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The Sanskrit woyd *bhujaṅga* is a synonym for *nāga*, the motif on the cover. It is interesting to note that this particular term had been chosen to convey the meaning of "scholar" in ancient Java. The Old-Javanese word *bhujaṅga* "apparantly denoted in ancient times in the kingdom of Majapahit a learned man belonging to the clerical order, a more or less official scholar who performed a spiritual and, occasionally at least, a political function."

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Kingship in Seventeenth Century Sri Lanka

Some Concepts, Ceremonials and other Practices relating thereto*

In this paper I propose primarily to discuss certain information derived from the records of the Dutch East India Company relating to the reign of the King of Kandy, Rājasiṃha II (A. D. 1628/1634 - 1687).[1] In my view, apart from the new elements that emerge from it, which are intrinsically very interesting and valuable, some of its value lies in giving authentic contemporary documentation to what has hitherto remained as conjectures and assumptions based on oral tradition or on written tradition which, however, was held suspect as being unhistorical.

Before the relevant documents connected with the reign of Rājasiṃha II are considered, it would be useful to trace very briefly part of the history of the dynasty to which he belonged. Vimaladharmasūriya I (1591–1604) who founded this dynasty in Kandy in opposition to both Rājasiṃha I of the Sītāvaka Kingdom and the Portuguese, is said to have been a descendant of the Pērādeniya dynasty (itself stemming from the Gampola royalty).[2] On the extinction of the Sītāvaka Kingdom, Vimaladharmasūriya's Kingdom of Kandy became the sole rallying point of Sinhalese resistance to Portuguese power in Sri Lanka. By marrying the young princess Kusumāsana Devi, the sole surviving heir of the previous dynasty at Kandy (which had been displaced by Rājasiṃha I), Vimaladharmasūriya strengthened his legitimacy as ruler.

Probably because his children were too young, the king appears to have designated his first cousin Senarat as his heir and, accordingly, on his demise the latter (1604–1634) succeeded him. Senarat married the widowed queen and had three sons by her. In 1628, Senarat designated his youngest

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* This is a revised version of a paper presented to the *Seventh Conference of the International Association of Historians of Asia* held at Bangkok in August 1977 and to the *Ceylon Studies Seminar*, Peradeniya, in February 1978 (under the same title and a slightly different sub-title).

1. Rājasiṃha was virtual ruler of the kingdom from about 1628, but it was only in 1634 that his father King Senarat died. For the history of Rājasiṃha's reign see: K. W. Goonewardena, *The Foundation of Dutch Power in Ceylon, 1638 - 1658*, Amsterdam, 1958 and S. Arasaratnam, *Dutch Power in Ceylon 1658 – 1687*, Amsterdam, 1958; also Paul E. Pieris, *Ceylon: The Portuguese Era*, 2 Vols., Colombo, 1913 – 14, C. R. de Silve, *The Portuguese in Ceylon, 1617 – 1638*, Colombo, 1972, and George Davison Winius, *The Fatal History of Portuguese Ceylon*, Cambridge, Mass. 1971.

2. The *Rājāvaliya or a Historical Narrative of Sinhalese Kings from Vijaya to Vimaladharma Sūriya II*, trsl. and ed. B. Gunasekera, Colombo, 1900, p. 77; H. W. Codrington, *A Short History of Ceylon* — Revised ed., London, 1947, p. 103; University of Ceylon, *History of Ceylon*, Vol. I, Pt. 2, Colombo, 1960, pp. 636 – 52.

son, then sixteen years of age, as heir-apparent and as ruler of the core region of the kingdom, the Kande-Uda-Pas-Rata in which the capital of Kandy (Senkadagala Nuvara) was also situated. The eldest son, Kumārasimha, was assigned a principality in the south-east, and the second son another in the north, of the kingdom. But from Sinhalese tradition, Portuguese sources, as well as from a letter written by him to the Dutch on 9th September 1636, it is apparent that the youngest son, Mahaāsthāna, or Rājasimha as he soon came to be known, had been virtually ruling the kingdom of Kandy since 1628 itself. The death of Senarat in 1634/35, and of the eldest of the three princes shortly before that left Rājasimha as chief ruler with the other prince Vijayapāla as a subordinate ruler. With Vijayapāla's rebellion and defeat and his ultimate crossing over to the Portuguese in August 1641 (to die in miserable exile in Goa), Rājasimha became sole ruler of the kingdom.[3]

Whilst we have no satisfactory evidence regarding the earlier queens of Rājasimha, we know that in 1644 he obtained two princesses as queens from the Carnatic region in South India.[4] It was doubtless the prince born to one of these queens that Rājasimha introduced to Gerard Hulft at his audience in April 1656. The prince was then said to be about ten or twelve years old.[5] When in December 1664 there was a rebellion against Rājasimha this was the prince whom the rebels tried to enthrone. But the prince fled with his aunt, the king's sister, to join him, and the rebels were thrown into confusion and easily subdued.[6]

Not long afterwards, however, it was reported that the prince had died of illness, but the rumour went round that he had been done away with on the king's orders to prevent any further rebellion invoking the name of the prince. Much of the reputation for cruelty which Rājasimha acquired centred on, and was built up on, the so-called death of this prince. For twenty years the king was able to keep up this hoax that the prince had died and fool everyone except a handful of trusted persons.[7] It is when following the circumstances in which he laid bare the truth and presented the prince to the people as his lawful heir that we encounter the very valuable and interesting information relating to ceremonials, practices, and concepts connected with kingship already alluded to.

Rājasimha's decision to perpetrate a hoax had been largely induced by the aggressive and unscrupulous policies followed by the Dutch, in particular the Governor of the time Rijckloff van Goens. Not only had he

3. For the relations between the brothers and regarding what rights they had or did not have to succeed to the Kingdom after Senarat, see Appendix.

4. *Cf.* Goonewardena, *op. cit.* p. 73.

5. *Dagh – Register* (Diary) of Jan Volkersz, *Sri Lanka National Archives*, 1/3409.

6. Robert Knox, *An Historical Relation of Ceylon*, London, 1681, f. 139; Arasaratnam, *op. cit* pp. 29 ff.

7. Knox, *op. cit.* f. 60; Arasaratnam, *op. cit.* pp. 28–29.

begun to expand the Dutch territory on the coasts of the Island (captured from the Portuguese) into the inland territories belonging to the king, but he had also begun intrigues against the king, particularly with some of the rebellious elements of 1664.[8]

The staged death and funeral of his only son and heir, however, led to one result which Rājasiṃha had not, perhaps, expected: van Goens, and later on his son too who succeeded him in the Governorship (1675–1679) when van Goens went on to the Council of Batavia (where he soon become Governor-General), both began to speculate and at times, to think aloud as it were, about the tantalising prospect before them on the king's death (which, incidentally, they persuaded themselves all the time as being imminent). They were certain that there would be such disorder and such a scramble for power on all sides that the Dutch would in effect be in a position to take over the kingdom with ease. The build-up of Dutch opinion on this question was such that Rājasiṃha seems to have had cause for great anxiety regarding the future of his successor and of his kingdom.[9]

It is at the same time apparent that he did not consider it advantageous to disabuse the Dutch by producing his son and heir before the public until the time was ripe. He awaited events to decide when that time should have arrived. He also took positive action to hasten that time. After a series of remarkable victories in the sixteen-seventies which left the Dutch in disarray both militarily and politically, he deliberately held his hand by not logically following up his successes. The shock of defeat, on the other hand, helped opponents of Van Goens' policies to carry the day in the Council of Batavia. Under the leadership of the Director-General Speelman the Council in late 1681 decided to reverse those policies and to follow an accommodating and peaceful policy towards Rājasiṃha, who, they acknowledged, had been much wronged by the Dutch.[10] Meanwhile, in Colombo itself, a new Dutch administrator, Laurens Pijl, had already begun a very flatteringly courteous and conciliatory policy towards the king. He continued to make every effort to convince Rājasiṃha that the Dutch had no aggressive intentions at all towards his kingdom. In return the king himself made some reciprocal responses signifying a change in the posture of suspicious, cold and haughty aloofness which he had adopted for many years towards the Dutch. In the middle of 1684 he despatched four important courtiers to Colombo whose mission was to assure the Governor of the king's confidence and trust in him.[11] To further strengthen the new understanding and to clear up as far as possible certain doubts which he still had, Rājasiṃha took a further important step in late February of 1686.

8. Arasaratnam, *op. cit.* pp. 29 ff.
9. *Ibid.*; *Algemeen Rijksarchief,* (the Hague) *Koloniaal Archief* (hereafter: K. A.) 1309 ff. 497–98.
10. Resolutions of Governor-General and Council, 20th October to 30th November 1681, K. A. 596 pp. 527–40; Arasaratnam, *op. cit.*, pp. 95–97.
11. K. A. 1285 f. 537 ff.

The ambassador sent on this occasion was a most unusual person and made a tremendous impression on the Dutch. He was the Ganebandāra or "High Priest" at the Court of Kandy and a close relative of the king. He was described to the Governor by the latter's Council members (who first went to receive him) as being a person dressed in yellow robes, of medium height, slim, and, of complexion, yellow, of about 25 or 26 years of age, with a dignified bearing and a person of few words.[12]

In the course of the secret conferences held by the Ganebandāra with the Governor at the Governor's house (between the 18th and the 21st March 1686) and at which no one else was present except the monk's own interpreter, he displayed a mature knowledge, tact and understanding which belied his youth. It appeared that, in accordance with the king's instructions, his task was to find out what the Dutch attitude would be towards the kingdom on the king's death. Pijl denied that the Company ever had had any intention of interfering in the affairs of the kingdom if the King were to die. He further informed the Ganebandāra that the Company would be most happy if His Majesty had a legitimate heir (and earnestly asked the Ganebandāra whether there was any such heir); if there was no such heir they would be happy if His Majesty were to nominate some blood relation or even someone who though he had no legitimate title, His Majesty thought was suitable; and any such person would be immediately recognised by the Company. The Ganebandāra appeared to be most pleased and convinced regarding the good intentions of the Dutch. He said that like the Dutch he too had heard that there might be some heir but whether it was a female or not or any other particulars he did not know. He added that he certainly knew that there was a true princess of the blood residing in Kandy but the king's son and lawful heir had died some time after the rebellion.

Whilst the above matters constituted the main concern of the two parties, there are certain other bits of information of an incidental nature which Pijl gathered principally from the Ganebandāra (and to a lesser extent from some of the Chiefs who had accompanied the latter to Colombo) which are of great interest and value for a study of sixteenth and seventeenth century kingship in Sri Lankā. The information is to be

12. The description of the monk is closely followed from the account received by the Governor on the 14th March from the special Dutch commissioners who had been sent to receive him at Hanwella. The account is to be found in an extract from the Colombo *Daghregister*. "*Hoogen Priester*" in the text is rendered as "High Priest". As, according to this report, a white parasol was held over him by the king's men, we can conclude therefrom that it signified honour done to him either on account of royal birth or on account of the highest ranking in the ecclesiastical hierarchy.

The age is estimated in that manner by the Dutch commissioners. K. A. 1309 ff. 517–18.

found for the most part in a document entitled "*Secreete Conferentie tusschen den Heere Gouvern. Laurens Pijl en den Gannebandaer off den gesant van Sijn Keijserlijke Maijts van Candia....*"[13]

In the first place there is authentic information regarding the Kandyan royal house such as is not available from any other source. The Ganebandāra's full name is given as Kobbäkaduve Medhankara Päviditän Vahanse. His grand-father Kobbäkaduva Bandāra was a first cousin of Rājasimha's late father, King Senarat, they being the children of two sisters. They came from families out of which the kings of Kandy were always chosen. It was also from these families that any king would receive the crown (*...het luijden geweest zijn bij wien de koningen van boven altijt verkooren wierden en van haar de croone oock moesten ontfangen).*[14] This means, as we may note, that in the ceremonies connected with kingship these families had at least a nominal or formal role of signifying their approval of the chosen ruler. Pijl had also heard that when, in former times, the Cakravarti or Emperor of the Island invested kings in Kandy, then too the choice was out of these families.

It appears futher from this document that no one from these families, whether male or female, married from outside their ranks so as not to lower their status. As a result they had always been proud and haughty, "indeed, they have not refrained from conducting themselves proudly even in relation to the king", for which reason he had humbled many of them and almost exterminated their line. Nevertheless, says Pijl on the basis of his information, the highlanders would hardly suffer anyone to rule over them, except those from the aforesaid descent. On this same source of information and for this same reason, Pijl noted that it was believed that although Rājasimha might have a son of low ancestry (on the mother's side) and wish to install him in the Government, he would not be obeyed without the support of the Ganebandāra or without placing the latter as the second person in the realm.[15]

It is, however, with regard to the consecration of rulers that this document contains the most fascinating information. Pijl says that some would consider it strange that it should be said that Rājasimha had intended to get the coronation ceremony performed after the capture of Colombo – the Ganebandāra himself had so informed Pijl – particularly

13. "Secret Conference between the Governor Laurens Pijl and the Ganebandara or ambassador of His Imperial Majesty of Kandy." It is from this same document that the information in the previous paragraph is also derived. K. A. 1309 f. 503 ff.

14. K. A. 1309 f. 503

15. For the importance and significance attached to a consecrated queen see University of Ceylon, *History of Ceylon*, Vol. I Pt. I p. 230. The significance attached to descent from a duly consecrated queen was so powerful that in 1739 when Rājasimha's grandson, the king, Vīra Parākrama Narendrasimha died, a foreign dynasty was enthroned in preference to Narendrasimha's son by a junior queen. (*Cf. Memoir of Joan Gideon Loten.* ed and trsl. by E. Reimers, Colombo, 1935, p. 55 of the Dutch text and p. 3 of the translation.)

because he had been known to give audience wearing a crown[16] upon his head, and therefore everyone (amongst the Dutch apparently) had thought that he was a crowned king. But in actual fact, says Pijl on the basis of his information, everyone has been wrong, as Rājasiṃha has never been crowned according to the customs of the country.

Let us pause to consider this information and conclusion. It is possible that Pijl did not grasp clearly all the nuances and import of what he was told. For instance, it is known from South Indian history that on the successful completion of wars special coronation ceremonies were celebrated in the capital of the defeated enemy (or elsewhere in the conquered territory.)[17] Considering the importance of South Indian influences during this period, it is all the more natural that Rājasiṃha should have been thinking of a special coronation if Colombo the capital city of his enemy, the Portuguese, fell into his hands. The idea of victory, it should be noted, is particularly associated with coronation ceremonies.[18] Moreover, in the Sri Lanka historical experience there are references to kings having had more than one consecration and from about the eleventh century such consecrations, it is known for certain, usually included coronation ceremonies. Parakramabāhu I had his first consecration, inclusive of a coronation, when he obtained the Rājaraṭṭha and had like ceremonies later when he became ruler of the entire island.[19] It is very very probable that the

16. Apart from Pijl's statement, we also know that he had given audience wearing a crown as early as 1637, from the evidence of the first Dutch diplomatic mission to Rājasiṃha II in that year (*cf* K. A. 1037 f. 175).

17. See T. V. Mahalingam, *South Indian Polity*, Madras, 1955, pp. 38 – 46.

18. Apart from the evidence from South India referred to above, see H. G. Quaritch Wales, *Siamese State Ceremonies; Their History and Function*, London, 1931, pp. 80 – 81.

19. See the *Cūlavaṃsa, being the more recent part of the Māhavaṃsa*, ed. and trsl. by Wilhelm Geiger (henceforth Cv.) (Colombo 1953), Pt. I, Ch. 71, vv. 28 – 29; Ch. 72, vv. 311 – 28. Bhuvanekabāhu II (1291 – 1302) had an annual coronation according to the chronicle (Cv. Pt. II Ch. 90 v. 61) and inscriptional evidence shows that in the 16th century Parākramabāhu VI (1412 – 1466) had likewise celebrated coronation ceremonies each year (University of Ceylon, *History of Ceylon* Vol. I Pt. II p. 731). It may be noted that though the first-named ruler was not so very outstanding, Parākramabāhu VI was one of the most famous of the Sinhalese monarchs and had brought the whole island under his dominion. This type of annual coronation might be compared with the British monarchy's King's or Queen's Birthday celebrations though the former would have had more complex ritualistic features and undertones than the latter. Special types of coronation celebrating victory or the accession to new power and/or status would have been of a different nature.

In the *Mahāvaṃsa* the crown is first mentioned in connection with the second consecration of Devānampiyatissa as one of the articles given by the Emperor Asoka for the purpose. (*The Mahāvaṃsa or Great Chronicle of Ceylon* hereafter Mv., ed and trsl. by Wilhelm Geiger, Colombo 1950, Ch. XI *vv.* 28 – 36). Though there are some scattered references to coronation thereafter, it would appear that in the early period the *chatta* or royal parasol was a more significant symbol of sovereignty than the crown, judging by the nature and the number of the references to the former. (See *e. g.* Mv. Ch. XVII v. 7, Ch. XIX v. 59, Ch. XXXI vv. 39, 78, 91 – 92; Cv. Pt. I Ch. 44 vv. 13 – 20). From about the 11th century, however, there are increasingly frequent and significant references to the crown in comparison with other symbols of sovereignty.

A very significant reference to the crown relates to the time of Kassapa II (641 – 650) when it is said that he 'united the kingdom under one dominion; but the crown he did not wear". (Cv. Pt. I Ch. 44 v. 145). The last part of this verse: "but the crown he did not wear" is very significant for our discussion relating to the time of Rājasiṃha II as it indicates that a ruler could reign even though he had not crowned himself. In the case of Rājasiṃha, however, the problem appears to have been – as we shall see – not so much the question of a first coronation, but of a higher type of coronation.

second set of ceremonies were of a higher order than the first judging by the greater grandeur and pageantry depicted in the account of the later occasion.[20]

This surmise acquires greater significance when we return to Pijl's report and find it stated that he had been informed that "no Emperors *(Keijsers)* may be crowned except those who were absolute masters of the whole Island.[21]" If Rājasimha could have obtained the Portuguese capital of Colombo he would have been in a position to consider himself master of the whole of Sri Lanka as he considered the Dutch to be only his faithful servants, a style of address which the Dutch were happy to accept during most of Rājasimha's reign. Thus it was that Rājasimha had cherished the idea of having a coronation ceremony as soon as Colombo was acquired. But as suggested earlier, this would probably have meant not his first coronation ceremony but a coronation ceremony of a higher order than before.

That there was such a coronation of a higher order, has already been suggested by us on the basis of information regarding the reign of Parākramabāhu I. Further support to that theory is lent by Paranavitana's statement that in "the fifteenth century, there was a special type of anointment known as *savrnābhiṣeka,* [*sic.* for *svarnābhiṣeka*], the precise significance of which is not known."[22] Before we make a close examination of the source on which Paranavitana made the above claim, it is relevant to note that on the same occasion Paranavitana has also pointed out that consecration and coronation ceremonies were intimately connected with each other during this period. Indeed the literary sources relating to the period as well as the epigraphic evidence show that the two terms are used as if they were interchangable.[23] For the purposes of this paper, we shall accept this identification subject to the understanding that the usual *abhiṣeka* consisted of a series of ceremonies in one of which the coronation was a particularly significant element. Having made this clear, let us turn to the source on which Paranavitana based his claim relating to the existence of a special type of consecration.

The source referred to is the Gadalādeniya slab inscription of Jayavīra Parākramabāhu (1463/66 – 1469)[24]. On close examination of this

20· Compare *Cv.* Pt. I Ch. 71 vv. 28 – 29 with Ch. 72 *vv.* 311 – 28.

21· *K. A.* 1309 f. 504.

22· University of Ceylon, *History of Ceylon*, Vol. I Pt. 2, p. 731.

23· According to the 1637 *Daghregister* report of the first Dutch envoys to Rājasimha, it is pertinent also to note that the king had referred to his accession as "when the crown devolved upon him". *K.A.* 1037 f. 175.

24· *Epigraphia Zeylanica*, Vol. IV, No. 3, Colombo, 1934, pp. 21, 24. (Incidentally, both Codrington and Paranavitana, had been unable to correctly identify the ruler mentioned in this epigraph. The correct identification appears to have been made by G. P. V. Somaratne in *The Political History of the Kingdom of Kōṭṭe*, Nugegoda. Colombo 1975, pp. 136 – 38.) The inscription does not mention any other coronation, But we assume that the King Jayavīra Parākramabāhu must have had the normal *abhiṣeka* immediately he succeeded his predecessor, as that would have strengthened his position. See note 25.

inscription, we find evidence not only strongly supporting our view that there existed a higher type of coronation ceremony, but also giving a rather precise significance to the consecration known as *svarnābhiṣeka* – a significance which had escaped Paranavitana's attention. The fact is that H. W. Codrington, who edited this inscription, and Paranavitana and others, failed to note the full significance of some of the ideas expressed in it, particularly in regard to the words: "....*svarnābhiṣeka mangalyayata palamuva kala dik-vijayehidi*...." which literally mean more than the translation of Codrington: "...on the subjugation of the realm effected before the Golden Anointing (Coronation) Festival." The more literal and accurate rendering would be: "....on the conquest of the (four) quarters effected before the Golden Anointing (Coronation) Festival." Thus the Golden *abhiṣeka* or consecration (coronation) referred to was that of an Emperor – one who has conquered the four quarters – and not of an ordinary king. The correct emphasis is all the more apparent when we notice that this *abhiṣeka* was in the fifth year of the particular ruler's (Jayavīra Parākramabāhu's) reign. It has to be distinguished from the ordinary *abhiṣeka* which must have been held at the outset of his reign, and with which Codrington appears to have confused it apparently because he was thinking in terms of only one *abhiṣeka* ceremony and of one type.[25]

The argument that this was, however, a special type of consecration on the attainment of *dikvijaya* or conquest of the four quarters, is virtually clinched by the presence of certain metonymical signs that are engraved as part of this inscription. Apart from the depiction of the traditional sun and moon, there are two metonymical signs that do not usually occur in this manner in our inscriptions, namely a *cakra* and a *śaṅkha*. The *śaṅkha* or conch-shell undoubtedly signifies the fact of *abhiṣeka* and the *cakra* or wheel establishes the special type of consecration, namely that of

25. It may be safely concluded from our evidence that an *abhiṣeka* was usually performed immediately on succeeding to the kingship or capturing power, even in cases where the new ruler's position was under challenge. Moreover, for this *abhiṣeka* there was no delay until representatives from all parts of his dominions were in a position to attend the ceremony or were willing to do so. This was obviously because the *abhiṣeka* ceremony virtually confirming accession to the kingship was a valuable aid to consolidation of power – very largely, no doubt, on account of its ritualistic significance.

Apart from the evidence cited earlier in the text in relation to the *abhiṣeka* ceremonies of Parākramabāhu I, the following further evidence would support these conclusions. The *Rājāvaliya* (p. 61 and Somaratne, *op. cit.* p. 159) specifically mentions that after the Prince of Ambulugala had captured the royal city of Kōṭṭe and killed the King Pandita Parākramabāhu, the very next day he "adorned the palace and ascended the throne under the name of Vīra Parākramabāhu (1477–1489). Similarly the *Rājāvaliya* (p. 66) says that in 1521 immediately after the capture of the city and palace of Kōṭṭe and the assassination of Vijayabāhu, the "next day they decorated the palace, and placed the eldest prince on the throne under the title of Bhuvanaikabāhu.... and he was introduced to the people." The same source indicates that subsequent to those ceremonies, a coronation festival was also held. For a very early and explicit appreciation in Sri Lanka of the awe that could be created by the ritual magic of the *abhiṣeka* see page 24 below.

cakravarti or universal dominion – which, in the Sri Lanka context, meant in effect dominion over the whole Island.[26] The relevant point here is not whether this particular king, Jayavìra Parākramabāhu had achieved such dominion – all rulers (and their subjects) may not have been equally punctilious about such matters – but that we have virtually established the existence of at least two types of coronation, one of which was of a higher nature conferring *cakravarti* status.

We had earlier pointed out, on the basis of South Indian evidence, the possibility of one type of coronation being particularly associated with victory in war. Looking further afield we can see other evidence to support our case for different types of coronation (consecration) ceremonies. In respect of Siam (Thailand) which in early times and up to about the eighteenth century was much influenced by Sri Lankan models, Quaritch Wales apparently refers to two types of coronation ceremonies in the late eighteenth century, namely, *prāptābhiseka* and *rājābhiseka*. Slightly earlier in Ayuthian times, there had also been a type known as *pusyābhiseka*. Furthermore, he drew attention to the fact that in India "there was not a single and final 'coronation', but numerous ascending grades of anointment *(abhiseka)*, spread over a number of years, perhaps throughout the life-time of the monarch."[27]

When we thus take the Sri Lankan evidence along with that from outside, we can place Pijl's information in proper perspective. Although Rājasimha was known to have been wearing a crown, on occasion, he had nevertheless expressed his intention of having a coronation ceremony after the capture of Colombo, because he was thinking of a coronation of a higher order than any he had previously had – a coronation of a *cakravarti* signifying dominion over the whole Island.[28]

26· See note 37 below.

27· *Siamese State Ceremonies*, pp. 70 and 121.

28· The fact that Rājasimha had not gone through the ceremonies entitling him to be legitimately addressed as a *cakravarti* ruler seems also to be suggested by the language in some of the compositions in verse that were woven around his person and achievements. The relatively sober and accurate *Rājasiha Haṭana* refers to him as king using a variety of synonyms including *himi* meaning lord, *mīṭā*, *bhūpā* meaning lord of the earth. But, whenever the word *cakravarti* in its various forms such as *sakviti* is used it inidcates a desired rank or glory rather than one that has been attained. Thus we get: "in the manner of a *cakravarti*." *(sakviti raja vilāseṭa*, v. 434) or "may he live victorious in the manner of a *cakravarti* lord of the earth." *(dine sakviti bhūpā vilase*, v. 438.) It has to be noted that this work composed around 1640 appears to have been in effect dedicated to Rājasiṃha and it, in all probability, would have been recited at the king's court. It is significant also that the *Rājasiha Sirita*, which is an unadulterated panegyric on Rājasiṃha in the *prasasti kāvya* style (and somewhat of a hotch-patch in its present form) has nowhere given him the *cakravarti* title though various other hyperbolical attributes are showered on him. (cf. *Rājasiha Sirita hevat Rājasiṃha Varṇanāva*, ed. C. Karunatilaka, Colombo, 1916). It too appears to have been composed during Rājasiṃha's reign and, according to all indications, it had been recited at his court.

To return to the further statements in Pijl's account, there was according to his information, another set of factors which had to be taken into account by a ruler who wished to go through the ceremony of coronation. In his own words:–

> "People also say that those who are going to be crowned must swear an oath to do everything good, to duly maintain the religion of the Buddha, not to kill anyone or cause anyone to be killed, but rather (where necessary) to banish such person from the land; and further, to live a pure life,[29] to uphold everyone in their due rights, and many more things relating to their religion. On account of this therefore, they let their kingdom be ruled mostly through kings, subject to their higher authority."

This passage is interesting and significant for several reasons. In the first place, it shows that the emphasis on the *dasarājadhamma*[30] ideology in realtion to kingship which runs through chronicles like the *Mahāvaṃsa* was not confined to literary works but was echoed by the subjects of the ruler. In the second place, it is implied that a ruler had to possess almost superhumanly good qualities to be fit to wear a crown (or rather the crown appertaining to an emperor). Well over a century later, Dr. John Davy set down current Sinhala views on this question more explicitly when he explained that a Kandyan ruler seldom wore a crown "imagining that in assuming a crown, he imitated the gods (who are supposed to wear crowns), and that unless he imitated them as well in his conduct, leading ever after the most correct and irreproachable and virtuous life, he should excite their highest displeasure, and draw down certain vengeance on his ambitious and unworthy head."[31] To put these ideas in a different way, one could see an element of divinity (encompassed in the *bodhisattva* idea) surrounding the coronation ceremony of a king or rather a certain type of coronation ceremony. Thirdly, the passage under consideration contains a unique attempt at resolving the contradiction between a person who has to be in effect a *bodhisattva* and at the same time an effective ruler of imperfect subjects. The solution indicated is that of a separation of functions. The crown-wearing ruler is an Emperor who lives the life of a *bodhisattva*; but the mundane work of administration (involving, presumably, the meting out of the death penalty) is left to kings who are subordinate to him. The argument ignores, of course, all questions of indirect responsibility by the Emperor for the actions of the kings subordinate to him.

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29. '*heiligli,k*' wou'd literally mean 'holily'. K. A. 1309 f. 504. cf. also *Lak Raja Lo Sirita*, British Museum OR 6603 (65).

30. The *dasarājadhamma* are indicated in this passage only in part and in general. They are frequently alluded to in the *Rājasiha Hatana* as well as the *Rājasiha Sirita*, and the *Mandārampura Puvata*, the last-named being a kind of continuing chronicle with successive reigns being written on by successive writers. (*Mandārampura Puvata* ed. by Rev. Labugama Lankānanda, Colombo, 1958.)

31. An *Account of the Interior of Ceylon*, London, 1821, p. 123.

To go back to the concrete problems relating to Rājasimha's coronation, or rather, the lack of a coronation, as understood by Pijl, the Dutch Governor says the he had nevertheless been informed that at the time that Rājasiṃha had been inducted into the Government of the country, the sword (of State) had been girded on him and that ceremony had effectively confirmed him in the Government. This ceremony of the girding on of the Sword of state is referred to in many documents of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. From the *Rājasiha Haṭana* it appears that kings who had no claims to *cakravarti* status at all also went through that ceremony, for not only Rājasiṃha but his two brothers also had undergone that ceremony at the time Senerat disposed of his kingdom amongst them.[32]

The intriguing information next mentioned by Pijl is that in case it was going to be the father himself who invests the son with the sword of state – that is to say, hand over the Government during his own life-time to his son by tying the ceremonial sword – and, if that father "was not himself a crowned Emperor", he would have to be the first to salute and show honour (by prostration) to his son, the new king. It was generally believed, so Pijl says, that Rājasiṃha would never perform such an act of obeisance towards his son, and that it was in order to avoid such a situation that he had been so keen on being crowned as Emperor; for, as Pijl was told, crowned Emperors need not pay such obeisance.[33] What Rājasiṃha ultimately did with regard to this matter we shall consider somewhat later.

At this point, there is one question that arises. Was it possible for a ruler to legitimately obtain the status of an Emperor merely by being crowned (in a special ceremony, with a special crown, perhaps) or was it also essential that he have other rulers under him in order to acquire the status of an Emperor – as implied in part of the information recounted above by Pijl? The term Emperor itself implies the existence of tributary kings or rulers. And indeed, there is evidence from many periods to indicate that in Sri Lanka there was conformity to such a model, at least at times. In the reign of Dharma Parākramabāhu IX (1489 – 1513) we find that his brothers ruled small teritorial units as kings acknowledging him as Emperor. Thus Rājasiṃha was at Mānikkadavara, Tāniyawalla at Mādampe, Sakalakalāvalla at Uḍugampola and the youngest Vijayabāhu at Devundara. On the death of the Emperor, Vijayabāhu became Emperor with the active support of his sole surving elder brother, who happily continued as ruler of Uḍugampola. Moreover, during these two reigns a powerful king in the Uḍarata (the kingdom of Kandy) and another in the northern kingdom

32. *vv.* 61 – 65. For reference to the ceremony of the girding on of the sword of state see also: *Memoir of Joan Gideon Loten, 1752 1757*, ed. and trsl. by E. Reimers, Colombo 1935, pp. 3, 55; *Memoir of Jan Schreuder, 1757-1762*, Colombo, 1946, pp. 30,130; *Lak Raja Lō Sirita; Parangi Haṭane*. ed. D.P. de Alwis, 2nd imp., Colombo, 1935 *v.*137, *Mandārampura Puvata, v* 527.

33. *K.A.* 1309 f. 504.

of Jaffna acknowledged a rather fitful vassalage.[34] In the light of our understanding of the *cakravarti* model, it would now appear that the so-called partition of Kotte in 1521 was also but a continuation of the tradition of an Emperor with subordinate kings under him. The Portuguese and their chroniclers looked on this event as a partition pure and simple and this idea became pervasive, more especially on account of the subsequent wars between the Emperor Bhuvanekabāhu and his Portuguese allies on the one hand and his two brothers on the other. We notice also that Jaffna and Kandy continued in theoretical vassalage to the Emperor at Kotte and on one occasion the brothers united to enforce that position in respect to Kandy, by force of arms.[35]

When the kingdom of Kandy had begun to function as an independent power from the times of Vimaladharmasūriya I, we find subordinate kings and chieftains ruling over small principalities, as is evidenced from traditional accounts as well as from the narratives of the early Dutch visits to the Island. This continued to be the situation under Senarat too until 1628 when he assigned parts of the kingdom to Rājasiṃha and the other two princes. It is doubtful, however, whether at that point, or before, Senarat formally assumed the status of an Emperor. This is a question which we shall have occassion to look into further. As for Rājasiṃha we ultimately see no subordinate or tributary rulers under him on account of his successful policy of centralization.[36] The absence of such tributaries within his kingdom would not, however, have presented an insuperable difficulty if Rājasiṃha had wished to enact the role of a *cakravarti* emperor; for, symbolic representation at least of such tributaries could easily have been provided for. The real difficulty would arise if there were to be any ruler in the neighbourhood who refused to acknowledge, or worse still, opposed the authority of the person who set himself up as an

34. For the above, cf. *Rājāvaliya*, p. 61; Somaratne, *op. cit.* pp. 162–64. For a much earlier example, see the reign of Parākramabāhu II (1236–71), where, apart from the Vanni rulers who were subordinate to him, his son Vijayabāhu and his sister's son Virabāhu (and probably other sons of Parākramabāhu) had the designation of kings and ruled territorial units. (cf. *Cv.*, Pt. II, Ch. 87 *vv.* 24–29; Ch. 88, *vv* 1, 67, 79, 101–02; Ch. 89, *vv.* 11, 51–52 and 71).

35. *Rājāvaliya*, p. 66. See also Somaratne (*op. cit* pp. 186-88) where, however, the idea of a partition has been accepted just as in Goonewardena (*op. cit.* p. 3) and in T. Abeysinghe, *Portuguese Rule in Ceylon, 1594–1612*, Colombo, 1966, p. 9.

36. Goonewardena, *op. cit.*, p. 12; C. R. de. Silve, *op. cit.*, p. 17 Tambiah has emphasized that a ruler as a *cakravarti* emperor "by definition required lesser rulers under him." This we can agree with subject to the possibilities of substitution for ritualistic purposes (in a centralized kingdom) as indicated by us. But it has to be noted quite clearly that the galactic type of polity in which lesser rulers "in turn encompassed still lesser rulers" and which he postulates for Thailand and, at least by implication, for Sri Lanka, did not exist in Sri Lanka during Rājasiṃha's times, nor did there exist the type of segmentary state which Burton Stein posits in regard to the Cōḷa Kingdom in South India. (cf. S. J. Tambiah, *World Conqueror and World Renouncer. A Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand against a Historical Background* — C. U. P. 1976 – pp. 70, 126-29, 146-48; Burton Stein, The Segmentary State in South Indian History" in *Realm and Region in Traditional India*, ed. Richard G. Fox, New Delhi, 1977, pp. 9–51)

Emperor. It was for this reason that the theory – which we have already noted – had developed in Sri Lanka, namely that no one could be crowned as Emperor except one who was absolute master of the whole Island.[37]

Though he had established a centralized kingdom by the sixteen-forties, Rājasiṃha was not sole master of the Island. The Portuguese, far from accepting his overlordship, were bent on destroying his power. That problem too was eliminated (through an alliance with the Dutch) by the total expulsion of the Portuguese from Sri Lanka by 1658. Though the Dutch remained behind, they did not seem to present a serious obstacle to the ritual celebration of a *cakravarti* coronation because they styled themselves (for their own advantage of course) in the manner of vassals by referring to themselves as servants of His Imperial Majesty and to their forts and territories as belonging to the same Imperial Majesty.[38] Pijl very pertinently observed, in the document which we have been considering, that Rājasiṃha had assumed a posture of overlordship in his diplomatic correspondence with the Dutch apparently because it fitted in with the requirements for a coronation as Emperor.

Unfortunately, however, one essential condition which Rājasiṃha seems to have set for himself, remained unfulfilled. Pijl's informants had mentioned how Rājasiṃha had wished to perform the coronation ceremony after capturing Colombo from the Portuguese, but had not been able to do so, apparently because the capture of that city by the Dutch had not sufficed for his purposes – though this last point was not made by his informants, but is an inference which we can make from the evidence.

37. It may be remarked that it was fortunate for the ruler and the people as a whole that Sri Lanka was an island, and a not too small one at that, because the territorial implications of the *cakravarti* model could conveniently be limited to the furthest shores of the island, whereby the possible amount of warfare in pursuit of that model could also be limited. Thus it appears that sole mastery over the world encompassed in Sri Lanka was often considered to be adequate to fulfill the teritorial aspect of the *cakravarti* concept. Hence the expression *dīpa sakviti, cakravarti* of the Island. It is this same idea which appears to be encompassed in the words *Trisiṃhalādisvara* and *Lankesvara* – a felicitous linguistic adaptation on the lines of *cakresvara* which was a current synonym in South Asia for *cakravarti*. (For *cakresvara* see D. C. Sircar, *Indian Epigraphical Glossary*, Delhi 1966, p. 65; for *dīpa Sakviti* see *Rajasiha Hatane v.* 43; for the other two terms see e. g. *Epigraphia Zeylanica*, Vol. I p. 130; Vol. III p. 66 and Vol. VI p. 308.)

Of course this limited territorial model of the *cakravarti* ruler would receive a jolt when there were South Indian or other invasions from across the seas, or the model could become expansive when the Sri Lankan ruler was quite powerful, and extension of his dominion across the seas was thought of. Moreover, China had not been alone in considering the arrival of foreign embassies with gifts as tribute-bearing missions. A king who had a notoriously flexible attitude regarding this matter as early as the twelfth century is known from inscriptions (see e. g. the inscriptions of Nissaṃka Malla in *Epigraphia Zeylanica*, Vol. I, pp. 129, 130; Vol. II, pp. 139, 141. Throughout much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the annual Dutch embassies to the Sinhalese court appear to have been considered (with at least a semblance of of justification) as tribute-bearing missions. The *Rājāvaliya*, *Cūlavamsa* and other traditional accounts reflect this attitude in their references to the Dutch.

38. Cf. Goonewardena, *op. cit.*, pp. 62–63, 70 and 124.

To Rājasiṃha, Colombo had been "the mother of all the evil"[39] that had befallen his people. He spoke from the bottom of his heart when in October 1656 he had written to the Dutch Governor regarding Colombo thus: "...since the most serene and famous Raju (Rājasiṃha I) who was King of Ceitavaca (Sitāwaka) laid several sieges to it and could not take it, for this reason I took it into my imperial heart to capture it.[40]"

His previous utterances had already led Governor-General and Council in Batavia three years earlier to refer to "that city which has caused so much evil to him and his fore-fathers and on (the capture of) which he is so set.[41]" In view of these repeatedly and publicly declared intentions,[42] the capture and taking over of this erstwhile Portuguese capital in Sri Lanka by his "faithful servants", the Dutch, could not have been adequate or appropriate enough for him to have considered it a capture and occupation by proxy on his behalf, as it were, entitling him at last to perform the coronation ceremony of a *cakravarti*. This was particularly so because everyone knew that the Dutch had not only broken their promises of handing over the city to him, but also that they had virtually turned its guns on his men. To have attempted such a celebration under those circumstances would have been to stretch the elasticity of ritualistic myth-making too far. And a man of his character and sagacity would have visualized the irreparable harm to his image and credibility in the eyes of his people if he had done such a thing. We can now understand why Rājasiṃha had not celebrated the special type of coronation which had been intended to confer on him an enhanced ritual and political status.[43]

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39. See his letter quoted in the *Dagh-Register* (Diary) of Batavia of 1641. (Goonewardena, *op. cit.* p. 25). For the use of the term 'imperial' see belown. 40 and pp. 15 – 17.

40. Goonewardena, *op. cit.* pp. 157 – 58.

41. *Ibid.* p. 183

42. On page 5 we have already seen how the Ganebandāra (and doubtless others too who had come on the embassy) knew of Rājasiṃha's erstwhile intention of celebrating a coronation ceremony after the capture of Colombo. It is very pertinent to note that over fifty years earlier, at the time that a popular request was made that the *abhiṣeka nama* of "Rājasiṃha" be taken by him, he is said to have explicitly proclaimed his intention of destroying the forces of the foreign enemy and capturing all hi fortresses and thereby bringing the country under one banner. *(para rupu sen sinda bala kotu binda häma melak puraya eka sesath sevanak karamin* - in verse 225 of the *Rajasiha Hanaṭa*. See also note 49 below.

43. In note 19 we saw the example of a king who for some unstated reason did not wear the crown though he seemed to have been entitled to do so. In the case of another king, Mahinda I (1724–1727 or 1730-1733), however, the reason is definitely known. He did not even undergo *abhiseka* and become king, but ruled the kingdom only as *Ādipāda* or *Mahādipāda* which was probably equivalent to Crown Prince, the reason for this act of self-abnegation being his sorrow at the death of his dearest friend. (University of Ceylon, *History of Ceylon*, Vol. I, Pt. 1, p. 318.) It is possible that Rājasiṃha, when he decided against the coronation, was concerned not so much about the opinion of his subjects as about his own self-respect. It could also have been due to a bitter sense of having failed to achieve his crowning ambition: the capture of Colombo.

Before we can move on to consider the sequel to the Rev. Kobbäkaduwe Medhankara's mission, it is necessary to consider, how and why Rājasimha came to use the name and style of Emperor in his external correspondence as we have already seen with regard to his letter of 23 October 1656.

In the first place it appears that except where the letters were written in Sinhalese, much latitude appears to have been left to the Portuguese translators of his letters. It was often these Portuguese versions which went as originals to the Dutch. On examining the extant records in the Sri Lanka National Archives,[44] we find indeed that in the letters written in Portuguese (and which the Dutch considered as originals) the royal signature ශ්‍රී (Śrī) has been inscribed not by the king but by the Portuguese translator (who appears to have been, very often, a Portuguese Catholic priest resident in Kandy). The time-consuming flourishes and adornments of the ශ්‍රී, which vary very much from letter to letter (sent during more or less the same period of time) indicate this. Rājasimha's own statements confirm it. In a letter to the Dutch Director-General Hulft, in February 1656, we find him stating that because these letters are composed in a foreign language there might be inconsistencies and Hulft should therefore check with him in case of doubt.[45] On the rare occasions when the accuracy of every word appeared to be essential, the letters were written in Sinhalese (sometimes perhaps in Tamil), it apparently being understood that the king's envoys or some other suitable persons would be at hand to provide a translation. The procedure on such occasions is clearly evident from his letter to the Governor-General of the V. O. C. in 1641 where he says: "I have not let the Portuguese (at court) write this ola as I did not trust them in this matter. I have got my own words to be written (on the ola) in the Sinhalese language, signed it, and sealed it with my own seal."[46]

All this would indicate that the scribes who set down the king's communications in Portuguese had a certain amount of freedom in their composition, on the understanding however that what the king wished communicated was rendered accurately. It would appear that certain Portuguese, or Portuguese-trained, scribes who were considered rather loyal to the king may have introduced nomenclatures and styles of address which had not been previously used by him, but which he may have tacitly accepted as being advantageous and even called for in the diplomatic correspondence with foreigners. As a matter of fact, this is the kind of thing that happened in his father's time. We have definite evidence to show that the title of Emperor (along with several other titles) came to be

44. No. 1/3253

45. See Donald Ferguson, "Correspondence between Raja Sinha II and the Dutch", *Journal of the Ceylon Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, (hereafter *JCBRAS*) Vol. XVIII, No. 55, 1909, p. 227.

46. See *Daghregister* (Diary) of Batavia for 1640-1641 ed. J. A. van der Chijs, p. 407.

ascribed to King Senarat for the first time in his life by a Dutchman named Boschouwer, whom he had used as an envoy. In 1620 the Danish admiral Ove Giedde not knowing of the forgery, enumerated before Senarat the king's titles as given in a document concocted by that Dutchman. When King Senarat heard these titles couched in the bombastic language of European feudalism – with princedoms, dukedoms and marquisates mingled with kingship and the imperial title – Giedde records in his diary that the king "put his hand before his mouth, looked at his council and laughed." Later that day, the king's secretary explained to Giedde that Senarat's title "was simply King of Candia." Nevertheless, when Giedde asked whether he should delete the other titles, the secretary said "....it might as well remain, since it did neither good nor harm."

From that time Senarat himself appears to have incorporated these titles in his correspondence with the Danes and we find Rājasiṃha in turn doing the same thing in his very first letter to the Dutch in 1636.[48] The attitude of these two kings appears to have been (as already foreshadowed in the Secretary's remarks) that since the European seemed to appreciate this kind of title and they (the kings) themselves could not possibly be hurt by such usage, it would be useful to incorporate such titles in the correspondence with these foreigners. It is very likely, however, that Senarat remained rather circumspect about using the title of Emperor and in all probability did not do so in the correspondence with the Portuguese as he seems for a long time to have acknowledged at least a token suzerainty of the Portuguese king. It is relevant also to note that Senarat had not taken an *abhiseka nāma* in the manner of his predecessor or his son,[49] his successor, or the latter's son, Vimaladharmasūriya II, for he had had the same name of Senarat before his accession to the throne too. Could it have been that his consecration was of a limited nature because he had his *abhiseka* without a consecrated queen participating in it? (It appears that he married the widowed queen of Vimaladharmasūriya only

47. *cf* "Diary of Events which took place in Ceylon··· till June 1, 1621" by Ove Giedde trs. by Mary Mackenzie in JCBRAS, Vol. XXXVII, No. 102 Pt. 2, 1946, p. 81. Though Senarat had not known it, Boschouwer had introduced these titles sometime earlier in his correspondence with the Dutch East India Company's officials,

48. 9 Sep. 1636 *of* JCBRAS Vol. XVIII No. 55, 1905, p. 169.

49. From the *Rājasiha Haṭana* (*vv.* 220–27) it would appear that the prince *Maha Āsthāna* as Rājasiṃha was known at the time of the girding on of the sword of state in 1628 had continued to be known by that name until shortly after the Treaty of 1633 with the Portuguese. Thereafter, the ministers and learned people as well as the army had unanimously requested King Senarat, so it is said, to invest the prince with the name of Rājasiṃha as the prince had already displayed extraordinary ability, physical prowess and leadership akin to the qualities displayed by the illustrious king of Sītavāka at about the same age. Accordingly Senarat had arranged for such an *abhiseka nāma* ceremony to be performed.

some time after his accession.)[50] Whatever the reason, the significant fact is that even the very cautious and rather mild king, Senarat, took on the title of Emperor in his correspondence with certain foreigners, although he undoubtedly had not assumed that title formally and ritualistically. It is not to be wondered at that his self-confident and assertive son should have improved on it by getting the Portuguese too to acknowledge his imperial status.[51]

As far as internal correspondence and general usage within the country was concerned, it is probable that certain traditional titles implying imperial power and status continued to be used in relation to the king as from olden times. In fact, even the term *cakravarti* may have been used. That would still not invalidate the thesis that there existed a special type of coronation the performance of which would have entitled the king to the highest ritual status as a *cakravarti* emperor. And the fact was that whatever titles he may have already assumed, Rājasiṃha had proclaimed his intention of celebrating a coronation ceremony after the capture of Colombo and our evidence indicates that this was connected with the attainment of ritually and politically effective *cakravarti* status or, may be, a higher grade within the status of *cakravarti* itself.

Let us move on now to consider the sequel to the Rev. Kobbäkaduve Medhaṅkara's mission. It has been known from the Dutch records and from tradition that the king did produce his son before the people and get him invested as king. Four generations after the event Davy recorded the tradition that because his courtiers were incredulous, Rājasiṃha had to prostrate himself before his son in order to convince them that this was indeed his son who had been thought to be dead.[52] But with the information provided above by Pijl, we should be inclined to give a different interpretation to the king's action. And in this and other connected matters certain contemporary documents do indeed give further significant information which has passed unnoticed hitherto.

In April and May 1686 the Dutch received information that chiefs, soldiers, drummers, dancers and labourers were being summoned to court

50. On the other hand, could there have been some ritualistic difficulty at least in this period – if the Queen (implying always the Chief Queen) had been previously consecrated – as in this case or could the difficulty have arisen because of her previous widowhood, this being a period when Hindu influences appear to have been strong?

51. Queyroz whilst virtually admitting that the Portuguese had ultimately to do this, says that the title of Emperor had first been accorded to Rājasiṃha by the Hollanders. (Fernao de Queyroz, *The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon*, trsl. by Fr. S. G. Perera, Colombo, 1930, Book VI, p 948).

52. *op, cit.*, p. 230.

and that the palace in Kandy[53] was being repaired and a new palace was being constructed adjacent to the old. All this, it was said, was in connection with the impending presentation of a prince before the people and the girding on of "the golden side-arms" (sword). Though there was no follow-up of these arrangements on account of the king's illness, as well as the outbreak of an epidemic disease, and certain other developments, the information is interesting for several reasons. The significance of the palace in the investiture ceremonies of rulers is well brought out. So also is the element of festivity and the national character of the event fore-shadowed in the summons to chiefs, soldiers, drummers, dancers and labourers. The sword of state is described as being of gold, thus confirming the statements in traditional accounts.[54]

The development of events relevant to our present concerns is next encountered in December 1687. On the 9th December Governor Pijl received a secret and express latter from the Ganebandāra. Its contents as set out by the Gavernor in his letter of 11th December 1687 to the Special Commissioner Van Reede Tot Drakesteyn are given below word for word on account of their importance.

> "On the 6th of this month at 2 in the morning the king finding himself to be very ill and weak caused all his chiefs to be summoned before him and pointed out to them that since they had many times insisted before him that he should name a successor in his kingdom for them, so that after his death they could acknowledge that person as such, he had therefore thought it appropriate to show him to them. Thereupon, having got the prince Mahastane to come before him, His Majesty had girded the sword round him (i. e. with the sword strap) and with that presented him before his chiefs as successor. Thereafter, that very morning at 8·00 a.m. the king had given up the ghost."[55]

53. In later years, Rājasiṃha had resided mostly in his palace at Hanguranketa (a few miles from Kandy) and went to the chief city only for certain ceremonial occasions, if at all; hence the pa ace and other related buildings might have required repairs. But it is apparent also that new structures were required for a royal consecration not only from the information received by the Dutch in 1686 but also on account of a requirement mentioned in the *Cūlavaṃsa* account of the preparations for the *abhiseka* of Vijayabāhu I (1055-1110) where it is stated: "since for the festival of the royal consecration a *pāsāda* (palace) and many other things had to be prepared...." *Cv.* Pt. I, Ch. 59, *v.* 2).

The symbolic significance attached to the palace comes out very clearly from many references in the chronicles and other literature. e. g. The *Cūlavaṃsa* after an elaborate description of the palace of Parākramabāhu I refers to it thus: "This splendid palace, like a matchless structure of Vissakamma (architect of the gods) charming and peerles, he, the first among protectors of the earth, built and gave it the name of Vijayanta (city of the gods) (*Cv.*, Pt. II, Ch. 73, *v.* 70). *cf.* also *Cv.* Pt. I, Ch. 68, *vv.* 41-42; the Pāpiliyāna Slab Inscription of Parākramabāhu VI (1412-1466) in *Kōtte Rājadhāniya* by W. A. F. Dharmawardena, Colombo, 1925, p. 12.)

54. For all the above information, see Extract from the *Dagh-register* of Colombo, K. A. 1309 fos. 533-34.

55. K. A. 1322 fos. 118-19.

This account is significant and important for several reasons, some of which are pertinent here. The insistent requests of the chiefs mentioned by Rājasimha show an aspect of the close relationship between him and the chiefs. It also indicates the importance of the king's nomination of a successor and the right which the king had in that respect. It is possible that there might usually have been an implication that the chief's approval of the king's nomination was a factor of some consequence. But Rājasimha seems to have been so beloved and respected by them at this period that no such implication would have been spoken of. If there was any ceremony associated with the king's tying of the sword, it has not been mentioned as not being relevant to the communication to Pijl[56] and anything elaborate is unlikely to have taken place in view of the suddenness of the occasion and the king's illness. The nature of the communication was such that one cannot expect the Rev. Medhaṅkara to refer to the king's paying obeisance to his son. That sort of information seems to have been considered as not to be divulged to outsiders. It is important also to note that under emergency conditions hardly any attention seems to have been paid to the selection of an auspicious time for investing the new king with authority.

Though the Ganebandāra had conveyed so much information to Pijl as a token of the friendship which had developed between them, the conventional position was set out by the official embassy that came on the 10th December to the Governor. The ambassadors stated that they had been sent by the young king to inform the Governor that "the old king had tied the sword round him and handed over his kingdom and the throne to rule his lands and subjects in his stead and that the Honourable Company and in particular the *Heer Gouverneur* Pijl could expect no less favours from him than they had enjoyed from the old king."[57] Though the ambassadors said that the old king was very ill, they did not indicate in any way that he was dead. The Governor kept up the pretence and ordered all the cannon to be fired and also volleys of muskets to celebrate the news of the accession. In connection with the convention kept up by the ambassadors, we are reminded of Quaritch Wales's remarks relating to the custom in Thailand (and many other Asian countries): "The coronation of the king took place during the period of mourning and this led to the strange procedure of suspending the mourning regulations for a time so that people could celebrate."[58]

56. But see below for the communication from the Embassy which arrived in Colombo on the 10th December, and which gives such information.

57. K. A. 1322 f. 119.

58. *Siamese State Ceremonies*, p 143. It would appear that in Kandy during the period of mourning there were no festivities as such, but only the solemnities associated with the new king receiving the homage of the people. See Davy. *op. cit.*, pp. 120-21. Davy also noted the tradition that the death of the king was announced only after the new king had been installed. The idea apparently was not to leave room for doubt and intrigue by having an interregnum. In fact, it is explicitly stated in the *Mandārampura Puvata* (*vv.* 596-616) that to prevent such intrigue the Chief Minister disclosed the death of Sri Vijaya Rājasiṃha (1739 – 1747) only after obtaining the agreement of the notables regarding the succession.

The ambassadors further informed Pijl that from that day (10th December) an unlucky period had commenced which would not end before January during which time nothing special would be undertaken and therefore no further embassy could be expected before its expiry. After that period the young king would get married and he would acquire a royal title. Moreover, they advised Pijl not to send any embassy to the young king before that event as it would not be received.[59]

When we ponder on the ambassadors' emphasis on the unlucky period and more especially on the request that no embassy should be sent during that time, we are reminded of Hocart's observations in his *Kingship*[60] to the effect that on such sacrosanct occasions "strangers, sinners, women and children are kept away and are not allowed to know anything." The Dutch would fall at least into the first category. The statement that after the unlucky period, the young king would get married and acquire a royal title, suggests a ceremony that would complete or round off the process of investiture. Hocart noticed the custom of consecrating the queen along with the king and Quaritch Wales touched on the symbolic significance of the investiture of a queen along with the king. In the history of Sri Lanka literary as well as inscriptional evidence have indicated the importance of consecrating a queen, it being held as an invariable rule that no one could inherit thc kingdom unless he were begotten of a consecrated queen.[61]

It may be noted that when the ambassadors told the Governor that no further embassy could be expected from Kandy until the unlucky period was over, they were undoubtedly relying on past usage. But there was some departure from custom (for reasons unknown) because on the 15th of the month – two days after the previous ambassadors had left – an even more prestigious embassy headed by the Chief Secretary of the State, Divākara Mohotti, arrived to announce on behalf of the new king the death and cremation of the old king, Rājasimha.[62] They also mentioned that the entire kingdom was mourning. It may be noted as significant that the old king's cremation seems to have taken place well within a week of his death, differing in that respect very considerably from the usages in Thailand and other regions of Southeast Asia, where Buddhist kingdoms existed.[63]

59. *K. A.* 1322 f. 119.

60. A. M. Hocart, *Kingship*, London, 1927, Ch. VII cited in Quaritch Wales, *op. cit.*, p. 124

61. As we have already indicated (*cf.* note 15 above) Rājasimha's grand-son, the new king's son, who succeeded him at his death in 1707, had a son from a junior or inferior queen, but that prince was held not entitled to the throne and accordingly, a foreigner, the brother of the King's consecrated queen was chosen as the successor. This may perhaps have been considered a natural return to succession through the female line. (cf. Appendix)

62. Though the exact number of days that elapsed are not quite unambiguously indicated, the *Mandaranpura Puvata* also indicates that the funeral was held very soon after the new king's investiture (*vv.* 526–27).

63. An early cremation would certainly have been called for if Davy was recalling a correct tradition—as appears probable—when he says (*op. cit.* p. 121) "Till the body of the deceased monarch was consumed (by fire) it was contrary to custom for the prince (king-elect) to take any refreshment."

Divākara also suggested that it would be a good thing if the Governor were to send an embassy to the king to convey condolences on the death of the old monarch, his father, and to congratulate him on his being acclaimed and crowned as Emperor of this Island. But he advised that since the period of mourning over the death of his most illustrious father was not yet over and because His Majesty had not, therefore, yet ascended the throne nor taken his imperial title, the Company should not address any letter to the king until those things were done. When Pijl pointed out that it was the custom amongst all princes and potentates in Europe to send a letter of credentials with any ambassador who was being sent to another court, Divākara said that he and his fellow-ambassadors would be the living credentials for the intended Dutch ambassador as they had heard and seen all about the proposed embassy from the Governor himself. This position Pijl was constrained to accept.[64]

Let us now consider the nature and significance of some of the statements made by Divākara Mohotti. First we note that although the cremation of the late king had been performed, the period of mourning had not ended. Second, we notice once again that by the girding on of the golden sword, the necessary ceremonies for the consecration of a king had not been completed. We further gather from Divākara that the ceremonial throne would also be used only with and after the proposed consecration. The reason why the desirability of sending an embassy at this stage was put to Pijl may be guessed from subsequent events. The next occasion when the green light for a Dutch embassy was given was only in July. The Court must have thought that in the interests of good relations it might be best to depart somewhat from customary usage and therefore allow an embassy towards the very beginning of the coming year (apparently as soon as the period of mourning was ended). Thereby the interruption of formal diplomatic relations that would be required – according to customary usage – during the consecration ceremonies and the festivals that followed, would be kept to a minimum.

It was undoubtedly because the prelude to the consecration ceremonies, those ceremonies themselves, as well as the festivities which followed, were all considered to be, in general, intimate and sacramental in nature, and properly pertaining to the king and his people alone, that the Dutch were not merely not invited or welcomed to them but also kept in the dark regarding them as far as possible.[65] Only towards the middle of July 1688 were they formally informed that two months prior to that His Majesty had been "acclaimed and confirmed as lawful Emperor of this far-famed Island of Ceylon" and that "it had pleased His Majesty to take the imperial title of Vimaladaham-Sūriya Maharaja."[66]

64. *Sri Lanka National Archives* 1/30 f. 54.

65. There are indications, however, that in the mid-eighteenth century the Dutch were not completely excluded from making an appearance during part of the consecration period.

66 *Sri Lanka Na ional Archives* 1/30 f. 114.

That the consecration ceremonies in May had completed the necessary conditions for the king to be accepted as a full-fledged ruler is further attested by an unequivocal phrase used in the instructions for the Dutch ambassador who was to be sent to congratulate the king. Governor and Council say that they had been informed of "His Majesty's definitive investiture upon the throne."[67] After the enthronement ceremonies in May there had followed a period of festivities which had also been considered to be of a special nature such that outsiders like the Dutch were excluded from participation. These festivities are referred to in the proclamation of Pijl and Council intimating to the inhabitants of Dutch territory the news of the acclamation of the king as Emperor and of his assuming the title Vimaladaham-Sūriya. The relevant section reads: "Whereover, within the great and famous city of Kandy an extraordinary joy has been displayed, with feasting and in other ways...."[68]

Although we have attempted to draw attention to the significance and importance of various events and ideas as the story unfolded itself in the documents, it may be worthwhile by way of conclusion to refer very briefly to a few matters that are particulary striking, and elaborate on one or two others with the aid of some dependable but neglected traditional sources.

The extent to which the ancient traditions were being maintained and the extent to which the indigenous tradition as preserved in chronicles and the memories of people is found to be accurate are two of the striking things that emerge. We find, for instance, that despite all his ambitions and desire for glory, Rājasiṃha does not go through a ceremony to which he feels he is not entitled. This was very likely due to the strength of tradition. But one cannot help wondering whether strength of character

67. "*absolute aenstelling op den troon*", *Sri Lanka National Archives* 1/30 f. 119.

68. *Ibid.*, f. 114. Note that this phraseology glorifying the city of Kandy would undoubtedly have been taken from a communication emanating from Kandy. The language of many traditional documents draws arresting attention to the symbolism that was associated with the capital. In the *Cūlavaṃsa*. for example, we find: "the town of Pulatthinagara - comparable to the city of Indra.... surpassed Mithilā, subdued Kāncipuri, laughed to scorn Sāvatthi, subdued Mathurā, turned to shame Bārānasi reduced Vesāli to nothing and made Campāpuri tremble with her glory." (Cv., Pt. II, Ch. 88, *v*, 121); in the *Mandārampura Puvata* (v. 259), the city of Kandy in Senarat's time is likened to the city of the gods; and the *Rājasiha Haṭana* has expressions such as: "the illustrious and auspicious city of Senkaḍagala" (i. e. Kandy) (*v*. 229) and "the famous fortunate city named Senkaḍagala" (*v*. 434). The rite of *pradakṣinā* of the city and certain other symbolisms are also indicated in this description from the *Cūlavaṃsa* relating to king Kirtisri Rājasiṃha's (1747-1782) *abhiṣeka*: "Then he gathered together the whole of the inhabitants of Lanka completely in the fair, glorious city and moving along with royal magnificence, the Great King whose merit was now having its effect, marched round the city, his right side turned towards it, thus making known that the realm of Lankā bereft of its king had again a king." (Cv. Pt. II Ch. 99 vv. 9 - 10. The word "town" in the translation was substituted by "city" to fit the context). In view of what we have so far seen, we may draw attention to Tambiah's references (largely in relation to the pre-19th century Southeast Asian Kingdoms) to the "totalizing conception" of the "king, his palace, his capital" as the "pivots and embodiments of the kingdom" (*op. cit.*, p. 115).

was not also a factor.[69] The fact that Rājasiṃha should have paid obeisance to his son after he had installed the latter as the ruler would point to the greater significance which was attached to the institution of kingship rather than to the person of the king. Even if one has any lingering doubts as to whether the king did pay homage in that fashion on account of his illness, the theoretical position that has been set down justifies our conclusion.

Whilst the information regarding consecration ceremonies indicates the various types or degrees of consecration that probably existed, it also shows that in Sri Lanka at this time the girding on of the sword of state alone was not adequate to make a ruler a full-fledged king. In these ceremonies, we notice also the importance of certain elements which have been considered significant for kingship in other countries of Asia where Hindu-Buddhist ideologies have operated. Thus we see the significance of the palace and the city, the sword, the crown, the throne and the royal title and last, but not least, of a consecrated queen.

We have also seen the importance attached to virtuous conduct in a *cakravarti* ruler. But in point of fact every ruler, whether a *cakravarti* or not, was expected to rule righteously according to the *dasarājadharma* of Buddhist political ideology. Thus the consecration ceremonies of a ruler contained one stage that emphasised the conditional nature of kingship; namely, that it was conditional on a righteous or just rule. This is specifically explained in the mid-eighteenth century document, the *Lak Raja Lo Sirita* which presents an ancient model of the *abhiṣeka*, first set down in detail (as far as we know) in the 12th century, as the one that had been always followed up to that time.[70] The *Mandārampura Puvata* which represents a rather popular type of literary tradition as against the more scholarly tradition referred to by the previous work, has none-the-less the same concept of conditional rule in the words: *"piligena lak rajaya vidhi lesa givisamina."*[71]

The way in which all classes of people were summoned and brought to the capital for the consecration ceremonies and associated festivities whilst outsiders like the Dutch were to be excluded from them[72] gives us

69. See note 19 above for Kassapa II who had attained *cakravarti* power but (for some unexplained reason) did not wear the crown. We have also noticed in note 41 another ruler Mahinda I (724 – 27), who in the plenitude of power did not even undergo *abhiṣeka* but administered the kingdnm only as Ādipāda or Prince; on account of his sorrow at the untimely death of his dearest friend. There had been thus occasions when even the immense political advantage of *abhiṣeka* had been eschewed for very personal and sentimental reasons.

70. *The Lak Raja Lō Sirita* refers to the *Mahāvaṃsa* as the authority, but on investigation one finds that it is the *Mahāvaṃsa Ṭikā* or Commentary called the *Vaṃsatthappakāsini* that is the real source for the main details of the ceremony. Incidentally, the *Lak Raja Lō Sirita* reference brings home to us how intimately the Commentary was linked with the *Mahāvaṃsa* itself. *Vaṃsatthappakāsini*, ed. G. P. Malalasekera, London, 1935, pp. 305 – 07, University of Ceylon, *History of Ceylon* Vol. I pt. 1, p. 230

71. "Accepting the government of Lanka whilst (at the same time) giving the appropriate pledge". (verse 527).

72. But see note 65.

some idea of the sense of communion that must have been engendered amongst the people of the kingdom. We can obtain a fuller and clearer appreciation, however, if we fill in the skeleton of information in the Dutch documents we have already considered with the body of knowledge that can be obtained from traditional sources.

It increases our understanding of the situation when we find with the aid of those sources that, for instance, the psychological impact of *abhiseka* ceremonies in creating both awe and affection in the minds of the people towards the ruler had been well understood since ancient times in Sri Lanka. This is very pertinently brought out in the appeal of the great dignitaries of state to Parākramabāhu I (1153–1186) made at a time when his power had not yet been properly established. The *Cūlavaṃsa*[73] has it thus:

> "Now the great dignitaries who were of great wisdom, came together and with clasped hands begged of the Monarch the (holding of the) king's consecration: 'Former kings, O Great King, have when they were victorious, in order to increase by every means the fear and affection of their subjects and to show forth everywhere their own abundance of glory, performed the king's consecration, even while they were still at the seat of war. A ruler fully equipped with political wisdom and self-discipline, must ever pay heed to the keeping up of good anci nt custom···· hence on a favourable day must be performed the king's consecration which must of necessity bring happiness to the whole world'."

Political purposes (though not always kept in view so consciously) were thus tied up, in the consecration of kings, with ancient custom and ritual as well as with the *bodhisattva* ideal of the king as a cosmic force for welfare.

Let us now consider how all classes of the people – in varying degrees and capacities no doubt – were associated in the *abhiseka* cermonies and the festivities that accompanied them. At the anointing ceremony (the *abhiseka* in its original sense) itself three groups of society were represented. In turn, a maiden from the royal clan, representing the *kṣatriyas*, a Brahman, and a *setthi* or merchant, representing the *vaisyas* (or the ordinary people), poured the sacred water of consecration on the king's head at the ceremony. Meanwhile, another group the *saṅgha*, which was held in reverence by all sections of society, chanted *pirit* to invoke blessings and ward off evil during this ceremony[74]. They, along with many other groups of society participated in the funeral obsequies of the late king which of necessity had to be held in between the ceremonies of induction of the

73· Pt. I, Ch. 71, *vv.* 19–26.

74· For the above *cf. Lak Raja Lō Sirita* and the *Mandārampura Puvata vv.* 523 and 615. It has to be noted that the *Govigama* caste (to which the majority of the population belonged and whose main occupation was agriculture) was considered to be *vaisya*. (cf University of Ceylon, *History of Ceylon*, Vol. I pt. I. p. 230

king into the government of the country on the one hand and his completion of the further ritual ceremonies of consecration on the other. The *saṅgha* and its affairs, it may be noted, received the most prompt and solicitous attention of the new king some of his first benefactions being invariably to the order of monks. These actions would in turn endear the king all the more to the people. The ritual processions in which the king played the leading role, furthermore, provided an opportunity for a variety of groups to play a part too. Not only courtiers and other high-ranking persons but also large numbers of lesser persons such as soldiers, singers, dancers, drummers and other musicians, played an important role. In addition martial displays, feats of skill and acrobatics, tournaments and competitions of various types and display of talent in music and dance were all held over a period of many days.[75] The sense of belonging which came to all these participants in the ceremonies and festivities must have been shared by the crowds of spectators that flocked to the capital city. In fact, we see the total involvement of all the people – in a metaphorical sense no doubt – explicitly mentioned with regard to the *abhiṣeka* of an eighteenth century Kandyan ruler when it is said that the king "gathered together the whole of the inhabitants of Lanka completely" into Kandy for his *abhiṣeka*.[76]

We had noticed earlier that the king's marriage ceremony and the consecration ceremonies were intimately connected with each other. The marriage festivities were another means of binding king and people together particularly on account of certain extraordinary features of these festivities which we can piece together from certain extant sources. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Davy stated[77] that, according to the information which he had been able to obtain from knowledgable persons regarding the Kandyan kingdom, there was an "unusual exchange of civilities, and an extraordinary relaxation of court-discipline" as between the king and his chiefs during these festivities, which were spread over a number of days. Amongst these were two grand dinners, the second of which concluded the marriage festivities. These repasts[78] were given at the palace by the king to the chiefs and their ladies, the king presiding in mirthful mood at the men's dinner and the queen at the women's. After dinner, on each occasion, was the variety entertainment provided by drummers and other musicians, singers and dancers, both male and female, (all of whom would already have partaken of a rich dinner at the king's expense).

75. For a vivid description see the *Mandārampura Puvata*, vv. 522 and 530 – 31.

76. *cf* note 68.

77. *op. cit*, p. 31

78. Now the significance of the news received by the Dutch: "Whereover, within the great and famous city of Kandy an extraordinary joy has been displayed, *with feasting* and in other ways", can be properly appreciated. (Italics mine). See page 22.

The eighteenth-century *Mandārampura Puvata*, however indicates that the dinners given by the king were even more elaborate and wide-ranging than Davy had realised. In the course of describing the consecration ceremonies and festivities associated with the *abhiseka* of Sri Vijaya Rājasimha (1739–1747) it says that the king caused alms to be given to the *saṅgha* and delicious food to be given to people from all divisions of the kingdom (*säma rata danan hata devamin rasa bojunā.*)[79] Apart from the two main state dinners already mentioned, there were thus in all probability a series of dinners for people from the respective divisions of the country. It is likely also that each such division in a spirit of friendly competition with others proudly presented performances or displays of such activities as the martial arts, feats of skill, music, dance and song (on the apportioned day) as tokens of their affection and of their homage.

We have noticed from the evidence of the Dutch records that a period of at least two months was spent in the consecration ceremonies and connected festivities (doubtless with appropriate pauses for other work) after the accession of Rājasimha's son as king. Most of this period appears to have been spent in the manner indicated above. We also know from Davy and from other tradition that certain other activities would also have taken place during this period, such as participation in Buddhist worship, exchange of gifts between the king and his chiefs and the offering of *dākum* or token expressions of affection and of fealty made by chief as well as commoner when presented before the king.[80] We see how in all these ways, religion and ritual, mundane mirth and pleasantry, the aura of kingship bordering on the divine on the one hand and the warm humanness of the king on the other, combined together to produce during this period a communion between king and people which must have been uniquely close and strong. It was this kind of communion that was thought of when Coomaraswamy quoted the *Mahāvaṃsa* regarding rulers who "made themselves one with the religion and the people."[81]

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79. *op. cit. v.* 529

80. *Ibid., vv.* 522 ff. *passim*; Davy *op. cit.*, pp. 31 ff.

81. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy in *Mediaeval Sinhalese Art*, 2nd revised ed. New York, 1956, p. 13. We have at the same time to keep in mind the fact that an unpopular accession to the throne or manifest incompetence and unjust rule could easily negate or dissipate the magic of *abhiseka*.

Incidentally, the various elements which we have noticed linking king and people on the religious and ritual planes is just the kind of evdence regarding "unifying ideological glue" which Frykenberg has failed to see in pre-modern Indian history. (cf. Robert Eric Frykenberg, "Company Circari in the Carnatic c 1799 – 1859: The Inner Logic of Political Systems in India" in *Realm and Region in Traditional India* ed. Richard G. Fox, New Delhi 1977, p. 125.

APPENDIX

The "Sons" of King Senarat and their "Rights"

Whether Rājasiṃha was Senarat's youngest son or his only son (the other two being sons of his half-brother or first cousin the late King Vimaladharmasūriya I) is still a matter of some controversy. The question of the relationship of the princes to Senarat is pertinent if it could be successfully argued either that the other two princes being elder had a greater right to the throne irrespective of other considerations, or that they being the sons of an elder brother and the previous king (Vimaladharmasūriya) had legitimate precedence in the matter of succession over Senarat's own son. If either of these could be proved, then some of Rājasiṃha's later conduct, – particularly regarding his not undergoing a particular type of coronation ceremony, – could conceivably be ascribed to a consciousness of his not being a legitimate ruler – at least up to a certain period of time.

C. R. de Silva has argued[1] that all three were sons of Senarat. In a personal communication he has drawn further attention to the evidence in the Treaty of 1634 between Senarat and the Portuguese wherein the princes are all referred to as sons of Senarat, as well as to the evidence in the statements of two prominent Portuguese about nine years earlier to the same effect.[2]

On the other hand, however, two important traditional sources, the *Rājāvaliya* and the *Cūlavaṃsa*, give the opposite view.[3] Moreover, the information relating to the respective ages of Rājasiṃha and Vijayapāla given by the Dutchman, W. J. Coster, who visited the court of Kandy in 1638, supports the traditional view. The ages are reckoned as 28 and 40 years respectively.[4]

The question arises as to whether a confusion could have arisen from the Sinhalese custom and tradition of calling brothers' children also as sons. That this could have been the case is strikingly indicated by the evidence of the *Cūlavaṃsa* itself where it is stated: "when his (Senarat's) sons *namely the sons of the former king and his own* son, were grown up he...

1. *The Portuguese in Ceylon, 1617 – 1638* (Colombo 1972) p. 13 n. 33

2. His citations are *The Ceylon Literary Register*, 3rd Series, Vol. III (1934) p. 293, the copy of the treaty in the *Diario do 3º Conde de Linhares*, p. 66 and *Biblioteca da Ajuda*, 51 – VIII – 40 f. 216 and f. 220 v.)

3. *The Rājāvaliya or A Historical Narrative of Sinhalese Kings from Vijaya to Vimala Dharma Suriya II*, Transl. by B. Gunasekera (Colombo 1900, Reprint 1954) p. 86; *The Cūlavaṃsa Being the more recent Part of the Mahavaṃsa*, Ed. and transl. by W. Geiger, Pt. II (Colombo 1953) Ch. 95 vv. 19 – 24.

4. *cf.* K. W. Goonewardena, *The Foundation of Dutch Power in Ceylon, 1638 – 1658*, (Amsterdam 1958) p. 11.

was minded to divide amongst them his mountain-girt provinces."[5] If almost as an afterthought, the *Cūlavamsa* had not given this explanation,, but stuck to general usage of the term 'sons', the distinction would have been almost impossible to discover.

Nevertheless, on account of several other reasons, the issue cannot still be considered as settled. In fact, the weight of opinion appears to tilt against the two chronicles mentioned.[6] The tradition mentioned in the *Cūlavamsa* that lots were drawn in dividing up the kingdom between these princes, could suggest that the other two princes might have possessed a better claim to the core kingdom, and, with it, the position of heir-apparent which fell to Rājasimha – if norms of succession had been followed. Against this, it could be argued either that Senarat had not wished to make a distinction as the princes were all born of the same mother, Kusumāsana Devì, (referred to in the Portuguese documents as Dona Catharina) and thus thought of drawing lots, or that the tradition of the drawing of lots was the result of a latter-day misunderstanding of a ceremony at the Temple of the Tooth Relic. This second possibility is strongly suggested by the fact that some other traditional sources such as the *Rājasiha Hatana*[7] (a very dependable work, which appears to have been compiled during the early part of Rājasimha's reign) speak only of a division of the kingdom amongst the three princes without any reference to the drawing of lots.

We have to consider also the evidence in Prince Vijayapāla's letters to the Dutch and to the Viceroy in Goa in 1642 and 1643 in which he refers to all three princes as brothers and states that Rājasimha had usurped the position due to him.[8] Vijayāpala's letters contained false statements on several other matters and as he was trying to suggest that Rājasimha had usurped his due as an elder brother, his information could be considered rather suspect. But then Rājasimha himself in his letters has referred to Vijayapāla (and Kumārasimha too) as a brother.[9] Moreover, a Dutchman, M.M. Boschouwer, who was in Sri Lanka and who appears to have had somewhat close contact with Senarat around 1612–15, has left behind information supporting the view that the princes were all sons of Senarat.[10] Though Boschouwer's testimony on several other matters can be justifiably discounted, we need not do so in this case as he had no palpable stake in it to motivate him to give false information.

5. Italics mine. *Cūlavamsa* Pt. II Ch. 95 vv. 19 – 20

6. The position regarding this question taken up in Goonewardena, *op. cit.* pp. 9 – 13, is thus revised.

7. Ed. H. M. Somaratne (Kandy 1966) vv. 61 – 65.

8. Letter sent to Arent Gardenijs in October 1642, K. A. 1052 f. 47 – 48; Vijayapala to Viceroy, 1st May 1643 in P. E. Pieris, *The Prince Vijayapala of Ceylon, 1634 – 1654.* (Colombo 1927) p. 29.

9. D. W. Ferguson, "Cortespondence between Raja Sinha II and the Dutch", *Journal of the Ceylon Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* Vol. XVIII No. 55 (1904) p. 226.

10. *cf.* Philippus Baldaeus, *Beschrijvinge van het Machtige Eijland Ceijlon* in *Naauwkeurige Beschrijvinge van Malabar en···Ceijlon,* (Amsterdam 1672) p. 31.

When we now turn to the terms of the Treaty of 1634 (as drafted in 1632–33)[11] we find that part of the first clause read as follows: "Firstly, that the Kingdom of Candea (Kandy) is divided among the three kings, sons of the Queen Dona Catharina–lawful heir of those realms of Candea whose heirs they are: and they already have the lands distributed by the king their father which they willingly accepted...." Here we notice that the stress was on the descent from Kusumāsana Devi whom the Portuguese had accepted as the legitimate heir towards the end of the sixteenth century. At the same time the princes are also described as the sons of the king who had distributed the lands amongst them. The relationship between Senarat and the princes is given in a clearer and more categorical manner, however, in a draft of the much earlier Treaty of 1617.[12] It was stated: "Firstly, considering that Sera, [*sic.* for Senarat] King of Candea, is married to the Queen Dona Catharina, lawful queen of the realms of Candea, *and has by the said queen three sons,* the same shall succeed him on the throne according to their customs...". The words indicated in italics,[12a] taken in conjunction with other supporting evidence, should under normal circumstances leave no doubt as to the fact that all three princes were sons of Senarat. But the *Cūlvaṃsa* phraseology "his sons, namely the sons of the former king and his own son" should make us somewhat cautious. It might be best to conclude that they were not certainly, but most probably, all sons of Senarat, and none of Vimaladharmasuriya.

It is possible also that we might be attaching too much significance to the paternal descent of the princes. The emphasis on the regal rights derived through the queen which we have noticed probably stems from yet another factor besides the full recognition of Kusumāsana Devi's rights by the Portuguese. This factor was the recognition of succession through the female line which, Paranavitana says, seems to have been adopted from the time of the Gampola dynasty onwards.[13] According to this form of succession the queen's brother or brother's son would be the logical successor. However, as neither Kusamāsana Devi nor her successors as Senarat's queens had any such brothers or male relatives closer than the three princes, no complication arises even if the theory of succession was through the female line.

We now find that we have not conclusively solved the problems we started with. Though the weight of evidence points very strongly towards the princes being all sons of Senarat, we cannot be absolutely certain. On

11. *cf.* S. G. Perera, "The Last Treaty of Peace between the King of Kandy and the Portuguese, 1633" in *Ceylon Literary Register*, 3rd Series. Vol. III No. 7 (Colombo, 1934) p. 293.

12. *cf.* S. G. Perera, "The First Treaty of Peace between the Portuguese and the King of Kandy, 1617" in *Ceylon Literary Register*, 3rd Series. Vol. II No. 12 (Colombo, 1932) p. 537. See also Vol. III No. 4 (1932–33) pp. 155 and 163.

12*a* Italics mine.

13. University of Ceylon, *History of Ceylon*, Vol. I Pt. II (Colombo 1960) p. 731. See also *ibid* p. 662; See the *Rajasiha Hatana* vv. 34–35 for a striking eulogy of the descent of Kusumāsana Devi.

the other hand, we have discovered that the legitimacy of rule in respect of all the princes was very strongly stressed on the basis of Kusumāsana Devi's rights and hardly on that of Senarat's. In the circumstances, we could approach the question of the legitimacy or otherwise of Rājasimha's claims to the throne purely from the angle of seniority. In other words, was custom and tradition violated when the youngest of three princes born of the same queen was given the core kingdom, and the position of heir-apparent to the chief rulership of the entire kingdom?

It does not appear to have been so for several reasons. In the first place, King Senarat is said to have consulted his ministers before allocating the respective portions to the three princes.[14] Furthermore, the *Cūlavamsa* account associates the blessings of the sacred Tooth Relic with the drawing of lots and thus indicates a powerful supportive ritual of legitimacy for the division.[15] Then again, we have already noticed that in the 1632–1633 drafts of the Treaty of 1634 it is categorically stated that "they already have the lands distributed to them by their king their father which they willingly accepted". So the division which was made in 1628 is on record as having been willingly accepted by them. Even more significant is the fact that already in 1632 the Prince Mahaāsthāna, as Rājasimha was then known, was negotiating on behalf of the entire kingdom with the Portuguese. In addition, his status is unequivocally elucidated in the same draft treaty in the following words which occur immediately after the last sentence previously quoted: "And as the kingdom of Candea is the chief of the realms and King Maastana remains their chief..."[16] We also note at the same time that external legitimation was given to these arrangements by their formal recognition by the Portuguese with the signing of the treaty.

The general acceptance of these arrangements by the other brothers, Kumārasimha, King of Uva (the eldest) and Vijayapāla, King of Mātale is further evidence to suggest that there was nothing illegitimate in the division. It is true that the Portuguese were trying their best to create dissension amongst the brothers and one of their documents claims that Kumārasimha tried to cross over to them at about this time.[17] But in all the military engagements against the Portuguese, Kumārasimha – until his death in 1634 – co-operated actively with Rājasimha. Vijayapāla did the same untill 1638 and he had an important share in the great victory over the Portuguese at Gannoruva in that year under Rājasimha's leadership. Shortly after that, however, Vijayapāla fell out with Rājasimha and a brief period of warfare ensued before he took refuge with the Portuguese. In any event with Kumārasimha's death in 1634 and Vijayapāla's death in 1654, there

14. *cf. Rājasiha Hatana* vv. 61 – 65 and the version of the *Parangi Hatana* in P. E. Pieris, *Ribeiro's History of Ceilao* (Colombo 1909)

15. Pt. II Ch. 95 vv. 21 – 24.

16. See note 11 above.

17. See the rather unreliable and confused account in *The Expedition to Uva made in 1630* ... Transl. Fr. S.G. Perera (Colombo 1930) p. 62 ff.

could thereafter have been no legitimate challenge to Rājasimha's authority even if we were to conclude that the two elder brothers had a legitimate claim to the prejudice of the youngest.[18]

In point of fact, in the light of what we have already seen and what we shall further see, at no time do they appear to have had a legitimate case. It is important to note that from the beginning the choice of Rājasimha as the chief ruler out of the three princes and as the heir-apparent, appears to have been acclaimed by the people as a whole–a state of affairs indicated in unmistakable fashion in the chronicles, panegyrics, and folklore.

This brings us to a final point. Ability and general acceptability rather than age-ranking appear to have been decisive criteria accepted in theory, and quite often in practice, in regard to the choice of a successor to the kingship from amongst several sons (or nephews). Less than a century after Rājasimha's reign, the Dutch Governor Falck asked a question that is most pertinent to our present concerns, from sources knowledgable in the customs and traditions of the Kandyan Kingdom. The question was: "Where a king has several sons, is there any rule permitting the installation of a younger prince overlooking the eldest?" The answer written down on the 12th August 1769 was: "Among princes, seniority in age is not a criterion for the kingship. The requirement for kingship is virtue, wisdom and *pin*."[19] The last may be rendered as "manifestation of the effect of accumulated merit" and would be recognized by such things as the excellence of physique and personality and good fortune.

As to which of the three sons of Senarat (or, perhaps, one son and two nephews) best fitted these requisites for kingship, there appears to have been no doubt in the popular mind, as we have already noticed. Even the bitterest enemies of the Kandyan rulers – the Portuguese – appear to have been of the same view in this matter, as one can see reading between the lines and making the necessary allowances for their bias and prejudice. For instance, a contemporary Portuguese who was hostile towards Rājasimha and well-disposed towards Vijayapāla had made this assessment of the princes in the early sixteen-thirties:

> "He of Candea, who is now king, though the youngest (for such is the custom of these people)[20] is a soldier, but sulky, inclined to evil, a great enemy of the Portuguese name.

18. On the above *cf.* Goonewardena, *op. cit.* pp. 16, 38, 58, 62–63.

19. *Lak Raja Lō Sirita*, British Museum OR 6603 (65). (I am indebted to Dr. A. K. Gunasena for copying this manuscript for me.)

20. Note the significance of the words: "for such is the custom of these people." It shows very clearly that Rājasimha's succession to the chief rulership had been acceptable within the kingdom and it was considered to be in accord with custom. The quotes are from S. G. Perera, *Expedition to the Kingdom of Uva····*, p. 34. *cf.* also Fernao Queyroz, *The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon*, Ed. and transl. by S. G. Perera (Colombo 1930) Bk. IV, p. 781.

> He of Matale is a great friend of ours···He is a frivolous young man, very playful, and I consider him a better soldier with the foil than with the common sword. His name is Vijayapala Adacin.
>
> He of Huva (Uva) is called Comari Singa Adacin. He is inclined to sleep by day, [i.e. he is a drunkard, as explained later on] is inconstant and is worth little."

If further evidence regarding Vijayapala's unfitness to succeed Senarat were needed one has to consider his subsequent conduct and pitiful letters. It is pertinent to note that he himself had once said:

> "···Though I am a Chingala [Sinhalese] by blood, I am Portuguese in my ways and my affections; it may well be that this is the chief reason for losing my kingdom···"[21]

As further examples of elder princes being overlooked in favour of more virtuous and intelligent younger princes, we may note first of all that the *Lak Raja Lō Sirita* itself refers by way of example to the *Mahāvaṃsa* account of Mutasiva's second son, Devānampiyatissa, being chosen as king. Then there is the evidence from the reign of Parākramabāhu II where it is shown that a choice was theoretically available in relation to the succession under somewhat similar circumstances. The king deliberated on the choice of a successor from amongst his own sons and his sister's son,[22] and ultimately accepted his advisers' recommendation in favour of his eldest son. That was in the latter part of the thirteenth century. Much closer to the events with which we are now concerned was the case in the fifteen–thirties when an elder brother, Rayigam Bandāra, King of Rayigama, happily accepted the overlordship of his abler younger brother, Māyādunne, King of Sitāvaka, and co-operated with the latter in his wars against their eldest brother, the titular Emperor.[23] In the previous reign Sakalakalāvalla had voluntarity renounced the chief rulership in favour of his younger brother, Vijayabāhu.[24]

Having thus examined what rights each of the three 'sons' of Senarat had to succeed him, we can conclude without hesitation that Rājasiṃha had succeeded him quite legitimately, and that, therefore, the manner in which he ascended the throne in no way adversely affected his entitlement to any *abhiseka* ceremony for which he was otherwise qualified.

21. "Vijayapala to the Viceroy, 1st May 1643" in P. E. Pieris, *The Prince Vijayapāla of Ceylon*, p. 31.
22. Note significance of the nephew being brought into the reckoning. *cf. Cūlavaṃsa* Pt. II Ch 87 vv. 36 ff.
23. *cf. Rājavaliya* p. 67.
24. See p. 11 above.

Wholenatured forms and the Genesis of the Erotic Embrace

> "What, you say that God has both sexes. Trismegistus?" "Yes, Asclepius, and not only God but all beings, animate and vegetable." *Corpus Hermeticum*, II. 20. 21.

When it came to Aristophanes' turn to speak on the subject of Love at the party given by Agathon at his house to celebrate his victory at the dramatic festival of that year,[1] it will be recalled that, whether from surfeit or some other reason, he was suffering from a hiccup. So he asked Eryximachus the doctor to cure him of it or speak in his stead until it ceased. Eryximachus, as we know, did both, and by the time he had himself finished speaking, Aristophanes was rid of the complaint though not until he had recourse to the extreme remedy of one or two good sneezes.[2]

The classic hiccup was to be as fitting a prelude to the great comedian's speech, when it did come, as the trance into which Socrates fell on his way to Agathon's house[3] was to his own account of the transcendental nature of Love. For, in spite of its underlying seriousness and suggestivity, it proved to be a choice sample of Aristophanic surrealism, perhaps even better than anything in the *Birds*. For it consisted of an attempt to express the nature of Love as a protistic sense of vacuity, psychic as much as somatic, which impelled lovers to embrace, by a myth *sub specte aeternatis* which conceptualized men and women as the severed halves of an original race of double-fold beings.

Some of the details of this bizarre myth which Aristophanes narates are embellishments of his own, or, at least, Plato's. But when these are recognized and cleared, the central motif which stands out together with its attendant elements is easily identifiable with the ancient and wide spread mythology of a primal androgynous being from whom all else had their origin.

Aristophanes' immediate and fundamental source is the zoogonical account of the philosopher Empedocles, but the esoteric significance he sees in the myth suggests his awareness of the tradition which goes back to at least the Orphics in their conception of the bisexual god, Phanes. It is more than likely that the Orphics themselves derived it from the East and, judging from the androgynism attributed to Zervan, the Persian god of boundless

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1. Plato *Symposium*; the year 416 B.C.
2. *ibid* 185c – d; 189a.
3. *ibid* 174d – e; 175a (– b).

Time, and of the Ardhanārīśvara Śiva of Hinduism, could well have belonged with the primitive stock of Aryan myth as the most ancient concept of a first being.

Neither Empedocles nor the Orphics, however, seem to have had a clear conception of the configuration of such a being. The resultant vagueness on their part, taken together with the one or two features that are affirmed of it or are, in any case, inferable, suggest that the constituent male and female halves of such a being were in a face-to-face crasis and not joined back-to-back as in the hermaphrodites of Aristophanes' account. In accordance with this, its bisexuality expressed itself, not by two separate sex organs, one male and the other female, but by a single organ which was a composite of the two and which, in our opinion, is represented in Hindu ideology by the Śivaliṅga.

In the context of such mythology, the natural congress of penis and vagina in the erotic embrace was understood as a temporary reconstitution of the original privy member from which they both derived, just as much as the union of the bodies of lovers in that embrace was viewed as an approximation of the configuration of the original totality of which they were viewed as the severed halves. The psychology of Love, which is in keeping with this myth, is that of a primitive, unconscious yet compulsive seeking of the one half of the severed unity for the other-or rather, of each of the halves for their lost unity. Raised to metaphysical heights, as in Tantra, that which is ultimately sought is the unity of the male and female aspects within tne self of the *yogin* himself, in the achievement of which there is reconstituted in him the original perfection of the godhead, which is Śiva – an orgiastic experience attended by divine ecstasy and immortality.

Aristophanes' conception of the androgyne as outward-facing in the two halves which constitute such a being derives from Empedocles, though not from the evidence which describes his equivalent of such beings, whom he calls 'wholenatured', but of the monstrous creatures which he says sprang up on earth in another phase of its zoogonical cycle. Empedocles himself conceived of his wholenatured beings as inward-facing, thus encountering the common difficulty of a clear idea of their appearance. If Aristophanes was not just careless, it may have been this very uncertainty of the configuration of beings in whom the male and female halves were joined face to face which led him to choose to visualize them as he did, even though it necessitated the elaboration of the myth thereafter to bring all the members of the severed halves to face the cut sides. Aristophanes surely had the whole account of Empedocles to go by than just the fragments left to us.

Empedocles drew on the evidence of the androgyne come down in mythology for a purely zoological exposition with little leeway for developing the metaphysical implications of which the concept was capable.

Even so, the primary quality of adhesiveness belonging to love and the language amounting to veneration, with which he talks of Aphrodite, its personification, retain religio-sexual overtones. These are strong, even if occult, in the names of the Orphic Phanes. Thus, when Aristophanes couches his myth of the *Symposium* in terms of a mystery cult of the god of Love based upon the notion of lovers as the sections of original whole-natured beings, he falls back upon a religious and phychological significance of the myth which was present with it in its first appearance in Greece. Orphism is mystical. While this speaks much for a mystical treatment of the myth of the androgynous Phanes, the pratice of secrecy entailed by such religious cults with respect to their *Mustikoi logoi* must account for the paucity of evidence that is met with in regard to the god and the teachings and practices that were associated with him. The little that is revealed of him by the detached and scrappy details that have become public and the cluster of names that has been applied to him appear to be chromosomes of those esoteric features which were developed in Hinduism into the elaborate cult of Śiva.

A review of the *Symposium* myth of Aristophanes in the light of the Greek evidence of Empedocles and the Orphics is surely the best way of finding out how the Greek tradition stood. However early it may have made its way in to Greece-and this may have been as early as the seventh century B.C.-the idea of a bisexual god, idenlified or associated with the World Egg, neither belonged to the regular Homeric theogony nor its body of mythology. It appears with a cosmogony brought into Greece by the Orphics which accomodates itself to the existing account of things by an identification of Phanes with Zeus either by the simple assertion of the fact or by mythopoeic expedient of making Zeus swallow him.[4] A look at the religious cults of the East which have received and given fuller treatment in the course of time to the potentialities of the androgyne myth through artistic expression and metaphysical development may throw some light on the meaning and relevance of some of the features and aspects of the myth which were either not developed at all or were known and lost through the secrecy in which they were held.

Mankind, says Aristophanes,[5] seem never to have comprehended the power of Love. If they had, they would have built temples and altars in his honour and offered the greatest sacrifices. For, of all the gods, he is the best friend men have, the helper and healer of the ills, the curing of which brings the greatest happiness to the human race. He then goes on to an explanation of the original nature of mankind and what it has since suffered, with an account which summarises as follows:

4. Procl. *In Plat. Tim.* 29a and 28c = Kern O. F. 167.
5. *ibid.* 189d - 193d.

The progenitors of mankind were a race of beings who had rounded bodies, their backs and sides forming a circle. They had four hands, four legs and a single head with two faces looking in opposite directions, set upon a round neck and precisely alike; also four ears, two genital organs and everything else to correspond. Those who were called male among these were those who had male organs on both sides, and so with female. But there was a third sex, called androgyne, who had a male organ on one side and a female organ on the other.

At some time (in the past) these beings, incited by their immense strength and ambition, attacked the gods in Heaven. Consequently Zeus and the other gods decided to destroy them outright, as they had the Giants. But afterwards, out of concern for the sacrifice and homage they received from them, Zeus resolved to bisect them down the middle, making two out of each one of them and thus also rendering them weaker than they had been before. As he did this with each one of them, he instructed Apollo to turn their faces towards the cut sides, so that the victims, having the evidence of their bisection before their eyes, might learn to behave better in the future.

Man's original body having been thus cut in two, each half yearned for the other and, when they met, threw their arms about each other and embraced in their longing to grow together again. In this way they kept perishing through hunger and the lack of will to do anything without the other. When a member of a pair died, the other sought and embraced another partner, which might be the half of a female whole (what is now called a woman) or of a male. They were being destroyed in this manner until Zeus, out of pity for them, moved their genitals too to the front. Before this they had them on the outside (i. e. when they embraced each other) and used to emit their seed on the ground like grasshoppers. But now the male generated in the female, so that when a man and woman met and embraced, sexual intercourse took place and the race was perpetuated.

Aristophanes goes on to add that, if, however, male copulated with male, at any rate the desire for sex was satisfied, leaving them to turn to their other activities and the business of life, "so ancient is the desire of one another that is implanted in us, reuniting our original nature, making one out of two, and healing the state of man."

The myth is narrated by Aristophanes in an effort to draw attention to what, in his opinion, is the most impressive quality of Love–its power of attraction. The previous speakers had failed to do justice to this in their discourses; they had merely dwelt on a description of the god and his deeds. In his attempt to make good the deficiency Aristophanes sets out to recount

man's original state and the trauma he has undergone which has given rise to the desire called sex. But he does so, not by means of a scientific anthropology, using the language of rational discourse *(Logos)*, but by means of *muthos* which seeks to convey the truth of the experience itself within its native context. It is of the intimate feeling of individual inadequacy, primitive, irrational and compulsive, which sends lovers in pursuit of each other and of the supreme joy they experience when in each other's arms.

The myth itself is treated with typical Aristophanic mock-seriousness. He is obviously fascinated by his own imagination of the double-fold human beings and the grotesqueness of their movement, so that, despite his confession of seriousness, he narrates the story with a great deal of relish.[6]

The description of their bisection by Zeus, the humourous detail of the knotting of skin at their stomachs to form the navel, and some of the other stuff as well are Aristophanes' own invention. One or two of the other details he derives from Empedocles, from whom also, as mentioned before, he derives the central motif of the myth. The resultant story Aristophanes proffers as a foundation myth for a mystery cult of the god of Love, which holds out to its adherents the recovery of the state of bliss which mankind lost through its original sin, which consists of the permanent union of the severed halves, pretending, at the same time, to be its prophet and high priest, and his audience, to whom he vouchsafes the mysteries of Love, its first initiates, who are in turn to teach it to other men.[7]

It is unlikely that the original metaphysical concern of the myth went beyond that of deriving the innate desire of male and female for each other, the nature of their union in sexual congress, and the ecstasy experienced in the act. The extension of it to cover male homosexuality and, incidentally, Lesbianism, by the introduction of two sorts of whole-natured begings other than the androgyne (i. e. those male in both halves, *andreia hola*, and female in both halves, *guneia hola*, together with all the consequential details, are Aristophanes' own contribution in deference to the particular interests of his fellow revellers at the symposium and of the Greeks of the classical age in general, among whom homosexual love was not only accepted but, in elite circles, viewed as the nobler sort. Socrates himself adopts it in its 'Platonic' form; but the fact that Aristophanes acquiesces to its carnal extension as well, for which Pausanias, speaking earlier on,[8] had cleverly pleaded but which Socrates rejected, if not in

6. *ibid.* 195b and 193d – e; but see 189b – c and the quality of the narrative.
7. *ibid.* 189d in the light of the religious myth pattern, of the state of preexistence, sin and fall, recovery of lost state of bliss. See also 193c – d.
8. *ibid.* 180c – 185c.

words, by his conduct as described by Alcibiades,[9] is sufficient to show that the doctrine of the myth here expresses Aristophanes' view and not Plato's.[10]

The feature of the offence which these first human beings committed and what it was that prompted them to it Aristophanes borrows from the indigenous myth of the Giants with the blithe observation that "Homer's story of Ephialtes and Otus attempting to climb up to Heaven and set upon the gods is narrated of these beings also." Likewise, Zeus and the other gods, he says, first thought of destroying them with thunderbolts "as they had the Giants." Androgynes do not appear to have figured in the traditional body of Greek mythology. The Orphics brought Phanes into the picture together with their religio-cosmogonical account by the identification of the bisexual god with Zeus. Now we have Aristophanes' blatant effort to enlist this obviously non-Greek mythological concept as a Greek one by couching it in the details of its nearest Greek parallel, the myth of the earth-born Giants, the race of humans who preceded men and suffered destruction at the hands of the gods for an offence which arose out of a quality which the androgyne could have been imagined to have in common with them, viz. superhuman strength.

All this goes to show that Aristophanes was ignorant of the original mythological circumstances of the primal bisexual being, including a reason for the bisection which it underwent. His derivation of the all-male from the sun, the all-female from the earth and the androgyne from the moon (since it partakes of the male nature of the sun and the female nature of the earth), is hocus-pocus of a different sort, drawn from Greek folklore and meant to give a cosmological and atavistic air to his story. The rotary and revolutionary movements of these astral bodies, together with the hoop-like method of progression of the wholenatured beings, their offspring, when they moved at speed, he borrows from Empedocles,[11] who is also his immediate source for the whole idea of these beings itself. On the other hand, the possibilities of a mystical treatment of the myth of the androgyne, together with the single quaint detail of the interim location of the genital organs of human beings at their rumps before they were brought round to the front by Zeus, Aristophanes owes to the Orphics. This last, as we shall see, is a misapplication by him of the evidence of the bisexual privy member of the god Phanes to the differentiated sex organs of male and female, which, if anything, are proliferations of the halves of it.

But what is the nature of the residual material when all this is brushed aside? Is it not simply the evidence of a primeval bisexual being (or beings) who split, or was split, asunder to give us the forms of man and woman

9. *ibid.* 217a – 219e.

10. Plato's own view of Love must be that which he puts forward through Socrates (199d – 212c), which pointedly combats the notion of it as being a seeking after the other half of oneself' (205d – e).

11. *frr.* 41 – 48.

and whose original condition was treated as the explanation of their innate desire for one another, called Love, and their urge to embrace? It provides a mythical basis for the psychology of inadequacy innate in either sex with out the other, the incompleteness of man without woman and without man. The religious possibilities develop from the sense of completeness and ecstasy experienced by them as lovers in the erotic embrace. Viewed in this light, the sense of loneliness and unhappiness of either without the other lends itself to interpretation as the consequence of punishment for some original sin.

The basic truth of the psychic condition which finds expression in the notion of a primaeval state of life in which we were undifferentiated and whole, the excruciating sense of incompleteness which the sexes feel by themselves and the *orgtasy in extremis* experienced in the act of sexual congress are caught up and expressed impressively by D. H. Lawrence in his poem *Tortoise Shout*. Treating the mating of the tortoise–to him symbol of primate life–he sees sex as a desperate effort to recover the original integrity with which life began, which was rounded off and whole but which, at some time in life's unfathomable dawn, was violently torn asunder. This traumatic experience which the nature of life itself underwent which nails us into sex he sees in terms of the sparagmos of Osiris and the crucifixion of Christ.[12] A more prosaic expression of the idea is found in Freud in the hypothesis that living substance, at the time of coming into life, perhaps underwent a rupture into small particles, which have since endeavoured to reunite through the sexual instincts, and when they had developed through the kingdom of *protista* to become multicellular organisms, by the transference of these instincts to the germ cells.[13]

With science having so little to say on the origin and evolution of sex, a hypothesis of the nature of Freud's though couched in scientific terminology, remains as much mythology, (even if it be the mythology of science), as the ancient account of the androgyne. The significant difference is that where Freud saw the tearing apart to have taken place in the simplest from of life, its *protista*, and to have worked upwards to the more complex forms, the myth viewed it in reverse, the tearing apart taking place in the highest form of life, God, and working down to the most insignificant, the ant of the Brihadāranyaka Upanisad.[14] The all-inclusiveness that is God expresses itself not only by the conception of him as an *arsenothelus* who holds in crasis the two sexes but, as in the case of Phanes of the Orphics, as a conglomerate symbol of all the kinds of living things, the supreme All-Animal' At any rate, the concept of wholenatured beings, though it

12. 'Why were we crucified into sex?
Why were we not left rounded off, and finished in ourselves,
As we began,
As he certainly began, so perfectly alone?'

13. *Beyond the Pleasure Principle.* tr. J. Strachey. London (1950) pp. 77 – 81.

14. See p. 155.

originated with mythopoeic thought, did receive serious consideration as a scientific hypothesis on one occasion at least. This was quite early in the history of Greek philosophy, in the theory of zoogony of Empedocles.

In his treatise On *Nature*[15] Empedocles describes two alternating cosmological cycles, one occuring when the primary four elements, Earth, Water, Air and Fire, come under the influence of an uniting force which he calls Love *(Philotēs)*, the other when they are dominated by its opposite, Strife *(Neikos)*. In the first of these the elements tend to greater and greater admixture until they are finally so completely mixed that they are incapable of further admixture and indistinguishable, one from another. Then Strife takes over and the whole process is reversed and the elements begin unmixing until they are completely seperated, one from another, in the universe.

With each of these alternating cosmic cycles is associated a zoogony, the middle stage of which manifests a phase of nature such as we have now, in which regular human beings and animals and the two sexes are possible. At the beginning and end of these sequences, however, the world is populated by creatures of nightmare shapes and chimerical configurations which outdo even the monsters of mythology. They are individual limbs and organs of men and animals endowed with life and movement, monstrosities created by the random amalgamation of such, or more complex beings, whom Empedocles calls 'wholenatured' *(oulophuē)*, who display in a single body the parts of both the male and female of a species.

The notable difference between these alternating zoogonical cycles of Love and Strife is that each reverses the sequence of the other, one beginning with a stage cemparable to that with which the other ends and ending with a stage comparable to that with which it begins.

The origin of life in the world dominated by Love describes a scene resembling Picasso's *Guernica*, in which limbs and parts of animals, faces without necks, unattached arms, eyes and the like, created beneath the earth and surfacing, wandered hither and thither seeking to unite with one another.[16] As Love's influence waxed and the elements mingled more and more, these odd parts fell together as and how they chanced,[17] producing, together with normal men and animals, fantastic combinations. There rose, for instance, oxen with the foreparts of human beings and human beings with the foreparts of oxen. There were also, says Empedocles, creatures with a face and breast on both sides and creatures who were partly male and partly female, but whose genital organs were sterile.[18] It must be of

15· *Peri Physeōs*. Empedocles was from Acragasin Sicily and lived from c. 493 B. C. to 433 B. C. His *Purifications (Katharmoi)* dealt with a doctrine of rebirth.

16· *fr.* 57–58.

17· *fr.* 59.

18· *fr.* 61.

these that Empedocles says in another fragment of his lost work that they possessed a rolling gait and innumerable hands.[19] The sterility of their genital organs and their own inability to adapt themselves to their environment would have been the causes he gives for the extinction of such monstrosities in the world, while mankind and the regular animals survived because of the harmony of their parts and their capacity to reproduce their species.

The extant evidence has nothing on the form of life which succeeded this age, when Love's domination of the elements intensified still further. With regard to Strife's dominance of the world, however, the difficulty is just the opposite. There is evidence of certain wholenatured beings with whom life began then; there is evidence of human beings (and animals) male and female, who inhabited the earth thereafter. What is somewhat lacking in evidence of the final stage, in which, due to the intensification of Strife's influence, men and animals themselves could be presumed to have disintegrated and been reduced to separate limbs and parts on the reverse analogy of Love's zoogony.

When the extant evidence of these two separate zoogonies is collated and reviewed as the upward and downward trends of a single process, however, the respective deficiencies of evidence in each is supplemented by the other, giving us stages of life somewhat as follows:

Under increasing Love.	Under increasing Strife.
1. Separate limbs and parts	1. Wholenatured forms
2. monsters (human beings and animals)	2. human beings (and animals)
3. wholenatured forms	3. separate limbs and parts

Fragment 20 of Empedocles, which summarises this cyclic process, has a broad indication that the disintegration of bodies into separate limbs and parts was the order of things in the last stage of Strife's reign. For he says there

> The mass of mortal limbs clearly shows this; sometimes through Love all the limbs, which the body has as its lot in the prime of flourishing life, come together; at another time again, sundered by evil feuds, they wander severally by the breakers of the shore of life. Likewise too with shrub-plants and fish in their watery abodes and beasts in mountain lairs and birds that fly on wings.

Zeus, says Aristophanes, after his bisection of the wholenatured beings because of their assault on the gods. threatened to bisect them once again if they persisted in their disobedience so that they would be reduced to the appearance of figures in *basso-relievo*, with half a nose and hopping around

19. *fr.* 60.

on one leg.[20] The idea fascinated Aristophanes as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the notion of the genesis of the sexes by the bisection of an original androgyne, but it is also obviously a parody of the stage of separate limbs under increasing Strife in Empedocles.

There is hope, on the other hand, says Aristophanes, that those who pursue Love would be reunited with their counterparts and made whole again, as they were in the beginning.[21] This is the gift of the god, our greatest benefactor, who will lead us back to our own nature in this life itself, and in the future restore us to our original state.

This is no more than a religious imitation of what is already found as a physical doctrine in Empedocles. Both the stages in which wholenatured beings occur in his zoogony–the first stage of Strife's sequence and the ultimate stage of Love's–are associated with Love, whereas their incomplete or disrupted forms, which yield the two sexes, are the work of Strife, the selfsame influence which incited the doubleformed humans of Aristophanes' myth to attack the gods. Correspondingly, as in Aristophanes, Empedocles' explanation of the desire of male and female to embrace each other in sex is nothing less than Love–in Love's reign, the Love that is waxing in the world, in Strife's, the residue of Love that is still around, though on the way out.

Notwithstanding this Aristophanes seriously mistakes the evidence in Empedocles in his conception of the configuration of his wholenatured ancestors of men. For he visualizes the male and female halves–taking the androgyne alone for consideration–as joined back–to–back, with the two faces in their single head turned outwards Janus–like, and perhaps also the limbs of their twin body.[22] They possess two genital organs, a male on the male side and a female on the female side. To all appearances they are no different from a man and a woman joined to each other back–to–back. The only difference between the halves in the whole and the halves after separation into individual men and women is that, on account of the act of Apollo in turning the face and limbs towards the out side, what was then back is now chest and stomach, and vice–versa. Otherwise a single Aristophanic androgyne became two human beings, a man and a woman, by the process of slicing down the middle–which is, after all, what Zeus did.

While this is all very simple and neat in the creation of two out of one, it vitiates against the confirmation of a man and woman in embrace–which is, after all, the basic aetiology in the myth of a primeval totality

20 · Plato *op. cit.* 190d; see also 193a.

21 · *ibid* 193c – d.

22 · The double statue of the Madonna outside the church of Grossmann, *Austria*, notably observe such a back to back configuration, with two similar faces, one looking up, the other gazing down. (For a line reproduction of this statue, see Ripley's *Believe It Or Not* 14th series, Pocket Books, U.S.A.)

which is both androgyne and anthropomorphic. For, in that event, they would seek to unite, not as is done now, *vis-a-vis*, but *dos-a-dos*, as in that original totality. Nor would there have taken place, in such a form of crasis, the necessary intercourse of male and female sex-organs (which are the physical and symbolic attributes of the respective principles of masculinity and femininity), towards which the whole act of the erotic embrace concentrates. It is surely this discrepancy which leads to Zeus' instructions to Apollo, after his bisection of the two-in-one beings, to turn their faces and half-necks towards the out side (on the clever pretext that they would thus have the evidence of their punishment before their eyes). He himself subsequently brings their genitals too round to the same side.

This elaborate rearrangement of members required in order that the out sides, together with the genitals, may come together when men and women embraced, can hardly have been part of the original myth. It is too laboured and out of keeping with mythological economy, making the natural pattern of male and female in embrace the outcome of a secondary elaboration, the product of sophistication rather than of the forthright genius of mythopoeic imagination. It is undoubtedly Aristophanes' own and has resulted from his singular misconception of the form of the primal androgyne of ancient myth.

It should already have been evident where Aristophanes has erred, or, possibly, diverged, from Empedocles' conception of wholenatured beings. By calling his outward-facing double creatures 'wholes' *(hola)* in reecho of Empedocles' expression 'wholenatured' *(oulophuē)*, he was assigning them the role of original beings from whom men and women were derived by bisection. But his conception of their configuration follows rather that of the monsters of the second stage of Love's zoogony in Empedocles, the creatures who had a face and breast on both sides and were mixed, in part from the male, in part from the female sex, and whose sex organs were sterile, not the true *oulophuē* of Empedocles' first stage of Strife, from whom Empedocles himself derived men and women.

Bury observed this resemblance between Aristophanes' biformed beings and the monsters of Empedocles. He also observed Aristophanes' use of the world *hola* as reflecting partially Empedocles' term *oulophuē* for the first beings from whom he derived men and women. But he did not comment on Aristophanes' mistake of using the characteristics of Empedocles' monsters to discribe his own wholenatured forms.[23] It is the same with O'Brien in his study of Empedocles' zoogony. He notes that the bisexuality or asexuality of the Empedoclean *oulophuē* was quite different

23, *The Symposium of Plato.* Cambridge (1909) pp. 56 – 57, n. to 189e. A similar failure to observe the discrepancy between the two natures of the androgyne is found in Freud (*ibid* p. 79–80 n. 54) and Radhakrishnan (The Principal upanisads London 1953 comment on p. 164) when they draw attention to the comparability of the Bṛhadāranyaka myth and that of Aristophanes.

from the random mixture of male and female parts in the monsters; again he says that the *oulophue* of Empedocles provide the first comparison with Aristophanes' double creatures, since they are more harmonious in their make-up than men and women and split apart into men and women.[24] The contradiction goes unremarked on the point of how double creatures who imitate the monsters of Empedocles, put together by the random mixture of male and female parts, could be considered harmonious beings akin to the Empedoclean *oulophue*. It may be added that the sterility of the monsters of Empedocles was quite another thing from the asexuality of his wholenatured beings; the former were barren *(steirois eskemena guiois)* because they were natures' freaks, the latter asexual because they were self-complete in their bisexuality. From this point of view the androgynes of Aristophanes are not true wholes, either in themselves or in respect of their sex organs (of which they have two). They are not harmonious unities but superficially allied dualities; they are, even on the Empedoclean theory of evolution, monstrosities.[25]

The popularity of the androgyne hypothesis as a more satisfactory conception of the sex of the original being to whom both male and female owed their descent in contrast to that of the primacy of the male and the secondary derivation of the female from the male appears in the acceptance of it in time by some sects of the Semitic religions as well. A number of *midrashim* held the view that Adam was androgynous. According to the Bereshit rabbs, "Adam and Eve were made back to back, joined at the shoulders; then God divided them with an axe-stroke, cutting them in two," –a belief which owes itself, at one or more removes, to Aristophanes' myth of the *symposium*, with God taking the role of Zeus. Certain others profess the opinion that "the first man (Adam) was a man on the left side and a woman on the right; but God split him in two halves."[26]

This latter conception of the androgynous nature of the first being, if it is to give us a complete man and woman after bisection and not one-legged splinters, like the *basso-relievo* into which Zeus threatened to reduce human beings if they presisted in their insolence, would have had to be of two complete human beings, a man and a woman, joined side to side like Siamese twins. The greater likelihood is that Adam was thought of as having a single body, the left half of which was male and the right, female. The influence here is oriental rather than Greek; *it is clearly of the Ardhanārīśvaraśiva of Hindu iconography*. In these images Śiva is male in one

24. *Empedocles' Cosmic Fragments*, Cambridge 1969, p. 227 n. 3. See also pp. 205–207.

25. Calling the male–female whole *androgynes*, he says this nature once had a real existence but is now lost, the name only being preserved as a term of ridicule (189e). See Virgil *Aen.* iv. 215 and Livy xxxiii. 28. 7. But the general of the hermaphrodite or *semivir* is more in the order of a simple human being who is neither fully male nor female. Cf. Lucr. v. 837 *ff.* and Ovid *Met.* iv. 378, also Livy xxvii. 11.4 and n. 56 below. Bury *ibid.* pp. 56–57 n. to 189e) lumps Eros-Phanes with these varied conceptions of androgynism without discrimination.

26. See Mircea Eliade *The Two in the One*, tr. J.M. Cohen, London, 1965 p. 104.

half of his body and female in the other *(dehadvayārdhaghatanā)* The right half is of himself, the left, of his Sakti, the goddess Pārvatī, *(vāmārdhajāni)* they are husband and wife sharing the same *mandala*, Many examples of Śiva in this form show him with matted locks, half vertical eye, serpent, sacred thread, necklace of skulls and tiger skin reaching down to his knee on the right side, while his left shows him as a female with frizzled locks, normal eye, one breast, feminine jewellery and finely embroidered muslin dress reaching down to the ankle. Some of the facial features appear also on the fifth-century heads of the god from Rajghat, one of which shows him with *jaṭājūṭa* and pronounced vertical eye.[27] As in most of these images, the outthrust left hip and thigh of the god in Cave I at Bādāmi in Mysore (sixth century) are voluptuously feminine and leg and arm, the palm of which cups a big round breast, are loaded with exquisite female ornaments.

The figure at Tiruvadi near Tanjore, however, reverses the arrangement of the halves, putting the male on the left and the female on the right, The god has four hands usually, as in the *aradhnārīśvara* images in Madurā, the Nāgeśvara temple at Kumbakōnam, the Elephanta Śiva temple of the eighth century, and in the niche of the wall of the Tanjore temple, though sometimes, as in the temple of Tiruchchengādu (Salem district) dedicated to Ardhanāri, there may have been only two.[28] More often than not, the god leans on a bull.

The representation of Śiva in this mode is purely symbolic, as is seen by its wide use in iconography. It is the artistic expression of the basis of the Śākta doctrine that only when combined with his Śakti is Śiva capable of discharging his divine functions. His implicit femininity is symbolised even in the depiction of the god as a male by the female ornament *(lamba-patra)* which he wears on his left ear. The *ardhanārīśvara* representation, displaying the male and female aspects of the god *(nara-nārī-vapu)* in visual and graphic form, emphasises the basic truth of nature, physiological, as much as psychological, that each individual is in part male and in part female. Rudiments of female characteristics are manifest in the male body, and the same is true of the female body. Inverts manifest this in psychology. The Rgveda gives expression to the age-old truth, observing, "What you

27. Vasudeva S. Agrawala, *Siva Mahādeva: The Great God*, Benares, 1966, plates viii and ix. *The Brihan-Nāradīya Purāṇa* conceives the *ardhanārīśvara* form of Siva as a person, half black and half yellow, nude on one side and clothed on the other, wearing skulls and a garland of lotuses in the two halves respectively and showing male features on the right and female on the left. *Matsya Purāṇa*, 260. 1–10, instructs on the making of the *ardhanārīśvara* form, adding, "Then in the half portion of the body covered with a tiger skin (i.e. the right) an organ should be made and the left part is to be covered with a hanging cloth decked with various jewels, and the right is to be covered with serpents." (I have still to see an *ardhanārīśvara* icon with genitals). See also H. K. Sastri *South Indian Images of Gods and Goddesses*, Delhi, 1974, p. 120.

28. An illustration from Dhārāsuram shows the god with eight arms, three visible faces (with perhaps two more behind), and a circle of light in the background.

describe to me as male are in reality also female; he who has the penetrative eye of the mind discerns the truth but not the blind who sees only with the physical eye."[29]

Thus a twofold sex impulse is present in the whole body. In the man the male is predominant, in the women the female. And both elemental passions need to meet their counterpart. As Agrawala observes in his study of the varied aspects of Śiva's divinity, "The grand phenomenon of the *ardhanārīśvara* is writ large on the visage of all living human and animal beings and also flowering plants where the romantic drama of the pistil and the anthers is carried on within the bridal chamber."[30] Bridegroom and bride, forming the two halves of the wedding ceremony, are in like manner typical of the *ardhanārīśvara* form.

Siva in his androgyne manifestation fully corroborates the inseparability of the male and female principles and comprises both in himself. He also shows that though apparently paradoxical, they are in fact complementary to each other. As a cosmic force, the god combines in himself these cosmic forces for the evolution of the world. According to the *Skanda Purāṇa*,[31] Śakti is not different from Śiva or Śaktiman; they are one and the same. Śiva is Śakti due to his own volition. The myth basic to this idea is found in the *Liṅga Purāṇa*. It says that Brahma himself asked Śiva to divide his body into two halves. Thereupon Śiva created the form of Devī from the left side of himself, making it in every way equal to himself.[32] The disastrous nature of the failure to recognize this fundamental truth of nature is depicted in the fate of the Hippolytus-like Bhriṅga.[33]

As observed earlier, however, the image of the *ardhanārīśvara* is more symbolic than mythological in its origin; the myth associated with it seems to achieve little more than explain the iconography. The androgynism here is no more than a static representation of the bisexuality of Śiva as creator. It is represented in a manner in which he is incapable of sexual activity, being paralysed in a position in which the male and female in him are denied any action relative to one another. This problem is recognized in a classica

29. 1. 164. 16.

30. *ibid.* p. 48.

31. 2. 11. 1–34.

32. 1. 75. 34–36; *Markaṇḍeya Purāṇa* 50. 10 says Brahmā, angered at the disregard shown at his creation of the world, produced a being (*purusha*) like the sun, possessed of an immense body, half of which was male and half female, and said, "Divide yourself." And this being divided his male and female natures into many parts with people gentle and cruel, black and white. The male was Manu Svayambhuva, the woman Sata-rūpā, and the former took her for his wife and brought forth two sons and two daughters (50. 13–16).

33. Bhṛṅga was so exculsively devoted to Śiva that he ignored Pārvatī. In anger she reduced him to a skeleton so that he had no life to stand up. Siva out of pity, gave him a third leg. When Pārvati assumed her role as half of Siva, in his ardhanārīśvara form, to baulk him, he turned into a bee, bored a hole through the middle of the body of the god and continued to circumambulate the Siva-half. Ultimately his constancy won Pārvati's admiration and grace. In iconography Bhringa is depicted as three-legged; see Sastri, *op. cit.* p. 165.

Sanskrit verse which pities Śiva for his inability to see Pārvati when they form the androgyne.[34] To unite (in sexual union) they need to separate, and this the configuration of the *ardhanārīśvara* or *haryardha* from effectively vitiates.[35]

For a configuration in which male and female aspects of the primeval being take on a dynamic role as an aetiology of sexual congress in Hinduism one needs to turn to the genesis myth of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*[36]. This work, which may possibly go back to 600 B. C., gives a mythological cosmogony in which the created universe is identified with Virāj (ātman), the first embodied being. Before the creation of other beings Virāj was alone. At first, says the *Upaniṣad*, fear came upon him on account of the notion of extinction. But when he realized that there was no one but himself to be his rival, that fear left him. The text continues:

> He, verily, had no delight. Therefore he who is alone has no delight. He desired a second. He became as large as a woman and a man in close embrace. He caused that self to fall into two parts. From that arose husband and wife. Therefore, as Yājñavalkya used to say, this (body) is one half of oneself, like one of the two halves of a split pea. Therefore this space is filled by a wife. He became united with her. From that human beings were begotten.

All the other species in their male and female sexes resulted when the primal female, called Śatarūpā ('the beauty of the hundred forms), attempting to escape the attentions of the primal male, Virāj (called Manu), went through a series of shape-shifts from cow down through to ant. For, at each of these metamorphoses, Virāj, assuming the corresponding male form, copulated with her and begot.

Viraj's expansion here, it would be noted, is neither in the side-to-side conformation of the *ardhanārīśvara* nor in the back-to-back of the Aristophrnic hermaporodite; it is in the face-to-face conformation of a man and woman in sexual cohabitation. There is no requirement of a

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34. *Subhāsitaratnakoṣa*. tr. D. H. H. Ingalls no. 82. Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 44, Harvard University Press 1965. (Wendy O' Flaherty, Asceticism and eroticism in the My thology of Siva Lond 1973, p. 257).

35. Maurice Henry *The Thirty-two Positions of the Androgyne*, New York, 1963, plates iv, viii, x, xi, xix, xxi, xxii, xxiv, and xxvi illustrate graphically the attempts of the two members of the pair to separate in order to unite. (O' Flaherty, ibid)

36. 1. 4. 1 – 5 tr. S. Radhakrishnan *loc. cit.* and for *ātman* as virāj, comment following: see also Swami Nikhilananda, *The Upamshads*, London 1962, p. 190. For a discussion of the date of the upaniṣad, see R.E. Hume *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads* London, 1931, pp. 5 – 9.

secondary rearrangement of face and limbs to face the out side after the separation in order to achieve the frontal encounter in sex; face and limbs already face the out side.[37]

The iconography corresponding to this mythology in Hinduism is not that of the *ardhanāriśvara* but of *maithuna*. The postures of *maithuna* are many and varied, progressing from those which show Śiva and his consort seated side by side in the initial separation of one from the other to those which show them entwined in close embrace, and spilling over to the numerous postures of sex encounter which render the walls of the Śaiva temples of Khajurao a milling orgia of sexual activity. The ithyphallic Śiva, Śiva seated with Pārvatī, whose hand sometimes touches his erect penis, or simply the two of them gazing into each others' eyes with deep emotion–and in this context, the *ardhanārīśvara* form of Śiva itself–take meaning from the central posture of sexual encounter in which the god and his consort confront each other, as at the separation envisaged in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. Proliferating the posture of *maithuna* are the numerous sculptures of Hindu temples which show a nude female thrust up against a standing male with her arms thrown round his neck and a leg entwining his hip, while they look into each other's faces with intense passion. Arrangements which show the god and his consort seated side by side emphasise the separation which necessarily underlies the desire for union. On the other hand, the several postures of ritual orgy, including the more convoluted sexo–yogic *āsanas* in which bearded *munis* devoted to the god are engaged with their female counterparts or *kāminīs*, must be interpreted as variations which upon the theme of sexual union multiply by hyperbole the eroticism of the act.

Wholenatured forms in the physical doctrine of Empedocles bear comparison with the inward–facing androgynism of Virāj of Hindu mythology, rather than the outward–facing hermaphrodites of Aristophanes. There was, as pointed out earlier, a deficiency of evidence on the nature of these as the ultimate beings of Love's zoogony. But this is made good by evidence on them as the original populace with whom Strife's zoogony begins. Describing these and their emergence is Empedocle's fragment 62:

> Come now and hear how Fire, as it separated, sent up the night-produced shoots of men and much–lamenting women; for my tale is not wide off the mark nor ill–informed. At first, wholenatured fofms

37. Compare the pea simile here with Aristophanes' sorb – apples cut for drying or eggs cut with a hair (190d – e). Most interesting is his simile of flat – fish (psettai; 191d). See also his *Lysistr.* 115; flat – fish were a traditional joke, perhaps based on the temptation they offered to put two of them together. Harvey Arden ('In Search of Moses' *National Geographic* vol. 149 no. 1 Jan. 1976 p. 18), on his visit to Lake Bardawil with a guide, writes, "Back on shore he showed me some flat flounder – like fish caught that morning by local fishermen. He slapped two of the fish together in sandwich fashion. Since each looked like half a fish, both its eyes being on one side, the two together looked surprisingly like a single fish. "Called *samak Musa*, Musa fish!" he announced. "When Musa (Moses) split the waters, these fish get cut in two. Now that way forever!"

rose from the earth, having a share of both Water and Heat. These the Fire sent up, wishing to reach its like. But they did not yet exhibit the endearing formation of limbs nor voice nor genital organ such as is proper to men.

The world, dominated *in toto* by Love, has come to a standstill, a dramatic moment, when all the elements, so throughly mixed by the action of that force, are incapable of any further mixing. Then suddenly a tremor passes through it; Strife has begun its ingress. All at once the process of unmixing is under way and the cataclysmic era described by Empedocles here begins, with the four elements struggling against each other to assume their respective stations. It must have been in a scene recalling prehistoric ages and the formation of the earth's crust. amidst volcanic upheavals and bubbling lava, earthquakes, thunder and lightning, that the subterranean fires, rushing strongly upwards to make their way, (as Empedocles thought), to the outermost region of the universe, thrust up these remarkable beings.

Empedocles calls them 'wholenatured' *(oulophuē)*.[38] From the fact that men and women are derived from the segmentation of these beings through the divisive action af Strife, their wholenaturedness must consist of the masculinity of the male and the femininity of the female; that is, they were bisexed. Due to the ambiguity of the evidence, however, there has been no clear conception either of the configuration of these beings or their bisexuality. For instance, D.O'Brien, in his study of the fragments of Empedocles, concluded that "the *oulophuē* had no sex or were bisexed."[39] If this meant that they had no sex because they were bisexed, he is certainly right. What leads him to his conclusion, however, is his interpretation of Empedocles' statement that they lacked a genital organ "such as is proper to men" to mean that they lacked a male member.[40] What Empedocles denied of them was not a genital organ, (and the same is true of voice), but one that was like men's, just as in the line preceeding (i.e. line 7), what he denied them was not a formation of limbs but an endearing one. Nor must it be thought that the denial of a genital organ comparable to that of men implied that it was any closer to that of women. If we are to suppose

38. fr. 65 and 67 Act. v. 7. 1. Fire and water are, for Empedocles, as a Greek, as for the Indians, the elements which represent male and female respectively. See Hippocr *Regimen* 1.28 (also interesting for its theory of sex determination in the light of Aristophanes' account), Arist. *De gen. anim.* 764a1 – b3 and 765a8 – 10, *De part. anim.* 648a28 – 31; Hermip. *De astrol.* 2.7; Lucr. v. 806.

39. *ibid.* p. 205

40. *loc. cit.* Lack of a male member, he says, arises from their having equal shapes of the male and female elements, fire and water. Their character is a perfection (p. 207); they are not, (as Millerd and Zeller thought) "very rudimentary forms of existence," but, on the contrary, as their name implies, more complete and harmonious creatures than we are. They are, in Love's final stage, the product of the unity of men and women (pp. 209 and 199). In the case of the endearing formation of limbs *(meleōn eraton demas)*, however, he concedes that it is not a detraction from their harmonious but purely to be taken from the point of view of sexual attraction (p. 207). Is it more likely, then, that they lacked a male member or possessed a more 'harmonious' one?

that men and women derived their separate characteristics from a distribution of such wholenatured beings in Strife's zoogony and, conversely, that wholenatured beings derived their's from an amalgamation of the characteristics of men aud women in Love's zoogony, the nature of the genital organ of these beings must be hermaphroditic, and in *that* sense, "not such as is proper to men."

The very indefiniteness of Empedocles as the configuration of these beings-he calls them 'forms' or 'shapes' *(tupoi)*-suggests a face-to-face crasis of the male and female halves of them and his own inability to visualize their appearance. His description of them-the little he gives-even if it lends itself to some inferences, is essentially negative. Noteworthy is the unattractiveness of their limbs. This is not just from a sexual point of view in the case of beings to whom sex meant nothing, but also aestheticall syo from our point of view if we imagine tham to be double-thick and ungainly, as they would indeed have been. Again, though bisexual from the point of view of their being unities of male and female, by themselves they would be asexual. In other words, sex is an emergent factor, arising with the division of the harmonious totality into man and woman and expresses the inadequacy which results for the new individuals with that very division itself. It is mythologically expressed as a craving for the lost wholeness, which, in our prcsent state is achieved only temporarily and fleetingly in the embrace of lovers, which itself Aristophanes expresses in religious terms as a foretaste of the ultimate bliss that the Love-god holds out to his devotees.[41]

Empedocles reiterates the significance of the beauty of form in sexual attraction in the case of human beings. Aetius, giving an account of the stimulus of sexual generation in the teachings of the philosopher, says that he took it, in the case of some, to be the thickening of the nourishment which gave the impetus to (the disturbance of) the semen, in the case of others, to the beauty *(eumorohia)* of women.[42] A surviving fragment of Empedocles goes on to associate the desire evoked by sight (of a member of rhe opposite sex) with memory.[43]

This memory is surely a subconscious archetypal anamnesis of the erstwhile state of integrity, which is the basis of the desire itself. This is the same psychology that we encountered in Aristophanes. In a word, it is the psychology which underlies the myth of androgynism, wherever it appears.

41. *ibid.* 192d. If Hephaestus with his tools were to visit lovers as they lie together and ask them if they wished ro melt and weld together, to become one flesh, to live and die together, says Aristophanes, we know what the answer would be.

42. Aet. v. 19. 5.

43. fr. 64. The desire is thus for the primal state of wholeness (*tou holou epithumia*; Sym. 192c.)

The inclusion of voice together with physical attractiveness and the genital organ here must suggest a sexual significance for it too in the case of human beings, which was however superfluous among the asexual *oulophuē*. There is no further evidence on it in the extant fragments of Empedocles. But in recent times a parallel intuition is found in Lawrence, who associates the articulation of voice with the agony and the ecstasy of sex in the context of the ancient mythology of the genesis of sexuality through the violation of an original integrity.[44] He speaks of

> Sex, which breaks us into voice, sets us calling across the deeps, calling, calling for the complement,
>
> Singing, and calling, and singing again, being answered, having found.

The peculiarity of the genital organ of the primeval androgynous being is implied by evidence of its peculiar location in the instance of the Orphic god, Phanes. Phanes was imagined as uniting in himself the characteristics of both sexes, being, in Orphic cosmogony, the source of all creation. "In as much as he was the first being, he was both male and female," says Proclus[45] and quotes a verse which describes him as "the mighty god Erikepaios, female and father." Lactantius[46] observes that the Orphics thought their god was both male and female "because he was unable to create in any other way except by having the potency of both sexes—as if he would either cohabit with himself, or, with himself, or, without cohabitation, not be able to procreate."

The bisexuality of Phanes also involved biformity. A verse attributed to Orpheus himself by Hermias[47] talks of him as "with four eyes looking this way and that." A little carnelian, reproduced by Guthrie in his *Orpheus and Greek Religion*,[48] shows the god as a winged Eros seated in profile in one half of an opened-out egg, but with no indication of biformity. Guthrie himself thought that Phanes was "in fact, in so far as he was anthropomorphic, a creature just like those described by Aristophanes in Plato's *symposium*," that is to say, double-formed and outward-facing.[49] The same thing is put the other way round by O'Brien when he accepts that the Orphic Phanes was also a possible source of influence to Aristophanes in his conception of man's bisexual progenitors.[50] But despite his proper suspicion that the elaborate rearrangement of the head and genitals

44. *op. cit.*
45. *In Plat. Tim.* 30c. d. = Kern O. F. 81.
46. *Div. Inst.* iv. 8·4 p. 296, 2 Brandt = O. F. 81. Cf. Synesios Hymn ii. 63 = O. F. 168 p. 206: "You are father, you are mother; you are male, you are female; you are voice, you are silence, etc."
47. *In Plat. Phaedr.* 246e p. 138, II Couvr. = O. F. 76.
48. 1st ed., London, 1935, p. 93 fig. 10.
49. *ibid.* p. 145. n. 25 to ch. iv.
50. *ibid.* p. 228.

(to face the out side) was secondary elaboration from (as he thinks) the hand of Plato,[51] it does not lead him to suspect that the original nature of Phanes, and, for that matter, Empedocles' wholenatured forms, was different from the outward-facing biformity of Aristophanes' hermaphrodites, The failure is understandable especially when it appears that the ancients themselves had no clear conception of the configuration of the inward-facing biformity of the primal androgyne, except that it was inward-facing, to press it for details.

Apart from his eyes that look "this way and that" *(entha kai entha)*, the single other detail that comes down to us about the god's body is one that says he had his genital organ "behind; in the region of the rump" *(aidoion echonta opisō per ten pugēn)*.[52] The evidence is of one genital organ, not two, and, likewise, of one rump as against Aristophanes' hermaphrodites, who had two genital organs and, perhaps, no rump: Certainly the awkwardness of its position suggests a difficulty of locating it where it is naturally in men and women. It is said to be 'behind' *(opisō)*, whereas 'beneath' *(hupo)* would have been preferred in the case of a being who stood errect (if such beings were thought to have stood errect), and was, in its lower body, all rump. Perhaps the vagueness achieved by *peri* ('in the regionl of") sees to this. At any rate, the detail accords with our notion of a front-to-front juxtaposition of the male and female halves in Phanes, as in human copulation or, for that matter, Virāj in expansion. It is perhaps because he was caught out by this peculiarity of Phanes that Aristophanes, for some time at least, had the severed halves of his hermaphrodites carry their genitals behind them (surely *opiso peritēn pugēn.'*) before Zeus himself brought them round to the front out of consideration for their dying race.

If we leave aside for the moment the esoteric symbolism of which the Śivaliṅga leads off in the metaphysics of Śaivism and view its purely physical formulation, can it be anything else than the privy member of the androgyne? Or is it, in spite of its evolution in the context of the androgynism of Siva, just a casual anagram of the male and female sex organs to which the god is thus entitled and not to be taken together as a single composite entity of which the male and female sex organs are rather the derivatives? The associations of the Śivaliṅga with the *ardhanārīśvara* form of Śiva are too immediate and emphatic to be denied. It epitomizes the creative power of the bisexed god, the *Liṅga* representing Śiva and the *yoni* his Śakti or female self, the goddess Pārvatī. The *yoni* in the form of a Jewish harp, is not a mere base *(pīthaka)* upon which the errect phallus grounds itself, but the two together represent the primal wholenatured or androgyne organ of which each of them is a part. The act of sexual union, so prolific in the erotic art of india, derives its meaning as an effort to recreate the original wholeness. Even where the postures

51· *loc. cit.*

52· Suid. s. v. Phanes = O. F. 80

adopted by the *kāmins* and *kāminis* deviate widely from the frontal encounter, the union of *linga* and *yoni*, as the physical as well as symbolic surrogates of male and female, achieve the desired reconstitution of the primitive *ardhanārisvara* totality. This is the MANI PADME, 'the jewel in the lotus', of the Tantric Buddhist mantra, the male in the female organ, the state of completeness.

The unity of the two, together with the destructiveness of the *linga* without the *yoni*, is amply illustrated in Siva-mythology. When Siva was roused by the arrow of fascination directed at him by Kāma, the god of Love, he resolved to marry Pārvati, saying, "I burn day and night because of Kāma. I will find no peace without Pārvatī."[53] The *yoni* is the cure for the desire of the *linga*. When the sages of the Pine Forest cursed Siva's *linga* to fall to the ground, it burnt everything before it like a fire, making its way all over the world, the underworld and heaven. And when the sages, in desperation, sought advice from Brahma, he replied, "As long as the *linga* is not still, there will be nothing auspicious in the universe. You must propitiate Devi so that she will take the form of the *yoni*, and then the *linga* will become still."[54] The story goes on to say

> They honoured Siva, and he appeared and said, "if my *linga* is held in the *yoni*, then all will be well. Only Pāravat can hold the *linga*, and then it will be calm." They propitiated him, and thus *linga*-worship was established.

The parallelism of Zeus-Phanes of the Orphics with Śiva-Virāj is too notable to miss. Pausanias, in his travels through Elcia, in the second half of the 2nd century A. D., observed the very devout worship paid by the people of Kyllene to an upright male member upon a pedestal, but as representing the god Hermes.[55] This may be a late derivation from India, though, even so, it is surprising to find it in so unlikely a place as the west coast of the Peloponnese. The identification of Hermes with the *linga* here obviously equates him with the role of Śiva, with Aphrodite as his Śakti, on the basis of the closest Greek parallel of the *ardhanārīśvara*, the hermaphrodite. In itself this is an interesting reinterpretation in the light of the *Ardhanārīśvara* Siva, since the traditional Greek androgyne, Hermaphroditos, is not the god Hermes himself but the son of Hermes and Aprodite.[56]

53. *Mahābhāgavata* 24·33 (O' Flaherty's Translation. op. cit. p. 256)

54. *Siva Purāna*, 4·12· 17 – 52, cf. O' Flaherty, op. cit. p. 257.

55. Paus. vi. 26. 5. Artemidorus (*Onesicr.* 1. 45), Lucian (*Zeus Trag.* 42.) Philostratus *(Vit. Apol.)* and Hippolytus *(Ref.* 5·7*)* mention the image. See also W. Roscher, *Hermes der Windgott*, p. 75 *ff.*

56. Cf. Theophr. *Ch.* 16. 10; Alciphr. *Epis*. 3·37. 4th century art depicted him as a beautiful youth with developed breasts, later as an Aphrodite with male genitals. Ovid (*Met.* 4. 285 – 388) narrates the myth of the union in one body of Hermaphroditos, son of Hermes and Aphrodite, and the nymph Salmacis. In this they do not share halves of the same body but impose one upon the other.

Notable among the phallic gods are, of course, Bacchus and Priapus in Greece. W. Ward[57] observes that the origin of the phalli of the Greeks bears a strong and unaccountable resemblance to some parts of the Purāṇic accounts of the *liṅga*. Bacchus was angry with the Athenians because they despised his solemnities, when they were first brought by Pegasus out of Boeotia into Attica; for which he afflicted them with a grievous disease that could not be cured, until, on the advice of the oracles, they paid due reverence to the god and erected phalli to his honour. Priapus may almost be said to be a phallus with a grotesque body than vice-versa. But in these instances the *liṅga* figured as an emblem of fertility and not in association with the *yoni* as epitomising the bisexuality of the godhead. Nor is ithyphallism of the gods an abbreviation of the two nor symbolic of chastity but expressive of pure sexuality. It is little wonder, then, that far from developing an impressive metaphysic as in India, with the outgrowth of naturalistic worship in Greece, phalli and phallicism became the subject of fun.

The broad tendencies in Śaiva doctrine found associated with the concept of the Ardhanārīśvara Śiva are latent in the names of Phanes. If they received development with the Orphics, the evidence of the nature and extent of such developments have been lost even to the ancients through the practice of secrecy in respect of *musteria* of this nature among the Orphics. The extreme paucity of evidence would even go beyond this and suggest that Orphic Phanism did not develop in anything like the richness and complexity of the religio-cosmic philosophy of Śaivism. For all that, a close review of what is known of the god will hardly fail to show him in the role of a Greek Prajāpati, both potential of and identical with the univese.

Like the first embodied form in Hindu cosmogony, Virāj or what you will, Phanes is first-born *(Prōtogonos)*; like Virāj he is an anthropomorphic androgyne. As Hiraṇyagarbha Virāj is identified with the Cosmic Egg, in which *hiranya* is Gold, which as prāṇa enters the world and takes the form of *Skambha* or the Pillar of Golden Light, which is the *axis mundi* and is supreme and inexpressible; *garbha* stands as the symbol of matter.

In the comparable cosmogony of the Orphics, Phanes hatches out of an egg which was laid by Night in the bosom of Erebos (darkness) or was produced by Chrones (Time).[58] This egg was silver-white *(argupheon;)*[59] Damascius calls it the Brillliant Vesture or Cloud.[60] The god who issued

57. A *View of the History, Literature and Religion of the Hindoos*, 5th ed. Madras, 1863, p. 10 and n. r.

58. Aristoph. *Birds* 693 *ff.* and the Neoplatonist version. See Guthrie *op. cit.* pp. 92-93 The close association of time with the appearance of the protogonous androgyne deserves study. The bisexual Persian zervan is a god of time; in tantra Time-figures as Mahākāla.

59. Damasc. *De princ.* 55.

60. In a verse cited by him. *Quaest.* 142. See G. R. S. Mead *Orpheus* London, 1965, p. 103.

from it is, as his name indicates, *(phaino*= 'shine forth') primarily the Light, "on whose shining forth *(autou phaentos*",) says Apion, "the whole universe shone forth by the light of Fire, the most glorious of the elements."[61]

The identification of the primordial androgynous being with the Cosmic Egg makes him the father of all creation that is potential in its plenitude. Thus Virāj is identified with the golden Egg, which, in its *ardhanārīśvara* form holds within itself all the possibilities of existence or life; that is, not only of human beings, the Asuras and the gods, but also of the five Bhūtase the seven oceans and seven mountains and everything else. It is in this senss that Phanes has the mysterious oriental name, Erikepaios, which mean, possibly Power or Life-Giver.[62]

It is in this same context that one should view the effort made in later times to raise the god to the representation of the Absolute Animal by depicting him as a complex symbol of all living creatures, not just the two sexes. Thus, the golden wings he possessed as symbolic of light and its swiftness, become, (as the birds in Aristophanes' comedy, *Birds*, saw them), symbolic of the creatures of the air, while round his waist he begins to acquire the heads of various animals, including a reptile's.[63]

Bignone[64] thought Empedocles' *oulophuē* were pangenetic, that is, that they were the common ancestors of both human beings as well as animals, and in that sense, all-animal. The evidence, however, restricts the origin from *oulophuē* to men and women, so that the evolution of animals in Strife's reign must have been thought to have taken place from analogous animal wholenatured forms.[65] Seperate hermaphrodite animal forms for the evolution of male and female animals would surely have been the order in Aristophanes' *symposium* myth, if he had the need to go into it. Similarly, the derivation of the species of animals, from cow down to ant, in the *Brihadāranyaka Upanisad*, by a series of shape-shifts undertaken by Śatarūpā followed by Virāj as Manu, whereas woman originates by the splitting of the original body of Virāj, makes something special of the creation of the human sexes as against the creation of the other species through the sexes.

61. apud Clem. *Homil.* 6.5.

62. Damasc. *ibid.* 123 = O. F. 60; Joann. Malalas, *Chronogr.* vi. 89, p. 74 Dind = O. F. 65.

63. Procl. *loc. cit.* Cf. 39e = O. F. 82. Compare the constitution of the Sphinx and the range of prior incarnations of Empedocles in *fr.* 117. Damascinus (*ibid.* 123 = O.F. 54) describes the power as "a god without a body, with golden wings on his shoulders and having, on his sides, the heads of bulls, and on his head, a monstrous snake with the likeness of every wild beast." The description given earlier in the same passage is as of "a dragon, with the heads of a bull and a lion and, between them, the face of a god, and having wings on his shoulders." See also Procl. *In Remp.* 2. 69,28 = O. F. 77, where Phanes is 'four-headed'.

64. I. *poeti filosofi della Grecia*: *Empedocle* in series *Il Pensiero Greco* vol. ii Bocca, Torino. reprinted in the series *Studia Philologica*, vol. i, Rome, 1963. See nn. to frr. 62 and 63 and also pp. 553 n. 2 and 557 n. 1.

65. O' Brien, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-234: Minor Problems (2)

Three fundamental feelings in human psychology are born with the origin of creation--those of fear and loneliness with Virāj and that of shame with Śatarūpā. Śatarūpā, the primordial and eternal female, felt shame when Virāj wished to embrace and copulate with her. Corresponding to this, on his part, was desire for the female arising from the fundamental loneliness of the self and the division it underwent at the beginning of life. It is externalized and personified in Hindu mythology in the character of Kāma Dēva. In the Orphic, however, Phanes, who is still bisexual and undivided, is himself Eros, the god whose role it is to bring the two sexes together after their separation. It is also interesting that Eros, in the traditional Greek concept of him, remains identified with the emotion of Love as a winged god, not bisexual now and comparable to the representation of Phanes in the cornelian mentioned above.

Love reappears in connection with the androgyne in the physical philosophy of Empedocles, though as a cosmological force which unites everything it affects. With living creatures it takes a sexual form;[66] it is not just *philos* but *philoiēs*, a word with definite sexual connotations, and at the same time involves a vague memory of their erstwhile state of wholenaturedness. On the other hand, Empedocles personifies it as Aphrodite rather than Eros, perhaps because his use of it is more abstract and free from the mystical associations with which the Orphics had overlaid the name of Eros–Phanes. These associations reappear with Love in this cadre of genesis mythology with Aristophanes who introduces it as a god once more, rich with mysteries and worthy of the highest cult. Love is something deeper and more ultimate than a passion for sensual gratification. For the intense yearning which each of the halves has for the other, says Aristophanes, does not appear to be simply a desire for sexual intercourse but for something else which the soul wants but cannot express, and of which it has only a dark and doubtful presentiment.[67] Beyond this Aristophanes himself does not push. The one who does at Agathon's symposium is Socrates; for, it will be recalled that even when he openly denied that Love was neither the search for the other half nor for the whole, unless it was good, he still based his doctrine of wisdom as the ultimate aim of Love on Love itself, thus possibly introducing into the discussion that dimension in the metaphysics of androgyne mythology in which the protogonous nature as Eros is found associated, at its highest elevation, with supreme enlightenment.

The barest hint of the potentiality for such an esoteric interpretation is found in the last of the popular names of Phanes, Metis. Metis is 'wisdom' such as is possessed by Zeus; it is personified as his first wife or Śakti, who is, interestingly enough, swallowed by him and thus incorporated in him., rendering him not only the wisest of gods and men but a veritable

66· *fr.* 17. vs. 22–24.
67· *ibid.* 192c.

androgyne.[63] Etymologically it belongs with the verb AMŌ, which has its ancient roots in *men-* and *man-*in many Indo-European languages and may go on to give the word 'man' a deeper significance in the light of androgyne mythology with its widespread derivatives meaning both 'eager desire' and reflection.' It may be equivalent to the element of knowledge and bliss which is, in classical yoge, attendant upon the recovery, through *samādhi*, of the original non-duality of the primordial situation.

In Tantric *yoga*, the absolute reality contains all the dualities and contraries gathered into a state of absolute Unity *(advaya)*., Creation involves the fragmentation of this primordial Unity and the separation of the two contrary principles incarnate in Śiva and Śakti. All relative existence implies a state of duality, which is, of suffering, illusion and 'slavery.' The ultimate endeavour of the *tantrika* is the reunion of these two contrary principles, Śiva and Śakti, within his own body, achieving thereby the lost androgynism of man. Androgynization is only part of the *coincidentia oppositorum* that works towards this Unity, but it is, in Tantric thought, one of the most fundamental and significant. It is this Unity that is immanent in the concept of the cosmological Egg or a primal totality in the shape of a sphere, from which everything has its origin, and in the activation of this cosmological process, in the concept of the primeval androgynous being who issues from, or is identified with, this Egg.

Influence of the androgyne myth is strong on the mystic Christian sects, as is evident in their concept of the Fall and the restoration of man. Adamas, the first human, is for the Naasenes both a man and a woman. God, then, in whose image he was created, is also an arsenothelys, and through Adamas so are we, every single man and woman. The Fall involves the disintegration of man's original androgynism. According to the *Gospel of Philip*,[69] the division of the sexes, the creation of Eve from the body of Adam, was the principle of death. The Naasenes saw the Fall not only as the disintegration of Creation but also as the origin of suffering-thus endowing a fundamentally cosmological account, implicit in the myth of androgynism, with an ethico-religious dimension, as in Aristophanes, story of the *Symposium*. What is quite new in the Christian redaction is the accomodation of the arrival of the Saviour into the scheme of things. This takes on the purpose of re-establishing what was thus divided with the Fall and of reuniting the opposites to which it gave rise in the universe. Those who died because they were in separation he will restore to life by reimiting them.[70] The re-integration of the sexes is one aspect of the vast process of cosmic unification that will be achieved through him. This

68. Hesiod, *Theog.* 886 *ff.*

69. Codex X from Chenoboskion. See J. Doresse, *Les Livres secrets des gnostiques*, vol ii, Paris, 195), p. 157. Leone Ebreo *(Dialoghi d'Amore* ed. Caramella Bari, 1929 pp.417 *ff.)* tried to connect Aristophanes myth with the Biblical event of the Fall interpreted as a dichotomy of Primal Man.

70. Doresse *loc. cit.*; Eliade, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

unification of opposites in the world is the Kingdom of Heaven, which, Jesus tells Salome in the *Pistis Sophia*,[71] will be achieved "when you shall have trampelled underfoot the garment of shame; when that which is without shall be as that which is within; when there shall be neither male nor female, but male and female shall be as one." In the *Gospel of St, Thomas*[72] he tells his disciples more or less the same thing: "And when you make the inner as the outer, and the outer as the inner, and the upper as the lower, and when you make male and female into a single one, so that male shall not be male and female shall not be female, then shall you enter (the Kingdom)." He is himself this Unity made flesh and, in the resurrection, is "neithrr man nor woman, though he was born and died a man."[73] "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus."[74]

How much of this is influenced by Hinduism, how much, (even indirectly), by Greek teaching centering upon the androgynism of Phanes it is not easy to determine. A *coincidentia oppositoum* is strongly evident in the speculations of the philosopher Heracleitus, with the further identification of all these ultimately with Zeus.[75] Again, Orphic more than Hindu or Buddhist would be the involvement of the female energy in the capacity of Wisdom (Sophia) but in a cosmogonical role, as is found in the Grostic account in the *Epistle of Eugostus the Blessed*.[76] Taken together with other manifest features, it may well involve material originating with the lost myth of Phanes. For, in passing from his account of the Infinite to the Unbegotten, Eugnostus speaks of the self-begotten Father as having produced an androgynous man, whose masculine name is lost to us, but whose feminine name is Sophia-Pansophos. This immortal being, in addition to mubh else and by uniting himself with his Sophia, produced a hermaphrodite son.

> This son is the first generative Father, the Son of Man, who is called Adam of the Light . . . . . He joins with his Sophia and procuces a great androgynous light, which is, by its masculine name, the Saviour, creator of all things, and by its feminine name, Sophia, the all-mother, who is also called Pistis. From these two are born six other pairs of spiritual androgynes, who produced seventy-two, then three hundred and sixty other entities. . . . . .

71· Cf. Clement *Strom.* 3·13 and his Second Epistle quoted by Doresse ii. p. 157.

72· Doresse *ibid.* p. 95; R. M. Grant, *The Secret Sayings of Jesus*, New York, 1960, p. 143 *ff.*

73· Scot Erigena *De Div. Nat.* ii. 4; ii. 8, 12, 14.

74· *Galatians* 3. 28.

75· fr. 67 esp. Heracloitus (c. 500 B. C.) son of apriest and from Ephesus on the eastern sea-board of the Aegean, a city strongly subject to oriental influence. He was well-known for his concept of reality as an ever-living Fire and his doctrine of the impermanence of all things.

76· Doresse *op. cit.*, i, 1958, p. 211. The principal teachings of this epistle appear in *The Sophia of Jesus*, another Gnostic text from Chenoboskion.

Śiva-Virāj, Zeus-Phanes-and now we have God-Adam. 'Adam of the Light' emulates Phanes, 'the Shining One'. He is likewise *'protogonos'* that is, 'First-born'. Sophia is the personification of the *metis* of Phanes-though, interestingly, treated as the Śakti of Adam. The life-giving power of phanes as Erikepaios is delegated to their emanence, the androgynous light which, by its masculine name is the Saviour, and by its feminine, Sophia.

More possitive evidence of the influence of Phanism appears in another Gnostic work, drawing along with it traces of the zoogony of Love of Empedoces, if not of his source of it. This manuscript, which is without a little and appears in the tenth codex of the Chenoboskion papyri and is numbered 40 in Doresse's inventory,[77] speaks of the appearance in the cosmogony of male-female Eros, whose masculinity is made of the fire of the light and whose femininity is a spirit distilled from the blood of the Pronoia While the influence of this Eros waxes over 'the daughters of the Pronoia, the plants, animals and birds make their first appearance, and a man is fashioned who is both male and female. This man, says the text, the Greeks call Hermaphrodite; the Hebrews call his mother, Eve from Löe. Doresse, who finds this borrowing from Hellenic mythology most remarkable however fails to trace its source beyond the references to the god in Hesiod's *Theogony* and the *Danaids* of Aeschylus.

Buddhist tantra represents numerous states of awareness by means of Buddhas of symbolic colours who meditate in sexual union with female figures who are comparable with the feminine Sophia of the Christian account, in combination with whom Adam produces the great androgynous light, called 'Wisdoms'. These states of awareness are of all the delusions that are engendered by a particular emotion and a particular mayic function of the mind. It is the female wisdom-state with whom he is in union which enables each Buddha to conjure these emotions, and meditation upon these iconographic representations assists the meditator to evoke like states of realization by identifying himself with each Buddha. Even if basically derived from the concept of Śakti, the role of such Wisdoms is not cosmogonical as that of Sophia in the Eugnostus account; they may rather be said to be ancillae to the very opposite process, the Tantric ascent to the bliss of supreme enlightment. Metis, the wisdom-aspect of Phanes, on the other hand, is already present in his androgynism and creative role, while the recognition of Adam as 'the first generative Father' and the further identification of him with Light also point strongly to Phanes as his prototype.

Many of the sexo-yogic āsanas of Tantra seek to effect the deepest penetration and unity between the participants. In these the woman displays her 'creeper-like' nature, clinging passionately to the seated or

77. *The Secret Books of the Egyptian Gnostics*, New York, 1960, pp. 165 f.

standing male. In the seated postures of the meditative Buddha of Tibetan art, the female Wisdom sits upon his lap, resting her buttocks upon his open palms, legs wound round his hips and arms thrown about his neck, while she rests her face lovingly against his. In the standing postures, both of the Buddhas and other deities of the Tibetan pantheon, the nude or semi-nude females cling limpet-like to their bodies, often embracing them with hands or legs.[78]

The female with whom the ultimate union is sought, however, is not the physical 'other half'; it is, rather, the female energy within the *tantrika* himself. The pressures exerted by the various postures of sexual congress are themselves esoteric techniques by which he seeks to stir the *kundalinī* which resides in snake-form at the base of his pelvis, coiled round an inner *liṅgam* and covering its mouth with hers, and to send her coursing up through the *suṣumna*. His aim is to achieve this as often as possible and as long as possible, until in the end virtually permanently. Buddhist Tantra visualizes the ascent of the conscious energy in the form of an "inner maiden', the 'red Ḍākini'. In either case the expcrience culminates in the encounter of the female energy with the male seed of Being and the sexual union of the two. The spiritual orgasm takes the form of a supernatural nectar which suffuses the whole being of the *tantrika*, the ecstasy of which involves the identification of the source of self with the world which lies beyond the crown of the head. The artistic expsession of this, the great bird, equated with the Persian Simurg[79] and sometimes shown carrying a pair of lovers, throws the mind back to the prominently winged and bisxual god of the Orphics.

The 'left-handed' or orgiastic path of Hindu Tantra *(vāmācāra)* seeks to unify the two contrary principles, Śiva and Śakti, within the body of the *yogi* himself, but the technique of evocation remains sexual congress between *yogi* and *kāmini*, and in this form, the whole exercise retains its fundamentally physical basis. It is only when the seed is stirred erotically that it can be absorbed mentally. Lose of semen is, however, loss of power. So, together with sexual congress is practised the retention of the seed *(coitus reservatus)* and the redirection of it as Śakti, in the shape of a serpent *(kuṇḍalinī)*, from the base of the body through the medial channel, or *suṣumna*, to the highest centre of the brain. This is symbolized as *kailāsa*, which is etymologically explained as the place of dalliance, that is,

78. Notable among the latter is the 18th century bronze, studded with jewels, which depicts a wild-eyed male 'destroyer of death' almost falling back under sexual onslaught of his female Wisdom. To the former belongs the 16th century icon of gilt bronze, also jewel-studded, of a seated male with female on his lap and facing him, who embrace and kiss with such total absorption, almost amounting to rapt, that they seem physically and spiritually to have melted into a single unity. See Philip Rawson, *Tantra: the Indian Cult of Ecstasy*, London, 1973, plates on pp. 41 and 42 respectively.

79. Rawson, *ibid.* p. 29.

"an ideal eminence or the towering peak of all physical impulses and amorous dalliances where Śiva and Pārvatī, or Nara and Nārī of each individual centre sit in embrace and enjoy for the full session of Life."[80]

At this mystical height, not only is the union evoked though sex not with man's physical counterpart, woman, but Love, in whose praise the whole myth of Aristophanes, indeed, the entire symposium at Agathon's house, was dedicated, is himself defeated and destroyed. The hostility of the asectic to the erotic is illustrated in Hindu mythology in the conflict between Śiva and Kāma, and in the burning of Kāma. The errect *liṅga*, swollen with the potentiality for creation, is not a mere symbol of lust; it is, at the same time and paradoxically, the symbol of chastity, of the retention of the seed and its redirection upwards *(ūrdhvaretas)*. Similarly all representations of the god which show him itpphallic *(ūrdhvaliṅga* or *ūrdhvamedhra)*. The most powerful iconographic expression of this grand achievement is the Gūḍimallam liṅga, coming down from the 1st century B. C. which shows a naked Śiva standing upon the shoulders of a squatting *yakṣa* before a lofty tumescent penis which rears its engorged glans like a war-head.[81]

The destruction of Kāma figures prominently in the mythology of Śiva. Śiva is the natural enemy of Kāma because he is the paragon of chastity, the eternal *brahmacārin*, the very incarnation of ascetism *(tapas)*. Thus, when Himālaya tries to bring Pārvati, his daughter, to the god, Śiva says:[82]

> This girl with her magnificient buttocks must not come near me. I insist upon this. Wise men know that a woman is the very form of enchantment, especially a young woman, the destruction of ascetics. I am an ascetic, a *yogi*, so what need have I of a woman? An ascetic must never have contact with women.

Paradoxically, then, the androgyne god has ended up as a mysogyne. He who began as bisexual, and therefore asexual, divided his nature into male and female, thus engendering (and in the Greek tradition, identifying himself with) Love, which draws the two halves together in sex, now

80· Agrawala, *ibid*. p. 48. In a work called , *Ānandānubhava* (no. 242, Shikaripur. Taluk, Shinoga Dist. Mysore) it is stated that Sakti is the form of the pleasure derivable from *guhya*, the female organ, and that Siva is the *linga*. From the union of the two is the cause of the joy found in the universe.

81· Called *Paraśurāmēśvara* and still in pūjā, it is five feet in height and of reddish igneous rock. Rao, T. Gopinath, *Elements of Hindu Iconography*. ii, pt. 1, Madras, 1916, p.65) , thinks it is perhaps the oldest known Hindu icon. The well-formed figure of Siva personifying his own *liṅga (purushavigraha)* wears a turban made of his own plaited hair; the finely pleated cloth wrapped round his thighs leaves his genital exposed. He stands feet astride on the shoulders of a giant *yakṣa* or *rākṣaṣa* the *apasmāra purusha* or *mala*. demoniac symbol of spiritual darkness (A.K. Coomaraswamy, *Yakṣas*, Washington, 1926, p. 8), who nevertheless wears a benign smile. on his face.

82· *Śiva Purāṇa* 2. 3. 12. quoted by O' Flaherty op. ci.t p. 141.

finally, with the sublimation of the episode to a spiritual plane, rejects the other half, and together with it, Eros (or Kāma Dēva) himself. The beauteous form of women, which Empedocles says sets in motion the semen in men, now, in the magnificint buttocks of Himālaya's daughter, becomes a destruction to the asceticism of Śiva and his *yogis*. "I burnt Kāma," says Siva, "for the success of all creatures and as a great favour for the gods. Let everyone remain without desire, as I am, and do *tapas* zealously, and by this meditation without desire you will obtain supreme bliss..... The pratice of marriage is not suitable for me. There are many evil attachments in the world, but the atrachment to a woman is the worst, a great shackle that cannot be broken."[83]

Yet, the selfsame god who burnt Kāma is himself, in many accounts said to have been burnt by Kāma and, despite the contradiction, the role of Love remains powerfully with Siva. The god whom the *Mahābhārata*[84] flaunted as the only one who shared his body with his wife and was is able to subjugate Kāma admits that he himself is vanquished. "My heart is being burnt by Kāma–and for the sake of the good of all, and for the increase of progeny–I have had the idea of taking a wife."[85]

> Siva looked at Pārvati and thought, "What pleasure it would be to embrace her," but in a moment he realised, "If I, thus deluded, desire the joy of touching a woman's body then what can one expect, of a mere lowly man? ..... Waiting for the wedding, even Siva, the lord of all, was in the power of Kāma, deluded by Kāma just like an ordinary man. For Kāma is powerful among man and has conquered the whole universe. He is the king."[86]

This contradictory attitudes to Love in Tantra show that, while the supreme achievement of its asceticism negates eroticism, like the ascent to wisdom of the Socratic daemon, it nevertheless launches itself from eroticism. The movement of the seed, which, directed upwards, unifies the respective serpent-powers of the male and female forms at the highest seat of tne brain, is induced by sexual stimulation at the base of the body. Metis, then, is not without Eros. Siva himself thus acknowledges the power of Kāma, and the god of the *ardhanārisvara* form, who is himself defeated and burnt by Love's fire, pays him a tribute which those who rose to speak in praise of him in Agathon's house had already so completely endorsed.

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83. *ibid.* 2·3·24·18–28; 2·2·16·30–36; 2·3·24·60–75; cf. *Skanda Purāṇa* 1·1·22·19–27. O' Flaherty, op. cit p. 44.

84. 13 append. i. no. 5 47–50; cf. *Kathāsāritsāgara* 114·1.

85. *Mahābhāgavata* 24·28 and 33, also 25·25; cf. *Vamana* 6·36. See W. D. O'Flaherty, *Asceticism and Eroticism in the Mythology of Siva*, London, 1973, pp. 145 ff. Translations from Hindu texts appearing in this article largely follow those appearing in this excellent work.

86. *Śiva Purāṇa* Jñānasaṃhitā 10·73b and *Skanda Purāna* 1·1·24· 52–55.

A Prince - Consort at the Royal Court at Polonnaruva

A critique of Professor Paranavitana's interpretation of the slab incription of Nissamkamalla at Polonnaruva- *Epigraphia Zeylanica* Vol. V No. 17.

One is always grateful for the slightest shred of reliable evidence which helps one to elucidate some of the more obscure points in the early history of Sri Lanka and the re-edition of the slab inscription at Polonnaruva by Professor S. Paranavitane in the *Epigraphia Zeylanica*, Vol. V, Part II in 1963 was extremely welcome. D. M. de Z. Wickramasinghe who had edited this inscription earlier in the *Epigraphia Zeylanica*, Vol. II, attributed it to Vijayabāhu II. This was pointed out to be erroneous by H. C. P. Bell[1] who sought to establish the view that its author was Nissaṅkamalla. In his edition, Paranavitana comes out strongly in support of Bell, adding futher arguments to his assertions. Their joint reasoning is sufficiently convincing to establish beyond any reasonable doubt that Nissaṅkamalla and not Vijayabāhu II was the author of the Polonnaruva slab inscription. Viewed in this light the contents of the inscription are extremely significant in that one gets a fresh insight into some of the more traumatic events which followed the death of Parākramabāhu I. These events have not been satisfactorily understood due to inadequate source material, and here Paranavitana makes an effort to resolve one of the more thorny points at issue – the question of the succession to the throne after Parākramabāhu I. In the course of this excercise, he introduces us to a 'Prince – Consort' at the royal court at Polonnaruva. What is proposed here is an examination of Paranavitana's theory with a view to testing its plausibility and historical validity.

At the outset it might be worth commenting on the term 'Prince-Consort'. According to accepted usage a Prince-Consort is the husband of a reigning queen who is himself a prince.[2] This definition is certainly not applicable to Nissaṅkamalla, the recipient of this title and neither does Paranavitana ascribe such a position to him. What he takes to be a Prince-Consort is a prince who becomes eligible to the throne by becoming the consort of the daughter of a reigning king. This mixing up of terms adds confusion to an already cloudy issue and therefore in the first instance the term 'Prince-Consort' should never have been used in the present context. It is indeed not necessary to argue that Nissaṅkamalla was not a 'Prince-Consort'. Technically he simply did not occupy such a position. On the contrary he was a fully independent monarch and had no reservations about

1. *Ceylon Antiquary and Literary Register*, Vol. V, pp. 24 – 28.
2. *Oxford Dictionary*

his claims to sovereign status. The problem however does not end here. Leaving aside that faulty understanding of the term 'Prince-Consort', Paranavitana's views regarding the actual position of Nissaṅkamalla *vis-a-vis* the royal family at Polonnaruva merits investigation. To put it differently-what we are considering here is whether Nissaṅkamalla's claims to the throne of Polonnaruva rested on his matrimonial connections.

According to the *Cūlavaṃsa*, the main chronicle which relates the history of this period, Parākramabāhu I was succeeded by his sister's son, Vijayabāhu II. After a year's reign he was killed by a usurper, Mahinda, who in turn was set aside after five days by Kittinissaṅka, the *uparāja* or sub-king of Vijayabāhu II.[3] Apart from stating the fact that Kittinissaṅka was born in Kaliṅga, the *Cūlavaṃsa* provides us with no information regarding his relationship to tha ruling dynasty and nothing in said about his right to the throne of Polonnaruva. Howerer, Kittinissanka, better known as Nissaṅkamalla, has in his own inscriptions tried to make good this ommission by providing his readers with a certain amount of bio-data. It is in this respect that the slab inscription at Polonnaruva proves helpful. It purports to record a grant of lands by Nissaṅkamalla to an official for loyal services rendered to him at the time of his accession. While on this subject, Nissaṅkamalla sets out the circumstances leading up to his accession and his relationship to Parākramabāhu I. The passage relevant to this discussion reads as follows:-

> Parākramabāhu vat-himiyan vahanse svavaṃsaya mattata da pavatnā kämätivä pūrva rājayan koṭa ā paridden mä Siṁha purayata yavā bänanuvan vahanse genvā taman vahanse namulā himiyā paṭa bandavā.....rājyaya sanātha koṭa[4]

Paranavitana's translation:-

> His majesty, the Lord Parākramabāhu.....desirous of the continuance of his own lineage in the furture also, sent (emissaries) to Siṁhapura even as previous kings had continued to do, brought over His Highness, the son-in-law (of his), conferred (on that prince) his own title, invested him with the insignia of Prince Consort.....Having thus provided for the stability of the kingdom.....

The key word here is *bāna*. It could either mean nephew or son-in-law. The use of the one word to denote two separate types of relationship was perhaps natural in a society where there was cross-cousin marriage, for one's nephew was often one's son-in-law as well. Therefore Nissaṅkamalla was either the nephew or the son-in-law of Parākramabāhu I or both. At the time Wickramasinghe identified the auther of the present inscription as Vijayabāhu II, the term *bāna* presented no difficulties. It was taken as

3. *Cūlavaṃsa*, Vol. II, P. T. S., 1927, Edited W. Geiger Chapter LXXX, vv. 1-19
4. *Epigraphia Zeylanica (EZ)*, Vol. V, No. 17, p. 205, 1·15-22.

confirming the statement in the *Cūlavamsa* that Vijayabāhu II was the nephew of Parākramabāhu I.[5] Bell, who thought differently, also took the word *bāna* to mean 'nehpew', and assumed that Nissaṅkamalla was also a nephew of Parākramabāhu I[6]. Paranavitana, however, prefers the alternative meaning of son-in-law, a view which he tries to mintain with the help of other sources as well, specially the Galpota inscription of Nissaṅkamalla.[7] But here again we are not presented with straight facts but a possible interpretation of words which supports his own particular theory.

The Galpota inscription provides us with a rather eulogistic account of the career of Nissaṅkamalla and here again there is a brief reference to the circumstances relating to the accession of the monarch. It corroborates the statement in the Polonnaruva slab inscription that Nissaṅkamalla was invited to Sri Lanka with a view to nominating him as a successor. The ruler who did so is not referred to by name but is described as a 'senior kinsman' *(kulajetu)* of Nissaṅkamalla.[8] This could be no other than Parākramabāhu I and the fact that he is referred to as a *kulajetu* makes it amply clear that he was a family relative at the time Nissaṅkamalla was invited over.

Regarding the claims of Nissaṅkamalla to the throne of Polonnaruva, the Galpota inscription reads, "*taman yona parapuren himi lakdiva.*"[9] This could be translated as "his own maiden, the island of Lanka, that belonged to him by right of hereditary descent." Paranavitana offers a different interpretation which would support his earlier contention that Nissaṅkamalla was the son-in-law of Parākramabāhu I. He says "the word *yona* in this place may be the same as the Sanskrit *yauna* - relationship by marriage."[10] If this is accepted, the translation would be 'the island of Lanka, which belonged to him through the lineage of his marriage. "The possibility of *yona* being the same as Sanskrit *yauna* was considered by Codrington as far back as 1924 and rejected. He preferred the usual meaning of the word *yon* which is 'maiden'.[11] A familiar expression met with in inscriptional records of rulers from about the 10th century A. D. onwards is *lakdiva polo yon parapuren himi* and has been translated as 'by right of descent the lord of the young damsel that is the earth of the island of Lanka.' Variant forms such as *lakdiva polo nava yon parapuren himi*,[12] where the earth of Sri Lanka is compared to a 'young maiden', and *lakdiva polo mehesana parapuren himi*[13] where the comparison is to a 'queen' are

5. *EZ*, Vol. II, No. 30, pp. 179 – 180
6. *Ceylon Antiquary and Literary Register*, Vol. Vol. V, p. 27
7. *EZ*, Vol. II, No. 17
8. *Ibid.*, p. 109, 1·5
9. *Ibid.*
10. *EZ*, Vol. V, p. 201
11. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (Ceylon Branch)*, Vol. 29, p. 308.
12. *Archaeological Survey of Ceylon, Seventh Progress Report*, p. 66
13. *EZ*, Vol. I, p. 25, 1·4–5.

frequently met with in the inscriptions of this period. *Lakdiva polo yon parapuren himi* occurs in Nissaṅkamalla's own inscriptions on more than one occasion,[14] and the fact that it is a mechanical repetition of an expression which had been in use for almost two centuries or more is sufficient proof that it was not used to convey the idea of a special situation where a ruler succeeds to the throne by virtue of his marriage. Paranavitana bases his arguments on the slight change in format in the Galpota record. Here the word *yona* is qualified by *taman* – 'his own' and the words *lakdiva* and *yona* are not juxtaposed. Such stylistic changes are not unusual as in the instance of *nava yon* noticed already and there is no reason to reject the traditional meaning of this expression. As pointed out earlier Nissaṅkamalla does use the old formula more than once where it is very clear that his claims to legitimacy lay through his own lineage and not through that of his queen. This is reiterated in many of his inscriptions, suffice to make reference to just two instances. In one he says that the island of Lanka belonged to his own dynasty in hereditary succession *(sva-vaṃsayata paramparāyāta laṅkādvīpaya)*.[15] The same idea is repeated once again when he says that Sri Lanka belonged to him through the lineage of Vijaya *(Vijayarāja paramparāyen laṅkāva himi)*.[16] There is no reason why he should have made conflicting claims. Unless there is independent evidence to prove that Nissaṅkamalla was the son-in-law of Parākramabāhu I and hence his claims to the throne, one has to reject the view of Paranavitana that in the Galpota record we have a clever manipulation of the words of a familiar expression to suit the peculiar position of Nissaṅkamalla *vis-a-vis* the royal family at Polonnaruva.

The title *himiyā* which Parākramabāhu I is said to have conferred on Nissaṅkamalla, having invited him over to Sri Lanka is another point which Paranavitana interprets in his favour. According to his interpretation of the Polonnaruva slab inscription Parākramabāhu I got down his son-in-law *(bäna)* to Sri Lanka, conferred on him his own title *(taman vahanse namulā)* and invested him with the insignia of 'Prince Consort' *(himiyā pata bandavā)*.[17] Thus Nissaṅkamalla was already the son-in-law of Parākramabāhu I when he came over and was given the title *himiyā* after his arrival. *Himiyā* means 'lord' or 'husband'. Paranavitana chooses to adopt the second meaning thereby reducing Nissaṅkamalla to a somewhat ridiculous position. The implication is that Parākramabāhu conferred on a prince who was already his son-in-law a title which simply meant 'husband'. The absurdity of this has obviously occurred to Paranavitana for he goes to the Galpota record for refuge. Here Nissaṅkamalla's titles prior to kingship are given as *āpā himiyā*.[18] As *himiyā* occurs in isolation in the

14. EZ, Vol. II, No. 42, p. 285; EZ, Vol. I, No. 9, p. 129
15. *Ibid.*, No. 13, p. 78, *I*·3–4
16. EZ, Vol. V, No. 43, p. 433, 1·1–3
17. *Ibid.*, No. 17, *I*·14–23
18. EZ, Vol. II, No. 17, p. 109, 1·6

earlier record we could take it that it was a title distinct from *āpā*. Paranavitana, however, takes *āpā himiyā* as a single title meaning 'Prince-Consort' which he would like to call the "full title".[19] It is unfair to assume that the earlier writer used only half the title, thus subjecting Nissaṅkamalla to an unnecessarily ridiculous position. Speaking of the consecration of Nissaṅkamalla the Polonnaruva slab inscription once again refers to him as *himiyānanvahanse (rājyayehi himiyananvahanse abhisikta va)*[20] making it eminently clear that it was a title independent of *āpā*. We have therefore to look elsewhere for a more plausible explanation of this term.

Alternative forms of *himiyā* and *himiyānanvahanse* are *svāmiyā* and *svāminvahanse*. These are common enough in the inscriptions of this period, sometimes used as an honorific as in *Kalyāṇavatīsvāminvahanse*[21] and at other times as a title as in the reference to the father of Vijayabāhu I in the Panākaduva copper plates – *apa piya mahasämiya Mugalan rajapāvahanse*.[22] In this latter example *mahasämiya (mahasvāmi)* is definitely a title given to Mugalan and this finds confirmatson in the *Cūḷavaṁsa*, which states that Mugalan was known as Mahāsāmi.[23] There is nothing to suggest that Mugalan was the son-in-law of an earlier ruler and was given this title for such reason. Thus *'himiyā'* can be explained in terms of current usage and it is not an unusual title for which a special explanation need be offered.

Yet another argument of Paranavitane centres on the statement in the inscription that Parākramabāhu I sent (emissaries) to Siṁhapura, even as previous kings had continued to do and brought over his son-in-law/ nephew *(bäna)*. He argues that there is no instance on record of a nephew being brought from Siṁhapura,[24] but one could argue with equal justification that there is no record of a son-in-law being brought from there either. He gets round this by saying that this is a general reference to matrimonial alliances with Kaliṅga for it is on record that princesses were brought from Kaliṅga to wed members of the Sinhalese royal family.[25] A much more plausible view is that this refers to an episode in the Vijayan period to which Nissaṅkamalla always harks back. According to his own statements, Nissaṅkamalla's claims to legitimacy rested on his Kaliṅga lineage to which the first king of Sri Lanka, Vijaya, belonged, a point stressed in this very same inscription.[26] It is Vijaya who has first gone on

19· *EZ*, Vol V, p. 201
20· *Ibid.*, No. 17, p. 205, 1·27–28
21· *Ibid.*, No. 12, p. 158, 1·11
22· *Ibid.*, No. 1, p. 21, 1·3
23· Ch. LVII, vv. 30 & 49
24· *EZ.*, Vol. V, p. 200
25· *EZ.*, Vol. V, p. 200
26· *Ibid.*, No. 17, 1·8–15

record as having sent messengers to Siṁhapura to invite a worthy successor to the throne[27] and Parākramabāhu's invitation to Nissaṅkamalla, also sent to Siṁhapura, is thus linked up with hallowed tradition.

Further evidence in support of his views has been found by Paranavitana in the name of a *stupa*, Subhaddā Cetiya, built by Parākramabāhu I. The king built two *stupas* in the Ālāhana Parivena, the Rūpavati Cetiya and the Subhaddā Cetiya. Rūpavati was the name of his chief queen and it has been argued that Subhaddā could have been his daughter, the same Kaliṅga Subhaddā who was the chief queen of Nissaṅkamalla.[28] This is not completely impossible although it is very strange that Nissaṅkamalla who goes out of his way to mention his association with Parākramabāhu I perfers not to specifically mention that he was married to the great king's daughter. Paranavitana, whose fertile imagination does not work for once tries to side-track the issue by saying "Nissaṅkamalla would have had his own reasons for not mentioning that Kaliṅga Subhadrā was Parākramabāhu's daughter and the chronicler equally valid reasons for his silence about her identity."[29] If one were to speculate in the same strain as Paranavitana it could be suggested that the Subhaddā Cetiya was built in honour of Parākramabāhu's sister, Bhaddavati, who was given in marriage to Gajabāhu.[30] This queen could easily have come to live in the court of Parākramabāhu I after the death of Gajabāhu.[31] Even if one were to concede that Nissaṅkamalla eventually became the son-in-law of Parākramabāhu, this is certainly not what he is claiming when he calls himself the *bāna* of Parākramabāhu I.

Nissaṅkamalla's position becomes clearer when one takes into consideration the fact that he was not the immediate successor of Parākramabāhu I and was not even intended as such. According to the present inscription which finds corroboration in the *Cūlavamsa*, Parākramabāhu's immediate successor was Vijayabāhu II. The inscription reads "The Lord Parakramabāhu·····in course of time attained heaven. And after that His Majesty Vijayabāhu was conscecrated according to seniority."[32] It is consequent to the death of Vijayabāhu that Nissaṅkamalla ascended the throne. Therefore it was seniority *(jyestha kramayen)* that gave Vijayabāhu precedence over Nissaṅkamalla. Vijayabāhu is known to have been a nephew of Parākramabāhu I and it would seem that Nissaṅkamalla had the same relationship but was the younger of the two.

So we come back to the original problem i. e. the precise relationship between Parākramabāhu I and Nissaṅkamalla, for which Paranavitana offered his own solution. It is on record that Parākramabāhu had three

27· *Mahāvaṃsa*, P. T. S. 1908, Edited by W. Geiger, Ch. VIII, vv. 1–7
28· *EZ.*, Vol. V, p. 201
29· *Ibid.*
30· *Cūlavaṃsa*, Vol. I, P. T. S. 1925, Edited by Geiger, Ch. LXVI, v. 147
31· Gajabāhu was the cousin and predecessor of Parākramabāhu I at Polonnaruva.
32· *EZ.*, Vol. V, No. 17, 1·15–24

sisters, Mittā, Pabhāvati, and Bhaddavatī.[33] Vijayabāhu II, whose personal name was Kitti,[34] has been identified with Kittisirimegha, the son of Parākramabāhu's sister, Pabhāvati, who was married to Mānābharaṇa, the ruler of Rohaṇa[35]. If Nissaṅkamalla was also a sister's son of Parākramabāhu then Pārvatīdevi, the mother of Nissaṅkamalla[36] should also have been a sister of Parākramabāhu. The chronicle does not refer to any sister by that name and here one can only enter the realms of conjecture. The name Pārvati used in a Pāli text would be changed to Pābbati. A later copyist could have thought this to be a mistake for Pabhāvati, a more familiar name. The problem does not end here for Nissaṅkamalla's father was a Sri Jayagopa from Kaliṅga.[37] Once again one can only speculate. Mānābharaṇa, the husband of Pabhāvati / Pārvati died on the eve of the second consecration of Parākramabāhu I[38], which took place in the second year of his reign (A. D. 1154).[39] Therefore, Mānābharaṇa could certainly not have been the father of Nissaṅkamalla, for the date of the birth of Nissaṅkamalla can be fixed according to the Galpota inscription, which was Buddha Era 1700,[40] i. e. A. D. 1157. This would mean that Nissaṅkamalla was born in the third year of Parākramabāhu's reign. One can suggest that Pabhāvati / Pārvati went over to Kaliṅga and married Jayagopa after the death of Mānābharaṇa.[41] Thus the heirs of Parākramabāhu I were the two sons of his sister, Pārvati and they ascend the throne in order of seniority *(jyestha kramayen)*. This term would hardly be meaningful if the relationship of Vijayabāhu II and Nissaṅkamalla to Parākramabāhu I was as disparate as nephew and son-in-law. If such had been the case the relationship to Parākramabāhu I and not seniority would have been the deciding factor in the order of succeession.

Although the author of the *Cūlavaṃsa* gives the name Kittinissaṅka to Nissaṅkamalla,[42] the Minipe slab inscription makes it quite clear that Kitti and Nissaṅka were two different princes.[43] It would seem that they were the two sons of Pārvati, the sister of Parākramabāhu I and that they had similar claims to the throne of Polonnaruva and ascended the throne in order of seniority.

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33. *Cūlavaṃsa* Vol. I, Ch.LXII, v. 3; Ch. LXVI, v. 147
34. *EZ.*, Vol. V, No. 12, 1·36
35. W. Soratha – *Kavsilumina*, 1947, p. 6 ff.
36. *EZ.*, Vol. V, No. 17, p. 115, 1·2–7
37. *Ibid*,
38. *Cūlavaṃsa* Vol. I, Ch. LXXII, vv. 301 – 311
39. *Ibid.*, v. 329
40. *EZ.*, Vol. II, No. 17, p. 115, 1·2–7
41. In fact Ratnāvalī, the mother of Parākramabāhu I had always desired to marry her daughters to princes of the Kaliṅga lineage. She most vehemently opposed Mānābharaṇa's proposal to marry one of her daughters and it was in the teeth of opposition that the marriage eventually took place *(Cūlavaṃa*, Vol. I, Ch. LXIII, vv. 6–17). Therefore with Mānābharaṇa out of the way, it is not surprising that the cherished linkage with the Kaliṅgas was eventually realised.
42. *Cūlavaṃsa* Vol. II, Ch. LXXX, v. 18
43. *EZ*, Vol. V, No. 12, 1·36

Causal Determinism or Scientific Realism? A Dilemma for Feyerabendian Meaning Variance*

Introduction

The emergence of what is commonly referred to as relativism in the philosophy of science has drawn much attention since the early sixties. Realtivism has more or less influenced most discussions in the philosophy of science for over a dozen years since. Its two main protoganists have been Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. Kuhn's book, *The Structure of Scientiffic Revolutions*[1] as well as Feyerabend's paper, *Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism*,[2] both celebrated works, appeared in 1962. These, together, laid a formidable argument for relativism. None the less, relativism is more a phenomenon of the times. Views relevant to it could be found in the writings in the fifties and the sixties of not only Kuhn and Feyerabend but other eminent philosophers, logicians, scientists and historians of science like Wittgenstein, Quine, Koyre, Hanson, Polyani and Toulmin.[3]

Relativism, as it is presented by its numerous protoganists, has a common core but is no one thesis.[4] The relativism of Feyerabend, for example, is directly associated by him with his realism. The purpose of the present paper is to argue that Feyerabend's contention that scientific theory should be amenable to realistic interpretation in *his* sense of realism is not consistent with relativism. Other writers have argued that realism (in any sense) cannot be coupled with relativism,[5] but this, in my view, is a mistake. On the otherhand, there *is* a contradiction, a very fundamental condradiction in fact, in the Feyerabendian view of "realism *and* relativism", but this has not drawn the attention of Feyerabend's critics possibly due to its submerged nature in the corpus of Feyerabend's writings. What will be attempted here is to bring out this basic inconsistency in *his* view of realism and the realtivism which he argues for.

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* The present article is partly based on a Ph. D. dissertation, "Meaning, Method, and Realism" (Cambridge University, 1974). The author is extremely grateful to Prof. Mary B. Hesse, F. B. A., his supervisor, for criticisms and discussions which helped him to clarify the concepts used here; but, ofcourse, the author alone is responsible for any errors and "misunderstandings" that have crept in and for the views expressed here. He also wishes to thank Prof. John Perry, then (1971) of the Department of Philosophy, University of California at Los Angeles, for directing him to the study of certain philosophical papers on quantum mechanics.

1. Kuhn, T.S., *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962.
2. Feyerabend, P.K., "Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism", in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. III, ed. Feigl, H. and Maxwell, G.. Minneapolis: University of Minnesta Press, 1962, pp. 28–97. Hearafter Feyeraband I.
3. Gunaratne, R. D., *Meaning, Method, and Realism*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Cambridge University, 1974, Hereafter, Gunaratne, See pp. 5 – 11.
4. *ibid.*, pp. 2 – 4.
5. See below, p. 77.

Relativism, especially Feyerabend's version of it, has its basis in what is known as the meaning variance thesis (MVT). Briefly, the Feyerabendian version of this thesis could be put thus: the meaning of the terms in each (comprehensive) scientific theory is internal to that theory. Meanings of all (descriptive) terms in successive theories change. (This part of the MVT is known as the Incommensurability thesis). Further, successive theories are inconsistent. (This part of the MVT is known as the Inconsistency thesis). These positions are both descriptive and prescriptive. Descriptive since it is maintained that, in the history of science, when one comprehensive theory is succeeded by another, these successive theories are, in fact, both incommensurable and inconsistent. Prescriptive because Feyerabend thinks that scientists *should* develop incommensurable and inconsistent theories in the same field.[6]

The argument in this paper will proceed, broadly, on the following pattern. First, the sense of Feyerabend's terms 'meaning change', 'theory' and 'language' will be outlined, indicating these to be closely associated with ontology. Next, two types of realism which are termed here metaphysical realism and scientific realism will be distinguished between. Feyerabend's criticism of the Copenhagen Interpretaion of Quantum Mechanics will be examined thereafter and this as a means of arguing that Feyerabend's is a metaphysical realism associated with causal determinism. It will be argued that metaphysical realism and Feyerabend's thesis of meaning variance are in direct contradiction.

Meaning of Meaning Variance

What is taken as the meaning of a term in a scientific theory by Feyerabend and what exactly he means by meaning variance in scientific theory change are points on which there has been much discussion. The present writer has argued elsewhere[7] that Feyerabend's view of theory, ontology, language, and meaning are intimately connected. In order to make the argument in this paper intelligible, it is necessary to give some idea of Feyerabend's use of these terms and their relations in his account.

Theories that Feyerabend is dealing with are, in his own words, comprehensive theories,[8] high level theories,[9] or cosmologies.[10] A theory gives a comprehensive world view, "a theory is a way of looking at the world."[11] Feyerabend goes on to say,

6. Feyerabend, like Popper, his *guru* at one time, thinks that philosophy of science should be prescriptive as well.
7. Gunaratne, pp. 50 – 59.
8. Feyerabend, P.K., "Consolations for the Specialist", in *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, ed. Lakatos, I. and Musgrave, A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 197 – 230. Hereafter, Feyerabend II. See p. 49.
9. Feyerabend, P.K., "Problems of Empiricism", in *Beyond the Edge of Certainty*, ed. Colodny, R. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965, pp. 145–260. Hereafter, Feyerabend III, See p. 216.
10. Feyerabend II, p. 228.
11. Feyerabend I, p. 29:

> When speaking of theories, I shall include myths, political ideas, religious systems, and I shall demand that a point of view so named be applicable to at least some aspect of everything there is. The general theory of relativity is a theory in this sense, "all ravens are black" is not . . . . There are certain similarities between my use of "theory" and Quine's "ontology" . . . Carnap's "linguistic frame works . . . Wittgenstein's "language game" . . . Pareto's "theory". . . Whorf's "metaphysics" . . . Kuhn's "paradigm". . . . I prefer this "accordian" use of the term because it provides a single name for problems which in my presentation are intimately realted . . .".[12]

Two points about his conception of a theory which could be gathered from the above seem to be the following. First, a theory is an ontology and a world view. Next, a theory (or an ontology) is fixed by its "principles" and a language presupposes a theory in the sense of these principles. A theory change thus brings in a change in the language (or the meanings). That a theory is associated with an ontology is seen by Feyerabend's comparison of his theories with Quine's ontologies and Carnap's linguistic frameworks. The association with Carnap's linguistic frameworks also suggests that the principles, key concepts or the "categories" of the theory, determine the language and the meanings based on that theory. The following account by Carnap on linguistic frameworks could be helpful in understanding this point.

> "The acceptance of a new kind of entity is represented in the language by the introduction of a framework of new forms of expressions to be used according to a new set of rules. There may be new names for particular entities of the kind in question; but such names may already occur in the language before the introduction of the new framework . . . . The two essential steps in the introduction of a framework) are . . . first, the introduction of a general term, a predicate of higher level, for the new kind of entities, permitting us to say of any particular entity that it belongs to this kind (e g. "Red is a *property*" "Five is a *number*"). Second, the introduction of variables . . . . From the internal questions we must clearly distinguish external questions, i.e., . . . philosophical questions concerning existence or reality of the total system of the new entities. Many philosophers regard a question of this kind as an ontological question which must be raised and answered *before* the introduction of the new language forms. The latter introduction, they believe, is legitimate

12. Feyerabend, P.K., "Reply to Criticism", in *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, ed. Cohen, R.S. and Wartofsky, M.W. New York: Humanities Press, 1965, pp. 223–261. Hereafter, Feyerabend IV. See p. 252, n. 5. See also 'The Archaeology of Knowledge', by Ian Hacking, in *Cambridge Review*, Vol. 93, No. 2208, June 1972, pp. 166 – 170, where Hacking comments, "Feyerabend's theories are almost as embracing as Foucault's discourses".

only if it can be justified by an ontological insight supplying an affirmative answer to the question of reality.... In contrast...we... (think it) does not imply an assertion of reality".[13]

While Carnap does not consider the "external question" as an ontological question, it can be shown that Feyerabend considers it as an ontological question "answered before the introduction of the new language".[14]

Wittgenstein's "language games" are not ontologies, but the analogy of theories with "language games" indicates the second characteristic of the theories that we mentioned above, viz., that a theory in the sense of its principles is presupposed by a language. That these principles also determine the meanings is seen from the following passage by Feyerabend.

"...the customary concept of meaning is closely connected, not with *definitions* which after all work only when a large part of a conceptual system is already available, but with the idea of a *fundamental rule*, or a *fundamental law*. Changes of fundamental laws are regarded as affecting meanings while changes in the upper layers of our theories are regarded as affecting beliefs only. There exists therefore a rather close connection between meanings and certain parts of theories. Meanings in the sense just explained are also independent of the analytic-synthetic issue. Moreover, it is now quite plausible to assume that meaning-talk can be replaced without residue, by theory talk...."[15]

This passage almost identifies "meaning" with "theory"[16] and is evidence that Feyerabend's "meaning" is only a theory-meaning in the sense that the meaning is (completely) determined by the theory-or the central principles of the theory.

It must be noted here that Feyerabend has not stated clearly what exactly goes into the meaning of a term. He has only said (as above) that it is rule dependent or theory dependent. Further, he has given examples only of changes of meaning of terms-like that of 'mass' from its meaning in Classical Physics to that in Relativity Physics. In the following passage he attempts to explain, not what exactly goes into the meaning of a term, but how the change of meaning (of terms) could be diagnosed, in general.

13. Carnap, R., "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" in *Revue. Intern de. Philo*, 4 1950. Reprinted (with revisions) in *Meaning and Necessity*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956.

14. See Gunaratne, p. 53.

15. Feyerabend IV, p. 259 n. 27.

16. "Identification of meaning with theory is implicit in Feyerabend's paper", comments Hilary Putnam, in "How Not to Talk about Meaning", in *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science*. Vol. III, ed. Cohen, R. S. and Wartofsky, M. W, 1965, pp. 205 – 222.

"... a diagnosis of *stability of meaning* involves two elements. First, reference is made to rules according to which objects or events are collected into classes. We may say that such rules determine concepts or kinds of objects. Secondly, it is found that the changes brought about by a new point of view occur *within* the extension of these classes and, therefore, leave the concepts unchanged. Conversely, we shall diagnose a *change of meaning* either if a new theory entails that all concepts of the preceding theory have extension zero or if it introduces rules which cannot be interpreted as attributing specific properties to objects within already existing classes, but which change the system of classes itself."[17]

Let us try to understand Feyerabend's view here using an example. Suppose we choose a higher predicate, "spatial". We can now have statements in a conceptual scheme which uses 'spatial' like "apples are spatial", "tables are spatial" etc. Suppose that 'spatial' applies to (some aspect of) *everything there is*. Hence we will also say, for example, "electrons are spatial", where the subject term of the statement speaks of a theoretical entity. Let us now change this higher predicate to "spatio-temporal". "Spatio-temporal" will now constitue one aspect of everything there is. This change can correspond to a high level theory change. The 'apples', 'tables', 'electrons', etc. in the "spatio-temporal theory" will have meanings different from their meanings in the "spatial theory". What Feyerabend seems to want to say is that whatever object that was "spatial" in the earlier theory is "spatio-temporal" in the new theory so that there is *nothing* that is "spatial" any more. The extension of the class spatial will thus be zero.

Two incommensurable theories that Feyerabend gives as examples are Classical Mechanics (CM) and The Special Theory of Relativity (SR). He explains how basic terms like 'length' and 'mass' have different meanings in these two theories.

"The concept of length as used in SR and the concept of length as presupposed by CM are different concepts. Both are relational concepts .... But the relativistic length ... involves an element that is absent from the classical concept.... It involves the *relative velocity* of the object concerned in some reference system.... It is of course true that the relativistic scheme very often gives us *numbers* which are practically identical with the numbers we get from CM-but this does not make the *concepts* more similar. Even the case $C \to \infty$ (or $v \to \infty$)[18] which gives strictly identical predictions cannot be used as an argument for showing that the concepts must coincide at least in in this case: different magnitudes based on different concepts may give identical values on their respective scales

17. Feyerabend, P.K., 'On the Meaning of Scientific Terms' in *The Journal of Philosophy* Vol. LXI, 1964, pp. 266 - 274. Hereafter, Feyerabend V. See pp. 266 ff.

18. There is an oversight here. This should be ($v \to 0$).

without ceasing to be different magnitudes (the same remark applies to the attempt to identify classical mass with relative rest mass)...."[19]

The above considerations suffice to give an idea of the meaning change in successive theories that Feyerabend (and other relativists) speak of and indicate that in Feyerabend's view theory, ontology, language, and meaning are intimately connected. But so far we have been discussing Feyerabend's sense of meaning without considering the basis of his view which makes meaning in terms of the principles of the theory the *only* meaning of terms. This basis is Feyerabend's "epistemological realism."

"Realism" and Meaning

Feyerabend's criteria for meaning change given above were: (i) the new theory entails that all concepts of the preceding theory have extension zero or that (ii) the new theory introduces rules which change the system of classes itself. But these, by themselves, do not necessarily give a change of meaning. Feyerabend thus mentions the role of realism in this conception.

> "...these two criteria lead to unambiguous results only if some further decisions are made... we must... choose from among the various kinds of interpretations···. I shall *decide* by adopting an epistemological realism. This means regarding theoretical principles as fundamental and giving secondary place to "local grammar", that is, to those peculiarities of the usage of our terms which come forth in their application in concrete and possibly, observable situations."[20]

The rules that collects the objects into classes have to be understood, I think, as the principles of the theory that we mentioned earlier. The principles of the theory thus determine the concepts or the kinds of objects in the theory. I have already indicated that these principles give the ontology of the theory. "Epistemological realism" will rule out other senses of meaning except those given by the fundamental principles. The "local grammar" (that is, the basis of giving meaning to objects like chairs, tables etc. in terms of our everyday notions) is thus not giving us the meanings of these terms in any serious sense. What this amounts to is that the meanings will be solely determined in terms of the ontology or the objects given by the fundamental principles of the theory. This is the effect of Feyerabend's "epistemological realism" on his view of meaning.

It should now be emphasized that it is this realism, or rather the realist meaning, which finally leads to Feyerabend's thesis of Incommensurability. The use of fundamental theoretical principles to give the kind of objects in the theory and the theory-meaning of terms need not by itself bring in incommensurability, if some other sense of meaning of terms in theories

19. Feyerabend II, pp. 221 – 222.
20. Feyerabend, V, p. 269.

was also allowed. But by deciding to "give a unified account, both of observable and of unobservable matters"[21] in terms of a few theoretical entities, Feyerabend rules out any other possible sense of meaning. Hence all the terms in the theory will have *only* the theory meaning. Different theories will have different principles and different meanings, almost by definition. Thus different theories do not have any common concepts and hence are incommensurable. Since the change of meaning is brought about by a change in the ontologies, the assertion of incommensurability is, in fact, an assertion of the incomparability or the disparateness of the ontologies. *By his view of meaning Feyerabend magnifies the question of disparateness of ontologies to a question of non-communicability.*

In one of his earlier papers, Feyerabend argued for a realistic interpretation of experience or a realistic theory of meaning in preference to a positivistic one.[22] There he adopted a realistic theory of meaning given by the principle I where

> I = "the interpretation of an observation language is determined by the theory which we use to explain what we observe and it changes as soon as theories change."[23]

and I is considered to imply what he calls the characteristic of realism Rc where,

> Rc = "(According to thesis I we must) distinguish between appearances (i.e. phenomena) and the things appearing (the things referred to by the observational sentences in a certain interpretation)".[24]

Feyerabend indicates how a theory could change even the meaning of observation terms like colour by the following example. Suppose our observation language assumes that colour is a property of objects. Now if a theory uses the "fact" of Doppler effect, colour in that theory will be a relation for it becomes a function of velocity as well. 'Colour' then ceases to be a predicate, as we consider it to be in (say) ordinary language, although this change is not discernible by general observation.[25] That one should distinguish between the observations and the things referred to by these observations does not imply that the objects "behind" the observations should necessarily change with every new theory. If, for example, one assumes metaphysical realism[26] the world will be structured independently of any particular theory and hence it may happen that some of the inter-

21. Feyerabend II, p. 222.

22. Feyerabend, P. K. "An attempt at a Realistic Interpretation of Experience", in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* – New series, Vol. LVIII (1958), pp. 143 – 170. Hereafter, Feyerabend VI.

23. *ibid.*, p. 163.

24. *ibid.*, p. 164.

25. *ibid.*, p. 163.

26. 'Metaphysical realism' is used here to mean that the world is structured into objects independently of our theories and that all our theories do/should attempt to reach or incorporate these pre-existing categories. See below pp. 78 – 81.

pretations, given in same or different terms in different theories, refer to the same objects. Thus, the principle I assumes a particular form of realism, which Feyerabend himself calls "hypothetical realism" (or epistemological realism)[27]

A number of critics[28] have made the point that the objects which are referred to by the observation language need not necessarily change with every new theory. But the hypothetical realism which Feyerabend professes apparently[29] maintains that the objects (in the world) are "given" by the theory. Hence it seems legitimate for a hypothetical realist to maintain that as the theory changes the objects change. If a decisive contradiction in the view that Feyerabend's realist meaning leads to incommensurability is to be brought out, it has to be shown that his realism amounts to a "metaphysical realism"–that is, that it has the elements which accept a characterisition of objects (in the world) independently of (our) theories. I shall attempt to show that this last, in fact, is the case with Feyerabend's realism. But his view of meaning, if associated with hypothetical realism alone in the above sense, need not assume that the objects in the world are different from those given by (each) theory.

Realism

It is thus necessary for us to examine Feyerabend's concept of realism. Realism is a term with a complex of meanings in philosophy. A general sense of it is given by Hirst when he writes, "in modern philosophy...it (i.e., realism) is used for the view that material objects exist external to us and independently of our sense experience...".[30] Hirst adds that realism is opposed to idealism which holds that the universe is in some sense mental and to phenomenalism which holds that the material objects consist of sensa.

In what follows, I shall consider the term 'exist' to have one meaning, so that although different types of objects could exist and different criteria could be used to assert the existence of something, things will not be taken to exist in different senses. This is a view that, e.g., Quine has argued for.[31] Thus, things, in so far as they are real (or exist), will be real in the same sense.

What is important for our purposes in this paper is the case of things being physically real–and the criteria for something to be physically real. These criteria have been envisaged differently by different philosophers.

27. Feyerabend I, p. 41.

28. See e.g., Scheffler, I. "Vision and Revolution: A Postscript on Kuhn," in *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. XXXIX, 1972, pp. 366–374.

29. 'Apparently', since it is argued below that, Feyerabend's version of realism is inadequate to maintain that objects are completely given by the theory, independently of the assumption of any prior categories.

30. Hirst, R.J., 'Realism" in *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, Vol. 7, ed. Edwards, P., 1967, p. 77.

31. Quine, W.V.O., *Word and Object*, Cambridge: Mass., The M. I. T. Press, 1960, pp. 241 ff. See also Gunaratne, pp. 123–125.

Thus, for example, Nagel[32] lists some of these criteria as follows: Something is physically real (for example, sticks, stones, etc.) if (a) it is publicly perceived when suitable conditions of observation are realized, (b) it is designated by any non-logical term of an assumed law (experimental or theroretical) provided the law is supported by experimental evidence and generally accepted by the scientific community (for example, kinetic energy, neutrinos, probability waves etc.), (c) it is designated by a term which enters two or more logically independent experimental laws (for example, gravitational force of the earth), (d) the term (designating it) occurs in a well-established causal law (or in a state description)-(for example, the Psi-state, but not the electron, in quantum mechanics) and (e) it is invariant under some stipulated transformations. For example, imagine the circular shadow due to a source of light on a wall of a circle drawn on a sheet of glass placed in front of the wall. By rotating the glass, we can turn the shadow of the circle into an ellipse. But a straight line on the glass, cutting the circle (in two points) will invariably cut all the shadows (circles, ellipses etc.) of the circle at two points. In this case it is not the shape, area etc. of the circle, but the fact that a straight line cuts it in two points which is physically real. Nagel incorrectly considers these criteria as giving different senses of 'real' or 'exist' but some idea of the above criteria for something to be considered physically real will be helpful in this discussion later on.

Metaphysical Realism and Scientific Realism

It is necessary now to distinguish between two types of realism possible in the philsophy of science. These will be referred to in the present article as metaphysical realism and scientific realism. By metaphysical realism I mean a realist view of scientific theory where the structure of reality described in a comprehensive scientific theory is, in whole or part, predetermined for that theory. In otherwords, if a realist accepts one or more categories[33] as necessarily common to all scientific theories in a field, then he is seen to be a metaphysical realist. This will amount to saying that reality cannot be correctly described without those particular categories as what they describe *are* aspects of reality. Such a contention is, of course, a presupposition and hence the suitability of the name, metaphysical realism.

On the otherhand, scientific realism is that view held by one who considers the entities posited by an acceptable scientific theory as real. Scientific realism does not consider it necessary to use any category as a necessary ingradient of *all* scientific theories in a field. That is, a scientific realist has no preconception about the structure of, or the entities constituting, the world. He will only consider the structure and the entities of the world to be what the theory asserts these to be. I use the

32. Nagel, E., *The Structure of Science*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961, pp. 146 ff.

33. *a la* Kant

term 'acceptable scientific theory' above to avoid having to consider the objects of rejected theories as real, and to allow consideration of the objects of hypotheses which have not yet been "fully" confirmed or accepted as putatively real. At any time, the set of acceptable theories will, of course, include the set of accepted theories at that time. Thus, we note, for example, that except perhaps (b), the criteria listed by Nagel for something to be physically real will be too specific or binding for a scientific realist.

It is important for us to see to which of these categories of metaphysical realist and scientific realist, in the sense in which these terms were defined here, Feyerabend falls. It shall be argued in this article that Feyerabend is a metaphysical realist.

Feyerabend's realism professedly springs from Popper's realism. Feyerabend acknowledges[34] that he is drawing many principles in his philosophy of science from Popper.[35] Indeed, the terms 'epistemological realism' and 'hypothetical realism', as well as other terms in Feyerabend's writings are drawn from Popper's philosophy.[36] Feyerabend can be considered to have started off as a Popperian primarily concerned with the methodology of science and, in particular, with the problem of interpretation of theoretical entities in science.[37]

Popper calls his realism, a "modified essentialism"[38] and it can argued that Popper's philosophy of science has some metaphysical elements but Popper is probably not a metaphysical realist in the sense in which the term was defined in this essay. But Feyerabend has strayed away from Popper and on a superficial glance one would get the incorrect impression that he has shed even the little metaphysical patches in Popper's realism and moved towards scientific realism. Thus, for example, methodological monism, i.e., the view that out of the theories competing in a particular domain only one can be correct, seems to be a presupposition in any form of realism, and certainly of metaphysical realism. Popper is a methodological monist, although he believes that,

> "...new scientific theories are, like old ones, genuine conjectures, they are genuine attempts to describe these further worlds.... Thus we are led to take all these worlds, including the ordinary world, as equally real...layers of the real-world (If looking through the microscope we change its magnification then we may see various completely different aspects or layers of the same thing equally real...)".[39]

34. Feyerabend, P. K., "Herbert Feigl: A Biographical Sketch" in *Mind, Matter and Method*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966, pp. 3 – 13. Hereafter, Feyerabend VII.
35. See e.g., Feyerabend I, pp. 31 – 32, IV, p. 25, n. 1, II, p. 215.
36. See e.g., Gunaratne, pp. 73 – 77, pp. 98 ff.
37. See Feyerabend VII.
38. Popper, K. R., "Three Views concerning Human Knowledge" in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Third serice, 1956. Reprinted in *Conjectures and Refutations*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1963, pp. 97–119. Hereafter, Popper I. See p. 117.
39. *ibid.*, p. 115.

Although different aspects of the same thing are equally real, at each level only one theory can be correct and Popper holds that, in principle, one could decide on a correct theory from among the competing theories in the same domain. For example, he thinks that Newton's theory contradicts, corrects, and explains Galileo's theory[40]. Methodological monism seems a necessary position, if one is a realist. Feyerabend, on the otherhand, advocates in methodology a pluralism where competing theories are played against each other leading to a proliferation of theories.[41] According to him the competing theories in the same domain (a) should have a common empirical content (b) are best when inconsistent (c) are best when fully meaning variant.[42] Thus Feyerabend's view of meaning and his pluralist methodology aim at allowing competing alternative theories in the same domain, though it seems difficult to make sense of 'same domain' and hence of 'competing alternatives', given his sense of meaning.[43] This also indicates a point which I have already mentioned: that his sense of meaning leads different theories to give us "disparate worlds".[44] Hence, no monism seems possible. Such a pluralism seems a far cry from metaphysical realism. On the otherhand, it will be argued here that Feyerabend's realism accommodates certain elements which make it a more "conservative" realism than Popper's–in fact, a metaphysical realism in the sense defined in this paper-and that his views of realism and meaning lead to contradictory positions.

This metaphysical element in his realism could be brought out by an analysis of Feyerabend's views on the interpretations of quantum mechanics. The significance of the philosophical problems of the current quantum theory for Feyerabend's views cannot be over emphasized. It can be said that one of the two main springs of Feyerabend's philosophical position has been the problematic nature of the current quantum theory. If the other has been the moral stand of "antidogmatism",[45] it again had an association with the "dogmatism" of Bohr, at least as far as Feyerabend's earlier writings go. Quantum theory has been one of his key examples of the problems of reduction and meaning variance and the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics of a clearly positivist (as against a realist) theory. Feyerabend's advocacy of a methodology in which a new theory contradicts the current theory and "readjusts" experience is intimately connected with the problem of finding an alternative interpretation to the dominant Copenhagen Interpretation which Feyerabend finds positivist

40. Popper, K. R., "The Aim of Science" in *Ratio* Vol. I, 1957, pp. 24–36. A revised version is published in *Objective Knowledge*, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1972, pp. 191–205. Hereafter, Popper II. See pp. 197 ff.

41. Feyerabend IV, p. 149.

42. Feyerabend I, p. 150

43. See, e. g., Gunaratne, pp. 97 ff.

44. i. e., in the sense of differently structured worlds or worlds with different ontologies.

45. Feyerabend, P. K., "Classical Empiricism" in *The Methodological Heritage of Newton*, ed. Butts, R. and Davis, J. W. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970, pp. 150–170. Hereafter, Feyerabend VIII.

and unsatisfactory. Hence, Feyerabend's views on the philosophical issue in quantum mechanics is central and crucial enough to reflect and decide on the issues in Feyerabend's philosohy of science itself.

Quantum Physics and the Copenhagen Interpretation

The problem of interpretation in quantum physics may be stated as follows. One could represent experimental evidence available in microphysics by means of an equation–the Schrödinger wave equation–which has some similarity to a classical wave equation. This equation enables one to calculate

> "...certain functions Psi–of the co–ordinates of a system and the time. These functions are called the Schrödinger wave functions...."[46] Note that

> "the wave equation has been given this name because it is a differential equation of the second order in the co–ordinates of the system, somewhat similar to the wave equation of classical theory. The similarity is not close, however...."[47]

It seems important to note this as the problem of interpretation in quantum mechanics–as, for example, Putnam[48] expresses it, is the question, "what is the significance of the "waves"? The "waves" are the Psi–functions mentioned above. The question then is what physical interpretation (or meaning) could be given to these mathematical functions? In experiments in microphysics[49] the following physical facts are met with: (i) light appears to have a dual nature of wave and particle and (ii) it is found that the state of microphysical systems cannot be determined fully in a classical sense (e.g., giving both position and momentum). In view of these physical facts which the mathematical Psi–function has to and does accommodate how could the function itself or the "waves" be interpreted in physical terms?

46. Pauling, L. and Wilson, E. B., *Introduction to Quantim Mechanics with Applications to Chemsitry*, New York and London: Mc Graw Hill, 1935, p. 51.

47. *loc. cit.*

48. Putnam, H. "A Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics", in *Beyond the Edge of Certainty*, ed. Colodny, R. G. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1965. Hereafter, Putnam. See p. 78.

49. e. g., Bohr, N., "Discussions with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics," in *Albert Einstein: Philosopher–Scientist*, ed. Schlipp, P. A. Library of Living Philosophers 1949. References in this paper are to Vol. I of the Harper Torchbook edition 1959. See. pp. 211 ff. Also Feyerabend, P. K., "Probelms of Microphysics" in *Frontiers of Science and Philosophy*, ed. Colodny R. G. London: Allen and Unwin, 1964 pp. 191–283. Hereafter, Feyerabend IX. See p. 199, and Putnam, p. 81.

At least four interpretations were presented since the nineteen twenties[50]. The dominant among these is the Copenhagen Interpretation (CI) associated with Bohr and Heisenberg.

The CI asserts the quantum postualte that "observables" such as position exist only when a suitable measurement is actually being made. Thus, for example, it considers that "...a particle is something that has. . . only a *propensity* to have a position if a suitable experimental arrangement is introduced".[51] It also admits complementarity, that is, the necessity of dualities like particle–wave, position–momentum involved in the description of reality. This is based on the Heisenberg Uncertainity Principle that *both* the position and the momentum of a quantum object cannot be determined. The CI abandons what is called the principle of no disturbance. This principle says that an observable has the same value (approximately) just *before* the measurement as that obtained by the measurement. The CI denies that an observable has any value before the measurement because there is no such physical state which could be called "the state before the measurement". The notion of measurement is admitted as an undefined primitive in the CI[52]. The CI also says that the wave representation gives a *complete* description of the physical system[53] and hence, for example, that there are no hidden variables. It also admits the Correspondence Principle which says that classical physics is a limiting case of quantum physics.[54]

Some criticisms of the CI spring from the fact that its description of reality does not conform to the classical model. Classically a particle like an electron was conceived as having both position and momentum at any moment and physical reality was conceived as something causally deterministic in the sense that one could predict the values of position,

50. Two early interpretations were (i) the wave interpretation which says that the "physical systems *are* sets of waves. "The waves spoken of in quantum mechanics do not merely "represent" the state of the system; they *are* the system" (Putnam, p. 65, p. 73.) (ii) the particle interpretation which says that microphysical systems consist of particles;"....the elementary particles are particles in the classical sense–point masses having at each instant both a definite position and a definite velocity – though not obeying classical laws. The wave corresponding to a system of particles does not represent the state of the system···but rather our *knowledge* of the state, which is always incomplete" (Putnam, p. 80). This is the Born interpretation which includes the view that the square of the amplitude of the wave at some point gives the probability of a particle being at that point. But (i) faces difficulties with the following facts: (a) the amplitudes of the waves are complex (b) the space of the waves are abstract (Hilbert spaces); (c) the waves depend on the type of representation (i. e., position, momentum etc.) used; (d) the physical fact of the "reduction of the wave packet" (See p. 87 below) and (ii) faces difficulties with the fact that interference patterns show waves physically. Thus both these were "rejected" in favour of the CI.

51. Putnam, p. 84.

52. *op. cit*, p. 77.

53. *op. cit.*, p. 90.

54. Hanson, N. R., "Quantum Mechanics, Philosophical Implications of," in *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, Vol. 7, ed. Edwards, p. 1967, pp. 41–49. Hereafter, Hanson. See p. 43.

momentum etc., of an object with certainty using laws and initial conditions. This also implies that physical reality could be described fully independently of actual measurement *at any instance*. In the CI, by the assumptions of complementarity, uncertainity relations, and measurement as a primitive, one only of an observable like position or momentum of a micro-object could be given or determined fully at a time. The theory can make predictions about these observables as probabilities or possible values within limits only. Further, the description of a section of reality is dependent on measurement and this seems to introduce a "subjective" element to description in physical science.

The above make it necessary to give either a positivistic interpretation to quantum theory (with the CI) saying that it only systematizes or predicts experience (phenomena) or recognize a reality which is non-classical. Bohr seemed to take the positivist stand in saying that we shall never be able to do away with the classical forms of thought and perception like "wave" and "particle" as he was thus using a "stability-thesis of experience".[55] The CI seems to take a further step towards positivism when it asserts that what is real is inseparably linked with measurement.[56]

Finally, we should note that realists among scientists have attempted to show contradictions in the CI formulation and/or come up with alternative interpretations,[57] usually called the hidden variable interpretations,[58] to meet the experimental and the conceptual situation.

Feyerabend's Criticism of the Copenhagen Interpretation

Feyerabend criticises the CI from the realistic standpoint. It is important for us to first examine why *he* considers the CI to be positivistic. The distinction between positivism and realism in scientific theories is held to be terminological by philosophers of science like Nagel. Feyerabend[59] admits that the issue between realism and instrumentalism (One version of positivism is instrumentalism which considers theoretical entities as just instruments of prediction, having no meaning. The other version considers theoretical entities as having meaning, but this meaning is given by the commonsense observation language) is a "verbal" issue in some instances of the problem, but he thinks that this is not so in the case of the CI.[60] Thus,

55. This phrase from Feyerabend refers to the positivists' view that objects in the observat on language do not vary (in meaning etc.) See Feyerabend VI.

56. Cf. Berkeley' *esse est percipi*.

57. e. g, see, Bohm, D. "Classical and Non-Classical Concepts in Quantum Theory" in *The British Journal for Philosophy of Science*, Vol. XII, 1961 – 6., pp. 265 – 280.

58. Hidden variable interpretations are interpretations referring to subquantum entities which satisfy classical requirements of actually having both position and momentum at every instance (although we may know only the position or the momentum but not both at the same time). Their successfulness is not clear (see e. g., Hanson).

59. Feyerabend, P. K., "Realism and Instrumentalism: Comments on the Logic of Factual Support" in *The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy*, ed. Bunge, M. The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, pp. 280 – 308. Hereafter, Feyerabend X. See p. 281.

60. See Feyerbend, P.K. "Structure of Science" in *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. XVII, pp. 237 – 249. Hereafter, Feyerabend XI.

what makes the quantum mechanics (with the CI) not amenable to a realistic interpretation should help one understand what realism stands for in Feyerabend.

The distinction that Feyerabend draws between the CI and the theories whose realism/instrumentalism issue is degenerate seems to be based on that unlike in the case of the latter theories, in the case of the CI (i) its construction itself does not make it amenable to a realistic interptetation and (ii) there are physical reasons (and not only philosophical reasons) advanced in favour of the positivism in the CI.

Before we take up these, we must dispose of a criticism of the CI that Feyerabend's early writings show. This was that the construction of the CI itself was not necessitated by the factual situation in quantum mechanics but that Bohr's positivistic views led to it. Feyerabend holds that Bohr adopted a philosophy in contrast to the classical realist point of view as represented, for example, by Einstein.[61] It is this philosophy which was applied to generate and defend the CI. The advocacy of complementarity and allowance made to subjective features of knowledge is dependent on Bohr's contention that we will never be able to transcend the classical modes of description and on Bohr's positivism and inductivism.

It is not clear whether, in the construction of physical theories, the physical situation, by itself, *necessitates* the construction of any particular theory, positivistic or otherwise. Usually a theory is constructed to accomodate the existing physical evidence–so that no evidence contradicts it–and if possible, so as to "generate" additional evidence by it. (This might not be the case at times of scientific revolutions). It is, of course, possible that Bohr was dogmatic about his view of the *necessity* of classical modes of description etc. but that is beside the point. In any case, we shall see that Feyerabend has later changed some of these views on Bohr's approach.

I shall now take up Feyerabend's arguments from the construction of the CI which deny the possibility of interpreting it realistically. He says that,

> ". . . it is quite true that Bohr, Kramers, Heisenberg, and others worked along very different lines. Their main objective was not the construction of a new physical theory about *a world that existed*

61. With the breakdown of classical physics two views developed. According to Feyerabend, "Einstein pointed out that all physics shares the fallibility of the classical point of view···. The younger physicists···under the guidance of Niels Bohr, draw a very different conclusion. The breakdown of the classical physics indicates to them that it it was speculation and therefore not physics at all···it nevertheless contains a physical core. They set out to free this core from its metaphysical trappings···the elements already obtained thus (and especially the elementary quantum theory) are called a "rational generalization of the classical mode of description···". Feyerabend IX. pp. 161 – 2.

62. Feyerabend, P.K. "Homage to Norwood Russell Hanson" in *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. III, Dordrecht: D. Reidl Publishing Company, 1967, pp. XXII – XXIII. Hereafter, Feyerabend XII.

independently of measurement and observation; their main objective was rather the construction of a logical machinery for the utilization of those parts of classical physics which could still be said to lead to correct predictions...".[63]

Again, Bohr treated classical concepts as abstractions or "idealizations" "whose suitability for description and explantion depends upon the relative smallness of the quantum of action...". Analysis of the elementary concepts "...has to reveal their limitations in these new fields...and new rules for their use have to be devised in order to evade the quantum of action...." These rules must

> "(a)... allow for the description of any conceivable experiment in classical terms (b) provide room for new laws...(c)...lead to correct predictions. Any set of rules, satisfying (a), (b) and (c) is called by Bohr a "natural generalization of the classical mode of description"..... regarding the quantum theory as...a rational generalization in the sense just explained does not admit of a realistic interpretation of any one of its terms. The classical terms cannot be interpreted in a realistic manner as their application is restricted to a description of experimental results. The remaining terms cannot be interpreted realistically either, as they have been introduced for the explicit purposes of enabling the physicist to handle the classical terms properly. The instrumentalism of the quantum theory is therefore *not a philosophical manoeuvre that has been wilfully superimposed upon a theory which would have looked much better when interpreted in a realistic fashion. It is a demand for theory construction that was imposed from the very beginning and in accordance with which part of the quantum theory was actually obtained.*"[64]

These arguments from genesis or motivation cannot be conclusive against a realistic interpretation of quantum theory with the CI. That a "non-realistic" approach of Bohr and others was in the background of the generation of the CI cannot by itself prevent the theory thus evolved being interpreted realistically. Even if Feyerabend's facts about Bohr's construction here are correct they do not suffice to prevent the outcome of the construction being a theory which would have been amenable to a realistic interpretation. It is well known that Schrödinger who created the elementary theory was realist. Bohr and his colleagues only interpreted Schrödinger's theory and on Feyerabend's own admission,

> "it turned out that Schrödinger's wave mechanics was just that complete rational generalization of the classical theory that Bohr, Heisenberg and their collaborators had been looking for and parts of which they had already succeeded in developing"[65].

63. Feyerabend IX, p. 203, my emphasis.
64. Feyerabend IX, pp. 764–5, n. 62. The author's emphasis.
65. *loc. cit.*

This indicates that irrespective of the contrary metaphysical positions and methods of theory construction of Schrödinger and Bohr there is good basic agreement in their physical theories.

Furthermore, let us consider whether some realist interpretation of quantum mechanics with the CI is not possible. One possibility is to consider that the objects in the world are macro-objects and that the micro-observables do not have sharp values, except when measured. Indeed Bohr and Heisenberg are marco-realists.[66] It has been argued by some realists that this view leads to inconsistency in the interpretation. They point out that a macro-observable has to be defined in quantum mechanics as an observable whose corresponding operator is in a certain sense an average of a number of operators. If from such a characterization and the laws of quantum mechanics it could be deduced that macro-observables always retain sharp values whether a measurement interaction involving them is going on or not, then one could assert that macro-observables retain sharp values at all times. But it is argued that even using classical limit theorems[67] this result could not be obtained. For the classical limit theorems do not always lead to the conclusion that macro-observables retain sharp values. This is argued, for example, in the *gedanken* experiment which is referred to as the paradox of Schrödinger's cat.

Schrödinger imagined an isolated system consisting of an apparatus that contains a cat together with a device for electrocuting the cat. At a certain preset time, an emitter emits a single photon directed towards a half-silvered mirror. If the photon is deflected then the cat will live; if the photon passes through the half-silvered mirror then the switch will be set and the cat will be electrocuted. Suppose now that the emitter emits the photon, say, at 1 P.M. Then still by 2 P.M. the state will be a superposition[68] of "live cat" and "dead cat". One has to say that the cat is neither dead nor alive at 2 P.M., unless someone comes and looks (i.e., makes a measurement) and that the cat is thrown into a definite state as an effect of looking. This odd result for macro-physical realism applies not only to fanciful cases like the Schrödinger cat but even to the "click" and "no-click" of a Geiger counter in the study of elementary particles.

66. See e.g., Putnam, p. 93.

67. Classical limit theorems say that a system obeying classical physics will behave analogously in quantum physics. What is attempted here is to derive that, if macro-observables have sharp values to begin with, then they will retain sharp values during the time under consideration, without having to assume measurement.

68. The problem of the superposition of states could be illustrated thus. Suppose that S is a system of particles with a number of possible states, X_1, X_2 X_3 etc. Let P, Q be properties of the particles which are incompatible. If X_3 is a linear combination state of X_1 and X_2, then in this state X_3 it is possible for 55% of the particles to have the property P and 55% of the particles to have the property Q. This can be mathematically predicated and experimentally verified. How come? The answer that quantum mechanics gives is that one cannot test the two statements:

1. When S is in state X_3, 55% of the particles have property P.
2. When S is in state X_3, 55% of the particles have property Q.

at the same time i.e., with the same experimental arrangement.

In practice a physicist does not find cases like the Schrödinger cat disturbing him, for he takes the stand that the cat being or not being electrocuted should itself be regarded as a measurement. Thus in his view the reduction of the wave packet (this is the fact that, in quantum mechanical formalism, measurement brings about discontinuous jumps in the waves) takes place at 1 P.M. when the cat either feels or does not feel the jolt of the electric current within its body. But what this shows is that the *working physicists accept the principle that macro-observables always retain sharp values* and deduce when measurement *must* take place *from* this principle. The intelectual relevance of the Schrödinger cat case does not seem to be thereby impaired.

Thus, one could at least question the possibility of interpreting the CI consistently on the basis of a macro-realism as suggested above. But surprisingly, Feyerabend himself thinks that such arguments like the one above do not impair the *consistency* of Bohr's position. For he takes the view that Bohr's interpretation that quantum mechanical states are relational,[69] together with the assumption of the indefiniteness of state descriptions, can avoid the challenge of such arguments advanced, for example by Putnam[70]. It could be that Feyerabend does not take Bohr to be macro-realist but, since he specifically rejects the soundness of arguments like those of Putnam, the possible attribution to Bohr of a macro-realism on what Feyerabend himself considers a consistent basis could not have escaped him. Why then does Feyerabend rule out the possibility of a realistic interpretation of the CI? The answer suggests itself that it is due to the nature of the particular brand of realism that Feyerabend is speaking about.

Another possibility of a realist view of quantum mechanics is to consider the existing objects as given by the only available "space-time" description and predicted by the Psi-function. We noted that according to criterion (d) for something to be "physically real" given by Nagel,[71] the Psi-state could be called real. The Psi-function describes the state of a quantum system in terms of the positions and energies of elementary particles. The wave equation, of which the Psi-function is a solution, asserts that the Psi-state of a system at a given time is invariably succeeded by the calculable Psi-state of the system at any specified future time. But the state-description does not give the position and velocity of an elementary particle like an electron. The Psi-state will thus be physically real according to criterion (d) given by Nagel. We may consider the Psi-states as the individuals on this conception. The electrons themselves will be, of course, in partially defined states. On such a conception elementary particles will

69. This says that all state descriptions of quantum mechanical systems are relations between the systems and measuring devices in action and are therefore dependent upon existence of other systems suitable for carrying out the measurement.

70. See, e.g., Feyerabend IX, p. 218.

71. See above, p. 78.

be, onotologically, in partially defined states-in one form or another. It seems compatible with scientific realism to consider these "semi-defined natures" as real. This view is expressed, for example, by Hanson·

> "What alternative is there but to concede that the physical theory which tells us the truth, or a good part of the truth, about micro-nature can do so only if we accept *its* rules? Such rules as do structure quantum mechanics run clearly counter to any metaphysical preconceptions familiar to philosophers with a nineteenth-century outlook. Therefore, it becomes a reasonable metaphysical possibility that nature is fundamentally indeterministic; that elementary particles are, ontologically, always in partially defined states; that they do not in any sense that is scientifically respectable and philosophically intelligible have both a precise position and an exact energy. The position lacks the aura of familiarity and intellectual comfort that Newtonian determinism had come to possess by the nineteenth century, but it has what determinism in micromechanics completely lacks–an extensive observational support structured by an inferentially well-made theory."[72]

Both the realist physicist Schrödidinger and the "positivist" physicist Henri Margenau, for example, affirm the objective reality of the Psi–function. Schrödinger considers the waves in Hilbert-space given by the Psi–function as real. Physical reality for Margenau is the class of all constructs which satisfies empirical verification and certain metaphysical criteria. The most important of these metaphysical criteria is causality which requires that,

> "physical systems be described in terms of states which are self–unfolding in a determinate manner; that the state of the system at time t is sufficient for a prediction of the state··· at any other time t'" [73]

The Psi-function satisfies these requirements. Together with the Psi-state, one could also consider the partially defined states of elementary particles as real.

We thus find that there does not seem to be conclusive reasons for not interpreting the CI realistically. Furthermore, Feyerabend himself seems to accept in the CI factors favourable to a realistic interpretation[74]. We may note first that "later" Feyerabend does not consider the CI to be subjectivist either. A main objection against a realistic interpretation of

72· Hanson, p. 46.

73· Margenau, Henri, "Advantages and Disadvantages of Various Interpretations of Quantum Theory" in *Physics Today* No. 10, October 1954, p. 13.

74· e.g., that the CI is non–subjectivist, that much of the realist criticism of the CI is invalid etc. See Feyerabend, P.K., "On a Recent Critique of Complementarity: Part I" in *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. XXXV, 1968, pp. 309–331. Hereafter, Feyerabend XIII, and Feyerabend, P.K., "On a Recent Critique of Complementarity: Part *II*" in *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. XXXVI, 1969, pp. 82 – 105. Hereafter, Feyerabend XIV.

the CI could have been to take the stand that the CI leads to subjectivism. That the CI is subjectivist seems to be, for example, Popper's view.[75] Feyerabend, criticising Popper's view, says that,

> "But "subject" in physics is for him (i.e. Bohr) not the consciousness of the observer but "the agency" used for observation, that is the material measuring... the "boundary" disappears, in physics, not from between the consciousness of the observer and "the world"; it disappears from between "the (atomic) phenomena (and) the (material) agencies of observation...". There is therefore no "ghost" to be exorcised from quantum mechanics".[76]

More importantly, in denying that the subject as consciousness enters the physical theory in the CI, Feyerabend *is* saying that the CI is non-positivistic, if he is consistent. For Feyerabend himself has written earlier, "Positivism sooner or later leads to subjectivism."[77] In his later writings Feyerabend also goes against his earlier view that Bohr was dogmatic for he writes, "Popper's accusing Bohr as dogmatic is ill-founded."[78]

Thus it seems correct to say that Feyerabend's views on the CI have undergone change. We also note that Feyerabend's view on methodology (as seen by his later papers, for example) too have changed.[79] But even in his later writings, he has not considered that quantum mechanics with the CI can be given a realistic interpretation. All the evidence indicates that while Feyerabend is ready to acknowledge the CI as a successful physical hypothesis, he does not consider it possible to give the CI a realistic interpretation in his sense of realism.

The possible realistic interpretations of the CI that we considered above do not meet the requirements of the "ideal" of *his* realistic interpre tation. As does interpreting the Psi-function of elementary quantum theory *without* the CI fall short of being a "unified account" required of a realistic view,[80] so do the suggested realistic interpretations of the quantum theory with the CI fall short of this ideal. Indeed, it seems to be the case that quantum theory cannot be realistically interpreted in the Feyerabendian sense while complementarity as well as certain experimental findings are left intact in the theory. What Feyerabend wants to see is the CI given up, and these "obstacles" to a "realistic" interpretation removed. He also

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75. Popper, K.R. " Quantum Theory without "The Observer" " in *Quantum Theory and Reality*, ed Bunge, M. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1967, pp. 7 – 44. Hereafter, Popper III
76. Feyerabend XIV.
77. Feyerabend VI.
78. Feyerabend XIII.
79. See Feyetabend, P.K. "Against Method" in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. IV, ed. Rudner, M. and Winokur, S., Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970, pp. 17 – 130. Hereafter, Feyerabend XV. See also Feyerabend XIII.
80. See Feye-abend, P.K., "Complementaaity" in *Proceedings of the Aristote ian Society*, Suppl. Vol. XXXII, 1958, London: Harrison and Sons. pp. 75 – 104. Hereafter, Feyerabend XVI.

thinks that it is not possible to reject the CI by rejecting positivism on the basis of philosophical arguments. The CI has certain physical reasons-or reasons from experience-which support it. Thus, for example, on the assumption of the indeterminateness of the state descriptions, Feyerabend notes that,

> "All these arguments presuppose the validity of certain experimental findings such as the quantum postulate, the laws of interference, the individual validity of the conservation laws; and the arguments show that *given* these experimental findings we are forced to reject various interpretations which do not work with the intrinsically indefinite state descriptions. It follows that an alternative to the idea of complementarity is likely to be successful only if it implies that at least some of these experimental results are not strictly valid.... The issue concerning the foundations of the quantum theory can therefore be solved only by the construction of a *new theory* as well as by the demonstration that this new theory is experimentally at least as valuable as the theory that is being used at the present time; it cannot be solved by alternative interpretation of the present theory."[81]

We must clarify Feyerabend's position here. His argument in connection with the CI is that, although the CI is a physically satisfactory theory, its basis, especially complementariy, need not be the final basis of all microphysics, (as it is claimed to be by Bohr) *and* that it cannot be interpreted realistically.

It may be the case that the basis of the CI does not have "absolute validity... to justify the demand that theories of the microscopic domain will forever have to conform to a certain pattern."[82] Feyerabend has come up with the argument that the above physical reasons may perhaps be overcome by devising alternative theories which will change some of our experience or the principles of experience. He has argued that a similar change in the principles of experience had to be brought about during the Copernican revolution by Galileo who defended the realistic interpretation of the Copernican view[83].

My argument here is that Feyerabend's view that the quantum theory with the CI (considering only the physical hypothesis in it) is not amenable to a realistic interpretation indicates that his realism amounts to more than scientific realism. Whatever may be the objects that Bohr has considered his theory to be positing, there seems to be some possibility of the CI being interpreted realistically. In maintaining that the CI *cannot* be realistically interpreted, Feyerabend ceases to be a scientific realist and incorporates a dogmatic or a metaphysical element into his realism.

81. Feyerabend IX, p. 201.
82. The quotation is from Feyerabend IX, Cf. also Hanson, pp. 46–47.
83. See. *e.g.* Feyerabend XV, pp. 45 ff.

A scientific realist must let the "rules of the theory," to use Hanson's phrase, determine what the ontology is. A requirement that all realistic theories have to conform to some specific types of object or law will be a dogmatic or a metaphysical requirement. Such a requirement will contradict Feyerabend's view of meaning as all "realistic" theories, and hence all theories acceptable to Feyerabend, will have an *invariant element.* And this will lead to his subscribing to a high level category determining the ontologies of all his theories.

Casual Determinism and Feyerabend's Realism

Ii is now necessary for my argument to indicate what this invariant element is. The rest of this paper will argue that the causal determinism is atleast a part of this invariant element required of Feyerabend's realistic theories. Let us now take a closer look at Feyerabend's conception of realism. *For Feyerabend a realistic theory gives a unified account* (of observable and unobservable matters). He describes the realistic ideal as the "subsumption under a general theory whose primitive concepts are universally applicable."[84] To understand what Feyerabend's realism could amount to we must try to see (i) what a 'unified account' means and (ii) what is meant by the primitive concepts being universally applicable. To take an example, the Psi-function in quantum theory can be considered universally applicable. But that is *not sufficient* for Feyerabend's realism, I think, because there are other primitive terms like 'wave' or 'particle' in the CI which are not universally applicable and which do not lead to a unified account. In one of the rare passages in Feyerabend where the meaning of 'unified account' is, at least vaguely, indicated, we read the following:

> "It remains to develop the obvious consequences of complementarity. These consequences are (i) *indeterminism.* This indeterminism is not due to the absence of *causes* which might be made responsible for changes in the behaviour of microscopic systems; nor is it due to the alleged disturbance of microscopic objects by the act of observation···. This indeterminism is due to the fact that different pictures utilized in the complementary mode of description do not allow for a unified account of motion and change *in the purely kinematic sense.* Which implies that *probabilities,* if they enter the scheme, must be regarded as irreducible".[85]

This passage suggests that Feyerabend's sense of unified account is connected with determinism. A unified account gives a deterministic account. It seems to be the case that a theory which gives a unified account (i.e., a realistically interpretable theory) should be able to *give an account of motion and change in a deterministic way.* Realism as "subsumption under a general theory whose primitive concepts are universally applicable" means more

84. Feyerabend XVI, p. 88.
85. *op. cit.*, pp. 94 - 95.

than that a few concepts like wave, particle, Psi-state "disjointly" cover the objective situation in the world. The theory should describe the "change and motion" in an inter-connected and deterministic way. Note also that Feyerabend, in the last passage quoted, seems to assert that indeterminism in the CI is not due to lack of causes connecting change and motion. He seems to assume, then, that there *is* casual determinism in the microscopic systems but that the CI is unable to give a casually deterministic account. Feyerebend would, I think, settle for something a little less than an actually deterministic account. He would, for example, consider Classical Statistical Mechanics as a unified account. What he is asking for is an allowance for a deterministic substratum in microphysical systems.

That this is Feyerabend's view can be seen in a passage which seems to make explicit some of the statements in the last quotation.

> "A change from conditions allowing for the application of the particle picture will, in the absence of more general and more abstract concepts which apply under all conditions[86], have to be regarded as an *unpredictable jump*. The statistical laws connecting events in the first picture with events in the second picture will therefore not allow for a *deterministic substratum*,[87] they will be irreducible."[88]

This irreducibility or the non-allowance for a deterministic substratum prevents one from giving a unified account and hence bars the possibility of a realistic theory; which is to say: a realistic theory should (at least) allow for a determinist ontology. There is further evidence to say that what Feyerabend is arguing for is classical realism-or realism with determinism[89].

Let us note first that Galileo, Einstein and Bohm and the like are the "standard realists" for Feyerabend. He says that,

> "Indeed the whole tradition of science from Galileo... up to Einstein and Bohm is incompatible with the principle that "facts" should be regarded as the unalterable basis of theorizing... within this tradition the condition to be satisfied by a future theory of the microcosm is not that it be simply *compatible* with duality and other

86. Cf. Feyerabend II, p. 222, saying, "a realist wants to give a unified account, both of observable and of unobservable matters, and he will use the most abstract terms of whatever theory he is contemplating for that purpose." One is reminded here of Körner's view that all philosophical arguments in physics take the form of a confronation of a theory with regulative principles (see, Körner, S. "On Philosophical Arguments in Physics" in *The Structure of Scientific Thought*, E. H. Madden, Boston: Houghton Miffin Co., 1960.)

87. My emphasis of 'deterministic substratum'.

88. See Feyerabend IV, p. 224.

89. It seems important to note here that while Popper has explicitly stated that he accepts indeterminism in the world, Feyerabend has nowhere said that he accepts indeterminism. See below, p. 95.

> laws··· but that it be compatible with duality *to a certain degree of approximation* which will have to depend on the precision of the experiment used for establishing the "fact" of duality.
>
> A completely analogous remark holds for the assertion that Planck's constant will have to enter *every* microscopic theory in an essential way···. If neither the constancy of h nor duality can be guaranteed to hold in new domains of research, then the whole argument is bound to break down: it does not guarantee the persistence of the familiar features of complementarity, of probability laws, of quantum jumps···".[90]

Feyerabend is arguing for theories of "the universality, the precision, and the formal accomplishment of Newton's celestial mechanics, or of Einstein's general theory of relativity···."[91]

There is further evidence to suggest that Feyerabend wants the CI replaced with a classically deterministic theory if a realistic interpretation is to be given to quantum theory.[92] We noted that Feyerabend admits that the elementary quantum theory, without the CI, could be given some objective or realistic interpretation but he also says that

> "··· the possibility of a realistic theory of microscopic phenomena does not depend on whether or not a realistic interpretation can be given of elementary quantum mechanics··· a realist solution···is···in···a completely new universal theory."[93]

We also find Feyerabend, criticizing the CI, saying that,

> "··· there is not a single sound argument, empirical or mathematical, establishing that complementarity is the last word··· and that a theoretician who intends to improve quantum theory will be successful only if he works with theories that possess in built uncertainties···"[94].

Further, Feyerabend is of the view that, "···there is no reason whatever why a future atomic theory should not return to a more classical outlook.'[95]

It cannot be doubted that the determinism that Feyerabend is arguing for is causal determinism. We already noted him saying that it is not due to a lack of causes which account for change and motion in microphysical

90· Feyerabend IV, pp. 226 – 227.

91· *op. cit.*, p. 228.

92· *e.g.*, Feyerabend XVI, p. 79 where he says, "···the classical ideal is closely connected with the position of *realism.*"

93· *op. cit.*, p. 89.

94· Feyerabend IX, p. 192.

95· *op. cit.*, p. 238.

nature, but due to the CI formulation, that indeterminism "sets in". The numbers used in experimentation and prediction in quantum mechanics must be generated by calculational devices that are dependent on both field-theoretic and particle-theoretic considerations and the CI "stabilizes" this situation by the assumption of complementarity. We can know only *partially* defined states of a microparticle, that is, its contribution to the ensemble given by the Psi-function, Hanson for example, notes that,

> "This must be sharply contrasted with the classical idea wherein a particle state can be completely defined when its place at x, y, z (at time t) is determined. Classical determinism, however, requires just such a location of "causal events" in terms of their complete state specifications in order that a totally deterministic account of the "effect event", should be forthcoming. It is this which quantum mechanics[96] *in principle*[97] cannot supply."[98]

We also note that the Psi-state is causally determinate and that it is considered physically real even by physicists like Margenau. Why, then, is Feyerabend not satisfied with accepting the Psi-state in the elementary quantum theory as real? This is because Feyerabend wants a theory where not only one type of state like the Psi-state but *all* states or events are deterministically predicted. Indeed, that this is the criterion of determinism is seen by the following passage by Popper.

> "We shall take indeterminism to be a doctrine asserting that not *all* events are determined in every detail (whatever this may mean), and determinism as asserting that they *all* are, without exception, whether future, present, or past. It is necessary to be clear that the problem contested by the two doctrines is only this, and that indeterminism does not, perhaps, assert that all or most or many events are not determined, but only that some events which are not completely determined exist-however rare they may be."

Thus, we may consider that the determinism in question is a causal determinism of a type analogous to that of classical physics.

Let us now recount the steps of our argument pursuing the metaphysical element in Feyerabend's realism. These were: (i) the physical hypothesis in the CI cannot be realistically interpreted in Feyerabend's view; (ii) even if the elementary quantum theory (without the CI) could be given some realistic interpretation, it is claimed not to be the ideal of a realistic theory in Feyerabend's sense; (iii) but, in our view, a scientific realist seems to

96. Hanson is speaking of the CI.

97. My emphasis of 'in principle'.

98. Hanson, p. 43.

99. Popper, K.R., "Indeterminism in Quantum Physics and in Classical Physics" in *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 1 nos, 2 & 3, 1950, hereafter, Popper IV. See p. 120 of No. 2.

be able to interpret the physical hypothesis of the CI realistically and it is not seen that Feyerabend has any clear physical or logical reasons against such an interpretation; (iv) one is thus led to suspect that Feyerabend's realism has a metaphysical element; (v) it is left for us to isolate or identify at least some aspects of this metaphysical element. Feyerabend's realistic theories are "unified accounts". We find Feyerabend arguing against the acceptance of complementarity. We also note that complementarity *is* the distinguishing feature of the CI. [100] Feyerabend thinks that complementarity makes it impossible for one to give a unified account of motion and change and hence that it leads to indeterminism. *Thus 'unified account' and 'determinism' are associated.* Obviously, the CI cannot have determinism and hence a realism which incorporates determinism. Further, this determinism is seen to be causal determinism.

We noted that there is further evidence that Feyerbend is thinking in terms of classical realism and determinism when he is speaking of realism. For we saw Feyerabend stating that the issues in the foundations of the quantum theory can be solved and a realistic solution found only by a new theory and not by new interpretations of the present theory with laws involving duality, quantum postulate, etc. He also argues that the possibility for us to return to determinism is open (and that even Planck's constant is not final here). Feyerabend has stated that realism and the classical ideal are closley related, and his "model" realists are all "classical realists". Again, Feyerabend has admittedly[101] used some of the ideas in Popper's view of realism, but whereas Poper thinks that there are indeterministic aspects of the world (although Popper criticises the CI as subjectivist and the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle as leading to the acceptance of a "chaotic" universe)[102] Feyerabend has not accepted any view relevant to a possible indeterminism in nature. *Indeed, his "super-realism"*[103] *will prohibit his acceptance of indeterminism as he cannot speak of ontologically different aspects or objects in nature.* Such a restriction does not apply to Popper, who is not "super-realist". *If Feyerabend accepts indeterminism, his universe will be even more "indefinite" than the "universe of Heisenberg" (the inherently indefinite nature of which is unacceptable to Feyerabend)* as Heisenberg at least does not seem unable to compromise between the indeterministic and deterministic natures.

100. Cf. 'The Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is the view that fundamental micronature is indivisibly bipartite – the wave particle duality" (Hanson, p. 43).

101. e.g., Feyerabend XVI, p. 79, n. 7, p. 88, n. 17.

102. See e.g., Popper III or IV.

103. This term is Mellor's. See Mellor, D.H. "Physics and Furniture" in *Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Amer. Phil. Quarterly Monograph, series 3, ed Rescher, N. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969, pp. 171 – 187. "The Amercian "supper – realist" view of Feyerabend, Sellars and Maxwell," according to Mellor, considers the proper effect on everyday beliefs of accepting physical theory as that of complete replacement (see p. 171).

Causal Determinism and Meaning Variance

We are thus led to conclude that some metaphysical elements associated with causal determinism will be an invariant feature of all physical theories acceptable to Feyerabend. That is to say that the "objects" in these theories will have the characteristic – or fall under the category – of being "causally determined" (objects). This is a *methodological necessity, as all* theories will have to conform to this model. "Causally determined" will thus be an invariant *super-category* under which all "objects" or ontologies in theories, which are amenable to a realistic interpretation in Feyerabend's sense, will fall. *This will be in contradiction with his theory of meaning* which will not allow any descriptive terms with a common meaning *even between two* theories. For 'causally determined' will now be invariant in meaning in *all* his theories.

It should be noted that it is not possible for one to maintain that 'causally determined' can have different meanings in different theories. Determinism here will mean that objects in each theory will have "full" determinism and predictability in terms of physical causes and our present logic. Indeed it can be argued that there is no significant sense in which a language having a logic different from ours can be asserted.[104] Thus it is reasonable to assert that all of Feyerabend's theories have at least a core of an invariant element of "causally determinateness", a common, descrip tive, predicate. If we turn back now to Feyerabend's own criteria of meaning change, it is seen that "we shall diagnose a change of meaning... if a new theory entails that all concepts of the preceding theory have extension zero...."[105] Since the concept "casually determined" will not have its extension zero in any of the "Feyerabendian realist" theories, in no theory change will *all* concepts of the preceding theory have extension zero, and thus there will be no meaning change in Feyerabend's sense in *any* of them!

It should also be pointed out that "causally determinate" is not a concept which is in the "meta-language" that is referring to the theories. This concept is part of each theory, in so far as it characterizes the objects in the theory. It or terms giving its sense are *used* to describe these objects. For example, one characteristic of the classical particle is its causally determinateness. This is a characteristic which, for example, the electron, as conceived by the CI, lacks.

It was usual for writers who denied the meaning variance thesis to point to the common "observation language" which meaning variant theories could still have. Feyerabend contested this approach in extreme terms. Thus referring to the meaning variance between Classical Mechanics and Special Theory of Relativity he writes,

104. See e.g., Gunaratne, pp. 120 ff.

105. See above p. 74.

"This conceptual disparity, if taken seriously, infects even the most 'ordinary' situations: the relativistic concept of a certain shape, such as a table, or of a certain temporal sequence, such as my saying 'yes' will differ from the corresponding classical concept also. It is therefore vain to expect that sufficiently long derivations may return us to the older ideas."[106]

Feyerabend was envisaging and arguing for such changes of meaning at the "minutest" level at the "lower" end. We have argued, on the other hand, that at the "higher" end, there are old ideas remaining invariant n his objects – and hence such ideas will remain invariant elements at *all* levels in the theories that Feyerabend is arguing for.

Incommensurability of theories, based on ontological relativity, may be consistently held with scientific realism but not with a realism which presupposes elements metaphysical. We have argued that Feyerabend's epistemological realism presupposes metaphysical elements. Hence it cannot have completely disparate worlds or incommensurability – for these worlds will have common categories like causally determinateness – which lead to a common ontology at some level, however "remote".

Some remarks on this conclusion must now be made. First, it is not possible to consider the contradiction of Feyerabend's theory of meaning change by his view of the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics as a case where Feyerabend has not applied his view of meaning and realism consistently to a special case. As we noted earlier, the significance of his attitude to the CI is so central to his view of meaning and method that the one cannot be dissociated from the other.

Second, we must note that Feyerabend's advocacy of "unified accounts" or deterministic theories is not based (or justified by him) on any aesthetic or methodological criteria like, say, "simplicity."

Third, it cannot be argued that theories which do not incoporate causal determinism are not intelligible or useful as, for example, the quantum theory is intelligible and fruitful. But can we conceive any justifiable role for science if matter has no inherent organization? If reality has a causally determinate form or law then Feyerabend's case for causally deterministic laws is justified. If there is no order at all in the universe – if it is just chaos – then is there any purpose served by a realistically interpreted science trying to bring reality under the laws of science? If such is the case with the universe, then assuming that our efforts could affect reality only inconsiderably at any particular time, we have to assign a pragmatic role for science. But, even if reality is not fully deterministic, it can still have some order, such as that given in quantum theory and other

106. Feyerabend II, p. 222.

statistical laws. Thus even if reality is semi-determinate we may still try to understand its "ultimate" nature while reaping the pragmatic benefits of such understanding as well.

On the other hand, if Feyerabend is asking for deterministic theories as he seems to do, then it obviously has to be related to his view of reality (or nature). To be brief, he must share with Einstein the belief that "God does not play dice."[107]

A Case of Reductio ad Absurdum?

Before concluding this essay, it must be pointed out that Feyerabend himself has not been always of clear about what he has been arguing for. Thus, for example, he took the Piagetian account of the change in the infants world as the infant develops its object concept at the end of the sensorimotor period as an example of meaning change.[108] Piaget's account suggests that the infant during the first two years only sees passing "impressions" which are not causally or otherwise connected and begins developing the object concept (which appears as the development of the basic Kantian categories, like "cause", "space" etc. that determine objects and the world) only at the end of the second year.

Now, leaving out other issues in connection with this example,[109] Feyerabend's very use of it as an example of the type of theory change that he is suggesting is surprising. One could show that a curious situation confronts Feyerabend, if changes like that from the "phenomenal" or "pseudo after-image appearances" to the material object could take place in adults. This situation interests us most since it seems to cut at the very root of Feyerabend's realism, at least if my argument in this paper is correct. For, granted that such a change is pessible, there is nothing to say that the change should be from the "phenomenal or the pseudo after-image" stage to the material object stage. The change could as well be in the reverse order – that is, from the material object stage (back) to the "phenomenal" stage – to the situation in which the infant was at birth and in the first year. If such a change did take place in the adult mind, or in other words, if an adult (mind) goes from the present conceptaul structure which seems to have a world of substantial (material) objects to a conceptual structure having (a world of) after-images or phenomenal objects, what are the implications for Feyerabend's realism? He can no longer demand that all theories be realist in his conservative sense, which seem to call for objects which are

107. Cf. e.g., Born, M. "Einstein's Statistical Theories" in *Albert Einstein: Philosopher Scientist*, ed. Schlipp, P.A. Library of Living Philosophers 1949, p. 176 of Vol. I of the Harper Torchbook edition, 1959. Note also that Feyerabend considers that the acceptance of the Heisenberg Uncertainity Principle amounts to an assertion that the "inherent indefiniteness is an universal and objective property of matter" (Feyerabend IX, P. 202.)

108. Feyerabend II, p. 223.

109. See Gunaratne, pp. 138 ff.

causally deterministic. For he will be unable to demand this if the objects now believed to be there in the world are "phenomenal" or "just passing appearances". These phenomenal appearances will have no "space-time-causal" relations in the required sense. The objects in the new theories can turn out to be similar to the micro-objects in the present quantum theory (with the Copenhagen Interpretation). Indeed, Piaget himself has, rightly or wrongly, repeatedly made the comparison between the "appearances" before the early infant and the type of object that comes in the current quantum theory. His writings seem to implicitly suggest that the current quantum physics has discovered the "objects" of an "early phase" of our evolution.[110] The case is even worse for Feyerabend's position as the "phenomenal appearnaces" of the infant are not "objective" and the child has only an operational sense of them[111] while the CI objects may not be so in either respect. If Feyerabend thinks that we can shift ontologies from pseudo after-images to material objects, there is no reason why the change cannot take place in the reverse order as suggested here. If such changes can take place in adults it will then be wrong for Feyerabend to suggest for example, that a theory which has become incommensurable with the theories using causally deterministic objects should (or can) use objects which are causally deterministic. For in such cases the incommensurability is precisely in that in one theory the objects are "passing appearances" or non substantial while in the other they are substantial. Feyerabend, given his advocacy of incommensurability, should welcome such theories as the present quantum theory with the CI (as it will be incommensurable with theories with causally deterministic objects). Moreover, it will be wrong to request only for theories with classical objects as, going by the above example, shifts in our conceptual frames could put us in a world of semi-determined (or completely un-connected) appearances *at any time*. This brings out the dilemma that Feyerabend could be made to face due to the disparity between his conservatism about the nature of *possible* objects in his realist theories and the more "radical" views that he advocates.

When Feyerabend, having the Piagetian example above in mind, writes that the "family of concepts centering upon 'material object' and the family of concepts centering upon 'pseude after-image' are incommensurable in precisely the sense at issue here"[112] he seems to be thinking of an ontological difference between the world of the early and later infant. And this ontological difference consists in having and not having the

110. See e.g., Piaget, J. *The Principles of Genetic Epistemology*-(Trans: Mays, W.), London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972, p. 76. Piaget's general view is that science begins its study with the current framework of physical objects, Euclidean space etc. and progressively discovers what went on in the earlier phases of our evolution. For example, we "discover" in science or mathematics first the Euclidean, then the projective and then the topological space (or geometry) and this is in the reverse order of a child's development. Similarly in physics, the earliest objects that the child knew, the quantum type of object, is discovered latest.

111. See Gunaratne, pp. 136 ff.

112. Feyerabend II, p. 224.

concept of material object or causally deterministic substantial object as a common denominator of the "theories" in question. But if this is a particular case of incommensurability that Feyerabend is speaking of as possible in the adults, it turns out that this is the very incommensurability that he should try to avoid in them, if he is to maintain some aspects of his realism. For, as I have attempted above, a sort of *reductio ad absurdum* for his position could be developed by conceiving the change of ontology which brings about this incommensurability to take place in the adults in the direction reverse to that in which it takes place in the infant.

The above indicates that Feyerabend himself does not seem to be always aware and clear about the bases and implications of his position, or the examples that he presents.

Finally, it must be emphasized here that the argument in this essay has only two purposes. First, to show that Feyerabend's sense of realism and his sense of realistic meaning are in contradition. Secondly, to examine his sense of realism and bring out its association with causal determinism. The argument does not say anything about the plausibility or the implausibility of the CI or of the correctness or the incorrectness of Feyerabend's position in regard to the nature of current or future microphysical theories themselves.

R. D. GUNARATNE

The Beginning of the Philosophy of Asceticism in India

It is a fact that the majority of ancient Indian religions lay great emphasis on asceticism. Particularly, Jainism and Buddhism have built up their ethical systems on this concept. The founders of these religions have themselves shown their utmost enthusiasm towards asceticism by renouncing family life and practising austerities before their enlightenment. These religions are distinguished from the Vedic ritualistic religion mainly because of the ascetic view of life proposed by them. This feature has been interpreted by some modern scholars to mean that they are 'protestants' against the prevalent Brahmanism. Such a view, has long been accepted by the Jains and the Buddhists themselves. We find in the respective literatures that the Jainas as well as the Buddhists refer to each other as ascetic sects. The *Dighanikāya* calls Nighanthanāthaputta, the founder (or the reformer) of the Jaina faith, as *cirapabbajita* (i.e. one who has long been a recluse.) The Thānāṅga, a *Svetāmbara* Jaina text, identifies the Buddhists *(sakka/sākya)* as *samanas*[2] The qualifying adjective *mahāsamana* (the great ascetic or recluse) is used both for Mah vìra and the Buddha by their respective followers. These facts indicate that even at the time of their inception, the two religions were recognized as ascetic movements. It is further noticeable that both religions agree that *nirvāṇa*, the ultimate goal of life, is to be sought out and realised through asceticism. This close relationship between asceticism and the two religions takes us to the very heart of the philosophy of asceticism itself.

Many attempts have been made during the last several decades to find out the beginnings of asceticism in India. Still it is hard to say if there has been any unanimous conclusion on the subject. Nonetheless, the contributions of these attempts are such that they throw much light on the different aspects of the problem. If we are to examine the different theories put forward, it would be clear that they place the origin of asceticism in different periods ranging from the dawn of Indian civilization to the Upaniṣadic age.

G. C. Pande, a chief exponent of the Śramanic theory, opines that the origin of asceticism goes back to the Pre-Āryan or Pre-Vedic civilization. To lend support to his view, he takes into consideration the occurrences of such words as *yati, muni* and *sramaṇa* in the Vedic literature. Those who were referred to by such terms belonged to a particular group of religious men, and they were treated by the Vedic writers as 'strangers'. Basing his

1. Dighanikāya, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter, Pali Text Society, London 1967, p. 49
2. *The Thānaṅga Commentary of Abhayadeva*, Bombay, 1937, p. 949

argument on the observation that the Rgvedic people were not even familiar with ascetics, Pande believes that the institution of asceticism is a remnant of the non-Aryan Culture[3].

A similar view is held by H. Chakraborti who assumes that "the practice of *tapas* was in a greater part adopted by the Rgvedic people from the aboriginals"[4]; and that "asceticism including the practice of *yoga* had its origin even among the Pre-Aryan people"[5]. In addition to the Vedic references to ascetics, Chakraborti cites several examples from the seals found in the Mohenjodaro excavations[6].

On the other hand, V. P. Verma holds that the "ascetic *(tapasvī)* is a Vedic institution"[7]. He, in fact, does not pay any attention to the unfamiliarity of the Vedic people with ascetics as suggested by G. C. Pande. Despite this, he admits that the style of life followed by ascetics was radically different from that of the common people.

Radhakrishnan[8] and Jacobi approach the problem from a different point of view. In their view, asceticism originated within Brahmanism itself which was older than Jainism and Buddhism. Jacobi arrives at this conclusion after a detailed comparison of Jaina *mahāvratas* and Buddhist *dasasīlas* on the one hand, with the vows of the *saṃnyāsi* on the other. To substantiate his thesis, he compares the ascetic rules given in the *Baudhāyanasūtra,* a Brahmanical text regarded older than the twin faiths. Jacobi further tries to deny the validity of the contrary view that the Brahmanic ascetic is modelled on either the Jaina *sādhu* or the Buddhist *bhikkhu.* Three reasons are given in favour of his contention: (1) the priority of the four stage-system *(āśramadharma)* to Jainism and Buddhism; (2) wider popularity of the *saṃnyāsi* than of the *sādhu* or the *bhikkhu* and (3) the greater antiquity of the *Baudhāyanasūtra* than that of latter religions.[9] D. Bhargava holds the opposite view that the Hindu asceticism resulted from Jaina and Buddhist influence.[10]

Another major theory relating to the origin of Indian asceticism was put forward by N. Dutt. Having examined the Vedic allusions to ascetics and asceticism, N. Dutt considers that "it is in the Upanisads that we come across, for the first time, terms like *muni, pravrājin,* and *tapas* refering to persons living in forests and practising austerities"[11]. In order to clarify the

3. See: Pande G. C., *Studies in the Origin of Buddhism,* Allahabad University, 1957, Chapter III, pp. 251–261.
4. Chakraborti H., *Asceticism in Ancient India,* Calcutta, 1973, p. 1
5. *ibid.,* p. 4
6. *ibid.,* p. 3–4.
7. Varma V, P., *Early Buddhism and Its Origin,* Delhi, 1973, pp. 59–62.
8. Radhakrishnan S,, *Indian Philosophy,* Vol. I, 8th impression, London, 1966, p. 329.
9. Jacobi, Hermann, *Jaina Sūtras,* (Sacred Books of Buddhists, Vol. XLV), Part I, Delhi, Introduction, pp. XXII ff
10. Bhargava, Dayānanda, *Jaina Ethics,* Delhi, 1968, p. 147.

doubts arising from this statement, he further states in a foot-note that "although the terms are found in older texts too, they bear different meanings"[12].

S. Dutt, who re-examines some of these opinions, presents an altogether different theory. His emphasis is mainly on the references to the religious mendicants in the Brahmanical literature *composed after the mantra-period'*. But he does not hold that mendicancy was recognized as an institution of the Aryan society during the Brahmanic period. Dutt means to say that the appearance of the *śramana*-cult in the East Indian lands resulted from a counter movement to the Western Indian institution of the *Brāhmana*-priest. According to him, this counter-movement took place some three centuries before Buddhism[13] (i.e. about the time of origin of Upanisadic thought).

The foregoing discussion shows that the origin of asceticism in India has been traced to different periods, viz. the Pre-Aryan or Pre-Vedic, the Vedic, the Brahmanic and the Upanisadic. This diversity of opinion only means that the problem is still not finally settled. Nonetheless, these theories have conclusively proved that asceticism, no matter where and when it originated, had taken distinctive shape. A common feature of these theories is that they have viewed the problem from what we may call the historical and literary standpoint. On the other hand, we propose here to study the subject from a philosophical standpoint.

Let us, first of all, recall John Mackenzie's observations regarding the origin of asceticism. He writes,

> "It was no certainly philosophical theory that originally gave rise to it (asceticism). It was rather the practice that suggested the theory: or, if this statement seems too strong, it may at least be said that the practice gave great impetus to the development of the theory."[14]

The first part of this statement, as the writer himself admits, seems too strong. As far as ethics is concerned, it is illogical to think of a common or a general practice, which has no original philosophy. Every human practice except some accidental or individual acts, is related in one way or the other to a philosophical theory. The statement seems too strong particularly when it is said with special reference to *a way of life* which was practised by men and large communities with great zeal over centuries. Mackenzie seems to think that asceticism was first practised by men who were divorced from thought; or in other words, it was started by

11. Dutt, N., *Early Monastic Buddhism*, 2nd edn., Calcutta, 1971, p. 67.
12. *ibid.*, fn. 2.
13. Dutt, Sukumar, *Early Buddhist Monarchism*, London, 1924, Chapter II.
14. Mackenzie, John., *Hindu Ethics*, 2nd edn., Delhi, 1971, pp. 233 ff.

men who did not have any philosophy of life. He seems to have forgotten that asceticism is recognized by the three major religions of India and that it is based on a *weltanschauung* aimed at freedom from worldly suffering.

Mackenzie, to whom the *Rgveda* has appeared as a "somewhat barren field for the study of ethics,"[15] cites several references to asceticism *(tapas)* in the Rgveda. Regardless of his own statement that it has no philosophical theory, he gives three meanings of the word *tapas* as follows: (i) heat, (ii) heat or fervour of devotion and (iii) austerity or self-mortification,[16] It is not unlikely that Mackenzie has mixed up the significance of the term *tapas* appearing in the *Rgveda*. First, he says that meaning (iii) does not occur in the *Rgveda*; but, then, he goes on to quote a hymn (i.e. X. 136) which describes a wandering, long-haired *muni* who wore a soiled garment of yellow hue.[17] This clearly goes to falsify his earlier contention. Further, let us examine his Vedic citations: "...it was through *tapas* that the Primeval Being began to create.' "By *tapas ṛta* was produced." "Indra conquered heaven by means of *tapas*.."[18] The word *tapas* in these citations bears the general idea that *it is a basic and productive power generated by austerity,* though the meaning of the word differs slightly according to the context. It is not unlikely that Mackenzie has failed to take cognizance of this general meaning.

When, however, Mackenzie accepts *tapas* to mean a productive power, he traces its origin to the pre-Upaniṣadic period. He states,

> "...it *(tapas)* had efficacy of a magical or quasi-magical order, *bringing to him who practised it superhuman powers which he might excercise over nature, his fellowmen and even the gods."*[19]

From this later development of the concept of *tapas*, he arrives at the corresponding later development of the philosophy of asceticism. But it seems to us that the philosophy of asceticism is not a product of such a later development. This needs to be explained.

Mackenzie himself concedes in the above statement that asceticism, though a later product, has a philosophy which teaches how to overpower one's surroundings. This is, and always has been, man's eternal struggle. And, therefore, the philosophy of asceticism is an integral part of human life and endeavour that falsifies any theory of 'later development'. Nor is Mackenzie's observation that asceticism originated spontaneously is plausible for the same reason.

15. *ibid.*, p. 1
16. *ibid.*
17. *ibid.*
18. *ibid.*
19. *ibid.*

We propose to proceed on our inquiry with the assumption that a brief survey into the general nature of the oldest form of Vedic religion would throw some light on the fundamental philosophy of asceticism. Our inference is based on the fact that it is in the *Rgveda* that we find first significant references pertaining to our subject.

Extensive studies in the *Rgveda* have revealed that the earliest form of Vedic religion is chtracterized by nature-worship. *Rgveda* has preserved for us several accounts of the gods worshipped by the common people in those days. From this in-estimable source of information we learn that the Vedic religion was polytheistic in the beginning. The earlier parts of the *Rgveda* (i.e. *mandalas* II-VIII) do not for the most part mention a supreme or an absolute god; they refer to a large number of gods who shared an equal position in the pantheon and, sometimes, equal characteristics. In these *mandalas*, the worshipper treats the god to whom he offers his oblations and prayers as the highest. The Indologists, therefore, generally believe that the Rgvedic man was a kathenotheist or a henotheist. Monotheism and monism are considered later developments of the Rgvedic religion and philosophy. What deserves our attention in the present study is an inquiry into Rgvedic pantheism, since it reveals the nature of the relation between man and gods.

A large number of gods referred to in the earlier parts of the *Rgveda* undoubtedly takes the form of personifications of natural objects, forces and phenomena.[20] Agni, for example, has the physical basis of fire which can easily be identified in the hymns. Similarly, Parjanya, the rain-god, is a representation of clouds. A study of the physical basis of the Rgvedic gods would thus, help us to understand why and how those gods came in to existence. Almost all the Indologists believe that the poetic imagination of the Vedic seers and the wonder they felt at the work of nature led to the creation of many nature gods. Dasgupta, for instance, says,

> "It was the forces of nature, her manifestations on the earth here, the atmosphere around and above us, or in the heaven beyond the vault of the sky that excited the devotion and imagination of the Vedic poets."[21]

Before we accept that it is only the poetical or aesthetic sense of the 'primitive' man which created gods we need further reflection on several other aspects of the matter.

To begin with, we may say that the men whose life story is indirectly narrated in the *Rgveda* lived *with* nature and not *against* nature. Naturally, the objects and phenomena which exhibited through natural activities their multifarious abilities to play different roles are conceived as gods. Macdonell gives clear expression to it while dealing with Vedic mythology:

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20. For a detailed account, see: Macdonell, A. A., *Vedic Mythology*, Indological Book House, 1963, pp. 15 ff

21. Dasgupta, S., *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, Cambridge 1922, p 17 Also see: Macdonell, *op. cit.* pp. 15 ff.

> "Such myths have their source in the attempt of the human mind in a primitive and unscientific age, to explain the various forces and phenomena of nature with which man is confronted."[22]

No doubt, there was a tendency in the mind of the Vedic man towards the personification of things he could not understand scientifically. We have reason to believe that the knowledge of the Rgvedic man was so perfect that he could understand the workings of nature exhaustively. After contemplating on such phenomena, he wonders how

> "the sparkling waters of all rivers flow into one ocean without ever filling it."[23]

Nature and its manifestations seemed to him so stupendous that his submission to them became inescapable. In the mind of the Vedic poet, the natural forces thus underwent a metamorphosis being transferred into gods that were more powerful than man, and capable of performing marvellous deeds.

In this connection, H. Chakraborti's opinion regarding the Rgvedic people's attitude to life is worth considering. He writes,

> "the life of Aryans as reflected in the hymns of the *Rgveda* shows signs of brightness and optimism. The Vedic gods were open-handed and did not need to be forced or cajoled by human suffering."[24]

This statement raises a number of questions: (a) what does the writer mean by 'brightness'? (b) was the singer's attitude to life really optimistic? and (c) were not the gods forced or cajoled by human suffering?

By his expression 'signs of brightness', Chakraborti seems to mean that the life of the Rgvedic man was eternally cheerful and happy. It appears to us that he is led to such a conclusion merely from the poetic exuberances of the Rgvedic hymns. Such a view, however, is not tenable. For the 'signs of brightness' manifested in the hymns imply not merely the poet's feeling of brightness of life but also his helplessness before the gods.

It should be remembered at this juncture that almost all the Rgvedic hymns are primarily prayers to the gods; and that the poet's motive in the composition of panegyric hymns is to receive the things he prayed for. Hiriyanna has rightly observed that the poet

> "cultivates a spirit of awe and reverence towards them (gods), sings their praises and offers worhip or sacrifice to them *with a view to propitiate them or to secure their favour.*"[25]

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22. Macdonell, *op. cit* p. I
23. This quotation is taken from Dasgupta, *op. cit.* p. 17
24. Chakraborti, H., *op. cit.* p. 3.
25. Hiriyanna, M., *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, 6th impression, London, 1967, pp. 30 – 31

Thus the panegyric nature of the hymns bears witness to the fact that the worshipper praised his god in order to win his favour. This is in conformity with the rule of exchange prevalent among men, i.e. give and take. Winternitz explains the nature of the hymns which reveals the psychological attitude of the worshipper to the gods as follows:

> "...in the Ṛgveda almost every god is at some time or other praised as the first and highest of all gods –*this is a sort of flattery, by means of which one wants to incline the god in one's favour in the same way in which later court poets have extolled many a petty prince as the ruler of the world.*"[26]

Thus, this panegyric character of the Vedic hymns might have impelled Chakraborti to conclude that the Ṛgvedic man was all too happy; that his whole environment was perfectly admirable. But we should not fail to understand that side by side with this feeling of brightness, the Ṛgvedic man felt his weaknesses and the limitations of his own nature. As is evident in the hymns, the gods were treated as powerful rulers, bestowers and superiors. What appears in the hymns in the form of poetical exuberances are, therefore, the humble and respectful descriptions of gods. Let us quote two verses, for instance, from a hymn to the godess Usâs in which such poetic exuberances are clear:

> "We see that thou art good; far shines thy lustre; thy beams, thy splendours have flown upto Heaven. Decking thyself, thou makest bare thy bosom, shining in majesty, thou goddess Morning."

again,

> "Red are the kine and luminous that bear her, the Blessed One who spreadeth through the distance. The foes she chaseth like a valiant archer, like a swift warrior she repelleth darkness "[27]

These hymns, while revealing the advancement of the aesthetic sense and the imaginative power of the Ṛgvedic man, do not, however, indicate that he was independent of the gods. In the hymns quoted above, we see that the poet first expresses his appreciation of the beauty of the goddess Usās and then, expresses how she helps man. Thus the Vedic man's way of thought is also governed by a feeling of utter helplessness and weakness. On the strength of this argument, we would like to point out that the 'signs of brightness' which Chakraborti has seen in Vedic life may also imply the *signs of darkness* in the sense that the Vedic man was not all too happy with his surroundings.

Therefore, the 'optimism' which is supposed to have been cherished by the Ṛgvedic man becomes questionable. As illustrated above, the worshipper's feeling that it is only the able help of gods which makes life secure and happy has very strongly ruled the Vedic man's thought. The god of war, Indra, for example, who was treated as the 'national' god, was offered

26. Winternitz, M., *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. 1, 2nd edn., Delhi, 1972 p. 85.
27. RV. V, I 64, 2 – 3; the translation is taken from Winternitz, *op, cit.* p. 92.

frequent prayers by the devotees. The votaries were very fond of praising his exploits, such as the destruction of Vala and Vrtra. This is undoubtedly a reflection of the feeling of the lack of self-confidence in the devotee's mind. The fear of attack from the enemies on the worshipper was temporarily suppressed by the prayers to Indra. Similarly, Varuna, the moral god, who stands nobly elevated above the mortals, is believed to be the one who punishes the sinner, Hence the poet ventures to approach him in fear and plead for forgiveness of his sins. Thus, the absence of self-confidence in ethical judgement manifested in the hymns has turnrd out to be the fear of god's punishment. Therefore, it seems to us that the Rgvedic man was not all too optimistic in the real sense of the term.

The next point that needs our careful attention is the question as to whether the Rgvedic gods were not 'forced or cajoled by human suffering'. The main element of Vedic religion is the institution of sacrifice *(yajña)*, a link between man and god. The motive force of this sacrifice is grounded in the application of what may be called 'a human psychology' to the gods. Just as the gods were personified in terms of human activities, their behaviour also was conceived in terms of human psychology and personality. Macdonell rightly observes that the gods are glorified human beings inspired with human motives and passion's. [28] The people simply thought that the gods, after the manner of their tribal leaders, could be satisfied with the offerings of the best they possessed. Inspired by such thoughts, they attempted to please the gods by means of sacrifice and prayers whereby they expected to get whatever they felt was urgently needed. However, there is a marked contrast between the offerings made to a tribal chieftain and to the gods. The offerings to the gods were always done through sacrifice. And sacrifice was regarded as a quasi-magical and impersonal power to which gods themselves were subjected. Thus, the human suffering invents sacrifice which in turn forces the gods to put an end to the selfsame suffering.

From the foregoing study certain characteristics of Vedic religion become manifest. Macdonell defines it in general as follows:

> "Religion in its widest sense includes, on thc one hand, the conception which men entertain of the divine or supernatural powers and, on the other hand, that sense of the dependence of the human welfare on those powers which finds its expression in various forms of worship."[29]

This definition, particularly in its latter part suits Rgvedic religion. The Vedic man's approach to the gods was submissive because he was subjugated by nature and was oppressed by natural phenomena. This is aptly expressed by Radhakrishnan as follows:

28· Macdonell, *op. cit.* p. 2.
29· *ibid.*, p. 1

> "Religion (i.e. Vedic) seems to have dominated the whole life. The dependence on gods was complete. The people prayed for even the ordinary necessities of life. 'Give us this day our daily bread' was true to the spirit of the Vedic Āryans."[30]

Thus the key-note of the Vedic religion is that man's life depends on the favours bestowed by the gods. The Vedic man finds submission as the method to win divine favour. He expresses his submission to a particular god by means of prayers.

In contrast to this submissive attitude of the Vedic man towards the gods, asceticism, which is grounded on a strong belief in one's own efforts, might have evolved. It is often mentioned that the ascetics always went against the traditional rites, rituals and irrational beliefs. They raised basic questions which challenged the foundations of traditional beliefs. Even in the *Rgveda*, the book of devotional songs, there is evidence to show that some religious institutions were considered absurd. The hymn, which praises so confidently the might and the strength of Indra, also casts doubt about the same god, raised by some sceptic thinker:

> "Of whom they ask 'where he is'? Of him,
> indeed, they also say: 'He is not...'"[31]

The same doubt is more strongly expressed in another hymn:

> "...many say: 'there is no Indra, who has ever seen him? To whom are we to direct the songs of praise?'"[32]

Thus these hymns reveal that the very national god of the Rgvedic people could not escape the critical questionings of the sceptics. Again, we come across some occasional references to the doubts regarding the efficacy of sacrifice. For instance, one thinker asks: "which god should we honour by means of sacrifice"?[33] These accidental references bear witness to the fact that at a time when the natural forces and objects were treated as gods influencing man, there had been an attempt to find another form of 'religion' or way of life that did not necessarily involve a concept of divinity. The protesting spirit of man here questions: 'Why should man be obedient to the gods?' This new way of thought manifested in the *Rgveda* itself is termed by Hiriyanna as the 'Vedic free-thinking'. These free thinkers were styled in the early literature as the 'haters of the *Veda (brahmadvis)*, maligners of gods' *(devanid)*, and men of no-principle *(apavrata)*. The free-thinkers were severe in there attack, in particular, on the orthodox priests whom they branded as 'selfish prattling priests that go about deluded'.[34]

30. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.* p. 108.
31. *RV.*, II. 12
32. *RV.*, VIII. 100
33. *RV.*, X. 121
34. Hiriyanna, *op. cit.* p. 43 ff.

In this regard, the hymn of Creation is worth studying for its expressed scepticism. The hymn, which starts with the description of the situation existing before creation, maintains that 'the One arose through the power of *tapas*' and 'as the first product of mind, *kāma* (desire, love) came forth'. Further, it says that 'in the *kāma*, the wise, searching in their hearts, have by meditation discovered the connection between the existing and the non-existing'.[35] The hymn gives us the impression that it embodies the basic elements of ascetic philosophy developed in later times; it gives an important place to the concept of *kāma* which in later asceticism was identified with the basis of all sorts of suffering. It may be of interest to note that, in this hymn, gods are reduced to a lower position:

> "Who knoweth it forsooth, who can declare it here
> Whence this creation has arisen, whence it came
> The gods hither by this world's creation only;
> Who knoweth then, whence this creation has arisen?
>
> Whence this creation has arisen, whether
> It has been made or not: He who surveys
> This world in highest heaven, he may be knoweth,
> Or, it may be, he knoweth not."[36]

The most notable characteristic of this hymn is its sharp critical approach to the problems of philosophy. It does not try to give any definite answer, but it implies that the philosopher is on his way to find the answer.

Thus, side by side with the traditional Vedic outlook on life, there also existed a revolutionary ideology which called forth for an inquiry in to a new approach to life. Such an ideology regarded prayer, praise and worship of gods to be by no means helpful to improve the conditions of human life. It laid emphasis on self-confidence. If man is to overcome his limitations, it is through a self-purificatory process of restraint and mental development expressed in ascetic practices, and not through any dependence on an external or supernatural power. This view developed into a challenging theory of philosophical and religious ideas and ideals during the age of intellectual unrest in the Upaniṣads, Jainism and Buddhism.

Before we speak of the ascetic philosophy in the Upaniṣads, it would not be out of place to turn our attention briefly to the Upaniṣadic philosophy[37] as a whole. It would be an exaggeration to hold that the whole of the Upaniṣadic philosophy is ascetic. If we examine the prominent theories and ideas found in them, it is quite clear that they represent the thought of a number of schools. Prominent among them are the elements of Vedic religious thought, of idealistic monism, and of asceticism. In the present context, we may note that asceticism also formed a part of the complex Upanisadic philosophy.

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35. *RV* X. 129
36. *RV*. X. 129. 6 – 7. The translation is taken from Winternitz, *op. cit.* p. 99
37. We refer here only to the thirteen principal Upaniṣads which are recognized as the earliest.

In contrast to the Vedic view that gods support man to achieve his goals of life and wishes, a pessimistic view of life was getting hold of the thinker's mind during the Upanisadic period. The problem of death or the shortness of life-duration invaribly entered into their philosophical discussions. In the conversation between Ārtabhāga and Yājñavalkya, death is described as a fire; and the warding off of repeated death is implied. The *Brhadāranyaka-Upanisad* doubts the efficacy of offering milk to gods as a means to escape from repeated death.[38] Such Upanisadic speculations indicate that death was considered a major problem of life; and that escape from repeated death *(Punarmrtya)* has been one of the strong wishes of men during the age under consideration.[39] A little later, as described in the *Maitri-Upanisad*, the pessimism rooted in the fear of death became more felt, as a result of which life itself appeared to be undesirable. The following question which is raised by king Brhadratha seems to support our assumption:

> "Sir, in this ill-smelling, unsubstantial body which is a conglomerate of bone, skin, muscle, marrow, flesh, semen, blood, mucus, tears, rheum, faces, urine, wind, bile, and phlegm, what is the good of enjoyment of desires?"[40]

Such a view on life, on the one hand, brought down the gods from the high pedestal of prayer and worship and, on the other, greatly contributed to the growth and expansion of ascetic philosophy. It convinced the thinkers that the desire for the material things or the attachment to the materialistic world was the cause of repeated birth and death. For example. the *Mundaka-Upanisad* says,

> "He who in fancy forms desires, because of his desires is born (again here and there;"[41]

Consequently, emphasis on the necessity of inward discipline became a remarkable feature of asceticism. So, the method proposed by the thinkers for exterminating the desires was to keep one's senses away from their respective objects. The practical application of this method is manifested in the practical application of renunciation followed by the great sages like Yājñavalkya and kings like Brhadratha. It is interesting to note that renunciation was oriented to attain the state of immortality which was conceived in this particular age as the union with Brahman, and which is further described as the 'state of independence' *(svantrya)*, 'the state of oneness' *(kevalatva)*, and the 'state of peacefulness' *(nirvrtatva)*.

38. *Brhadaranyaka—Upanisad*, 3.2.10; (this and all the other references to Upanisads are quoted from *The Thirteen Principal Upanisads* translated by Robert Earnest Hume, 2nd revised edn. Oxford University Press, New York, 1971.
39. *Brh. Up.*, 1·5·2
40. Maitri *Up.* 1·3
41. *Mundaka Up.* 3·2·2
42. *Maitri Up.* 6·21,22

The philosophy and the practice of asceticism finds a stronger expression in Jainism and Buddhism. This asceticism, both in Jainism and Buddhism, became the means to the ethical concern of emancipation from the cycle of birth and death. Hence, the principles of non-possession, non-violence, celibacy, austerity and meditation became the expressions of asceticism.

According to the Jainas, the *Jiva*, in its pristine form, is subjected to bondage *(bandha)* by its association with matter *(pudgala)*. This association is brought about by *karma* which itself is interpreted to be material in its nature. Hence, all the ethical endeavour expressed in terms of ascetic practices is meant for the dissociation of karmic particles from the *jiva* which is effected by a twofold process of warding off the influx *(āsrava)* of the fresh *karma* and the eradication of the accumulated *karma (nirjarā)*. In practice, however, the Jaina asceticism seems to have taken an extreme form.

In Buddhism also asceticism is subservient to the ethical aims of life. In some of the early Buddhist texts,[43] the way of life propounded by the Buddha is termed as 'going against the stream' *(patisotagāmi)* which simply means 'not following the common way of life.' The reference obviously is to the subjugation of one's senses and war against one's own nature as contrasted with the easy-going way of life prevalent in the Vedic religion. Nonetheless, Buddha does not advocate an extreme form of asceticism so that, in practice, asceticism should lose its character of being only an instrument to the attainment of the goal of *nibbāna*. Therefore, it could be said that rightly has it been claimed that the way of life taught by him is the Middle Path *(majjhimāpatipadā)*.

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43. *Saṅyuttanikāya*, Part. I, ed. M. Leon Feer, Pali Text Society, London, 1960, p. 136; *Anguttaranikāya*, Vol. II, ed. Rev. Richard Morris., P. T. S. London, 1955, p. 6

Doctrinal Buddhism and Healing Rituals

> "·····the analogies between ancient myths and stories that appear in the dreams of modern patients are neither trivial nor accidental. They exist because the unconscious mind of modern man preserves the symbol making capacity that once found expression in the beliefs and the rituals of the primitive. And that capacity still plays a role of vital psychic importance".[1]

This paper has two main objectives: to examine the therapeutic basis of doctrinal Buddhism in relation to the healing rites of Sri Lanka and Secondly to raise the question whether the psychology of Jung rather than of Freud helps us to grasp the mechanism that pervade the healing rituals.

Why are we interested in these two issues? Our own research into the psychology of Buddhism in the past was focussed on a comparative study of Freud and Buddhism.[2] As Carl Jung has displayed a dominant interest in Eastern religions, a natural question one could raise is whether the psychological insights of Jung throw light on any facets of doctrinal Buddhism.

Thinking on these lines it struck us that the later expression of Buddhism through the vehicles of art, literature, myths and symbols should provide an interesting field for a Jungian study. A Jungian analysis of religion appeared to be more meaningful in the light of the later developments of Buddhism and the compromises made with the folk culture.

Another factor that emphasizes the value of an exploration into the therapeutic basis of healing rituals is that during recent times there has been considerable interest in such 'primitive psychiatry'. Accounts of illness and healing in rural society which have apparently little in common with psychiatric healing are receiving the careful attention of psychologists and anthropologists today:

> "The Shaman, like the physician, tries to cure the patient by correcting the causes of illness. In line with his culture's concept of disease, this cure may involve not only the administration of therapeutic agents but provision of means for confession, atonement, restoration into the good graces of the family and tribe, and intercession with the spirit world. The Shaman's role may thus involve aspects of the roles of physician, magician, priest, moral arbiter, representative of the group's world-view, and agent of social control"[3].

Thus we hope to compare the therapeutic framework of the Buddhist cure for suffering and anxiety with that of the healing rituals.

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1. Joseph L. Henderson, "Ancient Myths and Modern Man", in *Man and His Symbols: Carl C. Jung*, (London, 1964), p. 107.
2. Padmasiri de Silva, *Budhist and Freudian Psychology*, (Sri Lanka, 1973).
3. Arie Kiev ed., *Magic, Faith and Healing* (London, 1964).

If we accept the distinction between the 'cognitive' and the 'symbolic' as two modes of mental activity, doctrinal Buddhism is presented in the cognitive mode whereas the healing rituals are expressed through the symbolic mode.[4] Inspite of the fact that Freud was a pioneer in the exploration into dream symbols, the god of Freudian psychology was *logos* (reason). While the comparison of the Buddhist and Freudian psychology was made through the medium of the cognitive mode, there is certainly room for a fascinating study, a Jungian study of Buddhism both with reference to the doctrine as well as its expression in culture, myths and rituals. While it is not intended to undertake a task of such a magnitude in a short paper, we believe that some student of the anthropology of religions will undertake this task in the near future. Our observations here will be limited to an analysis of the therapeutic potential of doctrinal Buddhism in relation to the healing rituals of Sri Lanka.

Folk religion and Buddhism

Though both the therapeutic aspects of the psychology of Buddhism as well as the cathartic value of the healing rituals have received the attention of scholars as independent subjects for serious study, a comparative study of their respective goals of therapy and the techniques of cure has received scant attention. In some recent sociological studies of the healing rituals queries have been raised and pointers made towards some possible lines of convergence as well as divergence.[5]

The psychology of Buddhism offers a clear analysis of the problem of human suffering and the recommendation of a way out of it. However, while doctrinal Buddhism provided an answer for human suffering and cosmic anxiety, folk beliefs and rituals helped them to deal with the trials and tribulations of daily life. When people were faced with problems like the failure of a crop, famine, disease and mental sickness they often sought the aid of rituals, ceremonies and certain magical devices. Our interest in this paper is in mental sickness and it may be said that in this case the cure offered by western medicine or *āyurveda* did not conflict with the use of healing rituals. The diverse causes for mental sickness like the medical, *āyurvedic*, magical and the demonological are often accommodated within one belief syssem. The focus of this paper is of course not the relationship between these healing rituals and the other alternatives open to people, but rather the relationship of these healing rituals to the meaning and cure for human suffering as found in the dialogues of the Buddha.

What exactly is the general relationship between the essential ingredients of doctrinal Buddhism and the popular practices of the rituals in the folk religion? Some feel that the popular rituals and the magical practices

4. See, John Halverson, 'Dynamics of Exorcism: The Sinhalese Sanniyakuma', *History of Religions*, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 358–359.

5. See Halverson *op. cit.* L. R. Amerasinghe, *Laughter as Cure: Joking and Exorcism in a Sinhalese Curidg Ritual*, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell, 1973.

go counter to the message of the Buddha, while others feel that without any violent contradiction, these practices help the Buddhist to survive the crises of daily life. It appears to us that while some facets of the folk religion like the use of magic to harm people unmistakeably go counter to the spirit of doctrinal Buddhism, the concepts of 'demonic possession' and 'ritual cure' call for a serious study by students interested in the therapeutic potential of doctrinal Buddhism. Perhaps some of the healing rituals facilitate a *symbolic encounter* with facets of human suffering and anxiety which are dealt with in a more prosaic and rational manner in the discourses of the Buddha. If such a deepening and illumination of human suffering is found in some facets of ritual cure, the aesthetic and the therapeutic dimension of these rituals need to be understood from the standpoint of doctrinal Buddhism. It must be mentioned that while our observations are limited to the rituals in Sri Lanka, there are other countries like Thailand and Burma, where the doctrine of *Theravāda* prevails like in Sri Lanka, but the healing rituals differ.[6]

There is one more important issue before we get to the main subject, that is the ontology of demonic existence. In the ritual context the demons map function at a symbolic level, but the actual existence of spirits and demons is referred to in the *Suttas*. There are references in the dialogues of the Buddha to the existence of evil spirits and demons as well as the heavenly beings and radiant ones. The *Āṭānāṭiya Sutta* is specially recited to protect people from evil spirits and demons. Commenting on this *sutta* Rhys Davids says that the recitation of something true *(saccakiriya)* has the power to heal. The spirits are dealt with the suffusion of amity rather than enmity: "The profusion of amity, according to Buddhist doctrine, was no mere matter of pretty speech. It was to accompany and express a psychic suffusion of the hostile man or beast or spirit with benign, fraternal emotion-with *metta*."[7] Even in the ritual context, though the demons are the symbols of attachment, lust and frustration, they are converted into more human forms, confronted and tamed. It has even been pointed out that there is a process of movement from excessive craving (represented initially by the demons) to runnunciation (taming of the demons).[8]

Perhaps what exactly takes place in this process of transformation is not an existential changes in the demon, but merely the way in which we perceive them.[9] Thus it seems that there is at least one central point on which the healing ceremonies as forms of 'psycho drama' offer an interesting extension of doctrinal Buddhism : the demons present themselves as 'images of excess and craving'.[10] But while both doctrinal Buddhism and the

6. See, S.J. Thambiah, *Buddhism and the Spirit Cults in North-East Thailand*, (London, 1970), pp. 327 – 337.
7. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Part III, pp. 185 – 187.
8. L. R. Amerasinghe, *op. cit.*
9. *Ibid*
10. *Ibid*

healing rituals deal with the springs of suffering, greed *(lobha)* and hatred *(dosa)*, Buddhism does not limit itself to the effective roots of greed and hatred but also the cognitive spring of delusion. In the final analysis the psychology of doctrinal Buddhism concentrates not merely on the roots of greed and ill-will but the contradictions emerging from the attachment to the ego. It may be possible to articulate this difference in the technical language of the psychology of therapy by saying that the healing rituals are a form of 'symbol therapy' while doctrinal Buddhism is a form of 'cognitive therapy'.

The Jungian Approach and Symbol Therapy

Jung remarked that he was not content to equate man's creative imagination to infantile wishes like Freud. The problems of life, its anxieties and tensions may be articulated and confronted at a deeper psychic layer through myths, symbols and 'archetypes' or to use Jungian terminology, at the level of man's *Collective Unconscious*: "... the analogies between ancient myths and stories that appear in the dreams of modern patients are neither trivial nor accidental. They exist because the unconscious mind of modern man preserves the symbol making capacity that once found expression in the beliefs and rituals of the primitive. And that capacity still plays a role of vital psychic importance".[11]

Jung divided the Unconscious into two parts: the Personal Unconcsious consisting of the individual's forgotten and repressed memories and the Collective Unconscious shared by all men which is derived from his ancestors. An individual's Personal Unconscious can be explained in terms of his personal history and the web of emotions, and ideas thus repressed was referred to by the term complexes. But these complexes of the Personal Unconscious develop in terms of the basic elements of the Collective Unconscious called the 'archetypes' by Jung. The Collective Unconscious is a deeper stratum of the Unconscious than the Personal Unconscious, "it is the unknown material from which our consciousness emerges".[12] The tendency to apprehend and experience life in a certain manner conditioned by our past history is described as 'archetypal' by Jung. These "pre-existent forms of apprehension" are unconscious but we become aware of them through certain typical images which recur in the psyche. Some of the most dominant archetypes are anima (inherited image of woman), animus (inherited image of man), mother earth, wise man and the devil, etc. Thus the widespread recurrence of the same symbols, myths and stories across different cultures and religions interested Jung.

These 'primordeal images' can appear through dreams, phantasies, phobias as well as creative literary work. A person can be dominated and possessed by these archetypes as, for instance, when he is possessed by a demon

11. Joseph L. Henderson, "Ancient Myths and Modern Man", in *Man and his Symbols: Carl C. Jung* (London, 1964), p. 107.
12. Frieda Fordham, *An Introduction to Jung's Psychology*, (London, 1954), p. 23.

Jung also uses the terms 'shadow' to refer to the dark, repressed and uncivilized desires of man and the term 'persona' to refer to the manner in which one relates oneself to the world. Persona is the socially accepted mask imposed on the person behind which is found the real man. In therapeutic contexts, whether it be a healing ritual or a psychiatric session this mask is unmasked.

We know that unlike the psychiatric encounters, the healing ritual is a communal or a social event and Jung would say that communal participation is possible because of the Collective Unconscious that cut across the people who witness the ritual, the patient, the dancers etc.

In the light of this brief resume of Jungian psychology it should be possible to understand what Halverson meant when he referred to the pattern of the Sanniyakuma as meaningful in the light of Jungian Symbol therapy: "Indeed, a Jungian analyst would recognize immediately most of the symbolic figures of the ritual as familiar archetypeal images of the unconscious. . ."[13]

The Problem of Human Suffering

The Buddha was basically concerned with the problem of human suffering summarily described by the Pāli word *dukkha* (and the Sinhala word *duka*). Disease, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain and grief are all facets of *dukkha* and in a deeper sense birth is a facet of *dukkha*. To be joined with the unpleasant, to be separated from the pleasant, and the failure to get what one wants is also suffering. In short, clinging to the five groups of mental and physical qualities that go to make up the individual is suffering.

In translating the Pāli word *dukkha* it is not possible to find one simple word that will compress all the aspects of its meaning. Starting with specific and concrete instances of physical pain and bodily ailments, we discern a broadening group of more abstract meanings: mental sorrow, frustration conflict, insecurity and anxiety. Then we come to even broader concepts like unsatisfactoriness, disharmony, emptiness and insubstantiality.

The genesis of this human predicament tied to pain and suffering is traced to the deep-rooted bases of greed, ill-will and the contradictions emerging from the attachment to the ego. If we are to use the language of the folk ritual we may say that the demons of greed, rage and egotism cause human misery. Greed takes the dual form of the desire for sensuous gratification and selfish pursuits and ill-will is the base of the destructive urge in man. These desires work both at the conscious and the unconscious level. There are also the healthy bases of human action which evoke liberality, kindness and wisdom, The person who wants to break through the vicious circle of pain and pleasure has to develop the healthy bases of

13. Halverson *op. cit*; L. R Amerasinghe, *op. cit* p. 35.

human activity. As this is an ardous task, some accept the ideal of renunciation and become monks, while the others who make a compromise with life, practice the virtuous life advocated by the Buddha within the bounds of the layman's social ethic and spiritual development.

A solution to the problem of human suffering as this is certainly an ethically and psychologically oriented system of therapy. It leaves out by its very nature, the use of rituals, the belief in mysterious powers and magic. The fact that with the passage of time these very components entered into the daily life of the villager has been pointed out by scholars who made a close study of religions in their popular form.

Folk religion is based on a belief in the supernatural and the efficacy of prayers and rituals. But, if so, how did these mechanisms sustain the affective dimension of village life? Some scholars feel that unlike Hinduism, Buddhism did not prescribe any specific ritual and that the folk religion found it easy to fill the gap: "It provided the layman with the means of solving his practical problems, that is, it gave him ceremonies of ensuring the success of his crop, it showed him how to propitiate the deities that cause disease and famine, and it opened up ways of gaining favours from the powers that control the elements. Its priests interceded between man and the unseen agencies, and performed benedicting rites for him in the crises of his daily life."[14] It has also been observed that instead of absorbing non-Buddhistic beliefs and practices and thus tarnishing the original doctrine, Buddhism came to a different kind of compromise with the folk religion: the gods and demons of the folk religion became instruments to deal with practical problems and in fact they were subsevient to the Buddha in performing these tasks. This is perhaps not the sole answer to the relation between doctrinal and popular Buddhism (as doctrinal Buddhism did get distorted in some way in making this compromise with the folk religion). But this analysis points out distinctly how the doctrine of the Buddha sustained the life of the villager without coming into any violent conflict with the benedicting rites and the curing rituals that he practiced.

The Healing Rituals

It is not our purpose here to pursue in detail the relationshlp between doctrinal Buddhism and the folk religion as such, but focus attention on the therapeutic features of 'ritual cure' against the background of the doctrine of the Buddha.

The first point that has to be mentioned is that there is a great deal of *symbolism* in these healing rituals. If we take for instance the ritual dance of the *sanni* demons it will be seen that the 'concept of the demonic' has a symbolic role to play. The concept of the demonic help the people to symbolize and dramatize the emerging passions of greed, rage, terror and

14· E. R. Sarathchandra, *The Folk Drama of Ceylon*, (Ceylon, 1968), p, 2.

anxiety. The demons possess the human beings because as humans have greed, anger and attachment. The demonic in the ritual situation symbolizes these passions in man as the concept of *māra* in doctrinal Buddhism represents the forces of evil which obstruct the man bent on seeking contentment and serenity.

It may be said that doctrinal Buddhism is concerned with the basic context of the suffering human being in a wide cosmic setting which stands in contrast with the role of folk rituals dealing with famine, misfortune sickness and mental instability. Though the range of doctrinal Buddhism in this context is both wider and deeper than that of folk religion, the points at which they cut across the question of mental sickness should be interesting. In fact, a recent researcher in this field has made an interesting observation: "Doctrinal Buddhism, as I have shown, places great emphasis on the problem of suffering, and curing rituals deal with suffering in every day life. It seems reasonable to suspect that there are 'deeper affinities' (Geertz) between these two expressions of the problem of suffering than are apparent from a hierarchial rendering of their relationship. This is particularly likely when we consider that there is less clear-cut contradiction between Buddhism and practical religion than is sometimes assumed in delineating the differences between them".[15]

The use of symbolism, imagery and metaphor form a part of the aesthetic dimension in which the doctrine of the Buddha relating to the problem of human suffering is presented. Dramatization or literary presentations of the doctrine supplements the analytical mode through which the doctrine is presented. But the diagnosis and remedial measures advocated by the Buddha is a systematic and methodical approach to the development of mental culture. It is in this context that any comparison with folk rituals should be made. Assuming that the symbolization of psychological conflicts enriched by Buddhist terminology offers an interesting point of convergence, what can we say about the other elements in the healing rituals?

Catharsis

The cathartic function of these healing rituals has been commented on by those who have made a close study of them. Certain demons are capable of causing particular ailments and in many cases it is possible to identify the demon that has to be exorcised. These demons are attracted by blood, feces, oily food, sex, lonely places and the power of sorcery etc. The demons symbolize human greed and attachment and have the power to arouse a sense of terror in people.

15. L. R. Amarasinghe, *op. cit.*

In the ritual situation these awe-inspiring beings are brought down to earth in human forms. They are "stripped of their mythological trappings" and subjected to jokes, humour and obscenity.[16] It has also been observed that we do not meet them only as human beings but as a part of our selves. This process of converting the 'demonic' into the 'ludicrous' is not merely an encounter with the demonic within one's own dark interior, but perhaps a way of laughing at oneself.

Can this kind of 'catharsis' be accomodated within the authentic fold of doctrinal Buddhism? The concept of catharsis itself has a number of components. Aristotle used the concept to describe the purification of the emotions: this could mean that emotional tensions are lessened by expressing them in aesthetic experience or refined by sharing in emotions universalized and artistically portrayed. In the psychoanalytic context, there is a release of tension by reliving past incidents (abreaction). Catharsis in the context of folk belief could mean that uninhibited expressive behaviour in one situation reduces the need for it in similar situations.[17]

There is nothing peculiarly Buddhistic about the release of pent up emotions. But the attempt to *master* tensions and anxieties by breaking through layers of repression, bringing them into the open by presenting them in a universalized artistic or religious idiom should be of interest to the Buddhist. Tranquility is an ideal of one form of Buddhist meditation, but it is not preceded by a kind of 'bursitng out', a storm before the calm. In the final analysis, the therapeutic aim of doctrinal Buddhism is to develop self-analysis, self-knowledge and insight. Insights refer to ones own nature, the perception of other persons and the nature of the world.

If a patient who takes part in a ritual emerges out of it with a sense of relief, but 'knows not why,' there is no development of self-knowledge. It is of course possible that the audience that witness the ritual derives a higher form of catharsis by re-enacting their own conflicts plus the obtaining of an insight both regarding themselves and the patient. We of course know that the kind of atmosphere generated by the chanting of *pirit* has a tranquilising effect, and that some of the musical components of the healing rituals have a tranquilising effect on the patient. But if the concept of 'ritual cure' implies that there is emotional relief without personal insight, here perhaps is a line of demarcation between the therapy of doctrinal Buddhism and that of the healing rituals.

Another problem relevant to the issue under dicsussion is the concept of 'personal responsibility' in relation to the patient. The fact that the cause for illness is accountable in terms of demonic possession does not

16. G. Obeyasekera, "The ritual Drama oi the Sanni Demons", *Comparative Studies in Sociology and History*, 1969.

17. H. B. English and A. C. English, *A Comprehensive Dictionary of Psychoanalytical and Psychological Terms*, (London, 1958).

make the patient committed or responsible for the illness. It has even been observed that the process by which mental sickness is centered on supernatural causation rather than a sense of personal responsibility makes way for quick recovery: when the 'self' remains unchanged it is easy for a person to shed the sick role quickly.[18]

This facet of 'ritual cure' may conflict with the concept of moral responsibility that runs through the Buddhist scriptures:

> 'Tis by self that evil is done, 'tis by self One comes to grief; 'tis by self that evil is left Undone; 'tis by self that one is purified; The pure the impure, both are of the self.[19]

The answer that may be given to this query is that hidden facets of the self are brought out by the symbolic identification with the demonic. It may be also said that it is difficult to apply the notion of responsibility to abnormal and deranged minds. Finally, society also works out its own mechanisms of coming to terms with aberrant behaviour in a humane way, and long before the emergence of psychiatry healing rituals played this role.

Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices: The Freudian Critique

Sigmund Freud remarks that there is a resemblance between "neurotic ceremonials and the sacred acts of religious ritual".[20] Freud made a comparison of the ceremonies followed by obsessional neurotics and those of religious practices and said that both were fed by an inner compulsion. Inspite of the fact that one was done in privacy and the other in the larger community he thought the resemblance was important. They spring from a certain sense of guilt and fear and are designed both to keep out temptations together with possible punishment. While sexual impulses dominate in obsessional neurosis, selfish and aggressive impulses have to be dealt with in religion. Freud came to the conclusion that obsessional neurosis was the pathological counterpart of religion.

It is of course not necessary to accept the Freudian analysis completely and reject the health giving healing rituals as a kind of obsessional neurosis. But the question is important as the Buddha himself criticised some misguided religious cults and rituals of his time and brought them under the term, 'rite and ritual clinging' *(silabbata parāmāsa)*. The term *parāmāsa* suggests that one clings to these rituals with a feeling of compulsion than a judicious understanding of their function. In the Buddhist context it came to mean the man who is attached to the merely outer ceremonial aspect of rules rather than their internal meaning. Religious fetishes like

18. See, Nancy Waxler, "Culture and Mental illness : A Social Labelling Perspective". *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, 1974, Vol. 159, pp. 379 – 395.

19. *Dhammapada*, 165.

20. Freud, *Obsessive Action and Raligious Practices*, Complete Works of Freud, Ed., Strachey, Vol.

bathing in the river, wearing hides and penances would fall into this category. If the healing rituals provide through its symbolism an opportunity for a deeper encounter with one's anxieties, rather than an external purification ceremony for washing away sins, it need not be considered as an expression of 'rites and ritual clinging'. In fact, the Buddha has said that even 'clinging to the Dhamma' is an obstruction to one's spiritual development. A raft is meant only for crossing the river, but if some one carries it on his head, he does not understand the purpose for which the raft has to be used–so is the Dhamma.

Some of the religious fetishes mentioned by Freud like the instance of hand washing are expression of obsessions and compulsions. The Buddha too exposed the vacuity of forms of purifications which were merely external. Doctrinal Buddhism encourages man to develop a healthy sense of moral dread and shame *(hiri-ottappa)*, but uneasiness of conscience, remorse and worry are an obstruction for spiritual development. Guilt laden rituals and the self-punishing ascetics violate the spirit of the healthy sense of dread advocated by the Buddha. To use the vocabulaey of Kleinian psychology Buddhism can accommodate a concept of 'reperative guilt' than one of 'persecutary guilt'. Doctrinal Buddhism did not encourage the development of a guilt-complex or rituals to deal with them: "In the place of priestly rituals he offered a radical inward purification of the springs from which outer evils arise: atcachment, aversion, spiritual blindness. He was as St. Paul or Freud in recognizing the egocentric, lustful, hostile and grasping proclivities of unawakened man; he set forth a way to uproot them··· and founded a religion which in general seems to have produced far fewer neurotic guilt-feelings than has Judaism or Christianity."[21]

Some Positive Thoughts

Now that we have weighed the *pros* and *cons* regarding the case for healing rituals in terms of doctrinal Buddhism, we like to conclude this analysis with some positive thoughts at a deeper level of understanding the Buddhist doctrine as well as the healing rituals. An entry into this dimension of thinking may be made by an analysis of the meaning of *dukkha* with which we started our exposition of Buddhism.[22]

A deeper grasp of the *dukkha* concept involves a 'perception of incongruities' and the catharsis in the ritual context is generated by a concept of the ludicrous-placing the fearful in a playful setting. Though laughter as such does not figure prominently in the teachings of the Buddha, there is a deep sense of the ludicrous embedded in the doctrine of the Buddha. This is a dimension of experience that has entered the Zen Buddhist tradition.

21· Terresina Havens, "Dynamics of Confession', *Wijesekera Felicitation Volume*, (Sri Lanka 1970), pp. 20–27.

22· See p. 115

Dukkha in this context may be rendered as tragi-comedy-the discrepancy between my self which I automatically assume to be permanent, and the only too manifestly impermanent things which I strive to possess in the temporal object-the situation is at once both *comic* and *tragic*. Here both tragedy and comedy are ways of apprehending contradictions. "There are little cracks and fissures in our complacent serious minded existence, and the reason why we laugh at them is to keep them at a distance, to charm them, to exorcise them, to neutralise them."[23] When we laugh at a comedy or weep at a tragedy what we are doing is busying ourselves, repairing all the little crevices that have appeared in our familiar world in the course of the day . . .[24]

This profound sense of the ludicrous has gone down with its Buddhist inspiration to the folk poetry of the villagers. To cite one instance analysed in *Aspects of Sinhalese Culture*:[25]

> Tired, carrying a pingo of pots and pans
> At an *ambalama* I rested
> The pots and pans a bull did smash
> At which I laughed and laughed

"On the day before Sinhalese New Year a village potter was carrying a pingo of pots and pans either as a present. or for sale. Being tired, he entered a dilapidated *ambalama* to rest. A bull resting in a corner of the ambalama rushed out in fright, smashing the pots and pans, on seeing the havoc caused he says, 'I laughed and laughed".[26] The word 'pottery' is a proverbial metaphor for impermanence, and it is often used in the Buddhist texts as a metaphor. Like the bull, death will smash the worldly life of any man. The folk poetry of the Sinhalese is rich in such Buddhist insights presented in a humourous vein. The ability to look at life with a sense of equanimity provides the Boddhist a rich base for the development of a profound sense of humour and irony. Such philosophical insights into the nature of human suffering may be found in the doctrine, healing rituals and folk poetry.

The gap between the healing rituals and doctrinal Buddhism

While it is possible to see interesting points of convergence as we pointed out between the healing rituals and doctrinal Buddhism, basically the healing rituals are form of Jungian symbol therapy while Buddhist therapy will not fit into such a description.

23. Personal Notes from the Unpublished Letters of Ven. Nanavira.
24. *Ibid.*
25. Martin Wickramasinghe, *Aspects of Sinhalese Culture*, (Ceylon, 1973, pp. 38–41).
26. *Ibid.*

Halverson commenting on the 'Dynamics of Exorcism' in the *Sinhalese Sanniyakuma* says that the experience of cure undergone by the patient is *symbolic* rather than *cognitive*: "Yet whatever he experiences, it can be hardly at the level of cognition; that level of the ritual is at very best slight. The symbolism, on the contrary, is extremely rich and pervasive. The close attention given by the patient is perforce directed to the pre-cognitive symbols."[27] The patient does not translate the symbolic into cognitive terms, rather "the symbolic patterns of the ritual correspond to and activate parallel patterns in the patient's unconscious mind on a principle of homology."[28] Thus the kind of therapy found in the healing rituals is close to Jungian symbol therapy.

The Freudian Id, the Jungian 'shadow' and the Buddhist *Āsavas* all depict the alien, primitive and the irrational in man. But while Jung adopts a symbolic mode of confrontation with the irrational, Buddhism offers a cognitive mode of confrontation with the irrational. These basic modes of therapeutic confrontation may supplement each other.

PADMASIRI DE SILVA

27. Halverson *op. cit.* L. R. Amarasinghe.
28. *Ibid.*

Stephen Guest and Maggie Tulliver

The character of Stephen Guest and his relationship with Maggie Tulliver are the most controversial aspects of George Eliot's *The Mill on the Floss*. Stephen has aroused antipathy in readers from Victorian to modern times. Swinburne said, "the man, I should suppose, does not exist who could make for the first time the acquaintance of Stephen Guest with no incipient sense of twitching in his fingers and a tingling in his toes at the notion of any contact between Maggie Tulliver and a cur so far beneath the chance of promotion to the notice of his horsewhip, or elevation to the level of his boot."[1] Leslie Stephen considered him "a typical provincial coxcomb" and a mere hairdresser's block."[2] Recently, Joan Bennet thought he was "a vulgarian", "a coxcomb and insensitive egotist", "a man without chivalry and without perception"; "a man without conscience or principle."[3] The sympathies of critics are usually drawn to Maggie. They feel that Stephen is unworthy of her. As a consequence, they tend to do Stephen less than justice. Indeed, George Eliot herself has encouraged critics to invest their emotions unduly in Maggie by idealising her at times as, for instance, when she refers to Maggie as "the tall dark-eyed nymph with her jet black coronet of hair." Maggie is not treated with consistent objectivity as Gwendolen Harleth is in *Daniel Deronda*, George Eliot's last novel.

There is, certainly, a difference in value between Stephen and Maggie. It is very marked on the occasions when Maggie is idealised. But usually the difference in worth between Stephen and Maggie is not as large as critics often think. Moreover, this difference becomes increasingly narrow as Stephen's character develops. It is true that Stephen is provincial, but so is Maggie. Indeed, Stephen has more experience of urban society than Maggie and, as a result, is more refined. Maggie is not more educated than he is; her short course of instruction outside St. Ogg had been at a "third-rate school-room." He is as fond of music as she. It is only at the beginning of their relationship that Maggie is seen to have far more depth of character than Stephen. George Eliot introduces him sarcastically as an idle, rich fop: his "diamond ring, attar of rosses, and air of nonchalant leisure, at twelve o' clock in the day, are the graceful and odoriferous result of the largest oil-mill and the most extensive wharf in St. Ogg's." Stephen enters the novel only at the sixth book, and a part of the reader's dissatisfaction with him may derive from the brevity of George Eliot's portrayal of him. His life is not depicted over the same span of years with the same fulness as, say, Maggie's or Tom's. The lives of Maggie and Tom are presented substantially from childhood to their adult years. We see

1. Algernon Charles Swinburne in *A Note on Charlotte Bronte* (London, 1877), p. 37.
2. Leslie Stephen, *George Eliot* (London, 1902), p. 100.
3. Joan Bennet, *George Eliot: her Mind and her Art* (Cambridge, 1962 ed.), p. 116.

Stephen only as an adult, and chiefly in so far as he interacts with Maggie and Lucy. We are not shown his fortunes after Maggie's parting from him except in one short letter. Still, he does come alive as a real person in the part of the drama in which he participates.

Stephen's relationship with Maggie has been censured more strongly than any other part of the novel. Swinburne called it a "potent flaw", "a cancer in the very bosom."[4] Bulwer-Lytton condemned it on strait-laced moral grounds, in a letter to John Blackwood, dated 4 May 1860:

> "It may be quite natural that she should take that liking to him, but it is a position at variance with all that had before been heroic about her. The *indulgence* of such a sentiment for the affianced of a friend under whose roof she was, was a treachery and a meanness according to Ethics of Art, and nothing can afterwards lift the character into the same hold on us. The refusal to marry Stephen fails to do so."

Blackwood sent Bulwer-Lytton's critical letter to George Eliot, and she defended herself most ably in her reply to Blackwood:

> "Maggie's position towards Stephen is too vital a part of my whole conception and purpose for me to be converted to a condemnation of it. If I am wrong there-if I did not really know what my heroine would feel and do under the circumstances in which I deliberately placed her, I ought not to have written this book at all, but quite a different book if any. If the ethics of art do not admit the truthful presentation of a character essentially noble but liable to great error-error that is anguish to its own nobleness-then, it seems to me, the ethics of art are too narrow, and must be widened to correspond with a widening psychology."[5]

George Eliot's Aristotelian view of Maggie as a noble protagonist with a tragic flaw is part of her total conception of *The Mill on the Floss* as a tragedy of contemporary life. Her view is true to the novel and true to life. Maggie responds to Stephen's polished solicitousness with particular sensitiveness partly because she is unused to such attention. It is significant that, though Maggie is nineteen years old, she is constantly described as "child-like". Her immaturity is fundamentally responsible for the unfortunate turn of her relationship with Stephen.

Given the circumstances and their respective characters, the relationship between Stephen and Maggie is prefectly natural and consistent; its gradual development is convincing. Before he met Maggie, Stephen was

4. Swinburne in A *Note on Charlotte Bronte*, p. 38.

5. Gordon S. Haight (ed.), *The George Eliot Letters* (New Haven, 1954), Vol. 3, pp.317-18 All quotations, which are not assigned to a specific source, come from *The Mill on the Floss*.

courting her cousin, Lucy Deane. His choice of Lucy was a matter of reasoning and not deep instinctive feeling. He chose Lucy because she had the "qualifications" of a desirable wife such as "to be accomplished, gentle, affectionate and not stupid." He was not formally engaged to her. Thus, it was not difficult for his real love for Maggie to push aside his affection for Lucy. Maggie's side of relationship is similar. When she meets Stephen she is already attached to Philip Wakem. But her attachment to Philip is not love. Rather it is a combination of pity for his deformity and a fascination with his cleverness. Thus, she could love Stephen and, at the same time, retain her feelings for Philip, Moreover, she was not formally betrothed to Philip. Stephen is the most eligible bachelor Maggie has met so far, and it is no surprise that she comes to love him. Philip was a hunchback and effeminate; the Wakems were at loggerheads with the Tullivers. Maggie disliked the rude young Torry. Bob Jakin was a wanderer whom she never thought of as a possible lover; in any case, Bob got married before long.

George Eliot presents the relationship between Stephen and Maggie with conscious. declared realism:

> "Had he fallen in love with this surprising daughter of Tulliver at first sight? Certainly not. Such passions are not heard of in real life."

At the beginning, Stephen admires Maggie's beauty and is interested by "her poverty and her troubles." On her side, Maggie is becoming emotionally prepared for the birth of love. "After years of contented renunciation, she had slipped back into desire and longing," and Stephen brings with him "the half-remote presence of a world of love and beauty and delight." Their mutual attraction increases instinctively; Lucy's house, "each was oppressively conscious of the other's presence, even to the finger-ends." As their love grows, Stephen's character deepens. He becomes aware of the serious complications attending a relationship with Maggie because of their attachments to Lucy and Philip respectively. At this stage, Joan Bennett could hardly call Stephen "a man without conscience or principle." When Stephen kisses Maggie's arm in the conservatory of Park house, he is not being a cad. His action stems from the understandable impulse of a man deeply in love. Maggie resents it as an insult to her and a "treachery" to Lucy and to Philip. But, at the same time, she does feel it to be "a moment's happiness."

Stephen tries "to be faithful to tacit engagements" and attempts to resist the growth of his love for Maggie. His love, however, is too powerful a force to be resisted. When he meets Maggie at Mrs. Moss's farm, she confesses that she reciprocates his love. But, in her case, she can exercise command over love. She rejects his proposal of marriage because she feels that their love would be "poisoned" by breaking their ties to Lucy and

Philip. At this stage, Stephen is not a "coxcomb and insentive egotist", as Joan Bennett describes him. He seriously argues his case with Maggie, but finally respects her feelings on the matter. Their relationship reaches a crisis when they drift along the Floss in a boat. Ironies of circumstance make their journey possible! Lucy and Philip unwittingly help Stephen and Maggie to come together. Stephen does not force Maggie to come along with him on the river; Maggie herself tacitly acquiesces in his entreaty. *The Westminister Review* in 1860 was wrong in referring to "his dishonourable abduction of Maggie." There took place no "abduction" as such; nor was there anything "dishonourable" in Stephen's motives.

When Stephen urges Maggie to go boating with him, he is only thinking in terms of an enjoyable outing. It is to go on such an outing that Maggie agrees. Both of them have no idea of an elopment. On the river, both are soon "enveloped" in an "enchanted haze." They pass Luckreth without noticing it; Luckreth is the point at which they should have turned back. Stephen comes out of the "haze" at the next village, but wishes to drift along further. He does wrong in not jolting Maggie out of the "haze", but he is genuinely penitent later. When both realise that they have drifted too far to return on the same day, Stephen acts sensibly and honourably. He points out to Maggie how society will look down on her and how it is a mistake to remain faithful to Lucy and Philip without love. His proposal of marriage to her is the most honourable and wisest course open to them. Maggie, however, does not agree with Stephen. The past has a peculiarly strong hold on her. She fears that marriage to Stephen will rend her away from all that her "past life has made holy and dear." Her thought that society will believe her is proved to be erroneous. St. Ogg society scorns her. The social antagonism to Maggie is so strong that Dr. Kenn, the benevolent priest, is forced to discontinue her services as governess to his children. Maggie, however, is steadfast in her resolve to break with Stephen. His later attempt to persuade her by letter to his line of thinking fails. The difference between Stephen's reasoning and Maggie's reflects a difference between maturity and immaturity, between practicality and idealism.

Stephen has no place in the climax of the novel, the episode of the flood; the climax belongs to Maggie and Tom. It is prefectly logical that Tom is featured with Maggie at the end; it is her relationship with Tom shat is the deepest of her associations, deeper than her relationship with Stephen or Philip Walkem. But *The Mill on the Floss* without Stephen Guest would be a considerably less interesting and less powerful novel.

D. C. R. A. GOONETILLEKE

Diacritical Devices in the Tamil Script

Several centuries of independent development separate the Devanāgari script, the most widely accepted script of the Indo-Aryan languages, and the Tamil script, which is associated with the oldest surviving Dravidian language. However, these and other Indian scripts have some important features in common, such as an essentially syllabic script structure and the generally uniform application of certain diacritical devices to a basic consonant symbol to yield the letters representing the vowel-consonant (i.e., the syllable consisting of the pure consonant followed by a vowel).

The letters in the Devanāgari and the Tamil script systems that represent corresponding sounds or sound sequences do not show much resemblance. But there is a remarkable similarity in the manner in which diacritical devices are used in the two script systems. An investigation of these common features could throw further light on the origin and development of these and other Indian script systems. The present note draws attention to the similarities between the diacritical devices used and attempts to explain the geometery of some devices used in Tamil in the light of these similarities.

The diacritical devices used in Tamil underwent some changes around the beginning of the 18th century. These change consisted of the replacement of the device ◌ை, which was originally used in the *ee* and *oo* series, by the device ◌ே, and the replacement of the device ◌ெ and a dot, which were originally used in the *e* and *o* series, by the device ◌ெ alone. The present comparisons are made on the basis of the Tamil script system prior to these reforms. The relevant similarities between the Tamil and Devanāgari script are as follows:

i. The basic consonant symbol represents the vowel consonant containing the vowel *a*.

ii. The pure consonant is formed by the addition of a single device to the basic consonant symbol.

iii. The *aa* series is obtained by the addition of a diacritical device to the right of the basic consonant symbol.

iv. The *i* and *ii* series are formed by the addition of diacritical devices attached to the top of the basic consonant symbol.

v. The *u* and *uu* series are formed by the addition of diacritical devices attached to the base of the basic consonant symbol.

vi. The *oo* series is formed by the addition of the device used for the *aa* series, to the right of the letters of the *ee* series.

	a	aa	i	ii	u	uu	e	ee	ai	o	oo	au
Tamil	அ	ஆ	இ	ஈ	உ	ஊ	எ	ஏ	ஐ	ஒ	ஓ	ஔ
Devanagari	अ	आ	इ	ई	उ	ऊ		ए	ऐ		ओ	औ
Malayalam	അ	ആ	ഇ	ഈ	ഉ	ഊ	എ	ഏ	ഐ	ഒ	ഓ	ഔ
Sinhala	අ	ආ	ඉ	ඊ	උ	ඌ	එ	ඒ	ඓ	ඔ	ඕ	ඖ
Telugu	అ	ఆ	ఇ	ఈ	ఉ	ఊ	ఎ	ఏ	ఐ	ఒ	ఓ	ఔ

Table I: The pure vowels in modern Tamil script and corresponding letters in other scripts.

	ka	kaa	ki	kii	ku	kuu	ke	kee	kai	ko	koo	kau	k
Tamil	க	கா	கி	கீ	கு	கூ	கெ	கே	கை	கொ	கோ	கௌ	க்
Devanagari	क	का	कि	की	कु	कू		के	कै		को	कौ	क्
Malayalam	ക	കാ	കി	കീ	കു	കൂ	കെ	കേ	കൈ	കൊ	കോ	കൌ	
Sinhala	ක	කා	කි	කී	කු	කූ	කෙ	කේ	කෛ	කො	කෝ	කෞ	ක්
Telugu	క	కా	కి	కీ	కు	కూ	కె	కే	కై	కొ	కో	కౌ	క్

Table II: The k - series of Tamil letters and corresponding letters in other scripts.



Table III: Principal diacritical devices used in the Tamil script and corresponding devices in other scripts.



Table IV: Diacritical devices in pre-reform Tamil script and Devanāgari equivalents.

These similarities indicate the possibility of there being a one-to-one correspondence between the diacritical devices used in each of the vowel-consonant series in the two script systems. (See Table I to IV for the diacritical devices used in the Tamil, Devanāgari, Malayalam, Sinhala and Telugu script systems.)

Columns 8 to 11 of Table IV show the corresponding sets of diacritical devices for the *ee*, *ai*, *oo* and *au* series in the Devanāgari and the pre-reform Tamil scripts. The *ai* series in Devanāgari is formed by placing two of the Devanāgari *ee* devices on top of the basic consonant symbol. The *ai* device in Tamil appears to be formed by a sequence of two *ee* devices. This view finds support in the fact that in the Sinhala and Malayalam scripts the devices ෙෙ and ൈ, respectively, are used in the *ai* series. The palaeographic data presented by Sivaramamurthy[1] also support this view.

The palaeographic data for the *au* series do not explicitly suggest the development of the device ௌ used in the *au* series, from ௗ and ு. However, all available versions of this device in the palaeographic data of Sivaramamurthy, can be interpreted as a fusion of the corresponding versions of the devices ௗ and ு. The suggestion that the diacritical device ௌ represents a fusion of the two devices ௗ and ு, finds support in the fact that the equivalent devices Sinhala and Malayalam (see Table III) appear to be the fusions of the devices ෙ and ා, and ൗ and ാ, respectively. It may also be noted that each of the above *au* devices in Tamil, Sinhala and Malayalam are used in the corresponding script system to convert the initial *u* and *oo* into the corresponding *uu* and *au*. (See Table I).

The resemblance of the diacritical device ௌ to the basic consonant symbol ஸ, representing the *la* series in Tamil, raises the question concerning the placing of some of the devices to the left of the basic consonant symbol, in the Tamil script. A possible answer is that the decision to place one of the ௗ's to the left of the basic consonant symbol was somewhat arbitarry, but this decision, once taken, made it necessary to place the other ௗ of the *ai* series, too, the left of the basic consonant symbol. (The placing of one of the ௗ devices to the left and the other to the right will lead to ambiguity as in ௗச ௗவ which could be interpreted as ௗச ௗவ, *cee vee* or as ௗசௗ வ, *cai va.*) The placing of the ை device to the left of the basic consonant symbol is consistent with the methodology in the other script systems. Thus the *oo* series had the ௗ to the left of the basic consonant symbol and the ு to the right. In the case of the *au* series the placing of the second ௗ either to the left or to the right of the basic consonant symbol would not present any problem provided that the second ௗ is to the left of the device ு. The confusion between the device ௌ resulting from the fusion of ௗ and ு, and the basic consonant symbol, ஸ, could

1. Sivaramamurthy, C. (1952) : *Indian Epigraphy and South Indian Scripts*, Bulletin of the Madras Government Museum, Madras.

have occured at a later stage, by when any modification to the established forms would have been strongly resisted by tradition. (In fact, the writing of *kau* as கௌ instead of the present கௗ will be free of ambiguity and consistent with the rest of the script system).

It is also interesting to note that Tamil did not have separate diacritical devices for the *e* and *o* vowel series (a pair of vowels absent in Sanskrit and other Indo-Aryan languages). The *e* and *o* series were obtained by the addition of a dot to the letters of the *ee* and *oo* series, respectively. It is, however, remarkable that the dot is used with some consistency in the Tamil script to indicate a reduction in vowel length. (The dot placed on the *a* vowel consonant yields the pure consonant and a dot with the *u* vowel-consonant yields the *kurriyalukaram*, a 'shortened' *u*.) The dot is also used to indicate the shortening of the 'length' of a consonant as in *makarakkurukkam*, a 'shortened' *m*.

It may be said in conclusion that,

i. Diacritical devices were used in the vowel-consonent series in Tamil only for vowels which were common to Tamil and Sanskrit. Tamil, however, had distinct basic consonant symbols for all its consonants including those not available in Sanskrit.

ii. A one-to-one geometric correspondence exists between the diacritical devices used in the Tamil and Devanāgari scripts. The similarities are systematic and consistent and even the apparant exceptions have a plausible explanation that shows that they do not violate this systematic one-to-one correspondence, despite many centuries of separate development of the two script systems.

It will be interesting to investigate whether the above observations reinforce the view held by some that the Tamil language simply adopted a script system developed for an Indo-Aryan Language, as opposed to the view that the Tamil script originated from a Dravidian script.

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