REFERENDUM

WILL S.L.F.P. GO TO POT?


LANKA

Vol. 5

No. 15

December 1, 1982

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Provision in Law Referendum Emergency likely

It's a democratic means, says JR


Protest march by Jasina undergrad

HEADLINES FOR

HISTORY

Priest implicated in bank robbery and altack

ijaya arrested NOW BEING HE



We accept PM's challenge to defeat UNP at Referendum

> Ten opposition parties want emergency lifted



C'EST SI BON!

"Lanka Ideal partner says BONN Minister" was the frontpage headline given to a statement made by West German Economic Cooperation Minister Dr. Warnke, the first Cabinet Minister from the new government in Bonn to visit the country. He was here of course for the inauguration of the Randenigala project, the FRG's biggest investment in Sri Lanka.

"Bon" agrees the Finance Minister Ronnie de Mel as he addresses a British trade mission and wins another frontpage headline that reads "Investors never had it so good". Agreeing enthusiastically, Sir Cyril Pitts, the delegation leader calls the "trade and investment picture" an encouraging one.

But there's a little grey cloud over this sunny landscape, and its none other than the Finance Minister who pointed the finger that, "Protectionism in trade is seldom the truest wisdom. It is self-defeating. Tell your Prime Minister Mrs. Thatcher, that the Finance Minister of a poor, oppressed, downtrodden country made this request. The request was to remove protectionist barriers.

The trouble is that British prime minister's prime concern is British industry and British jobs. And the British economy, like so many others, is in bad shape.

Up to 1977, Mr. de Mel reminded the mission, the balance was in our favour. No more. Trade is increasing but the gap is bigger.

(See also page 7)

Polls in US Press

Many of the Sri Lankans might have seen how the Newsweek of Nov. I, 1982 reported the Sri Lanka's Presidential election as "J. R.s' Sunday-Best vote for capitalism". For the benefit of the Lanka Guardian readers, I'm providing below a sampling of how the major newspapers in USA covered the election.

New York Times of Oct. 20th carried a four-column article by William Stevens with a caption, "It's capitalism vs Socialism in Sri Lanka Election Today". Photos of J. R. and Kobbekaduwa also accompanied this lengthy article. And on Oct. 22nd, the results of the election appeared in New York Times with a caption, "6 More Years of Capita-lism for Sri Lanka." The Chicago Tribune of Oct. 22nd, carried the story with a not-so exciting title, "President retained in Sri Lanka voting"; but it reported, "Unofficial results gave Jayewar-dene 55 percent of the vote."; and Boston Globe of the same date also reported the same figure of 55 percent vote for J. R., with a caption, "Sri Lanka election reaffirms capitalism."

The New York Times of Sunday Oct. 24th, in their weekly round-up of 'The World' had a smiling J. R. Jayewardene photo; again commented on the Presidential election with a caption, "East Goes West in Sri Lanka Vote." However, the most interesting caption was provided by

TRENDS + LETTERS

the Wall Street Journal, in its editorial of Oct. 29th: "Sri Lanka Keeps Its Rascals In." The opening paragraph of this editorial read:

"From Sweden to Massachusetts to El Salvador to Greece the trend among voters in those few countries with free elections is to throw the rascals out. But the citizens of Sri Lanka have just handed a solid re-election victory to President Junius Jayewardene in a contest that has important implications for Third World development policies."

Another feature is that Boston Globe of Oct. 22nd, also cited the anti-Tamil vote in a paragraph:

"Jayewardene won most of the 22 election districts in this island country in the Indian Ocean. He did not win those with predominantly Tamil — or South Indian origin—population. The Tamils, who constitute about a fifth of Sri Lankans, boycotted the election."

Why Boston Globe reported this specifically, the readers can come to their own conclusions.

Sachi, Sri Kantha

University of Illinois, Urbana, U. S. A.

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Can't Bank on Them

A recent report in one of our dailies read — "that in spite of incessant wooing, the four major British banks had refused offers to commence operations in Sri Lanka as, they were not too happy with 'some' aspects in the country." One, is left to imagine what these unhappy aspects are

Barclays bank is (arguably) the biggest of the four British banks and 'Barclays National' is the

(Continued on page 2)

(Continued from page 1)
largest bank in South Africa.
Indeed, its investment in South
Africa is such that the U. K. —
based 'End loans to South Africa
Group (ELTSA)' has formed a
'Barclays Shadow Board' which
for the past 2 years has published an annual Barclays 'Shadow Report' which informs the
public of the bank's activities in
South Africa.

Barclays, was recently asked to leave Nigeria. And foreign companies warned of stiff penalties if they collaborate with South Africa and Barclays.

Thus, it seems quite fortunate that Sri Lanka's offer was rejected by the Barclays 'group' for otherwise 'another' seeming embarrassment (as in the case of our rebel cricketers) and, — one which would have been difficult to explain away would have become our lot with the rest of the third world re:— association with South Africa.

L. Umagiliya

Colombo 7.

Cricket and Elites

Ever since Cricket was introduced by white masters it naturally became the exclusive monopoly of the upper stratum of the society. This elite class largely received its education at St. Thomas' or Royal. Thus, These two Colleges started dominating every aspect of the game both within and outside the field.

An analysis of the composition of the Sri Lanka team up to late 60's would reveal this position. Excepting a small percentage representing the leading Colombo Colleges: the Captains, Umpires, Selectors, Radio Commentators, Team Managers etc., were persons from these two Colleges. In view of an inflexible fixture, only a few Colleges had the chance of entering into their domain.

There was another important factor which enabled this elite to maintain its dominance over the game. It is the English Lan-

guage, As Mr. Reggie Siriwardena pointed out in a paper read at a Seminar it was not so much the language but the art of speaking, stressing the correct syllable etc., which kept the others away from them.

The situation started changing along with the political changes started in 1956. The takeover of schools in 1961 accelerated the pace. Naturally, leading Buddhist Colleges received State patronage. Thus, Cricket in these institutions receive an impetus.

These changes led to a battle between the elite Colleges and the others, latter being headed by Ananda-Nalanda combine. Big match live commentaries in Sinhala was introduced. To the credit of the pioneers, today, it is done with much success and ease though an element of bias is evident. However, this had a revolutionary impact on the game. Its popularity grew rapidly. Maha and Madya Maha Vidyalayas

(Continued on page 4)

wice of wmer



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Will the old multiparty system survive?

was to be seen everywhere in the city, on wall posters and hanging, Vesak-Kudu style, on lamp posts in the streets.

While the UNP had swung into the Referendum campaign almost immediately after the formal proclamation, the Opposition took time to organise their first Hyde Park rally. With its party secretary Mr. Ratnasiri Wickremanayake (now released) detained, other stalwarts spending

"I'll call all parties to help me"

The President said at Kandy:

l am thinking of seeking the support of all parties after the referendum is over, to —

- (1) help us in this programme.
- (2) to secure more representation for unrepresented parties and interests in parliament by increasing the membership of parliament, e.g to 196 as contemplated in the constitution.
- (3) to institute a method of recall of elected members districtwise, if the majority of MPs in a district wish it, or if the President thinks it necessary.

This should please the TULF who wish to resign in August 1983 — they need not wait so long if they agree to amend the constitution on these lines.

These are democratic methods adopted by some countries.

- CDN

Eleven to be indicted

Eleven persons, including SLFP party secretary, Mr. Ratnasiri Wickremanayake will be indicted in Court on charges of conspiracy to commit acts of violence against the State, the Prime Minister Mr. R. Premadasa told Parliament on Nov. 26. Outlining in detail "the material available", the PM indentified the persons, among whom the most prominent SLFP'ers are Mrs. T. B. Ilangaratne, ex-MP and wife of the party's Deputy leader, Mr. Anurudda Ratwatte, and Mr. Maurice Rajapakse.

hours making statements to the police, a fair number being pulled in over the false rice ration book affair, and finally Mr. Vijay Kumaratunge, in an Army hospital, the organisational problems and low morale of the SLFP was much in evidence. Still playing the leading role in the combined Opposition, the SLFP's difficulties were plainly a drag on the rest.

Mrs. B. is much more in command of the situation than in the recent past but as the fiasco of the All Island Committee meeting and the perahera of SLFP deserters show, the party is still in deep trouble.

President Jayewardene and Prime Minister Premadasa have concentrated on the Opposition's main charge—legal or not, the referendum is undemocratic because it seeks to deny the electorate a general election, and therefore the right to choose its own representatives.

By and large, the UNP's counterargument is two-fold. Far from being undemocratic, a referendum is the most democratic means of testing popular opinion. "We are seeking the consent of the people" said the



President, while the Prime Minister argues that if the referendum, which is no substitute for an election, is lost then the parliamentary polls will be held as scheduled.

The second part of the argument is essentially "the pot-calling-the-kettle-black" dialectics! How can the SLFP object to an extension of parliament's term when it did the same (2 years) by using a two-thirds majority rather than a referendum.

This still leaves a basic question unanswered and the Opposition, plainly believes that this is its trump card—i.e. the right of the voter to elect his own M.P. The Hyde Park meeting made clear that this was the main thrust of the "NO" campaign. The tactic was to draw in UNP supporters too. Said Mrs. Bandaranaike "Vote 'NO' on December 22, and then vote for the UNP, if you wish, at the general election".

Dr. Colvin R. de Silva drew much comfort from statistics. Adding up all the votes that were cast for Opposition candidates at the Oct. 20 polls and emphasising that the TULF's "non-participation" line had persuaded several lakhs to stay at home, he reminded the crowd that the TULF was also against the referendum.

The TULF is **not** in the Opposition's common front. Caught between the northern militants and the TULF on the one hand, and its ambivalent relationship with the government (the ongoing negotiations on DDC's still remains a hopeful, if loose, link) the TULF leadership has decided to cut an independent path. The TULF's old opposition allies however find encouragement in the thought that this path leads to the

same destination — "NO". President Jayewardene, undeterred by the attempt on the life of the Municipal Commissioner, and the tense situation following the arrest of several priests, went north a bare six weeks after his last visit to the peninsula.

"I will go from village to village in the next six years. I promise you there will be no differences between Jaffna, Puttalam or Matara. We are all equal" he told the rally at the Jaffna esplanade.

Since 1977, when it became legal, the J.V.P. has also pursued an independent 'line' contemptuous of the 'Old Left', intensely hostile to Mrs. B. and the SLFP, and cautiously critical of the U.N.P. "The Old Left is dead or dying, capitalism must be buried but until then better J.R. than Sirima" was essentially its tactical game. But the Oct. 20 result was a cold shower on the heady self-confidence of those JVP leaders who thought that they were automatically the "wave of the future". So, a shift of line. It will have no truck with the SLFP, but will work together with other "anti-capitalist parties", certainly at the trade union level, and on the main issue of the moment, the referendum. So will TULF and JVP votes fill the common pot to overflowing, as Mrs. Bandaranaike said at the Hyde Park rally?

If that happend and the "NOES" have it, elections will follow, and the political situation could be fundamentally different from what is likely to happen if the referendum is won. After elections, the main question will be the party balance in parliament and the relationship between parliament and the all—powerful executive President and the policies to which he is committed.

An "YES" vote could prove, historically speaking, a turning point. (See "Headlines for History" on the cover). Dr. Colvin R. de Silva, currently no hero of the SLFP nor, of the Anil faction, gave a characteristic demonstration of what 50 years in politics mean when handling hecklers. The 50 years have not diminished his gift for ideas and new terminology either. He spoke of "capitalist concentration".

Commentators like Migara have written of "democratic dictatorship" and "one-party rule". Other ideas

floating freely are "national government" and "consensus politics, ASEAN-style". (See TRENDS) The CDN published President Jayewardene's own plans. (See Box)

Does all this imply that the multiparty parliamentary system as we have known it from 1947 will find itself in the same 'dustbin of History' into which Mr. Anura Bandaranaike consigned Marxism? Much depend on how well the party which his father founded absorbs and survives the shocks and deadly blows it is now receiving. Correspondent Vinod Moonesinghe writes in this issue that the SLFP had no counterprogram or failed to present it to the people on Oct. 20. More important than the alternate program is the SLFP's historical position as the alternate government. If the pot doesn't overflow, will the SLFP go to

Letters . . .

(Continued from page 2)

took to big time Cricket. Simul taniously, Sinhala press too joined the publicity campaign. With the result, the elice Colleges faced stiff competition from the Sinhala speaking cricketers who started dominating the game both in numbers and capability.

Consequently, Ananda-Nalanda combine became the leading group with the backing of the Sinhala P. ess and the Commentary.

In spite of these contradictions reflected among the contending groups the fact remains that they belonged to one Community and that kept them bound together. The game does not lose its class character. Sinhala speaking cricketers not only acquired the skill but also started apeing the social life attached to the game.

What was the immediate compelling factor for the South African Tour. We live in a consumerist society. Man is greedy by nature. This society only encourages it.

Ranjith Chandrasekera

Rambukkana

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
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Church in the Crossfire

In this issue of the L.G. we begin publication of a short paper "Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia and Sri Lanka" by the Sri Lankan scholar Dr. Ameer Ali, now teaching in Australia. Islam, says Ameer Ali, is the state religion in Malaysia whereas in Sri Lanka its adherents constitute a small percentage of the population in an island where Buddhism, the religion of the majority, enjoys a pre-eminent place.

As for Christianity and the Catholic Church in particular, it may be noted that Sri Lanka is not the Philippines nor Poland. In the Philippines, Cardinal Jaime Sin has actually demanded that President Marcos should resign. During his visit to the country, the Pope himself had many things to say that did not please Mr. Marcos.

Nearly 40 years of Communist rule have not by any means led to the eradication of the traditional influence of the Church especially among the backward peasantry and the lower middle class. In the crisis over Solidarity, the Church had to move cautiously and deftly, particularly with a Polish Pope in the Vatican.

The fast-moving events in Jaffna, sparked off by the arrest of several priests, who had Eelam literature, a L. P. record with pro-Eelam songs and a fair amount of money in their possession, have now placed the Christian Church and clergy at the centre of a crisis which is both theological and political.

Latin America

The issues are not new. Not surprisingly it is in Latin America that the debate really started. It is a Catholic continent with the Church always having a very important socio-political role. Traditionally, the Church as an institution and its heirarchy were identified with propertied interests, with the huge

landowners and their foreign connections; in short, a part of the oligarchy.

But Latin America is also the continent of the sharpest conflict. Grinding poverty, exploitation, injustice and economic dependency have intensfied these conflicts to the point of explosion. Younger priests they were called 'men of social conscience' at first — began identify themselves on the other side, the forces challenging the status quo. Social action soon turned to activism, and finally to actual physical participation in armed struggle. Ideas and action go together. The advent of activist, militant priests was accompanied by "liberation theology". The name that spread across the Americas was that of Camillo Torres, the Colombian 'guerilla' priest killed by the army at the age of 37. Two years ago in San Salvador, gunmen of the ultra-right ORDEN murdered the Archbishop, Monsignor Romero, as he was celebrating mass.

"By the 1970's" writes Professor Enrique Lopez Oliva, "it became clear that the repression against the progressive Christian movement in Latin America was due to a carefully prepared strategy of liquidation. This was shown by some documents which were made public such as the Rockefeller report of 1969 and the Rand Corporation study on the Catholic Church requested by the State Department; the report of the intelligence department of Argentine General Staff called 'The Third World and the Catholic Church' in 1971; and the plan of the Hugo Blanzer regime in Bolivia in 1975 against the Catholic Church". But all this in another continent.

Here in Sri Lanka, no Christian country, the upper echelons of the Church were associated, in the pre-independence and early post-indepen-

dence phase, with the Establishment Either in their personal capacity or as influential opinion—making groups, they worked closely with the Establishment. Events forced the Church into a more neutral position—the 1956 Sinhala—Buddhist resurgence, the B.J.B. campaign against "Catholic Action", the schools' take—over, the failure of the 1962 coup and its political—propagandist consequences etc.

The Anglican Church took the initiative in making the Church and its ritual more national, consciously closer to indigenous culture. This initiative is widely associated with Bishop Lakdasa de Mel (later, Sri Lanka's first Metropolitan), Bishop Lakshman Wickremasinghe, and more recently Yohan Devananda.

Kurunegala is the authentic home of this liberal reform movement. And it was in Kurunegala in August this year that a movement called "Christians in the Struggle for Justice" was formed. 40 organisations (the Catholic Bishops Conference, the Church of Ceylon, the National Christian Council, various "fellowships", workers movements, peasant organisations, student groups, community centres) held what was called a "consultation". There was another meeting last week in Colombo where the movement protested against holding of the referendum instead of an election, and the incarceration of priests under the PTA. It also asked for the withdrawal of the emergency. (See Box on Page 6)

Christian responses to the developments in Jaffna are worthy of serious attention.

(Continued on page 6)

CHRISTIANS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE

The objectives of this Consultation were:

- 1. Mutual solidarity, co-ordination and deepening of spirituality among Christians and Church related groups active in the struggle for justice and liberation in Sri Lanka.
- 2. To clarify principles, objectives and roles of Christians in their participation with people of other religions and ideologies in the movement of development, justice and liberation.
- 3. To carry forward the work of development education and, in general the deepening of consciousness among the people in Society and in the Church on the problems of social change and the building of a just and humane society.

The Consultation began by analysing the major areas of injustice, oppression and alienation in Sri Lanka today and identified the following issues:

- 1. The erosion of our national sovereignity, through the operation of neo-colonialism through Trans National Corporations, lending agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF and militarisation on a vast scale.
- 2. The attack on civil rights. In view of the increasing human rights violations, the necessity to get rid of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and all other repressive legislation.
- 3. The oppression of workers including Free Trade Zone workers and the repression of trade unions and July 1980 strikers. The abuses suffered by migrant workers seeking employment abroad, especially in the Middle East.
- 4. Oppression of the peasants evictions, exploitation by traders, land given to foreign and local companies and effect on hitherto independent farmers, falling prices, failure of NADSA Scheme, no insurance in times of natural calamities, the lack of adequte

peasant leadership and organisation.

- 5. Cultural bondage, the lack of self -determination and freedom under the impact of neo-colonialism and consumerism. The repression and control of creative artists engaged in the cultural sphere. The illeffects of tourism and its impact on our cultural life.
- 6. Education Attempt to re-introduce privileged system of education. The future of our youth at stake. The White Paper proposals are reactionary and not realistic.
- 7. The National Question. A clear and open discussion needed of the various issues. There should be solidarity with the Tamils in the struggle for their rights, as well as understanding of the complexity of the problems and the needs of the Sinhala people too.
- 8. The lack of citizenship and the problem of statelessness, fear and insecurity and poor housing among plantation workers.
- 9. The exploitation and general oppression of women. Not deeply analysed and understood.
- 10. The problems of slum-dwellers in our cities.
- 11. The oppression of the caste system.

While grappling with these issues, we pledged ourselves to share more fully in the lives and problems of the oppressed and alienated peoples of Sri Lanka. We also reaffirmed our commitment towards a fundamental change of our present social system and consequently to a political struggle towards that ultimate goal. We further accepted the obligation in the meanwhile to make the short-term options which could effectively tackle their problems and oppose the present de-humanising trends. The Consultation broke up into six groups for more intense discussion and planning and formulated guidelines for action under the following headings:-

- 1. Workers Problems
- 2. Plantation Workers
- 3. Peasant Problems
- 4. National Question
- 5. Political Action
- 6. Action within the Church

At our Consultation, we welcomed participants of different faiths and ideologies and we affirmed the necessity for close co-operation and solidarity with such persons and organisations in a common struggle for justice. This is an obvious necessity within a pluralist religious and ideological context such as obtains in Sri Lanka.

We also took note of the resources of the Christian Churches and the need to utilise these resources in the service of the struggle for justice in accordance both with the teachings, life and example of Jesus the man, in whom God was incarnate, and also the prophetic calling of the Church throughout the ages.

Our theological basis is the self-effacing loving compassion of God in Jesus as a historical figure fully immersed in the aspirations and struggles of his time towards a new humanity. Flowing from that life, death and resurrection we claim our right along with all oppressed people to be fully human, and are inspired to practice. His universal love which is concretised through mass solidarity, social struggle, conflict and confrontation. (Philippians 2: 5-8; Pope John Paul II's Encyclical "Redeemer of Man").

It was decided to hold a similar Consultation annually and a Committee consisting of the Rt. Revd Lakshman Wickremasinghe, the Revd Soma Perera, the Revd Fr. Tissa Balasuriya, O. M. I., the Revd Fr. Paul Caspersz S. J., the Revd Fr. Aloysius Peiris, Sevaka Yohan Devananda, Sister Josephine Mendis, Vijaya Vidyasagara, Annathaie Abayasekera and Ainsley Samarajiwa (Convenor) was appointed to meet as and when the need arises.

(Continued from page 5)

The Catholic Bishops Conference issued what may be described as moderately toned "law, order and justice" statement. It upheld the principle that every person is innoce nt unless proved otherwise, but it "condemned" violence in furtherance of any cause, adding that those who broke the law must face the consequences. However the statement concluded with the Church re-itera-

ting its position on Truth, Justice and Equity.

The Bishop of Jaffna, according to the ISLAND, wrote to the President, PM, Ministers and MP's "vehemently protesting" against the fact that the priests were detained under "the obnoxious P.T.A. which had been condemned by organisations such as Amnesty International".

The Island (25/11) also reported that parishioners have been staging

sit-down fasts at the Churches in Vilan, Pandaterippu, Manipay and Atchuvely, and that students, who are boycotting classes, are wearing black bands.

The Army Commander told a press conference that the Church was in no way involved in the activities of the 6 priests, (4 Catholics and 2 Methodists) who were interrogated by the security forces. — M.

JVP on Referendum

I. THE continuing capitalist system has deepened the social, economic and political crisis of Sri Lanka and stretched the forty year old capitalist form of democracy and parliament to an unprecedented extent.

2. The capitalist government of Sri Lanka is seeking to destroy opposition parties, avoid holding elections and repress the activities of workers and students in an effort to consolidate its power.

3. It is apparent that Sri Lanka is increasingly becoming a puppet of US imperialism, specifically in in economic, political and military spheres.

4. The new constitution which created the post of an all-powerful President with executive powers, the extension of the President's term in office in light of the sudden Presidential Elections, the undated resignations of 143 Members of Parliament just prior to their term in office, the referendum to extend the life of parliament by another six years without holding a General Election, the recent efforts to draw sections of the SLFP into the UNP, the mounting repression against all opposition parties, and finally, the recent moves to provide storage facilities to the US imperialists are all indicative of the fragility of Sri Lanka's democracy and the deterioration of national sovereignty.

5. The Politbureau of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (Peoples Liberation Front) reiterates the important role of the left force in providing leadership to the people of Sri Lanka is freeing themselves from this predicament.

6. The JVP believes that the present crisis cannot be overcome by a political entity or organisation led by, and representing the interests of the bourgeoisie. Only united action by the anti-capitalist forces can accomplish such a task.

7. To this end, the JVP calls on every individual and organisation opposed to the destructive effects of capitalism to unite with the JVP to restore their democratic rights by voting against the UNP, the bourgeoisie, US imperialism,

and the lamp at the referendum held on December 22nd, by marking 'X' alongside the symbol of the pot.

Politbureau, Peoples Liberation Front (JVP)

Colombo 13.

TRENDS ... Police politics

Post-election violence is now a fact of life. The rapid rise in serious crime (bank robberies, daring hold-ups, armed gangs) is common knowledge. The latter has little to do with party politics.

In such a situation, no administration can afford to be unconcerned about police morale. This is the subject of an editorial in the Sunday DIVAINA which warns the government of the danger of punitive transfer of police officers who dare to stand up to politicians, local and regional bossmen. Protecting the politician who takes the law into his own hands at the expense of the morale of the law enforcement agencies can be seriously counter-productive. If the trend is not reversed in time, the local politico will in fact become the local enforcement agent.

Systems change

Quoting Pope, the WEEKEND's Migara triggered a local newspaper discussion on "forms of government" after he himself had tossed two ideas into the debate — "one party rule" and "democratic dictatorship". Soon after the ISLAND had republished an article by Ismail Kassim (of the STRAIT TIMES, Singapore) the authoritative DAILY NEWS followed suit, giving Mr. Kassim's piece top-of-the-leader-page prominence. Entitled "Working with the Opposition", Mr. Kassim's article opens, not surprisingly with a nugget of wisdom from Mr. Lee Kuan Yew.

"The price of keeping up the myth of an alternative government can be crippled when there is a shortage of trained talent".

In Singapore's case that myth was buried a long time ago. It was only recently that the Singapore legislature opened its doors, willynilly, to one Opposition MP, truly an odd man in.

(Continued on page 22)



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Hold elections — Tampoe

THE masses of the voters are confronted with a new move of President Jayewardene and his compliant Parliamentary Party. They have passed on amendment to the Constitution once again, to extend the life of the present Parliament for another six years, instead of holding a general election by August 1983. This is obviously because the UNP Government now knows, from the results of the presidential election, that it will not be able to secure a sufficient majority at a general election, to be able to chop and change the Constitution whenever it deems it politically advantageous to do so. To preserve its five-sixths majority in the present Parliament, the Government has to obtain endorsement of its latest amendment to the Constitution, the "Fourth Amendment", even by a bare majority, in a Referendum.

The Provisional National Committee for a Mass Workers Party denounces the Government's decision to hold a Referendum, to prevent a general election. The Referendum is intended not only to retain the five-sixths majority of the UNP in Parliament for another six years, but to enable President Jayewardene to exercise SUPREME LÉGISLATIVE POWER through a puppet majority in Parliament. All the UNP members of Parliament have already submitted their undated resignations to him for the purpose.

The nominated members of Parliament will have to be maintained at public expense, with no responsibility whatsoever to the people. They will be removable only by the President, and answerable only to him. They will pass whatever reactionary legislation or further undemocratic amendments to the Constitution the UNP Government may require. They will also unquestioningly endorse presidential proclamations of 'States of Emergency', for the suppression of

democratic rights and civil liberties. to any extent, as and when required.

The shape of things to come has already become evident after the presidential election. Having established a 'State of Emergency' on 20th October, for the professed purpose of checking 'post-election violence', the Government is now abusing its 'Emergency' powers, as it has done before. Though the Opposition parties supported the declaration of the 'State of Emergency', in the hope of securing some protection for their supporters from thuggery, they are now being hampered in mobilising opposition to the Referendum, in various ways, under the 'Emergency'.

The Provisional National Committee unconditionally upholds the right of the people, who are entitled to vote in a general election to exercise that right to elect a new Parliament in 1983, The people must be free to decide who should be members of Parliament, and not President Jeyewardene. A

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FP and its progressive past

V. I. S. Jayapalan

ot only in Sri Lanka but in most of the Asian countries where you find more than one nationality, left movements are facing special difficulties in organizing the people belonging to different nationalities of the same country. In most of these countries they said mechanically, "we belong to the working class and the working class has no Nationality". No doubt class interests play a determining role in the manifestation of National interest. This theory will help to understand the particular problems within the contexts of a Nationality and within a context of a multinational country like Sri Lanka. But this cannot help us to handle a situation of a multinational country like Sri Lanka which has living historically as distinct nations, Nationalities, and Ethnic groups which are developing towards nationhood or submerging with the other nations and nationalities. I am not supporting bourgeois ideas about the 'eternity of nations! But one cannot refuse to understand and accept the dominant role (not eternal) - the dominant socio-economic and cultural role-played by nations and nationalities and ethnic groups within a multinational country. The mistakes some of our Left friends have done was the over - simplification of the nations and nationalities into mere class divisions, the bourgeois and workers. In Sri Lanka because of this mistake left movements could not play an alternative role to the S. L. F. P. and Federal Party in the fifties and sixties. These mistakes led the main stream Left Movement to play a pro-S. L. F. P. opportunist role in the past while they attacked the Federal Party (F. P.) only because the F. P. did not accept the Sinhala-Buddhist line which was adopted by the S. L. F. P. As I mentioned earlier the F. P. had emerged as the rival political party

to the Tamil Congress (T. C.) the "U. N. P. party of the Tamils". Up to early Sixties, the Federal Party was functionally run by the Tamil Clerical servants. In 50's and early 60's in the Jaffna peninsula the transport workers have played a very distinct role in the extra-parliamentary activities of the F. P. This is the period the F. P. had a comparatively more progressive role than the S. L. F. P.

In the 1952 general elections in the Jaffna constitutuency the C. P. & L. S. S. P. supported the F. P. candidate Dr. Naganathan against G. G. Ponnambalam of the T. C, but this is a minor and short-lived role. The Federal Party was the only non-left participant in the historic Hartal of August 1953.

Later they were engaged in the struggle against oppression — National oppression — intensified by the S. L. F. P.

That is the struggle which gave a progressive character to the F. P. The S. L. F. P. intimidated their leaders, manhandled them even in front of the Parliament in 1956 June 5 when they opposed the Sinhala Only Bill, in the Gandhian way. On the same evening when S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike spoke to the crowd outside parliament he made very inhuman jokes about that assault. He made the same type of jokes even inside the parliament too. F. P. leaders have been arrested twice by him. Despite all these antagonisms, in 1960 March S. J. V. Chelvanayagam listened to the call of Dr. N. M. Perera and voted against the short-lived UNP government and helped him to open the path for the rise of Mrs. Sirima Bandaranaike. But Sirima Bandaranaike's government continued the oppressive policies. Partly because

of this fact and the rightist opportunist line of the Left on the National Question and in the formation of united-front movements, the F. P. started to drift away from the left and left-SLFP collaborations.

The other reason is the changed class character of the F. P. and S. L. F. P. in the mid-sixties. But that I don't want to discuss in this article. The anti-UNP progressive line which carried forward mainly by the Tamil clerical servants and Tamil Teachers and the transport workers of Jaffna inside the Federal Party became weak after the Satyagraha campaign of 1961, partly because of the unresponsiveness and irresponsibility of the left move-These Tamii sectors had helped the left movement and their ally the SLFP in 1952, 1956, 1960 elections not only by their partici-pation in Hartal and defeating the U. N. P. in 1960 March which helped Mr. and Mrs. Bandaranaike respectively to emerge into Sri Lanka politics, but also they voted for them in the Sinhalese areas. Even in 1956 they considered UNP's 'Sinhalese Only' as more 'dangerous than SLFP's 'Sinhalese Only'. In the debate on the 'Sinhala Only' bill G. G. Ponnambalam condemned F. P. elements for their foolish displays of joy immediately after the victory of the SLFP. During the 1961 Satyagraha campaign, while the LSSP showed some democratic sympathy the C P. mobilized its Jaffna branchto counter it. The people responr sible for the progressive character of the F. P. could not prove their line's worth. The Left movement which using Kandasamy's name even now on the platforms do not want to go against the Sinhala communalists to rebuild the statue of Comrade Kandasamy after that monument was demolished by the Sinhalese rioters in the 1956 'Sinhala only' riot. Simultaneously Colombo-

based UNP Tamils started to come out of the UNP after the UNP accepted 'Sinhala Only' in 1955 and Mr. J. R. Jayewardena's march to Kandy in 1958 and the UNP role in the 1958 riots. This tendency is encouraged by the F. P. election victories. I don't see any relevant reason why the left movement didn't consider the F. P. when they wanted to form a united front with nationalists'. Only the populist line and the rightist opportunist line which prevailed in those parties could be a valid reason. They only made united fronts with the SLFP. After that they (specially C. P. during Satyagraha campaign of 1961 and even before) wanted to show that they are very loyal and obedient to the political line of the SLFP regarding the National Question. They protested the passing of the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act. They organised processions against the Bill. In a 1968 document on the Party's 25 year History, the C. P has proudly paraded its role. But after being kicked out by the SLFP and after the collapse in the general election of 1977 they have repented for these mistakes. In the draft of self - criticism which C. P. has placed before the (1978) 10th Congress of the party, they have classified this mistake as a manifestation of the right deviations of the party. They accepted that "by joining with SLFP and LSSP and by having played a dominant role in the procession against the Tamil Language (Special Provision) Act, our Party leadership have surrendered the task of overthrowing UNP — FP government to communalism". They have considered that this mistake took place because of the rightist opportunist line that prevailed in the Party.

Above all they have accepted that this was the one of the two most grievous mistakes of the party during the previous decade. Any left groups and left oriented intellectuals if they fail to take a correct line on the national question in a multinational country like Sri Lanka inevitably will make the previous mistakes in developing tactics, programs and policies which will mislead the masses just as the above mentioned communal and rightist opportunist line. Specially before developing united front tactics they must

correct their mistakes in their stand on the National Question. They must analyse parties existing in all nations, nationalities and ethnical groups and identify them correctly. Then they must develop united front tactics applying Marxist-Leninist principals to the actual condition of various nationalities and their parties, instead of simply tailing behind the party of the big nation or nationalities - such as the SLFP. Newly emerging left and progressive groups in the South which are going to play a major role in the future, must restudy the history from the original sources, the History of our multinational country, not only trusted by the opportunist left historians of Sinhalese or Tamil communities.

In a country like India where the upper classes also almost united above their national differences the difficulties of the left movements are very much minimized when tackling certain types of problems. The difference in the Indian and Sri Lankan situation emerged not only because of the fact that Indian people have united and fought against the colonial masters for a long period. The major fact is unlike Sri Lanka where the industrial based national bourgeois are undeveloped or under-developed, In India they become a strong ruling class. The bourgeois whether they have developed in Tamil Nadu or in Pradesh that they have producing for and depending on the whole Indian market. Because of that the pan-Indian National bourgeois are able to stand against the communal chauvinist attitude of the decentralized land-based rich peasant classes. This is how the Indian bourgeois government was able to tackle the national question in a somewhat better way than most of the Asian countries. They have accepted the existance of nations. They have checked the development of regional nationalism by the acceptence of the linguistic statehood instead of stressing a unitary constitution with 'Hindu only' slogans. In this the united Indian National Bourgeois stand firmly against the rich peasant elements and the latter's organisations developed inside and outside the Congress party. This was the difference between the Sinhala reformist leader S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike

and the Indian national bourgeois leader Jawaharlal Nehru. This ensured at least to an extent, the development of the different nationalities into nationhood within the framework of Indian nationalism. This is also the point where Lenin took a more correct line than some other Communist leaders of the World. Lenin accepted the right of separation to confirm this right of developing into nationhood of the different nationalities.

The basic theoretical problem for the Left is that it has not yet formulated a correct answer as to whether the Tamil speaking people have the right to develop into nationhood. If the answer is negative, then there is no fundamental difficulties. But if the answer is in the positive, who has the right to decide?

For their part, the Tamil nationalist leadership has also wrestled with this problem from 1948. First they demanded parity and next regional autonomy. From 1956, they have rejected the unitary constitution as the name "federal party" signifies. When the F. P. supported the SLFP to defeat the UNP in March 1960 in parliament, they put forward as their minimum demand" the replacement of the present unitary constitution with the autonomy of the Tamil speaking areas". (FP statement of 30.3. 1960). Since then communal disturbances and riots have occurred many times. From these experiences a new consciousness has evolved first in the north, and to some degree in parts of the east.

Can a strong united bourgeoisie emerge which can handle the problem in the Indian way? Recent trends and developments I have shown have prevented a united left movement of both Sinhala and Tamil speaking peoples to emerge, particularly because of the role of the SLFP. As for the FP, it was only when various categories of the middle and lower middle class (the teachers, the clerks and their organizations) had some influence, that the party had a progressive character.

Indian Ocean — strategic realities

Prof. Shelton Kodikara

Analysing the strategic situation in the western Indian Ocean, an Indian defence analyst has averred as follows:

The strategic situation in the region of the Indian Ocean evolves from the operation of three inter-related factors: first the political and military interests of external powers in the region; second, asymmetries between the intra-regional littoral/hinterland powers; and third, the interaction between political/military interests of external and intra-regional asymmetries. I

Among Indian Ocean littoral and hinterland states, perhaps in no case are the asymmetries more pronounced and the interaction of intra-regional rivalry and political and military interests of external powers more relevant to the concept of the Indian Ocean an a Peace Zone than in the context of Indo Pakistani relations.

From the time of Partition and Independence, India and Pakistan inherited a legacy of rivalry and and conflict based on a number of issues, the old Hindu-Muslim antagonism, problems created by refugee rehabilitation, diputes over river waters and division of assets left oder by the imperial power, but principally due to rival claims to the strategically situated state of Jammu and Kashmir, which was divided by an UN imposed ceasefire iine after the first Indo-Pakistani war of 1947. From the time of independence and even after the Chinese intrusion into India in 1962, the major segments of the Indo-Pakistani armies have confronted each other on the Kashmir front, and Kashmir has been responsible for two of the three major wars fought between the two countries in 1947, September 1965 and in 1971. Bhutto considered Kashmir to be 'the handsome head of the body of Pakistan, without which Pakistan would be incomplete 'both territorially and ideologically' but by recovering which 'she would recover her head and be made whole, stronger, and more viable! 2 By the same token, India's claim to Kashmir was based on hard,

strategic realities: Kashmir commanded a northern access to the Indian plains, and shared a common boundary with China. Inevitably, Kashmir became an important component in the power equation between the two countries. As attitudes hardened, Kashmir was viewed as an essential condition of security by both sides.

In retrospect, it seems that a mutual accomodation on Kashmir might have been possible before attitudes hardened on bothsides in the sixties. Despite Nehru's strong emotional attachment to Kashmir, he might have been prevailed upon to accept some settlement based on a partition of the state. India had used its armed forces to integrate Junagadh and Hyderabad in Union territory because these states were enclaves within India. Such was not the case with Kashmir: Kashmir had a Muslim population and it was contigous to both India and Pakistan. The repeated offers of a no-war pact which Nehru made to President Ayub in the sixties indicates that even at that time Nehru might have been interested in a political solution of the Kashmir question based on mutual acceptance of the cease-fire line. The wars of 1965, however marked the point of no return for the two countries. Ayub's own response to Nehru's offer was to propose joint defence against external aggression. The proposal as mooted by Ayub in 1959 was, intended to be contingent on an agreed solution of the Kashmir and river waters problems, after which the armies of the two countries would disengage and move to their respective vulnerable frontiers, thus providing 'the substance of joint defence'. The question 'joint defence against whom?' was not clearly spelled out in Ayub's proposal, but it was made in the context of the Khampa rebellion in Tipet in 1959, evidence of Chinese activity in the Ladakh area of Kashmir, and Pakistan's commitment, through her link with western security pacts, to a containment of China policy.

Nehru's own response to the proposal was negative.

Though the US-Pakistan mutual security assistance agreement of 1953 and Pakistan's accession to SEATO were not directed against India, Nehru could not yet in 1959 envisage the possibility of a war with China nor consider the possibility of coluding with Pakistan in western military pacts. In the event, US arms assistance to Pakistan, then as now, escalated the Indo-Pakistani arms race and after 1965, when US arms assistance to both India and Pakistan was temporarilty halted, led to a major Soviet presence in India and a major Chinese presence in Pakistan. The presence in both instances was in regard to military assistance, but it held before India the prospect of a future war with Pakistan in which both China and the US would be Pakistan's allies, and led India to enter into the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971. Big power rivalry therefore became integrated into the Indo-Pakistani equation and has remained so even though perhaps Kashmir may now have become devalued as a factor in this equation.

As regards the Indo-Pakistan equation, the aftermath of the 1971 war left behind three distinct sets of consequences: first, those, relating to Kashmir itself, second, those relating to Pakistan's foreign policy generally, and third, those pertaining to the military alliance between India and Pakistan. The residual state of Pakistan after 1971 may be said to have become more viable in that it was now more geographically compact, as well as more culturally homogeneous and economically integrated. It has been cogently argued that the 1971 war entailed a reappraisal by Pakistan of its hard-line stand on Kashmir in several respects.³ For example in Simala in June-July 1972 Pakistan conceded recognition of the cease-fire line of 17 December 1971 as the basis of negotiation in respect of Kashmir. This enabled India to ignore the UN cease-fire line of 1949, and discuss directly with Pakistan the new one, which

incorporated territorial gains obtained during the 1971 war. Para IV(ii) of the Simala Agreement declared that in 'Jammu Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of 17 December 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations' Both sides further undertook to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line. The requirement in the agreement that 'Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the international border' meant Indian withdrawal from large areas of occupied in other sectors, mainly Sind. But the renunciation of the use of force (then considered an acceptable substitute for a no-war pact) and acceptance of bilateralism by Pakistan were important gains for India. It may therefore be surmised that another Indo-Pakistani clash over Kashmir is highly unlikely, and both sides may have come a long way towards accepting the 1972 delineation of the border as definitive. The Bhutto government did indeed acknowledge that the Kashmiris' right to self-determination was no longer considered a 'sacred duty' of Pakistan, but was a right to be won by the Kashmiris themselves. There is nothing to indicate that this attitude has changed fundamentally under President Zia ul-Haq.

The impact of the 1971 war on Pakistani foreign policy was also profound. If our assumption that Kashmir had become devalued as a factor in Indo-Pakistani relations is correct, it seems plausible also to assume that basic patterns of Pakistani toreign policy are also undergoing change. Pakistan's connection with SEATO had been purely nominal long before its disbandment, and with the disintegration of CENTO Pakistan became eligible, and was accepted, into the Non-Aligned movement. Pakistan had always had a Pan-Islamic component in its foreign policy, and recent years have seen this component gaining added emphasis, with a new dimension being given to ties with the West Asian states. It was under Bhutto that Islamic unity was transformed from a secondary theme to a principal instrument of Pakistani foreign policy and this theme remains important. By 1973, Pakistani training missions had become conspicuous in front-line Arab states like Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan and Pakistani civilian and military personnnel were becoming prominent in military air operations in Libya, Kuwait and in several Persian Gulf emirates. It was Pakistan which hosted the Islamic Summit conference held in February 1974, and from this time Arab economic assistance, particularly from Saudi Arabia, has become an important element of Pakistan's economic and military standing.

The \$450 million arms accord signed between the US and Pakistan in December 1981 had implications which were important, in such a context, both for Pakistani foreign policy as well as for the Indo-Pakistani military balance. According to the agreement, which was signed in the context of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the US committed itself to provide 3.2 billion dollars over the next five years, as well as helicopters, missiles, and M-60 tanks. By October 1982, the US agreed to provide Pakistan with 40 F-16 fighters worth I.I billion dollars, and Pakistan herself was to permit establishment of US naval and air bases in the south of Pakistan. India, which since 1965 had maintained a clear military superiority vis a vis Pakistan, was compelled to seek French Mirage 2000 jets to offset the advantage which the American deal gave to Pakistan, and in March 1982 the Soviet Defence Minister Dmitri Ustinov himself visited India to pledge massive Soviet assistance for the expansion of India's armed forces. What is relevant in any discussion of the Peace Zone concept in the Indian Ocean area is not merely that a new arms race has broken out between two of the area's most important littoral states, but that India seriously believes that sophisticated American weaponary may eventually be used by Pakistan against India.

In such a context another factor which impinges on the Indo-Pakistani military balance and indeed, on the whole question of peace in the Indian Ocean area, is the question of nuclear parity between India and Pakistan. India exploded its first nuclear device as far back as 1974, and despite repeated assurances about the peaceful intent of its nuclear technology, must be ranked as a near-nuclear

power, if not one which already can produce a nuclear bomb. Both India and Pakistan are not signatories to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and as far back as 1969 Bhutto had written:

... it is crucial for Pakistan to give the greatest possible attention to nuclear technology, rather than allow herself to be deceived by an international treaty limiting this deterrent to the present nuclear powers India is unlikely to concede nuclear mono-Poly to others, and judging from her own nuclear programme and her diplomatic activities especially at Geneva, it appears that she is determined to proceed with her plans to detonate a nuclear bomb. If Pakistan restricts or suspends her nuclear programme, it would not only enable India to blackmail Pakistan with her nuclear advantage, but would impose a crippling limitation on the development of Pakistan's science and technology. 4

The BBC's Panorama carried a programme on 10 August 1981 on a 'secret Islamic nuclear bomb' being developed at Kahuta near Islamabad with the assistance of a renowned Pakistani scientist Abdur Kadir Khan, previously an employee of a large uranium enrichment plant in Holland.5 General Zia ul-Haq himself has pointedly denied reports and rumours that Pakistan intended to develop the technology required to make a nuclear bomb. At the same time, he has vehemently asserted Pakistan's right to acquire technlogy for peaceful purposes. The Turkish semiofficial news agency Anatolia quoted Zia as saying:

An atomic bomb...has no nationality. When the United States exploded the first atomic bomb it was not called an American bomb. It was an atomic bomb. Now the Soviet Union and some other countries produce it. Why not Pakistan then? Pakistan is obliged at all costs to have nuclear technology".5

We may surmise that before the 21st century, Indian Ocean littoral/hinterland states may count among their number at least two powers with a military nuclear capability. Relevent to the Indo-Pakistani equation is the fact that although India may have a clear advantage over Pakistan as a near-nuclear Power, which enhances her overall strategic superiority over the latter, there are several Islamic states which have a vital stake in an

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SIGNS OF THAW?

while heads of State, government and Communist parties of East and West flew into Moscow for Mr. Brezhnev's funeral, attention was "focused on the presence of Mr. Huang Hua, China's Foreign Minister and the highest ranking Chinese politician to visit Moscow since the Sino-Soviet split of 20 years ago" wrote Anthony Robinson in Moscow.

The despatch added that Mr. Huang Hua had described Mr. Brezhnev as "an outstanding statesman" and had noted that "the Chinese people sincerely hope for a genuine improvement of relations through the removal of obstacles and that these relations will return to normal step by step".

From Peking, Frank Ching, China correspondent of the ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL sent the following report which was headlined "China reverses attitude, Praises Leonid Brezhnev":

In a dramatic reversal of earlier attitudes, high Chinese officials have turned out to mourn late Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, the man they had denounced for years as being the head of the "Soviet revisionists," "Soviet social imperialists" and "Soviet hegemonists."

Seizing the opportunity offered by Mr. Brezhnev's death, the Chinese have expressed a desire for an improvement in relations between the two countries. Foreign minister Huang Hua, who has been sent to Moscow to represent China at Mr. Brezhnev's funeral on Monday, voiced the hope for "a genuine improvement in relations."

Mr. Huang, whose rank is equivalent to that of vice premier, also went to the Soviet Embassy here Sunday to extend his condolences. Ulanhu, a vice chairman of the National People's Congress, China's parliament, accompanied Mr. Huang.

'Traditional Friendship'

In a conversation with Soviet Ambassador I. S. Shcherbakov, Mr. Ulanhu said the Chinese and Soviet peoples "share a traditional friendship" and China hopes "our two countries will move toward normalization step by step."

Mr. Huang, in an interview with the official Xinhua news agency before his departure for Moscow, heaped unwonted praise on the late Soviet president, calling him "an outstanding statesman." Mr.

Brezhnev, who died on Wednesday, had led the Soviet Union for 18 years after ousting Nikita S. Khrushchev.

Tracing the development of Sino-Soviet relations, Mr. Huang said they "were good in the early 1950s" and "began deteriorating in the late 1950s" under Mr. Khrushchev. And "by the late 1960s, this deterioration reached a serious stage," Mr. Huang said. In 1969, the two countries had a short but bloody border dispute.

FOREIGN NEWS

Mr. Huang didn't blame either Mr. Brezhnev or the Soviet Union for this deterioration. Instead, he said: "Not long before his death, President Brezhnev in several speeches expressed the wish; to work for the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations. The Chinese government and people appreciate these speeches."

First Public Praise

This was the first public praise by China for a Soviet leader in a long time.

ANDROPOV: A political profile

The appointment of a former security chief with strong military ties underlines the perceived need in Moscow for a strong Leader to deal with mounting economic problems and to handle relations with the West at time of increased military competition and mutual suspicion," writes Financial Times correspondent Anthony Robinson from Moscow.

In his militant acceptance speech Mr. Andropov backed up a call for vigilance and hard work at home with an uncompromising message for the West. He said: "We know full well the imperialists will never meet one's pleas for peace. It can be upheld only by resting on the invincible might of the Soviet armed forces."

Mr. Andropov has travelled more in Eastern Europe, met and negotiated with more party and intelligence service leaders of Soviet-allied countries, than any of his erstwhile rivals for the top Kremlin job, writes **David Buchan**, East Europe correspondent of the Financial Times.

Last May, when he became a secretary to the Party Central Committee on leaving the KGB, he took on the portfolio left by the late Mikhail Suslov, of prime responsibility for dealing with foreign Communist parties.

Most intriguing at a time when the Chinese are once again willing to talk to the Soviet Union, he is the

only current Russian leader to have travelled to China, before the 1960 Sino Soviet spilt.

But breadth of experience and travel have not softened Mr. Andropov's orthodoxy, comments correspondent Buchan.

Mr. Audropov, as head of security, cultivated close contacts with the military and apparently enjoys close relations with both Defence Minister Ustinov and his deputy, Chief of Staff Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, writes Anthony Robinson, who goes on to say that given the increasing weight of the military in Soviet life, including within the party itself, their support together with that of the powerful security apparatus, could well have been the decisive factor in the leadership struggle.

This is especially so at a time when the military feel under pressure from Nato and the Americans and when they believe a firm hand is needed to stamp out corruption and tighten labour discipline in order to reverse the slowdown in economic growth and raise labour productivity.

"This is the message which an Andropov leadership could be expected to put forward. In this country, this message with its hints of a return to neo-Stalinist discipline and sacrifice in the name of strength, security and order, could even become popular," concludes the Financial Times' Anthony Robinson.

The generals give - up

THIRTY years after the 1952 revolution, of which he was an architect and which constituted the second major political change in Latin America after the Mexican revolution, Hernan Siles Zuazo is back in the saddle in Bolivia, leading a left-wing coalition which includes the Communist Party and barely mellowed supporters of the guerrillas.

Though anticipated for weeks, the event is no less surprising in a country where for decades the military have been the law, eliminating opponents, smothering miners and peasants revolts in blood and using their power to run very profitable rackets, the latest being cocaine trafficking.

Siles Zuazo had won general elections three years running, and each time he had been prevented from assuming the presidency by fraud or military coups. The last coup d'etat took place, in fact, in July 1980. It put into the presidential office an especially brutal and cynical general cast in the same mould as the men who 13 years earlier had captured Che Guevara with CIA help and killed him. It was the Bolivian congress, which was elected two years ago but had never met until now, which chose the 70 year-old exiled leader of the Popular Democratic Union (UDP) as President of Bolivia at a highly critical point in its history.

For if the military have abruptly decided to step down, it is surely not because they have unexpectedly recovered a taste for democracy. As everywhere else in Latin America — yesterday it was in Peru tomorrow it might well be Argentina — generals hand over power only because they fail to come to grips with their countries social and economic situation.

In five months the Bolivian peso has lost 900 per cent of its value against the dollar, inflation is running at 200 per cent a year, and there is a shortage of basic foodstuffs in many provincial towns. Last month the Bolivian leaders were unable to meet the country's foreign debt servicing obligations. Doubtless the situation stems in part from the world crisis, but it is also the result of the military regime's incompetence, for Bolivia is not without natural resources, producing both tin and oil and raising upto four crops a year.

The generals decided to hand over the reins of government to civilians on the eve of an open-ended general strike ordered by the powerful Bolivian labour federation, COB. The Left assumed from this—and it's fair enough—that the people had forced the army to restore democracy. But the question may be asked whether the United States did not also lean on the military leaders to step down—leaders who have extended the drug smuggling racket to the US and bankrupted a country in which Washington has many interests.

The task before Siles Zuazo borders on the impossible. If he is to clean up the army and rid it of politics, as he says he wants to do, then he will have to reshuffle the high command and run the risk of laying himself open to a "barracks coup". If he wants to win his foreign creditors understanding, he will have to follow the IMF's recommendations and adopt austerity measures likely to alienate the support of this main followers, the working class. Bolivia is a quite difficult country to govern on the left as on the right.

- Le Monde

Nestle bows to WHO pressure

WASHINGTON

estle, the world's largest manufacturer of infant food formula, has adopted "comprehensive" changes in its "third world" marketing policies which appear to bring it in line with World Health Organization guidelines, according to former Senator Edmund S. Muskie, D-Maine.

But leaders of a five-year international boycott against Nestle products said that while the changes represented a "few more steps forward", they were still not sufficient to meet the code and vowed to continue their fight.

Muskie, who chairs an outside commission set up by Nestle to monitor the Swiss company's compliance with the WHO infant formula marketing code, said that the company has "responded fully" to recommendations from his commission to improve its sale instructions to Nestle representatives around the world.

The former Carter administration secretary of state said that he would now turn his attention to watching Nestles "performance in the field" in modifying aggressive marketing tactics that critics say encourged mothers in developing countries to switch from breast to bottle feeding.

"We will judge Nestle by what it does in the field," said Leah Margulies, who chairs the infant Formula Action Coalition (INFACT) board, a grass-roots group that co-ordinates the Nestle boycott supported by more than 100 national groups.

Nestle is the only major infant formula company that has outlined its intentions to comply with the voluntary WHO "International Code of Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes," which was passed by a 118–1 vote by the United Nations in 1981. The United States cast the dissenting vote.

After announcing its intentions to comply with the code, Nestle sent instructions to its staff interpreting the code earlier this year, but its interpretation came under criticism

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Che was neither utopian nor adventurist

Ramiro Valdes

he's own origins, the very fact that the young man born in Argentina to a middle-class family, having made contact with the reality and the suffering of the continent's peoples, developed his thinking to such an extent that he became a conscientious revolutionary is eloquent proof that in our times every honest, sensitive, responsible person will necessarily embrace the ideas of revolution and socialism.

It is imperialism and its system of exploitation and crime that create the conditions for the ever-increasing number of revolutionaries.

One of the things that drew our attention from the very begining was Che's capacity, despite his background and education, to identify with the illiterate peasants and humble workers that made up the bulk of our troops and our social environment.

Che always paid particular attention to the problems of the organization of the Party, especially the characteristics the members of the communist vanguard should have. A staunch enemy of formalism, bureaucracy and neglect of the masses, Che insisted that Marxists should be, above all, human beings capable of displaying the highest degree of comradeship, identification with the workers, concern for their families and children; people capable of reacting forcefully in the face of injustices committed anywhere in the world and who accept as their own the phrase by Marti which Che himself so often quoted: "Every true man ought to feel on his own cheek the blow dealt to the cheek of any other man.'

Socialism, he used to say, cannot just be a new form of distribution. . It must change man himself, develop

Che Guevara's death in October 1967, was welcomed by the entire global status quo. On the Left too, the traditional C.P's the Maoists and the Trotskyists, rejected his ideas as utopian, adventuristic and petty-bourgeois. They even denied that he was a Marxist-Leninist. In Sri Lanka, the CPSL and Mr.Shanmugathasan's CCP, in a rare display of accord carried on an ideological struggle against 'Guevarism'. In the post 1977 period, the JVP, which once had incorrectly been dubbed 'Cuevarist' by the media, rejected his ideas and theories while expressing admiration for him as an internationalist.

After the ideological struggles with the CPs in the late 1960's, Cuba too was forced to mute its defence of Che somewhat, from 1970 onwards, because of the failure of the Continenent, guerrilla struggles. This October, on the 15th Death Anniversary, the Cuban Minister of the Interior and Politbureau Member Major Ramiro Valdes made a staunch defence and reiteration of Che's theories on socialist construction, peaceful co-existence and armed revolution. The true significance of this must be seen in the new setting of intensified struggle in Central America, the onset of the New Cold War, the virtual collapse of US-USSR detente, the Polish crisis, and of course the deepening world capitalist crisis.

a new attitude towards life, work, society and the world. Many of the most important ideas which Che left us in his writings are aimed at contributing to solving this complex task. Che was not utopian in any sense. As a Marxist-Leninist, he recognized the need for socialism its principles and the application of the formula of distribution according to work done. Anyone can easily confirm this by analyzing his organisational efforts and theoritical statements. And yet with his great intelligence he didn't overlook inevitable contra-

ditions inherent in these socialist principles. He was concerned about the same problems which Fidel has discussed in detail lately, namely, that the need to use material incentives to encourage production and boost productivity, the need for using the monetary and mercantile mechanisms, cannot become a renunciation of a truely communist awareness, cannot mortgage the hope to advance toward a genuinely superior form of humanity, cannot become an open door to selfishness, individualism, lust for profits and even corruption.

The most important and significant thing about the ideas which Che formulated was that he clearly grasped that moral factors play a vital role in the process of building new society.

He understood that a people such as ours facing a long battle against U. S. imperialism could have no stronger defence than its morale, diginity, patriotism and political and revolutionary awareness.

He foresaw that when the imperialists could not destroy us by force or economic aggression they would resort to displays of their material wealth and try to undermine and corrupt the spirit of our people.

He was not only the fighter who went to the Congo and Bolivia, leaving behind family, responsibilities and honors. He gave us the most inspiring lesson of unselfishness, stoicism and internationalist spirit known.

Fifteen years after his death, what we most value in Che is that his ideas remain valid and are being confirmed by historical experience.

As more time passes and more events take place on the international political and economic scene, our respect and admiration increase for the impressive manner in which Che was able to predict the future.

Now — when the world is gripped by the worst economic crisis in the last 50 years, when the consequences of this state of affairs have a devastating impact on the underdeveloped countries, when the nations of Latin America have become the most debt ridden in the world, with a debt of 240,000 million dollars; when the region's economic growth is the lowest in the last three decades; and when many countries are on the brink of ruin or in a dead-end situation in which they can just barely pay for the oil they need, all of Che's speeches and articles analyzing and explaining the need to bring about a profound change in the structure of our hemisphere and the world take on a prophetic quality.

In the period when imperialism was still trying to fool our peoples with the illusion of an Alliance for Prospress, Che explained that the very nature of the monopoly system and the type of economic relations existing between the United States and the Latin American countries would transform that reformist and neo-colonialist program into a huge swindle of the peoples of the region.

He said that if there is no genuine liberation, if political power is not in the hands of the working masses, if the people do not become the owners of their own wealth, no plan can sura the ill that plagues the economics of Latin America.

The situation he envisaged was so urgent that the peoples had no alternative but to struggle for their liberation, to throw off imperialist dominantion and battle with all their might to overcome the economic, scientific and technical backwardness of centuries.

He rightly noted that the struggle for peace was firmly linked to the mobilization of the peoples against the common enemy. International solidarity and the solution of the vital economic demands raised by the poorest and most exploited nations.

All these problems which now plague the world — the worsening of unequal terms of trade, financial and technological dependency, unbearable indebtedness, the imperialist arms race, the imperialist tendency to take the most reactionary, arrogant and aggressive positions., to the extent that the crisis of the system becomes more acute — were predicted by Che with amazing foresight.

The ideals for which he gave his life had nothing to do with adventurism: they were based on a profound and objective reflection of the world reality.

Of course, he was a man accustomed to turning his ideas into action.

He could have died in Cuba at the start of our struggle but he died in Bolivia years later. And just as his death in our country would not have meant that the path he took was mistaken and futile, his death in Bolivia does not mean the failure of his ideas.

That is the conclusion the imperialists tried to promote claiming that Che's death showed it was not possible for new popular movements to carry out an insurrection and be victorious.

But not many years passed and one day on a small island in the Caribbean, an armed vanguard with the resolute support of the people ended the brutal regime, and brave Grenada started to advance along the path of Revolution.

A few months later it was heroic Nicaragua's turn.

Under the leadership of the Sandinista National Liberation Front, the Nicaraguan, people victoriously concluded its insurrection against the Somoza regime. Our America again witnessed days which recalled those of 20 years ago in January 1959.

Now the imperialist rulers again say that there will be no more revolutions and crimanally travel the path of counter-revolution and the intervention against the peoples of Central America and other parts of the world.

Cuba maintains its willingness to work for a negotiated political solution which will bring peace and tranquility to the peoples of Central America.

The imperialists are the ones who insist on a military solution.

On the other hand, we know one thing: that with or without a political solution, nothing can prevent the realization of the aspirations of the peoples of El Salvador and Guatemala for peace, justice and freedom.

The imperialists are unable to stop the advance of human society or extinguish just and legitimate demands.

If there was a single reason for Che's profound and constant optimism, it was certainty provided by his own experience that the death of indiziduals does not mean the death of their cause and that the example of heroes becomes a breeding ground for new leaders revolutionary fighters.

Che represents the future. His banners were not buried in Bolivia; they flutter in the wind in our lands with a message of inspiration and hope for all peoples who face tyranny and oppression.

This is the tribute truly worthy of his greatness. This only thing that could compensate for the fact that he is no longer with us. This is the only revolutionary way to be true his memory and his example. This is the only way in which, today and tomorrow, we can honour Che and all the heroes who fought and died with him and in which we can proclaim him absolute confidence in the future: — Ever onward to Victory!"

Nestle bows . . .

(Continued from page 14)

from the boycott groups as well as the United Nations Children's Fund.

Muskie said that changes Nestle adopted will discourage independent retail marketers from promoting infant formula at any point-ofsale, apply the code for us by children of any age rather than just babies under 5 months of age as critics had charged, provide free or reduced-cost supplies of infant formula only to infants who cannot breast-feed, stop routine provision of infant formula samples to health workers for their own children and clarify that there should be no advertising or other forms of promotion of infant formula to mothers. pregnant women or the general public.

- Washington Post

Islamic revivalism in harmony and conflict

Dr. Ameer Ali

The recent upsurge of Islamic revivalism which swept through the Muslim world has added more to the latter's problems than providing solutions to the existing ones. The problems it created and infact the nature of the revivalist movement itself have varied from country to country depending on the latter's political, economic, and social conditions. This paper intends to examine the shape of Islamic revivalism and its consequences in two countries, Sri Lanka and Malaysia, between which their are several contrasting structural differences.

The Environment — A Contrast:

In terms of its economic resources and GNP per capita, Sri Lanka is one of the poorer nations in contemporary Third World. With tea as the main source of exports, which accounts for more than 50 percent of the export revenue, without any significant mineral or oil deposits and with a total population of nearly 15 million people, increasing annually at the rate of about 2 percent, the island's economy is struggling hard to survive. The World Bank sources estimate Sri Lanka's GNP per capita for 1981 as \$230 and according to another survey the country ranks 116th in a total of 145 countries in terms of their GNP per capita. If the current inflation and unemployment are added to this picture, Sri Lanka's economic difficulties become clearly evident.

Malaysia on the other hand is one of the richer countries in the Third World. With a total population of nearly 14 million and a GNP per capita of \$1,370 it ranks 65th in the survey mentioned above. It has a diversified export sector based chiefly on rubber, palm oil, tin, timber and petroleum. The

low unemployment rate of 5.3 percent in 1980 and its lower rate of inflation than Sri Lanka between 1975 and 1980, give further indications to her economic strength.

With regard to the population structure both countries have a multi-racial and multi-religious society. However, while the Muslims in Sri Lanka form only about 7 percent of the country's population, their counterparts in Malaysia add up to between 44 and 54 percent. It is difficult to get a clear picture

Indonesia and least from the Indian subcontinent, the order is reversed in the case of Sri Lanka which receives most of its inspirations from neighbouring South India and some from the Middle-East and none at all from Indonesia. In other words a ruling religion in the Middle-East and Indonesia influences a ruling religion in Malaysia, and a subject religion in India influences a subject religion in Sri Lanka. Naturally, the force of that influence has to be different between the two countries.

The experience in Sri Lanka

and Malaysia

of the religious distribution of the Malaysian population. The official view is that all Malays are Muslims and since the latter is about 54 percent of the population, it is claimed that Malaysia is a Muslim majority country. But in practice all Malays are not Muslims. There are a considerable number of animists amongst the Malays who can be called at best "statistics Muslims". Nevertheless, what is important for our purpose is the fact that the Muslims are a ruling community in Malaysia with Islam being the state religion. In Sri Lanka on the other hand, Muslims are a community without any special constitutional status to their religion. Both groups are of the Shafiite school of the Sunni sect.

There is also another difference between the two groups with regard to religion which plays a crucial role in the revivalist movement. While the sources of religious inspiration and influence in Malaysia come mostly from the Arab Middle-East and neighbouring

There is also a political difference which determines the shape of Islamic revivalism between the two countries. In Sri Lanka since the Muslims are a minority and since they are a scattered settlement living in all parts of the island, there is less possibility of the community organising itself into a single political group to fight for its rights or for a particular share of the country's economic cake. The fact that there has been no Muslim political party in Sri Lanka illustrates this argument, The strategy which the community has adopted so far has been to join hands with the majority parties and try to win concessions from whichever the government that comes to power. The position is reversed in Malaysia. The Malays, according to Mohamad Mahathir, the present Prime Minister, are the "definitive people" and "if citizenship is conferred on races other than Malays, it is because the Malays, consent it is because the Malays consent to this. That consent is conditional." Thus, having established Islam as the state religion and having defined

the Malays = Muslims as the only definitive people, one cannot then stop a group of Muslims from entering the political arena with the sole intention of shaping the seciety's political and economic structure based on the religious principles,

Finally, the difference in the temperament and character of the two groups of Muslims also should not be ignored in discussing the environmental factors. In Sri Lanka the Muslims are noted for their enterpreneurship and hardwork. They are considered to be the most business minded community of all in that country. Because of this they always prefer a freemarket capitalist economy rather than a state controlled socialistic type. This explains their traditional support to the ruling United National Party.

In Malaysia on the other hand, the Malays, are considered to be less enterprising and therefore economically retarded and left far behind the other races in terms of economic achievements. (Mahathir attributes this to the Malay ethnic trait) This means in a free enterprise system the Muslims stand to lose in Malaysia. Even though the Malaysian government publicly announces its commitment to a free enterprise system, yet in practice it adopts a mixed economic model with increasing role to the state.

Thus the recent revivalist movements in Sri Lanka and Malaysia emerged in the context of two contrasting political, economic and socio-cultural environments. In the former it was a movement within a minority commuity without organized political parties, but living in a poor economy with a strong preference to operate under a capitalist economic framework; whereas in the latter, it is a movement within the ruling community, politically organized into several groupings and living in a rich economy but within a state controlled economic framework. These environmental factors play a crucial role in shaping the character of the revivalist movement in two coun-

The Nature of the Islamic Revivalism: A General Picture

The Islamic revival that ushered in the seventies was a combined product of there events of great significance: the partial victory of Egypt in the Ramadhan/Yomkippur war of 1973, the formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) with its Arab forming a subgroup (OAPEC), and the success of the Iranian revolution in 1979. All of shese events contained in common an element of aggression. Nevertheless, the revivalist movement that emerged out of them developed into two contrasting types, the iman-centred and the umma-centred movements, each in turn taking either a radical or a moderate image depending on the praticular socio-political environment in which it operated.

The ideals of the iman-centred movement is simply the self-purification of Muslims both spiritually and temporally so that they could build up a stronger iman of faith. According to this view, the summation of all purified souls will lead to a purified society. This approach to social change akins to the philosophy of the Benthamites who also believed that the greatest happiness of the greatest number could be achieved through the pursuit of individual happiness. If the existing Muslim state is corrupt or unislamic, the way to change it is not through organized revolution but through a change in the character of its subjects. Once the people become true Muslims then Allah will cause the downfall of the corrupt.

This philosophy of iman-centred revivalism determines the nature of its activities. Its followers are chiefly engaged in tabligh or missionary work by which they are less interested in winning new converts to Islam than in making the existing members of the faith more Islamic. Instructing the umma or the community to follow strictly the five pillars of Islam, teaching the young the basic principles of the religion, constructing mosques and establishing madrasas or Quran

schools, and endeavouring to change the curriculum in schools with a bias towards religion are some of the activities of this group. They lead a simple life with less desire for material advancement and their movement is essentially non-political in character.

In contrast to this, the ideal of the umma-centred movement is not only the self-purification of Muslims as individuals but also the purification of the snciety as an organized unit and of its supreme organ the state. The organizational transformation should go hand in hand with individual change rather than for the latter to proceed ahead of the former. According to this view, an inappropriate or unislamic environment is an impediment to the development of a strong iman. This philosophy thus leads naturally to organized action to change the environment. Islam in the hands of this group becomes a serious socio-economic alternative to the Western and Marxist development strategies. The activities of the umma-centred group therefore turn out to be political in nature and they do not necessarily confine to peaceful changes through parliamentary tactics but even extend their strategy to include a violent overthrow of existing regimes. To these radicals the end justifies means.

Even though both groups derive their ideological strength and arguments from the holy scriptures depending on how one interprets their content, yet on the Muslim international front the sympathies and support for their cause come from different groups of countries and organizations. Generally speaking while Libya, Iran, Syria and the PLO support the umma-centred, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and the Rabita — an organization mainly by Saudi Arabia and functions to propagate the message of throughout the world support the iman-centred. While the type of support to both groups takes the form of finance, educational scholarships and technological equipment that to the former includes even armaments.

NEXT: Revivalism in S. L.

Strategy of confrontation

Jan Nederveen Pieterse

If a strategy of reform is unlikely to contribute in a significant way to the liberation of the Third World from domination, then what is the alternative? The alternative apart of course from just muddling through, is to engage in a strategy of confrontation.

Up to a point North-South relations in the 20th century can be compared to the relations between capital and labour in the industrial societies in the 19th century. Gradually, labour obtained a better share in the deal. This took the form of civil rights, in the political sphere, and further labour legislation, union recognition, higher wages and generally improved labour conditions such as shorter working hours, safer working conditions and social security benefits. These improvements were not obtained 'just like that'. Each and everyone of these advances was fought for. They were not just handed out upon the blissful perception of a complementarity of interest between capital and labour. The battle itself was a long drawn out process involving stages of organisation, setting up unions and workers parties, clarifi-cation of aims, and engaging in action. Without having organized themselves workers would not have been able to carry off strikes, without organizing strikes they would not have been able to back up their demands with sanctions. The ability to strike, to with hold their services, was one of their weapons in the battle. This struggle between capital and labour has not ended, at most it can be said that a truce has been established, and a fragile one at that. New phases emerge, such as workers say in management and profit sharing, while the larger issue of the tension bet-ween capital and labour remains and the battle continues.

Present North-South relations should be looked at in a similar light. There is, given global

economic interdependence, potential for complementarity of interests. But rates of development being different for different areas, one party is so much weaker that it can be manipulated indefinitely by the other, so that the theory interdependence works out in the practice of dependence. Capital, technology, management skills, scientific knowledge and military strength are overwhelmingly concentrated in the North. What the countries in the South have to offer — with the exception of the oil-producing nations and some of the newly industrialising countries — are raw materials, cheap labour, a limited potential market, and here and there a strategic foothold. Under these conditions, if it is a matter of relying on a fair and merciful attitude on the part of the stronger party for a mutually satisfactory arrangement to be reached, then one can wait until hell freezes over.

And Third World countries are in no position to withhold what they have to offer. Politically and economically they are too dependent continuously queuing for the next handout in aid, loans or investment a handout which, in most cases, will deepen their dependency. They can't afford not to sell their primary commodities because they are in immediate need of the revenues and besides they would not risk the retaliatory withdrawal of credits that might follow. They are too deeply implicated in the capitalist system. To engage in a strategy of confrontation, under these circumstances, would seem to be an impossible undertaking. Still it must be remembered how workers in the capitalist societies in the 19th century possessed nothing but their labour — but their labour was indispensable to the system. Likewise Third World countries may have nothing to offer but their raw materials — yet these are indispensable to the developed capitalist

economics. The same holds, on a longer time scale, for their markets.


The difference between one class of workers in one nation and many nations of many classes within and among them is so huge that, obviously, an equation of the type North/capital — South/labour would be grossly misleading. Third World countries have in no way attained the degree of unity and clarity of purpose that enabled workers, back then, to improve their collective lot, and it is no wonder that they have not. Still the potential is there and here an attempt will be made to give an impression, in a brief sketch, of what a strategy of con-frontation with the developed capitalist economies, a strategy of col-lective self-reliance, would involve. The major steps in this strategy

- * Reducing dependency
- Delinking
- Commodity power
- Third World cooperation
- * Revolution


Reducing Dependency

The first and basic step in building bargaining strength is to reduce dependency. The navelstring with the old metropolises needs to be cut, the smokescreen of so-called foreign aid needs to be seen through just as workers in 19th century capitalism could not possibly make any progress unless they refused the handouts of charity and severed the bonds of patronage that existed between them and the ruling class. Dependency, at this stage, is one of the root problems of underdevelopment. Dependency exists in numerous forms which have been extensively discussed by the dependencia theorists such as Frank, Dos Santos, Furtado, Cardoso and Amin. Here it may suffice to list briefly some of the major forms of dependency.

(Continued on page 21)



වසර 1500 ක් පැරණි, සිරිලක් ශී විභූතියේ ජීවමාන සංකේතවූ, එද රජදරුවන් පිහිටෙව් යෝධ වැව්-අමුණු අදත් අප ජනජීවිතයේ සෞභාගයයට දිරිදෙනි.



සී. අයි. සී. සමාගම සිය ලෝකවායම්ත විවිධ විදාා නිපුනතාවයන් ශී ලංකාවේ ගොවිකම් හා කර්මාන්ත අංශයන්ට හරවයි. ඒ විපුල නිපුනතා කුඹුරේ සිට කර්මාන්ත ශාලාවේත් වතුකරයේ සිට ගෙපැලේ රටා වියන දුතේත් දිස්වේ.

එවන් ආදි දයාදයන් අප ජිවනය නියත වශයෙන්ම උසස් කිරීමට විදුහාකාර්මික ක්ෂේතුයේ ජයගුහණයක් වූ මහවැලි හැරවීමේ වාහපාරය සමග අත්වැල් බැඳ අනාගත සෞභාගාය කරා ගලායයි.



क्ट्र ग्रेट्ट शैंसकार्ग СІС හිපැයුම් දියුණුවක් ඉසුරුමත් දිව්පෙවතක් සළසයි

ell state of the line

Strategy . . .

(Continued from page 19)

There is, of course, dependency on foreign capital and foreign aid. Dependency may manifest itself also in an emphasis on foreign trade where it leads to an export-led concept of growth, dependent on external demand, and to food imports to compensate for the concentration on cash crop cultivation. Debt services and various capital transfers such as profit remittances by foreign investors, and invisible services such as shipping and insurance, are also known to be drains on the balance of payments of Third World countries. Dependence on foreign technology forms a chapter all by itself. It goes together with dependency in terms of information, scientific knowledge and Research & Development. And with dependency in terms of means of communication, the press and other mass media. This is a part of the pervasive phenomenon of cultural dependency, as it ranges from consumption patterns to the colonialism of the mind, and adds up to alienation. Finally, summing up the whole alphabet of forms of dependency, there is political dependency making Third World peoples, at times reluctant, but on the whole serviceable allies of one or another camp or metropolis in the developed world.

By contrast to the theory that correlates underdevelopment with dependence, some have argued that in fact dependence promotes development: 'what one observes increasingly throughout the Third World is a correlation of dependence and development'. The author notes that 'multinationalism permits develop-ment while at the same time maintains a pattern of benign dependence'. (Horowitz 1977, 210) It reminds one of the peculiar habit of IMF and World Bank experts to present the most distorted and throughly plundered economics, such as Ivory Coast, as success stories. Indeed they are success stories from the point of view of foreign investment. Typical cases in point are the cheap labour, industrial economics of the South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong type. Undoubtedly there is growth in these countries but to cite them as examples of development one must overlook a few points:

- (I) There tends to be a large and often widening inequality of income distribution; as in the case of Indonesia where burgeoning growth in export industries was accompanied, due to the capital intensive technology used, by declining incomes for the mass of the population (New Internationalist Dec' 79).
- (2) There tends to be 'enclave development', often marked by 'technical dualism' vis a vis the rest of the economy. This manifests itself also in regional disparity, eg the extreme poverty of Brazil's Nordeste.
- (3) In order to attract foreign capital (not easy during this period of economic crisis) wages are kept artificially low and labour organization must be repressed, as in Liberia's Free Trade Zone. Labour unrest is not taken kindly, as recent events in South Korea, Taiwan and Liberia testify. There tends to be a collusion between the military and foreign capital, eg between General Suharto and the so-called Berkeley mafia, and in various instances in Asia and Latin America. In addition to political repression, torture may be used, sometimes as in the Shah's Iran after foreign design.
- (4) Domestic demand tends to remain undeveloped as a consequence of the unequal income distribution, manufacture is export-oriented, thus the dynamics of the economy fails to be internal, autonomous, which is the hallmark of dependence.
- (5) To what extent the growth that occurs must be accounted to the developing nations or to the transnational enterprises operating in them is an interesting question. Overall figures for 1970 on the share of American transnational corporations' affiliates in the exports of Latin America rate it at 367, for Africa and Asia (excluding Japan) at 27%. (Cf Nabudere 1978, 206)
- (6) The situation in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and to some extent also India must be considered from another point of view. These countries went through a stage of import substitution industrialisation during the 30s and 40s, combined with progressive populist policies that

made the income distribution less unequal, creating a domestic market for home made products. Thus, observes Frank, they have reached a level of capital accumulation that is substantially different from most of the Third World and that enables them now to re-enter the international division of labour on a new footing, as exporters of manufactures not only of the consumer variety but also, in the case of Brazil, of capital goods. (Frank 1976) Their present level of development must therefore not be attributed to the 'benign dependence' brought by multinationalism but on the contrary to their delinking from the Western economics, induced from the outside by Depression and war. The oil-rich countries belong of course, to a different category

Dependence, then, has got its own economics — the economics of dependent capitalism and of a dependent bourgeoisie that thrives in the orbit of foreign connections. Dependency has its own politics, the politics of collusion. It has its own psycology, a chapter added to the psychology of the colonized as Fanon described it, a chapter on the psychology of the neocolonized expanding on the continuing story of inferiority and indeed paronia in the face of the overwhelming power of the developed nations. Dependence has its own culture, an amazing undergrowth of institutions — in administration, education — left behind in the metropolises but still flourishing in the neocolonies. Indeed dependence has its own traditions and legends (when the white man was still here'); it is in addition to a political economy, a climate of opinion, a mentality, a view of the world, that gets confirmed and reconstituted with every new act of dependence.

Dependency, like a morass, is no foundation for real development. It spells passivity, lack of opportunity, lack of intiative, lack of confidence and self-respect, lack of progress along every step of the way. It needs to be eradicated, infrastructure and superstructure, root and branch, before there can be any real progress that one can call one's own. One method for doing so is delinking.

Delinking

That no real development would be possible without breaking away from the imperialist system, without delinking from the capitalist world economy, is a frequent conclusion from the analysis of dependency. There is not as much clarity about what exactly is meant by delinking. Would it mean cutting alloties with capitalism?

According to one scheme delinking is conceived as closure, as closing the country off from ties with the capitalist world system. Daniel Chirot advocates the following steps: (1) To protect infant industries, keep out foreign finished products. (2) To concentrate the use of resources for domestic investment, keep out foreign luxury goods. (3) To keep consumption demands from rising, keep out cultural imports, ie mass media, advertisements etc. (4) To control political unrest on the part of the frustrated bourgeoisie and also of the general population that will have make do with low wages during the period of industrialisation, harden the state, also to end corruption and laxity. (5) To make the development effort possible, adopt an ideology of nationalistic agalitarian puritanism. Examples he has in mind are the USSR in the 30s, Chima, North Korea and Vietnam. 'The price paid is high: but the price of inaction, the terms of persisting poverty and dependence, is often higher in the long run.' (Chirot 1977, Ch 7) Chirot, then, is mainly concerned with imports, he doesn't talk about exports.

There are a few reasons why complete delinking is not a practiable option. The present period does not allow for a no-trade policy simply because of the high price of oil. This is one sideeffect of OPEC, on the one hand it represents a milestone in the emancipation of the Third World and on the other it has plunged the poorer countries into the basement of the bankruptcy. In effect, it has made for an integration upon another level of the capitalist world system, because it leaves the poorer developing countries no choice but to seek cash on the world market to finance their energy requirements, and because OPEC

oil earnings are largely recycled back into the system via Western banks that relend them. In addition, exports are necessary to obtain foreign exchange to purchase technology. Self-reliance does not mean that one can do without imported technology altogether. Finally, delinking in the sense of a ban on trade with the capitalist market is a misconception. Historically, nations that have chosen to follow the path of self reliance such as China and Vietnam have not stopped trading with the West but combined a dedication to self-reliance with an active trade policy. When the Soviet Union stopped trade with the West it was more a result of the blockade imposed from the outside than of a decision of its own making. Among socialist countries, possibly only Albania adheres to a no-trade policy with the West. Alejandro 1978, 108).

So delinking in the sense of a complete severance of ties with capitalism is not a viable nor a necessary line of action. But a case can be made for selective delinking. The outlines of a selective delinking strategy will be briefly indicated here (following Diaz-Alejandro 1978 and Amin 1979).

Foreign trade must be brought under central control and planned, in combination with strict exchange control. Exports must be promoted only insofar as imports are required by plan. Basic need should not be at the mercy of external supply, priority must be given to local production, and to the extent that imports are required purchases must be geographically diversified and ample locally controlled stocks must be provided for. Preference must be given to trade relations with other Third World countries and these relations should be direct, not via capitalist centres. Exports should be diversified and preferably oriented towards competitive markets rather than markets under tight control of multinationals. Rusiness associate must be kept independent from each other.

As to finance, the groundrule is that domestic savings must be the basis of capital information. No

concessional finance from abroad must be accepted under special circumstances. China paid for its imports in cash, so it incurred no foreign debt; here self-reliance referred more to finance than to trade. In present China of the counter-Cultural Revolution, its policy has changed: from a lender, to Third World countries, it has become a borrower, seeking Western loans and assistance to support its modernization programme. Most Third World countries are now facing balance of payment crises, due mostly to their energy bill, and to debt services on previous loans, in a context of decreased export revenues on account of the global economic recession. Besides inflation in the West adds to the price of their imports. Thus they are not in a position to observe the groundrule of financial self-reliance. At the same time relations between the IMF and the Third World are troubled, witness Nyerere's and Manley's refusal to accept any more IMF supportcum-conditions.

A solution might lie in the direction of establishing direct financial links between developing oilproducing and developing oil-consuming nations. Already some bilateral credit arrangements exist for oil purchases. These could be extended in the sense that money paid for petrol is lent back, on fair terms, to be used for development purposes. Payments in kind, in raw materials or in intermediate or finished products, as the Fast bloc countries accept, are another possibility. These relations could also be 'multilateralised' since OPEC, earlier this year, established a, reorganized, bureau for international development which is to engage in its own development projects are strategies (Aspecten, 1980, 1).

(To be continued)

Systems...

(Continued from page 7)

In Indonesia, GOLKAR is the "political vehicle of the armed forces" GOLKAR has a built—in majority at all times. The two legally permitted opposition parties can contest polls, under rigid rules, but can never win a majority even if they unite. Nor is that possible in Malaysia. Kassim calls this "consensus politics".

Indian Ocean . . .

(Continued from page 12)

'Islamic bomb', especially in the aftermath of Israel's destruction of Iraq's nuclear reactor plant in June 1981.

Despite these developments, India has consistently supported the proposal to make the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace. India did not react positively to Pakistan's proposal in the UN's Political Committee in late 1975 to make South Asia a nuclear weapons free zone. According to the Indian delegate, a nuclear-free zone "cannot be imposed from outside the region or by one or more States within the region".


On the other hand, it should embrace "an appropriate region of Asia", while the initiative for the creation of such a zone should come from the States of the region concerned taking into account the region's special features and geographical extent.⁶ These terms appear now to be more unacceptable to Pakistan than when they were first expressed in the light of the American arms deal and Pakistan's own advances in the development of nuclear technology. However that may be, both sides seem now to be responding positively, albeit hesitantly, to the idea of a no-war pact, recently revived on Pakistan's own initiative, and it is in progress on this front that an important element of intra-regional rivalry standing in the way of any further intrusions of Big Power presence in the Indian Ocean area, and of subtantive advances towards the concept of the Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone can be expected to be made

NOTES

- 1. See P. R. Chari, "Strategic Situation in the Western Indian Ocean", in Shanti Sadiq Ali and R. R. Ramchandani (ed), Indian and the Western Indian Ocean States (Bombay, 1981), p. 225. This paper contains some excerpts from my Strategic Factors excerpts from my Strategic Factors in Intersate Relations in South Asia (Canberra, 1979).

- (Canberra, 1979).
 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The Myth of Independence (London, 1969), p. 180.
 Mohammed Ayoob, "India and Pakistan: Prospects for Detente" Pacific Community, 8:165, October 1976.
 Bhutto, op. cit, p. 153.
 See, e. g. Special Report in the Indian Weekly Sunday, 11-17 April 1982; quotation from Teheran Times, 26.
- 6. The Hindu, 4 December 1975.

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Presidential election analysis

While agreeing with much that was said in the articles, analysing the Presidential Election, that appeared in the 'Lanka Guardian' of November 1, 1982, I feel that they lack somewhat in depth and contain certain errors and ommisions that should be rectified.

For examble, in 'The SLFP Voter — the other winner', it is stated that 'the SLFP upped its vote by 690, 923'. This is superficially correct, but it does not take into account the fact that Hector Kobbekaduwa was the joint candidate of six parties: SLFP, SLSSP, CPSL, MEP, DNF and DWC. In 1977 the ULF (of which three of the above mentioned parties were parts) polled some 430 000 votes, the MEP a further 22 000. Allowing for this, it is apparent that the increase recorded by the parties backing Kobbekaduwa was closer to 2.5 lakhs than to 7 lakhs.

In 'Press, polls predictions and SLFP's late rush' it is implied that the thousands upon thousands that turned out to the rallies in support of Kobbekaduwa were in fact SLFP supporters. This is only partially correct, for although about half the people who turned out were undoubtedly hardcore SLFP/Front supporters, the rest were simply observers, The electorate had no reason to go to the UNP rallies: the UNP's message had been blared out at them through the mass media for 5 years, UNP propaganda being intensified with the approach of the contest. But the paucity of information from the side of the opposition meant that the voters had to attend Kobbekaduwa's rallies to find out the alternatives to JR's policies.

But perhaps the foreign newsmen can be excused for being deceived by the vast turnout at Kobbekaduwa's rallies, for, as mentioned in the above article, so were the SLFP (and 'Aththa'); it even deceived UNP campaigners and many of the voters themselves.

The saddest part of all this is that the people who turned out to these rallies were not given an alternative to JR's policies. Although the SLFP

SLSSP and MEP had an agreed program (including reviving the Gamsabha system with increased powers to the local councils, workers' selfmanagement and regional autonomy, to mention but a few points), this was not given publicity. While the UNP had on its platforms actors and singers, Kobbekaduwa's platforms were dominated by clowns who, lacking political education, literally 'played to the gallery' (the hardcore supporters tended to be concentrated around the platform). The fact is that many of those on Kobbekaduwa's platforms' observing the vast crowds, imagined the battle already won and were celebrating the expected victory instead of seriously campaigning.

If I might make use of a military simile, the generals were jockeying for position with victory apparently in sight, in the same way as the Allied generals following the Normandy Breakout. The lack of unity pervaded down to the lowest levels, intensifying as the campaign progressed. This, more than anything, demoralise not merely the Left voters' but also many low-level organisers.

The lead article, 'JR's formula for success' while paying a lot of attention to JR's ability as a strategist, was not exactly a deep analysis of the conditions that made JR's victory possible. Although the deprivation of Mrs. B's civic rights was indeed a master-stroke, that alone was not sufficient to ensure the lack of unity in the ranks of the opposition. The above mentioned article also did not pay sufficient attention to the UNP's single most powerful weapon: propaganda concerning the 'return to the shortages'. What won the election was not this strategic brilliance, but the inability of the opposition to effectively counter this propaganda and to present a viable alternative acceptable to the people. Economic issues dominated the mass consciousness, but the opposition failed to take advantage of the opportunity presented to it. Undoubtedly Colvin's 'Law Point' kept voters away from the polls; undoubtedly JR's

advantages of personality, State power and propaganda' had its effect; undoubtedly the SLFP's lack of organisation cost it dear. But the single most important factor was the opposition's failure to present to the masses a viable programmatical alternative.

Considering the progress made by Kobbekaduwa in the North (albeit in the absence of the TULF), where the opposition presented a program that was viable and acceptable to the people, it is clear that a great deal more progress could have been made in the South if the opposition had campaigned on the same basis. The lesson that can be drawn from this is that the opposition was unaware of the aspirations of the masses. The opposition should keep in mind the fact that it cannot continue to take for granted the old 'facts of political life'. Vinod Moonesinghe

Rajagiriya.

(Continued from page 8)

Hold . . .

Referendum is not equivalent to a general election. The proposed Keferendum is a device to prevent the people from electing members of Parliament, on the basis of proportional representation, as required by the present Constitution, next year.

The democratic right of the people, including those who may vote for UNP candidates at a general election, to determine the composition of Parliament by election, even within the restricted framework of the present Constitution, must be defended. This right was incorporated in the Constitution introduced by the UNP Government in 1978. Now, when a general election is due to be held, for the very first time under that Constitution, the UNP Government seeks to deny even that minimal democratic right, through the device of the Referendum.

We demand that the Government END the 'State of Emergency', RESCIND the "Fourth Amendment" DISSOLVE Parliament and HOLD A GENERAL ELECTION!

UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS DAY

34th Anniversary

of

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights

NATIONAL CONVENTION

on 10th December, 1982, at 3-00 p.m.

at

THE NEW TOWN HALL

Colombo 7.

"The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of Government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures."

Declaration of Human Rights: Article 21 (3)

"WE SHALL PROTECT OUR RIGHT TO ELECT OUR OWN MPs"

Dear Rev, Sir Sir/Madam

We have pleasure in inviting you to participate or send delegates of your organisation to the NATIONAL CONVENTION to commemorate UN Human Rights Day on 10th December, 1982 at 3.00 p.m. at THE NEW TOWN HALL COLOMBO 7.

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