

TAMIL VOICE INTERNATIONAL

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Vol. 1 No. 14

1st August, 1988

Peace no closer one year after Sri Lanka accord

Chris Nuttall in Colombo

W HILE the Bofors case
dal - 14/7/88

cord with President Junius
Jayawardene, who sent the Sri
Lankan army meekly back to
its barracks and - - - - -
the cessation of hostilities.
In the days before the sim-
- - - - -


Guardian - 29/7/88

Sri Lanka loses faith in role of Indian troops

By Vijitha Yapa

The anniversary of the signing
Indo-Sri Lanka accord have called for a day of protest

The Times - 30/7/88



NO PEACE IN SRI LANKA

kan army curfew in the south
day to hold h - - - - -

The accord did, of course,
and it - - - - - that it
Guardian - 29/7/88

Quo Vadis? One Year After The Accord.

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Peace day bloodshed

A DAY OF VIOLENCE
erupted throughout Sri
Lanka on the first anniv.

The policeman was injured
in a clash with rebels at De
liatte, also in the south.

Evening Standard - 29/7/88

YOUR VOICE

INDIFFERENCE OF INDIA REVEALS THEIR MORAL GUILT

By R. Jayadevan, Wembley

Let me thank your organisation for the immense contribution you are making to reflect the true feelings of the Tamil people. I lost my mother and brother at the hands of the IPKF in October 1987. It is saddening to read the reaction of the Indian government to the Amnesty International Report which is nothing other than a false statement to hide the truth.

It is surprising to note that the Indian Government did not take any meaningful action to investigate the killings of my dear ones. Even the letters addressed to the Prime Minister of India and the Indian High Commission were never acknowledged. This shows that they are morally guilty of the sins they have committed in our motherland.

What I see now is that India is following the methods adopted by the Sri Lankan Government. I have written again to the Indian High Commission stating my feelings on their indifference and I am sure this too will reach their dustbin. My own feeling is that politically we Tamils have nothing to gain from India; they are in Sri Lanka to better their own interests, and so long as they are there, it will be total annihilation and destruction of our people and property.

I once again wish your organisation well, and call upon the Tamil community to recognise your sincerity and give the maximum support to strengthen your Journal.

A WAR OF PRIDE

By Palani, Madras

May I transmit through your new, but meaningful, Magazine to Mr. Rajiv Gandhi that his pride in not accepting the ground situation is only sinking him and our great India deeper and deeper, day by day, in the eyes of the world.

We Indians should realise our folly of electing a *Pilot*, immature in politics, as our Prime Minister. We have now to rally round and do whatever we can to salvage the good name and prestige of our country that is on the wane, before they sink further.

The Sri Lankan Tamil leader Mr. Prabakaran has been reasonable in his demands, honest in his actions, and devoted to his cause. We see that God is proving to us that justice will prevail even against the mighty 'Killer' Army of Rajiv.

It pains me to feel that he has disgraced his family, our great India, the Indian citizens, and their values.

Oh Krishna, save us from this ignominy!

A BLOT ON HIS FAMILY ESCUTCHEON

By Satya, Melbourne, Australia

India, revered for centuries by scholars both abroad and at home as the repository of ancient wisdom and spiritual development far surpassing that of any other country in the world, has now descended to the level of thuggery, rape, murder and inhuman atrocities perpetrated on an already war-weary and defenceless people under the aegis of its Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. He has turned out to be a blot on the family escutcheon by sending 130,000 Indian troops to Sri Lanka to crush the spirit of freedom of Sri Lankan Tamils fighting for the right to have self-rule in their traditional homelands of North and East of Sri Lanka, where their forefathers lived for generations under their own kings, recognised by the Sinhalese as well as by the Portuguese conquerors who defeated them first.

Today, the world refuses to recognise that the Sri Lankan Tamils are a nation in every sense of the word by reason of their distinct culture, language, religion and way of life. The Sinhalese forces tried for four long years to bring the Sri Lankan Tamils to heel by every method known to the imagination of man - torture, rape, shelling and bombing. They had come to their last gasp when the wily old fox Jayewardene saw his chance to bolster the corrupt and unstable Rajiv Gandhi and get him to do his dirty work by signing the Indo-Ceylon Peace Accord despite opposition expressed openly by some of his own Ministers, party supporters and the extremist elements among the Sinhalese majority.

That the numerical superiority of the Indian troops and the Sri Lankan forces have signally failed so far to crush the freedom fighters, the LTTE, although they (the Indians and the Sinhalese) have resorted to every possible atrocity, rape, plunder, wanton destruction and murder, is well known to the world outside, as is the fact that the Sri Lankan Tamils have been hounded and betrayed by traitors within as much as

mercenary foreign troops and spies brought in to create disruption by other governments beside India's.

At this tragic crisis in the history of Sri Lankan Tamils, it is the duty of those Tamils scattered all over the world to band together and petition the United Nations Organisation to intervene by sending an impartial Peace Keeping Force, as has been done in Lebanon, to bring peace to a shattered country, and satisfy the just aspirations of the Sri Lankan Tamils for self-rule. **The Tamils in the United States and in the U.K. should take the lead in flooding the UNO with demands for justice for their cause, supported by Tamils living in Australia, France, Holland, Norway, and Italy.**

"Unity is Strength." Unless we take decisive action now, the Sri Lankan Tamils will be wiped out by sheer numerical superiority of the forces banded against them - not merely the Indians and the Sinhalese, but the hidden arm of those who supply aid, advice and ammunition.

LYING PROPAGANDA BY A.I.R.

By Dr. V. Arkley, Liverpool

This week, for the first time, I managed to tune my Radio to the short wave transmissions from 'All India Radio'. I was completely shocked at the total lying propaganda that is being done about the Sri Lankan situation. It would be ludicrous if it were not so tragic!

Some of the Indian newspapers and magazines try to speak the truth but these Radio commentaries are disgraceful! They are sent out on SW.3 or 25 M at 11.6-8 MHz. from 8 pm onwards. I am tape-recording these essays in deceit. **This is a very serious matter, quite apart from the Tamil problem. It casts doubts on the integrity of India.** I know that these broadcasts are lies; so what should I think about similar statements on the Punjab situation? **It is surely time that India puts its house in order!**

TAMIL EELAM MARTYR'S DAY

B W S Pillai, Australia

May I suggest to Tamil people all over the world, including those living in Tamil Eelam, that we commemorate 10th October 1987 as Tamil Eelam Martyr's day. Let us pay tribute to the 20,000 Tamils killed, by Sri Lanka and its running dogs, in their liberation struggle.

THE 13TH AMENDMENT TO THE SRI LANKA CONSTITUTION

The Tamils of Eelam reject the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution in its present form. The Amendment fails to deal with 'the residuary matters' as promised by President Jayewardene to Mr. Rajiv Gandhi when the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was signed on July 29, 1987. **The Amendment as a whole does not provide for the sharing of power with the Tamil and Muslim peoples.**

The devolution of power provided for by the thirteenth amendment is rendered meaningless under Article 154(C) of the Sri Lankan Constitution. The relevant portion of Article 154 F(1), which renders the entire exercise in autonomy and power-sharing meaningless, reads as follows:

'... The Governor shall in the exercise of his functions, act in accordance with such advice (from the Chief Minister and the Board of Ministers) except in so far as he is by or under the Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion'.

It may be noted that under Article 154 C, executive power is absolutely vested in the Governor who may or may not, under Article 154 C, in his discretion, exercise executive power through Ministers, or officers subordinate to him.

To make it doubly certain that the Governor has complete executive power in all its abundance, Article 154F(2) states :

'If any question arises whether any matter is or is not a matter as respects which the Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion, the decision of the Governor in his discretion shall be final, and the validity of anything done by the Governor shall not be called in question in any Court on the ground that he ought or ought not to have acted in his discretion. The exercise of the Governor's discretion shall be on the President's direction'.

These specific Articles make the Chief Minister and other Ministers creatures of the Executive President of Sri Lanka and his governor. The ministers in a provincial council will thus have no authority over public servants even at the provincial level. Provincial Councils will in Sri Lanka therefore have the right to pass statutes under List I (Provincial List) but none of these will be executed by public servants unless authorised by the Governor who is an appointee of the President of Sri Lanka.

We, therefore, make the following suggestions **as a measure to ease the current impasse in Sri Lanka:**

1. A signed truce for a period of two years.
2. During the two year period, the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces shall remain in force.
3. An Interim Administration will conduct the affairs of the merged provinces. The Administration will comprise 12 members, (7 from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, 4 from the Muslim United Liberation Front and 1 representative from the Sinhalese community in the Eastern Province.)
4. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam will in the two-year period convene a Conference of Representatives of all groups and parties in the merged Province. This conference will submit proposals for the negotiation of a treaty and for its ratification by the Sri Lankan government and the leaders of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the leaders of the Conference of Representatives of the peoples of the merged Province.
5. During the two-year period, the Sri Lankan security personnel including the Sri Lankan army will be kept out of the merged Province. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam will negotiate with the Government of India on the subject of maintenance of law and order in the merged Province.
6. Should the proposals of the Conference of Representatives of the Northern and Eastern Provinces be amicably accepted, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam will negotiate with the governments concerned regarding the terms for the laying down of arms.

We sincerely feel that it will do all good if the governments of India and Sri Lanka could consider the foregoing suggestions seriously and discontinue their military operations in the Tamil homelands.

TAMIL VOICE International

எப்பொழுது யாரையாவது கேட்கிறோம் அப்பொழுது
மெய்ப்பொருள் காண்ப தறிவு.

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Material sent for publication may be abridged and edited if found necessary.

CAN ANY POWER ON EARTH DENY THE TAMILS OF SRI LANKA THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION ?

By Dr. Brian Senewiratne, M.A.(Cantab.), M.D.(Lond.), F.R.C.P.(Lond.), F.R.A.C.P., Consultant Physician, Australia.

A paper submitted to the 4th Tamil Eelam Convention, Nanuet, New York, 3 - 4 July, 1988

Tamils, and non-Tamils such as myself, who have been campaigning for the right of the Tamil people to live without discrimination in the country of their birth would say, "No. No one can deny the Tamils the right of self-determination. Justice must sooner or later prevail." Saying so makes us feel that our struggle is worthwhile and that we are living in a just world where everyone has the right to live with equality and dignity. But are we living in such a world? The world, or more specifically **governments in the world, do not act for humanitarian reasons but for complex geopolitical, economic and selfish reasons.** If humanitarianism was the guiding light, the world would be, as David Selbourne said at the 3rd World Tamil Eelam Convention in New York two years ago, "A happy, shining, sunfilled place where truth would reign, justice prevail, and fraternity be the law of the universe." But it is not.

I appeal to you to distance yourself from the deceptive and destructive illusion conjured up by unrealistic optimism, and rationally evaluate the current mess. **Wishful thinking has been one of the features of the Sri Lankan Tamils for forty disastrous years.** This unrealistic optimism, this gullibility, this inability to see what is obvious has been one feature that has distinguished me from my many Tamil friends and colleagues who are fighting for the liberation of the Tamil people from Sinhalese domination. This was never more obvious than immediately after the signing of the 1987 Peace Accord. **In scores of telephone calls across the world, I could not find one Tamil who agreed with me that the Peace Accord was one of the biggest acts of deception perpetrated on the Tamil people, one that gave the Tamils even less than what they had.** Slowly and painfully we have come round to recognising what was obvious from the very beginning, i.e. that the **1987 Agreement was no more than a**

deceitful act by two desperate politicians who, under the guise of solving the ethnic problem, were attempting to save the political career of one and accomplish the geopolitical ambitions of the other. Whatever the document claimed, it was patently obvious that **it would bring neither peace nor normalcy, and most certainly, not peace with justice.** There are many other examples of this unfounded optimism of the Tamils. There was the blind faith that the 1984 All Party Conference was a genuine attempt by President Jayewardene to settle the problem despite overwhelming evidence that he was playing for time to build up a seriously deficient military machine. There was the completely unrealistic hope that India would obtain for the Tamil people a degree of devolution of power greater than what India was prepared to offer its own periphery. There is now the present illusion that 'no power on earth could deny the Tamils the right of self-determination'. No disrespect is intended when I say that the Tamils are blindly optimistic. It may only be a manifestation of the basic peace-loving nature of the Tamil people and their eternal hope for peace at any cost that makes them so. Whatever the reasons, the effect of this unrealistic optimism is the generation of a very destructive complacency that sooner or later all will be well. There is also an air of despondency - "What can we do?" - an attitude that prevents the formulation of effective action.

The realistic answer to the question posed in this paper, which incidentally will determine the nature of the struggle ahead and the entire future of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka, must be, "Yes, **there are several forces and power groups that can and probably will deny the Tamil people the right of Self-determination.**" These forces must be identified and a proper strategy evolved to deal with them if the **Tamil people in Sri Lanka are to live with equality and without**

discrimination.

There are four, or possibly five, forces that will ensure continuing domination of the Tamil people by the Sinhalese-dominated government in Colombo since it is in their interests to do so. They are (1) the Indian Government, (2) a band of murderous Sinhalese extremists, (3) the politically powerful Buddhist clergy, the strongest advocates of Sinhala chauvinism, (4) the continuing conflict itself, and (5) if the current regime in Colombo changes, possibly the Chinese Government. There are other important factors which I, as a Sinhalese, feel disinclined to comment on, such as the lack of credible and effective political leadership of the Tamil people.

The Indian Government

In my opinion, the greatest threat to the establishment of a separate Tamil State is the Indian Government which is facing similar separatist tendencies in the Punjab, the North-Eastern States, in West Bengal and other parts of India. We must therefore expect (and plan a strategy to deal with) the opposition that we will most certainly meet, not from Sinhalese-Buddhist chauvinists, but from Delhi. With more than 70,000 troops entrenched in Sri Lanka and with India's standing in the international arena, this will be the greatest problem in our attempt to free the Tamil areas from the stranglehold of Colombo.

Two years ago, after I had addressed the 3rd Eelam Convention in New York, an Indian parliamentarian told me, "All you need to do is to decide whether or not you want India to intervene militarily." When I asked him, "Intervene on whose side?", he was both surprised and offended. I had to point out that Delhi had more in common with Colombo than with the Tamils and their justifiable quest for separation from the **distrusted and unreliable central government.** I suggested that the only factor that probably prevented

Delhi from coming to the rescue of the embattled Sri Lankan government (this was in July 1986) was the certain repercussions that would occur in South India, then under its charismatic and powerful leader, M.G.Ramachandran. This was dismissed as a delusion of someone who did not really understand 'the deep commitment that India had to the Sri Lankan Tamils'. At the risk of causing offence, I did express considerable doubt about Delhi's commitment to the Tamil cause. Has not that pessimism been entirely vindicated by subsequent events?

Many Tamils are surprised and disappointed by the 13th Constitutional Amendment. They do not realise that this does no more than legalise proposals put forward by the Indian government in the latter half of 1986 (the Chithambaram proposals). It is the Indian negotiators who took a leaf out of the Indian Constitution and suggested an arrangement similar to that which exists in India where Delhi can take over control of the Punjab or sack the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu and institute direct rule. Jayewardene could not have asked for better conditions. **What was ironic was that the Indians were supposedly looking after Tamil interests!**

Let me now turn to the difficult problem as to who can pressure Delhi to stop supporting the completely untrustworthy regime in Colombo and its undisguised attempt to continue the stranglehold on the Tamil people. I have no doubt that **the only people capable of accomplishing this task are the South Indian Tamils.** How we marshal South Indian support is a separate issue. But that it is essential in the present impasse is obvious.

Some would suggest that international opinion can pressure India to stop supporting a repressive and murderous regime in Colombo. **If world governments were unprepared to act against the insignificant Sri Lankan government during the past four years of atrocities, is it in the realms of**

reality to suggest that they will act against a major regional power such as India? To suggest that they would, is to ignore the power of realpolitik - the complex geopolitical and economic factors that determine the actions of those governments that create chaos or stand by watching the chaos in different trouble spots across the world, as long as their geopolitical and economic interests are secure.

Sinhalese terrorists

Today the reality of the situation in Sri Lanka is not what Rajiv Gandhi, Jayewardene or Mrs. Bandaranaike is prepared to offer the Tamils, but what a group of murderous Sinhalese



VIJAYA KUMARANATUNGE

brigands will permit them to offer. Any Sinhalese leader who is prepared to stand against these extremist terrorists is unceremoniously eliminated, as were Vijaya Kumaranatunge, the leader of a moderate Sinhalese party, Harsha Abeywardene, the President of the UNP and scores of others who have opposed their ethnic chauvinism. In such circumstances we must be realistic as to what will be an offer to the Tamils from the regime in Colombo. What is equally important is what Sinhalese leaders can realistically expect to implement with this murderous band of hoodlums in their midst.

Some 18 years ago, they started as a group of disadvantaged Sinhalese youths, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) that espoused Marxism and attempted to take over the state by violence. When this attempt failed in 1971, they appeared to abandon armed revolution, donned a political garb and reappeared as a political

party. Having been decimated in the 1982 Presidential elections (the JVP leader Wijewira polled only 4.1% of the votes), they realised that the quickest way to power in Sri Lanka is not via Marxism but via ethnic chauvinism. With others of their ilk, such as *The Patriotic Front for the Defence of the Motherland*, they have threatened to assassinate anyone who offers any devolution of power to the Tamils. With scores of political murders already committed, and others on their hit-list, they see themselves as patriots who are part of the *National Campaign for Punishing Traitors. These new champions of Sinhala Chauvinism who have infiltrated the police and the armed forces, are more ruthless and violent than even Cyril Mathew's band of hoodlums, the JSS.* They constitute a major force that will prevent any Sinhalese-dominated government, present or future, from offering any meaningful terms to the Tamils. What is serious is that with the proliferation of weapons that has now occurred in Sri Lanka, there is no prospect of these armed extremists

who have the backing of political opportunists and even sections of the Buddhist clergy, ever being brought under control. On the contrary, these groups are multiplying. These are crucial points to be appreciated when we hope for a negotiated settlement to come out of Colombo that genuinely accommodates Tamil hopes and aspirations.

There is a scenario which currently is no more than a possibility but one which will be a disaster if it materialises. President Jayewardene, under serious threat by JVP extremists in the South, has failed to obtain assurances from Rajiv Gandhi that Indian troops will come to his rescue if the need arises. He is quite capable of turning to Pakistan for military help to fight the JVP. We will then have the disastrous situation of Indian forces in the north-east and Pakistani forces in the south, with Sri Lanka turned into another Vietnam or worse.

(to be continued)

THIRUKKURAL

by S.Sriskandarajah

கணைகொடிது யாழ்கோடு செவ்விது ஆங்கு அன்ன
வினைபடு பாலாற் கொளல்.

"Kanai Kodithu Yarl Koadu Chevvihaank Kanna Vinaipadu Paalaat Kolal"
- (Transliteration).

"The arrow though straight in shape is deadly; the Yarl (lute) though crooked in shape is mellifluous. Let people be judged by their actions and not by their appearance." (Translation).

We have a tendency to take everything on its face value without looking at their intrinsic value. This is a tendency we have to guard ourselves against. It is easier said than done. Nonetheless, unless we are very circumspect in regard to this matter, we are likely to meet frustration at every turn in our life. To drive home the truth that appearance is more often than not deceptive, *Thiruvalluvar* employs a couple of illustrations in the Chapter on INCONSISTENT CONDUCT. One of such illustrations is contained in the Kural under consideration.

Arrow is straight and direct but in its function it is deadly and cruel. Compared to the arrow the lute is curved and crooked but functionally it produces beautiful music and soothes our heart and soul. Therefore, the quality and character of a person should be decided not by how he looks but by what he does. Many men, though foul-hearted, appear holy, bathe in sacred waters and pass for great men in the eyes of the world. The world contains people whose outside appears as fair and reddish as the berry of the Abrus (*Kunrimani*) but whose inside is as black as the nose of that berry. The berry of Abrus is bewitchingly beautiful with its red colour and barrel shape and is very tempting. But the berry is lethally poisonous. If one were to judge it on its face value and then consume it as if it were an edible fruit, then one would be committing an irretrievably terrible mistake.

Our *Puranas* and *Ithikas* are replete with instances where people have fallen prey to the machinations of the wicked by reason of their taking the wicked on the face value and appearance. The great *Rama* himself fell into the trap of *Ravana* when *Mareecha* transformed himself into a wonderful deer and bewitched *Rama*

with its surpassing beauty. Much against his wish, *Mareecha*, at the instance and importunity of *Ravana*, transformed himself into a beautiful deer and appeared in all its splendour and colour and spots before *Sita* and attracted her innocent attention. When the magic deer wandered and coursed here and there in the sight of *Sita* busy gathering flowers, she set her eyes on the peculiarly bewitching deer and stood spellbound at its wondrous beauty. So uncontrollable was her desire to possess it that she called *Rama* and *Lakshmana* to have a look at it. Both of them came out of the cottage to see it. So exquisite and marvellous was the beauty of the deer that *Lakshmana* paused for a while to assess it and evaluate it. He hesitated to take the deer on its face value and he grew suspicious. On the contrary, unable to resist the entreaties of his wife *Sita*, *Rama* believed it to be a real deer and wanted to capture it for *Sita*. The cautioning advice of

Lakshmana notwithstanding, *Rama* set out to capture the deer. The golden deer played games of deceit and disguise and took *Rama* far into the forest. It was then that *Rama* realised that *Lakshmana* was as usual right and that it was not really a deer but a transformation of a *Rakshasa*, and darted an arrow towards the wicked deer. When it pierced the deer *Mareecha* recovered his natural form and cried "Oh *Sita*! Oh *Lakshmana*!", in response to which, *Lakshmana* left *Sita* alone in the cottage and rushed towards the direction from where the cry of alarm came, when *Ravana* approached the unprotected *Sita* and carried her away to Lanka. What followed, you readers know.

Rama was simply deceived by the external appearance of the deer and fell an easy prey into the trap set by *Ravana*.

When such is the case with men of *Rama's* sagacity and wisdom, you can imagine how more prone and gullible we ordinary mortals will be. Let us therefore be very wary in our judgment of men and matters. This is the lesson the above *Kural* attempts to teach us.

Did not the great *Avvai* say that in spite of its mightiness the ocean is saline and useless, but the small spring on its coast is potable and useful.

'EARLY WARNING' PLAN TO FOIL GENOCIDE

An early-warning system to head off future racial massacres, was among proposals debated at a Conference on the Holocaust held at Oxford recently. Some of the hundreds of scholars who arrived from around the world for the conference argued that the murder of Jews in the second world war could not have happened if the Catholic Church had come out in opposition. The conference, called 'Remembering for the Future', was paid for by the newspaper magnate Mr. Robert Maxwell, to the tune of £1 million. His wife, Elizabeth, said she thought of it and planned it. "I am a Christian married to a Jew who lost almost his whole family in the holocaust", Mrs. Maxwell said. "I want the conference to establish that Christians were partly responsible because they preached anti-semitism for centuries." Cardinal Basil Hume, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of London, and the

Chief Rabbi, Lord Jacobovits, took part in the Oxford conference. The Bishop of Oxford, Dr. Richard Harris, represented the Archbishop of Canterbury. The "early warning system" advocated by Professor Franklin Littell of Temple University in the US and the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, proposes that 15 points in a 'grid' can identify potentially genocidal movements. The main accuser of the Catholic Church in the Nazi period, Dr. Chris Manus of Ife University, Nigeria, said that the mass murder of the Jews "could have been stopped if the bishops had stirred up the populace and appealed to the conscience of the world." Mr. Serge Klarsfeld, a Holocaust researcher, talked on how the clergy and French public opinion saved Jews in the summer of 1942. Walter Schwarz in *The Guardian* of July 11, 1988

THANTHAI CHELVA'S APPEAL TO EXPATRIATE TAMILS OF EELAM

We reproduce an appeal made by the late S. J. V. Chelvanayagam, the founder of the Federal Party and later the Tamil United Liberation Front and popularly referred to as Thanthai (father of Eelam), in March 1977 to the Eelam Tamils living abroad. The appeal is still relevant, that the Eelam Tamils should stand together against the Sinhala force that is trying to crush the liberation struggle of the Eelam Tamils with the mighty aid of imperial forces including Rajiv's India. Let all Tamils extend their support to the people in Eelam who are fighting a brave and historic war for their freedom.

As you are undoubtedly aware, Tamils of different political parties, of different political ideologies, of different religions and castes have come together in the Tamil United Liberation Front with the common ideology of regaining our lost freedom. As the leader of this Front, I make this appeal to you.

You are also aware of the political history of Ceylon over the last three decades. **Successive Sinhalese Governments have followed a planned and systematic campaign to reduce the Tamils to a position of slaves in their own land which history records was their homeland even before the advent of the Sinhalese.** I need hardly recapitulate the various stages of this policy of enslavement. But let me state the major iniquitous measures introduced from time to time by successive Governments. 1). The citizenship Law and the consequential disenfranchisement of the Tamils of the up-country. 2). The Sinhala Only Act and the resultant stamp of inferiority on the Tamils and their cherished language. 3). The planned colonisation of the traditional homeland of the Tamils by Sinhalese and the resultant drastic change in the demographic state of the Tamil provinces. 4). The new Republican constitution of May 1972 and the installation of a Sinhala Buddhist Imperialism - are some of the most important landmarks in this campaign of enslavement.

You will agree that no self-respecting people can tolerate such situation. **We did everything possible to impress on the Government that justice must be done to the Tamil people. We closed our ranks and spoke with one voice. We submitted a six point programme on behalf of the United Tamil Nation. These are the basic minimum that**

any civilised country recognises as the basic rights of citizenship. Both in Parliament and outside, our members of Parliament, Leaders and Volunteers made every effort to impress on the Sinhala Government and the Sinhala people the depth of our feelings. In the end, I resigned from the Kankesanthurai Seat and invited the Government to contest me on these matters. The Government delayed the holding of the by-election on spurious grounds for two years. Then the by-election was held, the voters of K.K.S gave me a resounding victory and thus endorsed on their behalf and on behalf of the entire Tamil nation the policy of the T.U.L.F. On this occasion, I solemnly announced to my people and to the country, that I consider the



The late S.J.V.Chelvanayagam

verdict of this election as a mandate that the Eelam Tamil Nation should ensure the sovereignty already vested in the Tamil people and become free.

All our efforts proved futile. They made no attempt to have even a dialogue with the accredited leaders of the Tamil people. On the other hand, they chose to tighten a wave of repression on the Tamil

Nation - Emergency Laws, Police and Military rule in the North and East, Arrest and Detention without trial, Draconian Laws with inhuman punishment; in short they used all the weapons in the armoury of a dictator. I am proud to say that the Tamil people withstood all these attacks and took the only logical step available for an enslaved people. **At the first National Convention of the T.U.L.F at Vaddukoddai, it was solemnly resolved that it has now become inevitable for us to regain our freedom and establish the State of Tamil Eelam.** The T.U.L.F is now engaged in achieving this goal.

This, my friend, is a total war where every Tamil, wherever he be must play his part. You too have a part to play. You are the fortunate few who have escaped the frustrations and indignities that have been the lot of your brethren who remain behind in Ceylon. But you cannot be unconcerned of the miserable plight of the Tamils. You will want to come back someday to this land of your forefathers. You and your children will naturally wish to come back to a land where we are free to live and work with dignity. That is what our movement hopes to achieve. **We in Ceylon will bear the brunt of this fight. But you must also share the burden of this struggle. In what way you can help us is best decided by you and other Tamils resident abroad. But please act quickly and effectively.**

GUNS ROBBED FROM MADULSIMA POLICE

About 40 unidentified men attacked the Madulsima Police Station in Badulla and got away with 24 guns on the 16th July 1988.

INDIA'S \$ 3 MILLION A DAY QUAGMIRE IN SRI LANKA

William Mc Gowan from Jaffna

(First part of the article appeared in TVI Vol.I, No:13)

Gandhi's under-estimation of resentment in the south and the effect that it has on Jayewardene's ability to hold up his end of the bargain may prove the real undoing of the peace accord. The southern heartland, which prides itself as the land Buddha chose to preserve his doctrine of non-violence and compassion, has become almost ungovernable under the emotional strains of the Indian intervention. Instead of seeing the accord as an opportunity to build bridges of trust between two warring communities, **Sinhalese generally see the Indian presence on their soil as a violation of national sovereignty as well as a threat to the existence of Buddhism, which they claim to practise in its most pristine form** and to protect as part of their mythic charter. The Indian presence has been popularly depicted as a reincarnation of invasions from southern India that wiped out Sinhalese kingdoms centuries ago. Most of the Buddhist majority saw President Jayewardene's acceptance of India's "help" (Gandhi would have invaded otherwise!) not as a shrewd calculation of geo-political realities but as a selling out of national interests.

Broad popular resentment of the accord sparked off other latent sources of disaffection against the ruling United National Party (UNP) of J.R. (as the President is popularly known). **Its Western-style economic policies, which have greatly widened the gap between rich and poor and led to official corruption on a vast scale, were attacked by the Sinhalese populace as inimical to Buddhist values.** Also attacked were the regime's increasingly anti-democratic tendencies; the denial of elections for the past ten years, manipulation of parliamentary procedure and the official sanction given to political thuggery. The signing of the peace accord without popular ratification was taken as the final step in J.R.'s subversion of the democratic traditions that have been cherished since independence, even if observed more in form than in substance. **The widespread feeling was that the**

old fox J.R. had tricked the young Mr. Gandhi into bailing him out in the north so that he could better defend himself in the south, where his base of support had crumbled and the rebellion was only a matter of time.

A banned ultranationalistic political party called the People's Liberation Front (JVP) has capitalised on the wave of discontent, focusing anger against the Indo-Lankan Peace Accord. Since September, it has conducted a campaign of political killings and subversion that has taken the lives of almost 300 ruling-party officials, nearly brought the simple exercise of civil administration to a collapse and fed worry that the Sinhalese will repudiate their obligations toward India and the Tamils. In areas where the JVP is strongest, police are reluctant to leave their stations after dark, and the public cowers behind shuttered doors. **Where Buddha supposedly saw a flourishing 'dharma', the people see assassinations and assault.** Most members of Parliament belonging to the UNP are under threat of death and shun their home districts for the security of the capital. Provincial Council elections, which are crucial to the momentum of the peace process, were called off in over half the country due to the threat of violence. Politically moderate intellectuals who have backed the peace accord have been branded traitors to the motherland by the JVP. It is also likely that the JVP has infiltrated cadres into the armed forces, raising the spectre of unreliability and coup.

The JVP taps into latent Sinhalese feelings of their special destiny, advancing a program that blends masochistic nationalism, apocalyptic rhetoric and the same chauvinistic cultural revivalism that also polarised Sinhalese-Tamil relations in the 1950s. Highly xenophobic, racist and romantic, the JVP calls for a return to 'indigenous' thought, values and economic development that pre-date European colonialism and contemporary Western influence.

The JVP thrives in the economically depressed far south of the island. Most of its members - their numbers still unknown - are lower-caste youths in the universities or jobless graduates with few prospects in an economy still skewed to favour high-caste English-speakers, despite decades of lip service by successive governments to the 'sons of the soil'. **There are also widening ranks of militant Buddhist monks in the party, who see their clerical role in political rather than spiritual terms and have defied superiors by calling for armed resistance in a Buddhist holy war. "We must weaponize", ranted one of them, clad in a brilliant saffron clothe, as a full moon bathed the sentinel face of a nearby stone Buddha, "We must weaponize to kill the traitor J.R. Jayewardene."**

The armed subversion of the JVP has justified the government's drift to authoritarianism in the name of preserving the only 'five-star democracy' in Asia. The ruling party has armed a private militia, at least 20,000 strong, many of them recently paroled criminals. Fifty thousand troops hitherto fighting Tamil guerrillas have been redeployed in the south to quell the insurgents and their sympathisers. And the government is operating death squads, which are targeting JVP suspects as well as legal political activists, opposition parties claim. Many innocents have been falsely accused and summarily punished in the bid to crush the JVP - the very pattern that has fed militancy in the north among Tamils over the past five years. Police have been personally indemnified against civil actions, extending a carte blanche for abuse, and international human rights groups have been blocked from investigating.

The recent announcement of an agreement between the government and the JVP to end the insurrection in return for the lifting of proscription was a promising sign - until it was discovered that the Minister of National Defence had been negotiating with hoaxers. But bringing the JVP into the mainstream means little when the

mainstream itself - including many of JR's inner circle - mistrusts the accord. Parliamentary ratification of the peace agreements, despite a UNP majority, could only be secured by strong-arm methods. Having whipped up his hard-liners for years, even as he tried to negotiate a peace, JR found it very hard to contain them. Many right-wingers preferred an outright Indian invasion so they could reap windfalls of international sympathy for once.

Sinhalese government bureaucrats have shown their true colours by dragging their feet on the provisions of the Indo - Sri Lanka Accord that required them to grant equal rights to the Tamils. For example, very few of the relief supplies and funds that Western donors rushed to the country have made their way from government ministries in Colombo to war-ravaged Jaffna as was intended. Priority has been given to the plight of Sinhalese refugees instead, even though Tamils in need outnumbered them tenfold. The government also refuses to discontinue its West Bank-style settlement program in the crucial Eastern Province, and has erected bureaucratic barriers to the repatriation of Tamil refugees who fled to India - 100,000 of them. On a grimmer note, virtually none of the police or soldiers involved in any of the atrocities since India stepped in has been disciplined, sending ominous signals that the security of Tamils is still not a state concern.

In essence, the Indian presence has not, as intended, provided an umbrella under which Tamils and Sinhalese can seek reconciliation. Instead it has made the scheming more byzantine and covert, with both sides jockeying around India for position. Sinhalese bloody-mindedness has made matters worse. As a recently returned Sri Lankan expatriate scholar said, "There is simply no sense of repentance on the part of the Sinhalese; no sense that they were in the wrong for many years and are now suffering for it; no sense that they brought the very intervention they feared on themselves. The reaction is just the opposite. They say they were not

tough enough. It's a very spooky psychology." Only now coming to recognize the extent of the alienation that persists between the two communities, all that Indian diplomats can say is "Nation-building takes time."



AN INDIAN WARSHIP OFF SRI LANKA

The Indians are in a double bind. Even if they tame the Tigers, there is very little chance for lasting peace unless the Sinhalese south gives up deep-seated anxieties and accepts the legitimacy of Tamil autonomy without backsliding. Given the current mood in the south, that is unlikely to happen. Should anti-government pressure build to a more dangerous level, or should the 82-year-old President die, the situation may become uncontrollable for the peacekeepers. The very point of India's involvement in Sri Lanka was to stabilise its own southern flank, but any direct movement of troops into the Sinhalese south could prompt a nationalistic backlash, uniting factions that are now hostile to each other. The ensuing bloodbath could further destabilise the situation and prompt a greater Indian intervention, which would be politically dangerous for Rajiv Gandhi, who already faces widespread public opposition over what many consider India's Vietnam.

Gandhi's Sri Lanka misadventure has emboldened his opponents. The unpopularity of the initiative among the 55 million Tamils in Tamil Nadu could hand his Congress Party an ill-affordable defeat in critical upcoming state elections. Bugged down by a few thousand guerrillas, the reputation of the Indian army has been sullied under the watchful eyes

of regional rivals like Pakistan and China, as well as of armed separatists inside India. And its clumsy handling of ethnic factionalism bodes ill for India's role in refereeing power sharing in post-Soviet Afghanistan.

The situation in Sri Lanka may in fact

have grown so poisonous that a cathartic blood-letting is inevitable. Militants on both sides - backed up by significant bodies of popular opinion - embrace the idea of a nationalistic 'Gottterdammerung' much more readily than that of compromise. The psychological breach between the two communities may be much too profound for ready reconciliation, no matter what agreements are signed and what platitudes mouthed. Even if the flames are banked for a while, the fuel will ignite again. As the Indians navigating them know only too well, the currents on both sides of Sri Lanka's ethnic divide are vicious. Far from being the light at the end of the tunnel, **India's involvement in Sri Lanka may well prove to be just a sidestep in a steady descent into darkness.**

By courtesy - *The Nation*(New York) - June 25, 1988

BYE-ELECTIONS OF JULY 14

In the bye-elections held on Thursday, 14th July, 1988, the UNP won 3 seats while SLFP snatched 1 seat. The UNP retained the Katugampola, Kekirawa and Welimada seats in Parliament with slender majorities of 2868, 361 and 1050 votes respectively. The UNP lost the Ratnapura seat to the SLFP which won the seat with a majority of 4785 votes.

EELAM NEWS

CURFEW RE-IMPOSED

A curfew has been clamped down in the Jaffna peninsula during the past few weeks and the unruly Indian forces have once again started their spree of harassment and humiliation. Under the notorious pretext of 'Search and Destroy' operation, the unbridled Indians continue to commit every manner of antisocial and inhuman crimes in the peninsula. On the 20th July, 1988, five innocent civilians were killed and 25 were injured at Chulipuram when the Indians fired some random shots from a mortar.

RESIDENTS OF VISUVAMADU RENDERED HOMELESS

As a result of the unrelenting onslaught on the Visuvamadu village, in Mullaitivu district, by the Indian forces, the activities of the residents of Visuvamadu have come to a standstill. It is reported that about 75 per cent of the residents have abandoned their homes and moved surreptitiously to other places of safety. The harassment by the Indian forces has reached such intolerable heights that even those who bore up the calamitous happenings with fortitude and remained in their village have now begun to desert their homes.

10 JAWANS KILLED IN MULLAITIVU

According to confirmed reports reaching our news desk, during an operation launched by the Indian forces pursuant to the widely publicised 'Operation Checkmate', ten Indians are reported to have lost their lives when the Tigers took them aback and drove the Indian forces away.

THREE INDIAN SOLDIERS KILLED NEAR JAFFNA KACHCHERI

Three Jawans of the Indian forces are reported to have been killed by the freedom fighters in Jaffna during a gun battle that ensued between the Tamil Tigers and the Indian Peace-Keeping Force.

675 INNOCENT TAMILS OF BATTICALOA TAKEN INTO CUSTODY

The Indian army carried out a 'search

and destroy' operation on a large scale in the Batticaloa district. It is reported that the Indian army took many civilian Tamils to their camps and subjected them to torture and degrading treatment in order to extract confessions and information. It is reliably learnt that on the 16th July 1988, the Indian army which pounced on the village of Kiran, arrested more than 600 civilians and took them to Pulipaaithakal army camp. It is further reported that on the 17th July, the Indian army went on a rampage into Murathanai, Koraveli, Pondugalsenai, Morathan Senai, Kattaiyadimadu and took into custody more than 50 farmers.

INDIAN FORCES AND LTTE CLASH - 7 INDIAN SOLDIERS DIE

On the 22nd July 1988, the LTTE guerrillas launched a landmine attack near the 8th Canal in the Trincomalee district on an Indian convoy moving from Pankulam army camp on a search-and-destroy mission. As a result, a military truck of the Indian forces was completely destroyed and seven soldiers were killed on the spot.

DON'T HAVE DEALINGS WITH LTTE !

The IPKF has ordered the people of the Batticaloa and Amparai districts not to have any dealings with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. It has further warned them that if they have any kind of relationship with the Tamil Tigers in breach of their order, they would be rounded up and dealt with accordingly. It is said that this order by the IPKF is a 'reactionary' move of the Indian forces in response to an earlier order made by the LTTE requiring the people to refrain from having close dealings with the IPKF.

IPKF RUNS RIOT IN MANNAR

A dusk-to-dawn curfew has been imposed in the Pesalai area of Mannar in the Northern Province and the Indian soldiers under the guise of searching for militants are reported to be indulging in all kinds of revelry and orgies with impunity. According

to very reliable sources more than thirty houses in the Pesalai area have been ransacked, looted and set on fire, while about 32 of the residents of the area have been bundled up in trucks for questioning.

FISHERMAN IN AMPARAI PUT TO DEATH

Reports coming from Amparai have confirmed that Samsudeen, a fisherman, and Jayaseelan, a bus passenger, have been shot dead by a jawan of the Indian army.

TELO KILLS TIGER SUPPORTER

According to reports reaching our news desk, a supporter of the LTTE, Ponnampalam, has been shot to death by a member of the TELO.

THREE TAMILS HACKED TO DEATH

"Unleashing of communal hatred and anti-Tamil terrorism and brutal violence on the hapless Tamils have become a regular feature in Trincomalee" says a newspaper report of 22nd July 1988. It is reported that the Sinhalese army on the 21st July 1988, joined hands with the Home Guards and the Sinhalese thugs of Trincomalee and went on a rampage in the heart of Trincomalee town, burning houses, looting shops and hacking Tamils. According to the news report, Sri Lankan government appears to be acting hand in glove with the Sri Lankan army and thugs.

LTTE SURROUNDS INDIAN ARMY CAMP

According to our correspondent in Tamil Eelam, the LTTE launched, on 14.7.88, a guerrilla attack on one of the Indian camps in Chunnakam which is notorious for molesting civilian Tamils. This attack by the LTTE has belied the claims of the IPKF that Jaffna is fully under the control of the IPKF. It is reliably learnt that the Indian forces have suffered severe casualties during the attack.

CHULIPURAM WITNESSES GUN-BATTLE

On the 16th July, the LTTE is reported to have engaged the IPKF in a gun battle. During the confrontation,

which was a shock and surprise to the IPKF, 3 Indian soldiers were killed and some Indian equipment captured by the LTTE. It is reported that during this confrontation Lt.Saleem of the LTTE was killed.

NEW ARMY CAMPS OPENED IN TAMIL AREAS

According to reports reaching the TVI from Batticaloa district, more Indian army camps are being opened in Iluppaichenai and Uppuveli villages in the Muthur district and in Ramanathapuram in the Kilinochchi district.

INDIAN ARMY'S MARCH HALTED !

Angered by the support given to the LTTE by the Tamils of Eelam in Pesalai village in the Mannar district, the Indian army has started to subject the Tamils of that area to untold hardships and iniquities. On the 18th July, upon seeing the Indian army heading to Talaimannar to massacre the Tamils, the LTTE commandos attacked the Indian soldiers with landmines. During the confrontation at a place called Kudiyiruppu twenty Indian soldiers were killed and many more wounded.

HEAVY SHELLING AT MURASUMODDAI

The village of Murasumoddai in the Kilinochchi district was subjected to heavy shelling by the Indian forces during the past weeks according to news reaching London. Though confirmed reports of the extent of damage to property and life are not available, it is reliably learnt that the Indian troops, on their way to their camp, have shot and killed a girl student and four other Tamil civilians.

ARMY TRUCKS BLASTED

The IPKF are reported to be continuing their operations against the LTTE in the Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi districts. A convoy of four army trucks carrying IPKF soldiers is said to have been mined by Tamil Tigers blasting one of the trucks and killing 20 soldiers.

HARTAL IN THE NORTH AND EAST

During a hartal observed by the people in the North and the East of Sri

Lanka, on the 13th and 14th of July, there were no violent incidents reported except that a Sri Lanka Transport Board bus was intercepted by armed youths while plying between Trincomalee and Vavuniya, the passengers ordered to alight from the bus, and the bus set on fire. All shops and offices remained closed in Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Vavuniya, Mullaitivu, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai.

OPERATION CHECKMATE

According to reports reaching from the Vanni district of Tamil Eelam, IPKF seems to have suffered more casualties than the LTTE during the military exercise code-named "Operation Checkmate" (interpreted as 'trapping the king' or, in effect, grabbing Prabakaran). West of Thirumurukandy, two soldiers were killed in an improvised explosives device; and at the 146th milepost on Jaffna-Vavuniya road, another Indian was killed while repairing railway lines. On the same day (16.7.88), four Indian soldiers were killed at Konari, about 52 miles south of Batticaloa on the Batticaloa-Pottuvil road, when their vehicle hit a landmine planted by the LTTE. It is also reported that another three IPKF soldiers were killed and four seriously injured in a separate incident in the Northern Province, on 15th July.

BLACK FLAG DAY ON JULY 29TH.

Jaffna District Social Development Society has appealed to all Tamils to declare 29th July as a 'Day of Betrayal', to wear black badges and to hoist black flags on all commercial and other establishments to mark the anniversary of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord.

JAFFNA ST.JOHN'S SHELLED

"On the 10th day of the IPKF advance they shelled the school. Apparently they had information that Tigers were here. The same night they stormed the school and occupied it. About 30 shells fell in the compound of which 12 scored direct hits. The worst damage was to the Jubilee hall (two hits), Science Block (two hits) and a set of class-rooms opposite the office. Other buildings hit were

the Principal's bungalow, library, Pooranampillai Block and the office. Our estimate of the damage to the buildings is about Rs.500,000. For furniture, fittings, laboratory equipment etc., the estimated cost of replacement is about Rs.750,000." From a letter of Principal, Dr.Devasagayam, to an old boy in London

FOUR IPKF MEN KILLED BY LANDMINE

Three soldiers and an officer of the Indian Peace Keeping Force were killed when the vehicle in which they were travelling hit a landmine on the Akkaraipattu road in Pottuvil on July 16, 1988. This brings to eight the number of Indian soldiers killed by the LTTE in the East within the past two days. Eight IPKF personnel were also injured in the past two days. The last 48 hours also saw two terrorists killed, three others injured and six civilians injured in the clash. On Friday an explosion in the west of Thirumurukandy killed two soldiers and wounded four. At Vavuniya one soldier and one terrorist were killed on the same day. By courtesy - "The Sunday Times" - July 17, 1988

FLASH

All members of the Liberation Tigers in Madras and other areas in Tamil Nadu have been placed under house arrest from 5.00 pm on July 27. Armed police have been placed where Mr. Kittu was living. All communications have been cut off.

Similarly, the LTTE office and houses where injured members of the LTTE cadre were undergoing treatment too have been placed under armed police guard.

Telecommunication and other equipments have been removed from a house and its occupant was taken into custody.

TESC (LONDON) TRACKS PROGRESS OF 'VIRAT' AND 'CHECKMATE'

They came to protect us; now they violate our human rights.

23 May, 1988 - 6,000 Indian troops converged on Alampil and surrounding villages of Semmalai, Nedunkerni, Kumulamunai, Mulliyavalai and Andankulam and attacked the LTTE bases in the jungles. Some residents fled from these areas and others were prevented from fleeing. **A convoy of 265 vehicles carrying reinforcements** were seen moving from Vavuniya towards Mullaitivu as the fighting progresses and soldiers are air-dropped from helicopters at Alampil, Semmalai, Kumulamunai, Tanniyuttu, Mulliyavalai, Murippu, Andankulam and Muthaiyankaddu.

24 May - Civilians from Puthukkudiyiruppu fled the strife-torn area towards Kilinochchi and residents from Alampil and Kumulamunai moved to Vavuniya to escape the hardship of continuous curfew and danger to their lives. More troops were brought into Vanni area and fierce fighting continued.

25 May - More than 15,000 troops were deployed over the entire Vanni area and search operations were carried out. During the search operation, troops harassed, humiliated and tortured the civilians and robbed them of their belongings. More than 100 civilians were arrested and detained. Petrol and diesel oil, from 30 bowzers brought in by troops, were sprayed over selected areas and set them alight. Parts of jungle were ablaze.

26 May - 4 Indian helicopter gunships strafed the area and several people were injured. Some were killed.

27 May - Indian troops stopped movement of people and effectively blocked information going out of the operation zone. Civilians were ordered to stay indoors.

28 May - Troops launched sporadic attacks on LTTE bases in the jungles. Civilians continued to stay indoors and were prevented from moving.

29 May - Search operations continued in Vanni area and many more were arrested, detained and tortured.

30 May - Four young girls were taken and raped by Indian soldiers at Muthaiyankaddu in the Mullaitivu district.

31 May - LTTE announced that they were abandoning one of their bases in the Mullaitivu perimeter. Fighting continued, and civilians were kept indoors.

1 June - Indian Military authorities confirmed that about 15,000 troops were de-

ployed in the region and they were mounting a major offensive on LTTE.

2 June - All hospitals, schools, government offices, shops and markets remained closed in the Vanni area. Fighting continued and civilians were threatened not to leave their houses.

3 to 12 June - Fighting was reported in the villages of Alampil, Kumulamunai, Puthukkudiyiruppu, Kovil Puliyankulam, Nedunkerni, Oddisuddan and Andankulam. One civilian escaped from Alampil and reported that people were undergoing untold hardships without food and medical supplies; those who ventured out had been shot by the military, several women were raped and a few committed suicide, young men were disappearing every day and parents did not know what to do. One LTTE member Paramanathan escaped from Indian army camp at Vadakkachchi in the Kilinochchi district.

13 to 15 June - Indian troops set up road blocks at Visvadamu in the Mullaitivu district. LTTE guerrillas launched a grenade attack on two soldiers at the road block. People from Mullaitivu defied military orders and staged protest campaign (wearing black badges) for three days against the Indian offensive on the LTTE and the Walioya Sinhala Colonisation Scheme in Mullaitivu district and called for the release of all political prisoners.

16 June - Indian troops set up more than 25 sentry posts between Kodikamam and Chavakachcheri, a distance of 5 miles apart, and people travelling between these two towns were harassed and humiliated. In Vavuniya 12 detainees were released by the Indian troops and more than 100 kept back in detention.

17 June - New weapons were used by Indian troops to attack the LTTE in Mullaitivu district. 9 Indian soldiers died in a landmine attack by LTTE when they were on their way to Skanthapuram from Kilinochchi on a search-and-destroy mission.

18 June - Tamil Welfare Societies of Vavuniya district held a mass demonstration demanding the Indian government to negotiate with the LTTE and to stop all colonisation efforts by the Sri Lankan government.

19 June - Fighting continued in Mullaitivu district. **Young women were taken naked along the streets to the army camps. Various parts of their**

bodies were subjected to 'cigarette burn' by the Indian soldiers.

20 to 22 June - Intensive search operations were carried out throughout Vanni area by Indian troops and almost every male was taken to army camps.

23 June - Indian troops launched military operations code-named "Operation Checkmate" throughout the Northern and Eastern provinces. A massive aerial attack was launched in Mullaitivu district by the Indian military. Indian planes and military helicopters bombed and strafed the residential areas of Alampil, Naay-aaru, Semmalai and Kumulamunai in the Mullaitivu district. Indian forces were reported to have used napalm and chemical bombs and 250-kilo bombs in the aerial attacks. Hundreds of houses, schools and government buildings were damaged. Civilian casualties feared high but no accurate figures were available.

24 June - More than 1000 people went on hunger strike from the villages of Thanneeroottu, Kumulamunai, Kallappaadu, Vattakandal and Mulliyavalai against the Indian military atrocities and demanded the Indian government to announce a ceasefire and to start negotiations with the LTTE.

25 June - Four Indian military helicopters 'MI.24' bombed and strafed an LTTE camp at Kumulamunai in Mullaitivu. Fierce fighting reported between LTTE and Indian troops. **One Indian Colonel aboard a helicopter was killed.** More than 1,000 Indian troops from Kilinochchi and Murukandy army camps surrounded the Kilinochchi area and carried out search-and-destroy operations. Several civilians were killed and injured, but details not available. Indian troops opened up two new camps at Akkaraayankulam and the Irrigation department building at Vannerikulam.

27 June - Seven Indian soldiers died and their weapons captured in an ambush by LTTE at Puliyankulam in Vavuniya district when the soldiers were on their way to Puliyankulam on a search-and-destroy mission.

28 June, 1988 - Indian troops surrounded the villages of Skanthapuram, Konavil and Anaivilunthan, and assaulted villagers and some were tortured. Many sustained injuries and were admitted to Kilinochchi hospital.

THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION

By Prof. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson

Thirteenth Amendment is an amendment which resulted from a major civil war and as a result of the intervention of the Indian Government. Its provisions must therefore be weighed in the context of these grave events. There is a case for the Amendment; there is a case against the Amendment. The case for and against will be stated below. Then we will argue what can and should be done on balance.

CASE FOR THE AMENDMENT

The Thirteenth Amendment provides for Provincial Councils and more importantly a merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces. There are three separate detailed Lists:

List I contains powers on which the Provincial Councils have an exclusive right to legislate.

List II, also referred to as *The Reserved List*, enumerates the powers on which the Central Government has exclusive jurisdiction. The Residuary of Powers (that is, powers not listed in Lists I, II or III) is, in terms of List II, vested with the Central Government. In the context of Lists I, II, III and the Residuary of Powers, the term Central Government acquires a constitutional significance. The Central Government in Sri Lanka will function as a Central Government in a federal or quasi-federal State such as the Union of India or Canada or Australia or the Federation of Malaysia.

List III, also referred to as *the Concurrent List* contains the powers on which the Central Government and the Provincial Governments can legislate. List III, enables the Central Government to have priority and supremacy in the event of a provincial statute conflicting with an Act of Parliament, that is, legislation by the Central Government. The Concurrent list by definition empowers the Central Government and the provincial governments to legislate on the subjects enumerated therein. The key to the problems that may arise is the supremacy that the Central Government is endowed with in the event of a conflict of legislation. This provision is included in all federal constitutions Article 154 G(5)(a)(b) & (6).

In terms of this division of powers or distribution of powers, the Central Government of Sri Lanka is no longer similar to the Central Government of a unitary state such as, for example, the United Kingdom or France.

In terms of this division or distribution, especially in respect of the powers enumerated in the Concurrent List (List III), there is bound to arise considerable litigation not in regard to whether an Act of Parliament is constitutional or not, but in regard to the quantum and extent of power. Constitutionality of legislation will be taken care of in the pre-legislation stage when the Supreme Court will pronounce its final verdict which cannot thereafter be challenged in a court of law.

Litigation will arise, probably/possibly, on the quantum of power and the extent of power that the Central Government can exercise and administer once it has legislated on a subject in the Concurrent List, that is List III. The weighing of the quantum and extent is a matter for the courts. The quantum and extent is not the same as constitutionality. The new system of government will therefore cause expensive litigation. Litigation and the independence of the judiciary will be the safeguards against an encroachment of power listed in List I, by the Central Government.

The quantum and extent is a matter for reasonable doubt, as to what was intended when powers were enumerated in the Concurrent List (List III). Reasonable doubt therefore has to be reasonably argued and judicially pronounced upon.

The test is, can the Parliament of Sri Lanka (1) at its own will and power, over-ride statutes enacted by Provincial Councils; (2) alter powers contained in each of the Lists I, II and III by ordinary legislation, that is, by simple majority of Parliament.

The answer to both questions is in the negative. Article 154 H(4) answers the first question. Its substance is that when a provincial statute has been referred to the Supreme Court for a decision and where the Court determines that the statute is consistent with the provisions of the Constitu-

tion, the Governor shall, on receipt by him of the Court's determination, assent to the statute." There is no question of the Sri Lanka Parliament vetoing or over-riding the statute in question. Article 154 B(8)(d) reinforces this interpretation. Substantially it means that the Governor has no option but to "exercise his powers in accordance with the advice of the Chief Minister" so long as the Chief Minister and the Board of Ministers command a majority in the Provincial Council.

The answer to the second question is that a change in respect of the Thirteenth Amendment must be made in accordance with Article 82 of the Constitution, that is by a two-thirds majority of members of Parliament including those not present. A simple majority of the members present in Parliament at the time of voting, as in the case of ordinary legislation, will not suffice.

If the answers are in the negative, the question arises as to whether Sri Lanka is a Federal or a Unitary State. **Our answer, which we will proceed to substantiate, is that Sri Lanka has lost its unitary character by virtue of the Thirteenth Amendment.** We hesitate to answer whether Sri Lanka is now a Federal State. Our authority is *K.C. Wheare* and his celebrated book *Federal Government* (4th edition, London, 1963).

The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, in its majority decision, argued that the Thirteenth Amendment provided for subordinate law-making bodies when Provincial Councils were created and that this was in accordance with Article 76(3) of the Constitution which in substance empowers Parliament to establish subordinate law-making bodies.

Our view is that Provincial Councils in their sphere (List I) are co-ordinate law-making bodies vis-a-vis the Parliament of Sri Lanka. Parliament cannot invade the legislative rights of Provincial Councils without in the first instance repealing the Thirteenth Amendment, not in the ordinary way, but by the process of Constitutional Amendment prescribed in Article 82 of the Constitution.

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Provincial Councils are therefore not authorities to which legislative powers have been delegated as for example local bodies nor are they authorities to which legislative powers have been devolved.

K.C.Wheare's method of determining whether a State is federal is as follows (page 33): "The test which I apply for federal government is then simply this. Does a system of government embody predominantly a division of powers between general and regional authorities, each of which, in its own sphere, is co-ordinate with the others and independent of them? If so, that government is federal."

The principle of devolution is, Wheare states (page 33), "that in which the regional governments are subordinate to the general government." The term has been applied to the system in Northern Ireland and to the Government of India Act of 1919.

In the case of Northern Ireland, the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, states that the Parliament of Northern Ireland has powers to make laws in respect of all subjects except certain enumerated subjects such as defence, external affairs, customs duties and the succession to the throne. However, it adds (quoted by Wheare, page 31): "Notwithstanding the establishment of the Parliament of Northern Ireland or anything contained in this Act, the supreme authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom shall remain unaffected and undiminished over all persons, matters and things in Ireland and every part thereof." Wheare argues (page 31) (a) "there is nothing in law to prevent the Parliament of the United Kingdom from passing laws for Northern Ireland not merely on the specified reserved subjects, but on any subject whatever." **In the case of Provincial Councils, Sri Lanka's Parliament has first to repeal the Thirteenth Amendment and that too by a two-thirds majority before taking possession of the law-making powers of Provincial Councils contained in List I.** (b) "the Parliament of Northern Ireland received its powers from the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and the latter can reduce or increase or abolish these powers." Sri Lanka's

Parliament has this same right but it can only do this by a two-thirds majority of its total membership which means that the members of Parliament from a majority of areas covered by the Provincial Councils must co-operate in any attempt to interfere with their legislative powers. In Britain, a simple majority of Parliament will suffice." (c) "laws passed by the Parliament of Northern Ireland, even though they are within the powers of that Parliament and have received the assent of the Governor, can be disallowed and rendered of no effect by the Home Secretary of the United Kingdom."

There is no such power of disallowance in regard to laws or statutes enacted by Provincial Councils provided such statutes are within the scope of subjects enumerated in List I.

In regard to the Government of India Act of 1919, Wheare states (page 31) that the provinces were given powers "but these powers were to be exercised subject to the supremacy of the

general government." There is no such limiting power or blanket restriction in respect of powers to be exercised under List I by Provincial Councils.

CASE AGAINST THE AMENDMENT

The case against the Thirteenth Amendment is in our view overwhelming. We will therefore have to work out whether on balance Provincial Councils are worth giving a try. The case against principally lies in regard to two matters, namely, 1. the exercise of the executive power; and 2. a comparison of the powers given to Provincial Councils under List I with the powers enumerated in List III (Concurrent list) where the Central Government has priority over statutes enacted by the Provincial Councils in the event of a conflict of legislation.

The executive power is wholly vested, under Article 154 C, in the Governor who is appointed by the President.

(To be continued)

RAJIV FEELS MORE AT HOME ABROAD

Rajiv Gandhi is fast emerging as a national nuisance No.1. And a very expensive nuisance at that. That he feels more at home abroad is already well established. But increasingly now, every time he decides to take off on a foreign jaunt, it costs the country dearly, sends Air India deeper into the red, and makes tens of hundreds of dislocated travellers hopping mad.

Take the present case. The President is away on a visit to the Soviet Union and the Prime Minister also takes off on a four-nation tour, both flying Air India. Result: as many as 62 AI flights have had to be cancelled since July 2, stranding and gravely inconveniencing an estimated 22,000 passengers! What this once much sought after national airline suffers in image and reliability cannot but have long-term effects on its finances. Already this year it is said to have incurred a loss of Rs.40 crore.

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inconvenience if there is a good reason for it. But if Rajiv Gandhi's globe-trotting is not so perceived, it is for a very good reason. **According to a computation done by the Sunday Observer, Rajiv Gandhi has spent one of every nine days he has been Prime Minister abroad. He has visited 52 countries in six continents, Greenland and Antarctica being the only exceptions so far! In a recent period of seven months he visited eight countries!**

Who is this man? Is he the Prime Minister of a country of 800 million people reeling under a mountain of problems? or is he a reincarnation of some Arabian Nights potentate, who views the state as his personal fief? That a Prime Minister should mock at their miseries in this manner, that he should go on and on with the mockery, galls the people more than anything else today. (*Indian Express*, July 13, 1988)

INDEMNITY LAW - 'MILITARISATION' ADVANCES

It was a coincidence of course but too striking not to mark well. Just two days after the Minister of National Security, Mr. Lalith Athulathmudali scoffed at the latest Amnesty report on Sri Lanka (See Amnesty on IPKF, Lanka Troops) the government gazetted a Bill to indemnify all PTA enforcers for eight-and-a-half years - from the introduction of the PTA in July 1979 to Dec. 1987! **The Bill covers all persons who acted "lawfully or unlawfully"**! And the ambit of the proposed law which is certain to be passed in a Parliament where the governing party enjoys a five-sixths majority is so wide that it covers almost every action taken by an 'offender'.

The indemnity embraces the lawful or unlawful act of any individual who was "involved in the detection, prevention or prosecution of any person indulging in unlawful activities specified in the Prevention of Terrorism Act."

In short, they are protected from being charged for human rights violations. Or, from the citizen's point of view, his fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution mean little if the transgression can be covered by the proposed Bill. Police and Security personnel will no longer bother to act under 'emergency regulations' tough as they are. If their 'lawful or unlawful' actions were committed before Dec. 31, 1987, and are covered by the PTA, they are totally immune. And since by 1989, the law is likely to be extended to cover such activities until Dec. 31, 1988, the immunity is not only absolute but permanent, and continuing.

An interesting feature is that this retroactive legislation is being introduced by a party that was so violently opposed to such measures by its United Front (1970-77) predecessor that it made a dirty word of 'retroactive'!

Official sources told the SUN which made a front page lead story of the new bill that the government's intention was to prevent 'frivolous' cases being filed against members of the security forces. Fair enough. But who is to judge what is frivolous or not?

The Executive or the Judiciary? In any event, this Bill when it becomes law will not permit any legal action to be instituted. It states: **"No court of law or tribunal shall have the power or jurisdiction to entertain or inquire into or hear and determine any such action or proceeding."**

In order to prevent 'frivolous' charges, all legal proceedings against security personnel will be automatically disallowed. In other words, security personnel, including those who may have committed 'unlawful' acts such as murder or torture, will be effectively above the law and the Constitution. Security personnel will be treated as a special class of citizens.

This step, shocking and horrendous as it is, does not reflect badly on this or that 'law enforcement agency' of the Government or its Army, Navy or Air Force; or of any particular Police Chief or service Commander. Indeed its enormous importance lies in precisely that fact - the far-reaching legislation change to afford extraordinary immunity to an institution - the country's armed forces and the police.

A few days after 'black July' (1983), Dr. Colvin R de Silva, answering a question on its likely consequences, surprised the present writer with this brief reply: "The army has thrust itself into politics." Of course, he meant the services.

The armed conflict created an increasingly larger role for the 'law-and-order' agencies, the police unable to contain the conflict on its own.

Indeed, such was the 'security threat', that new specially trained units were established to cope with the variegated challenges of this threat to the State. One was the Special Task Force (STF), an elite police commando unit trained by foreign mercenaries brought here by the KMS, a Channel Islands-based British firm formed by former S.A.S. ('Dogs of War') personnel, and by Pakistani and Israeli instructors. We then had the 'Home Guards' and other paramilitary units and militias. Defence spending, the Finance Minister kept complaining bitterly, rose from 2 per

cent of the annual budget to nearly 20 per cent.

The L.G. chose to call this 'the militarisation process for there was no rapid transformation of the nature of government and State, no dramatic transition from civilian government to junta via coup d'etat or power-sharing arrangement, a change so familiar to the Third World. The Presidency and indeed civilian Authority were very much in command. But all these visible, radical changes amounted to a process distinctly Third Worldist in character. It is a new 'period of transition' but not of the type which Mr. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike sought to announce in a characteristically rhetorical fashion.

The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord brought an end to the Army's direct participation in the northern conflict. But on the very day it was signed, a new security threat emerged even more dramatically - the violent opposition of the Sinhalese majority, which was soon to assume a more well-defined character and invite the descriptive title of the 'the JVP threat', or in Sri Kotha idiom 'Southern terrorism' and in the mainstream, state-run media, 'Southern subversives'.

The Southern Province polls, both a prestige battle for the UNP as well as a UNP-JVP tussle to demonstrate each other's 'effective control' of the deep South, is now over. A new phase begins.

The administrative and operational changes are explained in this report from the *Weekend*, a summary of the weekly 'Situation Report' by the exceptionally well-informed Iqbal Athas: **"The government will effect a major reorganisation of the security set up in the South with immediate effect."** *Weekend* reliably learns that measures will include a phased withdrawal of the Police Special Task Force (STF) and the appointment of new Military Coordinating Officers to areas affected by subversive activity.

With these changes, the security forces and Police will launch a massive public relations drive intended to overcome the fear psychosis created by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna.

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INDIA'S EIGHT OPTIONS

By Qadri Ismail in *The Sunday Times (Colombo)* - July 14, 1988.

"Better to let them do it imperfectly, than to do it perfectly yourself, for it is their country, their war, and your time is short."

The words are those of T.E. Lawrence, but they were probably similar to the thoughts of many Indian diplomats last week. Don't be mistaken; they are nowhere near conceding defeat. (In any case, they haven't been defeated.) Nevertheless, they are beginning to rethink. The first letters have been etched on a wall down Thurstan Road, though the full message will not be evident for many months: **No country, however large, can in the post-colonial era succeed in physically managing, over an extended period, the internal affairs of another.**

The U.S.A. in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan are only the high profile examples. The Vietnamese themselves were not successful in Kampuchea, the Israelis are not in Palestine, the Syrians are not in Lebanon, etc. Just as much we would not be in the mess we are in right now if our people and government had learned from the mistakes of others, India, too, wouldn't be in the mess it is beginning to realise it is in Sri Lanka today, if it had learned from the similar follies of the "super" powers.

It was way back in 1945 that K.M. Panikkar, the noted Indian foreign policy scholar, wrote, "while to other countries the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is the vital sea... Her future is dependent on the freedom of that vast water surface. No industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable political structure is possible for her unless the Indian Ocean is free and her own shores fully protected. The Indian Ocean must, therefore, remain truly Indian." The implications of this statement for countries around India are not difficult to grasp.

Jawaharlal Nehru was, being a politician, a little more ambitious and a little less diplomatic. In 1954, he called India "the obvious fourth country in the world after the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R and China". Not foreseeing the rise of Japan and of a united

(Western) Europe is forgivable. From a founder of Non-Alignment, his utterances on the relations between big powers and puny countries are not: "I can understand some of the similar countries of Europe or... of Asia being forced by circumstances to bow down before some of the greater Powers and becoming practically satellites of those Powers, because they cannot help it..."

There has been, from those days, a basic continuity in Indian foreign policy, a steady working towards the accomplishment of these goals. This is not the place to look at Sikkim, Bhutan, Nepal, or Bangladesh. Suffice to say that on July 29th 1987, slightly less than four years after Indira Gandhi walked through an ante-room in her office and told the various leaders of the Tamil militant organisations assembled there that she would look after them, Phase One of the recent Indian initiative on Sri Lanka was virtually over. The militants had been successfully used to gain the leverage India wanted over Colombo. All that remained was for them to be quietly neutralised. And all that stood in the way was one man, without even O levels, called Velupillai Prabhakaran.

PRABAHARAN RESISTED ACCORD

He resisted the accord and was dragged kicking and screaming into "co-operating with its implementation" in August. He fought back "non-violently" and won virtual control over the north and east in September. Dissatisfied, he fought back violently in October. In February, he authorised his former Jaffna commander, Sathasivam Krishnakumar, to begin another round of peace negotiations. When these seemed close to fruition, he struck again.

The Tiger statement of July 9th is ominous. It is also the most noteworthy political event so far this year. The "enormous sacrifices made by the Tamil people and martyrdom attained by thousands of Tamil youth was", it states, "not to effect a temporary merger and elections for powerless Provincial Councils. What is

described as north and east is the motherland of Tamils, and that is indivisible." After accusing the Indians of "committing greater atrocities than the Sri Lankans", it goes on, in the strongest language used by the Tigers to date, to call the accord nothing less than "a charter of servility for the Tamils." By those words, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam has categorically rejected the accord and lost the chance of entering the "main stream" of politics except on Indian terms.

The statement goes on to say that the Indians are wrong if they hope to implement the accord by destroying the Tigers and imposing a set of quislings on the Tamils. Then follows the threat, which the Tigers no doubt hoped would make the Indians tremble. "If India continues to engage in its efforts to eliminate Tigers and kill Tamils, it would withdraw from the farcical peace talks and prepare the Tamil nation for a long and protracted struggle against foreign domination."

Reacting to this, an important Sri Lankan official said, it has "frightful implications" and was worried that the Indians would now increase the heat on Colombo to immediately improve the devolution package. The Indian High Commission, however, reacted with equanimity. It regretted the LTTE's stance, "in the context of the very earnest endeavours made by the Government of India to invite the LTTE to the processes of democratic policies"; and added that India would "continue its various efforts at persuading them to give up violence."

WHAT INDIA CAN DO

Actually, there is very little new that India can do. On paper, it has the following options, presented in order of unlikelihood:

1. Withdraw the IPKF, say they made a mistake in getting involved in the first place and leave the Sinhalese and Tamils to sort things out;
2. Militarily destroy the LTTE;
3. Make the Sri Lankan government announce a permanent merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces and change the devolution package substantially;

4.Go through with elections in the north and east without LTTE participation- while the battle is still on - and claim that their obligations under the accord have been fulfilled;

5.Close down the LTTE office in Madras;

6.Arm more effectively and unleash groups like EPRLF, ENDLF and TELO on the Tigers;

7.Intensify rehabilitation and other efforts to drive a wedge between the Tamil population and the Tigers;

8.Continue doing what they are now.

To look at each option in turn. **Firstly**, the IPKF cannot withdraw. The Sri Lankan government will protest at India leaving without completing the job, and also leaving it to fight on two fronts at the same time. **More importantly from the Indian perspective, this would mean that all Indian regional ambitions, the main thrust of their foreign policy since 1948, would crumble.** (And the Pakistanis would celebrate Ramzan for the second time this year!) No, the Indians are still some years away from having to humble themselves before the world. Though, as with all "great" powers, their time, too, will come.

As for two; even if the Congress (I) forgets its ambitions in Tamil Nadu, **the IPKF cannot (attempt to) militarily defeat the Tigers because no army has, in the post-colonial age, vanquished a guerilla foe.** **Three;** the Indians can't put more pressure on Colombo and ask for permanent merger at this stage because it is politically impossible for the UNP to grant this (as long as an election is pending here); and now that India is actually in Phase Two of its Sri Lanka operation, **it is more important for it to "protect its investment in Colombo."** **In the words of one Indian diplomat, "We can't sacrifice Colombo for the Tigers."**

Four: elections cannot be held in the north and east as long as the LTTE and IPKF are fighting because, under the Provincial Councils Bill, the President cannot proclaim a merger of the Provinces until he is satisfied that

there is a cessation of hostilities. (K.C.Pant's timetable gets added to the long list of irrelevant pronouncements on Sri Lanka.) It is possible for Mr.Jayewardene to amend this particular clause. Or he can say that he is satisfied that there has been a cessation of hostilities - if the Indians persuade him - even though slight fighting continues. But (again, as long as an election is pending) this is not likely.

Five: closing down the Madras Tiger office would be counter-productive as long as the Indians can hope that the "moderate" Kittu can in any way influence Tiger thinking. **Options six and seven will probably be**



employed to whatever extent possible. But what the Indians are most likely to do is continue to meander along as they have been doing since February "intensifying" military operations and praying like hell that the Tigers see reason.

TIGERS HAVE 2000 WEAPONS

The Indians face many difficulties in moving for decisive victory against the Tigers. Sri Lankan intelligence estimates that the guerillas have 2,500 fighters, of whom only about half carry weapons all the time - for fear of getting caught at Indian check points. The Tigers are estimated to have around 2,200 weapons, including 80 to 100 heavy weapons. In certain areas, these sources say, like north of Vavuniya, Vantharumoolai and north of Mannar, no serious moves have been made against the Tigers. Which is where the bulk of them are meant to be found now. (The Tigers are also meant to be low on supplies; they do not engage the IPKF in direct confrontations, and no longer, always kill suspected informants with bullets, but were using knives etc.)

Currently, 15,000 troops are employed in some of these areas in

"Operation Checkmate", which is described by the Indians as "just a name given to the checking of movements of men and materials into the Vavuniya sector." Soldiers of the 4th division, who specialise in "information and disinformation", are being used here. The specialist counter-insurgency division, the 57th, is currently deployed in Batticaloa. This has seen anti-guerilla activity in Mizoram and Nagaland. "But," said a senior Sri Lankan officer who had trained with the Indian Army in Mizoram, "the terrain is very different. Those areas are hilly, wet and with thick jungle. While Mullaitivu has the thickest forests in Sri Lanka, those are dry and scrub and in flat land.

"The current Indian strategy," he said, "has to be changed to one involving protracted missions into these forests. They must be prepared to stay there for long periods - and even then their chances of success are not certain. They have to improve their intelligence and hit selected targets, hard and fast. That is the only way." For a proper cordon and search operation in such terrain, a soldier is needed every five yards. No army has this kind of man-power. In Nagaland, the Indian Army used as much as 6,000 men to cover areas of 30 square miles - and still had not very impressive success.

The LTTE operates now in groups of five to eight, each group a minimum of five and a maximum of ten miles from the next. Young, "innocent looking" children perform sentry duties; most of them have radios, but close to a camp, exploding a grenade alone would suffice as warning. With their superior knowledge of the terrain, the Tigers, who break into ones and twos when retreating, would find it easy to exfiltrate if attacked. "Besides", said the Sri Lankan officer, "the Indians are fighting with SLR's, which are not as effective in close combat as the AK-47. Like they did recently in the Golden Temple, they should use AK's themselves."

FULL-THROATED PRESSURE

In time, the IPKF will no doubt sort these things out as much as they can. Now that the Tigers have effectively

given up the negotiations option, the Indian Army will have to change from putting half-hearted to full throated military pressure on the guerillas. By failing to deliver the Tigers, it is RAW, which has been conducting the negotiations, that will find its credibility weakened. In contrast, Jotyindra Nath Dixit, who has been advocating a tougher line with the Tigers, was smiling this week.

RAW, badly needing to restore its image following the widely touted intelligence failures that led to major IPKF mistakes after October 10th, must have decided to make a deal with the LTTE at any cost. The cost of a short term triumph for RAW, of course, was long-term disaster for India. (Since the Tigers would have used the deal only as breathing space to be able once again to destabilise the situation.) RAW would have considered climbing this wall when they came to it.

Mr.Dixit would like to avoid it, he is careful. "They are not responding to political contacts, so military efforts

will continue," reveals only the thin edge of the wedge. What that statement actually says is that no deal is possible with the LTTE and the political option has to be abandoned. With his friend Narasimha Rao back in the Ministry of External Affairs, and with circumstances proving him right, Mr.Dixit's clout with his Prime Minister can only increase.



"A DEMOLISHED SCHOOL IN JAFFNA"

The LTTE clearly fear this. Mr.Dixit's refusal to be alarmed about their July 9th statement must have led to the one four days later, where the Tiger threat of protracted war was changed into an almost desperate plea that one must be prevented. "Heroic freedom struggles of the

oppressed people were never defeated in history," it concluded. Its author is right; but that fact does not mean that the LTTE has the ghost of a chance of winning, either - whether their goal is Eelam or anything else. The IPKF expects a long war of attrition, and this is what will happen, with the LTTE being steadily marginalised. (Though this does not rule out the occasional spectacular attack, say in Jaffna, for media purposes.) The only consolation for Mr.Prabaharan and his deputy will be that they will take the Indians down with them. Eventually.

From a country-wide perspective, what this means is continued instability. And, as long as conditions are unsettled in the north and east, it can be argued that national elections-whether General or Presidential - cannot be held. It will then be of little consolation to the SLFP, considering together all four electorates that voted on Thursday, they polled more votes than the UNP. *By courtesy - 'The Sunday Times' - July 17, 1988*

KIDNAPPING OF MR.KANTHASAMY

From Central British Fund for Tamil Refugees Rehabilitation communique of June 29, 1988

From January 1988, Mr.Kanthasamy, a founder member of the Tamil Refugees Rehabilitation Organisation (TRRO), has been visiting various districts in Sri Lanka including Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Mullaitivu, Vavuniya, Mannar and Jaffna and Colombo in connection with relief and rehabilitation programmes despite signs of danger to his life.

On February 22, the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS) invited Mr. Kanthasamy to a meeting with the Trincomalee District Development Foundation (TDDF), an organisation linked to EROS. Mr.Kanthasamy pointed out at the meeting that if gaining access to funds from donor agencies was an aim of the TDDF, then, to that extent, it would fail since no donor agency would support an organisation with allegiance to a militant group or political party.

On March 30, a representative of EROS visited the TRRO office in Jaffna to ask Mr.Kanthasamy for an immediate meeting. The latter who had just returned from Colombo proposed to have the meeting on 2.4.88. The representative went away unsatisfied. The

same evening three representatives visited Mr.Kanthasamy pressing for an earlier meeting, and it was agreed to be held the following day at 11 a.m. They warned him not to trifle with an organisation like EROS and added that they would send a van at 11 a.m. the following day and he should go to their office.

On March 31, the same three visited him and held the meeting at his place itself where he was confronted about a memorandum by TRRO signed under his name, calling for a Co-ordinating Committee of NGOs in each district. They told him they would disrupt any rehabilitation work that is not in conformity with their policy and that no work would be tolerated except with their permission. When he asked what their policy was they replied that they could not announce it but that permission would have to be obtained case by case. They also reminded him that Mr. Kathirimalai had been killed because he had acted against their policy, and that the same fate would befall others as well.

On May 5, the Secretary & Counsellor of TRRO was demanded by EROS to issue a statement that

Mr.Kanthasamy was dissociated from TRRO, which the officer declined to do.

On May 9, this demand was repeated by Mr.Balakumar, the EROS leader, to the Chairman of TRRO and the latter asked for time to consider the matter. May 12 - 21: When Mr.Kanthasamy returned to Jaffna from his visit to Trincomalee, TRRO officials advised him to leave Jaffna for a while for fear that EROS might harm him. He replied he would not run away and that he would continue to do his work. He told the Chairman that TRRO should not succumb to such interference and that it should be closed down if it could not function as a free organisation. He added he was going to apprise the donor agencies of the problems faced by TRRO; "I have worked in this field for nearly 12 years; and it has always been on the basis that the donors should know every problem; and I am not willing to act on any basis other than the truth."

On June 19, early morning a van appeared at Mr.Kanthasamy's residence and he was kidnapped. To date, no information has been received about his fate.

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Details about the proposed changes, *Weekend* learns, are now being worked out by General Cyril Ranatunga, General Officer Commanding the Joint Operations Command, in consultation with President J.R. Jayewardene.

The primary objective of the new exercise is to ensure that normal conditions exist for the conduct of both General and Presidential elections. Highly placed security sources said personnel of the STF who will be withdrawn from southern positions will be re-assigned. A Brigade Commander is also to be named for the Southern sector. Colonel Lucky Algama, Military Co-ordinating Officer for Ratnapura who is based in

Embilipitiya is being strongly tipped for this position."

Some political sociologists who have studied the intricate, multifarious ways in which armed conflict introduces the army as a major actor in the political drama have gone beyond 'militarisation'. When the armed conflict is not resolved but in fact assumes a new, ever-changing shape, civilian regimes need to rely more and more on the military which in turn demands not only more power, and more resources, but a special status and more privileges. In the end we have **the emergence of a military system** which is quite different from that which exists in First or Second world societies, argues Johann Galtung in his essay 'Military For-

mations and Social Formations: A structural Analysis." His focus is not on the military system as it operates in conflicts between States but within States; the Third World phenomenon. In any case, says Galtung, the growth rate of the military system is much higher in the Third World. The special emphasis of his study is on how the military system relates to the 'social structure in which it is embedded, the society that produces and reproduces the system, the degree of interdependence - the society forming the military system and vice versa - becoming more pronounced as the military system becomes stronger and more 'developed'. By courtesy - *Lanka Guardian* - July 1, 1988

BOOK REVIEW

AGONY OF SRI LANKA

THE PEACE TRAP: An Indo Sri Lankan Political Crisis:

By P.S. Suryanarayana: Affiliated East-West Press (P) Ltd., 25, Muniappa Road, Madras - 10. Price: Rs.36.00.

Here at last is a book on the Tamil ethnic problem in Sri Lanka and India's deep involvement therein. **The crisis should have ended with the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987, but of late pacts entered into by our government have a knack of adding fuel to an already raging fire.** The problem is very much with us and a book like this was long overdue, if only to put events in clearer perspective.

Mr. P.S. Suryanarayana, working with *The Financial Express*, has spelt out the issues and presented facts with commendable impartiality. According to the author the Indo-Sri Lanka Pact has become a **"peace trap" for the three protagonists - the governments of Sri Lanka and India and the militant Tamils** - who are running round and round in traps of their making, unable to find a way out.

One does not have to agree with the author that the Pact is a trap to appreciate the meticulous care with which the scenario has been sketched. As a pressman who was in the thick of it all and with his personal contacts with the elusive Prabhakaran he had access to information which he is now sharing with his readers. One great merit of the book is the author's self effacing stance, leaving the

readers to judge for themselves. The presentation is simple and straightforward, mercifully free from hyperboles and cliches. One fault that may be pointed out is that the author tends to shuttle back and forth over the events, ignoring chronological sequence, a style of writing that may confuse the casual or unwary reader. Nonetheless it is a job well done.

Though the two signatories to the pact were the Indian and Sri Lankan Governments - what the author calls the **"Mystery of the missing signature"** of the LTTE - it was part of the deal that the militants would surrender their arms and participate in the provincial elections. The LTTE made only a token surrender after which a truculent Prabhakaran and his men resumed fighting, this time against the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka. This is the new phase of the problem, the "Trap" which the protagonists have got into.

In 1987 the Indo-Sri Lanka Pact came as a breath of fresh air though India's motivation might have been basically what the author calls "geo-political diplomacy." The significant aspect of the Pact was that the Jayewardene Government agreed to the merger of the Eastern and Northern provinces which had been one of the major demands of the militants. The stage

was being set for carving out partially autonomous provinces as a substitute for separate State. By courtesy - *The Hindu (Intl. Edn.)* of June 25, 1988

THONDAMAN BLOWS HOT AND COLD

The entire basis of the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord is wrong, says Mr. S. Thondaman, Minister of Rural & Industrial Development. "The Agreement should have been between the Tamils and the Sinhalese of this country, with India underwriting it", he says.

He was commenting on the latest statement issued by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam who have called the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord a "Charter of Servility for the Tamils".

He said, "I have also reiterated that one should never negotiate by proxy. The Indian Peace Keeping Force now looks very foolish for having relied on Kittu. Negotiations should always be direct; otherwise the other party thinks that you are weak".

He further added, "The IPKF came on a mission of peace to assist the Tamils. Is it now possible for them to fight to the last man? They also said that they were interested in a negotiated settlement and not in a military solution to the problem. What will they do now? You must ask them that.

THE XIII AMENDMENT ON LAND SOVEREIGNTY

A CRYSTALLISATION OF CENTRAL CONTROL

By Wakeley Paul

Mr. Satyendra in his incisive article entitled "The Tamil National Question and the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord" highlighted the distinction between 'Devolution' and 'Federalism' as follows:

"Devolution means that power devolves from a higher body to a lower body..... Power so devolved ... can always be taken back, and, what is more, controlled and regulated by that higher body."

In another article, I demonstrated the extent to which devolved power (under the XIII Amendment) was controlled by a combination of the Sinhala dominated Central Government and Provincial Governments. Any initiative by the Councils of the North and East to deviate from the Sinhalese non-readiness to surrender power to the Tamils could and would be easily stifled and nullified by those two sets of Sinhala dominated institutions. In this article, I highlight how almost non-existent is the extent of devolution in that most crucial area to the Tamil people, "**Land and Land Settlement**" (ninth schedule list I, Appendix B of the XIII Amendment); the inability to exercise meaningful sovereignty over the Tamil homelands allows for an erosion of the Tamil ability to demand a degree of regional autonomy. It is the crux upon which the right to regional autonomy rests.

REASONS FOR DEVOLUTION

Before going into the provisions purporting to devolve the right to control territory in the Northern and Eastern provinces, I wish to briefly reiterate what we all know, the Sinhalese reluctance to constitutionally relinquish their control over the Tamils on the island as a whole.

The underlying grounds on the quest for **Federalism**, which has blossomed into a demand for **Tamil Eelam**, stems from a combination of Sinhalese convictions, not often shared or understood by the Sinhalese-educated elite who are not dependent as politicians are in playing to these convictions for their survival. These could be summarised as follows:

- (i) That this island is their only land.
- (ii) That other minorities have other homes to return to.
- (iii) That the Tamils in combination with their Indian counterparts intend to subjugate them.
- (iv) That this can result in the Dutugemunu fear of being driven from their homeland to the ocean.
- (v) That they must make up for the 'Divide and Rule' policy of the British that supposedly advantaged minorities at their expense.

All of the above resulted in the minorities having been relegated to a destiny of discrimination since the Sinhalese majority



WAKELEY PAUL

attained independence from the British. Sinhala-Buddhism had to be restored to its rightful place, and since the island was their only refuge, this had to take precedence. Minorities cannot demand equality from a majority who feel they were discriminated against. The primary goal of the Sinhalese clergy was to regain their primacy, which the minorities had to recognise. The island was theirs to achieve their aims, and minorities became a tolerated presence who had to understand the Sinhalese psyche, and the need for Sinhala-Buddhist resurgence.

The destiny of discrimination, accompanied by the fact that this was of necessity to be their only expectation, resulted in the demand for a separate but equal status in their traditional homelands. This raises two questions, what are those home-

lands and how much autonomy can they exercise over them.

HOMELANDS DELINEATED

Traditionally, Tamils and Sinhalese alike have regarded the North and East as traditional Tamil homelands. This was even reluctantly conceded in Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, Clause 1.4 which added to that recognition, that they "have been areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamils" with the proviso "who have at all times hitherto lived together in this territory with other ethnic groups." The recognition that these were traditionally Tamil lands was made in the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam and the Senanayake-Chelvanayakam pacts. Perhaps a pertinent recognition of this fact came in Mr. Cleghorn's observation as a first Colonial Secretary in 1799 when he said, "Two different nations from a very ancient period divided between them the possession of the island. The Sinhalese inhabiting the interior of the country in the Southern and Western parts, and the Malabars (Tamils) who possess the Northern and Eastern Districts"

Robert Browning delineated the area North of Puttalam to Batticaloa as Tamil territory.

TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY DEFINED

Sovereignty of territory involves ownership that can be divested by relinquishing to another the right to control it. This control involves in turn the right to determine who shall occupy it and on what terms. The question then is how far has the Sri Lankan Government, which inherited the state from the British, divested themselves of their rights of ownership to the Provincial Councils by the XIII Amendment.

The Amendment does precious little to give Tamils any semblance of sovereignty over their homelands, primarily because the Tamil desire to stem the tide of Sinhala colonisation remains unabated.

Appendix II begins with the ominous

proposition that title to state land continues to be vested in the Republic.

All land irrigated by inter-Provincial rivers, or are part of a land development scheme with a command post in two or more Provinces will continue to be the responsibility of the Sri Lankan Government (2:2) and will be managed and administered by it (2:8) they will select allottees based on landlessness, income level, agricultural background etc. (2:4) with distribution based on the National Ethnic Ratio. Where then is there any change in the status quo, since these are the lands that have been the primary object of past colonisation. The only concession is that settlement will be done (subject to the above principles) so as not to upset the demographic balance significantly (2:6). What does this mean? The fact is, **the balance will continue to be unbalanced in favour of the national majority as opposed to the regional majority.**

What part does the provincial council play here? All they can do after the Central Government has selected the allottees, and determined the size of the holdings, is to decide who will go where (2:4) (see the words "The actual application of these principles, selection of allottees, and other incidental matters connected thereto will be within the power of the Provincial Council"). Is this effective divestment of sovereignty? An Estate Kangani has as much control over the housing of labourers on estate Lines!

What degree of divestment of sovereignty has been made on other lands in these regions? The greatest concession here is that land not required by the Central Government for concurrent or reserved subjects shall be made available to the Provincial Council (1:1 and 1:2).

How much land does this encompass? And what power do the Provincial Councils have over these remnants of state land? Do they even have the right to select its allottees? The answer even here is in the negative, for that power is reserved to the President on the Council's advice, which of course he can reject or modify, since this has to be done in accor-

dance with laws passed by the Central Government (1:3).

Having thus effectively controlled their selection of allottees, what powers are they left with? It says "The right to administer, control and utilize such land in accordance with the laws and statutes governing the matter." It is clear they have no legislative power over this territory. All they can determine possibly are the crops to be grown, and how it shall be fertilised or irrigated according to the laws of the National Government. Even here they are totally subordinated to the dictates of the National Land Commission, which formulates national policy for state land use based on technical aspects and will lay down norms based on soil, climate... environmental and economic factors, (3:3) and provincial power will be subject to that policy. This technical bureaucrat is not just to be consulted, but to be heeded, so even the choice of crops or irrigation remains under central control. The Provincial Council has been relegated to the roll of a minor provincial administrator to carry out the dictates of the Central Government.

Furthermore, these lands can be nationalised at any time, or be commandeered for uses in the concurrent or reserved list. This includes land for the army, navy and airforce camps, buildings and homes for the construction and maintenance of harbours, airports, industrial projects, state government offices, prisons, national police units - all with no ethnic constraints. In those cases, all that the provincial council can expect is to be consulted as to its utilisation, for what that is worth their advice and views are subject to anything from outright rejection to watered down or total acceptance. The provincial council can do nothing to reverse the National Government's decisions.

CONCLUSION

It is quite evident that the XIII Amendment is designed to retain the Central Government's control of land in the North and East and continue its policy of colonisation in the North, Central and Eastern Provinces. With each passing day, the Sinhalese hold and claim

to these habitats increases, while Tamil demand for autonomy diminishes. Anyone with the desire for autonomy to acquiesce to this amendment as an acceptable solution to their aspirations for regional rule, must lack a fundamental understanding of its implications. The amendment only helps to enhance the need to resort to force as the only measure left for preserving the region's historical demography. It is hardly the peaceful solution to the ethnic violation that racks the country now. It consolidates power up rather than devolving it down.

SIRIMAVO IS RAVING AGAIN

The SLFP leader, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, feels that talking to the LTTE is a futile exercise. "It is useless trying to talk to Prabaharan. He is just playing for time. Prabaharan will never agree to the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord because he will then have to contest Provincial Council elections. And he knows that he cannot win at an election", Mrs. Bandaranaike said. She feels that the 'onus' is on the Indian government to subdue the Tigers militarily. "President Jayewardene has implemented his part of the Accord. But the Indian government has not implemented theirs. They should not allow the Tigers to remain in Madras. They should force them to return to Sri Lanka", she declared. "Instead", charged Mrs. Bandaranaike, "the Indian government is flying the Tigers to and from Sri Lanka and paying them money to maintain their cadres. I don't see why they can't arrest that fellow Prabaharan if they want to." By courtesy - 'Sunday Times' (Sri Lanka) - July 17, 1988

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THE MIXED HERITAGE OF JULY

By Ajith Samaranayake

July brings mixed memories to the United National Party. It was on July 22, 1977 that the UNP scored its most spectacular electoral triumph and established a Government, the Government which is still in power. Six years later, however, on the same anniversary anti Tamil riots broke out all over Sri Lanka inaugurating the present phase of Sri Lanka's agony. Last year in July the Government signed an accord with India which it was hoped would bring about peace in the north and the east. Last week, however, a somewhat disenchanted Minister of Lands, Land Development and Mahaveli Development Gamini Dissanayake, who is credited with being one of the chief architects of the accord, told a meeting of Foreign Correspondents in Colombo that India had failed to fulfil its functions under the accord.

As the Government celebrated its 12th year in office last week, political observers would not have failed to remark on another event. At Kapparatota in Weligama on Thursday, southern subversives tried out their first landmine. Nobody was injured but two vehicles were damaged. They were part of a convoy conveying members of the Southern Provincial Council for their inaugural meeting.

All these developments therefore have contributed to colouring and conditioning the last 12 years in Sri Lanka's politics. The fact is that when the UNP triumphally took office in July 1977 the country was already bifurcated. The non-Tamil opposition had been reduced to a sorry rump and the north had overwhelmingly endorsed the Tamil United Liberation Front's programme of establishing a Tamil Eelam. **During the years which followed, what the country witnessed was the gradual eclipse of the TULF and the ascendancy**

of the LTTE even while the Government in Colombo parleyed with the TULF and offered them some concessions which were too little too late and were anyway being overtaken by events.

Four decades after independence therefore we see a nation rigidly divided on the lines of race. For one reason or another it appears as if the north and the east have slipped out of the orbit of the state. And paradoxically enough parts of the south too are stirring on the same lines. What is interesting is that it was the intense feeling in the south against the Tamil struggle for separatism which made the Government intensify its campaign against the LTTE thus bringing about Indian intervention. But now the south is going on a limb and employing some of the more striking methods of Tamil terrorism like the landmine and the lamp post killing.

The reality however is more complex. Both Tamil terrorism and southern terrorism are the extreme virulent forms of deep-seated discontent among sections of society. In the vanguard of the movements are the lower middle classes who feel that they have not got a proper deal from successive Governments which have catered only to the elite in the big towns. The economic development on some fronts and the great personal wealths which a few merchant knights of the open economy have been able to build up in recent years have only served to accentuate the fissures in contemporary society and deepen the sense of discontent.

It is a sign of social dislocation that these sections have gone beyond all the bounds of accepted political protest and are resorting to unprecedentedly brutal and barbaric methods of trying to undermine the governmental structure.

It is difficult to believe that

counter-violence will be able to bring such campaign to heel. In the north, India has got bogged down in its Tiger hunt. In the South the JVP which now has no prescription inscribed on it back is nevertheless going on a killing spree.

What these groups, both in the north and the south, want is nebulous and hazy. What strikes the observer about them is not what they say but what they do. In the north they claim to be fighting for a separate Tamil state and in the south Rohana Wijeweera through his clandestine speeches tries to keep the faithful happy by supplying them with a diet of rhetoric, apocalyptic visions and personal abuse.

It is an illustration of how fractured the political system has become that not merely the ruling party but all conventional political parties are finding themselves unable to cope with the phenomenon.

While the ruling party has declared war on the JVP the Leader of the Opposition can only offer them some portfolios in a future SLFP Government.

Is it possible that they will be satisfied with such a gap? **Conventional politics, whether of the left or right, will have to come to terms with the reality of societal dislocation and think of radical remedies for what is a frightening malaise.**

Twelve years after July 1977 therefore the central problem which confronts the country is how Sri Lanka can be brought back to the main track of representative democracy so that the electoral process can be revived.

If this is not accomplished all the talk of elections that are heard now will only be so much fantasy.

Courtesy: "The Island", July 24, 1988.

DELHI EXPECTS KITTU TO FALL INTO THE SAME TRAP


The Indian government continues to tell the press and media that it is negotiating a peaceful settlement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). **The Delhi Government pretends as if it really wants peace.** If the Indian government is serious and sincere in bringing about peace, what should it do?

Let us illustrate. Assume that Ramu and Somu are fighting on the roadside and you step in to bring about a settlement. What would you do? First, you will ask them to stop fighting; won't you? If Ramu, saying that he is agreeable for peace, continues to assault Somu, will it make sense? If Ramu says "Somu should prostrate himself before me first; then only I will agree to conciliation", is it reconciliation or surrender?

Delhi government is enacting a similar drama. **While muttering the word "Peace" to the external world, it is hell bent on hunting down the Tamil Tigers.** "Liberation Tigers should put their arms down first; then only comes the ques-

tion of peace negotiations", says Delhi government.

Where is the need for peace talks after surrendering to your oppo-



KITTU

nent? This is the reason why the Liberation Tigers want the Indian Peace Keeping Force to stop fighting first. **The Liberation Tigers are not mere mice to surrender; they are seasoned 'tigers' with ten-**

acity of purpose. If they are able to resist the broad onslaught of 100,000 Indian soldiers how bold and brave they should be!

The Indian government wanted Kittu to go to Tamil Eelam, and to cajole Prabakaran into ratifying the Accord. Kittu point-blank refused to accede to their request. Some time ago also, the Indian government took LTTE Lt. Johnny from Madras to Tamil Eelam. Johnny entered the forest all alone to meet Prabakaran. But the Indian forces trailed him without his knowledge. When Johnny, however, smelt this he changed course, and the frustrated Indian army killed Johnny in the jungle.

The ulterior motive and aim of the Indian government is to find out the hideout of Prabakaran and to capture him alive. Kittu who knew the intention of the Delhi government refused to go to Tamil Eelam, and Kittu continues to be under house arrest ever since. *By courtesy 'Raani' of 24.7.88*

PREPARE FOR A LONG AND PROTRACTED STRUGGLE

(Statement dated July 9, 1988 issued by LTTE)

During the 9 months war of attrition, being waged unjustly by the Indian Army, large number of civilians have been killed, women have been brutally raped, millions of rupees destroyed and wild life and jungles devastated.

India is trying to teach democracy to the Tamil nation, that has suffered 40 years of oppression to the extent of genocide, by spending millions of rupees to bomb and burn Tamil areas.

India's propaganda seems to be that once the north and eastern provinces are merged together temporarily and an election is held the grievances of the Tamils would be over. It must be remembered that **enormous sacrifice made by the Tamil people and martyrdom attained by thousands of Tamil youth were not to effect a temporary merger and elections for powerless Provincial Councils.**

What is described as north and east is the mother land of Tamils and that is indivisible. The Sri Lankan Government rejoiced, rather vainly after "Operation Liberation" in Vadamarachi, that the liberation struggle of Tamils had been crushed.



However with the suicide attack by Black Tiger Miller at Nelliady on July 5, 1987 the Sri Lankan Government was stunned. The Sri Lankans and the whole world realised that the Tamil liberation struggle had not ended and the liberation Tigers have not been subdued or liquidated.

ELECTIONS SOON

India, which entered Sri Lanka under the pretext of protecting Tamils, claims to have crushed their liberation struggle after committing greater atrocities than the Sri Lankan government and also declares that elections could be held soon. India also seems to be exploring the possibilities if it could hold elections with the help of quislings. India mistakenly believes that if they could hold a show election and instal a puppet administration in

the Tamil homeland which had been made a big garrison of the Indian army, they could convince the world that democracy has been revived in Tamil Eelam. Since it is obvious that Tigers will not accept any solution couched under the veil of peace, that does not afford genuine protection for the Tamils, India is hellbent on eliminating Tigers and liquidating its leaders.

India is wrong if it believes that it could implement the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, a charter of servility for the Tamils, by destroying the LTTE and its leaders. If India continues to engage in its effort to eliminate Tigers and kill Tamils, it would become inevitable that the **Tigers would withdraw from the farcical peace talks and prepare the Tamil nation for long and protracted struggle against foreign domination.**

In the military engagement, last month **80 Indian soldiers were killed and 15 were wounded.** The number of Indian soldiers killed in various districts are as follows, Killinochi 26, Mannar 7, Jaffna 2, Trincomalee 16 and at Mullaitivu 15. On our side, Major Salam, Captains Ragavan and Sabesan, and Mano, Alex, Thamu, Hari, Sutha, Prince, Thiyagu and Arasan attained martyrdom, to whom we pay homage.