affairs in ng to their whims and fancies, resulting in the retarded Se Sectors, GOVernments can change. But development ng, Systematic process. Education and other areas 'Ct to change on the impulses of governments. Arbitrary hese sectors can be avoided in the future only if the
formulating a national policy framework integrating all hile this would help in the Solution of the ethnic crisis, it io the many drawbacks mentioned above. 2nsus has been reached on an initial framework for tion and the basis for its implementation has been lections can be held under a short-term multi-party ent. Here, parties can contest separately and as Fronts. al government can be formed comprising the parties lic. A System can also be formulated beforehand to assigning Cabinet and Other government positions in umber of votes obtained by each party. The Leadership ernment can be given to the Leader of the Party number of votes, and the Deputy Leadership can be of the Party obtaining the second largest number of
is this result in the acknowledgement of all parties but rty becomes responsible for the governance of the reates a political climate which is conducive for the
CriseS. ng it is easy to Convince parties to accede to Such a ties such as South Africa which had the advantage of a has Mandela, the steps towards a National Government manifold constraints. The amount of blood that was ne was also enormous. But it is to the benefit of the lifficult and complex Solution that is practical, rather sy, utopian impractical Solutions. ) dream of monarchy can only have hope if there is a onarchs in. If this opportunity, perhaps our last lution to the crisis, is not recognized, then the further uation into more and more destruction is unavoidable

Page 21
CP: The Government says that it's going to be a crucial year for the country. Howdoes this reflect on the neuv Constitution?
GL: We see the constitutional changes as a matter of immediate practical importance. It is not in the theoretical or the conceptual realm. Many of the problems that we are grappling with in respect of the economy-inflation, employment, the budget deficit, problems connected with social tranquility, destability of political institutions--all these have to do with the ongoing constitutional reform process. Indeed, these other matters can fall into place if there is somesignificant movement with regard to constitutional reform.
We have to establish stable constitutionalstructuresasanecessary pre-condition for achieving the conditions that will enable the other problems to be solved. So that will be the importance of constitutional reform. Now 1997 is a crucial year for this reason. the time has come to make
Oom
decisions and to implement them. We have spentagreat dealoftimediscussing these matterseversincewewereelected. It is not a waste of time, it is absolutely necessary. That is the feature of a democratic polity.
The clash of ideas, discussion in a spirit of candour, all points of view beingarticulated, now thathashappened and we feel that to go on with the same process isofnovalue, thenit will become repetitive and we will cover the same ground over and over again. So we are now reaching the end of the road with regard to that process and we will now present the Government's recommendations to Parliament and to the people. And since we are convinced
in our own minds th: and that there is noc who oppose the Solt with it have notcom alternative. Soint
WC 2IC IOW COIC modalities for action 1997 is going to be year. And that, I t importantelementol regard to the Consti
CP: What is this?Atuhich poi Committee on the come toanend?At the Government p Constitution outf
GL: Yes, tha One has to prepare it On the last Occasio
Committee met – t
 
 

it this is thesolution ther-indeed those tion or are unhappy eup with any viable
ose circumstances,
entrating on the practical action, SO an action-oriented hink, is the most developments with ution this year,
the timetable for It does the Select neuvConstitution whichpoint does ut the draft neuv or discussion?
's very important. to a timeschedule. when the Select at was on the 9th
and the 10th of January just a few days ago ... we agreed on a definite time frame. We are meeting today and on three other days this week. We will generally be meeting four days every week even though parliament is not in session, we will be doing this throughout the month of January and February. So not only have we agreed on the dates and times of these meetings, but we have also agreed on the topics that will be discussedateach meeting. Today we will take up parliamentary rights and discourse on it. We will have two other meetings this week to discuss problems connected withtheunitary state and the proposed union of regions. We have set apart two meetings to discuss matters connected with land. Someoftheother issues in respect of which there has yet been no agreementis Law and Order- that is the role of the police - and the provisions with regard to Finance--the fiscal aspects of the resolutions. So we have specifically zeroed in on these areas, identified and targeted these
areas because upto now we have disposed of about two thirds of the provisions in the devolution draft and the remaining issues are there, readily identifiable.
We have now planned our programme of action, a schedule of meetings Soas to enableus to investigate
in depth the issues connected with the
problems that remain and to arrive at conclusions. We will be able to bring the proceedings of the Select Committee to an end in March. We will then need aboutfive weeks probably to prepare the final reports of the Committee for Submission to parliament. After all, the Select Committee is a delegate of Parliament and the ultimate decisions
March 19970Counterpoint019

Page 22
will lie in the hands of Parliament itself. So Parliament will be in possession of this material sometime after the Sinhala and Tamil New Year. And it will then be upto Parliament.
CP: Butuhatistheprocedure after that? Isn't the Government going to put out a whole new draft Constitution rather than a devolution package separately?
GL: Yes, quite definitely. Because there is no other way of doing it. If you look at what happened in France under Charles De Gaulle and in Russia under President Yelstin, when you prepare a whole new Constitution for the COuntry there is really no way of truncating it and putting different sections of it to the peoplebecausein any Constitution there would be provisions that an individual would like, there are other provision that he will intensely dislike, there will be yetother provisions that he can live with, while he has reservations. Inevitably however, you have to defineyOurattitude to the entire Constitution on a balance with regard to everything that is contained in it, it will be impossible to isolate ten or fifteen issues which are dealt within the Constitution, and to ask people to respond piecemeal to those issues.
We will therefore publish the entiretextofthe Constitution. There has already been agreat deal ofdebateabout the more significant aspects, and no doubt there will be further debate, and more intense debate, when the actual text in its final form is made available to the public and it is at that point of time that the Parliament and the country will be required to decide whether the Constitution in the country is acceptable or not. Parliament, of course, will be in a position to move amendments but when it is put to the people, it will be put as one, interrelated and whole COnstitution.
CP: The Government is talking of holding a non-binding referendum for the new Constitution. What exactly is the strategy concerning that?
200Counterpoint0 March 1997
GL: Well, Iam me that question, bec great deal of misunc this. Now many of the expressed views in the in opposition to referendum, have whatever the result C there would still have majority in Parliamer We have never denied purposeofthis non-bi it is held-andupton no firm decision to ho that the country need It is important to stress there should not be: the government is qu situation. It is not help clear provision that is ( 86 of the present con lever that is capable C properly, quite constitutionally, sho arise. However, there now to have recourse Now, if t referendum is held, ar. then, the purpose referendumhastober It is in no way as parliamentary proces have a very usefulanc The purpose is to asc doubt what the state with regard to thisma run high, different p been expressed, and the Government to the people of the co matter that is undo importance with rega thecountry. Soifyou( it is only for the li ascertainingfor yours of the country re. proposals that you valuable to know thi
Then, havi knowledge of th perceptions of the p much easier to forn policy ona stablebas

lad that you asked ause there still is a erstanding about people who have : media about this, the proposed ointed out that, f the referendum, to be a two thirds t. That is correct. that position. The ndingresolution if )w, there has been ild it -- is an option S to be mindful of that point because in impression that ite helpless in this less becauseofthe contained in Article Stitution. So it is a fbeing used quite legally and uld the necessity is nodecision upto to that provision. he non-binding Iditishypothetical, of holding that clearly understood. ubstitute for the S. However, it does Irelevant purpose. ertain beyond any of public opinion is tter. Feelingshave
oints of view have
it may be useful for know exactly how untry feel about a ubtedly of crucial rd to the survival of all thereferendum, mited purpose of elf what the people ally think of the have made. It is for certain.
g obtained that
a view and the
eople, it would be ulate government is. Ofcourse, if you
wish to legislate on that basis, then, inevitably you have to comply with the
constitutional provisions which regulate
amendments totheexisting Constitution. But then, when you go to Parliament, you aregoingarmed with the knowledge that the people want this. In a representative democracy, where, after all, the Parliament mirrors the wishes of the electorate, it would not only be difficult, but in my view morally inconceivable for the elected representatives of the people to treatin cavalier fashion the vox populi which after all is the vox dieux. So one has to understand the rationale of this referendum if it were to be held and its relationship to the constitutional process that is spelt out in the present Constitution.
CP: How do you put it into a referendum? A simple "Yes" or "No" answer to a question like "Are you for the new Constitution?" or are you going to break it into sections such as Devolution, Fundamental Rights and the Non-Executive Presidency etc?
GL: No, there is not going to be anyclevernessoringenuityinformulating issues which the people are required to respond to. Now, Some people have expressed doubts and cynicism about the manner in which the issues will be phrased, we don't intend to resort to anything disingenuous. Because what we are trying to achieve is to Sort out these problems through a Constitution that is suited to the needs of our time. The distinctive feature of a Constitution as opposed to ordinary legislation is that itis intended tolastalongtime. Take the Constitution of the United States, it has existed for 220 years and there have been only 22 amendments. That is what a Constitutionisintended to be. But you can achieve that only through a genuine Consensus, not by resorting to trickery of various kinds.
So we do not believe in subterfuges of that sort. It will not bean exercise in semantics. We will publish the constitutionandexplainto the people

Page 23
what it is allabout. The issues are already known. I don't think any issue has been discussed in this way since independence, so it is impossible to say that the people are not aware of the major issues that are involved in this debate. Having published the text of the Constitution and having permitted further discussion, then we will ask the people simply to respond in the affirmative or the negative,
CP: Let's assume for a moment that you win the referendum, that, however, you don't get the two thirds majority in parliament. What are the options the government is going to look at at this point? Many of the people in thegovernmentare talking in terms of a constitutional devolution on the basis that the PA wentforthe'94 elections asking for a mandate to change the Constitution. If the Government wins the referendum they can claim that they have a fresh mandate to do the same. So can you explain what this constitutiomal devolutiom is?
GL: Ifthatsituation were toarise, I sincerely hope that it would not, that would mean a direct conflict between the will of the people and the will of Parliament in the sense in which that is defined by thepresent constitution. You see, because it is not as though the government would fail in Parliament, it would have a very substantial majority, although not the specific majority that is required by the present Constitution for this purpose. If that were to happen, we would bein thethroesofaconstitutional crisis. Now that situation again, is not unique. Therearemany countries where such problems have arisen in difficult circumstances. This is true of Zimbabwe, it is true of Pakistan, it is true of Cyprus, Uganda, Nigeria.
I have discussed these issues in depth in an article that I published about a week ago in the Sunday Observer, and the main points I made are these: That it has beenpointed outin the courts of many of these jurisdictions that no constitution is absolutely complete or
self-contained. Beca for the framers of make provisions foi that may arise. Soth inevitably. And if experiences of all comparable situatio resorttoabodyofleg principles which cau making decisions in circumstances.
In France an considerable empha on the doctrine of p That is, the source C people. And that i principle. It is, the that principle that Cl example, was able t Heads of Parliame people. And a sim resorted to by Yelsti But ultimate who must decide th country. All constitut on that basic premist aconflict of this natur really is, in keeping ideals, no other wa problem than by pla the shoulders of the their wisdom how or circumstances, thed for example, which not a problem that \ first time. And it can CP: Isn't th going outside constitutiот-таk. methods - even the - which are outs procedure? Aren' precedent for the i the armed forcest uvilland changetih even suspend it? . dangerous preced country uwhich ha and specially on which were anyth fair?
GL: Well, I ' that by making three that this is really a

(over Story
seitis not possible he Constitution to every contingency 're are certaingaps you look at the hese Countries in Ls, it is possible to land constitutional be called to aid in those very difficult
the United States, is has been placed )pular SOVereignty, f sovereignty is the the overarching efore, by invoking arles De Gaulle for appeal above the nt to the French ilar expedient was
. ly, it is the people e destiny of their ions are structured . So in the event of edeveloping, there with democratic y of resolving the cing it squarely on people to decide in Le should proceed. ctrineofnecessity, as been fully. It is would arise for the be dealt with. are a danger of traditional ing and using ugh democratic ide the normal you setting a ndividualor for ) evoke popular Constitution or sn't this a very nt specially in a seen elections e referendum ng but free and
ould respond to points. First of all, atter that would
have to be considered in depth only if it arises. Because it seems to me that given the cultural and the political traditions of this country, it is exceedingly unlikely. The second is that historically, one doesn't have to go to other countries, in our own country there is a solid precedence for this. What you said was that constitutional change must necessarily be within the framework of the existing Constitution. I think it is too absolute a premise to say that the framework is an absolute principle to which there can be no exceptions. I recognize the rationale of what you are saying, but to say that it is not morally permissible in any circumstances whatever is, I think, too rigid.
CP: I am not saying that it is not morally permissible. But aren't you setting a precedent ubich can have verydangerousconsequences? GL: Consider what happened in 1972. Under the 1948 Constitution, the Privy Council had clearly said that Section 29, Sub-Section, 2, reflects certain minimum conditions subject to which the minorities were prepared to accept the transfer of power from Whitehall to Colombo. In other words, that the Constitution would not have Secured acceptance among all the segments of the population of Sri Lanka had it not beenfortheprinciplesclearly enunciated in29-2, 29-1 said that the Parliament had the power to legislate for the peace, orderandgoodgovernmentoftheisland. "Peace, order and good government" was interpreted in a leading case called Hodge Vs Queen as words of empowerment, rather than words of limitation. It connoted plenitude, amplitude of legislative power. That is curtailed by 29-2 which prevents parliament from passing any legislation that confersonany community, benefits or advantages that are not available to Other communities, or legislation that imposes on any community disabilities or disadvantages which do not equally attach to other communities. That is an anti-discrimination provision.
29-4 refers to the two thirds procedure for the amendment of the
March 19970Counterpoint021

Page 24
Constitution. So prima facae it looked as if any provision in the Constitution, including 29-2, could be changed by resorting to the procedure that was adumbrated in 29.4, namely the two thirds majority. However, the highest court of that country at the time, namely the Privy Council, had said very clearly that 29-2 cannot be changed even in that way. So it is there, unalterable, absolutely entrenched... not relatively entrenched, but absolutely entrenched - you can't change it at all.
If that were the case, then that cannot be superseded by any other provision, you can't bring in a new Constitutionatall which does not reflect the same principle. However, Dr Colvin R De Silva, as the Honorable Sirimavo Bandaranaike's MinisterOfConstitutional Affairs had this problem and he had to circumvent it. That was the reason why he decided to do this through a Constituent Assembly. The Constitution that emerged from that process - the First Republican Constitution of 1972 - had a certain striking feature - that it does not derive any part of its authority or Sanctity from the pre-existing legal order. It is a completely new point of departure. There is no question of legal pedigree that is in any way connected to the previous Constitution. So there is a clean and total break. It is a new beginning.
So then one can argue in accordance with conventional and orthodox constitutional theory that the whole exercise is valid, because if you resort to these norms embedded in the previous legal order, then this is not permitted at all. But that is not how constitutions have evolved in the world in difficult situations.
The third point Iwant to make is this: that these are matters that involve nuances and gradations, there are questions of degree. Now you referred to Pakistan, the military establishment and the Constitution and the problems that arose in that connection. There are
judgements in the Pakistan which are developments in cert There has not been approval. One has t type of situation fro) there are ways of doi CP: Let u, government loses Where dothings sta the government d like that?
GL: If the GO referendum, Idon't Se is because this is a GC always actinaccordar of the people. The G desire to impose anyt contrary to their will. that has to be conside prosperity and progr but indeed its Surviva
SeSe.
Now, a gove guide public opinion. tell the peopleofacOl ought to be done. Th the moral duty of age not agree with what S. havesaidinthepastth should take this st implementing agenc political parties agree of action, then the Gc legislative authority te I think there i more creative andmo government. Govern the initiative intelling whatwethinkshould b if the people decide think that the Gover unacceptable, and unequivocal terms democratically elec would have no diffic accepting the verdict But wethinkt exceedingly unlikely mature, they have se the consequences of:
220Counterpoint0 March 1997

upreme Court of Sourced on Such in circumstanceS. a sort of blanket ) distinguish one h another. I think ng that.
suppose the he referendum? ind? What would ) in a situation
ernment loses the 2what the problem vernment that will Ce with thewishes Overnment has no ning on the people And this is amatter red not only for the 2ss of the country, lina fundamental
rnment can only Agovernment can intry what it thinks at is the legal and vernment. We do OmegOvernments at the Government and. We are an 1. If all the other Dna certain Course vernment has the ) implement it. Sa more dynamic, repositive role for ment has to take the people"this is edone". However, otherwise, if they hment Solution is f they say so in then we, as a ed Government, lty whatsoever in of the people. hatsuch a resultis and people are 'n for themselves (med conflict that
is protracted, spread out over such a long period, and the results are reflecting themselves increasingly in the daily lives of the people. Cost of essential commodities, interest rates, the impact of these interestrateson businessactivity, impact of that on the employment situation, all of this is now very much a part of everyday experience. There is no reason to think that the people will want a perpetuation of this state of affairs.
CP: One ofthe argumentshat is brought out against thedevolution package is that even if it's approved, the ground situation is such that it can't be implemented. Considering that the package is primarily to solve the ethnic crisis in the North and East, and the ground situation there makes implementation almost impossible, what is the point in trying topushitthrough now rather than wait until the situation improves, and it can be implemented?
GL; That point of view has been increasingly articulated during the last couple of weeks. There were incipient indications of the emergence of that argument but now it is being expressed in very stark and explicit terms. I find it singularly unconvincing and misconceived for this basic reason: That this has to be seen not as an isolated event, but as a process. If one is able to resolve this within the Sri Lankan polity -by which Imeantheestablished political parties in the mainstream of politics in Parliament - then, two things are going to happen: One is that the minority community, which has had a perception of alienation and injustice, will become convinced not by mere dissent but by empirical observation and experience, that the only solution to their problems does not come from armed conflict. They do not have to shed the blood of their sons to win their rights. There is a democratic path, and a Sinhaladominated Government has conceded

Page 25
that. Afterall, Chandrikais the firstSinhala leader to have had the moral and the political courage to say quite openly and publicly that the Tamil community does have political grievances which cry out for a political solution, now that is a special development. It is not an easy thing to do. Considerable fortitude is needed to do that. But then, she has had that courage, and she has made that statement publicly.
There is a dramatic transformation taking placeinthepsyche of the Tamil people. Onehastobecandid, It was the opinion of the Tamil people that the LTTE were their saviours. When some of the ugly incidents occurred in 1983 and at other times, the Tamil community did believe that it was the LTTE that imparted dignity to them. So there was this admiration for the LTTE, this sense of gratitude, a sense of appreciation and so on. How it was articulated depended on the sensitivity and the finesse of the people you were talking to. Some people in the Tamil community articulated it quite directly and unabashedly. Others would feel constrained and inhibited to give expression to their views in thatmanner. But they have that feeling within them and it can suddenlybreakoutin the most unexpected circumstances. That's a fact of life that we have to recognize.
Today, that is changing. In Melbourne, when I addressed agroup of expatriates, many of whom were Tamil, there was this lady who was about 70 years old who held my hand in a very emotionalway and told me, "wedohope that this will succeed, because now there isanalternative which wethinkiscredible and viable. So we really want that to be givenachance. That is very important to us."Now that is the change that is taking place in the opinion within the Tamil community. It is very significant. Iam not saying there is no admiration whatsoever for the LTTE now, the opinion is divided within the Tamil community, there is a clearSchism takingplace. That process is certainly going to be buttressed and facilitated by the emergence of a
consensus within southern part of th the first point to be The Second that this developm
beyond a point, wi
impact on the LT organization like operate in a vacu respond to exter circumstances. A cannot set about the degree of success w the support of the profess to be workir isgoingtochangeful of this.
So we do n
· simply saying let's n
until the LTTE com their imprimatur o we are going to dec to me a totally ev represents neither refusal to confront define those those precise and honest v evasion is certainly context of the effor made to identify a p the burning problen faced with.
CP: But Ca be argued in the that the only rea only reason, that has come to this p that there is an et going as far as e federal system, a LTTE. That the on is the separatist the LTTE? In tha message that's gc only way to get a Colombo to "do the take up weapons: GL:I thinkas development and ( something to be sai the role of the LTTEe befocused on this pr If one is frank, one w

tover StoryT
the parties in the country. So that is made.
point to be made is ent, as it proceeds l certainly have an TE itself, even an the LTTE cannot um. They have to al conditions and guerrilla movement
ir activities with any
thout the goodwill, people that they g for. That situation damentalybecause
ot see any merit in pt proceed with this e on board and put whatever it is that ide. Italways seems asive attitude. It more or less than a the issues and to attitudes in a clear, vay. Andthatkindof not hopeful in the t that is now being ractical Solution to that the country is
n't the same case exact opposite, son, perhaps the the Government oint of accepting bnic crisis and is vem discussing a s because of the ly reason for this var launched by it sense isn't the ing out that the борететt in rightthing" isto
amatterofhistorical volution, there is for the view that nabled attention to blem very sharply. ould have to admit
that had it not been for the LTTE it is unlikely that governments would have treated this matter with the seriousness that is clearly reflected in the devolution proposals that have been prepared and presented by the present Government. So the gravity of the problems that escalated to these levels were because of certain actions that were carried out by the LTTE at certain times.
However, in the history of conflict, there are different approaches that are appropriate at different times. Today, Ithink the Tamilcommunityitself is beginning to realize increasinglythata new situation has emerged in which a different approach is likely to be much more fruitful. Now this is primarily to do with the personality of the present President. She has consistently been committed to a negotiated political settlement that contains elements of justice for all the communities. And it is a very strong political resolve. It is a political resolve that is prepared to overcome theobstacles, evenaqcuiesing to certain short term disadvantages. It is an indomitable determination toget to
grips with this issue taking a long term
view of things. Now that, I think, is the most significant single political factor characterizing the present situation. So there is this unrelenting commitmenton - the part of the Head of Government and the Head of State. Given that commitment and the dominance of the President within the political establishment of her own government.
Then there is this fact that methods of violence were resorted to in the past to achieve this objective. But todaythere is anotherapproach which is likely to yield quicker and better results. Sosimply because violence was resorted to with some degree of effectiveness in the past, it does not follow that it is this same method that will succeed in all situations that would evolve in the present and in the future. There has to be a degree of resilience and flexibility about these matters. Nowl I think that that reality is dawning upon the Tamil community today
March 19970Counterpoint023

Page 26
MONKEYING WITI
GROTIUS
hedusthas now settled o he Shirani Bandaranayake affair after the legal community of Sri Lanka was thrown into a period of tumult with the appointment of Sri Lanka's first Woman Supreme Court judge. It is now interesting to reflect on how the main actors in the controversy fared in terms of their own reputations and Standing. Not one of the players in the drama came off well: Shirani Bandaranayake, G.L. Peiris, President Kumaratunga and her controversy-prone Secretary, Balapatabendi, the BarAssociation, the Supreme Court and the judiciary all depart from the stage their statureand prestigewounded.
Justice Dr. Shirani Bandaranayake
Grotius found that her former colleagues and students at the Faculty were reluctant to either praise her as an academicorcondemn the appointment. The consensus seemed to be that she was a competent Dean whose strengths were administration and dealing with student problems. She was however, a mediocre academic who had not published widely. Shehad not published her Ph.D thesis. She is relatively young. As one of her former colleagues said "It was too early. Perhaps in 10-15 years time after she had completed a book or two and published more articles." She had become an Associate Professor just acoupleofyears ago. Incountries where academics areappointed to the Superior
PAS
THE SHIRANIBAND
Courts they are exp jurists." Professor Amerasinghe, Dr. Dr.C.G. Weeraman or Professor G.L. F that category. It is anyone could, a appointment, Bandaranayake an
Manycollea as to whysheaccept Is it because she c mentOr G.L. Peiris?
Minister G.L. F
He muSt Su
the piece. His p.
distance himself fri
240Counterpoint0 March 1997
 

THE JUDICIARY
TYLE
ARANAYAKE FLASC0
ni Bandaranayake
ected to be "eminent Nadaraja, Dr. A.R.B. C.F. Amerasinghe, ry, Dr. JAL Cooray eiris would fall into inconceivable that the time of her label Shirani minent jurist. gues were perplexed ed theappointment. uldn't say no to her
eiris
rely be the villain of thetic attempts to m the appointment
when the uproar over the appointment took him by Surprise, convinced no one. The appointment demonstrated his contempt for the Supreme Court as an institution. Did he genuinely believe that Shirani Bandaranayake was the best person, or indeed woman, for the job? How come that her writings on Constitutional
law, devolution and local
government are relatively
unknown?
He seems to have
convinced himself that the most respected, able and independent judges on the Court, Justices Fernando, Amerasinghe, and Wijetunga are pro-UNP. Was the appointment of Justice Bandaranayake anattempt to pack the court with judges who were not hostile?
The academic Peiris spoke So eloquently and wrote Soprodigiously about the Rule of Law, the dangers of untrammelled discretion in Public Law, theneed forgreatersafeguards toprotect the independence of the judiciary, and in addition, the importance of men and
women of integrity, courage and ability
holding positions in the judiciary. The politician Peiris declares that thejudiciary should confineitself to itsallottedsphere, highlights the length and breadth of the Scope of discretionary powers, and abandons the virtues of excellence and independence in his recommendations for appointments to the higherjudiciary. The academic who wrote so extensively about the duty to give reasons in the interests of responsibility and

Page 27
accountability in Public Law, has no qualmsaboutdismissingtheexperienced and able Secretary of his Ministry and asserting that there is no obligation for him or the President to furnish reasons for the summary and humiliating dismissal.
Some of his statements in interviews on the controversial appointment were downright idiotic. When questioned about Shirani Bandaranayake's public defence of the Government's Devolution Proposals at meetings organised by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, he comparedit to lawyer Mark Fernandos participation in a team
of lawyers that defended the 13th
Amendment to the Constitution when its constitutionality was under consideration by the Supreme Court. There is surely a difference between Speaking in One's personal capacity at a meeting/seminar, and making submissions before court. The problem with academics (or ex-academics) is that they often think that non-academics are fools
President Kumaratunga and Kusum Balapatabandi
The President seems to have a knack for following bad advice in legal matters. Theunconstitutionaldissolution of the two UNP-controlled Provincial Councils was not on the advice of Professor Peiris but President's Counsel cum Secretary Balapatabandi. Professor Peiris was presumably responsible for advising the President to bypass both Justices Fernando and Amerasingheand appoint Justices Priyantha Perera and Anandacoomaraswamy (both members of the more"executivefriendly"minority decision in the Shirani Bandaranayake Case) as members of the Judicial Service Commission. Professor Peiris was clearly responsible for appointing his protege, Shirani Bandaranayake, to the Supreme Court. The fact that these controversial decisions have alienated the Bar was clearly demonstrated by the fact that the Government had no option but to trot
out Messrs. Jayatis Ediriweera to defen of Dr.Bandaranayake of their brief and ass
The Presider follow the advice counsel
The Bar Associa
The Shiran appointment, ultima weaknesses in the Constitution of 197 provision that perm
. A consti
Executive President to the Supreme ( consultation or rati does not specify any
appointee, must unsatisfactory prov ASSociation makean Governmentor the Committee on how Independence of t
 
 

sa de Costa and d the appointment . They madeahash es of themselves.
it would do well to of different legal
tion
i Bandaranayake itely, highlights the Second Republican 8. A constitutional hits an all-powerful
to appoint a perSon ourt without any fication, and which qualifications foran
Surely be an ision. Did the Bar ySubmissions to the Parliamentary Select I to strengthen the he Judiciary either
before the appointment or after? The petitioners in the Fundamental Rights application stressed the importance of an independent judiciary for a lawyer to practisehis profession. Whythendid the Bar Association wait until a crisis before raising such an important issue?
It seems clear too, that many members of the Barwere opposed to the appointment for the wrong reasons. The fact that Dr. Bandaranayake didnotcome from an elite background and was a woman clearly influenced many of the critics of the appointment. The assertion that a judge of the Supreme Court must
always be a practising attorney flies in
the faceoftrends in many other countries where the principle has been accepted that eminent jurists and academicS are appointed to the Superior courts as it is felt that the questions of law which confront these courts would benefit from an academic or jurisprudential perspective. The insular, myopic and arrogant attitude of vast numbers of Sri Lanka's legal profession was clearly demonstrated in the campaign against the Bandaranayake appointment.
The lack of leadership in the Bar was also highlighted. The ridiculous spectacle of the SLFP Lawyers' Choir bellowing pal kavi in order to disrupt meetings of the ASSociation and the mannerin whichseniorlawyersbehaved at these meetings made the Bar quite justifiably the laughing stock of the general public.
An international conference on Human Rights co-hosted by the International Bar ASSociation and the Bar Association of Sri Lanka from 14-16 December 1996 also revealed the poor calibre of the leadership of the ASSociation. Theopening address by the Co-Chairman of the conference Mr. N.R.M. Daluwatte P.C. WaS embarrassingly devoid of substance. He read out the programme of the conferencewhichalltheparticipantshad in front of them, with brief interjections on the speakers, which had nothing to do with their expertise on the subjects allotted to them, but rather included (as
March 19970Counterpoint025

Page 28
Mr.Desmond Fernando quipped in his speech which followed) a report on the state of health of the speakers. He did not participate in the conference thereafter. The contribution of Nr. Fali Nariman, Presidentofthe Bar Association of India, bothin his scholarlypresentation and interventions throughout the seminar, was, by contrast, invaluable.
The final session of the conference wasadiscussiononproposals to strengthen the Rule of Law, Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession. Since it was the day on which the judgement in the Shirani Bandaranayake case was delivered, one would have expected a comprehensive set of proposals from the Bar ASSOciation. Its proposals were vague, inadequate and lacked Substance.
The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court too did not escape unscathed. The
mannerin whichitdealt with theapplication was
to prevent the pack Government stoog duringtheproceedi by the indifference to theserious const of the case. On lawyers for the underlining the consultation with t method of ensuri
persons were app
interesting. The Chief Justice decided to dodge the issue by refusingtosition the bench. Thequestion as to whether he was consulted prior to the appointment was important to the petitioners' case as they sought to argue that a convention that the President consulted the Chief Justice had existed in the past and had been violated in the instant case.
It was clear to many legal observers that the weak link in the applications was the nexus between the appointment and the violation of the rights of thepetitioners. Theapplication therefore, was a gesture of protest and also an opportunity for the Supreme Court to lay down criteria for the appointmentofjudges in the futuresoas
260Counterpoint0 March 1997
Ниlj
and thedangers of Justice Priyantha whether the Pres Chief Justice or r business,
The mint Justices Perera, Anandacoomara: passive, legalis interpretation whic in constitutional relianceon themos in the Second Rep Article 35, (which Sweeping immu application, when evenaparty to the
 

ing of the court with S.Observers present ngswere takenaback
of some of the judges
tutionalimplications Ine occasion when
petitioners were
importance of he Chief Justice as a ng that competent binted to the court,
isdorp
infettereddiscretion, Perera declared that ident consulted the ot was none of his
brity judgment of
Ramanathan and wamy reflected a tic approach to hshould havenopart nterpretation. Their tobnoxious provision ublican Constitution, grants the President lity) to reject the he President was not broceedings, stunned
even the opponents of the application. The majority judgment of Justices Fernando, Amerasinghe, Wadugodapitiya and Wijetunga, Surprisingly, did not lay down criteria for future appointments by fleshing out the interpretation of Article 107 of the Constitution.
The application had littlechance of ever succeeding. The hapless Justice Bandaranayake had to endure several more weeks of embarrassment. On the positive side, however,
Dr. Asoka de Z. Goonewardena was appointed several
months late; better late than never,
Conclusion
AS faras the new justice is concerned, the onus is on her. She can prove her critics wrong by delivering or Supporting judgments that are independent and scholarly. The Bar ASSOciation, opposition political parties and civil Society groups must ensure that the provisions on the judiciary in the proposed new constitution do not reproduce the defects of the present one. Professor Peiris would do well to take steps to rehabilitate his tattered reputation. He has joined the select band of politicians and cronies including.J.R. Jayewardene, Felix Dias Bandaranaike, and Nihal Jayawickrema who have "monkeyed" with the judiciary. The Kumaratunga Government and the entire legal community have suffered irreparable harm. Letushopethatlessonsarelearned by all the actors. The Shirani Bandaranayake fiasco must never be repeated.

Page 29
FA T H E R
Victor Gunewardena
he issue of the Tom់o Of Fr. TiSSa Balasuriya from the Catholic Church has entered the public domain not only because he is a public figure but also because the Catholic Church in Sri Lanka is an important religious and Social institution, COuntingamongitS members a little over one million persons, comprising about 7.5 per cent of the Island's population. However, its influence in the life of Sri Lankan Society far exceeds the relative smallness of its numbers.
It is the oldest of the Christian churches in the island, having been established in the early 16th Century, during the Portugueseoccupation of the maritime provinces. During its long history, the country has been enriched
T I SS A
MISUNDERSTOO
by its religious valu its sustained and ext to the spread anc education, its huma the sick, the disable poor, and the courag several of its memb the cause of Social ji
Fr, Balasur mantle of the renow describedasthe Apo with whom he had in the movement for order.
Roman
in The
Having gra University of Ceylon
Political Science in 1 the same year he j
 

B A LASUR IY A
) ANDMALIGNED
es and inspirations, ensive contribution i development of nitarian Services for d, the aged and the ge and dedication of ers in championing uStice.
iya inherited the Vned Fr. Peter Pillai, StleofSocialJustice, Collaborated closely reform of the social
Degree
ology duated from the in Economics and
945 at the age of 21, oined the religious
order of the Oblates of Mary Immaculate because he saw in it "an option for the poor". Two years later he was sent to the Gregorian University in Rome, where he received a degree in Theology and was ordained in 1952. He returned to the island the next year and was appointed to the teachingstaffof St.Joseph's College, Colombo under the rectorship of Fr. Peter Pillai. In 1962, he went to Oxford for a postgraduate diploma course in Agricultural Economics, but quit prematurely because of ideological disagreement and went to Paris to study atthe InstitutCatholiqueandthe Faculty of Sociology at the University of Paris.
On Fr. Pillai's deathin September 1964, Fr. Balasuriyareturned totheisland and was appointed Rector of Aquinas University College,Colombo. During the seven years he spent there, he tried to direct that institution inspired by the
March 19970Counterpoint027

Page 30
new vision of the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) which sought to update the Church and make it responsive to the modern world with its complex challenges. During this period he served alsoasAsian chaplain of the International Movement of Catholic Students.
Turning Point in Ministry
Perhaps the turning point in his priestly ministry was his participation in 1968 in a consultation on Theology and Development, sponsored by the World Council of Churches in Geneva, where hemet the Peruvian Catholictheologian,
Fr. Gustavo Gutierrez, author of A .
Theology of Liberation. Fr. Balasuriya recalls that the many discussions with him and the seminar"convinced me of our approaches and pushed them further".
His resignation from the rectorship of Aquinas in 1971 stemmed from a conviction that "a radically new approach to theology and its relationship to social problems is desperately needed". In August the same year, he helped found the Centre for Society and
Religion. Its main objective is to help in .
integral humanliberationand realisation of human values in economic development with social justice and a deepeningofculturalandspiritualvalues. Thesame year, after theoutbreak of the JVP insurgency and the manifest need for ensuring civil rights, Fr. Balasuriya, along with Bishops Leo Nanayakkara and Lakshman Wickramasinghe, Professor Ediriweera Sarathchandra, S Nadesan Q.C., Rev. Celestine Fernando, RKW Goonesekara, Suriya Wickremasinghe, Kumari Jayawardena, Bernadeen Silva, Desmond Fernando and several others formed the Civil Rights Movement.
Among other organisations through which Fr. Balasuriyacampaigned for respect for human dignity, justice and peace were the Citizens' Committee for National Harmony (on the ethnic question), the Pavidi Handa (an inter
280Counterpoint0 March 1997
religious group on t 1982) and the U Organization, which, common front of the
achieve Social peace
Third World
As a Third Wo Balasuriya has bee articulation of a "w thattranscendsallhur He is a prominent Ecumenical Associat Theologians (EAT theologian, Frankly
internationa
says of Fr. Balasuriya a post-denominatio) addressed also to th unevangelised, the
secularised and the anemphasis on One( One Earth and Hum; He goes on to say: "TI Christology, Mariol anthropology raisec also the issues ra theologians, both R. Protestant, in Asia, a so fundamental, tha that these issues me research."
 

he referendum of nited Religious aimed at Creating a Several religions to and harmony.
Theologian
prld theologian, Fr. n advocating the Orldwide theology man particularities". member of the on of Third World WOT). An Indian J Balasundaram,
thathe"propounds hal global theology le unchurched, the de-clericalized, the young people with Sod, OneHumanity, an Consciousness". he issues related to ogy and Christian | by Balasuriya are ised by different oman Catholic and nd these issues are it all one can Say is erit an international
Theological
Publications
His theological publications have been well received in many countries and as a result he has been invited to address gatherings of theologians and other Christian scholars both in Asia and in several countries in the West. Among his Publications before 1990, in which year his controversial book, Mary and Human Liberation was published, are the following: The Development of the Poor through the Civilisation of the Rich (1972); Jesus Christ and Human Liberation (1976); Eucharist and Human Liberation (1977); The Kingdom of Truth, Peace, Justice, Freedom and Love (1980); World Churches and Integral Liberation (1984); Planetary Theology (1984);AThird World Theology of Religious Life (1985); and Ethnicism and Theology in Sri Lanka (1986). Between 1990 and 1994 Fr. Balasuriya has published tenotherworks, including Doing Marian Theology in Sri Lanka (1994). This last work covers aspects of the institutional Church's reaction to his controversial book and his responses and comments on the official criticism.
None of the other publications of Fr. Balasuriya came in for strictures by the official Church, that is presuming they were read by one or other of the eleven Bishops who comprise the Catholic Bishops' Conference of Sri Lanka. The bishops claim to be "responsible pastors" who have a duty by virtue of their office "to alert the faithful" against publications that "can cause positive harm to the faith of our people". One infers therefore that the bishopshavejudged Fr. Balasuriya's work as a theologian solely on his book on Mary and came to the conclusion that while he may be a good economist he is no Catholic Theologian.
Curiously, there has been no official Church comment on Fr. Balasuriya's competence as a theologian in respect of his several other published works on theology. Could it be that there is nothing objectionable in those

Page 31
AND THI
How did radical theologians, Kung Curran excommunication while Tissa Balasuriya did not? Th them and made sure that the punishment fitted the cri Conference has not done so.
Was Tissa Balasuriya excommunicated becaus orevennouvell?Oruvashe apaumina battleforsuprema - in other words was he not a victim of Church politic Sri Lanka has anticipated the appointment of a Sri L couple of years ago there was speculation that one am Lanka might be appointed to coincide with his visi demonstrate their conservative credentials by their su Paul II and his arch conservative "defenderofthefaith' the progressive developments of the Second Vatican Co. : the thinking and practice of the Roman Church m. Declaration ofFaith which Father Tissa Balasuriyawa contrary both to the letter and the spirit of Vatican II. One wonders whether Bishop Malcolm Ranjith the Roman Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, Documents of Vatican II uwhich Pope John XXIII and Po The Second Vatican Council Declaration on Religiou. God calls men to serve him inspirit and truth under no compulsion. God has regard for the dignity i isto beguided by his own judgment andbe isto enjoy) in whom Godmanifested Himself and His ways withm meek and humble of heart; in attracting and inviting to illuminate his teaching and to establish its truth; bi to confirm them infaith, not to exert coercion upon the X・ listened to Him, but he left vengeance to God in expe Himself the Son of Man who came "to serve and logive the perfect Servant of God who "does not break the br Who has really violated the Gospel of Jesus Chri Church" as demonstrated by the Second Vatican Cou ဒွိ What a pity that Tissa Balasuriyadid not have. answer to, regarding the controversy surrounding his
publications, or even that there is such in these matters anc matter, the bishops' silence is because (P.2, Mary and Hum they "should be examples of patience Other Side, pres and charity. One must not beemotional Abhayaratne (on be
 
 
 

EOLOGY | |
and Gutierrez escape the ultimate punishment of econsensus seems to be that their Bishops supported me. In Sri Lanka, unfortunately, the Catholic Bishops
2Of his theological views which were really not radical cy within the hierarchy of the Roman Catholicchurch s? Since the death of Cardinal Cooray, the Church in ankan cardinal. When the Pope visited Sri Lanka a long certain influential and ambitious Bishops in Sri t. Observers point out that these Bishops sought to pport for the attempts of the conservative Pope John "Cardinal Ratzinger, to turn the clock back and undo uncil (1962-65). The Second Vatican Council changed aking it more open, tolerant and progressive. The spressurised to sign containedstatements which were
Bishop Vianney Fernando (the former Chairman of ) and their colleagueshave forgotten the remarkable DePaul VI worked so hardtoproduce and implement. s Freedom, paragraph 11 states: ; bence they arebound in Consciencebut they stand of the human person whom HeHimselfcreated man reedom. The truth appears at its height in Christ Jesus en, Christisatonceour Masterandour Lordandalso his disciples Heusedpatience. He wrought miracles ut His intention uvastorouse faith in His hearers and am. Hedidindeeddenouncetheunbeliefofsomeuho ctation of the day of judgment. He preferred to call his life asaransomforthemany." Heshowed Himself uised reed nor extinguish the smoking flax." st? Who has really "twisted the integrity of the Catholic ၇C#/? မွိုမႝာ နို်ဎွိ မွို . Jesus Christ, the Servant Lord and Gentle Shepherd, to #book! შენ : . . . . .
i rush into things"? Fr. Balasuriya's theological writings have lan Liberation: The been published almost every year since ented by Manel 1972 and it would appear that episcopal half of the group). vigilance has not found them positively
March 19970Counterpoint029

Page 32
harmful to "the faith of our people". Or could it be that it is another example of the monumental "patience and charity" of the "responsible pastors?"
Exercise of Episcopal Authority
Fr, Balasuriya's controversial
bookonMarymustbeseeninthecontext
of his other writings over a period of nearly 25 years as part of a search for a "truly indigenous theology", which incidentally was a recommendation of the SriLankan Church's National Pastoral Convention of 1995. It is a quest for a "deeper and more committed Marian spirituality" in the modern world.
It was in December 1992 that ecclesiastical action was taken by the appointmentofanadhoc committee to study and reporton thebook. Its findings were communicated to Fr. Balasuriya in January 1993. He contends that there was disagreement among the members ofthecommitteeabout theirconclusions. Written submissions were made by him to all the bishops early in 1993, which, according to the bishops, were considered inadequate. There followed personal appeals by some bishops, who say they found the priests's attitude "unhelpful and reactive".
Fr, Balasuriya'spositionhasbeen that the allegations that his book contains "serious theological errors" are made without proof, by misrepresentation of his text, significant omissions of words and phrases, and byresort to incomplete quotations and illogical inferences. In his several responses to the bishops he has repeatedly maintained that "if my book contains doctrinal errors that can be objectively proved at the level of contemporary theological knowledge, I will certainly correct such proven material".
But the bishop's reaction, accordingtoPresenterAbhayaratne, was: "such conditionality practically negated hisso-called readiness tocorrect himself". That is not a conclusion one can accept facilely. Why did not the bishop want to prove his wrong at the level of
contemporary thec
When the published an adm book in the officia 5th June 1994, Fr.) the grounds on wh was based, buthis re. in either paper.
It is an aspe ethics to afford to a an allegedly incorr opportunity to cor impugned matter. denied to Fr. Balasu also did not publis their position surprisingly does Fr bishops are thus accuserSandjudges for their actions.
Ironically, t disregarda relevant the National Pastoral which cites a comm of Canon Law, that be no less than ag justice and equity t corollary of this guai a presumption of p on the part of allege( NPC recommendat disciplinary action Properenquiryandc are to be followed". What affects institutional Churc due process, which Canon Law. It is in Lankan bishops di procedure. The gre the Congregation fo Faith in Rome d competent tribunal matter according t natural justice an procedures.
Also depl Balasuriya was call Profession of Faith him under duress b So would lead to ex refusal to sign the was on the groun
300Counterpoint0 March 1997

gical scholarship?
shop's Conference nition against the Catholic weekly of alasuriya contested ch the admonition ly was not published
of communication Ierson aggrieved by ct publication the ect or clarify such Not only was this iyabut the bishops h a clarification of hemselves. Not Balasuriya Says the perceived as both undnotaccountable
le bishops seem to recommendation of Convention of 1995, entary on the Code "church law should lardian of freedom, han civil law and a dianship functionis urity of intent even i law-breakers". The on adds: "arbitrary is to be avoided. anonicalprocedures
the credibility of the is the absence of
is provided for by credible that the Sri not adopt such a ater surprise is that rtheldoctrine of the
id not appoint a
to inquire into the o the principles of accepted judicial
irable is that Fr. 2d upon to Such a specially drafted for ecause failure to do Ommunication. His articular document that it contained
certain matters which he could not in conscience accept. One such matter was a formulation on Salvation which is at variance with the Second Vatican Council teaching on the subject. The other startling formulation was that "the Church has no authority whatsoever to confer priestly ordination on women". Vatican Two did not address this issue at all. Nor did the extraordinary Synod of Bishops in Rome in December 1985 to celebrate, verify and promote the Second Vatican Council.
Solidarity with Fr. Balasuriya
The tremendous expression of solidarity with Fr. Balasuriya worldwide stems from arealisation that he has been denied a fair hearing. Assuming that his book contains serious errors that could be damaging to the faith of believers, he is neverthelessentitled to beheard in his defence by judges who are also not his accusers. That is why people are petitioning the Pope asking that Fr. Balasuriyabegivena fairjudicial hearing.
The absence of due process is bad for the Church. What is worse is the post-excommunication behaviour of the institutional Church in Sri Lanka, which displays an absenceofrespectforhuman dignity and want of compassion for a person in distress. Nota single Catholic bishop has conveyed to Fr. Balasuriya evena word of thanks for the 44 years of his priestly ministry. The "Messenger", the English official Catholic weekly, has inan article writtenby a priestsuggested by innuendo that Fr. Balasuriya is like a rabid sheep whom even the Good Shepherd does not seek because of the risk involved. What an unchristian twist to Christ's parable! It seems to have escaped the vigilanceofthe "responsible pastors". Furthermore, persons who have expressed concern about the manner in which Fr. Balasuriyahas been treatedare maligned in the official paper. There is little evidence now of patience and charity. Instead, there seems to emerge a determination to crush the bruised reed and spurn the sorrowing spirit.

Page 33
he People's , T habits of the principle of sub-juc What is the administration ofj judice rule declare a substantial risk of that case is curtaile
Under the Parliament on a mc investigate the abdu rule. UNP legal lun Gunasinghe had ir ManOrani Saravana in that case Was, hac to be debated in
appointed to invest Recently, M criticism on the hare underthe COver oft had not even beend Such a discussion! H proceedings are sec the pending litigati journalists who obvi of the rule, disputes only declare"I am a Obviously, t IGP and the other entertaining yet unc victim of the whole pronouncement.
But then, w Fortunately, the pas SHOULD have been
a) involved b) was notap of subjudice
It happened The wholecountryw on the Fundamental Bandaranayake to ti December. The laws meet Over the week
 
 

Iliance Government seems to be adopting several of the bad orevious UNP regime. One such habit is retreating behind the ice when confronted with awkward questions. ub-judice rule? In an attempt to strikeabalance between the fair stice and the freedom of expression and publication, the subthat when a matter is pending beforea court and when there is prejudice to that case, public discussion on the specific issues in i. Both conditions should be fulfilled. revious regime, the government sought to prevent a debate in tion calling for the establishment of a commission of inquiry to ction and murderof Richard deZoysaby invoking the sub-judice inaries in Parliament referred to the fact that the late Ronnie stituted an action for defamation against de Zoysa's mother, huttu, as the basis for the invocation of the rule. Thespecificissue Ms. Saravanamuttu defamed Mr. Gunasinghe? The issue Sought arliament was, whether a commission of inquiry should be
gate the matter. Two completely different issues. edia Minister Dharmasiri Senanayake, undoubtedly rattled by Issment of Ishini Wickremasinghe and TNL staff, decided to hide he sub-judice rule. He made theastounding claim that the issue iscussed at the Cabinet meeting as the subjudice rule precluded How on earth can deliberation at a Cabinet meeting where the ret, pose a substantial likelihood of prejudice to the outcome of on? To make matters worse when, at the press conference, ously were more knowledgeable about the meaning and Scope Senanayake's interpretation of sub-judice, the Minister could lawyer. I should know." he Rupavahini Corporation, Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte, the Senior police officials who were paraded on television in an onvincing attempt toportray the poor Police Department as the fiasco, did not agree with Minister Senanayakes's subjudice
hen, readers may ask, should the sub-judice rule operate? t few months also gives us a classic example of when the rule applied. And mirabile dictu it otjust a mere lawyer, but an Emeritus Professor of Lawl and plied. In fact there was notevena whimperconcerning theissue
on Thursday, 12 December 1996 in the Parliament of Sri Lanka. as waiting for the verdict of the FullBench of the Supreme Court Rights application which challenged the appointment of Shirani e Supreme Court. The judgment was due on Monday, 16th 2rs had concluded their submissions; the seven judges were to nd to prepare their determination.
March 1997.0Counterpoint031

Page 34
Summing up the debate on the votes of the Ministry of Justice, Professor G.L. Peiris referred explicitly to the case filed against Shirani Bandaranayake (in which he and Mr. Balapatabendhi were respondents). The Hansard of that day indicates that he referred to the pending case and Stated that
"oncea judgeofthe Supreme Court
is appointed, the only method for
removal is by the President and Parliament." "we are seeing today a dramatic erosion of the authority and the lawful powers of Parliament." "In the case of no other President has it been suggested that the powerofthe President was fettered in any way." "The judiciary must confine itself to its proper sphere. It must not overreach itself. It must not endeavour to discharge the functions that are entrusted to the Executive and the Legislature...We need to apply the brakes and those
brakes need to be applied if the
judiciary is to continue to retain the respect of our people which it has richly merited upto now."
The Hansard indicates that sections of Minister Peiris' speech were expunged on the order of the Chair. The Daily News report of the proceedings in Parliament on that day spells out, in addition to theabove, severalstatements made by Minister Peiris. These presumablyinclude the statements made by Minister Peiris which were subsequently expunged. w "What is happening today Mr.Chairman? The Supreme Court is considering whether to sack one of theirjudges. The Supreme Court has no right to do this at all. The Supreme Court is usurping the powers of Parliament. Consider for a moment, Mr. Chairman, the ridiculousness of this spectacle. Some judges are seeking to Sack otherjudges. What about thejudges who are purporting to do the Sacking. Can their brethren sack those judges?".
ER "In the case o
has it been power of appo Court judges way....Whyisit are being Sou only on Pre Bandaranaik DOes the COu President? Doe
or oppose President?" "Some of the judgment got method tha questioned. V moral and leg judgmentovei It is not a ma them at all. Th Mr. Chairman, very social fab Ina bizarret
speech, Professor P. did not want to Substantive issues the case!
These stat days before the di Court. They referex issues that were be application for lea authority of the col an application; President's discreti the role of the Su realm of constitut etc. The first requi is thus fulfilled.
320Counterpoint0 March 1997
 

no other President uggested that the ntment ofSupreme is fettered in any hat theseconditions ght to be imposed sident Chandrika ! Kumaratunga?... it like or dislike the 's the Court Support
the incumbent
judges sitting in there by the very t is now being What then is their al authority to sit in their ownbrethren? tter that belongs to is is the surest way, to tear asunder the ric of our country." wist at the end of his
eiris declared that he comment on the hat had surfaced in
ments were made termination of the plicitlytothespecific ore the Court in the ve to proceed: the rt to entertain such he scope of the on under Article 107; reme Court in the onal interpretation ement of sub-judice
Was there a substantial risk of prejudice to the case? When a powerful and influential Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs makes aspeechon the specific issues of a case four days before the Court delivers its verdict, and the speech contains intimidating Statements Suggesting that even entertaining the application implied hostility to theincumbent President, and an abuse of the exercise of judicial authority, it must Surely have had an impact on the seven judges hearing the case. This is fortified by the context in which the speech was made. The background of Government hostility to Justice Fernando in particular; the President's public criticism of Supreme Court judges, the fact that Justice Fernando was not reappointed to either the Council of Legal Education, despite his pioneering contribution tothereform of legal education at the Law College, or to the Judicial Service Commission, in an unprecedented departure from convention, and the widespread perceptionin legal circles, that Professor Peiris was responsible for both these unfortunatesteps. There was, therefore, a substantial likelihood of prejudice to the outcome of the case.
The Professor of Law violated the sub-judice rule. Yet notone Member
of Parliament from the Government or
the Opposition rose to a point of order. Legalluminaries ChoksyandTiruchelvam did nothing to prevent the threatening statements. The Chairman of Parliament remained silent, merely ordering the expunging of the statements outlined above, after the damage had been done. The Professor-Cabinet member ignored the Sub-judice rule when it should have applied. His lawyer-Cabinet member colleague invoked the subjudice rule when it did not apply. It is high time that members of the legal profession, journalists, Members of Parliament and the general public comprehend the meaning of the rule and the circumstances when it can legitimately be applied.

Page 35
Ketheshwaran Loganathan
(Research Consultant, Centre for Policy Research & Analysis, University of Colombo)
"Privatization", generally, conjures up different images depending on the specific context in which it is being implemented. In the Sri Lankan context, the response to privatization spans diverse and extreme emotions. Privatization, to Some, evokes the primordial fear of "losing the family
silver". Toothers, it is the "panacea for all
ills". But to most, the form and content of privatization remains shrouded in mystique. And, the reason is simple. Privatization has its variants and hybrids. It also affects different economic Sectors and social categories differently. For this reason, there can be no single yardstick by which privatization can be characterized as either the panacea for all evils or their cause.
The above, although axiomatic, is often ignored in the on-going debate. The purpose of this article, hence, is to laybare the various conceptual nuances behind the policy of privatization and the various contradictions in its practice in the Sri Lankan context.
1.Theoretical Basis of Privatization:
Some Misconceptions
While it is true that privatization is inseparably linked to the processes of "globalization" and "liberalization" and the integration of National Economies into the World Economic Order, the genesis of privatization has its own independent rationale - a rationale that is seemingly"pragmatic", but essentially ideological.
The "p privatization is "inherent" product private Sector/privat allocative efficien mechanism. Theco the "inherent" inef
R
Privatizati variants an It also: different
sectors a categories For this rea can be n yardstick privatizati characte either the
sector/public enter "invisible hand accommodate the providing infrastru privatecapital forma ideological rational Whileitcani that the private sec. growth"indevelopir not necessarily imp and invincibility oft or the market force
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

ZATION
Realities
ragmatism" of premised on the ive efficiency of the eenterprises and the cy of the market rollary of theabove is ficiency of the state
on has its d hybrids. affects
conomic nd social
lifferently. ဒွိ son, there o single by which on can be rized as
panacea
s or their se. 災
prises. Adam Smith's ", modified to role of the State in ictural Support for tion, constitutes the
howbesafely posited tor is the "engine of ngeconomies, itdoes ly the omnipotence he "invisible hand"- S. On the contrary,
the experiences of not only the newly industrializing and developing economies, but also that of the industrialized countries of the Western Hemisphere and the "Asian Tigers", all reaffirm the "visible" hand of the State in the management of the market forces in fostering private capital formation. A recent publication of the UN affiliated WIDER, which Some years ago was headed by Dr. La Jayawardena, the present Chairman of the National Development Council and Economic Advisor to the President, provides a Convincing argument in favour of an interventionist State as the ultimate entrepreneur and conflict manager in the processofeconomictransformation. (See, The Role of the State in Economic Change, Clarendon Press, 1995)
Further, as Professor J.B. Kelegama pointed out in the 1996 Convocation Addressatthe University of Jayawardenapura, "We tend to ignore the fact that in some of the most Successful of Asian economies - Japan, Republic of Korea and Taiwan Provincethe State intervened directly to stimulate the animal spirits' of investors, strengthen their confidence, lengthen their time horizons, coordinate their expansion plans and enlarge their command over resources by manipulating market forces through protection of local industries, establishment of state banks, targeting and subsidizing credit to selected industries, selective and gradual liberalization, controlled foreign investment and technology transfer, investment in applied research,
March 1997.0Counterpoint033

Page 36
establishing export marketing institutionsandeven promotingbusiness conglomerates".
It must also be borne in mind that the publicsector, in most developing economies, have been net savers, in addition toactingasanimpetus toprivate capital formation. This aspect comes out clearly in numerous studies, the most detailed being Taylor's, "Varieties of Stabilization Experiences: Towards sensible macro-economics in the Third World" (Clarendon Press, 1988). Inshort, thepublicenterprisesarenot"invariably" and "inevitably" a burden on the state treasury, as it is generally assumed to be. Yet, it must beconceded that the case for privatization, as advocated by its proponents, arenotentirely unfounded. This is evident from the following stated objectives of privatization
topromoteeconomicefficiencyby fostering well-functioning markets and competition; to reduce the fiscal burden of lossmakingpublicenterprises, in order to help regain fiscal control and macroeconomic stability; to reduce public debt; to release limited State resources forthefinancingofotherdemands; to generate new investment, including foreign investment; tomobilize domestic resources for development, and deepen domestic financial development; and to spread and democratize share ownership.
(Source: UNDP (1995); Comparative Experiences with Privatization, p2)
The issue, however, is to what extent do the above stated objectives conform to the practice of privatization in the Sri Lankan context? Therest of the article will attempt at addressing this problematic.
2. The Sri Lankan Experience: The False Debate
At the outset, I had enumerated thebroadobjectives behind privatization
asadvocatedbyitspri Lankan context,
privatizationessentia the following factors Bridging ofbuc
Retirement of
These object justified and "sold" ti in populist terms "peoplization") or t propagandistic"sales State Institutions ent of privatization (ieth
the private sectoran of the public "peoplization" is t ensuring that the"pe dispossessed whil pacified, the "salespi adds insult to injury. The debate C experience in Sri La least, unfortunate. A theblameliesin relati The failuretodi Sectors; and a. The mode of p) Let me elaborat
340Counterpoint0 March 1997
 

oponents. In theSri the practice of illy revolves around or compulsions: getary deficits and bublic debt lives, however, are o the public, either (ie Premadasa's hrough the crude pitch"approach of rusted with the task le"evangelizing" of
i the "demonizing" sector). While he surest way of ople"arematerially e psychologically toh" approach only
in the privatization Inka is, to say the ld, to a large extent onto the following: ferentiate between
ivatization.
.
2.1. The Devil and the Deep Blue Sea Syndrome
As pointed out earlier, while the proponents of privatization cite the "inherent" inefficiency of the public sector, the opponents of privatization moan over the loss of the "family silver". What is conveniently forgottenis that the majority of the private enterprises in Sri Lanka are still to prove their efficiency, whilemany ofthepublicenterprises have already replaced the family silver with brass ware.
The deficiencies of the private sectorin Sri Lanka was highlighted at the Tenth Annual Session of the Sri Lanka Association of Economists held in mid 1996. At this Conference, the following aspects were identified as constituting themainweaknessesoftheprivatesector in Sri Lanka. These were summed up by Dr.Nimal Sandaratne in an article as follows:
Many family firms and private companies tend to equate the acquisition of managerial skills as a cost rather than as an investment; They are proneto quick profits and lack the capacity and willingness to plough back profits for reinvestment;
In addition to the above, the exposés of the sordid deals emanating from "Tawakkal" and "Kotagala" and other similar "transactions", have raised serious doubts about the nature and character of the indigenous entrepreneurs, their managerial stratum and foreign collaborators.
If one were to take the public enterprises, it is abundantly clear that irrespectiveofwhethertheseenterprises control the "commanding heights of the economy" or provide essential goods and services, most of them have proven to be a source of"private accumulation" and "political patronage" with little benefits accruing to the economy and Society.
22. Mode of Privatization
The biggest and the most
irreconcilable contradiction behind the entire privatization exercise in Sri Lanka

Page 37
is that it is the more viable and profitable of the public enterprises that are being "privatized". The logic is simple. There will be no takers in the stock market for public enterprises whose financial and market profile are suspect.
Another issue of concern is the impactofprivatizationonpublicutilities. Firstly, certain public utilities are "natural monopolies" with advantageous economies of scale. Privatization of such public utilities will only entail the replacement of state monopoly with private monopoly, with one qualitative difference. The State Monopolies are ultimately accountabletothepeople and driven by public interest, at least theoretically, while Private Monopolies are accountable to their shareholders and driven by the profit motive - not merely theoretically. The problemarises when the profit motive and public interest do not exactly coincide. The controversy related to indiscriminate price hikes by Shell Company, the postprivatization owners of Colombo Gas Company, is a case in point.
Secondly, it must not be forgotten that even private capital formation can be impeded if public utilities comeunderthecontrolofprivate monopolies. This point was raised by Econsult, an organization which works closely with the private sector and monitors public policy on its behalf. In one of its reports, Econsult observed, "Given Sri Lanka's size and limited consumer market, it is likely that certain vital aspects of the country's economic infrastructure will not prove to be commercially viableataSociallybeneficial cost. Thequestionis whether, asaresult, the development of these parts of the country's economic structure should be entirely neglected...The essential fact to be understood about the roleplayed by the running and development of economicinfrastructure is that it should contribute to the enhancement of the present and future profit of the private sector as a whole and in particular the sectors accorded a strategic role in the development process".
Ifoneweret sector, it is evidentt endemic to the pl independent of th ownership. The pro
productivity, yields
production is lar plantations as a "syS characterized by ala resident labour forc and amorphous m compounded by lar, without any concom
Scale, and resist diversification. Neith Houses nor the post Institutions or, for present Management have been abletobre; of low productivity, lc high costs that contin plantation sector. ownership, witho changes in the system technology, is unlik significant impact.
In all fairness, instances of privatizati to the rejuvenation of But, what is relevantis ofprivatization on the This has been far fron
 

take the plantation at the crisis that S ntation Sector is
actual mode of lem of low labour and high cost of ely due to the em ofproduction" ge regimented and , an unproductive nagerial stratum, escale operations tant economies of
ance to crop er the old Agency land reform State that matter, the Agencies/Owners k the vicious cycle W technology and ues to plague the Aere change of t fundamental ofproductionand aly to have any
One can also cite n which haveled hose enterprises. heoverall impact ational economy. encouraging.
IQOYOVIY
3. The Need for a Reassessment
From theaboveitshould beclear
that the issue is not whether the "private
sector" or the "public sector" is "inherently" superior or inferior. The stark reality is that both, in the Sri Lankan context, have proven to be inefficient. There are certainly exceptions to the rule. But, what we are concerned with is the dominant tendency.
The policy makers need to be cognizant of the fact that privatization, involving transfer of ownership from the state sector to the private sector, does not lead to the "reform" of the public enterprises as the name PERC (Public Enterprises Reform Commission) Seems to suggest. What it leads to, instead, is the dismantling of the public enterprise - not to its reform. Far worse, there are no mechanisms to ensure the regulation of post-privatized enterprises. Similarly, conceptually and in practice, policy makers should be able to conceive of methods of deregulation, whereby the publicenterprises and State monopolies are exposed to competition from the privatesectorwithouttakingreCourseto their divestiture. Inshort, regulationand deregulation, far from being mutually exclusive, must be seen to complement each other in reforming both the public enterprises and the private sector.
In conclusion, the task of economic transformation clearly does not lie in replacing an "inefficient"public sector with an "efficient" private sector or vice versa. The above constitutes a false problem leading to false solutions. What is required, instead, is how best to () reform the private sector and (ii) reform the public sector and, through this process, evolve an environment where both co-exist and compete - and attack the inefficiency of the other.
As to whether the policymakers can break the shackles of looking at privatization as a mere source of "once and for all gain" to the state coffers and, instead, view it in the wider context of economic transformation, remains to be seen
March 19970Counterpoint035

Page 38
A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT
F ollowing the Army's move to capture Killinochchi from late July last year, a population of about 200,000, many of them already refugees, were displaced to the South of the Wanni. The Government claimed that it had made arrangements to accommodate 100,000 refugees in Vavuniya, who according to one official would be prevented by the police from "escaping" from the camps. But most of the displaced who wanted to leave the Wanni were originally from Jaffna, wished to proceed to Colombo, and were not interested in what were
Coming as refugees for its part had remo having no further ne Government was restrictions for them But the pe wanted to leave the Government had c medical Supplies, an the medical centl recorded 30 deaths Things took a differ refugees crossing th numberexceeding3. The crossing was ha drowned at sea wher
War Games and the
whether one was proceeding south to
Colombo and elsewhere, or was coming as a refugee. Getting in the former way was difficult. Hardly more than 100 were allowed inaday, of whom hardly 25 were youngsters. Thus about 3000 entered declaring themselves refugees, hoping to Wangle their way out of the refugee centres later. Most of them found themselves effectivelytrappedandabout 25 families went back to the Wanni. Thereafter, people generally stopped
an a 100 perse, Valvettithuraiwasfi Lankan Navy and Wa: an island off Jaffna one woman was kille Indian governmen Lankan governme requirements into the exodus to India.
On 21st OC Defence Minister vi this time, many of th Wavuniya had been cl had a novel idea
360Counterpoint4 March 1997
 

although the LTTE ved all restrictions, ed for them, as the
imposing the
ople desperately Wanni, where the rastically curtailed |by mid-December e at Mallavi had rom malaria alone. nt turn with Vanni sea into India, the 100 by mid-October. zardous. About 14 theirboatcapsized
"liberalising"ofentry into Vavuniya. This meant that from the 22nd of October the distinction between the categories of those going South and those coming as refugees was removed, and a message Went Out encouraging people to come. About 13,000 arrived from the Wanni thinking that the hassle of going South had been removed. But in fact, they were herded into camps in Vavuniya and conditions for clearance to the South were made unaccountably more draconian. Once more the influx from the Wannialmost ceased. There were of course genuine Security concerns and a humanitarian problem of considerable
People of the Wanni
brought ashore at peninsula. At least d. At this stage, the Wanted the Sri it to ease entry avuniya to curtail
ober, the Deputy ited Vavuniya. By e3000 refugees in ared. The Minister
and ordered a
ed upon bythe Sri
stables. This was the background to the outburst by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) on 5th December 1996.
The Defence Ministry Press Release
The Release needs to be called an outburst because it did not address the crucial problems, hardly bothered about consistency, and resorted to some imprudent name-calling. It claimed at

Page 39
the beginning "...under LTTE pressure (i.e. obstruction) mostofthem (i.e. Wanni refugees) could not reach the area toget the benefit of these facilities (i.e. camps inWavuniya)offeredbytheGovernment". Later on it goes on to say the opposite, that "the LTTE has pushed the people in different directions including Vavuniya". Thereason for the change is to meet the criticism that the Government was restricting the freedom of movement of these people. The MoD argued rather uncomfortably that it was not further restricting the freedom of those who had come to Vavuniya not through an exercise of their freedom of movement, but because been pushed out by the LTTE.
There was another curious remarkbearingonthefateoftheconfined refugees: "As a matter of principle, mass movements of persons in a situation of this nature cannot be permitted to develop into distortions of broad Settlement patterns without creating undue tensions". The reference is, we understand, to Tamil refugees from the North buying property and settling down in Vavuniya, which successive governments have been trying to Sinhalise as with Trincomalee. Prominence given to Buddhist edifices and the Conspicuous use of Sinhalese at a recent official functionat District Court Vavuniya to the exclusion of Tamil, have been contentious issues. It is remarkable that such wisdom about Settlement patterns should strike the MoD not when they were prominently instrumental in furthering Sinhalese settlements in Trincomalee and Mullaitivu Districts (Welli Oya in the latter), but only when hapless Tamil refugees come into Vavuniya. It only reinforces the Tamil nationalist position that any government in Colombo cannot think other thanasa Sinhalese government.
The main provocation for the Release were two reports in the Hindu published20daysearlier whichsetmuch journalistic focus on Vavuniya: "Some preSS reports havesaid that "Curbs trigger reverse flow into LTTE areas". (Title of
report in The Hin 1996). The Hind "However, with Go inordinately delaye persons (757) have LTTE-controlled are development, acco in refugee camps, is the Government's re allowing Tamil civili: in other parts of Sri shelling, shortage ( and closure of Schc reasons given by th made the move to Several camp re circumstances which Over to India or con the Same". --
The last ma the hundreds going controlled Wanni w because Of Sheer fr the restrictions. The registered at refuge to havea picniclastir and thengo hometo
2量C纽。
Havingconc persons had Soretur. the incredible cla "returned to their h north of Vavuniya" preSS reports Such "False and distorte propaganda". (Th might Suggest that in fact true). The GOvernment's att generous". The M renowned for a journalism Commen in the world. Knowi of public relations famous aerial maSS. Nagar Kovil), MoD r blinkered to pit th against that of the H
The Situation and Ka
Apart from gymnastics, the MoD for the Governmen

he Norths
du, 15th November u report stated: vernment clearance d, several hundred decided to return to as in the Wanni. This ding to the people sufficient critique of strictive policies on ans to live and work Lanka. Bombing, pf medical Supplies ols are among the e people for having Vavuniya. In fact, sidents said the lmade people move he to Vavuniya were
de it very clear that back to the LTTETere doing SO only ustration caused by y had not come and 2 Camps in Vavuniya nga couple ofweeks the LTTE-controlled
2ded that in fact 1541 ned, the MoDmakes im that they had Ome areas in Wanni, and later refers to as in the Hindu as d versions of LTTE 2 MoD's grammar TTE propaganda is Release terms the itude "kind and adras Hindu is long tradition of Surate with the best ng their past record (Such as over the cres at Navaly and minds must be truly eir own credibility indu.
in Vavuniya lpitiya
its absurd verbal release whichspoke
t did not touch on
the poignant questions raised in the reports. It claims that about 50 LTTE cadres were taken in for questioning from among the refugees, but of whom nothing more was heard subsequently. As an eloquent testimony to the humanitarian tragedy, The Hindu of 14th November provided a picture of One among Several other men talking to his wife in a camp throughabarbed wire fence.
From October, parallel restrictions have been enforced at Kalpitiya for those travelling by Sea from Mannar island (which unlike the Vanni is a cleared area under army control). But here the restrictions are even more arbitrary and the inconvenience of going back even greater,
In both Vavuniya and Kalpitiya there are several cases of families, even Women with children, who are awaiting emigration to Australia or Canada and were in possession of letters requiring their presence at the embassy on a particular date. They were not allowed to proceed and missed their interviews. One man who underwent heart-valve bypass Surgery was allowed to reside outside the camp in Vavuniya. But his wife and children remained inside. Thus he had no on to care for him or to give him food - he had to eat in aboutique. Other comical Scenes could be seen in Wavuniya which further illustrate the absurdities. These are of old men and Women carrying thick files of their birth certificates, marriage certificates, employment records, testimonials and Other Correspondence, trying to prove to officials that further to being citizens of this country, thy arequalified to reside in another part of the country besides the North. Even foreign embassies do not ask for more than the passport and one or two other documents before issuingavisa. The Governmentis indeed "most kind and generous"
According to the MoD's figures pertaining to early December, out of about 15000 persons whoentered camps in Vavuniya, about 5000 left the camps. Of this about 2700 opted to go to Jaffna,
March 19970Counterpoint037

Page 40
(mostly asan alternative togoingback to the Vanni), 1500 back to the Vanni and only 1550 were cleared to travel south of
Vavuniya, of which 400 went to
south of Vavuniya is i - police, and according
Trincomalee and Batticaloa.
Fundamental Questions
At no level of the Government have some fundamental questions been asked. What is the rationale behind placing such draconian restrictions on Northern residents, while the East remains wide open for "Tamilterrorist" infiltration into the South? Would the Government find it practical or even reasonabletoimposesimilarrestrictions on Eastern Tamils as well? Are the restrictions in Vavuniya really effective against theLTTE2Does theLTTEneed to use Vavuniya at all when it has jungle accesses and LTTE boats have been reportedas farsouthas Negombo? What is the political cost of this exercise? Does not this exercise in humiliation, harassment and the effective stamping of Tamils as worse than second-class citizens make them feel that they have no alternative but the LTTE?
Such questionsareseldomasked in Sri Lanka. Corruption and inertia explain much of the game and the game goes on despite deafening press exposure.
Beneath the Surface
The refugee camps in Vavuniya come under the police, headed by SSP GaminiSilva,SPMeegodaandSPRodrigo. Meegodahasresponsibility fortheeleven refugee camps, each underan Inspector of Police. It is also generally known that many police officers in the North-East were close to the former UNP regime and are on punishment transfer. It is notable that Gamini Silva was formerly ASP Gampaha and on a special recommendation was promoted to SP Grade II by Premadasa's cabinet in February 1990 along with Douglas Peiris. The latter, a protege of UNPleader Ranil Wickremasinghe, had fled the country
after being wanted connection with Commission. The in circularpertainingto
the interpretation is
Then, the Rehabilitation provid day to each refugee from canteens.These given on contrac businessmen wh connections with th Further, each refuge who are prominent in part of the circle of touts at the Registrar these agents will f necessary paperwork toproceed South. Th using their network from Colombotoprov is a permanent resid networks operate in Such is the ubiquity c Social workers and pa of going into these c painted with the sam
The flow of c
has created vested in
confined the refugee theregulations, thebe ofcourselonghaditsi in Vavuniya. The socia that whoever the LT South had gone withl is thereforeaxase for such restrictive pro
rather than enhance:
The political know that the state too corrupt and to execute any rational policy. The Northern where things have go The Government mu take measures to bring in the handling of this issue more MoD pres
380Counterpoint0 March 1997

for questioning in the Batalanda erpretation of the permission totravel in the hands of the to social workers, very narrow.
Ministry of es about Rs 50 per to purchase food Canteenshavebeen t to prominent o have close e security forces.
e camp has agents
the camps and are the caterers. Like
of Motor Vehicles,
ora fee get the done fora person is may, say, involve to get documents ethat theapplicant ent there. (Similar Kalpitiya as well.) of these agents that rty activists are shy amps, lest they be ebrush. ash is such that it terests - i.e. more sand the narrower etter. The LTTE has nfluential networks ul workersare clear TE wanted to go ittle trouble. There the argument that bcedures worsen security.
authorities well machinery here is ) incompetent to , finely calibrated refugees area case ine terribly wrong. st accept this and ggreaterhumanity matterrather than s releases.
3:
refugees living mostly und
experienced systematic extor racketeering and near conscripti
in fact, the cause o
e LTTi they have

Page 41
CP: What are the activities of MSF in Sri Lanka? .
GB: We have been working in this country for the last ten years. We signed a memorandum of understanding with the SriLankan Government in 1986. The first team came in early 1987 to Pt. Pedro. After this, we started working in Batticaloa.
Tham we have a missioninVavuniyathat we opened in August 1995 and the Madhu Open ReliefCentre where we have the refugee returnees coming from India and the internally displaced people from the surrounding area. Then we have a surgical mission in Pt. Pedro. There's MSF France and MSF Holland operating here. MSF Holland operates a surgical mission in Mannar island and the Malavi Peripheral Unit.
In the pastwehavehada mission in Trincomalee which was closed in 94 andonein Moneragala which was cleared in 93.
CP: So what would you identify as the main concerns that yои ироиldbave asа потрartisат, purely awedical and wedicalrelated relief operation?
GB: Interms of health, the main concernis doctors. Weare here because therearenoSri Lankandoctors willingto go to these areas. Nobody is going to be happier than meifSri Lankandoctors are willing to go to these areas... ten years is along time.
In the Wanni, the major concern for the expatriates is security - we have expatriates moving in that area and it's notso reassuring that thearmycan bomb anytime.
СР:Doyоиfeeltibatadeфиate precautions are not being taken to protect civilian populations or to protect relief teams like you?
GB. TheArm With theongoingop us to stop moving. then is that we don't our humanitarians move, we cannot h provide assistance, are here.
Our second ofstaff. Today weha' in Malavi because doctors to take ca number of civilians' during last year's op
Our third Though I must say months we have comprehensive ag Ministry of Defence are getting whateve the area.
CP Watt until four months bad?So subat na
G: We hav in touch with the M Ministry of Defenc Finally, four months oneofthesemeeting things with the Medi we understood eac From that moment ( easier.
 

yis makinganeffort. eration they inform But what happens move, and we limit pace. If we cannot eal and we cannot and that is why we
concern is the lack veseven expatriates there are no local re of the massive who were displaced erations. concern is drugs. that in the last four reached a very reement with the for Madhu. Now we we want to send to
at implies is that ago it was fairly oked tibechangeľ been trying toget edical Board at the 2 for a long time.
ago, was invited to .
sandlicoulddiscuss alBoard and Ithink other's positions. in things have been
CP: And the problems were mainly in the Warand area?
GB. Yes. CP Holy is it ing the East?
GB: Batticaloa has been a very hot Districtallalong theyear, but nobody pays any attention. There are permanently ongoing operations in the East. So I would say that the East has always been a forgotten area of the conflict. In terms of the suffering of the civilian population, I would say that this area is the worst Of and their movements are restricted. There are no problems with drugs, but the problem is access to these civilian populations.
CP: They are mainly in uncleared areas?
GB. Yes. CP. Ils your access restricted by the wilitary?
GB: No. We have excellent collaboration with them. We negotiate everything locally, with the brigadiers. They are in the field, they know what's going on. What is very clear is that the Ministry of Health moves mainly in the cleared areas and the ICRC and MSF move in the uncleared areas. We have been here for the last nine years and we have never had an accident, so.
CP: In termes qf the civilian issue, obat do you think are the major problems? What you are doing Polo is crisis Nanagement, In the process, is there any apathy in terms of their attitude, in the sense "fat dying, let nego?"Do you find wore and wore of that? How is it affecting the situation?
GB: Peoplearereally tired of the war. People have no more coping
mechanisms. They've been displaced
three, four, fivetimes from their homes
March 19970Counterpoin59

Page 42
for I don't know how long and they are tired. It's only a feeling, I don't have objective measures, because in this country we are not involved in this area of health care. ܀- CP: No trauma and posttrauma work?
GB: No. It is too much. In 1996, we have done more than 9,000 surgical interventions. We have done more than 100,000 consultations and administered more than 30,000 doses of vaccines. We cannot do more.
СР: When you say there bave been 9,000 surgical interventions, what are they?
GB: Everything. At the time of the fall of Jaffna town, Pt.Pedro was the only surgical hospital in the whole of the Peninsula. Our surgeon there was doing 700 surgical interventions per month. Operating from8o'clockin the morning till midnight,
Ibroughta second surgical team here whichspent four weeksin Colombo and we never got clearance from the Ministry of Defence to send them up to the Peninsula. Even if the Ministry of Health requested us to reinforce the team, we had the problem of drugs. In September '95 some NGOs taking drugs up there were banned. Wesurvived with the little remaining till July '96. After 17 requests for authorization in July 1996, the MoD allowed me to take drugs up there again. Now they are at the Governmental hospital. Today we have drugs for the next two weeks and then there will be no more drugs again. Ihave stuff stacked up in Colombo because I cannot deliver it to the Peninsula.
CP: I can understand the Government saying "we don't have the supplies to send." But here, you have it, what would prevent the Government from taking it?
GB: I don't know. I don't believe that this is a lack of willingness to help these people. I think it is bad administration,
CP: And you have naturally approachedeverybody? Right to the top?
GB: The to the Medical Supp interlocutor at the Dr Perera, Direct( Services. He's very at gone further up wi Jaffna Teaching HC the firstinvitation of to establish JTH in turned down by the We received a seco was turned down a
third one, and it Wa
CP: Who request?
GB. The Mi the Ministry of Defe We received the fo 2ndofOctober 1996 for an answer frc Defence. I have Gunadheera and M amstillwaitingfora a "No". Because I h by since Novembel alreadyasked forlea their workplaces f here as volunteers, CP: Wha objection to this? GB. I don't CP: Nouv til area apparently military control what could be the istheexactsituat Hospital premise GB: The Te completely destroy 96, and then again a they have done no have rehabilitated : haveawonderful Ol everythingbut thes staff. Last Friday, h received clearancef three expatriates at But today wants to help civil government has requested us to CC interventions up th allowed to Senc
400Counterpoint0 March 1997

p is the Director of lies Division. Our Ministry of Health is Dr, General Health ccessible. Ihave even th this issue of the spital. We received heMinistryofHealth January 1996. It was
Ministry of Defence. .
ind one in March, it gain, we received a is also turned down.
gives you the
nistry of Health. And
ince doesn'tallow it. urth request on the andhamstillwaiting m the Ministry of sent letters to Mr inister Fowzee and I nanswer. An "Yes" or lave a team standing in Europe. I have ving permission from or them to come out
it could be the
know. his is in a cleared , which is under , apparently, so problem?... what ion ofthe Teaching s, is it damaged...? aching Hospital Was ed. I visited it in July few weeks ago. What yw is amazing. They a lot of wards, they Pworking. Theyhave pecialists. They need owever Mar 7), we rom the MoD to post
the JTH.
in Pt. Pedro, MSF lian operations, the allowed us and Dntinue the Surgical here but we are not i drugs and the
government doesn't send drugs. Sohow can we operate on patients?
CP: Is that still the situation? Ithought you said now it's changed? GB: It changed in the Madhu
22.
CP: Let me ask you a very serious question. In the face of this kindofobstacles, can you continue to imagine that it is purely administrative? Doesn't it go beyond that to lack of uill, or worse than lack of will, negligence?
GB: I don't think so. It is very different when you are in the field. I was working in this country in 1992, and I have come again now. The way that the army is dealing with the civilian population today has improved a lot. And now there are signs at the checkpoints saying "Thanks for you collaboration". I have witnessed soldiers addressing Tamils as "Thambi", "little brother". These things were not happening some years ago,
My feeling is that, in the field, everybody knows that they are on the same boat. When we had the massive displacement of people from Jaffna to the East we managed to send a public health team theretomonitorpathologies that could lead to an outbreak. But we had nothing to treat them with. The Soldiers were drinking the same water, eating the same food, and if there was an outbreakstartingamong these IDPs, they would have caught it as well.
Today, as I told you, we have the only surgeon in the area, we operate Soldiers in Pt. Pedro, and we have no Oxygen. It is a Brigadier in Palaly who gives us Oxygen because the Ministry of Health is not sending the supplies up there. So I cannot see this as lack of willingness because even the soldiers are suffering because of this lack of willingness. So I have to assume that it is
i bad administration.
CP. The point that you make is very well taken. The military now has become more professional. It is now less openly hostile to the civilianpopulation. And the civilian

Page 43
populationisalso lessopenly hostile to the military, But still, the cohorts in Colombo, the Health Ministry, The Defense Ministry, those attitudes don't seem to have changed,
GB. I think that they have ... I don't know. Again, take the example of JTH, the Ministry of Health requests us to go, the Ministry of Defense doesn't allow it. Today, there are no more blood bags at Pt. Pedro, and there are only 15 blood bags remaining at JTH. No more. I have blood bags here, Palaly is waiting for these blood bags. But here, I don't have the right to deliver the bloodbags to the Ratmalana Airport.
CP: What is the reason they give?
GB: I need MoD clearance. And the MoD needs the approval of the Medical Board. So you have to wait till the Medical Board meets.
CP: Can you tell me who's on this Medical Board?
GB: I don't know names. There is a Surgeon, Ithink he's a Major, there's a Colonel,
CP: So the Medical Board is entirely a Defence Ministry concern?
GB: Yes. CP: The villains of the piece? GB: No. If you asked me last year, I would have said "Yes". I know that. What happens is that they are not informed. Idon't know whohastoinform them. Today, I have to deliver these blood bags, I don't know whom to address. If you address the Ministry of Health, they say that you have to go to the Ministry of Defence, and if you go to the Ministry of Defence, they say "no need, you can take whatever you want with you, there's no need of authorization". You go back to the Ministry of Health and they say "No". There's no communication.
CP. This sounds like some absurd drama..."
GB: Mm. CP: Your experience has
been that when you to the Medical Sup GB: Iamgoir another way. This is orders. There are qu should arrive in tim why they are notar cannot lose time in Supplies are going completely in two we first time that this delivering drugs to th Divisionandallowing wherever they want.I. now in the Peninsula all themedical suppli needs in the ICRC bi CP. Whenyc there seems to be
GB: No. Atle CP: Is it tha you?
GB: They dc don't trust MSF, I d means that they don' been working here fo Our principles are independence. Weha Aspirin to a Tiger.
CP: So wha artificial shortage
GB: Yes. CP: Dopeo as a result of this? GB; No. But V We are notable to m the patient. We : anaesthesize properl was cited to me anaesthesiologists wh put the whole popula cannotaneasthesizet when we reach this thatWestartdoingonl CP: And a possible that the si worse and worse a point, even harde have to be taken, actually endang people.
GB: I hopeth; arise.

give the supplies plies Division. gtoformulate it in the Governmental arterly orders that ... I am wondering riving. Secondly, I Sending Supplies. to be run out eks. This is not the has happened by eMedical Supplies themtosend them need these supplies Why can't I send es that this hospital Dat? u ask them why, no reason for it? ast I don't know. t they don't trust
n't trust me, they on't know what it trust me. We have rthelast ten years. e neutrality and veneverevengiven
you have is an of drugs.
ble actually die
ye Sacrifice quality, Ianage the pain of Lre notable to 7. A good example by one of our OSaid to me"I can tion to sleep, but I hem". What wedo ind of situation is
vemergencycases. f course it is tuation will get nal that at some r. decisions uvill and you might r the lives of
tsituation will not
- TrungMTUMIK
CP: But youaretalking about 15 days more,
GB: I am going to start transferring the patients to JTH. Though there are no surgeons at JTH, there are twoSenior HouseOfficersdoingsurgical interventions... but I don't know their actual stock of drugs.
CP. So it's not going to cost the government a penny, I know it is not your duty, but is anybody appealing to the Minister, the Ministry of Defence, ortherresident regarding this matter?
GB: Yes, I believe that the international community is expressing their concern about this issue.
CP: Thatmakes it worse, that there is some high level concern expressed and still the system can't work. What is the difference in the Wanni? Why is it now going to be better in the Wanni?
GB: I am not saying that things arebetterin the whole of the Wanni. Iam referring specifically to the area where we are present. The procedure in the Vanni is sometimes very complicated. The request for drugs submitted has to besigned, recommended and forwarded by the DPDHS. Once this request is recommended by the DPDHS, you have to present it to the Medical Supplies Division. The Medical Supplies Division is going to send it to the Medical Board, Ministry of Defense. The Medical Board, Ministry of Defence is going to meet, nobodyknows when, and this is going to be sent back to the Medical Supplies Division and to us.
The validity of the authorization is thirty days. During this time, we have to buy the material and donate the material to the Medical SuppliesDivision because Weare not allowed to transport it there. They take the material up whenever they have the transport. Normally by then, the first authorization validity is already expired. So we start again on the procedure. When the Medical SuppliesDivision gets transport, the drugs are sent to Vavuniya, Again, they are checked and the drugs sleepin
March 1997.0Counterpoint041

Page 44
the EPHS stores and wait for the GA convoygoing to the frontline. Finally the drugs are delivered to us in Madhu.
The first time we did this, it took us 112 days. The second time, it took us 95 days. Then we were not allowed to donate drugs anymore. My meeting with the Medical Board of the Ministry of Defense made me realize that this was not again a lack of willingness, but misinformation and miscommunication about ICRC and MSF persons in the area. And from that momenton, that problem with the Ministry of Defence was solved. Since that moment, I have presented one request, and I got the copy three days later... coming back to your query, you have to go and see the WHO representative regarding these bottlenecks. Because WHO is willing to do something. They have already designeda project to improve thesystem in the Medical Supplies Division with computers and So on.
CP: Whathas happened here in the areas that you work in the Wanni, that uvon't percolate to Pt. Pedro? Surely, if you have established your bona fides with the Medical Board.
GB: But the Medical Board has nothingtodo with Pt.Pedrobecause the Peninsulaisundergovernmental control, soarethegovernmental hospitals, andit
is the Ministry of Health that has to take
care of these hospitals. That is a very
clear position with the Ministry of
Defense.
CP: Are the health services adequate in the East?
GB: Yes, we've been trying to do somethingelse in the East, but couldn't. We asked the health authorities to pinpoint for us the areas for further intervention, and nothingcameoutofit. CP: Sothere'saproblem with developing, expanding?
GB. Yes. CP: What do you think the worst affected area is, the area where you feelyou shouldfocus on? GB: It is still the Wanni. There are still about 600,000 - 700,000 internally
displaced people according to official
CP: And the are there? Smalldiobirroa, dysente GB: No epid high incidence of falciparum malaria plasmodium that Ca malaria).
CP: Is an reduce it, to prev GB: Yes, atle has arrived in the ar.
CP: Are basically in camp or are they dispen GB: They ar why it's so difficult. CP: And ho are you working a GB. In the Wa and there are the d There's the Madhu ( where we do 5000 month. Theofficial fig wasabout 13,000 beft We have 5.000 con must assume that medical services for people living in that '96, we had aboutah in maternity wards. these people come camps. What you disruption of the he In Our ante midwife goes to assistance. The wom cometoMadhuifthe delivery. Not becaus position to solve because we have the the District. So we patients on a dailyb
CP: So is working overtime GB: Not Ove checkpoint is open in the morning til afternoon. So the pr you receive a wom night, you know tha
420Counterpoint0 March 1997

living in the area figures. 2 usual problems scale epidemics, ry? 2mics. But there are malaria, especially i (falciparum is the n provoke cerebral
ything done to 2nt it? ast somemalathion
2, these refugees -tight situations sed? e dispersed. That's
many locations in in the Wanni? mniwearein Madhu, isplaced in Malawi. Dpen Relief Centre, consultations per guresforboth camps prethelastoffensive. Sultations, then we we are providing a huge amount of area. At the end of Lundred admissions Eighty percent of from outside the see is a complete alth structure. -natal clinics, our areas without any en from theseareas yhaveacomplicated ewe are in a better the problem, but only ambulance in can transfer these asis to Wavuniya,
the ambulance p rtime, because the only from 9 o'clock 4 o'clock in the oblem is that. When an in labour in the t it is a complicated
delivery and you can do nothing to stop thelabourtill nineo'clockinthemorning. So I don't know how the team has managed to have only one death in the whole year. Again the guys at the checkpoint are really cooperative, the army in Vavuniya as well. We transfer more than one hundred patients per month, and we negotiate the authorization on a daily basis.
CP: You don't have asurgeon at Madhu?
GB: No, Madhu is very small, it is a rural hospital. Wehave25 beds. Actually, Madhu is a non-governmental hospital. The building was a School belonging to the Catholic Church. In '90, we transformed it to a hospital. That's why We are supplying all the drugs there. The hospitalisunder UNHCRprotection, weareworking there with UNHCRfunds, and we buy the drugs with UNHCR money.
CP: How are the internally displaced in the East?
GB: Those in Batticaloa are mot in camps anymore. In 1992, I was the paediatrician consultant in Batticaloa Hospital, and then we had about 10 IDP camps. But then, all these people were relocated and movedback to their places. I know there are some IDP camps, but they are outside Batticaloa and we don't visit them.
CP: Doyou think thepopular isconceptions about the MSF and the ICRC bagve gome auvagy nouv?
GB. Yes. CP: I think many unscrupulous elements use that to discredit the ICRC and MSF.
GB: I never had problems with authorities of in the field since I arrived here in January 1996.
CP. When you say you are from MSF, you feel that they treat you well?
GB: Excellently. CP fatal, the problem is at the Colombo level, upper-class,
Colombo
GB: Probably, but I have not encountered it.

Page 45
RIGHTS AND
An Experience i
RAJAN HOOLE
most remarkable statement was de by the LTTE leader during his broadcast to the nation on National Heroes Daylast November. He claimed that the government of Chandrika BandaranaikeKumaratungahadiinflicted the most far-reaching damage on the soul of the Tamil Nation in comparison withformerSinhalese governments. This claimcomes againstawidespread feeling among Tamils that the LTTE had inflicted the war on them in April 1995 while there was real chance ofan honourable peace under the present government. This could be objectively tested despite hair-splitting arguments to the contrary
in some quarters.
Shortly after the outbreak of war in April 1995, the BBC Tamil Service broadcastaseriesofinterviews recorded in Jaffna. Several of those interviewed blamed the Government and justified the LTTE's resort to war. This was to be expected given the deliberate isolation of Jaffna and the use of the entire social apparatus by the LTTE to constrict and constrain the minds of the people. But yetasignificant numberintheirdifferent
ways refused to bed the government, des easiestand accepted principal of a girls's LTTE had been hasty The principal of a t that as an educationi drawn into discussin couched his respons and concluded, "we Godwillgiveus peac ruthlessness with whi suppressed during what was said was ex
Even more fic ladyintheteachingp on the trauma suffer
ʻ theeffectsofwar, bol
adding that theycans Through what was message came th unmistakable:Waris which the people whoever imposed it. a verygrave moral re
To thoseamc still had illusions ab final denouementca exodus from Jaffna in
 
 

HE TAMIL STRUGGLE
rawn in to blaming spite this being the thing in Jaffna. The chool said that the in resorting to war. boys' school stated st, he would not be gpolitics. A doctor esin religious idiom : trust in God and e". Consideringthe ichdissenthasbeen the past ten years, traordinary.
orceful was a senior rofession. Shedwelt ed by children from mbingandsheling; lottakeitanymore. i left unsaid, the rough clear and a horrendous thing do not want, and on them must bear esponsibility.
ng the people who out the LTTE, the me with the forced October 1995. The
n Valvettithurai
Tamil people, as much as others, do have, and certainly must exercise, the righttoholdthegovernmentaccountable for terrible violations in the course of conducting the war. But the LTTE has no moral right to criticize the government. The main thrust of its politics is that people must die to enhance its political claims, and thishasbeen itscorestrategy. The people had to bear this additional burden, and the Government had to be wary in the face of the LTTE's actions aimed at provoking reprisals against Tamils in the North-East as well as the South. Despite failings, the government and the armed forces have been under intense pressure to reduce civilian casualties and to adopta more humane approach to the Tamicivilianpopulation. It has not been lost on the LTTE that the Tamil people are beginning to see an alternativetothesuicideofferedbythem. This is the import of the LTTE leaders'
words.
Dissent What motivated that senior school mistress in Jaffna to express her dissent with such force? She was after all alone individual with few connections, having a husband and children to mind.
March 19970Counterpoint43

Page 46
There are indeed a number of wellconnected artful intellectuals in Jaffna
whopraised the LTTE from its platforms,
glorified the death of cornered youth and then told their friends in the South that one had to play this game to exist. It was quite easy. On the otherhand, those
who dissented did so out of a sense of
responsibility. If the Tamils were to have a chance of life the pretensions of their would-be leaders had to be exposed. Telling the truth was the last weapon they had. Only by telling the truth did they have a fighting chance of bringing the state forcesto account, ina situation where their ownside (the LTTE) wanted them to be killed. Theheroicsacrifices of hundreds of Tamil dissenters remains to be written.
It was in such a bleak frame of mind that someofus began writing The Broken Palmyrabinate 1987 andmoved ontotheworkofthe UniversityTeachers for Human Rights (UTHR), Jaffna, the following year. There was a particular
practiceofours which many others found
unconvincing: Whenever, following and incident, the state forces (Indian or Sri Lankan) rose above the level of unrestrained brutality anticipated from them by the LTTE and showed restraint towards civilians, we gave them due credit. We felt this to be important if we were to play the role of defending the people and confronting the state forces without even inadvertently becoming party to a duel agenda. We wanted no truck withadiseased politics that had no notion of protecting the community, but thought of human rights activity as a useful component of the armed struggle tohammer thestatewithat international fora.
Looking back, the dangers of doing otherwise are brought out most clearly in the tragic role of the Walvettithurai Citizens' Committee. It also brings out an aspect of the politics that few caretounderstand-where theLTTE's attitude to a particular community, whether Muslim, Sinhalese border villagers or the people of Valvettithurai, could changeovernightwith tragiceffect.
Walvettith
Following si Walvettithurai in ear contacted a friend C native of the town, years my senior at dedicated man who in Jaffnatocontribute With an introduction into Valvettithurai frc in Point Pedro to me the Citizen's Commi dedicated man, a r professional who education from Har Pedro. Atits primeth austere appearance English public st anywhere in the C Struck an easy rapp was eased, Itold hin violations by all force to accept without information I wan systematically docun
The general on the 15th of Febr month, with the LTT boycott. An incide
- neighbouring Udup
army column esco stopped ashortway tense, and started S thearea. In the house asoldier, foranunknc fire, killing two wo children and badlyinj I was taken to the h after making ing Valvettithurai CC.
When our
preparedandprinted were circulated, and Chairman, WTCC. this copy was hande Vice Chancellor, Prc who was then part Chairman of the na UTHR. Though nots; betrayed anxiety wh itself to us. He said WTCC, had object
440Counterpoint0 March 1997

urai CC
bme incidents in ly January 1989, I f mine who was a a professional two
the university - a
had stayed behind toits development. from him, Icycled om my wife's home et the Chairman of ttee. He too was a eturned expatriate had received his tley College, Point eschool, despiteits offered the best hopl education ommonwealth. We ort and my anxiety that we recorded s, whichheseemed discomfort. The ted was given in hented form. elections were held uary the following Etryingtoenforcea int took place in piddy. An Indian rting ballot boxes from town, became earching houses in 2 ofa CSIclergyman wnreason, opened men, one or two uringanotherchild. nome by my friend uiries from the
report (2) was , anumberofcopies one was sent to the A few weeks later, dback to us by our fessor Thurairajah, of the group as COtional body of the aying much, his face ich communicated that the Chairman, ed in particular on
the Uduppiddyincident. Apart from what I had gathered from my visit to Uduppiddy, the report contained additional information that came independently from a very reliable local
source: This was that an LTTE gunman
had fired one pistol shot ahead of the army column which caused noharmand had runaway. Althoughhardly anyonein the area was willing to talk about this openly, without this additional information the incident was totally incomprehensible.Itonlyspokeofsheer barbarity without a human element. We putit downinthereportbecausewehad no reason to doubt the information. I told Prof. Thurairajah how I came by the information, adding that he could easily check on it since Uduppiddy was very close to his home in Wathiry. He did not refer to the matter again.
The copy of the report returned by the Chairman was full of penned
remarksasaschoolmasterwouldcorrect
an incorrigible pupil's work book. He had takenparticularobjectiontoanalyses that questioned the LTTE's conduct and hence theirclaimtobethesolelegitimate representative of the Tamil people. The additional information about the Uduppiddyaffairheregardednotmerely as fictitious, but as damaging and nullifying. He was also not happy with our treatment of the LTTE as just one among the Tamil militant groups.
I may add here that during that periodProf. Thurairajah remainedaloyal colleague. He neither objected to our reporting nor did he make any move to distance himself from collective responsibilityforthecontentsofreports.
Although we had not thought about it
seriously before, there was a sense that We had crossed the Rubicon,
The Truce
Subsequentlymyfriend who was intimate with the WTCC called on mein Point Pedro. He too objected to our work in very similar terms. He had felt hurt by the manner in which we had reported the murder of Mr. Sivanandasunderam-aretired gentleman

Page 47
residentin Point Pedro and an uncleofa very close friend of my wife. We had merely stated the facts. Theclose of 1988 was a period of mounting individual killings. Both the pro-Indian groups led by the EPRLF and theLTTE weregunning for the real and imagined supporters of the other side for reasons of fear, hatred, or both. Sometimes, different members of thesame family werekilled by different sides (atypical example being the family of the TULF's ex-MP for Killinochchi). During this period Mr. Sivanandasunderam was addressing meetings where he strongly upheld the claimsofthe LTTE. Whilereturninghome after addressing a Thileepan memorial function in Ariyalai, near Jaffna, his bus was stopped in WallaiMoor, he was taken out of sight by a pro-Indian militant and was shot dead. Mr. Sivanandasunderam was abraveman, but his deathexpressed plainly against this background did not come out as heroic. In an atmosphere where two sides blinded by circumstances were killing each other, one would beveryunrealisticinclaiming immunity to holdabriefforoneside and to denigrate the other. It was difficult for LTTE sympathizers to see this, as it was to give a balanced account of such a tragedy.
Indeed all deaths at that time were wrong and tragic, but hardly ever heroic. They were of people with much potential for the advancement of the community, but who were wasted and destroyed by its politics.
The moods in my friends' Conversation kept changing although generally pleasant and often innocent. Atone pointhesaid, "If you people want to write reports like this, you will have to doit from insidean Indian Army Camp!". I could detect a transient undertone of anger. He then went on, "The Valvettithurai Citizens' Committee are not part of the LTTE as you may think. The LTTE has its own way. No One could tell them anything!" He related a recent incident in WWT where the LTTE had humiliatingly abducted a gold merchant who was attending a Sacred festival at
Chellacchanithy Te
were much offended The Citizens' for his release. The severaldays later, but aransom in the regio gold bars. By this t dealing closely wit Governmentin Colo: me while parting, "TI step to get the Indi there would be a struggle with the Sr "Tamil Eelam".
I was now cle CC. They were esse men. They regard concernas lookingal Valvettithurai, in whic dealings with both th the LTTE. Their supp cause, they considere act of volition. The turned out was a dan incompatibles. It was could then be said to Jafna. Citizenactivists potential for indeper inconvenient had be LTTE. The numbe politicians, former Nadarajah and Prof. ' brother-in-law, Mr. Suthumalai. The WWT the Indian Army with communicating with being the village of it Deputy Leader, Mah the troublesofJanuar been negotiated appl WT, allowing both th Army to use the town in confrontation. At triumph of diplomac after the manner in States looked after Machiavelli's time. situation was shifting While WWT re other parts of Vadam; neighbouring vill frequently from hit-a the LTTE. There was

PeFSpedIVe
ple. The people
ommitteepleaded TTE released him inly aftercollecting of Rs.100 lakhs in me the LTTE was the Premadasa bo. Myfriend told is is only the first h Army out. Then ong and difficult Lankan Army for
rer about the WWT
ntially honourable d their primary er the interests of ncapacity they had e Indian Army and Ort for the LTTEs dan independent dual agenda as it gerous mixture of the only CC that be functioning in elsewhere, whose idence was found en killed by the r included Left
DDC Chairman
Thurairajah's own asupathypillai of CC also provided a useful means of the LTTE - WWT Leader and then attaya. Following 1989, a truce had ing exclusively to 'LTTE and Indian without engaging ne level it was a for the WTCC, which Italian city heir interests in But the ground apidly. hained at peace, atchy, including ges, Suffered d-run attacks by mounting anger
against WT in Vadamaratchy, and the LTTE was accused of favouritism. In the meantime thendian Army was conscious oftheLTTE beingarmed bytheSriLankan Government that had unceremoniously asked the Indian Army to quit. The LTTE for its part was bound to fulfill its share of the deal to provoke incidents that would embarrass the Indian Army. In August 1989 it launched several attacks purely meant to provoke. The first was in WT, where, by breaking the truce with an act of pre-meditated violence in a polluted and foetid political atmosphere, the provocation was meant for maximal effect. The LTTE was killing several birds with onestone. The WTCC's pro-LTTE stance was not helpful to the people as it turned out.
The Walvettithurai Massacre
On the morning of 2nd August 1989, LTTE men hidden in houses and behind a wall in WT fired at a passing and unsuspecting Indian Army patrol, and ran away, having killed about eight
- Soldiers. After reinforcements arrived,
reprisals began, leaving more than 50 civilians dead. At one point people assembled in the Valvettithurai Square were fired upon leaving about 25 dead. About a week later the LTTE fired at the hospital army post from inside Mannar hospital killing 25 soldiers and another attack near the hospital was launched in Adampan on the Mannar mainland. In these last two instances the restrained and disciplined conduct of the Indian Army was commended in our report (No. 3).
TheWTCC faithfully compileda blow-by-blow account of the Indian Army's doings on that day and circulated it for international use. An appeal was made to the Government of Sri Lanka which was responsible for the massacre in Valvettithurai in May 1985 that claimed 70 lives. As part of the game, Deputy DefenceMinister Ranjan Wijeratnevisited WT to commiserate with its people. Less thana yearlaterheshowed his colours in massacres by the SL Army of thousands of Tamils in the East. Privately, the people
March 19970Counterpoint045

Page 48
of Walvettithurai were disillusioned with the LTTE. Several of them stated that the massacre was planned and executed by the LTTE. Nothing of this was reflected by the CC.
Having backed a party that they could not in the least influence, the CC wereagainsttheirbetterjudgementbeing dragged by their nose into proceedings that reeked with hypocrisy. It was an insult to the memory of the dead they were meant to defend. This was "Human Rights as a useful component of the armed struggle"
The people who saw the injured victims at Point Pedro hospital, some with amputated limbs, were full of sympathy. But otherwise there was generalisatisfactionin Wadamaratchythat this had happened to Valvettithurai. The scores had been evened as it were. This was the politics of liberation which had left the people without any basis for trust, mutual concern or any rationale for a common goal. "Thamil Eelam" was neither policy nor a goal. Even as the TULF had well understood it, it was a slogan-one that could chargetheyoung into suicidal acts and to eliminate "traitOrS".
The Walue of Truth
Imayagainstress that there is no novelty in our reporting and the restorative value of the whole truth is deeply felt by people living dangerously in isolated circumstances. When reporting on an event where the Army conducted itself with care after a severe provocation, we are often told by the people themselves, "When you write, you must say that the Army conducted itself well and weappreciate it." Today's is a very different situation from 1982, when the army personnel merely assaulting a civilian in Jaffna would have been a straight case of the State against the people, and the role of human rights concern wasunambiguous. Weare today operating on a much lower level. The people have whether consciously or unconsciously become so disillusioned with the politics of liberation that they
expect nothinggoo They have been re. of powerlessness survivaldependson prevailsamong the put out very inadec acceptable, reports only about ra disappearances r actions of the Sri La They would give 1 particular Tamil ci Colombo. But they the people of Jaf offensive to thema
A Pos Walvettith enormously since bombarded by the went through mas 1989. Itboretheinit Liberation in May Leaderwaspresenti it lies all but to evacuation on the ( Army's unevent Wadamaratchy in withoutirony. TheL to leave Jaffna peni the Vanni, An asto protested. A man member of the LT issuing instruction demanded: "Youa were going to libel us "Tamil Eelam". leaveourlandands on earth are you g Eelam?" News Of quickly through V. the LTTE conside This spurred then pressure to bring of WT. The sea mariners whose r Indian coasthadl national sovereig suffered for them on her most sing It is nowl notes with myfrie
460Counterpoint0 March 1997

from the liberators. Iced to a condition where their very hatevergoodsense te forces. Wecould ate, but technically Odaywhere we talk 2, murder and ulting from the kan Army in Jaffna. uch satisfaction to cles abroad and in will be unhelpful to na and indeed be ority of them.
script rai had suffered 1984 when it was Sri Lankan Navy. It Sacres in 1985 and albruntofOperation 987 while the LTTE nWavettithurai. Now tally deserted. Its ave of the Sri Lankan ful advance into April 1996 was not TTEasked thepeople nsula and move into nished WT citizenry whose son was a E, gripped the cadre is by the neck and ways toldus that you ate the land and give Now you ask us to Oto the Wanni. Where bing to give us Tamil the incident spread damaratchy, causing ble embarrassment. to use considerable bout the evacuation as thus bereft of its gular passage to the ng made nonsense of ity. The town had placed trust reposed
aSO. ng since I compared d. He did not see the
development ofJaffnahehad longed for. Professor Thurairajah did not see the Faculty of Engineering and the further flowering of education he hoped would crown his Vice Chancellorship of the University of Jaffna. The very idea of education was incompatible with the politics. What we reaped were its inevitable consequences: A community physically and mentally mauled, its institutions paralysed, its modest capital destroyed or cannibalized for military purposes, and those with the means to escape scattered into marginal peoples of Western suburbia.
The politics was incapable of offering anything stable or permanent. Itsinnerdynamicandaccumulatedkarma drove it from one internal crisis into the next, as exemplified by the breaking of one truce after another ... as in October 1987, June 1990 and April 1995. The manner in whichevery truce was broken was calculated to bring severe reprisals against the people and succeeded admirably in all but in the last instance. Valvettithurai is a local example, but in the same spirit. -
It is in the nature of panegyrists and poets to romanticize, of scholars to complicate, of peace-makers to obfuscate, and some straddle all these since the lines of division are vague. The last category is very common in international fora, some as reputable as the Oxford Refugee Programme, where one learns such novel facts as "owing to Some trouble between Tamils and MuslimsintheEast, theLTTE (in october 1990) advised the Muslims to leave the North for their own safety".
And yet most common people had no illusions about this politics and understood it extremely well. Nor could one blame the LTTE for not making themselves clear. They did so again and again by telling the people that it is theirs to die. The others did no, listen, and more often did not want to listen.

Page 49
FOST WITH ONE'S OWN PRINCIPLES
CALIBAN
C ynicism has become the last refuge of the
cognoscenti of ourtimes. Disillusionment with the People's Alliance, even in the camps of its staunchest allies, has led to the rehashing of tired platitudes about power and Corruption, about Compromise and politicking, about elites and family bandyism.
No one will deny that the cliche-mongers have won the day. It has been a rout of the dilettantes who felt that some goodwill, an ounce of non-Chauvinism and a manifesto-full of high-sounding phrases could ride on the back of the people's well-earned hatred against the UNP into a better, freer, fairer, and most importantly, a peaceful society. If we are fairer and freer now, that's a temporary anomaly which is being "rectified"even as we articulate the thought.
The tragedy of itallis, alas, that Weare now doomed to defend one set of Creeps against another. The journalists and television-types who broadcast the most trivial gossip and Claptrap, shamelessly touting for Rani | Wickremasinghe's UNP in willful blindness to a decadeand-a-half of murder, mayhem and more, have been made heroes and heroines for a day by Chandrika Kumaratunga's PA government. What the hell, one might ask, are the defenders of this kept press doing When they picket and parade, not to mention stand and wait, when they Commit the deadly sin of trashing the Very Conceptofa Satyagraha (for Gandhi this was a breaking of the law in a non-violent Way and, therefore, provoking arrest etc.) in the name of media freedom? Are they merely serving those whose record in these areas Was Orders of magnitude Worse, and who have not even made any attempt to put their house in Order? Or are they upholding a principle that media freedom isthespace forcretins, thata Weeklydose ofvomit must be ensured for a healthy vibrant press?
These formulations were not nice, of Course. Noris much of what they Write. But then, the kept press On the other (government) side is equally disgusting. They don't publish anything that embarrasses the powerful and go out of their way to do so when the targets are the enemy. These
 

are all honourable men, too. Sexism, you see, reigns supreme in the media -- especially print journalism. Honour has outlived honesty it seems, once more, and so We are doomed to spend the rest of the days of Our lives fighting these imaginary battles Over real issues. Or is it real battles over imagined issues? I'm Confused.
One thing is becoming clear to me, though, and that is the growing conviction that all this is a waste of time. One can't help feeling that one is being taken for a ride in all of this. Certainly don't want to be defending bullshit, but I'll be damned before I let any government get away with selective terror of the press. After all, the only legitimate arbiter of such matters is the (discerning) reading public. Surely, everyone can see through the Government's puerile propaganda on Rupavahini, unless he/she is blinkered or biased? I have a Colleague, given to Conspiracy theories, Who Suggests that all this is a ploy to detract from the Crisis enveloping us. The Wartoo serves Such an end--it is both a Cause-and-effect of the Crisis and an endless delay of its being perceived as One. That Was Certainly a mouthful! Sorry, folks, but I often misquote Becket defensively in such contexts, invoking his comment on the tragedy of our times where everything has to be Over-simplified and trivialized to the point of absurdity. Like saliva dripping down ourmouths, think he said. Ours isa salivating world where only slow dribble is taken to be meaningful. None of this, however, lets the government off the hook for its hypocrisy and viciousness.
So We're back where We started: defending people We don't believe in Ortrust, because that's What We should be doing, that's What we believe in. We feel good, though a little Contaminated. The government behaves like a paranoid schizophrenic, and We feel a little more justified in what We do. But are we getting anywhere? That's areally depressing question. Rushdie wrote somewhere that "the past is a Country from which we have all emigrated", but in Sri Lanka We Wallow in the pastatmany levels -- whether it be the ancient past which We have uncritically glorified into a golden age, or whether it is simply the 17 years of misrule that obsesses us. In fact, the flippant Comment that the Sri Lankan passport is not even recognised/valid to emigrate from the past, expresses a sad truth. Rushdie WOuld be happy with this Conflation of the serious and the COmic, but realisation hardly helps to overcome Our predicament.
The point then is that principles sometimes backfire Onus. is any principle that plays into the hand of the villain of the piece - the UNP - Worth standing up for? Or at another level, should One defend arch-racist Nalin de Silva's right to free speech? Worse still, can any common :ause with the war-mongers and professional Sinhala hauvinists of the Divaina and The Island amount to
March 1997.0Counterpoint047

Page 50
anything more than a tacit endorsement of their filthy diatribes? There can beno question thatone is used in the process, that one Wastes one's time as well, but believe that the answer to all these questions and their ilk, is"Yes". In fact, the mistake made by some in the FMM and others Outside of it was to align themselves too closely with the PA once it came into power. It is only now that disillusionment has set in, and even that may be "too little too late" which, of course, is the story of this Country in a nutshell! The challenge of non-partisan intervention in this Context, the taskforthose Committed to real SOCial change, is precisely this disparate and discontinuOUS activity. The role of the media Watchdog, of the Concerned intellectual is, then, to Work on a multiplicity of fronts that are not always mutually Congenial. The luxury of single issues, of absolute and utter clarity of Self-evident belief we can no longer afford. Today, to believe totally in, say, the proletarian revolution is to bury one's head in the sand against global realities. Similarly, the self-indulgence of eXclusivist. feminists, environmentalists, and so on needs to be rethought.
Most plausible, and hence most insidious, is the vast lobby that has virtually declared a truce with this government on the sole basis that it is Committed to the resolution of the ethnic Conflict. This is merely a variation On the reasoning that the PA is better (more democratic, less racist, less violent etc.) than the UNP, and hence should be given cautious support. I have at least three Concerns With this rationalization Which Characterize as the preferred strategy of those who are involved with this governmentatvarious levels, be it as Consultants/advisers, influence-peddlers or actually hold some sort of office, though not everyone who shares this thinking is doomed to juggle SOblatanta Conflict of interest. I can also see the allure of Such a rationalization: afteral, it is SO much easier to deal with the PA than with, say, Premadasa because at least for the preferred few there is space for dissent and disapproval (if sufficiently muted and if articulated at the rightfora), for "business as usual."
That's then the first Concern: to What extent is this justification a defence of Vested interest and entrenched benefits which these groups are loathe to relinquish? I have been taught to become suspicious of Conclusions which maintain the status quo and reinforce my privileged status. Second, the argument that implies thatagovernment Which is SOund On One issue needs to be nurtured at the expense of devaluing other issues is a non sequitur. The Government can be supported on the issue inquestion and questioned on the others, otherwise the Compromises may Well Outweigh the benefits envisaged. The PA's record on the ethnic issue is undoubtedly better than the UNP's, but that does not vitiate its sharply declining stand on media
480Counterpoint0 March 1997

freedom or its long-lapsed election pledges vis-a-vis Constitutionalreform. This philosophy is the polaropposite of "throwing the baby outwith the bathwater" and is equally futile because it seeks to retain both the bathWater and the baby, notwithstanding the fact that the baby is bound to . beCOme Sick as a result.
Thirdly, I'm not even so sure that this government is Committed to resolving the ethnic crisis expeditiously. Sure, the politically correct phrases are being mouthed by Some people at the top, but, equally, Minister Ratwatte and others represent the military option in all its horrendous ramifications. Is this merely a "good guy - bad guy" routine? Minister Pieris has succeeded in Watering down the devolution package beyond recognition (and serious usefulness, perhaps) with a little help from his friends in the Select Committee. The role and responsibility of others (not the least the Tamil parties) in this process requires a much more detailed analysis, and I'm not suggesting that the Government is the sole Culpritat all. Yet, my sense is that there Was an eagerness and alaCrity to make changes Some of which were evengratuitous. At any rate, uncritical support even here has proved to be counter-productive. The Government must put its money where its mouth is: its two-step of War and peace is getting nowhere beyond the dancefloor of rhetoric. It is disingenuous to say the least to pretend that the War is winnable on the one hand (at least Ratwatte has stopped giving us a timeframe for victory), and to bemoan its toll purely in terms of the loss of life, limb and property of the Sinhala South a la Sudu Nelum for instance.
Which brings me full cycle to my original unease about the protest against the Government's harassment of Sections of the media. One of the slogans specially prepared for the Occasion read, "The PTA which was brought in for the North is now being used in the South." No surprise that the Lakbima-Divaina-IslandLankadeepa-Sunday Times-Sunday Leader types See no problem with the draconian PTA as long as it is Confined to Criminalizing Tamils. It is only when this law is "misused" in the South against Sinhalas that there's a problem for them. The FMM went off on its Own to denounce the PTA as a whole, with support from Some NGOs and papers like the Yukthiya and Haraya , and ironically, this voice achieved dominance in the heat of the noOnday Sun Opposite the Fort Railway Station on January 15th. Was this a case of the temporary victory of the angels OVer the rest, or was it simply a moment"full of sound and fury, signifying nothing."
lf had to do all this over again -- and, of course, "I have to -- WOuld? Yes, and each time with less and less Conviction. Old habits die hard.

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