



UNIVERSITY OF CEYLON REVIEW

OCTOBER 1955

PUBLISHED FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF CEYLON
BY THE CEYLON UNIVERSITY PRESS
COLOMBO, CEYLON

Vol. XIII, No. 4

Rs. 2-00

Editors
 K. KANAPATHIPILLAI
 N. A. JAYAWICKRAMA
 K. N. JAYATILLEKE

Manager
 THE LIBRARIAN
 UNIVERSITY OF CEYLON

October, 1955

CONTENTS

	PAGE
The Art of Discovery by A. S. Parkes	153
Is the Definition of Knowledge Circular ? by K. N. Jayatileke	160
Technical and Aesthetic Theories of Poetry in Sanskrit by J. Tilakasiri	167
Metre in Early Sinhalese and Some Aspects of its Subsequent Development by U. D. Jayasekera	177
සිය බස් ලකර හා පැරණි සිංහල කවි සමය—I කාව්‍ය ලක්ෂණ හා වස්තුව ආනන්ද කුලසූරිය විසින්	194
Reviews	204

UNIVERSITY OF CEYLON REVIEW

The University of Ceylon was established on the 1st July, 1942, by the fusion of the Ceylon Medical College (founded 1870) and the Ceylon University College (founded 1921). It has at present the Faculties of Oriental Studies, Arts, Science, Engineering and Medicine. The University has taken over from the Government of Ceylon the publication of the *Ceylon Journal of Science*, which has been developed as its chief means of contact with scientists elsewhere and has also started the *Ceylon Journal of Medical Science*. The *University of Ceylon Review* was founded in order to make similar contact with scholars in literary subjects, to provide a medium of publication for the research in those subjects conducted in the University, and to provide a learned review for Ceylon. The Review is published four times a year, in January, April, July and October. Exchanges are welcome. Correspondence regarding exchanges should be addressed to The Librarian, University of Ceylon. The annual subscription is Rs. 5.00, and a single copy Rs. 2.00.

University of Ceylon Review

Vol. XIII, No. 4

October 1955

The Art of Discovery

SOME years ago, at a Research Institute in London, a group of philosophically-minded members of the staff decided to hold a series of discussions on the methods and aims of science. After a while they ran short of themes and a sardonically-minded colleague suggested that they should hold a whole day meeting on the question "Is it better to work or talk about it?" This was perhaps rather harsh, but, for the most part I have always felt that it is better to work than to talk. In particular, for me, the fascination of scientific work has been enough, and I have been content to leave the philosophical background to others. However, as time's gone on I've found that it's intriguing to stand back now and then and look at the scientist as a zoological specimen, to see what sort of a man he is and how he obtains his useful, interesting or embarrassing results. Often he's a curious sort of creature, a worthy subject for his own analytical and observational methods. In other words, the scientist is very fond of putting other things under the microscope; let's put the scientist under his own microscope.

It happens also that over the years several intriguing books have been published in England which have caused a certain amount of introspection on the part of the scientist. The latest of these is a little book by Professor Beveridge of Cambridge on *The Art of Scientific Investigation*. The use of the word "art" in this connection is perhaps surprising. Art and science are usually thought of as being fundamentally different. Professor Beveridge, however, in writing this book had in mind investigations leading to major discoveries, and he analyses the circumstances attending such discoveries and the mental characteristics of those responsible. His conclusions clearly justify the use of the word "art." The word "investigation" is perhaps less fortunate. It suggests vistas of plodding routine. I hope that I have given a rather different impression in calling this paper the "Art of Discovery."

I want to examine the idea that creative research is essentially an art ; to talk to you about the psychology of discovery rather than the technology of investigation. In taking this as my text, I am thinking mainly of those who extend the frontiers of knowledge rather than of those who consolidate and exploit the newly won territory. In doing so, however, I do not wish to imply that one is more important than the other. Both play an essential part. I should add that I am thinking mainly of the biologist, in the widest meaning of the word. The medical man, for instance, is a biologist in the sense that he deals with material which is living—at any rate to start with. In these days, also, I must take shelter behind the clause now incorporated in the Statutes of the Royal Society of London, that words importing the male sex shall include the female. In other words, women scientists are now playing an important part in the advance of knowledge.

First of all, what are the intellectual weapons with which a scientist must be armed ? The once popular conception of the research worker as an absent-minded old gentleman or else as a sort of human calculating machine has long since disappeared, but the former had perhaps more basis than the latter. Years ago, Trotter maintained that, to perceptive minds, chance and intuition are weapons far more potent than reason and logic. Few will disagree with this contention. Many discoveries could not have been deduced from existing knowledge and could not, therefore, have been arrived at by processes of reason alone. In biology, especially, we never have all the relevant facts available, and there are nearly always alternative explanations of those we have. As a result, the development of a discovery can be planned, but the original discovery cannot. It is true, of course, that to reach the ranks of the immortals a scientist must combine exceptional inspiration with the most powerful intellectual machinery, but the fact remains that many scientists become prominent mainly by virtue of other characteristics than a capacity for reasoning. The significant conclusion follows that a distinguished scientist may be as irrational as anyone else, or even more so.

Moreover, even where reason and logic are appropriate tools, few possess them. In the last resort, there is no such thing as the disembodied intellect, and but few instances of the brain packed in ice. The scientist, like everyone else, is a puppet of his psychological and physiological make-up, and is just as likely as anyone else to think with his emotions instead of his intellect. In particular, much of what masquerades as reason comes from an attempt to rationalise, that is to justify by apparently reasoned argument a view which in reality is determined by self-interest, emotional

THE ART OF DISCOVERY

considerations, prejudice and the like. To the scientist this almost universal habit of rationalising may well take the form of dressing up in the garb of logical deduction a discovery made by very different means. Certainly, the sequence of a research is usually erratic and quite different from the orderly presentation aimed at in publication. Reason, therefore, is a tool of limited value. What else is available? Let's consider the use of hypothesis, and do so by way of analogy.

A very good example, as Beveridge points out, is provided by Columbus's discovery of America; it has many of the features of a classic discovery in science. Columbus, you will recall, was obsessed with the idea that if the earth were round he could reach the East Indies by sailing west. Notice the following points—(1) the idea was by no means original, but he had obtained some additional information from a sailer blown off his course; (2) he met great difficulties in getting someone to provide the money as well as in making the actual experiment; (3) he did not find the expected new route, but instead found a new half of the world; (4) despite all evidence to the contrary he clung to the belief that he had found a new route to the Orient; (5) he got little credit or reward during his lifetime; (6) evidence has since been brought forward to show that he was by no means the first European to reach America.

Many discoveries in science have been made in a similar way acting on a hypothesis, and it should be added that a hypothesis may be very fruitful without being correct.

We should now consider the role of chance. It is well known to laboratory workers that chance and accident have been directly responsible for many major and a host of minor discoveries. This may come about in various ways. A well conducted experiment, designed to elucidate one problem, may, in the result, throw brilliant light on another, or some fortuitous circumstance may intervene to alter the whole bearing of the experiment, or, again, the experimenter may make a simple mistake and in doing so make a discovery. Many writers have been lured into cataloguing discoveries which have been made by chance, and many well known examples might be cited. So far as my own experience is concerned, two discoveries with which I have been associated have arisen in this way. Many years ago, when I was very inexperienced, I used female mice, in doing an experiment, when I thought I was using male, and that, of course, led to most interesting results. More recently, an even simpler and more fruitful kind of error arose merely from taking the wrong bottle off the shelf. Probably the most famous of all examples of discoveries arising by chance is the discovery of the antibacterial properties of

Penicillium. The accidental contamination of Fleming's culture by spores, which led ultimately to the discovery of penicillin, would probably not have happened at the present time when sterile rooms and filtered air would be the rule for such work. This raises a somewhat paradoxical point. In the past, chance has been a fruitful source of discovery ; but, present-day planning of research is designed, so far as possible, to eliminate chance by abolishing the wayward experiment, the fortuitous circumstance, and the absent-minded mistake. It is perhaps well to remember that in perfecting the science of investigation we may starve the art of discovery. Chance, however, does not always come to our assistance, as is well shown by the history of another group of anti-bacterial compounds. Sulphanilamide was known to the chemists more than 40 years ago, but its bacteriostatic power was not discovered until shortly before the second war. It is salutary to consider that the course of history might have been altered had the biological properties of sulphanilamide been discovered by chance or otherwise before the first war.

I must be very careful not to give the wrong impression in these remarks about chance. I do not want to imply that anyone can work in a laboratory for a few weeks, make a lot of stupid mistakes and thereby make discoveries. What I am trying to say is that if one works hard enough and long enough, with sufficient single-mindedness, then, one may perhaps make some small discovery, and, if one does, then, looking back, it will probably appear that chance has played a large part in it. At best, chance does not make discoveries unaided. Odd things happen almost every day in an active laboratory, and may make little if any impression on the observer ; those that do attract attention are often discounted as irrelevant nuisances, which is exactly what most of them are. To quote from Beveridge :

“ Anyone with alertness of mind will encounter during the course of an investigation numerous interesting side issues that might be pursued. It is a physical impossibility to follow up all of these. The majority are not worth following, a few will reward investigation, and the occasional one provides the opportunity of a lifetime. How to distinguish the promising clue is the very essence of the art of research.”

This is very true, and it requires that elusive something, the ability to divine the significant happening and to appreciate its potentialities, which distinguishes the great scientist. This elusive something defies analysis, as does the genius of the great painter or composer. It is compounded of imagination, intuition, insight, flair, or what you will. Appleton, in a

THE ART OF DISCOVERY

recent broadcast, said, "The big things in science occur when an adventure takes place in the mind of an individual. The consequences of that adventure can be followed up by an individual or by a team of workers. But, the big steps forward in science are matters of individual enterprise." My friend and one time tutor, Dr F. H. A. Marshall of Christ's College, Cambridge, influenced the development of the physiology of reproduction to an extent out of all proportion to the volume of his scientific writing. When he died a few years ago, his obituary notice included this paragraph: "Scientists are of many kinds, but inspiration flows most fruitfully from those who are able, by some gift withheld from lesser men, to divine the richness of unchartered country and sense the vital landmarks. Thus do they avoid the barred places and the morasses of unimportant detail which engulf so many. To these, discovery is an art rather than a science, a matter of instinct rather than of intellectual machinery."

This concept of the great scientist as a creative artist has important implications. How can imagination, intuition, originality and the like, be encouraged, and what factors are likely to be inhibitory? Beveridge points out that intuition, originating in the subconscious mind, will come to the surface only when the conscious mind is relaxed and receptive, and will do so, in fact, most readily on the fringes of consciousness. There is at least one authentic record of a biologist passing on a death-bed inspiration to his favourite pupil who was able, by a few simple experiments, to demonstrate the correctness of the idea and thereby to make a substantial contribution to knowledge. Most of us, however, would prefer not to go to our death-beds to obtain inspiration, and fortunately there are other recipes. For instance, Descartes is said to have made his discoveries while lying in bed in the morning; Brindley, the engineer, when up against a different problem, would go to bed for several days until it was solved. Other recipes for encouraging intuition include light occupation, pottering in the garden, sitting in the bath, and the like. All this boils down to the idea that a scientist must have time and opportunity for meditation, and must not be expected to spend all his life in an intellectual steeplechase.

On the other side of this picture there is the undoubted fact that scientific insight of the highest order may go hand in hand with all sorts of unlikely characteristics, including continuous mental and physical activity. As Derrick has said, "The advent of a genius is unpredictable. He cannot be organised into any scheme, for he creates his own world. All that planning can achieve in regard to genius is to provide an environment in which he can flourish, and to pray for the grace to recognise and encou-

age him." This, of course, is not as easy as it sounds. Only a very small proportion of those taking up research are geniuses ; the others do not necessarily give of their best in conditions appropriate to creative art. It is impossible, however, to segregate the various categories which, in any case, merge imperceptibly. Nor is it desirable. Ordinary people make up the backbone of any research organisation, and extraordinary people are most inspiring when there are not too many of them. How then, to create under one roof conditions calculated to encourage the blooming of rare genius and at the same time suitable for day to day research ? This question is extremely difficult to answer, but an answer must be found if the large and highly organised research institutes now established in many parts of the world are to give of their best.

It is perhaps easier to discuss factors antagonistic to creative research. In the world western we are fortunate—mainly—in being free from the worst enemy of expanding knowledge—authoritarianism, with which seekers after new knowledge have often had to fight. Nevertheless, it is in human nature to be allergic to new ideas, and discoveries are not always received with undiluted enthusiasm. This is particularly true when the discovery impinges upon some vested interest or conflicts with the views of the scientific hierarchy. Many years ago T. H. Huxley, who had a most happy knack of epigram, said, "It is the common fate of knowledge to start as heresy and end as superstition," and it is not always easy to decide at which stage of this cycle a piece of knowledge has arrived at any particular time. Discoverers in short have inherent difficulties to contend with. They themselves may raise additional ones. Discoverers are not always the most persuasive and tactful people and, moreover, an independent thinker in science may well be an independent thinker in other ways less acceptable to authority.

We can, therefore, give some of the analytical data for the great man of science. Is it then possible to arrive at the constitutional formula and perhaps to effect a partial synthesis from more plentiful material ? One may well have doubts on this point, but a knowledge of how the great men of science have worked and how discoveries have been made in the past can hardly fail to inspire those, especially those of the younger generation, now engaged in research.

Well, these are some thoughts on the scientist and his work, prompted by a fairly long experience of research. In conclusion I would say this. A man engaged in creative science is often regarded as doing a desirable and rewarding job under pleasant conditions. This is undoubtedly true, but it is only half the picture. Research is compounded of work, hope,

THE ART OF DISCOVERY

doubt, bafflement, and more work, and at the end of it all disappointment is more common than even minor triumph. Years of work along a particular line may end in nothing, or success may be anticipated by someone else. Chance, too, is a fickle friend and works more often against the researcher than in his favour. Yet, every day of active research work is an adventure, exasperating, fascinating, satisfying. To some, scientific research is a profession ; to others, it is a vocation ; to all of us it is a way of life which few would willingly forsake.

A. S. PARKES

Is the Definition of Knowledge Circular?

IN defining the criteria of knowledge Woozley says that “knowing involves : (i) that what is known is true ; (ii) that the person knowing is sure that it is true. However, although these are necessary conditions, they are not yet sufficient, for it would not be difficult to think of situations in which both conditions were fulfilled and yet one could not truly be said to know.”¹ He then proceeds to give these further conditions of knowledge : “To know then, a man must (a) have evidence ; (b) be right about the evidence ; and (c) be right about the relation of the evidence to the conclusion.”²

Now I propose to show in this paper that these latter conditions (b) and (c), which are deemed necessary to knowledge, are, as stated, circumlocutions which conceal the fact that what is really required by them is (1) a knowledge of the propositions comprising the evidence for p (the proposition claimed to be known) as well as (2) a knowledge of the fact that these propositions constituting the evidence are relevant to the truth of p and do in fact entail (causally or logically) p . I would try to show that where the claim to knowledge is based on evidence, anything short of the knowledge of the propositions comprising the evidence and the knowledge of the fact that they entail what is claimed to be known, not merely vitiates but nullifies the claim to knowledge. If so, it would seem that Woozley’s attempt or in fact any attempt to define knowledge in terms of evidence is circular in view of the fact that according to this account knowing p is defined in terms of knowing the evidence for p and certain implications of this evidence. I would not, however, draw the moral that the definition of knowledge in terms of evidence is therefore a total failure or that it obscures the true nature of knowledge, although I shall not attempt any positive definition of knowledge in this paper.

Before I come to my main point I would like to examine Woozley’s condition (a). As quoted above he says that “to know a man must have evidence.” This can be interpreted to mean that no claim to knowledge is valid unless at least what is claimed to be known is based on some evidence. I shall examine this interpretation below but it would appear from Woozley’s example of a claim to know on no evidence that this is possibly not what

1. *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 191. In a later article on “Knowing and Not Knowing” in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (New Series)*, Vol. LIII, pp. 150-172, he somewhat alters his position with regard to criterion (ii) by trying to show that it is a mistake to think that a man cannot know something unless he is sure of it.

2. *ibid.*

he means. If his illustration is to throw light on his meaning then what he probably means to say is that no claim to knowledge is valid when what is claimed as evidence for what is known is no evidence at all since it cannot be seriously considered as evidence.

Let us consider his example of "the pessimist who claims to know that his fireworks party will be spoiled by rain." Woozley contends that in spite of this claim and in spite of the fact that it may rain for this fireworks display the pessimist does not know because he has no evidence for saying so. But would it be correct to say that from the pessimist's point of view he has no evidence at all for his claim to know? I think we have to distinguish between a claim to knowledge on no evidence at all and the claim to knowledge on ostensible grounds which are no grounds at all. The former claim would be that of a person who claims to know something but when asked for the evidence on which his claim to knowledge is based answers that there is no evidence, while the latter would be that of a person who claims to know something and when asked for the evidence produces the evidence, which all or most people (excluding him, of course) would reject as being no evidence. Now Woozley's example seems to depict a situation in this latter category for if his pessimist quite seriously meant what he said (and was'nt trying to be humourous not quite meaning what he said) he may argue as follows. He may say that the turn of events in nature supports the hypothesis of pessimism and that in general most attempts on the parts of humans to be happy are thwarted by nature and that since on the last so many occasions when he tried to have a fireworks display it rained, he had strong grounds for asserting that it will rain on this occasion as well and he was proved right. Now it is worth noting that if a fair number of us had similar experiences and were pessimists we would be inclined to regard all this not merely as evidence but as valid evidence. In other words, in such a situation the dividing line between having no evidence, having wrong evidence and having valid evidence would be rather thin. It is also worth stressing that such situations need not be purely hypothetical. They can occur in a science where there is a strong division of opinion among the experts about the validity of a view and the relevance or not of certain propositions as tending to establish this validity. So if the criterion that "to know we must have evidence" is interpreted to mean that when X's evidence is no evidence X's claim to knowledge is invalid, we have to grant that there are situations in which the application of this criterion is arbitrary and of little value in distinguishing knowledge from error. Another point that is not clear is that if this is what is meant by condition (a), namely that when what is claimed as evidence is no evidence the claim to knowledge is invalid, this condition

would not be very different from that of (b) which covers cases where one has evidence but is wrong about the evidence.

This brings us to the first interpretation as being logically the one that should be preferred, namely that what is meant by saying that "to know a man must have evidence" is that no claim to knowledge is valid where the claimant has no evidence in the sense that he adduces or can adduce no evidence for what he claims to know. Now if this were the valid interpretation it seems to me to be clearly false for all self-evident propositions claimed to be known as self-evident would surely be known without evidence since it would be self-contradictory to speak of the evidence for a self-evident proposition and thus to talk of the evidence of a self-evident proposition is analytically ruled out.

But are there any propositions apart from these which one may rightly claim to know without adducing or being able to adduce evidence? One should think not, except for the fact that "hunches" or "intuitions" may sometimes tend to fall into this category. Suppose someone were to make consistently correct predictions without being able to say just how he comes to make them except that whenever he entertains or contemplates what he asserts as a prediction there is an impelling sense of certainty that what he says is true. Now supposing he makes these predictions for a considerably long period without ever being in error, wouldnt there be a tendency to say that so-and-so knows the future or at least that so-and-so knew that such-and-such things would happen. And what is there to prevent someone from arguing that since the words 'know' 'knew' are or can be significantly used in such contexts, any theory of knowing must take this into account in formulating the criteria of knowledge. To take a less hypothetical example would we say (as some do) that Ramanujan, the mathematician, knew by intuition certain theorems which were later proved by Hardy, although he may not have been able to prove them himself? We find here a strong tendency to say that such "intuitions" etc. are instances of knowledge in virtue of not only their certainty and veracity but that even though there seems to be no evident method by which they were arrived at they are so profound and unexpectedly accurate that chance seems to be ruled out as a mode of discovering them and they seem to have differentia which distinguish them from mere groundless but correct chance convictions. The strong reluctance to calling this knowledge on the other hand is undoubtedly due to the fact that the claimant is unable to put his finger on the evidence and prove it from any evidence or give the proof (since these propositions are by no means self-evident).

IS THE DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE CIRCULAR ?

It means that if we leave out these doubtful or borderline cases as well as the self-evident propositions, knowledge is not possible without evidence although what constitutes evidence may be open to doubt. Where I would disagree with Woozley is (i) that I would not hold with him that under all conditions one cannot know p where one has no evidence for p since self evident propositions can be known although they do not fall into this category and (ii) that I would say that some instances where we hold that X has no evidence for p on the grounds that X's evidence is no evidence may well prove to be situations in which X's evidence is evidence and X has a valid claim to knowledge.

One of the points that I have tried to make so far is that there can be knowledge without evidence but that the instances are more or less limited to the knowledge claimed of self-evident propositions, whether self-evidence be interpreted to mean the self-evidence of a fact of nature, of an analytic truth or of a hypothetical connection of the form "if p , then q ." We are then left with the knowledge claimed of *a priori* truths not immediately self-evident and of contingent truths. Now it would seem that a valid claim to both these forms of knowledge must be grounded on evidence and/or proof. One cannot make a valid claim to know an *a priori* truth not immediately self-evident without being able to give its proof, nor a contingent truth without being able to show the evidence and the fact this evidence entails what is claimed to be known. This brings us to Woozley's conditions (b) and (c) and to the main point of my paper.

Woozley states that to *know*, a man must not only have evidence but must (b) be right about the evidence and (c) be right about the relation of the evidence to the conclusion. It would be pertinent to ask under what conditions one would be *right* about the evidence and *right about the relation* of the evidence to the conclusion. It would appear that the only conditions under which it would be correct to say that one would be right about the evidence is where one would (i) *know* and not merely entertain, suppose or believe the propositions constituting the evidence and also (ii) *know* and not merely suspect that these propositions are relevant to the truth of the conclusion. Similarly, the only conditions under which one would be *right about the relation* of the evidence to the conclusion is where (iii) one *knows* and does not merely believe or suspect that the propositions constituting the evidence entails causally or logically the conclusion claimed to be known. The fact that merely believing in the propositions comprising the evidence and merely suspecting or even believing that the evidential propositions are related to the conclusion will not constitute valid grounds

IS THE DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE CIRCULAR ?

for claiming to know the conclusion shows that what is really required for a valid claim to knowledge of a proposition p of this sort is that where evidence is required the evidence and the relation of the evidence to p should be *known* and not merely entertained or believed and that to describe this as "being *right* about the evidence etc." merely evades and obscures this fact.

Perhaps an example would clarify this point. Supposing I claim to know the proposition p namely that "that there are two books in X's library containing the same number of pages." I make this claim quite confidently although I have never seen X's library and the only information I had about it was when X, an honest and intelligent man, told me very reliably that he had exactly 275 books in his library and the biggest book (meaning thereby the book containing the largest number of pages) had only 268 pages in it. Let us suppose that Y, wishing to test my claim, has access to X's library, counts the number of pages in the books and the number of books in X's library and discovers that X was right about having 275 books and that the biggest book had 268 pages. Let us also say that he makes a list of the titles of the books having the same number of pages including the numbers of these pages and now proceeds to test my claim to know p . He asks me to name at least two books having the same number of pages and to give the number of pages these two books have. I confess that I do not know and have not known the title of even a single book in his library and that I do not even know the exact number of pages that the two books I refer to have. At this, it is possible that Y who cherishes the belief that without a direct or indirect (through the testimony of others) acquaintance with two books in X's library having the same number of pages, it is not possible to know p , may say that I have no evidence since what I claim as evidence is not relevant to the truth or falsity of p . He would therefore contend that my evidence (viz. that X's library contains 275 books and the largest book has 268 pages) is no evidence at all and that therefore my claim to know p is invalid although p may be a good guess on my part.

On the other hand I maintain that the proposition that "there are 275 books in X's library" (q) and the proposition that "there are 268 pages in the biggest book in X's library" (r) together entail (in this instance, logically) the truth of p and therefore I can validly claim to know p . Of course, *prima facie*, it may appear that neither q nor r considered separately or together has any relevance to the truth of p , but I proceed as follows. Let us consider a lot of 268 out of the 275 books. Now among these 268 books either there are two books having the same number of pages or

there aren't. If there are, then p is true. But if there aren't then since the pages can't exceed 268 (since the *biggest* book has 268 pages) and we avoid having two books with the same number of pages the only possible distribution of pages among them has to be that one of the books has 1 page, another 2 pages, yet another 3 pages and so on until the 268th book has 268 pages. It would be seen that any other distribution would result in at least two books having that same number of pages in which case again p is true. The only possibility of avoiding this is to have 1 to 268 pages (each having a different number of pages) for the 268 books. Now let us take one of the remaining seven books. By definition (since the biggest book contains 268 pages) this would have any number of pages from 1 to 268 but not more. But whatever this number may be (from 1 to 268) there would be a book having a corresponding number of pages in a set of 268 books according to the only distribution which avoids having two books with the same number of pages. So however we may distribute up to 268 pages for the 275 books with a maximum of 268 pages for the biggest we are bound to have at least two books having the same number of pages. So given the evidence q and r , it logically follows that p is true.

It is of course not necessary to establish my claim to know p that I should have argued exactly as above. I might have argued differently, so long as my argument was valid. I might have tried to prove in general that in any library if the number of books exceed the number of pages in its biggest book then there are at least two books in it with the same number of pages ; or I might have argued it more generally as a theorem in numbers. Or again I might even have simplified the situation by taking the example of a library with three books with only two pages in the biggest book for facility of comprehension, though this would be superfluous so long as I can validly argue that the truth of the premises constituting the evidence entail the truth of the conclusion claimed to be known.

But it is important to note that merely believing or supposing that these evidential premises (i.e. q and r in the above example) were true, can in no circumstance imply knowledge of p since the doubt that infects the premises would be carried over to the conclusion for, if I merely suppose the premises, the conclusion too would be hypothetical ; and if I merely believe the premises, the conclusion would also be a mere belief which will not constitute knowledge. It will also be seen that I may know the premises (for instance, q and r) without seeing that they are in any way relevant to the truth of p . It is therefore also necessary that I *know* and not merely suspect their relevance to the truth of p . Now to describe these two conditions as "being right about the evidence" is to miss this point, namely

that what is really required is that we *know* the premises as well as *know* their relevance to the conclusion claimed to be known.

It is also necessary before a valid claim to know p can be made that I *know* and here again not merely entertain, suspect or believe that the premises entail the conclusion and to describe this condition as “*being right about the relation of the evidence to the conclusion*” does not make this explicit.

I would however like to point out that although a valid claim to know p involves knowing the premises and their implications which show the truth of p , it is by no means necessary to a valid claim to know p that I should have previously consciously entertained these premises and seen that they were true or have gone through the proof which ensures that these premises entail p . It is sufficient that I should be *able to say* what these evidential premises are and show their relevance and relation to the conclusion if challenged, so that knowledge of these premises as also the fact that they entail what is claimed to be known need only be dispositional and not necessarily actual. But what is important is that when the criteria for knowing p are thus stated with some degree of clarity they involve a necessary reference to *knowing*, thus making the definition of knowledge in terms of evidence (in cases where evidence is relevant) circular.

K. N. JAYATILLEKE

Technical and Aesthetic Theories of Poetry in Sanskrit

THE Indian conception of poetry in its technical and aesthetic aspects is, indeed, distinctly represented in the early and later stages of Sanskrit poetical theory, respectively. The study of these aspects, which we attempt in this paper, is all the more significant and interesting in view of the same distinction established in Western art criticism, which speaks of the early acceptance, (according to critics like Collingwood) in Greek and ancient Western literature, of the technical or technic criteria in art appreciation whereas the moderns without emphasising that aspect of art, consider aesthetic criteria and standards as more valuable in the evaluation of what is termed 'a work of art.'

The technical theory of art has been primarily advanced in order to interpret and explain the artistic activity, centering round the production of artifacts among primitive peoples throughout the world. It was later extended in its scope to cover literary activity, too, because it was felt by some that the theory fitted into the 'craft' of poetry, which apparently employed similar techniques and devices.¹

A technical theory of poetry, exactly similar to that of the Greek theorists (outlined by Collingwood),² had been conceived by the ancient Indian poets and poet-theorists of the Rgveda as early as the second millennium B.C. Though considered barren by many from the point of view of poetical theory, the Rgveda yields abundant information about the poetical processes and techniques the authors (of the hymns) employed in the writing of poetry and the views they held about the function of words and their significance in poetry. We often come across references made to the poets who take special care to compose an original hymn (*navyam brahma*). Sometimes the 'composer' of a hymn refers to the devices he uses to make the composition look more original than that of his rival. These devices are, in his opinion, analogous to the methods and means employed by a weaver, chariot-maker, carpenter or smith—all common vocations among the Aryans—producing an artifact. Thus a hymn speaks of his art in such terms as these,

1. See R. G. Collingwood—*The Principles of Art*, Chapter II—*Art and Craft*—for a full discussion of the technical theory of art.

2. Collingwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18.

Indra brahma kriyamānā juṣasva
yā te śaviṣṭha navyā akarma
vastreva bhadrā sukṛtā vasūyū
ratham na dhīraḥ svapā atakṣam³ (Rv. V. 29.15).

where, the poet, Gaurivīti, asks Indra to take delight in his new poem which he has fashioned in the same way as a 'maker' turns out beautiful robes or as a carpenter makes a chariot.⁴ This analogy and similar others are often used by the poets, especially, in the Family Books, to describe the aptness and effectiveness of the new poetical devices invented by them. The most striking parallelism is drawn, in another hymn,⁵ between the art of decking a horse and the artistic technique of the poet, where the necessity to chose and arrange words with due regard to metre and rhythm, not ignoring the decorative function of 'the alankaras,' is significantly compared to the efforts employed in grooming the horse and rendering it fit for the fray. We observe, therefore, that the technical theory of poetry, which emerges from the Rgveda, is something consistent with their general approach to art and life, which was viewed more from utilitarian ends than from the strictly aesthetic angle.

It is clear, nevertheless, that this conception of poetry is particularly associated with the older strata of the Rgveda, as suggested by the Family Books, where the connexion between poetry and the crafts, known to the Aryans, had been established on the basis of technical skill. At a later period (in the parts of the Rgveda considered relatively late) the more reflective among the poets, or—we may even call them—poet-theorists began to theorise on the efforts of earlier and contemporary poets. As the efficacy of their prayers and supplications to the deities depended on the correct and purposeful use of language attention was directed to the power of words, in their literary function and in their religious function as a means of obtaining divine knowledge.

In the hymn,⁶ discussing the theme of Knowledge (Jñānam), the varied functions of Vāk (Speech) as it impressed on the author, Bṛhaspati, are mentioned. It describes, at the outset, how language originated when names were given to various objects and how great value was attached to their meaning, which is described as something hidden (guhā). It

3. The use of the root √takṣ (atakṣam) here is very significant as shown by the following parallelisms.

See Burrow—Sanskrit Language § 9, p. 79. Skt. takṣ "to construct in wood (as a carpenter)" Avestan-taš, Greek-techne (art) <tek, tékton "carpenter" (cp. Skt. takṣan-carpenter")

4. See Diwekar-Les Fleur de Rhetorique dans l'Inde p. 5.

5. See Rv. I. 130.6

6. Rv. X. 71.

TECHNICAL AND AESTHETIC THEORIES OF POETRY.....

resorts to the simile of 'men sifting corn-flour in a cribble'⁷ to illustrate how the 'wise' chose their language, and proceeds also to speak of various types of people, who could be graded according to the impressions they receive from Speech (Vāk). In the commentary to the hymn Sāyaṇa uses expressions like 'vāci arthajñānam paśyāmah ityarthah, jñātārthā āhuḥ,' showing that the hymn attempts to extol those who used language with a full awareness of the significance of words. It is therefore possible to assume that views like these on the function of language and of meaning influenced the conception of poetry too and that a tendency to attach more importance to the internal substance of poetry than to its external form (as is observed in the earlier hymns) had already manifested itself before the compilation of the Rgveda was completed.

The study of the etymology of words, whose meaning had become obscure in the course of the growth of the Veda into a Samhitā, received priority among the varied aspects of Vedic learning (Vedāṅga) and developed as the Nirukta Vedanga as it was considered indispensable for all literary studies. In the *Nirukta*, the celebrated work of Yāska, there is definite evidence of the impact of the tendency to emphasise the role of meaning in language, as observed in the later vedic hymns. From a study of the *Nirukta* one is able to see how Yāska attempted to formulate a theory of poetics with particular reference to the semantic function of words in the poetry of the Rgveda.⁸ To him, therefore, Vedic poetry had lost its early technical and craft-like significance and offered a much more fruitful field of investigation into the processes of language and imagery.⁹ Throughout his work Yāska shows a critical approach in the scrutinisation of the literary material of the Rgveda, throwing out valuable suggestions and ideas, which, even if they are not directly connected with the later aesthetic conception of poetry, seem, at least, to bring it nearer to us.

We have no definite evidence about the date of the origin of the truly aesthetic theory of rasa in the history of art and literary criticism in India on account of the general uncertainty with regard to dates in Indian literary history. Although the theory receives a full and comprehensive treatment in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* of Bharata, assigned within the broad limits of the 2nd

7. Ibid. X. 71.2. Also words which have no significance are described as yielding "neither fruit nor flower" (aphalāṃ apuspāṃ) Ibid. 71.5.

8. It was he who emphasised, as a theorist, the dual aspect of language consisting of "word (vāg) and meaning (artha)," an idea which formed the basis of all later definitions of poetry. Diwekar. op. cit. p. 25.

9. Yāska has made a significant contribution to early poetical theory in his critical study of the simile based on the data supplied by the Rgveda.

century B.C. and the 2nd century A.D., Bharata himself admits that the theory had been traditionally handed down.¹⁰ We may, however, infer from this specially in view of the mnemonic system of imparting instruction (prevalent in the period just after Yāska and the grammarians) that the theory dates back to a period just after Yāska when the technical theory of art was being gradually superseded in the light of the developments and advances in the fine arts as opposed to the technical or practical arts (crafts). Bharata's work also shows the influence dancing and music, especially, among the fine arts, had on this new conception of art, where the emotive and imaginative content of the new artistic media easily lent itself to a new orientation in the approach to art criticism. The exposition of the theory in the *Nāṭyāśāstra* appears to be so comprehensive that we must postulate a period of continuous activity spread over centuries prior to Bharata resulting in its formulation in such a complete form as found in his time. Bharata may, perhaps, have systematised the concept traditionally known, and raised it to the level of an acceptable theory applicable to both art and literature.

The aesthetic character of the theory lies in its recognition that music, dancing and literature or for that matter all forms of art contain an element of emotional stimulation (*bhāva* producing *rasa*) which was rarely grasped by the earlier theorists who were more concerned with the external and formal aspects of the literary and artistic forms. It is perhaps the specific literary genre, the drama, to which, in Bharata's own words, (*nāṭye rasāḥ smṛtāḥ*) the *rasa* theory is first applicable, that helped him to analyse clearly and critically, the gamut of feelings, impressions and images arising in the mind of the spectator during the significant stages of a play. The antecedent states of mind, called the *bhāvas*, necessary for the production of *rasa*, in the spectator, also point unmistakably to the dramaturgic origin of the concept for they are strongly associated with the gestures and movements of the actors and dancers.¹¹ It is also obvious that a theorist could make a psychological or aesthetical approach to the analysis of the feelings of an actor or dancer on the stage more readily than those of the characters of a written poem or story. Here, therefore, for the first time in the history of literary activity, attention was focussed on the central problem of literary appreciation—the analysis of the psychological processes involved in critical judgment. The emphasis on external features of the literary form 'by

10. Bharata refers to Druhina as the exponent of the *rasa* concept. See *Nāṭyaśāstrā* VI. 16.

11. *Nānābhīnayasambandhān bhāvayanti rasān imān*
Yasmāt tasmād amī bhāva vijñeyā nāṭyayokṭrbhih Nṭs. XI. 34.

Kalidasa also refers to the manner in which a dramatic performance is capable of evoking *rasa* when accompanied by graceful dancing. See *Mālavikāgnimitra* Act I.v. 4.

critics of the earlier period appeared, indeed, as a very amateurish effort at literary criticism in the light of the *rasa* theory which had the distinctive merit of being applicable to any artistic or literary form known at the time. Thus the significance of this new criterion became such a decisive factor in literature that it not only influenced every writer of Sanskrit and naturally entered into the vocabulary of criticism from then on but also formed the basis for the formulation of still more critical concepts like *dhvani*. But before we examine how the theory of *rasa* came to be closely linked with the very revolutionary theory of *dhvani*, it is interesting to observe how the *rasa* concept gradually undermined the exaggerated importance of the *alankara* concept which had motivated the literary conceptions and aims of poets for centuries.

Soon after its formulation by Bharata, the *rasa* theory asserted itself as a very useful criterion influencing both poets and dramatists in their works. Its influence on Kālidāsa is quite patent in his works, especially, in the *Mālavikāgnimitra*. We may even go further and add that Kālidāsa's conception of *rasa* and its kindred principles marks an important stage in the process of its evolution from a theoretical concept, in Bharata's times, to a criterion applied in drama and poetry, later. But, in spite of the refreshing novelty and aesthetic value of this new concept, the tyrannising dominance of the 'alankāra' school of Sanskrit poetics persisted, as is observed in the (mahākāvya) writings of the post-Kālidāsan poets like Bhaṭṭi, Bhāravi and Māgha, and in the theoretical manuals of Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha, the two outstanding critics of that school. Even in the next important period in the history of Sanskrit poetics—the period of Vāmana—the full impact of the *rasa* theory on critics and their standards is not seen although the 'alankāra' criterion does not loom so large in his new approach to criticism through 'rīti.' He had also laid the right emphasis on the 'soul' (essence) of poetry (in his new definition of *rīti* as the 'soul of poetry')¹² in contrast to what his predecessors, Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha, had emphasised,—the (external) 'body' of poetry (*kāvya-śarīra*),—which, in their opinion, had necessarily to be 'ornamented' (*alankṛta*). He also set the tradition of substantiating his observations in poetical theory with reference to the literary usage of known poets and dramatists—a step which led to the elevation of literary standards in no small measure.

Towards the end of the ninth century A.D. almost all the important literary works had been produced and the new critical outlook displayed

12. Rītir ātmā kāvyasya. Kāvylankārasūtra. II. 6.

by Vāmana, in the *Kāvyaḷaṅkārasūtra*, focussed attention on the necessity of assessing afresh the available literature, examining also the validity of the criteria and methods of criticism employed till then. The new school of criticism, *dhvani*, which emerged in this period is of immense significance for not only did it tackle the outstanding problems of poetics in a forthright manner but it also influenced the attitudes and conceptions of later schools.

There seems to be hardly any doubt that by the time the *dhvani* school came into being the aesthetic approach to art had been firmly accepted. But the *dhvani* theorists found that the criterion of *rasa*, which was primarily of dramaturgic origin, was in itself inadequate for the criticism of poetry, where the judgment of a poem or composition depended on the effective use of language in conveying the purport (*artha*). Thus Ānandavārdhana and Abhinavagupta, the authors of the *Dhvanyāloka* and the *Dhvanyālokalocanā*, respectively, and the chief protagonists of the new school, attempted to build up a composite theory called *rasa-dhvani* on the foundations of the old *rasa* concept with special reference to the varied import of words in the production of 'dhvani.' The *Dhvanyāloka* clearly shows the manner in which the traditional disciplines of grammar and logic helped the theorists in the formulation of the new concept. A term used by the grammarians to indicate a sort of mystic essence of sound, *dhvani* was adapted as a canon of literary judgment, the touchstone of all good and purposeful writing. It is not relevant for this discussion to trace the possible steps in the process of its adaptation from a grammatical concept to a poetical criterion. But we may inquire a little further into the salient features of this theory in so far as it signifies the greatest advance in the aesthetic sensitiveness of Indian literary critics.

Vāmana's conception of the 'soul' of poetry (as opposed to the 'body' of poetry, which constituted the basis of earlier definitions of *kāvya*) influences the *Dhvanyāloka* in its definition of *dhvani*, which is tersely put in the statement—*kāvyaśya ātmā dhvaniḥ*. Eschewing the external and superficial aspects of poetry in the definition, the authors of the *Dhvanyāloka* attempt to show how the new criterion helps in cultivating one's aesthetic aptitude for poetry and drama. The *Dhvanyālokalocanā* clarifies the premises of this definition in maintaining that the 'soul' here is *rasadhvani*, the essence or substance of poetry, which is the most important out of the three elements (*vastu-dhvani*, *alaṅkāra dhvani*, and *rasa-dhvani*) that constitute poetry and which the critical reader (*sahṛdaya*) should always try to elicit in his appreciation (*rasacarvanā*-relishing or enjoyment) of literature.¹³ The

13. *Locanā* I. pp. 38-41.

critic himself is called 'sahr̥daya,' accordingly, as he is one whose mind is refined and perspicacious by his constant reading and intimate knowledge of poetry and the consequent ability to enjoy poetry through the process of identification with the characters and situations described in literary works.¹⁴ In other words he has attained a state of complete harmony or attunement with the poet or writer (*svahr̥dayasaṃvādabhājah*) as the following analogy from the *Nāṭyaśāstrā*, cited in the *Locanā*, aptly illustrates.

Yo'rtho hr̥dayasaṃvādī tasya bhāvo rasodbhāvah
Śarīraṃ vyāpyate yena śuśkam kāṣṭhamivāgninā. (Nṭś. VII. 7).¹⁵

This definition of poetry is subsequently subjected to a detailed analysis with particular reference to the important literary works like the *Ramāyana*. The *Ramayāna* is held up as the earliest model of Sanskrit poetry which appeals to readers by the 'inclusion' of 'what is charming'—*lalita*—provided by style, imagery etc., and 'what is appropriate'—*ucita*—the proper treatment and development of the theme with a view to the evocation of *rasa*.¹⁶ The terms, *lalita* and *ucita*, acquire a significant value in later poetical theory for they seem to foreshadow the later concepts of *lālitya* and *aucitya*. The *Dhvanyāloka* attempts to prove that the entire purpose of the poet is to bring out a rich 'purport' (*artha*), which only the critically gifted reader could elicit. To this end it makes a distinction, dividing *artha* into *vācya* and *pratīyamāna* (out of which the *vācyārtha*—expressed meaning—produced by means of the 'devices like simile etc.,' and accepted by theorists, traditionally, is not so important as the *pratīyamānārtha*, the implied meaning of poetry, a quality, elusive and undefinable, nevertheless, existent in all good writing, and constituting what is called 'beauty.'¹⁷ It then proceeds to establish the superiority of the *pratīyamānārtha* in Sanskrit literature, citing the *Ramāyana* as a poem illustrating its validity. Here the *Locanā* (commentary) adds that the *pratīyamānārtha* is none other than *rasadhvani* (suggestion of *rasa*) which the subsidiary factors (*vastudhvani* and *alaṅkāradhvani*) of *dhvani* help to evoke. It is from this standpoint that we are to evaluate the epic and in this connexion our attention is directed to its introductory episode where the feelings of grief roused in the author (Valmīki) on seeing the separation of the *krauñca* bird from its mate seem to move and inspire him to transmute his emotions into poetry (*śokah ślokatvam āgataḥ*) by a process of sympathetic identification and consequent sublimation, (*hr̥dayasaṃvādatanmayībhavanakramād*

14. Ibid. I. p. 38-39.

15. Ibid. I. p. 38.

16. *Dhvanyāloka* I. p. 45.

17. Ibid. I. 49.

āsvādyamānatām pratipannah).¹⁸ This manner of approach to criticism is consistently maintained throughout in the analysis of the detail processes which are said to produce dhvani. It is not possible, of course, to agree with the dhvani theory in all its details, but there can be no doubt that, at this period, Sanskrit poetics had not only developed in its theoretical aspect but evolved a comprehensive system of practical criticism.

Among the critics of the dhvani theory Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka attempted to invalidate the suggestive function (*vyāñjanā*) of poetry, yet retaining the essential aesthetic character of the rasa theory in his acceptance of the activity of *rasacarvanā* as the essential factor in literary appreciation. From the references made to him by Abhinavagupta in the *Locanā* we note that he was in agreement with the dhvani theorists in the acceptance of *abhidhā*, as the primary function of words, but differed from them in upholding that *bhāvakatva* (the generalising function attributed to rasa) and *bhojakatva* (the function of enjoyment or appreciation attributed to the *sahṛdaya*) indicate the nature of the processes at work, more clearly. The second function of *bhavākatva* is derived from the activity of the *bhāvas* (*bhavāyanti rasān iti bhāvāh*), a stage in which the emotions, though appearing as individualistic, impress on the audience in a generalised, sublimated form. Contending therefore, that rasa is not something suggested (in the view of the dhvani theorists) but is experienced or relished (*bhojakatva*), he attempted to show that the processes involved in the appreciation of literature should be examined and defined, more from the point of the view of the audience or reader than from the angle of the literary work. The value of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's theory, reconstructed from these remarks in the *Locanā* is often minimised on account of the loss of the text, but it is undeniable that he was, himself, striving to define the nature of the aesthetic experience, as much as the dhvani theorists, and that, although he did not accept the dhvani concept altogether, he was somewhat influenced by it in the analysis of the various stages of his own theory.

The search for the 'beautiful' in poetry which was, as we observed earlier, the aim of the dhvani school, resulted in the popular acceptance of such terms as *saundarya*, *lālitya*, *cārutva*, *vicchitti*, *vakrokti*, *camatkāra* etc., by many critics of the period. New theories began to develop under the influence of these concepts. Kṣemendra advanced the theory of *aucitya*, as essential to rasa, while Kuntaka, a contemporary of Ānandavardhana, maintained that *vakrokti* (a much older concept than *aucitya*) is the 'soul' of poetry and defined it further as the beauty of language (*vācām vaici-*

18. Ibid. *Locanā* pp. 85-86.

tryam, vicchittiḥ). In the works of the pro-dhvani critics the dhvani theory is unquestionably accepted, its premises being further clarified with reference to the usages of a still wider range of writers. Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha are the most outstanding critics among them, who in, a very eclectic manner, give us the most lucid treatment of the fundamentals of Sanskrit poetics, maintaining the aesthetic traditions of Bharata and Ānandavardhana. The exposition of the dhvani theory in the *Dhvanyāloka* is made in such an involved manner with refutations of the arguments and counter-arguments of its critics, that we have to look for the clearest statement of its basic premises in the *Kāvyaṭīkā*,¹⁹ which leans heavily on dhvani. The *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, on the other hand, emphasises the rasa concept, as the foundation of dhvani, giving to poetry a definition—*vākyam rasātmakam kavyam*²⁰—which has been accepted as the most critical and effective of all definitions of poetry in Sanskrit. Its analysis of rasa²¹ could be considered a distinct contribution to the subject since the rasa theory was put forward by Bharata. An attempt has also been made to define ‘*camatkāra*, the term which was perhaps accepted by many as implying the aesthetic experience, in the course of this analysis, and the views presented merit our attention as we observe therein a significant development in the interpretation of the old rasa theory. Defining *camatkāra* as ‘a feeling of surprise accompanied by the up-swelling of the mind,’ Viśvanātha, the author, quotes the view of a contemporary who held that ‘the substantial content (*sāra*) of rasa is *camatkāra*, which, when existent, the feeling of the marvellous is enjoyed everywhere (in all literature.)’²² It is clear from an observation of this nature that later literary critics²³ were finding it difficult to accept, fully, the conventional rasa theory (with as many as eight or nine rasas) in view of the logical conclusion that the aesthetic function of all the rasas is nearly the same, being intended to evoke our feelings and sensibilities in a manner which makes our apprehension more intuitive than conscious. It is certainly this element of intuitive apprehension underlying the realisation of the aesthetic experience in art and literature, especially, in their religious aspects, that led to equating the artistic experience in its developed state with the mystic experience of religion. Jagannātha’s definition (in the *Rasagaṅgādhara* of the 17th century A.D.) of rasa as ‘that which gives disinterested pleasure’ is evidently an attempt to compromise the accepted

19. See Chapter IV.

20. See Chapter I. p. 5. ed. Kane.

21. See Chapter III.

22. *Sāhityadarpaṇa*. Chapter III. p. 1. ed. Kane.

23. Bhoja (author of *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa*) had put forward the view that *śṛṅgāra* (of all the rasas) is the real rasa, in the 11th century A.D.

ends of artistic appreciation with the aesthetic purpose of the religious experience.²⁴ Later Sanskrit poetical theory, when it did not deteriorate into an elaborate recapitulation of the old alankāra categories, tended in this direction finding in the artistic and literary creativeness of man an urge to enjoy spiritual bliss.²⁵

J. TILAKASIRI

24. cf. V. Raghavan—Some Concepts of the Alankārāsāstra. p.271.

25. See S. K. De —History of Sanskrit Poetics. Vol. II. p. 328.

Metre in Early Sinhalese and Some Aspects of its Subsequent Development

IN discussing a subject like metre in Sinhalese poetry, it would be appropriate first of all to examine the nature of the early Sinhalese language. But since scholars have sufficiently discussed the tradition of the colonisation of Ceylon together with the nature and development of this early language,¹ such a discussion will be unnecessary here. We may, however, state that the North Indian Āryan speech in its several dialects, prevalent in India during the third century B.C.,² and subsequently, would have greatly influenced this early language. The early inscriptions of Ceylon and the numerous Prākṛit inscriptions of Asoka testify to this effect.³ It can also be true that the Sinhalese language not only assimilated various linguistic features of the Prākṛitic dialects of the mainland from time to time, but also followed their literary patterns as well. "Poems and religious works were written"⁴ in these numerous Prākṛits from early times, and this being so, we may surmise these patterns may have influenced Sinhalese writers.

We may now examine the documentary material belonging to the early period to see whether we can observe any traces of metre in the language. It is possible that a poetic tradition in *Sinhalese literature* goes back to a very early period, probably as far back as the time of Gajabāhu I or immediately after. But unfortunately the source material for a careful study of the art of the poet of the past has to a very great extent been irretrievably lost of us, for, the earliest examples of the poet's art we have, is that of the Sīgiri graffiti. But when we examine the style and diction of the early Brāhmī inscriptions, it is rather interesting to observe the sonorous nature of the composition of the words, and the possibility in very many instances, of putting them into metrical form. Of the numerous Brāhmī inscriptions brought to light so far, Paranavitāna draws our attention to three of them, which he considers to be couched in verse.⁵

1. See Geiger, W. A grammar of the Sinhalese Language, 1938 introduction. Jayatilleke, D. B. etc. A Dictionary of the Sinhalese Language, 1935 Introduction.

2. Grierson, G. A. Linguistic Survey of India, 1927 Vol. I. pt. I, p. 121.

3. Muller, E. A. I. C., 1882, p. 3.

4. See Grierson, G. A. op. cit. p. 122.

5. Paranavitāna, S. Brahmi inscriptions in Sinhalese Verse, J. R. A. S. CB., Vol. XXXVI, No. 98. p. 58 ff.

The first of these is found on a rock boulder at Kossagamakanda near Maradankaḍawala in the Anurādhapura District. Parānavitāna says that, “there is something unusual in the order of the words of the sentence comprising this record,”⁶ and assumes that this has been done for the sake of poetical requirements. “Examining our document on this assumption, we find that it is quite possible to read it as a stanza composed in the well-known Yāgī metre, which is very common in Sinhalese poetical works of the tenth, twelfth and thirteenth centuries and is not yet obsolete.”⁷ He gives the inscription in its metrical form as follows :⁸

	Mātrās
Maha-rajhaha Gaṃiṇi—	9
Abayaha Devana-piyaśa	11
(Ra)ṃa[ṇi] ba(ri)ya Milaka-Tiśa—	11
Vihare kā[ri]te Katiya	11

Here, in the scanning however, as Parānavitāna observes, the last syllable of the first, second and fourth *pādas* should be considered as long due to their position ; and such allowances are made, both in Sanskrit and Sinhalese prosody.⁹

The next is a record, perhaps of the first century of the present era, found at Kirinda in the Māgam Pattu, in the Southern Province. Here again, Parānavitāna says that there is something unusual in the order of words in the sentence, and studying the inscription for a possible metrical pattern he observes it to contain two verses, one in the *Udgīti* metre, found in Sanskrit, Pāli and Prākṛit languages, and the other in the *Yāgī* metre already observed in the previous record.

Parānavitāna gives the transliteration of the two verses he has realigned from the original inscription,¹⁰ as follows :—

	Mātrās
Āpārimī / tē lōkā / hī Būdhā /	12
Sāmē nātī / āṭhānā / pā / rāmā-dūlā / bē /	15
Sāvā-ñūtā / -pātē ānū / tāre sāthē /	12
Māhā-sārā / ṇē lōkā / - cākā Būdhā / nāmā sāyā / bhū /	18

6. Ibid. p. 59.

7. Ibid. p. 60.

8. Ibid. p. 60.

9. Ibid. p. 60.

10. Ibid. p. 62.

	Mātrās
Me-galahi vihare Naka-	9
Uvara[je na]ma Budha saraṇa	11
Gate miciya-diṭika bidiya	11
[Yaha]-(maga)-[para] (ya) [ṇa]- bhute	11

The third inscription comes from Tissamahārāma, in the Southern Province. This again, according to Paranavitāna, has two verses like the above, one in the *Yāgī* and the other in the *Upagīti* metres, and Paranavitāna further says that the two inscriptions “commemorate the same event—the conversion to Buddhism of a viceroy of Rohaṇa—one document being set up at the vihāra where the conversion took place.”¹¹ The transliteration of the two verses, with the ‘maṅgala’ word ‘siddham’ excluded as forming no part of the verses, is as follows :—

	Mātrās
Yā gēdhāmā / sē bāyē / nāmā /	12
Sāgā-vādā / mā nē nā / mā / micā-diṭi / kā /	15
Jānā āvā / tāyā nē hā / kiyē sāgā-/	12
āsā / ti sōhā rā / jā / k[i]yā gā mē /	15
Mica-diṭi binaka aṭi	9
Mathima buda saraṇa gate	11
Nāga-uva-rāje nāma	11
Kaḍa uva-rāja-kālahi	11

Apart from these three inscriptions, Paranavitāna also draws the reader’s attention to another pre-Christian Brāhmī inscription, which he considers consists of an incomplete stanza.¹² “It reads as the first half of a stanza in the *Āryā* metre, more particularly of the variety known as *Pathyā*, for the first three feet are treated as a *pāda* enabling the last syllable to be scanned as two syllabic instants.”¹³ The text of the inscription, transliterated and scanned is as follows :—

	Mātrās
Mācu[dī]rā / jhāśā māṇi / kārāśē /	12
Śilā-iṭā / kā kāṭāyā / āgātās[e] / māc[ū]-gātā / ś(ē) /	18

Paranavitāna finally ends up his essay by saying that these records “afford us evidence to prove that the period during which the Sinhalese language has had a literary culture of its own goes back to at least two thousand years.”¹⁴

11. Ibid. p. 63.
 12. Ibid. p. 65.
 13. Ibid. p. 65.
 14. Ibid. p. 66.

In these inscriptions, one observes a poetic pattern in their composition to warrant the assertion that they are perhaps written as such. But it is not quite certain whether the scanning has been done correctly, especially in regard to the *e* and *o*, for it is quite uncertain whether the words involving these letters in the inscriptions were pronounced long or short at the time. From very ancient times there had been no distinction regarding the orthography of the long \bar{e} , \bar{o} and short *e*, *o*. This has been due to the influence of Sanskrit and Pāli, where these letters are always pronounced long, except where in Pāli, they are pronounced short when followed by conjunct consonants. Therefore these languages required no special signs to indicate the long \bar{e} and \bar{o} . This practice has been followed in Sinhalese as well, till in recent times it was found necessary to deviate from the earlier practice. Thus, the long signs to \bar{e} and \bar{o} have been since introduced, when it was found that in the highly developed modern Sinhalese, words with *e* and *o* pronounced long or short conveyed different meanings from one another. Compare for instance *etara minihā* (the man on the other side or bank) and \bar{e} *tara minihā* (that fat man); *ahō deviyani!* (Oh, ye gods!) and *ahō dēviyani* (Oh, you queen!); *koṭi* (leapords) and \bar{k} *oṭi* (a million) *kolaya* (leaf) and \bar{k} *olaya* (disease) etc. Thus it was found necessary to introduce long signs for long \bar{e} and \bar{o} , though even now the earlier system is quite prevalent, where we write words like *hetuva*, *lokaya*, *kopa* and so on, but pronounce them as *hētuva*, *lōkaya*, and *kōpa* respectively.

Therefore, the absence of long signs to indicate the long \bar{e} and \bar{o} in ancient times would in no way mean that words containing these letters were pronounced as short *e* or *o*. Therefore, Paranavitāna's treatment of the above inscriptions is open to doubt. And, in that case, the number of syllabic instants he has allotted to lines containing especially the *e* and *o* may not be correct. Under such circumstances, one could doubt whether Paranavitāna's allotment of a particular inscription to a particular type of metrical verse is justified.

Apart from this objection, it may be perhaps accepted that these inscriptions are in verse. A characteristic of Secondary Prākṛit, which would have influenced the early Sinhalese language, is that it possessed an "absolute fluidity, becoming a mere collection of vowels hanging for support on an occasional consonant."¹⁵ This feature is clearly visible in the early inscriptions.

15. Grierson, G. A. op. cit. p. 122.

METRE IN EARLY SINHALESE.....

The arrangement and the assonant nature of the early inscriptions are such, that it would be perhaps worthwhile for us to examine them to see whether there is any likelihood of their having been composed in verse. So far, no scholar appears to have devoted his attention in this direction, except Paranavitāna, who has, as we have indicated earlier, brought to the notice of scholars, three inscriptions he considers to have been drafted in verse. Since the graffiti at Sīgiri go back to the sixth century and the subsequent period, we may examine the inscriptions coming down only as far as the verses at Sīgiri. Of the inscriptions coming under this period, we could easily leave out the one-lined short ones, though almost all of them, being of an assonant and metrical nature, are easily capable of being constructed into two lines of sonorous verse. There are also two other inscriptions,¹⁶ which, though two-lined, being very short, can be put into only two lines of verse, and hence would be left out. But the fact that all the above inscriptions could be set into either one or two lines of a sonorous and metrical pattern, does indeed indicate the possibility of the poet's art being at work in these inscriptions. We can also leave out fourteen other inscriptions,¹⁷ being either too long for our examination or with the text missing here and there, or both. It may however be possible that these long inscriptions may have been composed in more than one verse.

I shall here consider altogether ten inscriptions, as to the possibility of their being in verse. While admitting that there can be no finality at all in the arrangement of the lines here made, I give below what I consider to be the possible form of the lines of the inscriptions put into verse.

	Mātrās
1 Damarakita tera (śa)	8
Agata-anagata-catudiśa	11
[Sa]gaśa Aṇikaṭa-Śoṇa-pitaha	13
Bariya [u]paśika Ti (śa) ya leṇe ¹⁸	12

“The cave of the female devotee Tiśa (Tissā), wife of the father of Aṇikaṭa-Śoṇa, [is dedicated] to Dhammarakkhita Thēra [and] to the [Buddhist] priesthood of the four quarters, present and not present.”¹⁸

16. See E. Z. Vol. I, p. 21 ; Vol. III. p. 162.

17. See E. Z. Vol. I, p. 146, (b) ; Vol. III. p. 166 ; Vol. I. p. 69 ; Vol. III. p. 166 ; Vol. III. p. 116 ; Vol. I. pp. 61-62 ; Vol. I. p. 148, a, b ; Vol. I. pp. 254-255 ; Vol. III. pp. 177-178 ; Vol. III. p. 122 ; Vol. III. p. 250 ; Vol. III. p. 251. Vol. III. p. 218.

18. See E. Z. Vol. I. p. 18.

UNIVERSITY OF CEYLON REVIEW

	Mātrās
2 Parumaka-Palikada-puta	10
Parumaka-Palikada-puta	10
Upasaka-Harumasa	8
Leṇe catudisa-śagasa ¹⁹	9

“The cave of the lay devotee Haruma, son of His Eminence Palikada, [is dedicated] to the [Buddhist] priesthood of the four quarters.”¹⁹

	Mātrās
3 Parumaka-Palikadasa	9
Bariya Parumaka-Śirikita	11
Jhita upaśika-Citaya	9
Leṇe śagaśa catudiśa ¹⁹	9 ^{19a}

“The cave of the female devotee Cita (Citrā), daughter of His Eminence Śiri-kita (Śri-kīrti ?) and wife of His Eminence Palikada, [is dedicated] to the [Buddhist] priesthood of the four quarters.”¹⁹

	Mātrās
4 Devanapiya maharajaha	10
Gamaṇi-Tisaha puta Devanapiya	13
Tisa-A[baya]ha leṇe agata	11
Anagata catudisa sagasa (di) [ne] ²⁰	13

“The cave of Devanapiya Tisa Abaya, son of the great king Devanapiya Gamaṇi Tisa, is given to the Buddhist priesthood from the four quarters, present and not present.”²⁰

	Mātrās
5 Mahamata Bamadata puta puru-	12
maka Bahike purumaka Puśa-gute	13
purumaka Mite purumaka Tiśe	12
Etehi karite Ariṭa-maha-gama ²¹	13

“In the fifteenth year (?), the sons of the Mahamata Bamadata [namely] His Eminence Bahika, His Eminence Puśaguta, His Eminence Mita and His Eminence Tiśa—by these chieftains was formed the great village Ariṭa.”²¹

19. E. Z. Vol. I. p. 19.

19a. This could be taken to consist of 9, 11, 10, 11 mātrās as well, in which case it resembles; Verses 409, 415 and 428 of Kavsiḷumiṇa. See the edition of Siddhattha.

20. E. Z. Vol. I. p. 144.

21. E. Z. Vol. I. p. 152.

METRE IN EARLY SINHALESE.....

	Mātrās
6 ²² Devanapiya Tisa maha—	9
rajaha Marumaṇaka Kuḍa-kaṇa	12
Rajaha jeṭa pute	7
Raja Abaye ataragagahi	11
Gaṇa . . takaha aḍi	8
Pilipavata viharahi	9
Biku-sagaya sovaṇa—	8
Koturu(ni) niyate ²³	7

“ Hail ! King Abaya, eldest son of King Kuṭakaṇa and grandson of the great King Devanapiya Tisa, dedicated with the golden vase (i.e. having poured water into the hands of the donee with a golden vase), the canal of Gaṇa . . ṭaka in the Ataragaga (country) to the monks (residing) in the Pilipavata monastery.”²³

	Mātrās
7 ²⁴ Sabaraje Ekadorika-Viharahi	13
Pohatakara karavaya Upaladoṇika-vavi	17
Pacasate(hi) kiṇiya paca-satehiya	14
Pasu ovaya biku-sagahaṭaya dine ²⁵	14

“ Hail ! King Saba constructed the Sabbath-hall at the Ekadorika Monastery ; and having bought the Upaladoṇika tank for five hundred [pieces of money] and having removed the silt by [spending another] five hundred gave the same to the confraternity of monks.”²⁵

	Mātrās
8 Maharaja (ha Vaha) bayaha	10
Maṇumaraka Tisa-maharajaha	12
Puti maharaji Gamiṇi-	9
Abeya Upala-vibajakahi	11 (a)
Vaḍamanaka-vavi paca-saha(si)	12
Kahāvaṇa dariya kaṇavaya	12
Tubaraba buka-sagahaṭaya catiri	14
Paceṇi pari [bujanaka koṭu dini] ²⁶	13

22. This inscription was taken on, though there is *one* letter missing in 1.2. The ‘ maṅgala ’ word ‘ siddham ’ at the beginning of the inscription has been left out here.

23. E. Z. Vol. III. p. 154.

24. The ‘ maṅgala ’ word ‘ sidha ’ has been left out here.

25. E. Z. Vol. III. p. 165.

(a) If this verse is taken to contain 10, 12, 10, 12 mātrās in the four lines respectively, it would be exactly similar to v. 440 of Kavsilumina, as found in the edition of Siddhattha.

26. E. Z. Vol. I. p. 211.

“ The great king Gamiṇi Abaya, son of the great king Tisa [and] grandson of the great king Vahaba, having borne [the expense of] five thousand *kahavanas*, and having caused the Vaḍamanaka Tank in the Upala division to be dug, [granted the same] to the community of monks at Tubaraba, [and thereby secured for them the enjoyment] of the four priestly requisities.”²⁶

	Mātrās
9 ^{26a} Kaḍaha (va)p[i]-gama Dakavahanaka-	13
Vasiya-Nada-tere ceta vadita	12
Akuju (ka) bikujarana samatavaya	14
Cataradorahi patagaḍa atāḍi ²⁷	13

“ (Hail) ! The elder Nada, residing at Dakavahanaka in the village Kaḍahavapi enlarged the *cetiya* ; [and] laid the steps at the four entrances having made the chief monks at Akujuka acquiesce [therein].”²⁷

	Mātrās
10 Maharaja Vahayaha rajehi	11
Ameta Isigiraye Nakadiva	12
Bujameni Badakara-atanchi	12
Piyaguka-Tisa vihara karite ²⁸	12

“ Hail ! In the reign of the great king Vaha[ba] and when the Minister Isigiriya was governing Nakadiva, Piyaguka Tisa caused a *viharā* to be built at Badakara-atana.”²⁸

In his article, “ Brāhmī inscriptions in Sinhalese verse,” Parānavitāna puts forward the theory, that of the Brāhmī inscriptions found in Ceylon, only the three inscriptions he has observed in his article, could be considered to have been written in verse, together with a possible incomplete stanza indicated at the end of his article. He has not considered any of the inscriptions we have observed above, probably because he does not consider them to be in verse, since they cannot be assigned to any metrical form according to those observed in Sanskrit, Prākṛit or Sinhalese works on prosody. But we need not be deterred on this account, for it is a fallacy to conclude that all the possible *vṛttas* (rhythm) under any metre are recorded in these prosodical works. Any work on prosody could, and necessarily would discuss only a few of these *vṛttas*, for they could be counted by the thousands. This fact is particularly so with regard to the Sinhalese prosodical work, *Elu-saṅḍas-lakuṇa*. It would be no exaggeration to say, therefore, that the *vṛttas* not enumerated in the work would number many times more than those actually observed in it.

26. E. Z. Vol. I. p. 211.

26a. The ‘ maṅgala ’ letter ‘ si ’ at the beginning has been left out.

27. E. Z. Vol. III. p. 215.

28. E. Z. Vol. IV. p. 237. The ‘ maṅgala ’ word has been left out.

What we have been so far trying to establish is, that the fact that these inscriptions we have observed, cannot be assigned to any particular metre or rhythm observed in these works of prosody, should not be the criterion to decide their metrical nature or not. On the other hand, if they are not a sort of metrical composition, it is rather difficult to understand the assonant nature of the compositions and the particular arrangement of the words in these inscriptions.

Attracted by a particularly assonant and rhythmic nature of these inscriptions together with their peculiar arrangement of the words, I examined the inscriptions Nos. I—10 given above, covering a period of four centuries, from 2nd century B.C. to 2nd century A.D., by breaking them up into *pādas*, without making any special attempt to make them conform to any particular metrical pattern. The only criterion followed in this attempt was the ability to read each line into a rhythmic unit. Inscriptions of the succeeding period could not be included in this analysis, because all the available inscriptions from the 3rd century A.D. to 5th century A.D. had to be left out, either because they were too long for an examination of this nature or because numerous letters were missing from the text, or both. In this analysis, I have given against each *pāda*, the number of syllabic instants, or *mātrās* coming in it. As far as these are concerned, there is absolute authority in poetry to consider a *mātrā* long or short for reason of *yati*²⁹ (or caesura). Therefore the number of *mātrās* given by me against each line could be adjusted to contain one or two *mātrās* more or less in each *pāda*. For example, the last syllable in each line, though short, could for all purposes be considered long and counted as such, without any break of poetic rules. Thus it could even be said that the *mātrās* in 1 could, quite justifiably be counted as 9, 12, 14 and 13; of 2 as 11, 11, 9 and 10; and those of 10 as 12, 12, 12, 12 etc. It is also permissible according to *Elu-saṅdas-lakūṇa* that while a long syllable may be shortened, the opposite is also applicable for purposes where a particular number of *mātrās* may be required for a *pāda*.³⁰ On this basis, the last line of 3 could be considered to contain 11 *mātrās* by taking the last *e* of 'lene,' and the last vowel of the line to be long. Then the verse would contain 9, 11, 9, 11 *mātrās* in the four lines respectively. This is a very important observation for us, for, we see the example from *Asakdā-kava* given in the *Sidat-saṅgarā* as exception to the rule regarding the use of 'ha' falling into this precise pattern. We also find other similar instances in literature.³¹ But

29. See *Elu-saṅdas-lakūṇa*, V. 4.

30. See, *Elu-saṅdas-lakūṇa*, V. 4.

31. See, *Haṃsa-sandesa*, V. 1.

we find that this *vr̥tta* is not recorded in *Elu-sañ̥das-lakuṇa*. Thus, on the same grounds that justify us in regarding the above as verse, it would be difficult not to recognize these inscriptions also as having been written in verse, although none of them find a place among the categories of verses enumerated in books. This position has been clearly exemplified in the *Elu-sañ̥das-lakuṇa* itself, when its author says that metrical types in Sinhalese contain hundred thousands of millions of poetic *vr̥ttas*, and further goes on to say that if poets were to embark on these, what compositions of theirs would not fall into a *vr̥tta* ?³² Thus, although none of the inscriptions in the form arranged above as verses can be identified with any metre or *vr̥tta* recorded in works of prosody, yet the categories into which they may fall could be determined with a fair amount of certainty, for, a careful examination of the verses 1, 2, 3 and 6 would induce us with reason, to consider them as modified forms of verses belonging to the class called *vaktra-chandas*. And 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 and 10 could be considered as belonging to a modified form of *gīti* type found in the *āryā* metre. Just as Indo-āryan words became modified as they passed into Sinhalese, like *āgata* < *agata*, *Dhammarakkhita* < *Damarakita*, *saṅghassa* < *sagasa* etc., so when a Sanskrit or Pāli verse is imitated in Sinhalese poetry, a modification of the syllabic numbers of the original appears to have taken place as a natural process.³³ The Sinhalese *yāgī* which is an imitation of *āryā*, from which it also appears to have derived its name, (Skt. *aryā* < P. *ariyā* < S. *āyyā* < *yā*) serves as an excellent example to show the validity of this theory. According to Sinhalese prosody, a *yāgī* contains 20 *mātrās* in the first half, and 22 *mātrās* in the second half of the verse. It appears that this pattern got established itself in Sinhalese poetry, as a result of the fact that the original *āryā* of 30 and 27 *mātrās* in the first and second half respectively, reduced themselves in Sinhalese to 20 and 22 *mātrās*. That *yāgī* is derived from *āryā* can be indicated further by showing that the number of words in a line of *āryā* verse could be put into a line of *yāgī*, with slight changes, necessitated of course, due to the case system in Sinhalese. To take a few examples :³⁴

1. *Sanskrit*

Taruṇaṃ sarṣapa śākam—navaudanaṃ picchilānica dadhīni

Alpavyayena sundari—grāmyajano miṣṭam aśnāti³⁵

Beloved, the peasant folk enjoy such delicacies as tender mustard leaves, freshly cooked rice and sour curd, at little expense.

32. See, *Elu-sañ̥das-lakuṇa*, V. 115.

33. I am indebted to Dr C. E. Godakumbura of the University of London for this view which has been first put forward to him by Professor Helmer Smith.

34. I record here my indebtedness to Dr M. Sri Rammandala of the Department of Sinhalese for assistance in this direction.

35. *Vṛttaratnākara*, V. 11.

<i>Sinhalese</i>	Mātrās
Turuṇu habadaḷukoḷa—navabat ämbul dīkiri	(20)
Maṇḍa viyadamini soṇdure—gāmidene rasaṭa valaṇḍā	(22)

2. *Pāli*

Danto dantehi saha—purāṇajaṭilehi vippamuttehi
Siṅgīnikkhasuvaṇṇo—Rājagahaṃ pāvīsi bhagavā³⁶

“The tamed with the tamed, with the former matted-hair ascetics, the well freed with the well freed, The Lord, beautifully coloured like a golden ornament, entered Rajagaha.”³⁷

<i>Sinhalese</i>	Mātrās
Dāmi dāmunavun saha—pāraṇi duḷulu midunavun	(20)
Siṅgunik samavanātiye—Rajagaha pivīsi bagavat	(22)

3. *Prākṛit*

attā ! taha ramaṇijjam
amham gāmassa maṇḍanī-hūam
lua-tila-vāḍi-sariccham
sisireṇa kaam bhisinī-saṇḍam³⁸

“Oh mother ! So the mass of lotuses that was so delightful and the ornament of our village, the cold has made like a garden of cut sesamum.”³⁹

Sinhalese

Mavsāṇḍini ramaṇī—apa gamaṭa maḍanak baṇḍu
Tala-kāpu-piṭiya men—keḷe sisireni bisini haṇḍa.

(piyum vana)

To reverse the order, let us now see how a Sinhalese *yāgī* would appear in Sanskrit and Pāli respectively.

1. *Sinhalese*

Raja pāmīni bōsat—sat rajuneḍi māḍa visī
Visī tamā kara kalak—kalak dasaraja damnen^{39a}

36. The Vinayaṭṭaka, ed. Oldenburg, H., Vol. I. The Mahavagga, Williams and Norgate, 1879. p. 38.

37. The Book of Discipline, Vol. IV, Mahavagga, Translated by I. B. Horner, Luzac & Co. Ltd., 1951, p. 50.

38. Hala, Sattasāi. V. 8.

39. Woolner, A. C., Introduction to Prākṛit, 1939. p. 119.

39a. Kavsilumina, V. 5.

The bōsat who had become king, ruled according to the ten regal virtues, suppressing the might of the seven kings, and making his wife well-disposed towards him.

Sanskrit

Rājyasthabodhisatvaḥ—saptanṛpānām uvāsa hṛtadarpaḥ
Nijavaśakṛtāgrakāntaḥ—daśarājadharmaparo suciraṃ.

2. *Sinhalese*

Paha usbavaṭa tos—vī rivi ē puraverē
Dāka sīmādurōrehi—vuvan piyum varaṅganan^{39b}

Pāli

Pasādunnatituṭṭho—babhūva ravi puravare tasmim
Disvāna sīhapañjara—varaṅganāvadanapadumāni^{39c}

3. *Sinhalese*

Raṅga nobaṅda kēnam—kē nam nogī tiyugī
Novismū len kavarek—kavarek nohaḷa pudavat^{39d}

Pāli

Ke vā abaddharaṅgā—ke vā thutigītayo na gāyimsu
Ke vā vimhitahadayā—anāhaṭa pujjavatthūnaṃ

This observation reveals two very valuable facts concerning Sinhalese versification, namely,

(a) Indo-Āryan *mātrā* metres are the prototype of the Sinhalese *gī* metre.

(b) The number of *mātrās* of the Indo-āryan *mātrā vṛttas* appear differently in Sinhalese *mātrā vṛttas*.

But, unfortunately we are not in a position to trace each and every one of the Sinhalese *gī* metres to its precise prototype with any certainty as in the case of the *yāgī* for, probably due to very apparent differences seen in the Sinhalese and its original prosodial metres, Sinhalese poets named their verses with names different from the original from which they derived them. Therefore they used such names as, *umatu gī*, *yon gi*, *piyum gī*, etc. which names are not found in Sanskrit, Pāli, or Prākṛit poetry. But from what has been said so far, it may be asserted beyond doubt that all these *gī* tunes must be imitations of one or the other of the Sanskrit, Pāli or Prākṛit *mātrā vṛttas*, namely,

39b. Muvadevdā-vata, V. 9.

Seeing the lotus-like faces of the noble damsels in the balconies of that great city, the sun was gladdened at the height of the mansions.

39c. This is a Pali upagīta, which contains the characteristics of the second half of āryā metre in both its lines.

39d. Sasadāvata, V. 203.

What being did not dance (for joy) and who did not sing songs of joy? What being did not wonder in mind, and who did not offer objects of worship?

- (a) *Āryā*
- (b) *Āryā gīti*
- (c) *Vaktra*, and
- (d) *Vetāliya*

And all these possible *gī* tunes modelled after the above-mentioned varieties of *mātrā* metres have not been exemplified in the *Elu-saṅdas-lakuṇa* as is proved by the fact that verses composed in metres different from those given in it, are found in works both before and after the *Elu-saṅdas-lakuṇa*

Further evidence to indicate the fact that the syllabic position of the original verse stands differently in the Sinhalese may be seen from two more examples given below, from tunes other than the *āryā* type.

1. *Pāli*

Pakkodano duddhakhīrohamasmi
Anutīre mahiyā samānavāso
Channā kuṭi āhito gini
Atha ce paṭṭhayasī pavassa deva.⁴⁰

Living on the banks of the mahī river with my cows, I have milked them, and cooked my rice. My hut is thatched, the fire is lit, and O Rain, thou mayest rain if thou wishest.

Sinhalese

Pisu batimi devu kirimi mam
Vasam mihi nadiye samaterē
Seviniya kiḷi dālvina gini
Vasnē vāsi dān kāmātiyehi nam

Mātrās

12
13
12
15

2. *Pāli*

Manujassa pamattacārino
Taṇhā vadḍhati māluvā viya
So plavati hurāhuraṃ
Phalamicchaṃ va vanasmim vānaro⁴¹

Sinhalese

Pamadin sarana minisahu
Taṇa vāḍenuyē māluvā ev
Hē palayi beven bevē
Pala isnā venehi vaṅduru ev

Mātrās

11
14
11
14

40. Fausböll, V. Suttanipāta, Oxford University Press, 1885. p. 3. V. 18.

41. Fausböll, V. Dhammapada, Luzac & Co. London, 1900. p. 74. V. 334.

Examples of this nature could be multiplied quite easily. One observes a very striking similarity in the above verses and the inscriptions I have rendered into metrical form. Both these types are not found mentioned in any of the works on prosody. But that fact cannot in any way exclude these from the domain of poetical composition. It may be mentioned here that in later times, like that of Parakkamabāhu I, not to speak of Nissankamalla, we have inscriptions in poetic form. Reference may be made to a Sanskrit śloka and a Sinhalese inscription considered to be in verse appearing among the inscriptions of Parakkamabāhu I.

Svasti—Idaṃ Laṅkādhināthena
Srī Parākrama Bāhunā
Kāritam viśvalokārtham
Kāryyavyāpāritātmanā.⁴²

“This was caused to be made for the benefit of the whole world by Srī Parākrama Bāhu, Supreme Lord of Lankā, minded of what was fit to be done.”⁴²

The Sinhalese inscription, cut in five lines, would appear as follows in the verse :

Bāṅda nī gaṅga vāvu
Siri Lakāda ket karavā
Siyal diya raṅdavā
Pārākumbā niriṅdu keḷe mē⁴²

“Having dammed up smaller streams, rivers, [and constructed] tanks in Srī Lankā [and] caused fields to be cultivated [and] all the water to be retained [in the tanks,] King Parākrama Bāhu made this.”⁴²

On the face of all this evidence we have observed, it seems justifiable for us to conclude that even the early inscriptions of Ceylon, at least up to the time we have examined, have been mostly written in verse, which would take our poetic tradition to very ancient times.

Reference may also be made to the statement made by Buddhaghosa in one of his commentaries regarding songs sung by women working in the fields in Ceylon.⁴³

Coming on to the time of Kumāradāsa of the early sixth century, we have the very popular tradition where he is said to have inscribed the first

42. Archaeological Survey of Ceylon, Seventh Progress Report of 1891, Ceylon Sessional Paper XIII of 1896. p. 63.

43. See, Buddhaghosa. Paramathajotika, II, P. T. S. p. 397.

two lines of a stanza on a wall of a house he had visited, promising a handsome reward for anyone who would appropriately complete the verse. This was later on said to have been done by Kālidāsa the poet friend of the king. Without going into any discussion regarding the veracity of this popular identification, we may merely say here that it has been questioned by scholars on various grounds. We cannot also bring in any scientific evidence to establish the truth of this incident. All we could say is that there is a strong tradition regarding it. On examining the verse considered to have been the one concerned, we observe more developed features in it than in the Sīgiri verses ascribed to the same period. Therefore all we can say is, we cannot be certain of the authenticity of the verse, for, it appears to be modern.

In the absence of any work written by Mogallāna or the twelve great poets of the time of Aggabodhi I, we have naturally to turn to the next earliest specimens of the poetic art in Sinhalese, the Sīgiri graffiti. Archaeological work at Sīgiri first begun in 1895,⁴⁴ was carried on till 1905,⁴⁵ when for the first time, the existence of these very important lithic records was made known to the public in the report for that year.⁴⁶ Bell, who was responsible for the excavation work at Sīgiri and for bringing these remarkable lithic records to the notice of the public, not only realized their great importance, but also published, according to his own reading, ten such records with his own version of the translation.⁴⁷ He also recognised the antiquity of these records when he says, "The 'inscriptions' in Sinhalese date paleographically from the 6th to the 15th century."⁴⁷ The ten verses published by Bell belong to the period between the twelfth and the fourteenth centuries. The next scholar associated with the study of these graffiti is Parānavitāna, who seems to have directed his attention to these lithic records in about 1929,⁴⁸ that is, twenty four years after they were first brought to light. Parānavitāna, while drawing our attention to the fact that the verses belonging to the sixth and seventh centuries are few, and only a very few of these belonging to a period after the eleventh century are of any particular interest,⁴⁹ tells us that "the majority of the graffiti belonging paleographically to the 8th and 9th centuries consists of stanzas, some of them rhymed,..."⁵⁰ Parānavitāna also believes that there must

44. A. S. C. 1895, Ceylon Sessional Paper XL of 1904. p. 10.

45. Ibid. 1905, Ceylon Sessional Paper XX of 1909. pp. 12-14.

46. Ibid. Appendix C, pp. 53-55.

47. Ibid. p. 53.

48. Parānavitāna, S. Sigiriya Graffiti : Earliest Extant Specimens of Sinhalese Verse, J. R. A. S. CB. Vol. XXXIV. No. 92. p. 314.

49. Ibid. p. 310.

50. Ibid. p. 311.

have been a large number of verses written on the wall, very much more than what appears to be at the present time, and he further believes that the sections of the wall which have collapsed may also have had these verses inscribed on them.⁵¹ In 1939, he has "succeeded in obtaining satisfactory readings and interpretations of over 150 of these notable records."⁵² and towards the latter half of 1940, he claims to have successfully deciphered over 350 verses.⁵³

I have earlier developed the theory that the early inscriptions have been written as poetry. If we were to neglect this theory for a little while, we may say that the earliest extant poetry, where we could bring in conclusive evidence, is found in the Sīgiriya verses. It is unfortunate that Paranavitāna in his essay,⁵⁴ has not dealt with the graffiti belonging to the early 6th and 7th centuries.⁵⁵ Nor has Bell examined these. Therefore our analysis will have to be confined to only these verses, the text of which has been given by Paranavitāna in his essay, for, no other verse is available to us. Paranavitana has given altogether 42 verses, belonging to the period from the 8th to the 11th centuries.

From these we note that the majority of the verses are *gī* verses. And there are also two four-lined rhymed verses.⁵⁶ We may also consider another verse which has been written as a rhymed verse.⁵⁷ Examining the rhymed ones we note that they have been written to rhyme at the end only, and not at the beginning. It may therefore be possible that at this time, the rhyming was made only at the end of the line. Further, from the very significant majority of the *gī* verses we may conclude that the four-lined verses made their appearance later in poetry. It may be possible that our early poets found it easier and more convenient to write the short *gī* verses without 'elisama' than the four-lined verses. The fact that the term *gī* has been used by the writers more than once,⁵⁸ and 'yāgī' twice,⁵⁹ in their verses, indicates that these terms had come into use at these particular times which shows a developed stage of the poetical art.

51. Paranavitāna, S. "Sigiri Graffiti : Earliest Extant Specimens of Sinhalese Verse"—Journal R. A. S. CB., Vol. XXXIV, No. 92 of 1939. p. 315.

52. Ibid. p. 314.

53. Ibid. p. 315.

54. Ibid. p. 309ff.

55. Ibid. p. 310-311.

56. Ibid. p. 324.

57. Ibid. p. 316.

58. Ibid. pp. 321, 333, 334, 335 and 337.

59. Ibid. pp. 334 and 335.

METRE IN EARLY SINHALESE.....

In conclusion it may be surmised that the origin of Sinhalese poetry is perhaps as old as the earliest Sinhalese language developed by the first settlers in this country ; and, that on inscriptional evidence it could be stated to be at least as old as the earliest inscriptions, and by the time of the Sīgiri verses the poet's art in Ceylon had developed to the extent of having its own terms for various types of versification.

U. D. JAYASEKERA

සිය බස් ලකර හා පැරණි සිංහල කවි සමය—1

කාව්‍ය ලක්ෂණ හා වස්තුව

කාව්‍ය ශාස්ත්‍රයෙහි සැම කල්හි ම මූලික ප්‍රශ්නයක් ව පවත්නා වූ “කාව්‍යය යනු කුමක්ද? යන්න විසඳීමට ප්‍රථමයෙන් කාව්‍ය වස්තුව පිළිබඳ අවබෝධයක් ඇතිකර ගැනීම යෙහෙකැ යි සිතේ. කාව්‍ය වස්තුව කුමක් ද යන ප්‍රශ්නය විභාග කිරීම යට කී කාරණය තේරුම් ගැනීමට ඉවහල් වනු ඇත. කාව්‍යයේ අභ්‍යන්තර සවභාවය පිළිබඳ යථාවබෝධයක් ඇති කර ගැනීමට මුල් පියවරක් වශයෙන් එහි ස්වරූපය තේරුම් ගැනීම වටී. එවිට කාව්‍යයකින් අවශ්‍යයෙන් බලාපොරොත්තුවනු ලබන්නාවූ රස, ධ්වනි ආදී සුක්ෂ්ම ධර්මයන් වටහා ගැනීමට ද පහසු වෙයි. එහෙයින් පළමු කොට කාව්‍ය වස්තුව පිළිබඳ පරීක්ෂණයක් කිරීම යෝග්‍ය වේ.

කාව්‍ය ශාස්ත්‍රයේ ආදි ම අවස්ථාවෙහි දී කාව්‍යයට වස්තුව වූ දෙය ශරීරය හා අලංකාර නමින් හඳුන්වන ලදී. හරත මුනිහුගේ නාට්‍ය ශාස්ත්‍රයෙහි කාව්‍ය ශරීරය පිළිබඳ සඳහනක් නොවතත් අලංකාර ගැන සඳහන් වෙයි. එම ග්‍රන්ථයේ සොළොස්වන අධ්‍යායයෙහි කාව්‍ය ශාස්ත්‍රය කොටස් සතරකට බෙදනු ලැබේ. එනම් (1) චතුර්විධ අලංකාරය, (2) දශවිධ ගුණය, (3) දශවිධ දෝෂය, (4) සතිස් ලක්ෂණ යනු වෙයි. ශාස්ත්‍රයෙහි ප්‍රධාන කොටස් මෙසේ වී ය යි සැලැකිය හැකි ය. හරත මුනිහුගේ ග්‍රන්ථයෙහි දැක්වෙන පරිදි කාව්‍ය ශාස්ත්‍රය නාට්‍ය ශාස්ත්‍රයට යටත් වූ ද එහි එක් අංගයක් වූ ද ශාස්ත්‍ර ප්‍රභේදයක් වූ බව සැලැකිය යුතු යි ඒ හැම අංගයක් ම නාට්‍යයෙහි පරමාර්ථය වූ රස පෝෂණය පිණිස යෙදේ.

භාමහගේ කාව්‍යාලංකාරය නම් ග්‍රන්ථයෙන් පෙනී යන්නේ කාව්‍ය විෂයයෙහි අලංකාර ශාස්ත්‍රය ප්‍රමුඛ ස්ථානය දරූ බව යි. අලංකාර ශාස්ත්‍රය ප්‍රධාන වන අතර නාට්‍ය ශාස්ත්‍රය හා රස වාදය ද්විතීය ස්ථානයට එළඹෙයි. සවකීය ග්‍රන්ථයට කාව්‍යාලංකාරය යි නම් තැබීමෙන් අලංකාරය කාව්‍යයේ ප්‍රධාන අංගය ලෙස ඔහු සැලැකුවා පමණක් නොව නාට්‍ය ශාස්ත්‍රයට යටත් නොවූ කාව්‍ය විචාර මාභීයක් ද භාමහ විසින් ආරම්භ කරන ලද බව ද ඔප්පු වේ.

ආදි යුගයෙහි විසූ ආලංකාරිකයෝ කාව්‍යයේ සවභාවය, කාව්‍ය රසය, කාව්‍ය රසාස්වාදනය නොහොත් කාව්‍යයේ රස විඳීම යන කරුණු විශේෂයෙන් නො සැලැකූ හ. ඒ වනාහි පසු කලෙක විසූ විචාරකයන් සතු වූ කායභීයකි. භාමහ¹ සහ දණ්ඩී² කාව්‍ය ශරීරය ගැන ම වෙහෙසුණ හ. එහෙත් කාව්‍යයේ සවභාවය අල්ප මාත්‍රයෙන් වුව ද වටහා ගත් බව සිතීමට තුඩු දෙන සාධක නැත්තේ නො වෙයි. කාව්‍යය ශරීරයක් ලෙස සැලැකූ ඔවුහු කාව්‍යාත්මයක් ගැන හැඟවුවා විනා එය ඉඳුරා ප්‍රකාශ නො කළහ.

කාව්‍යයක ශබ්දයන් අර්ථයන් අලංකාරයන් භාමහ සැලැකුවේ ය. සුන්දර වූ අර්ථයක් ගැප් වූ ද, විචිත්‍ර වූ අලංකාරයන් ගෙන් සරසන ලද්ද වූ ද, උචිත වූ පද සමූහයකින් නොහොත් ශබ්දයන් ගෙන් යුක්ත වූ වාක්‍ය ප්‍රයෝගය කාව්‍යයේ අග්‍ර ඵලය ලෙස හෙතෙම සැලැකුවේ ය.

කාව්‍ය ශරීරය ප්‍රධාන කොටස් දෙකකින් යුක්ත වෙයි. එක් අතකින් ශබ්ද-අර්ථ දෙක හා අනෙක් අතින් අලංකාරයෝ ද වෙති. භාමහ ගේ මතය පරිදි ශබ්දයන් අර්ථයන්

1. *Kāvyaḷankāra*—Text with English Translation and notes. Edited by Sastri (Tanjore, 1927) I. 23.
2. *කාව්‍යාදර්ශය*—දෙඩන්දුවේ ධර්මසෙන සංස්කරණය (කොළඹ, 1905). I. 10

නිසි ලෙස ගැලැපීම කාව්‍යය නම් වෙයි. එහෙයින් ‘ශබ්දර්ථෝ සහිතෝ කාව්‍යම්’³ කියන ලද්දේ. මෙයින් පෙනෙන්නේ ඔහු අලංකාරය කාව්‍යයෙහි අංගයක් ලෙස සැලකුව ද එය අත්‍යවශ්‍ය අංගය ලෙස නො තැකූ බව යි. කාව්‍යයෙහි අග්‍ර ඵලය ලැබීමට ඉවහල් වන කරුණු අතර අලංකාරය ද ගැණෙනත් කාව්‍යයට අවශ්‍යයෙන් ම තිබිය යුත්තේ ශබ්දය හා අර්ථය යන දෙක පමණි. කවියකුගේ නිර්මාණ ශක්තියෙන් හා බුද්ධියෙන් (එ නම් ප්‍රතිභායෙන්) පැන නගින්නාවූ කාව්‍ය රසය කාව්‍යයෙහි අවශ්‍ය අංගයක් වන බව නො කියැවෙයි. කාව්‍යයක ප්‍රාණවත් පක්ෂය හෝ රසවත් පක්ෂය හෝ ඔහුගේ විමැසිල්ලට භාජන නො වෙයි. අලංකාරයන් ගෙන් යුක්ත වූ කාව්‍යයේ බාහිර ස්වරූපය නොහොත් ආකෘතිය ම ය ඔහුගේ විශේෂ සැලැකිල්ලට යොමු වනුයේ.

කාව්‍ය වස්තුව පිළිබඳ දණ්ඩ ගේ මතය භාමහ ගේ මතයට බෙහෙවින් සමාන ය. දෙදෙනා ම කාව්‍යයේ ශරීරයන් අලංකාරත් විස්තර කරති. දණ්ඩ තම කෘතිය වන කාව්‍යාදෘෂියෙන් කොතරම් විශාල කොටසක් අලංකාරයන් විස්තර කිරීමට වෙන් කොට ඇත ද කාව්‍යයේ ප්‍රාණය වශයෙන් සලකන්නේ ගුණය යි.

කාව්‍යාදෘෂියේ I: 10 වැනි ශ්ලෝකයෙහි ශරීරය හා අලංකාර පිළිබඳ සඳහන් වෙයි:

තෛ: ශරීරං ච කාව්‍යානාම-ලංකාරාංශච දර්ශිතා:
ශරීරං තාවදිෂ්ටාර්ථව්‍යවච්ඡින්නා පදවලී.

“ ඒ පූවීසුරින් විසින් කාව්‍යයන්ගේ ශරීරය ද අලංකාරයෝ ද දක්වන ලදහ ; ශරීරය නම් ඉෂ්ටාර්ථයෙන් නුසුන් වූ පද සමූහය යි.” මෙහි ශරීරය හඳුන්වා ඇත්තේ ඉෂ්ටාර්ථයෙන් නුසුන් වූ පද සමූහය හැටියට යි. ඉෂ්ටාර්ථ යන්නෙන් අදහස් කරනු ලබන්නේ කුමක් ද ? රසවත් වූ ද වර්ණනා කිරීමට සුදුසු වූ ද කවින්ගේ ප්‍රතිභාවට විෂය වූ ද සුන්දර පදර්ථයෝ ය. එ වැනි ඉෂ්ටාර්ථයන්ගෙන් ව්‍යවච්ඡින්න වූ නොහොත් විශේෂයෙන් අවිච්ඡින්න වූ, පරිපූර්ණ වූ පද සමූහය යි. “ ඉෂ්ටත්වය නම් සාහිත්‍ය ශාස්ත්‍රයෙහි වමන්කාරය පෙරටු කොට වර්ණනා කිරීමේ අභිලාෂය යි. වමන්කාරය ලෝකෝත්තර ප්‍රීතියක් ” වන බව ද කියැවෙයි. ඉෂ්ටත්වං ච සාහිත්‍ය ශාස්ත්‍රේ වමන්කාර පූර්වක වණිනාභිලාෂ: . වමන්කාරශ්ච ලෝකෝත්තරාහ්ලාද: 4 යනු ව්‍යාඛ්‍යාන පාඨය යි. මෙයින් කාව්‍ය ශරීරය පද සමූහයක් වන බව පැහැදිලි යි. එහෙත් ඒ පද සමූහය ඉෂ්ට වූ අර්ථයන්ගෙන් නුසුන් විය යුතු යි.

කාව්‍ය ශරීරය සැරසිය යුත්තේ ය. එය හොබවන ලද්දේ, අලංකාර කරන ලද්දේ අලංකාරයන් ගෙනි. එහෙයින් කාව්‍යාදෘෂියෙහි⁵ ම

“ කාව්‍යශෝභාකරාන් ධමීන-ලංකාරාන් ප්‍රචක්ෂතේ
තේ වාද්‍යාපි විකල්ප්‍යන්තෙ-කස්තාන් කාර්ත්ස්නේන චක්ෂ්‍යති.”

“ කාව්‍යය හොබවන ධමීයන් අලංකාරයනැ යි කියති. ඒ අලංකාරයෝ අද දක්වන්නේ විවිධාකාරයෙන් දක්වනු ලැබෙත්. කවරෙක් ඔවුන් සාකලයයෙන් කියන්නේ ද ? ” යනුයෙන් අලංකාරයන් විවිධාකාර වූ බව කාව්‍යාදෘෂි කතුවරයා සඳහන් කරයි. යම් සේ විවිධ වූ ආහරණයෝ ශරීරයක් සරසත් ද එ සේ ම විවිධ වූ අලංකාරයෝ කාව්‍ය ශරීරය ද සරසත්.

3. *Kāvyaḷankāra*—Edition Sastri, I, 16
De S. K.—*Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics*. (London, 1925)
II, 46—47, පිටු ද බලන්න.
4. *Kāvyaḷadarśa of Dandin*—Edited with an original commentary by
Vidyābhūṣaṇa Pandit Rangacharya Raddhi Sastri. (Poona, 1938): 8.
5. II. 1.

වාමන ගත් මහ දණ්ඩ ගේ මහට බෙහෙවින් සමාන වේ. දණ්ඩ මෙන් ඔහු ද කාව්‍යයේ ගරීරය වාක්‍යය යි පිළිගත් සේ පෙනේ. රීතිය කාව්‍යයෙහි ආත්මය වන බව ප්‍රකාශ කරන අතර වාමන කාව්‍ය ගරීරය ද හඳුන්වයි :... “ රීතිය නම් කාව්‍යයේ ආත්මය යි, එහි ගරීරය වාක්‍යය යි.”

“ රීතිර් නාමේයමාත්මා කාව්‍යසා ගරීරසා වේති වාක්‍යගේෂ්ඃ⁶ ”

යනු කාව්‍යාලංකාරසූත්‍ර වෘත්තියෙහි දැක්වෙන පාඨයකි.

යථෝක්ත විස්තරයෙහි කාව්‍ය විචාරකයන් ති දෙනෙකුගේ මත හඳුන්වන ලදී. කාව්‍යයේ ප්‍රධාන අංගය හෝ ප්‍රාණය හෝ ආත්මය හෝ පිළිබඳ ඔවුන්ගේ මත වෙනස් වුවත් කාව්‍ය ගරීරය පිළිබඳ ඔවුන් පැවැසූ අදහස් බෙහෙවින් සමාන වූ බව ඉඳුරා පැහැදිලි වෙයි. ඔවුන්ගේ දෘෂ්ටි කෝණය එකිනෙකට වෙනස් වී ය. ඔවුන් අදහස් ප්‍රකාශ කළ අයුරු ද වෙනස් වෙයි. කාව්‍ය වස්තුවට අත්‍යාවශ්‍යක වූ අංගය ගබ්දර්ථ දෙකින් යුක්ත වූ වාක්‍යය බව ති දෙනා ම පිළිගත් සේ පෙනේ. එය වනාහි ගබ්ද අර්ථ දෙක නිසි පරිදි ගැලපීම යි භාමහ කිය. එය ඉෂ්ටාර්ථයෙන් අනුන වූ, (නො අඩු වූ) පද සමූහය යි දණ්ඩ පැවැසී ය. ඒ දෙකට ම නොවෙනස් වන පරිදි කාව්‍යයේ ගරීරය වාක්‍යය යි වාමන කී ය.

* * *

සිය බස් ලකර නම් වූ ප්‍රශස්ත අලංකාර ග්‍රන්ථය දණ්ඩ්‍යාවාය්‍යීයන්ගේ කාව්‍යාදර්ශයේ සිංහල අනුවාදයකි. මූලාශ්‍රය වූ කාව්‍යාදර්ශයට අසමාන තැන් කිහිපයක් ම මෙම ග්‍රන්ථයෙහි ඇති බැවින් එය සම්පූර්ණයෙන් පරිවර්තනයකැ යි කිව නො හැකි යි. කාව්‍ය ලක්ෂණ, අලංකාර, ගුණ, දෝෂ ආදී කාව්‍යයෙහි විවිධ අංග විස්තර කරන මේ ග්‍රන්ථ කතීවරයා කාව්‍යය ගබ්දයන් ගෙන් යුක්ත වූ ගරීරයක් ලෙස සලකයි. එය ගබ්ද-අර්ථ දෙදෙනා ගේ මනා ගැලැපීම යි. යම් සේ විවිධ ආභරණවලින් ගරීරය භොබවනු ලැබේ ද එසේ ම විවිධ අලංකාරවලින් කාව්‍යය ද භොබවනු ලැබේ. කාව්‍යය අලංකාරවලින් භෙබවිය යුතු ගරීරයකි. කාව්‍යාදර්ශය මෙන් ම සිය බස් ලකර ද තුන් සගකින් යුක්ත යි. මුල් ග්‍රන්ථයෙන් සිය බස් ලකර කතුවරයා ගෙන හැර දක්වන්නේ සිංහලයට අදාළ වන කොටස් පමණ යි. මුල් ග්‍රන්ථය ශ්ලෝක 650 කින් යුක්ත වන අතර මෙම ග්‍රන්ථයෙහි ඇත්තේ ගී 400 කි. 1 වන සගෙහි මහා කාව්‍ය ලක්ෂණ, වණ්නා ක්‍රම, දගවිධ ගුණයන්ගෙන් සත් ගුණයක්, කවිත්ව හේතු, කවිත්ව ලාභෝපාය ආදී කරුණු දක්වනු ලැබේ. 2 වන සගෙහි 35 අලංකාරයෝ දක්වනු ලැබෙත්. ඒ මෙ සේ යි :— (1) සවභාවෝක්ති, (2) උපමා, (3) රූපක, (4) දීපක, (5) ආවාත්ති, (6) ආක්ෂෙප, (7) අර්ථාන්තරත්‍යාස (8) ව්‍යතිරේක, (9) විභාවනා, (10) සමාසෝක්ති, (11) අතිශයෝක්ති, (12) උත්ප්‍රේක්ෂා, (13) හේතු, (14) සුක්ෂ්ම, (15) ලේශ, (16) ක්‍රම, (17) ජරේයස්, (18) රස, (19) උච්ඡ්‍රස්ඵ, (20) පයභාසෝක්ති, (21) සමාහිත, (22) උදන්ත, (23) අපහ්නුති, (24) ශ්ලේෂ, (25) විශේෂ, (26) තුල්‍යයෝග, (27) විරෝධ, (28) අප්‍රස්තුතස්තොත්‍ර, (29) ව්‍යාජස්තුති, (30) නිදර්ශන, (31) සහෝක්ති, (32) පරිවෘත්ති, (33) ආශීර්වාද, (34) සංකීර්ණ, (35) භාවික ආදී වශයෙනි. 3 වන සගෙහි යමකාදී කොට ඇති බන්ධන සහ දගවිධ කාව්‍ය දෝෂ දක්වා ඇත.

මෙම ග්‍රන්ථය ක්‍රි.ව. 846 ටත් 972 ටත් අතර කාලයෙහි ලකදිව රජකමට පත් සලමෙවන් සෙන් නම් රජ කෙනෙකු විසින් රචනා කරන ලදී. ඒ රජතුමා ගේ සහෝදර වූ අමරගිරි කාශ්‍යප නම් මහ ඇපාණන් විසින් මෙය රචනා කරනු සඳහා ආරාධනය කරන ලද බව මෙහි ආ ග්‍රන්ථාවසාන ගීයකින් පෙනේ.

කවි සමය නම් කවීන් ගේ සම්ප්‍රදායය යි. කාව්‍ය ශාස්ත්‍ර විෂයයෙහි භාවිත වන ශිෂ්ට සම්පන්න ජනයාට අහිමත වූ ශිෂ්ට ප්‍රයෝග නියමය යි.

6. *Kāvyaḷankāra Sūtras* (with gloss)—Edited by R. G. Bhaḷḷa. Benares Sanskrit Series (Benares 1908). 1. 2. 6.

සිය බස් ලකර හා පැරණි සිංහල කවි සමය—I.....

කාව්‍යය පිළිබඳ පැරණි සිංහල විචාරකයන් ගේ මතයක් වී ද? මෙයට පිළිතුරු සැපැයීම වස් අපට පිහිට වනුයේ සිය බස් ලකර යි. කාව්‍යය පිළිබඳ සිය බස් ලකර කතුවරයා ගේ මත බෙහෙවින් ම කාව්‍යාදහී කතීාවරයා ගේ මතවලට අනුකූල වූ බව නොරහසකි. එහෙත් සිය බස් ලකර කතූ තුමා සවකීය ආචාර්ය වරයා තරම් ප්‍රතිපාක්ෂිකයන් ගේ මතවලට පටහැනි ව ලියූ බවක් නො පෙනේ. කාව්‍යාදහීයේ කතීා වූ දණ්ඩාචාර්යතුමා භාමහ ගේ අදහස්වලට තදින් පහර දෙන්නට සැරසුණු බව පෙනේ. අවසරලත් හැම තන්හි දී ම එසේ කිරීමට එ තුමා පසු නො බසී. සිය බස් ලකර කතුවරයා පිළිබඳ ව එ බන්දක් කිව නො හැකි ය. ග්‍රන්ථයේ මුල් ගී නවයෙන්⁷ කාව්‍යය සම්බන්ධයෙන් සවකීය අදහස් සාමාන්‍ය වශයෙන් ගත් කතුවරයා ගෙන හැර දක්වයි. කාව්‍යාදහීය හැර අලංකාර ශාස්ත්‍රය පිළිබඳ තවත් බොහෝ ග්‍රන්ථ තමා හැදෑරූ බව සවකීය ග්‍රන්ථයෙන් හෙළි වෙයි. දඩි ඇදුරා හැර යටත් පිරිසෙයින් තවත් ආලංකාරිකයන් දෙදෙනෙකු ගේ නම් එ තුමා සඳහන් කරයි. ඒ වග දෙ වැනි ගීයෙන් ඔප්පු කළ හැක:

“ මහ බඹ සකාසුර—ඇපුරා එකසුඛු ඉසි
පවර වාමන දඩි ඇ—නැමද කවිලකුණැපුරන්.”⁸

කසුඛු ඉසිවරයා (කාශ්‍යප) හා වාමන පඩිතුමා ගැන යට දැක් වූ පාඨයෙන් සඳහන් වේ. මෙහි සඳහන් කරනු ලබන මහ බඹ (මහා බ්‍රහ්මයා), සක් (ශක්‍රයා), සුර ඇපුරා (බාහස්පති) ආදීන් කල්පිත චරිතයන් විය හැකි වුවත් කසුඛු ඉසි හා වාමන පඩිවරයා සම්බන්ධයෙන් සැක කිරීම නුච්ච මනා යි. සකුයෙන් ලියැවුණු පත පොත තමා විසින් භාවිතා කරනු ලැබුව ද තමා පවසන්නේ සිය බසින් (සිංහලයෙන්) කරන ලද කාව්‍යයන් ගේ ලක්ෂණ බව කතුවරයා මුලින් ම පහද දෙයි. එ ද සවභාෂාමය කාව්‍ය ලක්ෂණයෙන් එක් දේශයක් වන බව ඉදුරා පළි කෙරෙ යි.

“ දෙ රැස් වස් කියමි—පෙර නත් සකෙව්නිදු වූ
නොදත නොදත දෙවි බස්—සිය කවි ලකුණි නෙක් දෙස්.”⁹

වචනයට නොහොත් ශබ්දයට තමා ඉමහත් සැලැකිල්ලක් දැක්වූ බව පෙනේ. සියලු ශබ්දයෝ ප්‍රසාද ගුණය හේතු කොට ගෙන පවත්නාහු වෙති. ලෝක යාත්‍රාව පවත්වන්නෝ ශබ්දයෝ ම ය. ඉදින් ශබ්ද නැමැති ප්‍රදීප රශ්මි සමූහය නොදිලිසුණේ වී නම් මෙ තුන් ලොව ම අන්ධ භාවය දෙන්නාවූ සනාන්ධකාරයක් වන්නේ ය.

“—සියල් වදනුන් ම පහන්
ගුණෙන් පවති සවාරෙන්—තෙමෙ ලෝයා පවත්මින්
මෙ තුන් ලෝ සියල්—ඉදි සද වැටුප් රැස් රැස්
නො දිලි යෙන’ද බැව් ද—තම කද නො කල්භායෙන් ”¹⁰

තව ද, පෙර මහ රජුන් ගේ යස නමැති පිළිබිඹුව ගමන් කොට බස නමැති කැටපතෙහි පිහිටියේ නැවැත ඔවුන් නැති කාලයෙහි ද දාශ්‍යමාන වෙයි. බස මනා කොට පැවැසූ අයට සුරහි ධෙනුව මෙන් ඉෂ්ඨාර්ථ සිද්ධිය සලසා දෙයි. ක්‍රම වරදවා බස යෙදූ තැනැත්තාට හුදු ගොන් බව ම සාද දෙයි.

“ පෙර මහරු මහරජ—යස පිළිබිඹු; ගොස් බස්
කැට තලෙහි සිටුණෙ පෙනේ—පිළි ඔවුන හට කල්හි දු ”

“ ගව’හන වේ පසස්—නදු බස් කැර සකස්
පියසුවහට අන් හට—ගව බැව් ම හුදු සාද.”¹¹

7. සිය බස් ලකර විවරණය—බෙන්තර ධම්මසෙන සංස්කරණය. (කොළඹ, 1948)
1—9 ගී. [සි.බ.ල.]
8. සි.බ.ල. 2.
9. —එම— 3.
10. —එම— 4—5.
11. —එම— 6—7.

බස නොමනා ලෙස යොදන්නවුන්හට ගොන් බව ම සාද දෙනු බව කියමින් ඔවුන් අන්ත පරිභාසයට ලක් කරයි. ගව බැව් යන්නෙහි ශ්ලේෂාර්ථය සලකන කල්හි, කාව්‍යාදශීයෙන් ගන්නා ලද ඒ උපමාව කදිම යෙදුමක් බව පෙනේ. කාව්‍යයෙහි මද දෙසක් වුව ද සෙවිය යුත්තේ ය ; සුන්දර වූ ගරිරයක් එක් කැලලක් නිසා සියල් සිරියෙන් පිරිහෙන්නා සේ එක් දෙසක් නිසා සුන්දර වූ කාව්‍යයක් කිලිටි විය හැකිය.

“ එ බවනි කවිහි මද—දෙසුදු සොයන්නට වත්
කැනු එක් ලපෙක්නි සියල්—සිරිහුන් ව සොඳුරු දු වූ.”¹²

එහෙත් කාව්‍යයෙක ගුණ දෙස් පිරික්සීම කා හටත් කළ නො හැකි වෙයි. එය කළ හැක්කේ මනා කොට ගුන්ට උගත් පුද්ගලයාට ය. එසේ ශාස්ත්‍ර ගුන්ට උගත් පුද්ගලයාට ගුණ දෙස් පිරික්සීමේ ශක්තියක් ඇති වන්නේ ය. අන්ධයාට රූප හෙද දර්ශනයෙහි කවර නම් සම්බන්ධයක් ඇද්ද ?

“ ගුණ දෙස් කෙසේ ගත්—නොදන්නා දෙනෙ කෙරෙ තොර
කීම අදහට ඇත සබඳ—රූ වේ දස්නෙහි සියල්.”¹³

එහෙයනි පෙර පඬුවන් විසින් සකල ලෝක සත්ත්වයා ව්‍යක්ත කරන අධ්‍යාසයෙන් විචිත්‍ර මාගී ඇති වචනයනට කාව්‍ය ලක්ෂණ බඳනා ලද්දේ.

කාව්‍ය ගරිරය හඳුන්වන සිය බස් ලකර කතුවරයා සවකීය ආවාය්‍යී තුමා ගත් මහ ම ගනිමින් කාව්‍ය ගරිරයන් අලංකාරයන් දක්වයි. අභිජරේතාර්ථය ප්‍රකාශ කළාවූ වචන ප්‍රබන්ධය හෙවත් වදන් පබඳ කාව්‍ය ගරිරය වේ :¹⁴ ඒ කාව්‍ය ගරිරය ගද්‍ය පද්‍ය මිශ්‍රාදි වශයෙන් ත්‍රි විධ වේ. ඉන්පසු සංඝාත, කෝෂ, මුක්තක, තුලක, සම්බන්ධ යනාදි වශයෙන් පද්‍ය කාව්‍යයේ ප්‍රභේද දක්වනු ලැබේ. තව ද පියුම්, ගී, දෙ පද බැඳුම්, සතර පද බැඳුම්, අට පද බැඳුම්, දෙළොස් පද බැඳුම්, සොළොස් පද බැඳුම් හා සැහැලි, ඇහැලි, උපහැලි, බැහැලි, අඹහැලි හා පිහියොඹ, සිතිලි ගී, උනුසද වසම්සද යන බැඳුම් විශේෂ ද දක්වනු ලැබේ. තව ද ගල සඳ (ගල ව්‍යඤ්ජය), සුන්හිස් (ශිරශ්ඡින්න), දෙව් පාණි (දේවපා ඡා) නම් වූ බැඳුම් ද සඳහන් කරනු ලැබේ.

මහා කාව්‍ය ලක්ෂණ දක්වන්නට පෙර කතුවරයා පද්‍යය බුද්ධ චරිතය වැනිමට ද, ගද්‍යය වූත වාරිත්‍ර ආදිය වැනිමට ද ගද්‍ය පද්‍ය දෙක මිශ්‍ර කොට කරන ලද රචනා නාටක නිපදවීමට ද යෙදිය යුතු බව සඳහන් කරයි :

පෙදෙන් බුදු සිරිතැ—බසින් වත් සිරිත් ඇ
පද යුතු බසින් නළු ඇ—අනතුරු ලකුණු දක්වමි ”¹⁵ යන

පාඨයෙන් එය පෙනේ. මහා කාව්‍යයක් උදර කථානායකයකු ගෙන් යුක්ත විය යුතු යි කාව්‍යාදශී කතෘහු සඳහන් කළ සේ මෙම ගත් කතුවරයා පද්‍ය කාව්‍යයකට යොග්‍ය වූ උදර චරිතයක් නම් බුදුන් ගේ චරිතය යි සිතුවා විය හැකි. මෙ රට කවි සමය අනුව කල්පනා කරන හොත් බුදුන් ගේ චරිත කථාවක් කාව්‍යයට ඉතා ම සුදුසු වස්තුවක් ලෙස සැලකූ බව පෙනේ. කිවි බව කාව්‍ය වාක්ෂයෙහි කුසුම් සම්පත්තිය වෙති යි කවි සිළු-මිණ කරුවෝ කී හ. එහි විපුල් පලය නම් බෝසත් චරිතය වැනිම යි ඔහු සැලකූ හ.

“ කිවි බැව් කිවි දුමේ—කුසුම් සැපතෙහි විපුල් පෙලෙ
බෝසත් සර වැනුම්—වියතෙමුව පවත් වේ වා ”¹⁶

12. —එම— 8.
13. —එම— 9.
14. —එම— 11.
15. —එම— 20.
16. කවිසිළුමිණ—මඩුගල්ලේ සිඬාර්ථ සංස්කරණය. (කොළඹ, 1926). 4.

සිය බස් ලකර හා පැරණි සිංහල කවි සමය—I.....

මෙ කී සිද්ධාන්තය අනතුරු කාලයේ විසූ කවීන් ගේ රචනාවල වචනයෙන් ප්‍රකාශ නොවුවත් ඔවුන් එය මහත් ඕනෑ කමින් අනුගමනය කරන ලද බව පෙනේ. ගී පොත් කරුවන් ති දෙන ම තම කාව්‍යයනට වස්තු කොට ගත්තේ බෝසත් චරිත ගැප් වූ ජාතක කථා යි. තොටගමුවේ ශ්‍රී රාහුල හිමියෝ කාව්‍යශේඛරයෙහි ද වෑත්තුවේ හිමියෝ ගුත්තිලයෙහි ද එ ම රීතිය අනුගමනය කළ හ. මාතර ලේඛකයන් අතුරින් මහා කාව්‍යයන් රචනා කිරීමට තැත් කළ කවිහු ද එ මහ ම ගත් හ.

කාව්‍ය නායකයා ගුණවත් පුද්ගලයකු ලෙස වර්ණනා කිරීම යෙහෙකැ යි පවසනු ලැබේ. එසේ වර්ණනා කොට අනතුරු ව ඔහු සතුරන් දිනූ සැටි කියත හොත් ඒ වනාහි සවභාවයෙන් ම යහපත් මාගීය යි.

කාව්‍ය ගුණ දසයක් ඇති බව කියැවෙයි. මට්ටු (ශ්‍රේණිය), පහන් (ප්‍රසාදය), සම බැව් (සමතාව), මියුරු (මාධුර්‍යය), සුකුමර (සුකුමාරතාව), අරුත් පළ (අර්ථ-ව්‍යාකෘතිය), උළාර (උදරත්වය), ඔද (ඔජස), දනකල් (ජන කාන්තිය), සමාදි (සමාධිය) යනු යි. ඉන් මට්ටු, සමබැව්, සුකුමර (ශ්‍රේණි-සමතා-සුකුමාරතා-) යන තුන හැර ඉතිරි සත් ගුණය සිංහලයෙහි යෙදෙන බව ගත් කතු වරයා ප්‍රකාශ කරයි.

මට්ටු (ශ්‍රේණිය), සම බැව් (සමතාව) සුකුමර (සුකුමාරතාව) යන තුන් ගුණය සිංහලයෙහි නො යෙදෙතැ යි කියා අත් හරින ලද්දේ කවර හෙයින් ද යනු පැහැදිලි නො වෙයි. පදයන්ගේ ශ්‍රේණිපාඨයන් සමතාවත් සුකුමාරතාවත් පැරණි සිංහලයට ආවේණික වූ ලක්ෂණයක් වන හෙයින්ද? සිංහල වචන මාලාව—වශේෂයෙන් පද්‍යයෙහි යෙදෙන වචන මාලාව—සවභාවයෙන්ම එකී ගුණයන්ගෙන් යුක්ත වූ හෙයින්ද?

“ හැම අලංකාරයක් ම අර්ථයෙහි ඒකාන්තයෙන් රසය වහනය කෙරේ වා. එහෙත් ඒ හැම තන්හි දී ම අග්‍රාම්‍යත්වයෙන් යුක්ත විය යුතු යි.” කාව්‍යයෙක අලංකාරයෝ කෙ බඳු තැනක් උසුලන් ද යනු ඔහු මැනැවින් දන් බව මින් පෙනේ. අලංකාරයෝ කාව්‍යය හොබවන්නෝ ය. එහෙත් වැඩි සැරසිල්ලෙන් රූපයක් අගෝභන වන්නා සේ වැඩි අලංකාරයෙන් කාව්‍යයක් ද අගෝභන වන්නේ ය. අලංකාරයන් අතිබහුල ව යෙදුණ තැන ග්‍රාම්‍යත්ව දෝෂයට මහ පෑදෙයි. නියම කවියා විසින් ග්‍රාම්‍යත්ව දෝෂයෙන් සදහට ම වැලැකිය යුතු යි. කාව්‍යයක් අලංකාරයන් ගෙන් සරසන ලද්දේ වී නමුත් එය කියවා රස විදින රසිකයන් ගේ සිත් නොරිදෙන ලෙස ඒ යෙදිය යුත්තේ ය. එය ශිෂ්ට සම්ප්‍රදායට අනුකූල විය යුතු යි.

සිය බස් ලකර කතු වරයා ගේ විස්තරය කියැවීමෙන් පෙනෙන්නේ ඔහු උසස් කවියා ලෙස සලකනු ලැබූයේ රාජ සභා කවියා වන බව යි. දණ්ඩ මෙන් ම ඔහු ද මහා කාව්‍ය ලක්ෂණ ගෙන හැර දක්වා ඇත්තේ රාජ සභාවට යෝග්‍ය වන පරිදි යි. කථානායකය උදර චරිතයක් ඇත්තා වූ, සතුරන් ජය ගන්නා වූ රණකාමී වීර පුරුෂයෙකි. ඔහුගේ එඩිතර ක්‍රියා කලාපය සතුරන් ඉදිරියෙහි ඔහු දක්වන ක්‍රියා ශූරත්වය උත්කර්ෂයෙන් වර්ණනා කටයුතු යි. එ බඳු වර්ණනා උචිත වනුයේ රාජ සභාවට යි. එහෙයින් ඔහු උසස්කොට සැලැකූ කවියා රාජ සභා කවියා යි, උසස් කොට සැලැකූ කාව්‍යය රාජ සභා කාව්‍යය යි.

ශබ්දර්ථෝ සහිතෝ” යි භාමහ කී තැන ශබ්දයෙන් තොර අර්ථයක් හෝ අර්ථයෙන් තොර වූ ශබ්දයක් හෝ නැත. කාව්‍ය වස්තුවට ඒ ශබ්ද අර්ථ දෙක අවශ්‍ය යි. ඒ කාව්‍යය ශරීරය අලංකාරයන්ගෙන් හොබවනු ලැබේ. ඒ අලංකාරයන් විස්තර කිරීම යි භාමහ ගේ කෘතියෙන් කරන ලද්දේ. කාව්‍ය ශරීරය සම්පූර්ණ වීමට තව ද අංග වුවමනා බව සිය බස් ලකර කතු වරයා පෙන්වා දෙයි. එය මහා කාව්‍ය ලක්ෂණයෙන් යුක්ත විය යුතු යි. ඒ ලක්ෂණ කාව්‍යාදීයෙහි දැක්වූ පරිදි මෙම ග්‍රන්ථයෙහි ද දක්වනු ලැබේ ; ඒ කාව්‍ය ලක්ෂණයන් ගෙන් යුක්ත වන අතර ම සත් ගුණයකින් ද යුක්ත විය යුතු යි. ඒ සත් ගුණය උදහරණ දක්වමින් විභාග කරනු ලැබූව ද එය කාව්‍යය හොබවන අලංකාර

ලෙස කතුවරයා සැලකූ බව පෙනේ.¹⁷ අලංකාරයන් දෙ කොටසකට බෙදෙන බව ප්‍රකාශ කොට ඇත්තේ සිය බස් ලකරයෙහි දෙ වැනි සභියෙන් දැක්වෙන 35 අලංකාරය අක්ෂාලංකාර ගණයෙහි ම වැටේ. එහෙත් ශබ්දලංකර නමින් ශබ්දය සම්බන්ධ වූ අලංකාර විශේෂයක් ද වෙයි. කාව්‍ය ගුණ වශයෙන් දැක්වනුයේ ඒ ශබ්දලංකාර යි නිගමනය කළ හැකි.

සම්බන්ධ මහා කාව්‍යයේ ලක්ෂණ විස්තර කරන සිය බස් ලකර කතුවරයා කාව්‍ය වස්තුවට යෝග්‍ය වූ වෘත්තාන්ත ද ඊට සරි ලන වණ්නා ක්‍රමය ද පැහැදිලි කරයි. කාව්‍යාදර්ශය අනුසාරයෙන් කරන ලද එම විස්තරය අප අලංකාර ග්‍රන්ථයෙහි දැක්වෙන්නේ මෙසේ ය :—

“ සග සියෝ මහකව්—කිමෙහි ලකුණ වියත් වත්
 වත් නිදෙය ආසි හෝ—නමකර හෝ පෙරට වේ.
 හෙ වී මෙ සේ යන—පුවතෙයිනත් පුවත් හෝ
 සිවු වග පල සබද ව—උළාර නා සියෝ වේ
 නුවර සයුරු ගිරි සු—සිසි හිරු උද වැන්මෙන්
 උයන් දල කිඬුනි මහත්—අවන් මනදෙළ කෙළියෙන්
 පෙළැඹුම් විවා ගැනුම්—කුමරුනු පැත් වැඩුමෙන්
 මතුරු දු දු ගමන් යුද—උළාර නා උදෙහි දු

17. Raghavan V—*Bhoja's Śrngāra Prakāśa* (Bombay) Vol. I Part II. 300—301.

මට සිලුටු—සමබැව්—සුකුමර (ශ්ලේෂ—සමනා—සුකුමාරනා) යන තුන් ගුණය සිය බසෙහි වෙසෙසින් සැලකිය යුතු ගුණයන් මෙන් නොයෙදෙන්නේ කවර හෙයින් ද යනු වටහා ගත හැකි ය. ශ්ලේෂ ගුණය නම් අල්ප ප්‍රාණාක්ෂර අධික කොට ඇති සිලුටු බව යි. සිය බසෙහි නොහොත් එ වකට භාවිත වූ පද්‍යමය හෙළ බසෙහි මහා ප්‍රාණාක්ෂර නො යෙදුණ හෙයින් අල්ප ප්‍රාණාක්ෂර යෙදීම ම රීතිය වී. එ බැවින් සිලුටු ගුණය සාමාන්‍ය ලක්ෂණය වූයේ ය. සිය බසෙහි නිරන්තරයෙන් ම පිහිටි ගුණයක් වූ හෙයින් එය විශේෂ ගුණයක් ලෙස දැක්වීම බැහැර කරන ලදී.

සම බැව් නම් වණ්‍යන්ගේ යෙදීමෙහි යම් පිළිවෙළක් ආරම්භ කරන ලද ද ඒ පිළිවෙළ නොසිද ගෙන යෑම යි. සංස්කෘත-මාගධි භාෂාවන්හි මාදු-ස්ඵුට දෙ වර්ගයෙහි ම ශබ්දයන් යෙදෙන නිසා සමනා ගුණය පැහැදිලි ව දැක්විය හැකි වෙයි. එහෙත් මාදු ශබ්ද සමුහයකින් ම යුක්ත වූ හෙළයෙහි එ බඳු විශේෂ ගුණයකට අවකාශ නො යෙදේ.

සුකුමර ගුණය පිළිබඳ ව ද මෙය ම කිව හැකි ය. එය හෙළ බසෙහි ඇත්තා වූ ශබ්ද සමුදායයෙහි නිරන්තරයෙන් ම යෙදෙන ගුණයකි. එ බැවින් එය විශේෂ ගුණයක් ලෙස දැක්වීම අනවශ්‍ය ය.

මේ තුන් ගුණය පැරැණි සිංහල භාෂාවෙහි ප්‍රකට ව පැවැති ලක්ෂණයන් ලෙස සැලකිය හැකි ය. සිය බස් ලකර විසාර වණ්නාව—හේන්පිටගෙදර ඤාණතිලක සහ හේන්පිටගෙදර ඤාණසිහ. 20-23 පිටු බලන්න.

අලංකාරයන් දෙ කොටසක් ඇති බව සුබෝධාලංකාරයෙහි දැක්වෙයි.

“ වී ප්‍රකාර අලංකාරා—තඤ්ඤා සද්දඤ්ඤා හෙදනො
 සද්දඤ්ඤා බන්ධනාමාව—තං සජ්ජිත තදවලි.”

සුබෝධාලංකාරය—උදම්මිට ධම්මරක්ඛිත තිස්ස සංස්කරණය. (රත්දෙමළ, 1910).

සිය බස් ලකර හා පැරණි සිංහල කවි සමය—I.....

ලකුළු කවි රස බැව්—නතුරු නුමුත් නො විතර
 සහිත් යුත් සවන් ගත්—සුසඳ පිළි නොද මද වූ
 ලෝ මන රඳනෙ කිව්—කරු දනන් පලදිනේ
 තහවුරු ව සිටිනෙ දෙනේ—විසිතුරු ලකර ල ගනී.” 18

යට දැක්වූ පාඨය කාව්‍යාදර්ශයේ පදගත අනුවාදයක් හා සමාන යි. මහා කාව්‍යයක නිබ්‍යය යුතු හැම අවශ්‍ය අංගයක් ම එහි දැක්වෙයි. සුළු වෙනසකට ඇත්තේ කථා නායකයා පිළිබඳ වත් සභාන්තයේ වෘත්තය පිළිබඳ ව දක්වා ඇති කරුණු ය. කථා නායකයා වතුර උදර දෙගුණයෙන් ම යුක්ත විය යුතු බව කාව්‍යාදර්ශයෙහි පෙනේ (වතුරෝදන්ත නායකම්. කා. 15). සිය බස් ලකරෙහි නායකයාගේ වතුර බවක් සඳහන් නො වේ. ඔහු උදර වර්තයෙන් යුක්ත විය යුතු ය. පසු ව ද කියැවෙන්නේ ඔහු කෙරෙහි නිබ්‍යය යුතු උදර ගුණය ම ය. (“උළාර නා සියෝ වේ.” “උළාර නා උදෙහි දු”¹⁹ තව ද සභාන්තයෙහි දී වෘත්තය වෙනස් කළ යුතු බව අප ග්‍රන්ථයේ නො කියැවේ.

කාව්‍ය රචනයෙහි කිවියා විසින් අනුගමනය කට යුතු යහපත් වර්ණනා ක්‍රම ඇත. එය වර්ණනා මාභීය නොහොත් රීතිය යි. කාව්‍යාදර්ශයෙහි වෛදර්ශී, -ගෞඩීය යන වශයෙන් ප්‍රධාන මාභී දෙකක් දක්වෙයි. එම ග්‍රන්ථයෙහි විස්තර කරන ලද දශ ගුණයෙන් යුක්ත වූ නිදෙස් වර්ණනා ක්‍රමය වෛදර්ශී මාභීය යි. සිය බස් ලකරෙහි ද විස්තර කරන ලද්දේ එ කී දශවිධ කාව්‍ය ගුණයෙන් සතකි. ඒ අනුව සලකන හොත් සිය බස් ලකර කතුවරයා පිළිගත් මාභීය වෛදර්ශී මාභීය යි සිතීමට ඉඩ තිබේ. නමින් කිසිවක් එ තුමා සඳහන් නො කරයි. සමහර විට සංස්කෘත කාව්‍යයෙහි යෙදුණ ඒ වර්ණනා මාභී දෙකින් සිය බසට, සිංහල කාව්‍ය ව්‍යවහාරයට වැඩක් නො වූ හ යි ඔහු සිතුවා විය හැකි. කවර කරුණක් නිසා හෝ වේවා එසේ කරන ලද ද කාව්‍ය නායකයා ගුණවත් භාවයෙන් දක්වා ඔහු සතුරන් ජයගත් හැටි විස්තර කිරීම සවභාවයෙන් ම යහපත් මාභීය යි සිය බස් ලකරෙහි²⁰ කියැවෙයි. ඒ හැර වර්ණනා මාභී ගැන ඔහු කියා ඇත්තේ එහි විවිධාකාරය යි. “සකුරු, කිරි, මී පැණි, උක් ආදීන් ගේ එකිනෙකට විශේෂ වූ රස ඇත්තා සේ ම, කියා නිම කොට නො හැකි සේ වණිනා මාභී ද විවිධ වේ, ඒ අනෙක ප්‍රකාර වූ කාව්‍ය වර්ණනා මාභී විස්තර කොට කියා නිම කළ නො හැක්කේ ය. රීතිය පිළිබඳ සිය බස් ලකර කතුවරයා දක්වන අදහස් මේ සේ ය.

පුරාණ කාව්‍ය ශාස්ත්‍ර සිද්ධාන්තයනට අනුකූල ව සවකීය කාව්‍යයන් රචනය කළ සිංහල කවීහු කාව්‍ය වස්තුව වශයෙන් සද්ග්‍රයයක් ම තෝරා ගත්තාහු ය. එහෙත් සිය බස් ලකරෙහි “පෙදෙන් බුදු සිරිත...” ආදී වශයෙන් කියා ඇතත් ඔවුන් තෝරා ගත්තේ බුදු සිරිත නොව බෝසත් සිරිත යි. උදර ගුණයෙන් යුක්ත වූ යහපත් වර්තයක් ඔවුන් සොයා ගත්තේ සිංහල සාහිත්‍යය නිරන්තරයෙන් පෝෂණය ලැබූ ජාතක කථා සම්භාරයෙනි. එහෙත් මෙ තැන දී නැගිය යුතු ප්‍රශ්නයක් වෙයි. බුද්ධ වර්තය ගද්‍යයට උචිත වූ වස්තුවක් වී නම් පද්‍යයට එය යෙදීමට සිංහල ගත් කරුවන් මැළි වූයේ කවර හෙයින් ද? අමා වතුර ගැදි කවකි, එහි කතෘහු ගේ ම පිළිගැනීමේ හැටියට එය බුද්ධ වර්තයකි. එහෙත් ඊට සම කළ හැකි පැදි කවක් සිංහලයෙහි නැත. බුද්ධ වර්තය කාව්‍ය වස්තුවට විශාල වැඩි වූයේ ද? එය කවි සමයත් කවි ශක්තියත් ඉක්මවා යන තරම් වූ හ යි ඔවුහු සිතුවාහු ද? නො එසේ නම් රසුචංශයෙහි මහා කවි කාලිදසයන් සුයඹී වංශයත් සවකීය අල්ප විෂය වූ බුඬියත් අතර කොතරම් මහත් පරතරයක්, ප්‍රමාණයෙන් කො තරම් වෙනසක් වී ද යි සැලැකූ පරිද්දෙන් ම අප කවින් ද බුඬ වර්තයත් සවකීය අල්ප

18. සි.බ.ල. 21—26.
 19. සි.බ.ල. 22—24,
 20. සි.බ.ල. 29.

විෂය වූ බුද්ධියත් අතර විශාල වෙනසක් වූ බව සලකා බුද්ධ වර්තය වණිනා කිරීම වෙනුවට බෝධි සත්ක වර්තය තෝරා ගන්නා විය හැකි ය. බුදුන් වහන්සේ ගේ ගුණානිශය වනා නිමැවිය නොහැක්කක් බව අප කවිහු මැනැවින් දන් හ. සස ද වතෙහි²¹ මෙවැනි ගී වලින් දැක්වෙන පරිදි :—

“ මුනිඳු ගුණ මහරු—වැකුව ද ම කුදු තෙපලේ
උතුම් ම නො එ මුනි දම්—ලියුව ද නොරන් පත්හි,
නොසෙ කිසි දෑ අඳ—බිරු පිඵ දුඹුල් බිළිදෙක්
ගැඹුරු සයුරු තරනට—තම බඳ තමෙ කි ම'න් මට
ඉති දු මිණි මලෙ වී—දැක්මට මුනි ගුණෙක් දෙස්
මොකැසිඳ බඳ මත මා—යුහු කෙලෙ සෙබේ සේ කිවි.”

බුදු ගුණ මහරු වන බැවින් ද රත් රනින් නොකළ පතෙක බුදු දහම නො ලිවුවත් එය උතුම් ම වන බැවින් ද තමා කරන්නට සැරසෙන කටයුත්ත ජාත්‍යන්ධ වූ, බිහිරි වූ කොන්ද පණ නැති දුඹුල් බිළිදකු ගැඹුරු සයුරින් එ තෙර වන්නට කරන තැනක් බඳු වුව ද තම සිත මොක් සැපත පතන හෙයින් ඒ මුනිඳු ගුණයෙන් එක් දේශයක් පමණක් ජෙක කවීන් ගේ සභාව ඉදිරියේ පවසන්නට අප කවියා සැරසේ. බුදු ගුණ හමුවේ තම ශක්තිය මෙ තරම් අල්ප සේ කිවියාට වැටහුණේ නම් මුළු බුද්ධ වර්තය ම ගැන කවර කථා ද ? මුව දෙව් ද ²² කරු ද

“ හනිම් මා මෙනෙන්—ගුණ හිමියා කියන්නට
පොහොම් නෙළුඹැසින'වුණ—පලඳුන් හොත් තුසර හර
ඉති දු හෝත කියම්—ගුණ ලොබිති ලෝ හිමියා
මෙනෙහි වරද නොබජවු—ගුණෙකැත් නම් මෙහි බජවු ” යි

අහිමානයෙන් බුදු හිමියන් ගේ ගුණ වනනුවට වඩා පිනි බිඳු නෙළුම් ඇසින් අවුණා මාලයක් කොට පැලැදීම පහසු ය යි කියේ ය. එහෙත් ලෝක ස්වාමියාගේ ගුණ ලෝහ-යෙන් එය පවසන්නට යන බව සඳහන් කරයි. බුදුන් ගේ ගුණ මහිමය එ තරම් විශාල වූ හෙයින් ඉන් එක් දේශයක් පමණක් වණිනා කිරීමෙන් පුරාණ සිංහල බෞද්ධ කවිහු තෘප්තිමත් වූවෝ ය. බුද්ධ වර්තය වෙනුවට බෝධිසත්ක වර්තය ඔවුන් තෝරා ගත්තේ එ හෙයිනැ යි සිතිය හැකියි. බුදුන් වහන්සේ කෙරෙහි අවංක, ශ්‍රද්ධා හක්තියෙන් යුක්ත වූ ඒ පැරණි කිවිවරයන් මේ මහ ගැනීම පුදුමයක් නො වේ. ඔවුන් ගේ කාව්‍ය රසය විදීමට උත්සුක වූ ශ්‍රෝතෘ ජනයා ද ඒ කාව්‍යයන් ඇසීමට බලාපොරොත්තු වූයේ ඊට නොඅඩු වූ ශ්‍රද්ධා-හක්තියකිනි. කාව්‍ය රසය දීමට වුවමනා වූ කථා රසය අනුන ව සැපයූ නොසිදෙන උල්පතක් බඳු වී ය ජාතක පොත. ජාතක පොතින් බැහැර වූ අන්‍ය කථා වස්තු අප කවීන් හට නුවුවමනා වූයේ ද ජාතක පොතෙහි විශේෂ බල පැවැත්වීම නිසා ය.

මෙ ම පරීක්ෂණයෙන් පැරණි සිංහල කවි සමය පිළිබඳ වැදගත් නිගමනයකට බැස ගත හැකි වෙයි. එය සකස්වුණේ එකිනෙකට වෙනස් වූ ලක්ෂණ ඇති සාහිත්‍යයන් දෙකකින් පෝෂණය වීමෙනි. එය කෙටියෙන් කියන හොත් මෙ සේ ය :—

1. සංස්කෘත අලංකාර ශාස්ත්‍ර ග්‍රන්ථයක් ඇසුරු කොට ගෙන රචනා කරන ලද සිය බස් ලකරින් සභිඛන්ධ මහා කාව්‍යයේ ලක්ෂණ සිංහල පද්‍යයට ඇතුළු විය. පද්‍ය කාව්‍යයේ ස්වරූපය ඒ අනුව හැඩගැසුණේය. කවි සිඵ මිණින් ඇරැඹුණු සිංහල මහා කාව්‍ය සියල්ල ම ඒ මහ ගත්තේ ය.

21. කුමාරණතුංග—සස ද විවරණය (කොළඹ. බු.ව. 2483). 4-6 ගී.
22. කුමාරණතුංග—මුව දෙව් ද විවරණය (කොළඹ. බු.ව. 2482). 4-5 ගී.

සිය බස් ලකර හා පැරණි සිංහල කවි සමය—I.....

2. පද්‍ය කාව්‍ය වස්තුවට බුදු සිරිත යෙදීම යහපතැ යි සිය බස් ලකර කතුවරයා කී ය. (“පෙදෙන් බුදු සිරිතැ. . .”). එහෙත් බුදු සිරිත පද්‍ය කාව්‍යයට තෝරා ගත් බවක් පැරණි සිංහල සාහිත්‍යයෙහි නො පෙනේ. එය කවි ශක්තිය ඉක්මවා ගිය විෂය-යකැ යි සිංහල බෞද්ධ කවීන් සිතූ සේ ය. කවි සිළු මිණි කරු කිවි බව නමැති වෘක්ෂයෙහි උසස්තම එළය ලෙස සැලකුවේ බෝසත් සිරිත වැනුම යි. කථා නායක වශයෙන් සිංහල කවීන් විසින් තෝරා ගන්නා ලද්දේ බෝසත් සිරිත යි. එය සිංහල මහා කාව්‍ය පද්ධතියේ නිරන්තරයෙන් ම පෙනෙන ලකුණකි. කථා වස්තුව තෝරා ගන්නා ලද්දේ බෞද්ධ ජාතක කථා සමූහයෙනි.

එහෙයින් සිංහල පද්‍ය කාව්‍යයේ ස්වරූපය සහ වර්ණනා ක්‍රමය ඇති වූයේ සංස්කෘත අලංකාර සාස්ත්‍රය අනුව ලියැවුණු සිය බස් ලකරිනි. එහෙත් එහි වස්තුව ජාතක කථා වලින් ගත්තක් විය. කථා නායකයා බෝසත් තුමා විය. පැරණි සිංහල කවි සමය වනාහි සංස්කෘත අලංකාර ශාස්ත්‍ර නියමය අනුව රචිත සිය බස් ලකරින් ස්වරූපය හා වර්ණනා ක්‍රමය ලැබූ, ජාතක කථාවලින් වස්තුව ලැබූ, කවි සිළු මිණි ප්‍රතිපත්තිය අනුව හැඩ ගැසුණු කාව්‍ය මාභීය යි. මෙ කී කාව්‍ය නියමයන් අනුව ලියන ලද්ද වූ ද මෙ බඳු ලක්ෂණයන් ගෙන් හා ස්වරූපයෙන් උපලක්ෂිත වූ ද මෙ බඳු වස්තුවකින් යුක්ත වූ ද ඒ පැරණි කවි සමය පණ ලැබූයේ කුමකින් ද ?

(මතු සම්බන්ධ යි)

ආනන්ද කුලසූරිය

Reviews

The Polonnaruva Period : The Ceylon Historical Journal, Vol. IV
Nos. 1-4 pp. 192.

Studies in Ceylon History have made considerable advances during this century and the publication of *The Polonnaruva Period*, a special number of The Ceylon Historical Journal issued in commemoration of the 800th anniversary of the accession of King Parakramabahu the Great, marks a further step in their progress. The study of the earlier periods to which this number has contributed is yet, in many respects, in its basic stages. Many gaps have yet to be filled, and even what has been done, being mainly the work of archaeologists, linguists, epigraphists and numismatists, has to be re-examined from the angle of the historian and re-interpreted.

Towards the end of the third decade of this century Wilhelm Geiger made a definite contribution to the study of the Polonnaruva Period by the publication of both the Pali Text and an English translation of the *Cūlavamsa*, the second part of the *Mahāvamsa*, which still remains the chief source for the study of this period. The introductions to these volumes as well as the copious footnotes and appendices to the English translation incorporate his research as well as that done by others such as Notes on Ceylon Topography in the Twelfth Century by that precise scholar and numismatist, H. W. Codrington.

Geiger was essentially a Pali scholar and a linguist and his work has been supplemented by others who made a study of the ancient monuments and inscriptions. Dr S. Paranavitana in particular contributed numerous articles and finally produced a most valuable work on the Art and Architecture of the Polonnaruva Period based on his long years of research as an archaeologist, epigraphist and linguist. Still further light was shed on the Polonnaruva Period by Mr R. L. Brohier who in his three volumes on the *Ancient Irrigation Works of Ceylon* covered also the irrigation works constructed during this period and by Professor K. A. Nilakanta Sastri who in his two volumes on *The Colas* examined critically with the aid of the South Indian inscriptions Ceylon's relations with South India as described in the *Cūlavamsa*. Apart from these there have also been other works which dealt with the developments in Sinhalese, Pali and Sanskrit languages and literature during this period. Thus the main gaps that had still to be filled was a critical account of Ceylon's relations with Burma, an account of the developments in irrigation during this period, and perhaps a monograph on the Pali works of this period including the *ṭīkas* similar to the work on the Pali commentaries by Dr Adikaram. In the light of the new evidence that had accumulated during the last twenty-five years time was also ripe for re-examination of the *Cūlavamsa* as a source of history which in turn would have led to a reassessment of the achievements of Parakramabahu the Great.

This volume makes no serious attempt to re-examine the material accumulated since the publication of Geiger's work on the *Cūlavamsa*, fill the gaps that still existed and present a series of articles giving a coherent account of the various aspects of the history of the Polonnaruva Period. Instead it follows a less ambitious scheme and provides eleven articles on many aspects of the history of this period. It reprints three articles that have already appeared elsewhere. For an account of the art and architecture of the Polonnaruva Period it reproduces the excellent Arts Council monograph on the subject by Dr Paranavitana which appeared about a year earlier. For the topography of Ceylon in the twelfth century it republishes the notes by H. W. Codrington that appeared in Nos. 75 and 78 of the Journal of the Ceylon Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. From the Indian Historical Quarterly is reproduced an article on Army and War in Medieval Ceylon which Geiger based on the evidence he classified in his English translation of the *Cūlavamsa* (II, p. 336). Professor K. A. Nilakanta Sastri deals with Parakramabahu's relations with South India from the Ceylon angle covering more or less the same ground as in his history of *The Colas*.

The other articles besides the last have been specially written for this number. Of these Mr C. W. Nicholas' articles on the Irrigation Works of King Parakramabahu I, which incorporates a considerable amount of research carried out by the writer, fills a definite void in our historical literature on this period.

It helps us not only to follow the economic developments during this period but also to re-assess the achievements of Parakramabahu. The articles on Pali and Sanskrit languages and literature by Prof. O. H. de A. Wijesekera and on Sinhalese by Miss Sumana Saparamadu cover some new ground, but the student of history would have been more pleased had they dealt more with the subject matter of the literary works in order that he might gain a fuller idea of the social conditions of the time. The other articles on the Background to the Rise of Parakramabahu I by Dr A. L. Basham, on Buddhism by Mr Vincent Panditha and the Sources for the Study of the Reign of King Parakramabahu I by Miss S. Wickramasingha sum up the evidence on these subjects.

The Editor himself regrets that an article providing a fresh examination of the *Cūlavamsa* could not be included. The article on the Life of Parakramabahu I by Dr B. C. Law is no less a disappointment. Apart from other serious defects from which it suffers, it is not even an accurate or coherent account when it should have formed the central theme round which all other articles revolved.

Any criticisms of a production like this must take into account the difficulties, some of which are almost insurmountable, which an editor has to face in collecting the necessary material in a field where the writers are limited. Under such circumstances the readers of this journal will be grateful that they now possess such a useful collection of articles on the Polonnaruva Period in one single volume at such a moderate price.

G. C. M.