



# ABHIDHAMMA STUDIES

RESEARCHES IN  
BUDDHIST PSYCHOLOGY

BY

NYANAPONIKA


294-3824

NYA

Handwritten mark or signature on the right side of the page.



139-26







ISLAND HERMITAGE PUBLICATION No. 2

# ABHIDHAMMA STUDIES

RESEARCHES IN  
BUDDHIST PSYCHOLOGY



BHIKKHU NYANAPONIKA

FREWIN & Co., LTD., COLOMBO

1949



294.38214

NYA



The "Island Hermitage", Dodanduwa (Ceylon) is a monastic settlement composed chiefly of Western Buddhist monks. It was founded in 1911 by its present leader, the Mahāthera Nyanatiloka.

The "Island Hermitage Publications" have been started for the purpose of making known works principally by the Mahāthera Nyanatiloka and his pupils on the authentic teachings of the Buddha.



## P R E F A C E

---

These Studies originated when the author was engaged in translating into German the "Dhammasangani" ("The Compendium of Phenomena") and its commentary "Atthasālinī". These two books are the starting point and the main subject of the following pages which, in part, may serve as a kind of fragmentary sub-commentary to those two works.

The content of these Studies is rather variegated: they include philosophical and psychological investigations, references to the practical application of the teachings concerned, pointers to neglected or unnoticed aspects of the Abhidhamma, textual research etc. This variety of contents will serve to show that wherever we dig deep enough into that inexhaustible mine of the Abhidhamma literature we shall meet with the most valuable contributions to the theoretical understanding and the practical realization of the Buddhist doctrine. It is therefore the main purpose of these pages to stimulate further research in the field of Abhidhamma, to be extended much wider and deeper than it is found in this humble attempt.

There is no reason why the Abhidhamma philosophy of the Southern or Theravāda tradition should be stationary to-day, or why its further development should not be resumed. In fact, through many centuries there has been a living growth of Abhidharmic thought, and even in our own days there are original contributions to it from Burma, e.g., by that remarkable monk-philosopher Ledi Sadaw. There is a vast number of subjects in the canonical and commentarial Abhidhamma literature which deserve and require closer investigation and a new presentation in the language of our times. There are many lines of thought, only briefly sketched in our tradition, which are just calling for a further development in connexion with related tendencies of modern thought. Finally, in some important subjects of Abhidharmic doctrine, we have doubtlessly to deplore the partial loss of ancient tradition, a fact which is clearly indicated by the occurrence of technical terms nowhere explained. Here a careful and conscientious restoration, in conformity with the spirit of the Theravada tradition, is required, unless we want to degrade these parts of the Abhidhamma to venerable, but fragmentary museum pieces.

Abhidhamma is meant for inquiring and searching spirits who are not satisfied by repeating monotonously and uncritically some ready-coined terms, even if these are Abhidhamma terms. Abhidhamma is meant for imaginative minds who are able to fill in, as it were, the columns of the tabulations to which the canonical Abhidhamma books have furnished the concise headings. Abhidhamma is not meant for those timid souls who are not even soothened when a philosophical thought does not contradict Buddhist tradition, but demand that it should be expressly, yea literally, supported by canonical or commentarial authority. Such an attitude, being contrary to the letter and the



spirit of the Buddha - Dhamma, would mean that the Abhidhamma philosophy would be stifled by dogmatism and cease to be a living and growing organism. Such a death by suffocation, or the degeneration by intellectual inbreeding, would certainly be deplorable on many reasons. We are convinced that the Abhidhamma, if suitably presented, could fructify also modern non-Buddhist thought, in philosophy as well as psychology. To state the parallels to modern western thought, or the historical precedence of the Buddhist versions, is not so much important in itself. It is of greater importance that the Buddhist way of presenting and solving the respective problems will show to modern independent thinkers new vistas and open new avenues of thought which, in turn, might stimulate again Buddhist philosophy in the East. We are convinced that from such a reciprocal process of philosophical communication there will arise a glorious vindication of those eternal and fundamental truths, simple and profound in one, which were proclaimed by the greatest genius of mankind, the Buddha.

It should be noted that the author alone takes the responsibility for those statements in the following pages which are not expressly referred to their sources, or are not evidently based on quite well-known parts of Buddhist tradition. With regard to these contributions of his own, the author will gladly accept any enlightened criticism, based on reason and on the traditional three criteria to be applied to "personal opinion" (*attano mati*):

- (1) the views of the teachers of old (*ācariya-vāda*),
- (2) conformity with the canonical scriptures (*suttānuloma*),
- (3) direct verification by passages from the canonical scriptures (*sutta*).

(*Samantapāsādikā*", PTS I, 231)

The English translation of "Atthasālinī" by Maung Tin ("The Expositor") was not accessible to the author when writing this book. Therefore, in quoting passages from the "Atthasālinī", reference is made only to the edition of the text itself, published by the Pali Text Society.

These Studies will be continued in due course.

In concluding these prefatory remarks, the author expresses his deep-felt gratitude to his teacher, the Venerable Nyanatiloka Mahathera, of Island Hermitage, Dodanduwa, who had first introduced him into the world of Abhidhamma and who has helped so many western students of Buddhism to gain a clear understanding of this great doctrine.

Further I have to thank Mr. J. G. Fernando of Colombo who, desirous to help in the study and propagation of the Dhamma, has initiated this series of publications, and generously defrayed the cost of this volume.

NYANAPONIKA

"Island Hermitage"

Dodanduwa, Ceylon

15th March 1947.



## CONTENTS

	PAGE
I. THE TWOFOLD METHOD OF THE ABHIDHAMMA PHILOSOPHY	
II. THE SCHEMA OF CLASSIFICATION IN THE DHAMMASANGANI	
The First Type of Wholesome Consciousness ...	11
The Schema of Classification ...	13
III. THE LIST OF MENTAL CONSTITUENTS (DHAMMĀ) IN THE DHAMMASANGANI	
1 General Remarks ...	15
2 The Pentad of Sense Impression ( <i>phassa-pañcaka, F1-5</i> ) ...	24
APPENDIX :	
The Authenticity of the Anupada Sutta ...	28
3 The Factors of Absorption ( <i>jhānanga, F6-10</i> )	30
4 The Faculties ( <i>indriya, F11-18</i> ) ...	34
APPENDIX :	
The omission of Memory in the List.—About the nature of <i>saññā</i> ...	39
5 The Powers ( <i>bala, F24-30</i> ) ...	43
6 The Path Factors ( <i>magg' aṅga, F19-23</i> ) ...	45
7 The Wholesome Roots ( <i>kusala-mūla, F31-33</i> )	48
8 The Ways of Action ( <i>kamma-patha, F34-36</i> )	49
9 The Guardians of the World ( <i>lokapāla, F37, 38</i> )	50
10 The Six Pairs of Qualitative Factors, ( <i>yugalakāni, F39, 50</i> ) ...	51
11 The Helpers ( <i>upakāraka, F51, 52</i> ) ...	59
12 The Pairwise Combination ( <i>yuganaddha, F53, 54</i> ) ...	59
13 The Last Duad ( <i>piṭṭhi duka, F55, 56</i> ) ...	60
14 The Supplementary Factors ( <i>ye-vā-panaka, F57-65</i> ) ...	61
15 Graduations of Intensity Among Parallel Factors	63
16 Concluding Remarks ...	66
IV. ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF TIME	
1 Time and Consciousness ...	69
2 Planes of Time ...	74
3 The Conception of the Present in the Abhidhamma : (About the term <i>uppanna</i> , "arisen") ...	79





# I

## THE TWOFOLD METHOD OF THE ABHIDHAMMA PHILOSOPHY

Having used in the above title the term "Abhidhamma Philosophy," we shall first state in which sense these two words are to be taken here.

As it is well-known, the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka forms the third main division of the Buddhist Pali Canon, and consists of seven books. But when speaking in these pages of the Abhidhamma in general, we have in mind particularly the first and the last one of these seven books, i.e., *Dhammasaṅgani* and *Paṭṭhāna*, which are so aptly characterized by the Ven. Nyanatiloka as "the quintessence of the entire Abhidhamma."\*)

Now, in which sense may the Abhidhamma be called a philosophy? Let us take that rough division of philosophy into Phenomenology and Ontology which we briefly explain as follows: *Phenomenology* deals, as the name implies, with "phenomena", i.e., with the world of internal and external experience. *Ontology*, or Metaphysics, inquires after the existence and the nature of an essence, or ultimate principle, underlying the phenomenal world. In other words, *Phenomenology* investigates the questions: *What* is happening in the world of our experience, and *how* is it happening? Of course, when enquiring after the What and How, philosophy is not satisfied with the surface view of reality as it presents itself to the naive and uncritical mind. *Ontology*, on the other hand, insists, at least in most of its systems, that the question *How?* cannot be answered without reference to an eternal essence of reality, be it conceived as immanent or transcendent. Particularly in the latter case the question *How?* is frequently changed into a *Why?*, containing the tacit assumption that the answer to it has to be searched for somewhere or somehow outside of the given reality.

Between these two divisions of philosophy, the Abhidhamma belongs doubtlessly to the first, i.e., to *Phenomenology*. Even that fundamental Abhidhamma term "dhamma" which includes corporeal as well as all mental "things", may well be rendered by "phenomena" † if only we keep in mind that, in Abhidharmic usage, "phenomenon" must not be thought to imply a correlative "noumenon", as, e.g., in Kantian philosophy.

---

\* "Guide through the Abhidhamma Pitaka", Colombo 1938.

† See the title of the first book of Abhidhamma, *Dhammasaṅgani*, rendered by Nyanatiloka as "Enumeration of Phenomena."



When denoting the Abhidhamma as Phenomenology we have to make two reservations which, however, will not greatly alter the substance of our statement. First, Nibbana too, mostly under the name of *asankhatā dhātu* (i.e., the Unconditioned Element), enters the "Enumeration of Phenomena" ("Dhammasangani") within several classificatory groups treated in that work. Being "supramundane" (*lokuttara-dhamma*), Nibbana is certainly, in the sense of that term *lokuttara*, a meta-physical or transcendent entity. The latter term, "transcendent," may even well be rendered by another Abhidharmic classification of Nibbana, viz: *apariyāpanna*, i.e., "not included" in the three worlds of the universe as conceived by Buddhism. Though Nibbana, resp. *asankhatā dhātu* does, in fact, occur quite frequently in the Dhammasangani, †), for the sake of completeness of that "enumeration of things," it should be noted: (1) in all cases there is only a bare mentioning of it, without any further explanation beyond the respective classificatory heading under which it appears, -differing in that respect from the other "things" to all of which a definition is added. (2) The classifications of Nibbana are all of a negative character. On the other hand it is noteworthy that Nibbana is definitely termed a *dhamma*, and this also in such classifications where it is certainly not viewed as a possible object of thought (i.e., *dhamma* in the sense of a mental object, corresponding to *mano*, "mind"). So we have to admit that this sole *non-phenomenal* entity belongs likewise to the system of the Abhidhamma, but, what is relevant in our connexion, it is never enlarged upon, because Nibbana is an object of realisation and not of philosophical research.

Our second reservation with regard to an exclusively phenomenological character of the Abhidhamma is the following: The results of the penetrative phenomenological investigations in the Abhidhamma are a definite and valuable contribution to ontological problems, i.e., to the search for an abiding essence in reality. The results of the Abhidhamma philosophy show clearly and irrefutably where such an alleged essence can never be found, namely nowhere in the world of the five Aggregates (*khandha*). Included in those five phenomenal Objects of Clinging (*upādānakkhandha*) and excluded from the sphere of the Unconditioned Element are also the most sublime states of meditative consciousness, so frequently identified with the manifestation of, or the mystic union with, a Deity of a personal or impersonal nature. At the same time, the thorough analysis of all phenomena undertaken in the Abhidhamma, leaves no doubt what Nibbana definitely is not. It is true that these ontological results of the Abhidhamma are "merely negative," but they represent certainly more substantial and consequential contributions to the ontological problem than the "positive" assertions of many metaphysical systems, indulging in unprovable or fallacious conceptual speculations.

† See the table in the English translation of Dhammasangani, by Mrs. Rhys Davids, 2nd Ed., p. 342.



Having dealt with these two reservations, we may return to our initial simplified statement and formulate it now in this way: *The Abhidhamma is not a speculative, but a descriptive philosophy.*

For the purpose of describing phenomena, the Abhidhamma uses two supplementary methods: that of analysis, and that of investigating the relations (or the conditionality) of the things. Both of these typical features of the Abhidhamma, i.e., the limitation to a purely descriptive procedure and the two-fold method, will be evident already by looking at the fundamental schemata of the two above-mentioned principal books of the Abhidhamma.

(1) The analytical *Dhammasangani*, i.e., The Enumeration of Phenomena, has the following schema:

“At a time when (such or such a type of) consciousness has arisen, at that time exist the following phenomena...” (See p. 10.)

(2) The *Paṭṭhāna*, i.e., The Book of Origination, being the principal work dealing with the Buddhist philosophy of relations, is based on the following stereotype formula:

“Dependent on a (e.g., wholesome) phenomenon may arise a (wholesome) phenomenon, conditioned by way of (root-cause).”

It is evident already from the wording that in both cases purely descriptive statements are made. In the first cases, a description is given of what is really happening when we say “consciousness has arisen,” i.e., what are the full contents of that event which is seemingly of a unitary, non-composite nature. In the second case, the description answers to the question How, i.e., under which conditions the event is happening.

Already the mere juxtaposition of these two basic schemata of the Abhidhamma allows us to formulate an important axiom of Buddhist philosophy:

*A complete description of a thing requires, besides its analysis, also a statement of its relations to other things.*

Though the Abhidhamma, being non-metaphysical, does not deal with a beyond of the things in general (“meta ta physika”), it goes nevertheless beyond the single things, i.e., beyond things artificially separated for the purpose of analytical description. The connexion or relation between things, i.e., their conditionality (*idapaccayatā*), is treated particularly in the *Paṭṭhāna*, supplying a vast net of relational categories. But the mere fact of relations, i.e., the non-existence of isolated things, is already implied in the results of a thorough analysis, as undertaken in the *Dhammasangani*. These results show that even in the smallest psychic unit, i.e., in a moment of consciousness, a multiplicity of mental factors is active between which there must necessarily exist a certain relationship and interdependence. This fact is frequently emphasized in the commentary to *Dhammasangani*, called *Atthasālini*, e.g., when commenting on the first sentence of *Dhammasangani* (see p. 11), *Atthasālini* gives different meanings which the word *samaya*,



("time" or "occasion,") may have in this context; one of them is *samūha*, i.e., the aggregation (or constellation) of things. If *samaya* is rendered in that way, the respective sentence would read: "In which aggregation (or constellation) of things a wholesome state of consciousness.....has arisen, in that aggregation exist: sense impression etc." Here Atthasālini remarks: "Thereby (i.e., by the above explanation of *samaya*) the view is rejected that any one thing may arise singly." In other words: Thorough analysis implies an acknowledgement of relationship. The necessity of investigating the relations of things is further emphasized in Atthasālini by two more axiomatic sentences:

"Nothing arises from a single cause" (*ekakāraṇavādo paṭisedhito hoti*)

"Nothing exists (or moves) by its own Power" \* (*dhammānam savasavattitābhimāno paṭisedhito hoti*).

We are adding, thirdly, the already quoted sentence in an abbreviated form:

"No thing arises singly" (*ekass'eva dhammassa uppatti paṭisedhito hoti*).

(Asl. p. 59—61)

These terse sentences represent three fundamental principles of Buddhist philosophy which well deserve to be taken out of the mass of expository detail where they easily escape the attention due to them. Next to the fact of Change (*aniccatā*), these three axioms, implying the principle of conditionality (*idapaccayatā*), are the main support of the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of Impersonality resp. Unsubstantiality (*anattatā*).

The analysis, as undertaken in *Dhammasaṅgani* shows that the smallest accessible psychic unit, a moment of consciousness, is as little indivisible (*a-tomos*), uniform and undifferentiated as the material atom of modern physics. Like the physical atom, a moment of consciousness is a correlational system of its factors, functions, energies or aspects, or what other name we may give to the "components" of that hypothetical psychic unit. In the *Abhidhamma* these "components" are called simply *dhammā*, i.e. "things" or "states."

It should be noted, however, that the *Paṭṭhāna*, the principal work of Buddhist "conditionalism," is not concerned with the relations within a single psychic unit (*citta-kkhaṇa*) which we shall call "internal relations" but it deals with "external relations," i.e., with the connexions between several of such units. But these "external relations" are to a great extent dependent on the "internal relations" of the given single unit or of previous ones, i.e., on the modes of combination and the relative strength of the different mental factors within a single moment of consciousness. This shows that the analytical method is as important for the synthetical one, as the latter is for the first.

\* The opposite view is called in Asl "the great conceit" or "the great delusion" (*abhimāno*).



Presence or absence, strength or weakness of a certain mental factor (*dhamma* or *cetasika*) may decide about the occurrence or non-occurrence of a certain external relation, e.g., in a wholesome state of consciousness unassociated with knowledge, the presence and strength of Energy (*virīya* = *sammā-vayāma*) may, by its being a part of the Path Factors (*magg'anga*), establish a relationship to a future state of consciousness where also the Path Factor "Right Understanding" is present. In other words: The tendency toward liberation which characterizes the Path Factors, is, in our example, at first mainly expressed by energy, i.e., the active wish and endeavour directed toward liberation. This Energy will naturally strive to acquire all the other necessary requirements for reaching the goal, particularly the Path Factor "Right Understanding." If there is the definite awareness that a certain quality is a member of a certain group of factors having in common a certain purpose, then the respective state of consciousness will possess the inherent tendency to complete that group by acquiring the missing, or strengthening the undeveloped members of the group. In that way a bridge is built to another type of consciousness, and we can see from that example how the composition of a state of consciousness, i.e., its internal relations, influences its external relations.

As already mentioned, the *Paṭṭhāna* investigates only the external relations, but in another work of the Abhidhamma, the *Vibhanga*, the internal relations too are treated. In the *Paccayākāra-Vibhanga*, the "Treatise on the Modes of Conditionality," the schema of the Dhammasangani is combined with the formula of the Dependent Origination, *patīccasamuppāda*, e.g., "At a time when (the first unwholesome state of consciousness) has arisen, at that time there is dependent on ignorance the (respective) Karma-Formation (*sankhāro*, in singular!)." In that text, there are some deviations from the normal formula of the Dependent Origination, varying in accordance with the type of consciousness in question. This remarkable application of the *Patīccasamuppāda* is called in the Commentary *ekacittakkhaṇika-patīccasamuppāda*, i.e., "the Dependent Origination within a single moment of consciousness." The Commentary indicates those of the 24 modes of conditionality (*paccaya*) which are applicable to the links of that "momentary" *Patīccasamuppāda*. In that way, by showing that even an infinitesimally brief moment of consciousness is actually an intricate net of relations, the erroneous belief in a static world is attacked and destroyed in its roots. In that important, but much too little known chapter of the *Vibhanga*, both methods of the Abhidhamma are exemplified and harmonized at the same time, i.e., the analytical and the synthetical.\*)

\* It is to be regretted that the statements of that *Vibhanga* text are (as so often in the Abhidhamma) rather laconic and are only partly elucidated in the old Commentary. It will require patient scrutiny and reflection till at least the most important implications of that text will be clearly understood. In a separate essay, the author intends to make an initial contribution to the exposition and the understanding of that text and its commentary.



The Buddha who is so rightly called "skilful in his methods of instruction" (*nayakusalo*), has used on other occasions too the same ingenious approach of first applying separately two different methods, and afterwards combining them. We shall give only a few examples:

According to the *Satipatthāna Sutta*, the contemplation of the different objects of attention should proceed in two phases:

- Phase I:**—(1) *ajjhattam*, i.e., the contemplation of phenomena (corporeal and mental), as appearing in oneself;  
 (2) *bahiddhā* i.e., phenomena appearing in others;  
 (3) *ajjhatta-bahiddhā*, i.e., combination of both.

Here the synthetical or relational method is applied, by breaking down wrong differentiations between Ego and Non-Ego, and by showing that the life-process is an impersonal continuum. Only a thorough practice of the first two stages (I, 1 and 2) will lead to that result.

- Phase II:** (1) *samudaya-dhamma*, i.e., phenomena viewed as arising;  
 (2) *vaya-dhamma*, i.e., phenomena viewed as arising;  
 (3) *samudaya-vaya-dhamma*, i.e., combination of both.

Here, by breaking up wrong identifications, the analytical method is applied.

In the course of the practice of *Satipatthāna*, both partial aspects, the synthetical and the analytical (the Phases I and II), will gradually merge into one perfect and undivided "vision of things as they really are."

Also the following instruction for the gradual practice of Clear Insight (*vipassanā*), frequently given in the commentaries and the *Visuddhi Magga*, follows a similar method:

- |   |              |
|---|--------------|
| (1) Analysis of the corporeal ( <i>rūpa</i> )   | } Analysis.  |
| (2) " " mental ( <i>nāma</i> )  |              |
| (3) Contemplation of both ' <i>nāma-rupa</i> )  | } Synthesis. |
| (4) Both viewed as conditioned ( <i>paticcasamuppada</i> )  |              |
| (5) Application of the 3 characteristics to Mind and Body-cum-conditions = Combination of Analysis and Synthesis. |              |

Only by applying both methods, the analytical and the synthetical, the impersonality (*anattatā*) and the unsubstantiality (= voidness, *suññatā*) of all phenomena can be understood fully and correctly. An one-sided application of analysis may easily result in the view of a static world of material and psychic atoms. When science has come close to the Buddhist Anattā-Doctrine, it did so, at least up to the beginning of this century, mostly through radical application of the analytical method. Therefore its kinship to the Buddhist concept is only a partial one, and has to be accepted with some reservations. However this analytical approach of science has been supplemented by the dynamic or energetic world view that dominates the latest trends in modern science, psychology and philosophy. To be fair, we have to admit that



also distinguished Buddhist writers of the past and also of our times have not always avoided the pitfalls of an one-sided analytical approach. This may happen easily because analysis takes a very prominent place in Buddhist philosophy and meditation. Furthermore, in striving for Clear Insight, i.e., for a "vision of things as they really are," analysis comes methodically first. It is the first task to remove, by analysis, the basis for all the numerous false notions of substantial unities, be it the unquestioned conviction of the average man to be an identical Ego, be it the theological belief in an individual soul, or the various concepts of materialistic or idealistic systems. Finally, analysis tends to be overemphasized in expositions of the Abhidhamma, because the analytical *Dhammasangani* presents relatively easier reading, resp. studying-matter than the *Paṭṭhāna*, giving more concrete facts than the latter book. The *Paṭṭhāna* furnishes but an abstract schema of all possible relations, only scantily illustrated. It presents the formal aspect of the life process. The "bodies" within which these abstract principles operate, are supplied in the analytical books of the Abhidhamma. In other words, analysis describes, by critically chosen terms, the "things" which actually enter into those relations dealt with by the synthetical method. All these fore-mentioned points are strong temptations to stress unduly the analytical aspect of the Abhidhamma philosophy. All the more it is imperative to supplement it by the constant awareness of the fact that the "things," presented by analysis, are never isolated, self-contained units\*), but are conditioned and conditioning. They occur only in temporary aggregations or combinations which are constantly in a process of formation and dissolution. But the word "dissolution" does not imply the complete disappearance of all the components of the respective aggregation. Some of them always "survive," or, more correctly: are repeated, in the combination of the next movement, and others may, conditioned by their previous occurrence, re-appear much later. Thus the uninterrupted flux of the life stream is preserved.

Bare analysis starts, or pretends to start, its investigations by selecting single objects, existing in that sector of time which is called "Present." The Present is certainly "the only reality" in the sense of "existence," but it is a very elusive "reality" which is constantly "on the move" from an "unreal" Future to an "unreal" Past. But strictly spoken, the object of analysis, as of any thought, belongs not to the Present, but already to the Past when it is considered. This has been stated already by the commentators of old: "Just as it is impossible to touch with one's finger tip that very same finger tip, in the same way the arising, continuing and ceasing of a thought cannot be known by the same thought." (Commentary to Majjhima Nikāya, Anupada Sutta). This statement that, strictly spoken, a thought has not a present, but a past object, holds good even if we have in mind the much wider term of the "serial Present" (*santati-paccuppanna*), i.e., the perceptible sequence of several moments of consciousness which alone

\*) See the commentarial axioms on p. 4.



is actually experienced as "present"; and if we are leaving aside the so-called "momentary Present" (*khaṇapaccuppanna*) which consists of a single, practically imperceptible moment of consciousness. The duration of the object of bare analysis in an artificially delimited, elusive, and not even genuine Present, gives to it, for a philosophical mind, a strangely illusory character which forms a quaint contrast to the frequent assertion of "pure analysts" that it is only they who are dealing with "real facts;" but these facts are constantly slipping them through their fingers. A frequent and vivid experience and contemplation of that illusory nature of the Present not in the well known general sense, but as established by Abhidharmic analysis, will be of great help in the final understanding of *suññatā*, i.e., Voidness or Unsubstantiality.

We have remarked that bare analysis starts with single objects occurring in the Present. But even the most self-contented analysts cannot afford to stop at that point: they have to take cognizance of the fact that other "single" objects existing in the "same" space-time, act upon their original object, respectively are "acted upon" by it. They also have to take notice that the chosen object undergoes before their eyes a consecutive series of changes. In view of these facts, analysis has to give up its self-sufficiency and to admit into the range of its scrutiny at least those two above-mentioned relational facts. After that extension of range we may speak now of "qualified analysis," in distinction from the previous "bare analysis." In its widened scope, "qualified analysis" spreads, as it were, its objects and the results of its investigations on a plane or a surface, having only the two dimensions of breadth and length. The "breadth" consists of the first-mentioned relational fact: the co-existence of other phenomena as far as they are in interconnection with the original object of analysis. The "length" signifies the second relational fact: the sequence of observed, consecutive changes stretching forward in time. Thus, in qualified analysis, only those of the 24 Modes of Conditionality (*paccaya*), treated in the Patthana, are taken into consideration which refer to co-existence (e.g., *sahajāta-paccaya*, "conascence") or to linear sequence (e.g., *anantara-paccaya*, "contiguity").

Bare as well as qualified analysis are closely bound to a spatial view of the world, and, as we have seen, only to a two-dimensional space. Those who rely on these two kinds of analysis do not fear anything as much as the disturbing intrusion of the time-factor into their "well-ordered," but static, sham world of supposedly "unambiguous and palpable facts." Having had to admit the time-factor, at least partially, by way of the above-mentioned two relational facts, qualified analysis endeavours to render the time-effect as harmless as possible, by trying to reduce it to spatial terms of juxta-position, etc. The co-existent things are, as we have seen arranged into the dimension of breadth which could be accepted by us provisionally. The fact of change is disposed of by imagining the single phases of the change to be arranged in the dimension of length as if the time during which these changes



occur, were a stretch extending in space on which the object moves. Obviously, the strange assumption is that, while the object "changes its place" on that stretch of time, it changes also, in a mysterious way, its nature, i.e., it undergoes the observed alterations, e.g., ageing.

In that way, sequence in time appears to bare and qualified analysis to be like a cinematographic performance in which a great number of single static pictures is turned so quickly as to produce in the spectator the effect of moving figures. This illustration is, since Bergson, very frequently used in literature without or with the implication that, properly, motion or change is illusory or a reality of a lesser degree, while only the single static pictures, i.e., self-identical physical and/or psychic (time-) atoms have genuine reality. But, according to the Buddha, just the reverse is true: Change or Flux is real, and the single static pictures, (i.e., individuals, atoms, etc.,) are illusory. If we take up another aspect of that same simile, we shall get a more correct view of the facts concerned: To take a film of moving objects with help of a mechanism called "camera" and thereby to dissect the continuous motion of the objects, might be compared to the perceptual activity of the mind which, by necessity, must fictively arrest the flux of phenomena for the purpose of discrimination. But that function of dissecting is only an artificial device based on the peculiarity of our perceptual "mechanism", just as it is in the case of the camera; it is not to be found in the actual phenomena, as little as in the moving objects rendered to static pictures by the camera. These static pictures obtained by filming correspond to the static images or imaginations, concepts or notions, resulting from perception.

But we shall leave now this simile. We have said before that the spatial world of qualified analysis is limited to the two dimensions of breadth and length. Bare or qualified analysis cannot dare to admit those conditioning and conditioned phenomena which are bound up with the third dimension of depth, because the latter is too closely connected with the disturbing time-factor. By "depth" we understand that subterraneous flow of energies (a wide and intricate net of streams, rivers and rivulets), originating in past actions (karma) and emerging to the surface unexpectedly at a time determined by their inherent life rhythm (time required for growth, maturation, etc.) and by the influence of favouring or disturbing circumstances. The analytical method, we said, is willing to admit only such relational energies which are transmitted by immediate impact (the dimension of breadth) or by the linear "wire" of immediate sequence (the demension of length). But relational energies may also arise from unknown depths opening under the very feet of the individual or the object; or they may be transmitted, not by that linear "wire" of immediate sequence in time-space, but by way of "wireless," travelling vast distances of space and time. It is the time factor that gives depth, profundity and a wide and growing horizon to our world view. By the time factor, the "present moment" is freed from banality and insignificance adhering to it only in the equalizing world of space and one-sided analysis. The time factor as



emphasized by the philosophy of relations, invests the "present moment" with that dignity, significance and decisive importance attributed to it by the Buddha and other great spiritual teachers. Only by the synthetical method, i.e., the philosophy of relations, due regard is given to the time factor, because in any comprehensive survey of relations or conditions, the Past and Future too have to be considered, while one-sided analysis may well neglect them.

Just because the following pages are mainly concerned with the analytical part of the Abhidhamma, we thought it advisable to underline the importance of the other aspect too.

But we have stressed the harmonization of both methods not only on philosophical grounds, but also on account of its practical importance for spiritual development. Many will have observed in themselves or in others how greatly it often affects the entire life of man whether the dominating activity of mind is a dissecting (analytical) or connecting (synthetical) function, or whether they are well balanced. The consequences will extend not only to the intellectual, but also to the ethical, emotional, social and imaginative side of the character. This may even be observed when one's mental activity is only temporarily engaged in the one or the other direction. But it can be seen clearly in the case of extreme types of an analytical or synthetical trend of mind; here the particular virtues and defects of both will be very marked. We need not elaborate this matter here. The hint given will suffice to point out how important it is for the formation of character and for spiritual progress to cultivate both the analytical as well as the synthetical faculties of one's mind and to follow also in that respect the Middle Way of the Buddha that alone leads to Enlightenment.





## THE SCHEMA OF CLASSIFICATION IN THE DHAMMASANGANI

### THE FIRST TYPE OF WHOLESOME CONSCIOUSNESS

*Translation of Dhammasangani § 1*

All the following investigations are based on the 1st Type of Wholesome Consciousness, dealt with in the first para of the *Dhammasangani*. For the convenience of the reader, a translation of it, preceded by the Pali text, is given here. The single mental factors have been numbered for facilitating reference to them in the following pages; they will be quoted there as F (=factor) 1, etc.

“Katame dhammā kusalā? Yasmiṃ samaye kāmāvacaram kusalam cittam uppannam hoti somanassa-sahagatam nāṇa-sampayuttam rūpārammaṇam saddārammaṇam gandhārammaṇam, rasārammaṇam phoṭṭhabbārammaṇam dhāmmārammanam yam yam vā pan’ārabbha, tasmim samaye phasso hoti vedanā hoti...avikkhepo hoti, ye vā pana tasmim samaye aññe pi atthi paṭiceasamuppannā arūpino dhammā,—ime dhammā kusalā.”

“Which are the things that are wholesome? At a time when a state of wholesome consciousness belonging to the sensuous sphere has arisen, accompanied by joy and associated with knowledge (and spontaneous), referring to anyone (object), be it an object of sight, sound, smell, taste, a tangible object, or a mental object, at that time there is:—

- |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Sense Impression (<i>phassa</i>)</li> <li>2. Feeling (<i>vedanā</i>)</li> <li>3. Perception (<i>saññā</i>)</li> <li>4. Volition (<i>cetanā</i>)</li> <li>5. Consciousness (<i>citta</i>)</li> </ol>   | } | Pentad of Sense Impression<br>( <i>phassa-pañca</i> ) |
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>6. Thought (<i>vitakka</i>)</li> <li>7. Deliberation (<i>vicāra</i>)</li> <li>8. Interest (<i>pīti</i>)</li> <li>9. Pleasure (<i>sukha</i>)</li> <li>10. Mental One-pointedness<br/>(<i>cittass’ekaggatā</i>)</li> </ol>   | } | Factors of Absorption<br>( <i>ihān’āṅga</i> )         |
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>11. Faculty of Faith (<i>saddh’indriya</i>)</li> <li>12. „ „ Energy (<i>viriy’indriya</i>)</li> <li>13. „ „ Mindfulness (<i>sat’indriya</i>)</li> <li>14. „ „ Concentration (<i>samādh’indriya</i>)</li> <li>15. „ „ Wisdom (<i>pa’ññ’indriya</i>)</li> <li>16. „ „ Mind (<i>man’indriya</i>)</li> <li>17. „ „ Joy (<i>somanass’indriya</i>)</li> <li>18. „ „ Vitality (<i>jīvit’indriya</i>)</li> </ol> | } | Faculties<br>( <i>indriya</i> )                       |



- |     |   |   |                                       |
|-----|---|---|---------------------------------------|
| 19. | Right Understanding ( <i>sammā-dit̥ṭhi</i> )                      | } Path Factors<br>( <i>magg'āṅga</i> )                    |                                       |
| 20. | „ Intention ( <i>sammā-sankappa</i> )                             |   |                                       |
| 21. | „ Effort ( <i>sammā-vāyāma</i> )                                  |   |                                       |
| 22. | „ Mindfulness ( <i>sammā-sati</i> )                               |   |                                       |
| 23. | „ Concentration ( <i>sammā-samādhi</i> )                          |   |                                       |
| 24. | Power of Faith ( <i>saddhā-bala</i> )                             | } Powers<br>( <i>bala</i> )                               |                                       |
| 25. | „ „ Energy ( <i>viriya-bala</i> )                                 |   |                                       |
| 26. | „ „ Mindfulness ( <i>sati-bala</i> )                              |   |                                       |
| 27. | „ „ Concentration ( <i>samādhi-bala</i> )                         |   |                                       |
| 28. | „ „ Wisdom ( <i>paññā bala</i> )                                  |   |                                       |
| 29. | „ „ Moral Shame ( <i>hiri-bala</i> )                              |   |                                       |
| 30. | „ „ „ Dread ( <i>ottappa-bala</i> )                               | } Wholesome Roots ( <i>kusala-mūla</i> )                  |                                       |
| 31. | Non-Greed ( <i>alobha</i> )                                       |   |                                       |
| 32. | Non-Hatred ( <i>adosa</i> )                                       |   |                                       |
| 33. | Non-Delusion ( <i>amoha</i> )                                     |   |                                       |
| 34. | Non-Covetousness<br>( <i>anabhijjhā</i> )                         | } Wholesome Ways of Action<br>( <i>kusala-kammaṭṭhā</i> ) |                                       |
| 35. | Non-Illwill ( <i>avyāpāda</i> )                                   |   |                                       |
| 36. | Right Understanding<br>( <i>sammā-dit̥ṭhi</i> )                   |   |                                       |
| 37. | Moral Shame ( <i>hiri</i> )                                       | } The Guardians of the World<br>( <i>lokapala</i> )       |                                       |
| 38. | „ Dread<br>( <i>ottappa</i> )                                     |   |                                       |
| 39. | Tranquillity of Mental Concomitants<br>( <i>kāya-passaddhi</i> )  | } The Six Pairs<br>( <i>yugalaka</i> )                    |                                       |
| 40. | „ „ Consciousness<br>( <i>citta-passaddhi</i> )                   |   |                                       |
| 41. | Agility of Mental Concomitants<br>( <i>kāya-lahutā</i> )          |   |                                       |
| 42. | „ „ Consciousness<br>( <i>citta-lahutā</i> )                      |   |                                       |
| 43. | Pliancy of Mental Concomitants<br>( <i>kāya-mudutā</i> )          |   |                                       |
| 44. | „ „ Consciousness<br>( <i>citta-mudutā</i> )                      |   |                                       |
| 45. | Workableness of Mental Concomitants<br>( <i>kāya-kammaññatā</i> ) |   |                                       |
| 46. | „ „ Consciousness<br>( <i>citta-kammaññatā</i> )                  |   |                                       |
| 47. | Proficiency of Mental Concomitants<br>( <i>kāya-pāguññatā</i> )   |   |                                       |
| 48. | „ „ Consciousness<br>( <i>citta-pāguññatā</i> )                   |   |                                       |
| 49. | Uprightness of Mental Concomitants<br>( <i>kāya'ujukatā</i> )     |   |                                       |
| 50. | „ „ Consciousness<br>( <i>citta'ujukatā</i> )                     |   |                                       |
| 51. | Mindfulness ( <i>sati</i> )                                       |   | } The Helpers<br>( <i>upakāraka</i> ) |
| 52. | Mental Clarity ( <i>sampajañña</i> )                              |   |                                       |



- |     |                                       |   |
|-----|---------------------------------------|---|
| 53. | Calm ( <i>samataa</i> )               | } The Pairwise Combination<br>( <i>yuganaddha</i> ) |
| 54. | Insight ( <i>vipassanā</i> )          |   |
| 55. | Exertion ( <i>paggāha</i> )           | } The last Duad<br>( <i>pitthi-duka</i> )           |
| 56. | Undistractedness ( <i>avikkhepa</i> ) |   |

These, or whatever other conditionally arisen uncorporeal things there at that time, these things are wholesome.”

The supplementary Factors (*yevāpanaka*), as given in the *Atthasālinī*, are the following :

57. Intention (*chanda*)
58. Decision (*adhimokkha*)
59. Attention (*manasikāra*)
60. Mental Equipoise (*tatramajjhataṭṭā*)
61. Compassion (*karuṇā*)
62. Sampathetic Joy (*muditā*)
63. Abstinance from wrong Bodily Action (*kāyaduccaritavirati*)
64.     "         "         "         Speech (*vacīduccaritavirati*)
65.     "         "         "         Livelihood (*ajīvaduccaritavirati*).

### The Schema of Classification

The purpose of the first part of the *Dhammasangani*, the “ Book of Consciousness ” (*cittuppāda-kaṇḍa*), is to give

- (1) a classification of all consciousness ;
- (2) a detailed analysis of the single types of consciousness.

The classification is given in the first part of the principal sentences, exemplified on page 9 : “ At a time when a...state of consciousness has arisen.” Here the respective type of consciousness is briefly characterized with help of certain categories.

The detailed analysis follows in the concluding part of the sentence : “...at that time there is : sense impression, etc.” This enumeration of mental factors will be called in the following the “ List of Dhammas ”. The word “ dhamma ”, of course, is here again used in the sense of “ thing ” or “ phenomenon.”

The classifying categories used in the first part of the sentence, are statements (1) about the “ subjective ” side of the cognitive process, (2) about the “ objective ” side.

- (1) The statements about the “ subject ” refer to
  - (a) The plane or sphere of consciousness (*bhūmi*) ; in our example: the sensuous sphere ;
  - (b) the karmic value ; here : wholesome ;
  - (c) the emotional value ; here : joyful ;
  - (d) presence or absence of knowledge ; here : associated with knowledge ;
  - (e) spontaneous or non-spontaneous occurrence ; here: spontaneous.



(2) The statement about the "object" is generally not used for constituting separate classes of consciousness. The six kinds of sense-objects are considered only as variations of the same type. In nearly all cases it is the "subjective" relation to the object which is used for the differentiation of consciousness. The objects determine the classification only in the case of initial *five*-sense perception in its narrowest sense (called *dassana*, "seeing," etc.), i.e., in that still very primitive phase of the perceptual process which follows immediately after the first "adverting of the mind"; (*āvajjana*). At that time the impact of the object is predominant, and the activity of the subjective factors is still weak, as shown by the small number of mental concomitants present in these types of consciousness.

From the above subjective categories *a—e*, the following are anticipations of factors contained in the complete analysis as given in the List of Dhammas :

(b) The karmic value, here "wholesome", is determined by the presence of the "wholesome roots". If the state of consciousness is "associated with knowledge", as in our case, all three "roots" are present, viz : Non-Greed, Non-hate and Non-Delusion (F 31, 32, 33) ; if "dissociated from knowledge", the last is missing.

(c) The emotional value, here "joyful" is represented by the factors : Feeling (F2), Pleasure (F9). and Joy (F17).

(d) The association with, resp. dissociation from, knowledge is determined by the presence or absence of the third "wholesome root", Non-Delusion (F33) and its various synonyms or aspects (e.g., F15, 19, etc.)

The category of spontaneous or non-spontaneous occurrence cannot be traced to any factor of the respective present moment of consciousness, but depends on previous mental processes. We speak of "spontaneity" if the reaction or decision takes place immediately, by force of inclination or habit which both may have their roots in a distant past, even in a previous existence. We speak of "non-spontaneity" if the reaction or decision is preceded by one's own deliberations or by an outer influence in the way of advice, request or command; i.e., the non-spontaneity of a state of consciousness might be due either to premeditation or to instigation.





## THE LIST OF MENTAL CONSTITUENTS (DHAMMĀ) IN THE DHAMMASANGANI

In psychology "a difference of aspects  
is a difference in things."

*James Ward*, Ency. Brit. art. Psychology.

### 1. General Remarks

When perusing the list of the constituents of consciousness, as given in the Dhammasangani, this list appears, at the first impression, to heap up, rather arbitrarily and superfluously, a great number of synonyms, thus presenting a strange contrast to the otherwise so terse, lucid and strictly systematic composition of that work. Just this striking contrast will make us hesitate to ascribe the seemingly unsystematic character of the List to a lack of the most elementary skill in methodical exposition. If we look at the admirable architectonics of the Dhammasangani as to ground-plan and details, we shall certainly not be prepared to suppose that its author—be it the Buddha himself or his early disciples—should have been unable to undertake the simple procedure of summarizing parallel factors under a single heading, as in later periods it was actually done in the Commentary (*Atthasālinī*), the Visuddhi Magga and the Abhidhammattha-Sangaha.

Already *Atthasālinī* (p. 135) discusses a criticism referring to an alleged lack of system and to the superfluous repetitions in the List of Dhammas. The commentator puts into the mouth of the critic the following drastic indictment: "It is a disconnected exposition, disorderly like booty carried away by thieves, or like grass deranged by a herd of cattle on their way. It is done without an understanding of the matter." *Atthasālinī* meets that criticism by giving the following simile: A king has levied a tax on the different crafts and professions, ordaining that those who execute several crafts are obliged to pay the corresponding amount of tax units. Now, the different professional activities of a single person correspond to the different functions of a single factor of consciousness. The number of tax units payable by the same person are to be compared to the number of classifications corresponding to the various functions of a single factor.

This simile, however, does explain only the inclusion of parallel factors regarded separately, resp. as function of a single mental quality. It does not do justice to another important fact which properly rounds off and completes the explanation; namely the arrangement of these quasi-synonyms into groups. A factor, by force of its various functions, enters into combination with various sets of other factors grouped around a common function or purpose. This fact is important, firstly, because



just these groups represent the formal principle of arrangement of our List. The names of these groups, as given on pp. 11-12, are assigned to them partly in the text of the Dhammasangani itself\*), partly in Atthasālinī, but the fact of the grouping is quite evident from the List itself. On the other hand, if the grouping were nothing else than such a formal principle of arrangement, it would not have been allowed to determine the composition of the List. Though the general predilection of the Indian mind for a very formalistic method of exposition is well-known, this peculiarity will rarely impair the treatment of the subject-matter itself. And it would certainly not be permitted to do so in our case of a work that offers psychological instruction in such a tersely concentrated form, reduced to the bare essentials, without any embellishments. We cannot suppose that in a work of that character the List of Dhammas should have been encumbered by tautologies, merely for a formalistic reason. The groups among which we find those different parallel terms, are more than devices of arrangement; they are also psychic realities in themselves, as they represent purposive associations of single factors, i.e., their concurrent directions of movement and their common tendencies of development. We shall soon give an example for a single factor's membership of several groups and shall deal with it further in the following chapters which are devoted to the various groups.

By the introduction of partly overlapping groups, the subtle and complicated structure of a moment of consciousness is indicated. It shows that a psychic unit is not "composed" of rigid parts, arranged, as it were, in juxtaposition like a mosaic, but that it is rather a relational and correlational system of dynamic processes.

In order to give to the groups their deserving place within the above-quoted simile of the Atthasālinī, we may supplement it by making an addition in so far as the person executing various professions and paying the corresponding taxes should also belong to each of the respective professional guilds to be compared to the groupings. But the different kinds of application of one faculty may become more clear through another simile. If the simile chosen by the teachers of old, was somewhat banal, it will be excused if ours is likewise so.

Let us suppose a man is, as the head of his family, in charge of the household purse; in his professional capacity, he is a cashier, and in his club its treasurer. In such a manner his general skill in reckoning is applied to different aspects of his life and to different social groups to which he belongs. Consequently, his skill serves different purposes, for the attainment of which he has to combine it, in each case, with partly quite different qualities of his own. It brings him also in contact with quite different sorts of people. The application to our case is as follows: The general skill in reckoning which the man of our simile possesses, corresponds to a single factor (viewed in abstracto), belonging to a certain moment of consciousness. The three practical applications of that skill are the different actual functions of that factor. The

\*In the chapter called *Sangaha-vara*, i.e., "Summary".



various other faculties which our man has to summon to his aid in the three different spheres of his activity, correspond to the other members of those groups to which our factor belongs; they signify the *internal* relations within the same moment of consciousness. The fact that the man, in executing his skill in different kinds of environment, meets there different sort of people,—this corresponds to the *external* relations to other states of consciousness which may belong to the same or a different classificatory type.

By the various functions of a mental factor, quite different lines of development, i.e., different external relations, might be started. E.g., “One-pointedness of Mind” (*cittass’ekaggatā*) may be deliberately cultivated as a “Factor of Absorption” (*jhān’anga*) and be developed up to the degree of a complete absorption of mind (*appaṇā*). Or, with emphasis on its liberating quality, “One-pointedness” may have the aspect of the Path Factor “Right Concentration”, and, for the purpose of Clear Insight (*Vipassanā*), be developed only up to Approximate Concentration (*upacāra-samādhi*). Or, “One-pointedness” may appear as “Calm” (*samatha*) in the “Pairwise Combination” of Calm and Insight. (See page     ).

It will be at first a single function or aspect of a mental factor that initiates a certain external relation with the following moments of consciousness, but this does not exclude that also other aspects of the same factor manifest themselves more prominently in later states of consciousness. In the same way, the relative weakness or strength of any factor might be without visible consequence just now, but might produce effects at any later moment when conditions are favourable. The net of relations, conditions or causes, extending from a single moment of consciousness, may reach very far, in space as well as in time.

The relational system of the factors within a single moment of consciousness does not only extend to the future, but also to a multiplicity of past states of consciousness which are its conditions. That is to say: the mental factors are far from being self-contained units, but are “open” towards the past as well as the future, and, though meeting in one moment, they are related to quite different “layers” of those time periods. From that we can gauge the highly dynamic nature of the processes going on in a single moment of consciousness.

All these facts, and other reasons too, do exclude the assumption of certain later Buddhist schools, e.g., the Sarvastivadins, that the mental factors (*dhammā*) are a kind of Platonic ideas or psychic atoms in the literal sense of indivisibility. By these schools the old grammarian’s definition of *dhammā* (Skr. *dharma*) — *attano-sabhāvam dhārenti* — has been misunderstood as implying that each *dhamma* is the “bearer” of a single quality (*sabhāva*) or of a single characteristic (*lakkaṇa*). But, in the true spirit of Buddhist philosophy, that definition means only that the Dhammas are not reducible, in further retrogression, to any substantial bearers of qualities. It does not imply that these Dhammas themselves are such “substances” or “bearers”; nor are they to be distinguished in any way from their qualities or functions which in no



phase of their existence can be said to have self-identity. The sub-commentary to Dhammasangani (*Mūla-tīkā*) says: "There is no other thing than the quality borne by it." (*Na ca dhāriyamāna-sabhāva añño dhammo nāma atthi*). And these things (*dhammā*) themselves, as Atthasālini expressly says, "are borne by their conditions" (*paccayehi dhariyanti*). Therefore they cannot be said to be ultimate "bearers". Furthermore, it is impossible to speak of a thing as the bearer of a single quality in a strict sense, if the functions of the respective factor its direction of movement, its intensity and karmic quality are variable, in accordance with the relational system to which that factor belongs.

We shall give now a few illustrations of possible variations of so-called "identical" factors or qualities. We have already spoken of the varying functions, directions of movement and degrees of intensity in the case of Mental One-pointedness (p. 17) and are adding the following. The intensity of "One-pointedness" may sink to such a low level that this fact is expressly registered in Dhammasangani by an abbreviation of the stereotype definition, restricting it to mere "stability" (*thiti*); the terms denoting greater intensity (*santhiti*, *avathiti*, etc. are left out. The variations with regard to karmic quality are shown, e.g., by the fact that "One-pointedness" is present in unwholesome consciousness too.

Even such an elementary factor as "Perception" *saññā* is not equivocal. According to *Atthasālini* and *Mūla-Tīkā* its reliability and steadiness is dependent on the presence or absence of knowledge and on the higher or lower degree of concentration.

Furthermore, even consecutive states of consciousness of the same type, i.e., having the same mental factors, are not strictly identical. The fact alone that they are conditioned by way of repetition (*āsevanā-paccaya*) means that, by force of practice, certain factors will be intensified. But even this effect of repetition or habit is in no phase stationary: after gradually reaching its peak the effect will wear off, and certain factors, e.g., "interest" (*pīti*), will grow weaker. There is yet another reason why the first occurrence, of a state of consciousness will differ from its repetition: at the first occurrence, an outer stimulus may have been the primary condition (e.g., of "inducement", *upanissaya*) while for the repetition this place will be taken by the first occurrence of the respective thought,—a circumstance which will certainly give a different character to the consecutive repetition.

In view of so numerous possibilities of variations even among so-called identical factors of the same type of consciousness, there is no justification to believe in any unchangeable "bearers" of definite qualities.

By arranging the mental factors in relational groups, a supplementary synthetical element has been introduced into the mainly analytical Dhammasangani. By doing so, the danger inherent in a purely analytical method has been avoided. This danger consists in erroneously taking the "parts", resulting from analysis, for genuine separate



entities, instead of restricting their use to methodical and practical purposes : to the purpose of classification (i.e., orientation) and of dissolving the composite units, wrongly conceived as ultimate unities. Up to the present time, it has been a regular occurrence in the history of physics, metaphysics and psychology that, after a Whole having been successfully dissolved by analysis, the resultant "parts" themselves are again regarded as little "Wholes". To this danger already early Buddhist schools have submitted, e.g., the Vaibhasikas, better known as Sarvastivadins, which belong to the so-called Hinayana. It were these schools, who, according to Otto Rosenberg ("Probleme der buddhistischen Philosophie"), have defined the Dhammas as "substantial bearers of their specific, exclusive qualities". They assumed that "the *substance* of all things has a permanent existence throughout the three divisions of time, the present, the past and the future"\*), while only the manifestations of these "substantial bearers" were impermanent and subject to differentiation according to the three divisions of time. The teachings of these schools have been probably the reason why Hinayana in general has been denoted as a "pluralistic" doctrine, by Mahayanistic thinkers as well as by some modern writers.†) But this statement is certainly not justified with regard to the Theravāda School and still less with regard to the Pali Canon itself, as amply proved in these pages. Besides, the charge of "pluralism" could not be restricted to Hinayana alone, as quite a number of Mahayana schools too have accepted this pluralistic "Dharma Theory", as shown in the above-mentioned book of Rosenberg. On the other hand, it was a prominent Mahayana School, the Mādhyamikas, that has vigorously rejected and criticized the pluralistic Dharma Theory. In the sense of what we have said about the "twofold method of the Abhidhamma", it is significant that this criticism of pluralism comes from the Mādhyamikas, being a school which has particularly emphasized the synthetical method, i.e., philosophy of relations, against an one-sided analysis which too easily tends to become dogmatic. The Mādhyamikas have even exaggerated the application of that principle, by denying the ultimate validity of the formula of Dependent Origination and of the 24 Modes of Conditionality. By doing so, they have carried the principle of relativity to an extreme where it destroys its own basis. However, by rejecting the other extreme, namely that of an one-sided analytical method, this Mahayanistic school has preserved the spirit of the pure Doctrine, at least in this respect, more faithfully than the Hinayanistic school of Sarvastivadins. We wish to emphasize once more that the genuine tradition of Theravada is, in our opinion, not affected by that criticism, provided that its standpoint is formulated with due caution, i.e., by using both the analytical and the synthetical method, as done by the Buddha in Sutta as well as in Abhidhamma. By following, in this respect too, the Master's great example, the danger of converting, or perverting, concepts of relative validity into entities of ultimate reality will be avoided.

\*Yamakami, Systems of Buddhistic Thought (Calcutta 1912), p. 109.

†See Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana (Leningrad 1927).



From the wrong supposition of separate units of any description (ultimate Dhammas, Platonic ideas, atoms, elements, qualities, traits of character, etc.,) follows the belief in the actual existence of clear-cut opposites of any kind. In our context, we shall say a few words about one pair of opposites only : identity and diversity. These opposites are of no absolute validity, but are relative terms denoting various degrees of similitude or divergence, indicating different grades in the proximity and the extent of ever-present relations. The ultimate reality of these two terms has been denied by many philosophical systems, but this denial has a truly secured foundation only in a doctrine where any kind of substantiality is so radically disposed of, as it is done in the Buddhist philosophy of relations. We wish to emphasize again that the "Voidness of Substance", i.e., the anattā-Doctrine, can be established securely only with help of an all-comprehensive philosophy of relations, and not by analysis alone.

The Buddhist philosophy of relations shows that, in life, there is no complete identity or diversity, but only a continuous process of identifying and diversifying, of assimilating and dissimilating. There is a persistent struggle between these two forces, resulting in an only temporary dominance of the one, but never in the complete exclusion of the other. In every phase of assimilation there is an irreducible rest of diversity, making for dissimilation ; and in every phase of dissimilation there is an irreducible rest of identity, making for assimilation.

These factors do also furnish the explanation of the famous Buddhist dictum with regard to the problem of rebirth : *na ca so na c'añño*, "it is not the same nor another one" who is reborn. The differences with regard to each and every mental and corporeal factor appearing in the two concatenations involved in the process of rebirth, excludes "sameness", i.e., the Ego-identity of a transmigrating soul. But the likewise existing close relations between these two series of life processes exclude an absolute diversity of the "old" and the "new" existence. These close relations are represented, e.g., by the correspondence between the rebirth-producing Karma and the resultant rebirth-consciousness, by the immediate contiguity of Death Consciousness (*cuti-citta*) and Rebirth Consciousness (*patisandhi-citta*). The same principle—"not the same and not different"—holds true also for normal consciousness during the life-time : though there is no identity between subsequent states of consciousness, there is also no complete diversity, owing to the overlapping of certain factors and groups. In our comparison of the man with three different fields of activity, the relative identity is represented by his general skill in reckoning which forms the common basis for all three kinds of his activity. The relative diversity is shown by the application of that skill within different social spheres (i.e., difference of groupings), in a different manner (i.e., difference of functions) and with different purposes (i.e., difference in the direction of movement).

To express it generally: absolute *identity* is excluded by the internal differentiation of things, i.e., by the difference of intensity, function,



direction and composition, existing even in apparently identical phenomena. Absolute *diversity* is excluded by the continuity and interdependence of things which restricts the effect of the differentiating tendencies.

In contemplating the relativity of these two concepts of identity and diversity, the true nature of Change or Impermanence (*aniccatā*) will become distinct, by revealing the two complementary aspects of Change, namely its dissolving and its connecting function. They are like two faces, turned towards opposite directions. The fact of Change implies both: the breaking off of old units and the establishing of new ones. Change performs simultaneously a two-fold function: dissimilating or diversifying, and assimilating or identifying. When expounding the Characteristic of Impermanence (*anicca-lakkhaṇa*), the Suttas and also the popular treatises on Buddhism stress mainly or exclusively that aspect of Change, which consists in separation, dissolution or dissimilation. This particular emphasis is fully justified in so far as the ultimate purpose of Buddhist instruction is a practical one: the Final Deliverance of the Mind. This lofty goal is reached when the last traces of belief in (*ditthi*), and clinging to (*tanhā*), an Ego-identity or any other kind of substantiality are destroyed. With that goal in view and this work at hand, that aspect of Change, which consists in the final separation and dissolution inherent in all composite things, will furnish the strongest emotional appeal for practical renunciation. At least, this will be so with most of men, though not with all types, as there are some who firmly believe, or pretend, that they affirm and enjoy "variety" at any cost and for its own sake. But also the theoretical or philosophical understanding of reality has certainly to start with the dissimilating aspect of Change, i.e., with its dissolving effect on apparently ultimate units. This corresponds to the methodical precedence which analysis takes in Buddhist philosophy in general as well as in the practice of meditation. The first task of Clear Insight (*vipassanā*), is, as the Commentators call it, *ghanāvinibbhoga*, i.e., the dissecting of an apparently compact mass. Possibly, this might have been the reason why, in the arrangement of the seven books of the Abhidhamma, the first place has been given to the analytical Dhammasangani and not to the Patthāna. Both books are equal in importance, but methodically analysis comes first.

But notwithstanding the great practical and theoretical importance of contemplating the dissolving effect of Change, we have to give due attention also to its connecting function. Only by doing so, a well-balanced view of reality will be obtained which is indispensable for endowing Clear Insight with its full liberating power.

The apparent repetitions in the List of Dhammas demonstrate (1) the multiple internal relations within a single moment of consciousness, (2) the multiple external relations to past and future moments. This two-fold multiplicity of relations has its parallel in the two-fold "differentiation" (*cittatā*) of consciousness of which Atthasalini speaks in its



didactic definition of *citta*.\*) (1) Consciousness is differentiated in itself, with regard to its object, its sphere (*bhūmi*, its karmic quality, etc. (2) It *produces* differentiation (*citta-karāṇa*), by causing the various activities in the outer world, and, in the case of karmic consciousness, by producing various rebirth processes. We meet here a similar parallelism of micro-and macrocosm as in the world of matter where the movements in the relational system of the atom resemble those of the solar system. In the same way correspond the "microcosmic" internal and external relations of a single moment of consciousness to the "macrocosmic" relations which consciousness in general entertains to the outer world, and by which the so-called personality is linked to the sequence of rebirth processes caused by it.

Microscope and the subtle experimental methods of modern science have analysed and "smashed" ever smaller material units, until the most minute results were no more perceptible directly, but only deducible from the observed effects of those energies. Modern research has penetrated to a point where even the last accessible components of the material world have lost their static appearance and have been recognized as dynamic processes. What here has been the gradual result of painstaking research through many hundreds of years, by many hundreds of scientists, that has been achieved, with regard to the "psychic atom", by a single great thinker: by the Buddha. With a unique power of penetration, in which the intuition of the genius, was combined with scientific method, the master-mind of the Buddha has shown, by way of analysis, that even the last, likewise only deducible psychic unit is not uniform and homogenous, but variegated and complex; and in his complementary philosophy of relations, he has shown that this complexity is not of a static, but of a dynamic nature.

--

--

--

In the following detailed treatment of the single groups of Dhammas, the opinion is expressed that there is, at least partly, an intentional order in the sequence of their enumeration. This opinion seems to be expressly rejected in the following passage of Atthasālini (p. 107): "Concerning the mental factors arising in a single moment of consciousness, it is not possible to say that one appears first and another one later. . . . Sense Impression is mentioned first, by reason of sequence in the exposition only. One could as well enumerate in the following way: 'There is Feeling, Sense Impression . . .', or, 'There is Feeling, Perception, Thinking, etc.' Just as here, so in the case of the other factors too, one should not enquire after the sequence of what comes earlier and later." This objection does not invalidate our opinion that the groups of factors are enumerated in the List, in an intentional order. Obviously, the commentarial objection is directed only against the supposition that the arrangement of the List implies a sequence in time. This, of course, is not the case, on the simple reason that all

\*It is of course only a play with words, for a didactic purpose, and not meant as a linguistic derivation when *cittatā* (from Skr. *citra*, "variegated") is used for explaining *citta* (equal in Pali and Skr.)



these factors appear simultaneously in a single moment of consciousness. But the assumption that the List gives, for the purpose of exposition, a meaningful, and not arbitrary, sequence, is not contradicted by that objection. We maintain only that there is an interconnexion between certain *factors*, as established already by the fact of grouping, and that there is also an interrelation between some of these *groups*. Further, we believe that, at least in some cases, the particular character of the groups does explain why some are enumerated previous to others. The Commentary certainly is carried away by its argument if, in the passage quoted above, Atthasālini goes even so far as to imply that the arrangement of the single factors is a fully arbitrary one. In the last example of possible variations which Atthasālini gives in the passage quoted above, even members of different groups have been mixed together. Against that it should be remembered that even the canonical text itself emphasizes the fact and importance of the group arrangement, by regularly adding a Chapter of Summary (*saṅgaha-vāra*) that serves to indicate which groups and how many group members are present in the respective type of consciousness.

We have to admit, however, that only in the case of the first six or eight groups we have been able to establish an interconnexion. But even if it should not be possible to find such a connexion between the other groups too, this would not exclude the existence of an inner relation between the first groups which contain the most important concrete factors at their first occurrence in the List. In any case, our observations with regard to that point may contribute to a better understanding of the distinctive characteristics of the groups and of the manner how they operate within a single moment of consciousness: in other words, a better comprehension of the complicated inner relations going on in a conscious moment, might be achieved.

In the foregoing "General Remarks" not all the reasons have been mentioned which may be assumed as having motivated the inclusion of parallel factors in the List. Additional reasons will result from the following detailed survey of the single groups and a summary will be given in the "Concluding Remarks".





## 2. The Pentad of Sense Impression

(*phassa-pañcaka*, F1-5)

The first five factors, enumerated in the List, are called in Atthasalini *phassa-pañcaka*, i.e., the pentad, or the five-fold group, (beginning with) Sense Impression. These five are the basic non-rational elements of a state of consciousness, and, therefore, they are rightly given the first place in the List. They also are the briefest formulation, by way of representatives, of the four mental Aggregates (*khandha*). The Aggregates of Feeling and Perception are represented by the same terms *vedanā* and *saññā* (F2, 3); for the Aggregate of Consciousness (*viññāṇa-kkhandha*) the synonymous term *citta* (F5) is given; while the Aggregate of Mental Formations (*sankhāra-kkhandha*) is represented by two of its most typical general factors\*): Sense Impression (*phassa*, F1) and Volition (*cetanā*, F4).

In the composition of that Pentad a fundamental axiom of Buddhist psychology finds expression: the inseparableness of the four Mental Aggregates, viz: Feeling, Perception, Mental Formations and Consciousness. Even in the weakest state of consciousness (including subconsciousness) all of them are represented.

### *Verification of the terms in the Suttanta.*

In order to illustrate how widely the Abhidhamma is based on the Sutta Pitaka, we shall, also in the following sections, trace the respective Abhidhamma terms to their source in the Suttanta. But we shall do so only in cases where this fact is not quite evident, or where it is of particular interest.

Probably the earliest occurrence of the Pentad—i.e., of the terms in toto, not of the group name—is among a stereotype sequence of doctrinal terms to be found, e.g., in the *Mahā-Satipatthāna-Sutta* (Digh. Nik. 23) and at the beginning of the *Rāhula-Samyutta* (Samy. Nik. XVIII, No. 1 sq):

“( . . . eye - visual object - ) visual consciousness - visual impression - feeling, produced by visual impression-perception of visual objects - volition relating to visual objects . . . ”

“( . . . cakkhu-rūpaṃ-) cakkhu-*viññāṇaṃ*-cakkhu-*samphasso*-cakkhusamphassajā *vedanā-rūpa-saññā-rūpa-sañcetanā* . . . ”

Here the order of enumeration and the naming of the factors differs slightly from that in the Dhammasangani, but all the five terms are consecutively given.

At, perhaps, a somewhat later period, we meet these terms in the *Anupada-Sutta* (Majjh. Nik. 111), a text which is of particular interest with regard to the genesis of the Abhidhamma. There the five factors are, among others, mentioned as the result of a psychological analysis of

\*These, altogether seven, general factors are called in the later Abhidhamma books *sabbacittasādhāraṇa*, i.e., factors “common to all consciousness.”



jhanic (meditative) consciousness, undertaken in retrospection by Sariputta after rising from Absorption (*ihāna*). The passage referring to the First Absorption runs as follows :

“The things occurring in the First Absorption, viz: Thinking, Deliberation, Interest (Rapture), Happiness and Mental One-pointedness; *Sense Impression, Feeling, Perception, Volition, Consciousness, Intention, Decision, Energy, Mindfulness, Equanimity, Attention*,—these things (or mental factors) were determined by him one after the other.”

“Ye ca pathamajjhāne dhammā : vitakko ca vicāro ca pīti ca sukhañca cittekaggatā ca ; *phasso vedanā saññā cetanā cittaṃ chando adhimokkho viriyam̐ sati upekkhā manasikāro*,—*tyāssa dhammā anupada-vavatthitā honti*.”

Here the five Factors of Absorption (*ihān'āṅga*) are enumerated first, being the main characteristics of jhanic consciousness to which that retrospective analysis refers. Then our Pentad of Sense Impression follows in the same order and identically named as in the Dhammasangani.

In another passage of that Discourse, the Buddha gives to that analysis the name of *anupada-dhamma-vipassanā*, i.e., “Insight into the things taken one after the other”, and the Buddha mentions further that Sariputta did practice it for a fortnight. During that period, “these things were determined by him one after another”, or, as the Commentary to that Sutta says : the nature of these mental factors was defined by him through their characteristics (*lakkhaṇa*). The analysis given in the Discourse extends to all nine Absorptions and represents a precursor of the detailed analysis of jhanic consciousness as given in Dhammasangani. So we may regard this fortnight of Sariputta's practice of analytical Insight as one of the germ-cells of the later Abhidhamma literature. The *Anupada Sutta* shows that an elaboration of the doctrine in the manner of the Abhidhamma was undertaken already at the Master's life-time, by analytically and philosophically gifted disciples. This development was expressly encouraged by the Buddha when, in that Discourse, he mentioned and highly praised Sariputta's fortnight of analytical enquiry.

By the *Anupada Sutta* also two traditional views, expressed in *Atthasalini*, are supported:

(1) The close connexion of Sariputta with the origin and the handing down of the Abhidhamma. According to an ancient Buddhist tradition, it was Sariputta who received, as the first on this earth, the Abhidhamma teachings from the mouth of the Master, after they had been enunciated by the Buddha in the Heavenly Mansions of the Thirty-three Gods. (See *Atthasalini* p. 16, 32, 410).

(2) It tallies also with the statement of the *Atthasalini* (p. 16) that Sariputta had only used and elaborated the method or the key words of the Abhidhamma as indicated to him by the Buddha who is said to be



the first *Abhidhammika*. With regard to the Pentad of Sense Impression, Sariputta may well have taken as such an indication the above-mentioned terms of the *Mahā-Satipatthāna-Sutta*, and have made use of them in his psychological analysis of jhānic consciousness.\*

As to the origin of the Abhidhamma, we are inclined to think that the Buddha did not regard it as his task to expound in full detail his Abhidharmic knowledge. We think that, in his decision to continue his earthly life after attaining to Enlightenment, he was primarily moved by the wish to give the first decisive spiritual impulse and instruction to as many beings as possible. Instead of giving difficult and detailed philosophical expositions, comprehensible only to a few, the Buddha mostly preferred to repeat, all the more frequently, the fundamental features of his liberating doctrine, bearing the distinct stamp of his first great inspiration under the Bodhi Tree. This is impressively demonstrated by the very numerous repetitions or slight variations of those fundamental expositions, as faithfully recorded in the Sutta Pitaka by the monks of old. A striking example of these repetitions or variations is the last book (*Mahā-Vagga*) of the *Saṃyutta-Nikāya*. In accordance with his frequent appeal to the listener's own effort and judgment, the Buddha mostly left it to the individual to develop by himself the spiritual or intellectual impulse received from the Master, and to apply it to his personal life and thought. In particular, the Master left it to some of his eminent disciples, specially proficient in certain theoretical or practical aspects of the Doctrine, to give additional help and instruction to those in need of it. This is clearly shown by the numerous stereotype passages in the Suttas where monks are asking the Buddha for a brief summary of the Doctrine or a terse maxim to be used as their subject of meditation. Sometimes these monks, so we read, approach later one of the Chief Disciples, asking for a further elucidation. It is therefore quite probable that the Buddha transmitted the gist of his Abhidharmic knowledge to such individual monks whom he knew to be capable of elaborating and applying the briefly indicated method by their own penetrative intellect, as, e.g., in the case of Sariputta. This theory of ours agrees with the commentarial statement that the Buddha transmitted to Sariputta only the *mātikā*, i.e., the Outlines or the Method of the Abhidhamma. From this we may also conclude that the ancient tradition regarded the Buddha as the "auctor", but not as the "author" of the Abhidhamma books, i.e., as the creative genius to whom the ideas, and perhaps the frame of the system, but not the literary formulation has to be ascribed.

#### *The Pentad in the post-canonical Pali literature*

In the sources at our disposal to-day, the group name *phassa-pañcaka* appears at first in the *Netti-ppakaraṇa*, under the variant *phassa-pañcamaka* †). We have to assume it to be earlier than, or at

\*) See the Appendix "The Authenticity of the Anupada Sutta", at the end of this Chapter.

†) The variant *phassa-pañcaka* is preferable, as *phassa-pañcamaka* means "having Sense Impression as the fifth", while *phassa* is always enumerated first.



least contemporary with Buddhaghosa, as the latter quotes the *Netti-ppakarāṇa* under the abbreviated name of *pakarāṇa* in his commentary to the Satipaṭṭhāna-Sutta. But it is possible that the term *phassa-pañcaka* did occur already in the old commentaries on which Buddhaghosa's were based. This seems more probable than to assume that the term was coined for the first time in the *Netti*.

The respective passage in the *Netti-ppakarāṇa* runs as follows: 'Mind-and-Body' (*nāma-rūpa*) are the five Aggregates of Grasping. Here, the 'things having Sense Impression as their fifth (*phassa-pañcamakā dhammā*) are 'mind' (*nāma*). The five corporeal sense faculties are the 'body' (*rūpa*). Both of them are 'Mind-and-Body' connected with consciousness' (*viññāṇa-sampayuttaṃ*)." (PTS. p. 15) From the separate mention of *viññāṇa* in the last sentence, we have to conclude that, in this passage, "consciousness" (*viññāṇa* or *citta*) is not included in the Pentad. Probably *manasikāra* ("attention") takes its place, being mentioned in another passage of the *Netti* (PTS. p. 78) where, with inclusion of *citta*, six factors are enumerated: "Feeling, perception, volition, consciousness, sense impression, attention,—these are called the 'mental group' (*nāma-kāya*)." The enumeration in this passage is derived from the *Sammā-ditṭhi Sutta* (Majjh. 9).

Buddhaghosa (or, at least, the manuscripts and editions of our days) uses both forms of our term. E.g., in his Commentary on the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, we find *phassapañcaka* in the section of Breathing In and Out, and *phassapañcamaka* in the section about the Contemplation on Feeling. There the five components of the Pentad are identical with those in Dhammasangani, i.e., including *citta* and excluding *manasikāra*.

Before Buddhaghosa's time, the same five factors, in the same order, but without the group name, occur and are explained in the *Milinda-pañhā* (*Tatiyo Vaggo*). But there is also a passage in the *Milinda-pañhā* where, in giving a representative selection of mental concomitants, *manasikāra* too is included: "And the Elder enlightened the King Milinda through words of the Abhidhamma. 'The origin of visual consciousness, O King, is dependent on the sense organ of sight and on visual objects. And the things arising simultaneously, as sense impression, feeling, perception, volition, concentration, vitality and attention,—they arise in dependence thereon.'" (*Dutiyo Vaggo*) It deserves to be pointed out that this enumeration agrees with the seven general mental factors (*sabbacittasādhāraṇa*), mentioned in the Visuddhi Magga (PTS. p. 589) and the Abhidhammattha-Sangaha. It is significant that Buddhaghosa does not mention this group of seven factors in his Atthasalini. His reason for not doing so was most probably the fact that the Lists in the Dhammasangani, commented upon in Atthasalini, are not meant to give an abstract and systematic arrangement of factors, but refer to definite moments of consciousness in their dynamic actuality where these factors appear as members of relational groups.

To the difference with regard to inclusion and exclusion of *manasikāra* we shall revert when dealing with the Supplementary Factors (p. 46).



## APPENDIX.

### The Authenticity of the Anupada Sutta.

Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, in the Preface to her translation of the Dhammasangani \*), throws doubt on the authenticity of the Anupada Sutta (Majjh, Nik. iii.) as a genuine discourse of the Buddha. She says: "The Sutta, as are so many, is an obvious patchwork of editorial compiling, and dates, without reasonable doubt, long after Sariputta had preceded his Master in leaving this world. We have first a stock formula of praise, spoken not once only of Sariputta. Then, ex abrupto, this tradition of his fortnight of systematic introspection. Then, ex abrupto three more formulas of praise. And that is all. The Sutta, albeit put into the mouth of the Founder, is in no way a genuine discourse." So far Mrs. Rh. D. We do not agree at all. There is certainly no reason why we should doubt that the Master remembered in fact, with words of praise, his great disciple. On the contrary, it would have been strange if he had not done so. We do also not share Mrs. Rh. D.'s impression that the parts of the Discourse follow each other in an abrupt way. On the contrary, it seems to us quite natural that, between the words of praise at the beginning and the end, there is embedded an illustration to this eulogy of Sariputta's wisdom, namely the account about his period of analytical introspection, being an example of his penetrating wisdom. The fact that stock formulas are used is not peculiar to the *Anupada Sutta*, but can be met with all over the Sutta Pitaka. It can scarcely be maintained that all these numerous texts in which stereotype passages occur, are "compilations", and that these passages themselves are, by necessity, insertions. Even if the *Anupada Sutta* should really be a compilation, this would not exclude the possibility that the single parts composing it, are authentic words of the Buddha. "But,"—Mrs. Rh. D. says,—“the intrusion of two words—of *anupada*, and of *vavatthitā* “determined”—which are not of the older idiom, suggest a latter editing...” Though *anupada* does not occur frequently in the Pitaka, it is also not at all a characteristic expression in any later period of Pali literature; so we cannot draw any conclusions from the mere fact of rare occurrence. With regard to the other word, it is true that derivatives of the verb *vavattheti*, e.g., *vavatthita*, and particularly, *vavatthāna*, are to be found very frequently in such later canonical books as the Patisambhidā Magga and the Vibhanga, and especially in the commentaries and the Visuddhi Magga. But *vavatthita*, “determined” or “established,” is likewise not such a highly technical term that the dating of a text could be based on that evidence alone. There are many other words too which occur only once or sporadically in the Sutta Pitaka. Even if one of these words, e.g., *vavattheti*, has become “the fashion” in later idiom, in preference to its synonyms, such a development, very frequent in the history of

\*) "A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics", 2nd Edition, London 1923, p. VIII. sq.



words, does not exclude that the same word has been used occasionally in an earlier period too.

Mrs. Rh. D. writes further: "Buddhaghosa either did not know the *Anupada Sutta*, or forgot to quote it. Yet to quote it, is precisely what he would have done just here, when he was writing the *Atthasalini* on the *Dhammasangani*. And his canonical erudition was remarkable. How did he come to overlook the *Sutta*?" He did not overlook it. But Mrs. Rh. D. overlooked the fact that Buddhaghosa's Commentary to *Majjhima Nikaya* deals, of course, also with the *Anupada Sutta*. Besides, in the *Atthasalini* too, Buddhaghosa made a quite unmistakable allusion to that *Sutta*, by mentioning (p. 208) the most characteristic term occurring in it, namely *anupadadhammavipassanā* (see p. 25), an expression which, to our knowledge, does not appear anywhere else in the *Pitakas*. It need not surprise us that Buddhaghosa did not quote the incomplete List of Dhammas, as given in that *Sutta*. In commenting on *Dhammasangani*, he was not concerned with historical research, and, besides, he did not need to prove what was quite evident at his time: that the *Abhidhamma* has wide-spread and deep roots in the *Suttanta*. Only to-day it has become necessary to emphasize the latter fact, against hyper-criticism like that of Mrs. Rh. D. who goes even so far to say (l.c., p. XII) that the "*Abhidhamma* . . . is not the message of the Founder; it is the work of the monkish world that grew up after him." It is to be regretted that such a gifted scholar as Mrs. Rh. D., has marred the value of her latest works by hasty and prejudiced judgments.

Concluding, we repeat that we do not see any reason why just the *Anupada Sutta* should not be regarded as authentic Buddha Word. We therefore think to be fully justified in quoting that Discourse as a *Suttanta*-source of *Abhidhamma* terms.





### 3. The Factors of Absorption

(*jhānaṅga*, F6-10).

The group of five factors which now follows is well known through its frequent occurrence in the Suttanta, under the name of "Factors of Absorption" (*jhānaṅgāni*), representing the most characteristic constituents of the First Absorption (see p. 20). Here too they have the same group name. They are classified in that way already in Dhammasaṅgani itself (PTS, p. 17), notwithstanding the fact that the state of consciousness treated here, does not belong to the jhanic consciousness of the Sphere of Form (*rūpāvacara*), but to the normal consciousness of the Sensuous Sphere (*kāmāvacara*). Evidently, the term "Absorption" (*jhāna*) is used here in the same wide sense as in the case of one of the 24 Modes of Conditionality, namely *jhāna-paccaya*. This "condition by way of absorption" refers likewise not only to meditative states of mind, i.e. to Absorption proper, but it may appear in nearly all types of consciousness and in all spheres (*bhūmi* or *āvacara*). In that wider application, *jhāna* refers to any stronger "absorption" in an object, i.e., to an intensive concentration on it. Each of these five Factors of Absorption exercises an intensifying influence on the other associated bad or good factors of the same moment of consciousness and on the simultaneous corporeal phenomena. Even more than that: they do not only influence corporeal phenomena, but, according to commentarial tradition, \*) it is the presence of these factors that enables a state of consciousness to produce corporeal phenomena (*rūpa-samutthāpaka-citta*). †)

Now, after the above definition, agreeing with that of *jhāna-paccaya*, we are able to express more distinctly the general function of the *jhānaṅgāni* in their wider sense, by denoting them as Intensifying Factors. In doing so, we are supported by the *Mūla Tīkā* to the *Kandha-Vibhanga* where they are spoken of as *baladāyaka*, i.e., "strength-givers".

We shall now briefly examine the single factors composing this group. Pleasure or Happiness (*sukha*, F9) was already included, under the name of Feeling (*vedanā*, F 2), in the Pentad of Sense Impression. But it may have a strongly intensifying effect on the respective state of consciousness and contribute to the absorption in the object, it enters also into the Factors of Absorption. Here we meet the first multiple classification of factors, resp. overlapping of groups: In the case of the type of consciousness treated here, "Feeling" in the Pentad corresponds to "Pleasure" among the Factors of Absorption. In other classes of

\*) See Commentary and Sub-Commentary to the Khandha-Vibhanga.

†) "*Cittam angāto aparihinam yeva rupam samutthāpeti. — (Mūla-Tīkā:) angato'ti jhanangato; jhanangani hi cittena saha rupasamutthāpakani.*" — Corporeal processes which are produced by consciousness (*citta-samutthana* or *citta-ja*) are, e.g., Bodily and Vocal intimation (*kaya-, vaci-vinnatti*), being expressive of intention.



consciousness, it may correspond to "Pain" (*dukkha*) or to "Indifference" (*upekkhā*). The fact that (mental) "Pain" too counts as Factor of Absorption, illustrates the extended meaning in which the term *jhānaṅga* is used here.

Compared with the relatively primitive and non-rational (we may even say, pre-rational) character of the Pentad of Sense Impression where the grasp of the object is still rather weak and incomplete, the Factors of Absorption represent a plane of consciousness where also the rational element has entered, and which, at the same time, possesses a higher degree of *differentiation* and *intensity*. The rational factors are Thinking (*vitakka*, F 6) and Deliberation (*vicāra*, F 7). Primarily by them, the greater *differentiation* and complexity of consciousness, and also its greater agility, is caused, while all five factors serve to *intensify* the activity of consciousness in general.

The intensifying effect of *pīti* (F 8) in its two aspects of Interest and Rapture, is quite evident. But it is, in particular, Mental One-pointedness or Concentration (*cittass'ekaggatā*, F 10) that, by counteracting the distracting, dissolving and thereby weakening influences, is the main force making for intensification and absorption. However, a minimal degree of intensifying Concentration is indispensable in every, even the weakest, state of consciousness, enabling it to interrupt the stream of subconsciousness (*bhavaṅga*). Therefore Mental One-pointedness belongs to the seven mental concomitants common to all consciousness (*sabbaciṭtasādhāraṇa*), together with Attention (*manasikāra*), Vitality (*jīvitindriya*) and four factors of the Pentad, i.e., excepting Consciousness. Now, one may ask why One-pointedness, being such a fundamental factor, was not added to the first group of the List, the Pentad. As an answer we suggest that it was included among the Factors of Absorption, firstly, because it has there its traditional place according to the Sutta-sense of that group, being the most typical factor of jhanic consciousness; and, on the other hand, the Pentad too forms, as we have seen, a distinct unit also in the older sources. Secondly, Mental One-pointedness or Concentration is that general factor which is most decisive for any further development of consciousness, and therefore its place is rightly among the generally intensifying Factors of Absorption. Still one may ask why it has not been classified among both groups, the Pentad and the Factors of Absorption, all the more so, as, anyhow, Mental One-pointedness does appear in our List under a great number of headings. The answer is that Dhammasaṅgani is not concerned with a formal or abstract arrangement of the factors, e.g., whether they are common to all consciousness, but only the actual function of a factor within a given state of consciousness and within the groups of factors, is taken into account. These groups are more than a formal principle of arrangement; they register the common denominator or purpose of the various single factors or functions. In that strict sense, the Pentad does not form a homogenous groups, and, perhaps on that reason, it is not mentioned as such in the Chapter of Summary (*sangaha-vāra*) of the Dhammasaṅgani, but the factors constituting it, are enumerated there singly: "There is one Sense



Impression, one Feeling etc.” The group name *phassa-pañcaka* is found only in the Atthasalini, having been taken from other sources, as mentioned above.

It deserves to be noted that the intensifying Factors of Absorptions follow immediately after the relatively primitive Pentad of Sense Impression which is fully developed in the dullest consciousness, even in that of animals. This juxtaposition of a relatively low level of mind and of one possessing vast potentialities points to the thought-provoking fact that, from an average state of consciousness, movement into two opposite directions is possible: The downward way, resulting from an insufficient cultivation of the Intensifying Factors, leads to a gradual weakening, dulling and animal-like degeneration of consciousness which, in due time, may even end in an actual rebirth as an animal. The upward way consists in developing and strengthening the Intensifying Factors. This way, in its progress, may fully transcend the coarse and heavy consciousness of the Sensual Sphere (*kāmāvacara*) which limits the intensification of consciousness. It may rise to a different plane of mind: to the meditative or jhanic consciousness of the Sphere of Form (*rūpāvacara*) that is incomparably more intense, powerful, luminous and agile. This ascent to a higher level of consciousness may be of brief duration for one who attains the meditative Absorptions during life in the World of Sense; or it may be of longer duration when rebirth in the World of Form (*rūpaloka*) has been obtained where this refined state of mind is said to be the normal condition of consciousness.

This shows that the seeds of “another world,” of a higher level of consciousness, are present in the average human mind where they are waiting to be nursed to full growth and final fruition. It shows that these two worlds are not separated from each other by an abyss to be overcome only by a forcible jump or by “divine grace.” The two worlds, the sensual and the jhanic, meet and overlap within our everyday consciousness. From the figurative expression “seed”, used above, should not be inferred that the constituents of the Sphere of Form are necessarily diminutive and weak in the Sensuous Sphere. On the contrary, they are main elements of many types of “sensuous” consciousness, and for the purposes of that Sphere, four of them may be quite strongly developed. It is mainly the fifth factor, Mental One-pointedness, which will need special cultivation for reaching the decree of intensity required for the meditative Absorptions; and of course, a change of the direction of all factors is necessary.

Beginning from the degree of strength which the Factors of Absorption possess in an average state of consciousness, a further intensification of consciousness aiming at realisation of the Noble Eightfold Path, may develop in different directions: (1) Emphasis on Thinking and Deliberation (*vittakka-vicāra*) will lead to an intensification of the intellectual faculties to be directed towards the growth of Clear Insight (*vipassanā*); (2) emphasis on Mental One-pointedness may lead to the attainment of Full Absorption (*appanā* or *jhāna*); (3) from here a side road may branch off on which, after having reached the Fourth Absorption, the Four Dominant Factors (*adhipati*; i.e., Intention, Will, Inves-



tigation and Consciousness) are developed up to the level of the corresponding four Roads to Power (*iddhipāda*). Here the intensity of consciousness is increased in such a degree that the Magical Powers (*iddhividha*) may be obtained which give a far-reaching control over mind and matter. This magical control of matter may be viewed as an extension of an already mentioned feature of the Factors of Absorption in their general aspect as Intensifying Factors: namely, that, owing to their presence, consciousness is enabled to produce certain corporeal phenomena (see p. 24).

On the other hand, as we mentioned already, the possibilities latent in the average human consciousness, may also lead to the downward path, to rebirth in the world of animals. The fact that all the Intensifying Factors, more or less developed, may be present in higher animals, implies both: the chance of sinking to, and of rising from, the level of animals. If human consciousness would not have certain factors in common with the lower and the higher worlds, rebirth as an animal or in the Sphere of Form would not be possible.

The intensity of a state of consciousness does not allow to say anything about its ethical value or its spiritual rank. This is a common point between the Intensifying Factors and the Pentad of Sense Impression: both groups are ethically indifferent; they may occur in wholesome, unwholesome and karmically neutral consciousness. Both groups take, as it were, the colour of their "root sap", i.e., they assume the quality of the wholesome, unwholesome or neutral "root causes" (*mūla* or *hetu*), associated with them. One of the differences between these two groups is that the Pentad contains only constant factors, while among the Factors of Absorption there appear, for the first time in our List, also non-constant ones, namely, Thinking, Deliberation and Interest which are not present in every type of consciousness.





## 4. The Faculties

(*indriya*, F11-18)

Next comes a group of eight factors, called *indriya*. Their common function consists in exercising a dominating, governing or controlling influence over the other mental factors associated with them (*sampayutta-dhammā*) and over the simultaneously arising corporeal phenomena. This function is indicated in Atthasalani by reference to the derivation of the word *indriya* from *inda* (Sanskrit: *indra*), "lord", e.g.: "Faith exercises lordship under the sign of devotion" (*adhimokkhalakkhane indattham kareti'ti saddhindriyam*; Asl p. 119). Like *jhāna*, *indriya* too is one of the 24 Modes of Conditionality (*paccaya*), "in the sense of predominance" (*adhipaccatthena*), as the Commentary to the *Patthāna* says. Based on these traditional explanations, we may denote the Indriyas as Controlling Factors, though we shall also retain the somewhat vague name of "Faculties" which is the one mostly used in translations.

First in the order of enumeration, a sub-group of five factors beginning with the Faculty of Faith, is given, which we shall call "The Five Spiritual Faculties". For them, besides the above general definition, an additional explanation of their *indriya*-nature is given by the Commentators, saying that they are called *indriya* because "they master their opposites" *patipakkh'ābhibhavana*; (Cy to Indriya-Vibhanga) i.e. they keep them under control. Faith (or Devotion, Confidence; F11) brings Faithlessness (or: lack of Devotion and Confidence) under control. Energy (F12) masters Indolence; Mindfulness (F13) controls Heedlessness; Concentration (F14) subdues Agitation, and Wisdom (F15) overcomes Ignorance (see Patisambhidā Magga, *Indriya-kathā*). These five Spiritual Faculties occur so frequently in the Suttanta that we do not need to give any references relating to them.

The sixth place in that group has the Faculty of Mind (*man'indriya*, F16). It belongs to the six Sense Faculties and is identical with the factor Consciousness (*citta*, F5) in the Pentad of Sense Impression. "Mind" is a Controlling Faculty on account of its pre-eminent position among the mental factors (*cetasika*) associated with it. These latter factors, among them also the other Faculties, by fulfilling their own particular tasks, serve at the same time the purpose of the general function of Consciousness or Mind (*citta mano viññāna*) which consists in discriminating (*viñāna*) the object.

Besides, in the sense of the previously given general definition of *indriya*, also the control exercised by Mind over certain corporeal phenomena is implied. An example of that control is the conscious intention accompanying and directing purposeful bodily movements (= *kāyaviññatti*) and "vocal utterance" (= *vacīviññatti*). This Indriya-quality of consciousness, as manifested in a certain control over matter, is capable of far-reaching development. It reaches its peak in one



of the four Roads of Magical Power (*iddhipāda*) which consists in the Concentration of Consciousness (or, as the complete Pali term runs: *citta-samādhīpadhānasankhāra-samannāgata-iddhipāda*). The efficacy attributed to it, is illustrated by the following passage in the Iddhi Chapter of the Patisambhidā Magga: "If he wishes to resort to the Brahma world, his body remaining invisible, then he forces the body by his consciousness, he directs the body by his consciousness." (PTS II, 209)\*) Neither the *cittasamādhī-iddhipāda* nor the corresponding *citt'ādhipati* ("predominance of consciousness") is sufficiently explained in the texts or the commentaries. It is, however, somewhat easier to understand, how to the other three constituents of these two groups, viz: Intention, Energy and Investigation, such a powerful influence could be ascribed. But now, by our reference to the general Indriya-quality of consciousness, i.e., its controlling power, we hope to have made a contribution to a better understanding of the rôle of consciousness too. It will now be better comprehensible how the "mere fact of being conscious" may achieve such prominence as "predominant factor" (*ādhipati*) or as a "Road to Magical Power" (*iddhipāda*). It is the *manindriya*-aspect of Consciousness, i.e., its controlling power, which is the starting-point of these developments. In this connection, it should be recalled that the ancient teachers expressly defined *indriya* by *ādhipaccam* (being the abstract form of *ādhipati*), i.e., predominancy or sovereignty.

By this brief excursion into the "Realm of Magic" we wanted to show that the inclusion of the controlling aspect of Consciousness is not only justified by its normal influence over mental and corporeal phenomena, but also because it represents one of the starting-points of higher development, inherent in normal consciousness. Of course, not only the Faculty of Mind, but also the Five Spiritual Faculties as well as the intensifying Factors of Absorption are forming the foundation on which the lofty structure of spiritually developed consciousness may be built. But it is of particular interest that to "mere consciousness" is ascribed such an active part in that work. Obviously these ancient Buddhist thinkers have clearly comprehended (without formulating it in abstracto) that developed Consciousness represents an eminently activizing and mobilizing force against the tendencies to stagnation and stabilisation of nature in general and of the human mind in particular. They have pointed to that aspect of consciousness (*citta*) by defining it as *citta (=citra)—kāraṇa*, "that what makes for differentiation" (see p. 18, ). This activizing and, thereby, governing influence of Consciousness is due to its *manindriya*-aspect, i.e., to Consciousness considered as a Controlling Faculty; or, as we may also express it, it is due to "conscious control".†) This general aspect of consciousness forms the basis on which other activizing and controlling factors, like Mindfulness

\* See Visuddhi Magga, PTS p. 402, 404, 405; Samy. Nik. LI, No. 22

† See the title and contents of a book by an eminent practical psychologist: F. Matthias Alexander, *Constructive Conscious Control of the Individual* (London, Chaterson).



(*sati*) etc., might be cultivated successfully. With their help, the field of conscious control might be extended far beyond the imagination of those who have lost sight of the ideal of Man Perfected or of that type of Superman (*mahā-purisa*) which the Buddha defines as the embodiment of perfect Mindfulness (*sati*) and perfect Clarity of Consciousness (*sampajañña*).<sup>\*</sup>

Returning to our subject proper, we repeat that the above examples serve to show that the apparent repetitions in our List of Dhammas are not superfluous, but are serving to point out essential aspects as well as potentialities of the respective mental factor. To consider these aspects and potentialities carefully, will yield important results for a deeper understanding of the theory and the practice of the Buddha's doctrine.

We resume now our cursory treatment of the eight Faculties. The seventh of them, the Faculty of Joy (*somanass'indriya*, F 17), belongs to the five Faculties relating to Feeling, viz: bodily pleasure and pain, joy, grief and indifference. "Joy" is an *indriya*, a Controlling Faculty, because, when a joyful mood arises, it dominates one's whole being. It suffuses all the other associated mental qualities (e.g., the intellectual activity), giving them the colour of joyfulness, and it enlivens also the accompanying bodily activity. "Grief" and "Indifference" too appear as Controlling Faculties in the respective classes of consciousness. It need not be elaborated here, how, through sadness or aversion (which likewise counts as *domanassa*, "Grief") and through indifference or equipoise, mental and bodily activities are influenced or controlled.

The eighth Faculty is that of Vitality (*īvitindriya*, F18) which represents the life-force of mental phenomena, in distinction from the identically named factor that governs physical vitality, having its place among the constituents of the Aggregate of Corporeality (*rūpak-khandha*). The Faculty of Psychic Vitality controls and guards the continuance of the mental life-process.

Among the Faculties appear, for the first time in the List, factors occurring only in good consciousness.†) These Faculties are Faith, Mindfulness and Wisdom. The ethical value of the remaining two Spiritual Faculties, Concentration and Energy, is variable. The Faculty of Concentration is identical with Mental One-pointedness, of the Factors of Absorption. Energy appears here for the first time.

For performing their governing and controlling function, the Faculties require a high degree of strength and intensity which is imparted to them by the intensifying Factors of Absorption. It is therefore consistent that, in the List, the Controlling Faculties are preceded by the intensifying Factors of Absorption, being their supporting con-

\* See Samyutta Nik. XLVII, No. 11 (PTS, vol. V, p. 158)

† We shall use the expression "good consciousness" as a rendering of *sobhana-citta*, a later Abhidhamma term, coined in order to include not only karmically wholesome consciousness (*kusala*), but also the results of wholesome Karma (*kusala-vipaka*) and the mere functional "good actions" of an Arahāt (*kriya-javana*).



dition. The following examples will illustrate the connexion between these two groups, exemplifying at the same time the "internal relations", spoken of above (p. 4).

Faith, Devotion or Confidence will have a controlling or governing influence on the character only in the case when the Factors of Absorption *pīti*, i.e., joyful interest or enthusiasm, and *sukha*, i.e., pleasure or happiness, possess themselves a considerable degree of intensity, and, according to their above-mentioned function, impart it also to "Faith". It is from Joy that Faith derives a good part of his conquering power; and it is keen and enthusiastic Interest which makes for the constancy of Faith or Devotion. Furthermore, Faith will be able to become an exclusive Devotion only in the case when there is also a high degree of Mental One-pointedness, performing the intensifying function of a *jhānaṅga*.

In order that the Faculty of Wisdom may fully comprehend its objects, keenness of intellect must be highly developed by the Intensifying Factors "Thinking" (*vitakka*) and "Deliberation" (*vicāra*). For the unfoldment of the Spiritual Faculties Energy, Mindfulness and Concentration a high degree of stimulating "Interest" (*pīti*) is required which will intensify the activity of these Faculties. On the other hand, when Mindfulness and Concentration are progressing well on their road, they will, for their part, keep alive and increase "Interest", preventing it from fading away.

The Mind-Faculty, in its general function of control over the cognitive process and in its inherent tendency to become ever more awake, lucid and powerful, is helped by the intensifying effect of all five Factors of Absorption, but particularly by Mental One-pointedness.

The Faculty of Joy is identical with the Factor of Absorption "Pleasure" (*sukha*), but it will be stronger and more enduring when linked with a high degree of intensifying *pīti*, having the degrees of Interest, Enthusiasm and Rapture. *Pīti* forms, in the Pali scriptures, very frequently a compound either with *somanassa* or with *sukha*.

The Faculty of Psychic Vitality too is enlivened by Interest and transmits this intensifying effect, received from interest, to Physical Vitality too. E.g., in the case of old or sick people, vivid interests, be it in persons, affairs or ideas, may prolong life, by being an incentive to gather all physical and mental energies of resistance, as any physician will confirm. On the other hand, it happens as frequently that old or sick people will be found to deteriorate quickly when they "lose interest in life", e.g., owing to the death of a beloved person or due to disappointments.

The five Spiritual Faculties together with the corresponding five Spiritual Powers (to be treated in the next chapter) continue the work begun by the Factors of Absorption, namely to increase the agility and pliancy of mind, its capacity to effect deliberate inner changes, be they positive, negative, or such of adaptation. These latter features are the basis of any mental and spiritual progress. It is mainly owing to the operation of these five spiritual Faculties, resp. Powers, that consider-



able transformations with regard to character, conduct, ideas and ideals become possible. Sometimes it will even appear as if quite a new personality has emerged. One thinks, e.g., of the vast inner and outer changes, of the "revaluation of all values"; occurring in the life of the great men of religious faith, after their "conversion" or after receiving their "revelations".

If, on the contrary, the Intensifying and Controlling Factors are weak or partly absent, a general heaviness and unwieldiness of the mental processes will result: the force of habit will be predominant; changes and adaptations will be undertaken but slowly and unwillingly, and in as slight a degree as possible; thought will be rigid, inclining to dogmatism; it will take long to learn by experience or from advice; affections and aversions will be rather fixed and strongly biassed; in general, the character will prove to be more or less inaccessible. In such a condition, the human mind will be in dangerous proximity to the level of higher animals with their very limited mental movability where likewise the Intensifying Factors may be partly present, but in a very weak degree (see p. , ). It is due to the fixity and unwieldiness as well as to the weakness of the animal mind that, as the Buddha often explained, the emergence of a being from the animal kingdom to a rebirth in the human world is so exceedingly difficult.

We have spoken in detail about the positive and beneficial side of the controlling power yielded by the Five Spiritual Faculties over the other mental factors. But there is also a negative, or, at least a somewhat dangerous aspect of it: The controlling and influencing activity of these Faculties may develop to an extreme degree. It may turn into a tendency to dominate, if a single Faculty is developed exclusively, while the others, especially the counterparts, are neglected or deliberately suppressed. E.g., Faith (*saddhā*) and Reason (or Wisdom, *paññā*), Energy (or Activity, *virīya*) and Concentration (or Tranquility, *samādhi*) may seriously impair and weaken each other, if any one of them is allowed to grow on the expenses of its counterpart. As in the macrocosm of human society, so in the microcosm of the human mind: those who are "in control" are often tempted to abuse their power. In both cases the final effect will be detrimental: the balance will be disturbed and a continuous and harmonious development will be prevented. From this evinces the importance as well as the great wisdom of insisting on the "Harmony of the Five Spiritual Faculties" (*indriya-samatta*) as taught by the Buddha and elaborated in the Commentaries.\*) It is the Faculty of Mindfulness (*satindriya*) that watches over the harmonization of the four other Faculties, having in that way the "chief control" over the other Controlling Factors.

\*) See Ang. Nik. VI, No. 55 (Simile of the Lute); Cy to the Satipatthana Sutta (translated by Bhikku Soma in "The Way of Mindfulness", p. 45f).



## APPENDIX

### The Omission of Memory in the List.—About the Nature of *saññā*

Here, at the first occurrence in the List of the factor “Mindfulness” (*sati*), we wish to draw the attention to a problem presented by it. We have already mentioned that *sati* occurs only in so-called “good consciousness” (*sobhana-citta*). This implies that *sati* means here first of all *sammā-sati*, Right Mindfulness, referring to the fourfold “Arousing of Mindfulness” (*satipaṭṭhāna*). The original meaning of *sati* (Skr: *smṛti*), “memory”, is however not fully excluded, having its place in the definition given in *Dhammasaṅgani*, but it stands rather in the background and refers always to good consciousness. Now the question suggests itself: why has such an important and frequently occurring mental function as that of memory not been expressly included in the List, in its quality as an ethically neutral factor? We cannot suppose that it has simply been forgotten. Against such an explanation stands the fact that our List of Dhammas is too obviously the product of a mind working with the greatest exactitude. The List is doubtlessly the result of careful investigation, supported by an unfailing introspective intuition. Certainly no essential aspects of the subject-matter have been overlooked here, though, of course, the List admits of condensation as well as of additions.

This question of Memory as an ethically neutral function has been raised already in *Atthasalini* (p. 249). We quote the passage in full: “In a mind devoid of (Right) Faith (*asaddhiya-citte*), there is no Mindfulness (*sati*). How then, do not the adherents of wrong views remember an action performed by them? They do. But that is not *sati* (“Mindfulness”). It is merely an unwholesome thought-process going on in such a manner (*ten’ākārena akusalacittappavatti*). Therefore, *sati* is not included (in unwholesome consciousness). But why, then, is Wrong Mindfulness (*micchā-sati*) mentioned in the Suttanta? On the following reasons: because the unwholesome Aggregates (*khandha*) are devoid of Mindfulness; because it is the opposite of Mindfulness, and in order to complete the group of the Factors of the Wrong Path (*micchā-magga*). On these reasons, Wrong Mindfulness is mentioned in an exposition of relative validity (*pariyāyena*). But in an exposition of absolute validity (*nippariyāyena*) it has no place.” We cannot say that these explanations are very satisfactory. They still leave open the question why Memory has not been included in the List under any other name e. g., *patissati*, distinguishing it from *sammā-sati*.

In the Sub-Commentary (*Mūla-Tīkā*) to the just quoted passage of *Atthasalini*, we find however a hint for a plausible theory with regard to the omission of Memory. There it is said: “(According to that passage in *Asl.*) Wrong Mindfulness is explained as the unwholesome Aggregates which are void of Mindfulness and contrary to it. This



again should be understood as follows: when reflecting on previous actions, e.g., in the case of inimical feelings, those unwholesome Aggregates are associated with keen perception (*patu-saññā-sampayutta*).” Taking up this suggestion we may assume that ancient Buddhist psychology did ascribe the main share in the process of recollecting to Perception (*saññā*), regarding it merely as a variant of the latter. It should be recalled that *saññā* belongs to the Pentad of Sense Impression and to the factors common to all consciousness (*sabbacittasādhāraṇa*), so that the requirement of all-round occurrence as a neutral and general factor is fulfilled. We are supported in our theory by the definition of *saññā*, to be found in Atthasalini (p. 110). There two sets of explanations are supplied, given in the customary categories used for definitions (*lakkhana, rasa* etc.). According to the first explanation, the characteristic (*lakkhana*) of Perception, applicable to all cases, is “perceiving” *sanjānana*, lit. “cognizing well”; the essential property or function (*rasa*) is “re-cognizing” (*paccabhiññāna*), said to be applicable only to certain cases, namely when Perception proceeds with the help of a distinctive mark of the object, either fixed to it intentionally (as by woodcutters to trees) or being a characteristic of the object itself (e.g., a mole in the face of a man). The second explanation is said to apply to all cases of Perception. The characteristic is again “perceiving”. As the essential property is given here: “making marks as a condition for a repeated perception (i.e., for recognizing or remembering; *puna. sanjānana. paccaya-nimitta. karaṇa*).” So we may sum up: Perception (*saññā*) is the taking up \*), the making and the remembering of distinctive marks of the object. In this connexion it is noteworthy that “mark” or “sign” is also one of the different meanings of the word *saññā* itself.

Not only the “taking up”, but also the “making” and the “remembering” of marks may be applied to all cases of perception if understood in the following way: That what happens really in the simple act of perception is that some features of the object (sometimes only a single, striking one) are selected. The mental note we are making of that perception is closely associated with those selected features, i.e., we have, as it were, “attached a tag” to the object, or made a mark on it, like woodcutters on trees. In so far, every perception is “making marks” (*nimitta-karaṇa*). In order to understand how “remembering” or “recognizing” too is implied in every act of perception, we have to mention that, according to the deeply penetrating analysis of the Abhidhamma, the apparently simple act, e.g., of seeing a rose, is in reality a very complex process, composed of different phases †) each of these

\*) Commentary to Patisambhidā Magga: “Perception means taking up the appearance of a thing.” (*Akaragahika sanna*). Note that the Latin word *per-cipere* from which the English “perceive” is derived, means literally “to seize or take up thoroughly”; the prefix “per” corresponding to the Pali “sam” in *san-jānana = sanna*.

†) Cf. “Compendium of Philosophy” (trsl. of the Abhidhammattha Sangaha by S. Z. Aung), London 1929, p. 32ff.—The perceptual “phases”, treated there and briefly mentioned above, are elaborations by later Abhidhamma scholars and not to be found in older works.



phases consisting of numerous smaller combinations of conscious processes (*citta-vīthi*) which again are made up of several single moments of consciousness (*citta-kkhana*) following each other in a definite sequence of diverse functions. Among these phases (i.e., the most comprehensive series mentioned in the last sentence), there is one that connects the present perception of a rose with a previous one, and there is another one that attaches to the present perception the name "rose", remembered from previous experience. Not only with regard to a relatively distant past of similar experiences, but also between those infinite simally brief single phases and "process"-sequels the connecting function of rudimentary "memory" must be assumed to operate because each phase and each smaller sequel has to "remember" the previous one, — a process called by the later Abhidhammikas "grasping the past" (*atīta-ggahana*). Finally, the single contributions of all those different perceptual processes have to be remembered and co-ordinated, in order to form the final and complete perception of a rose.

Not only in such a microscopic analysis of sense-perception, but also in every consecutive thought-process, e.g., in reasoning, the phase of "grasping the past" can be observed, when the parts of an argument are connected, i.e., when conclusions are built on premises. If that "grasp" on the past is too weak to be effective one says that one has "lost the thread". The way by which one remembers the earlier phases of one's thought-process, is likewise through selected marks (*nimittakaraṇa*), because it is neither possible nor necessary to consider all the minor aspects of a thought. But if the "selection" is too incomplete, overlooking essential features or consequences of the past thought, then a faulty argument built on wrong premises will follow.

In these two ways we have to understand that "remembering" i.e., connecting with the past, is a function of Perception in general. We may formulate now the following definition: *saññā* is cognition as well as re-cognition, both by way of selected marks.

We may summarize our findings as follows :

(1) Memory, as we usually understand it, is not mentioned as a separate component of a moment of consciousness, because it is not a single mental factor, but a complex process.

(2) That single mental factor which is most important for the arising of Memory is Perception (*saññā = sañjānana*), being that kind of elementary cognition (*iānana*) which proceeds by way of taking up, making and remembering (i.e., identifying) of marks.

(3) Apart from that what is usually called "remembering", the reminiscent function of Perception, in general, is to be found (a) in the imperceptibly brief phases of a complete perceptual process, the sequence of which is based on the connecting function of "grasping the past" phases; (b) in any consecutive line of thoughts where this "grasping of the past" is so habitual and refers to an event so close to the present that in normal parlance it is not called "memory", though it is not essentially different from it.



Another reason for the non-inclusion of Memory either among the components or the classes of consciousness is the following: Remembrance means merely the fact that a state of consciousness has objects of the past (*atītārammaṇa*). But, as mentioned already before (p. 11), in Dhammasangani, the object-side of the perceptual process is used for the classification of consciousness only in a single instance which refers only to the division in to visual objects, etc. The time-relation of objects, in particular, does not enter at all the classification or the analysis of consciousness, being irrelevant in these connections. Still less could the time-relation, e.g., that of Memory, be counted as a separate component of consciousness. In Dhammasangani, the time-relation of objects is treated separately in the Triad of things with past, etc. Objects (*atītārammaṇa-tīkā*). But the fact that a moment of consciousness has objects of the past does not warrant the inclusion of a separate factor called Memory.

As a point of comparison between the Pali Abhidhamma of the Theravadins and the Abhidhamma of later Buddhist schools, it deserves mentioning that in the Lists of Dhammas as composed by the hinayanistic Sarvastivadins and by the mahayanistic Vijnanavadins, *sati*, resp. *smṛti*, is given as a neutral factor. It is included there in a group of factors called *mahābhūmika*, composed of factors common to all consciousness, corresponding to the category of *sabbacittasādhāraṇa*, in Theravada. The fact that *smṛti* is really intended there as an ethically neutral and not a wholesome factor, is also proved by the definition given, in the same connexion, in the Commentary to the Abhidharma Kosa: *anubhūtasya asaṃpramoṣa*, i.e., "the not forgetting of that what has been experienced." This divergence from the List given in Dhammasangani shows that these old thinkers too had noticed the absence of Memory in that List, assuming perhaps that it had been forgotten. But for the reasons given above, we think that this omission was not only deliberate, but that it is fully justified. In other cases of divergence too, we have found that, on close examination, the Theravadin's List of Dhammas is by far to be preferred, being based on a much more mature judgement of psychological facts than the Lists of the Sarvastivadins or Vijnanavadins. But here we are not concerned with such a comparative study of the different Abhidhamma systems.





## 5. The Powers

(*bala*, F24—30)

We have already remarked that the faculty of controlling presupposes a certain intensity of the mental factors concerned. We have seen that the function of intensifying is performed by the Factors of Absorption, and we have exemplified it in the particular case of the five Spiritual Faculties. The resultant intensity of those Faculties is shown and emphasized by repeating them in the List under the name of "Powers" (*bala*).

The commentarial explanation (e.g., Asl p. 124) says that the five factors corresponding to the Spiritual Faculties and also the two other constituents of this group, viz: Moral Shame (*hiri*) and Moral Dread (*ottappa*), are called "Powers", because they are "unshakeable" (*akampiya*) by their opposites: so, e.g., Faith is not shaken by Faithlessness (Unbelief) etc. But in view of the fact that all these psychological statements refer, in the first instance, only to the duration of a single moment of consciousness, and as the "Control" or "Power" won at that moment, may well be lost in the next one,—therefore we may better, and more modestly, render the word *akampiya* by "firm". So we may say that these seven factors are Powers of Firm Preponderance. In the case of the five Spiritual Faculties, this signifies that the "control" exercised by them has a certain stability.

It should be kept in mind that the five Spiritual Faculties and the five Spiritual Powers are only two different aspects of the same qualities. Their nature of being basically one, though differentiated in their functions was illustrated by the Buddha in the following simile: Let there be a river flowing eastwards, and in the midst of it an island. In this case, the stream could be regarded as one, when seen in its flow on the eastern and western side of the island; it could be regarded as two, when the island's northern and southern sides are considered. In the same way, the identity of the Spiritual Faculties and Powers has to be understood. (Condensed from Samy. Nik. 48, No. 43).

When the function of these five Powers is considered only within a single moment, merely the somewhat self-evident fact is implied that, to be in existence at all, the corresponding five Spiritual Faculties must necessarily have been able to "overpower" the opposing tendencies for the duration of that moment (*indriya*-quality), and, by doing so, achieved a certain "Firmness" (*bala*-quality) likewise for the same period of time. In so far, the Powers can be said to be present even when the Faculties are relatively weak. But this does not exhaust the Power-aspect of the Faculties. They are not only those limited actualities of the brief present moment, but also potentialities of the future. We have already mentioned (p. ) that the enumeration of a factor under different group-headings points to potential connections with such other constituents of these groups which are not included in the given state of consciousness; in other words, new perspectives are opened beyond the present moment. In that case, the potentialities refer to an increasing width of relations to other wholesome factors. Here, in



the case of the Spiritual Powers, the potentialities, included in that aspect, refer to an increasing strength, up to the degree when these Powers have become "unshakeable" (*akampiya*) in the fullest sense. This takes place on attainment of the Stages of Sanctity (*ariyamagga*). Only then, when certain Fetters (*samyojana*) and Hindrances (*nīvaraṇa*) have been completely abolished, those Faculties, and other spiritual qualities too, become really "unshakeable" i.e., they cannot be lost any more. E.g., Faith becomes "unshakeable" when the Fetter, resp. Hindrance, of Scepticism (*vicikicchā*) is radically destroyed on the Stage of Stream Entry (*sotāpatti*).

Therefore, for the practical purpose of spiritual development, the mentioning of the Power-aspect may serve as an incitement not to be satisfied when the Spiritual Faculties exercise a momentary or short-lived control or power, but to strive untiringly until they have reached the full status of "Unshakeable Powers".

If we consider the potentialities and not only the limited actualities, we may say that the Power-aspect of these five factors, though actually present in the given moment, need not be as strongly developed as their controlling (*indriya*-) aspect. This is corroborated by the fact that in certain types of consciousness the Power-aspect may be fully absent, though the Faculty-aspect is present. We shall give the details of it in a later chapter of this treatise (see page ).

The last two Powers given in the List are Moral Shame (*hiri*, F29) and Moral Dread (*ottappa*, F30). They are strengthening wholesome consciousness, by making it "unshakeable" through Shamelessness and Unscrupulousness. If their roots in the character of the individual go deep enough, they will automatically set in motion spontaneous reactions of restraint, curbing all evil influences. Therefore, in the following repeated occurrence in the List (F37, 38), these two Powers are called "The Guardians of the World" (see p. ). They are indispensable for the securing, protecting and stabilizing of moral qualities, and are therefore the pre-conditions of any further spiritual growth. While we denoted the factors of this group, in general, as "Powers of Firm Preponderance", these two, in particular, may be called Protective Powers. Due to their purely "defensive" function, they have no counterpart among the more active Indriyas, like the other five Powers.





## 6. The Path Factors

(*magg' aṅga*, F19-23)

In the actual order of the List, the Path Factors have their place before the Powers which we preferred to explain immediately after the Spiritual Faculties, on account of their close connection with them.

Of the factors of the Noble Eightfold Path, only five are given in the List. The remaining three, viz: Right Speech, Right Action and Right Livelihood, are not included because they are variable factors, i.e., they do not necessarily appear in every case of that type of consciousness, and they do not arise together in the same moment. They are included in the Supplementary Factors (*ye-vā-panaka*), under the names of Abstinence from Evil Conduct in Words, Deeds and Livelihood.

Of the five Path Factors given verbatim, four are identical with or better: different aspects of, the corresponding Spiritual Faculties (*indriya*):

Right Understanding (F19)	=	Faculty of Wisdom (F15)
„ Effort (F21)	=	„ „ Energy (F12)
„ Mindfulness (F22)	=	„ „ Mindfulness (F13)
„ Concentration (F23)	=	„ „ Concentration (F14)

The fifth, Right Intention (*sammā-saṅkappa*, F20), is counted as a repeated enumeration of the Factor of Absorption “Thinking” (*vitakka*, F6).

If we search for a reason why, in the arrangement of the List, the Path Factors are enumerated after the Faculties, we may find it perhaps in the fact that the Path Factors continue the work of the Spiritual Faculties in effecting a stronger directive or purposive energy within the flow of wholesome consciousness,—a tendency which is already prominent in the Spiritual Faculties, as we have seen. But in the likewise mentioned tendency of the unharmonized four Spiritual Faculties to dominate and to suppress their respective counterparts, there lies the danger that they will lose, more or less, their original measure of “directiveness”. Easily their functions will become a purpose in itself and an enjoyment in itself. The goal towards which the respective Faculty was originally working and moving, will lose in importance, and its directive influence on that Faculty and on the entire personality will diminish. It might even happen that the original goal is lightly exchanged for an other, an opposite one. E.g., the strong urge felt by some people “to believe in something” (= *saddh' indriya*) may cause them to change with surprising facility the object of their belief. Or: a keen intellect (= *paññ' indriya*) enjoying its versatility and superiority, may, all too quickly, be ready to “prove” just the opposite of what it had advocated a while ago; this will lead to intellectual dishonesty and to an indifference or cynicism with regard to definite ethical or spiritual values. We are further acquainted with a



fervid thirst for unceasing activity (= *viriya* 'indriya) that tries to quench itself in sundry ways, often very indiscriminately chosen. These examples show the great danger arising from the dominating tendency of the Indriyas. It can be countered (1) by their harmonization (see p. 38) and (2) by emphasizing their aspects as Path Factors which is inherent in them. If one gets accustomed to remember frequently that the highest employment of those Faculties is that in the service of the liberating Path, then they will be less liable to go astray.

With the Path Factors we enter the *sphere of definite and unmistakable values and valuations*, and, consequently, their *directive and purposive* energy is greater than that of the Spiritual Faculties. These features of the Path Factors find expression in their commentarial explanation (Asl p. 154) as "factors of deliverance" (*niyyān-atthēna*, lit. "leading out", sc. of the Samsara) and as "conditions" (*hetu-atthēna*), e.g., as conditions or requirements for attaining Saintship (*arahatta*). If, e.g., the factor Concentration (= Mental One-pointedness), being in itself neutral, i.e., outside of the sphere of values, receives the valuating attribute of "Right" (*sammā*), it becomes a Path Factor, i.e., a Factor of Deliverance: because, from the highest standpoint of the Buddhist doctrine, "right" is called only that what is conducive to Deliverance.

However, the Path Factor quality of a certain mental concomitant must not be particularly distinct at every occurrence of the type of consciousness concerned; still less must there always be a conscious awareness of it. The knowledge associated (*ñāṇasampayutta*) with the 1st type of wholesome consciousness which is treated here, will not always be strongly developed, being frequently limited to the immediate occasion for the arising of that thought, without looking beyond it. Besides, the respective individual must not necessarily be acquainted at all with the Noble Eightfold Path and its goal. Nevertheless, in these cases too, the Path-Factor aspect is actually present, signifying an, at least, minute contribution to the long process of beating a track to Deliverance.

We shall add a few remarks on the interrelation and the co-operation between the last two groups and the Path Factors.

The *indriya*-quality supports the Path-aspect of the corresponding factors through its controlling and thereby co-ordinating influence on the other simultaneous mental concomitants and bodily activities, making them subservient to the liberating purpose of the Path and engaging them, as it were, as auxiliary workers for "beating the track".

The *Power*-quality, having the nature of being "unshakeable" by the respective opposites, supports the Path-aspect by its "preponderant influence" on keeping "the track" free from obstructions and deviations, facilitating in that way a firm and steady course.



On the other hand, if the character as a *Path Factor* is strongly marked and highly developed in the corresponding Faculties and Powers, the arbitrariness in their application to other purposes will be reduced and, finally, abolished; they will be less threatened by isolation and disruption, caused by a lack of balance; they will be directed more purposefully to the only salutary goal of Deliverance.

The inclusion of the Path Factors in the analysis of wholesome consciousness means the lifting of the spiritual eye from the narrow confines and limited purposes of every-day consciousness to the wide horizon of the Ideal. It means that, in the midst of life's dense jungle, of its labyrinths and blind alleys, the glorious freedom of a Way is opened. It means the gradual liberation of the mind from sceptical or muddle-headed aimlessness, by pointing to a well-marked Way that leads to a definite and noble destination. Already from the mere awareness that such a Way does exist and that it is traceable in the wholesome thought arising just now, — from that knowledge alone there will come assurance and peace, solace and encouragement. The Path Factors are an appeal to make every moment of one's life a part of the Great Way and to continue in that effort until, in proximity of the Goal and in the attained assurance of reaching it, the Way is transformed into the Supermundane Path (*lokuttara-magga*).





## 7. The Wholesome Roots

(*kusala-mūla*, F 31-33)

The three wholesome Roots are the main criteria by which a state of consciousness is determined as being wholesome. The first two of them, Non-Greed (*alobha*) and Non-Hate (*adosa*), have to be present in every class of karmically wholesome consciousness if it should have that status. Non-Delusion (*amoha*) is to be found only in those wholesome states of consciousness which are "associated with knowledge" (*ñāna-sampayutta*).

Non-Greed and Non-Hate appear here for the first time in the List, and occur once more in the following, among the "Ways of Wholesome Action" (F34, 35). Non-Delusion was already represented in the List by other aspects (F 15, 19, 28) and occurs yet three times more (F 36, 52, 54).

Non-Greed and Non-Hate may, according to the single case, either have a mainly negative meaning, signifying the absence of Greed and Hate; or they may possess a distinctly positive character; e.g., Non-Greed as renunciation, liberality, selflessness; Non-Hate, as amity, kindness, forbearance. Non-Delusion has always a positive meaning, as it represents the knowledge which motivates the respective state of consciousness. In their positive aspects, Non-Greed and Non-Hate are likewise strong motives of good actions. They supply the non-rational, volitional or emotional motives, while Non-Delusion represents the rational motivation of a good thought or action.

The three Roots may be called Motive Powers, in the double sense of these words, as they induce and impel the other simultaneously arisen mental factors to their activities in the service of that motive. Their "root sap" actuates and nourishes these other factors, and gives to those that are in themselves "colourless", i.e., neutral, the "colour" of a wholesome quality.

The wholesome Roots too belong to the "sphere of values", but they have not necessarily the strong purposefulness of the Path Factors, their unvariable direction towards the goal of Deliverance. Like the Spiritual Faculties, they may, in many cases, be entirely limited to the single occasion.

The common membership of the "sphere of values" seems to be the only connexion between the Wholesome Roots and the preceding group of Path Factors, as it is also the case with the following "Ways of Action".



## 8. The Ways of Action

(*kamma-patha*, F34-36)

The three same Wholesale Roots, though differently named, are given now in their aspect of wholesome Ways of Action. They are called here Non-Covetousness (*anabhijjhā*), Non-Illwill (*avyāpāda*) and Right Understanding (*sammā-ditṭhi*), comprising mental Action or Karma which alone, among the altogether ten Ways of Action, enters this analysis of consciousness. The remaining seven Ways of Action refer to the actual performance of bodily and verbal actions and do therefore not belong to the domain of analytical treatment. Only the volitions combined with them might be thought to be included in the Supplementary Factors". Abstinence from Wrong Bodily, resp. Verbal Action (F63, 64).

While these three factors, considered as Roots, belong to the "impelling" or "motive powers" of the unceasingly turning Wheel of Life, they are here regarded as sections of that Wheel itself, forming its part of wholesome mental activity. Thus they belong to the Formative Powers (*abhisankhāra*) of a happy rebirth. They, and their unwholesome counterparts, are treated in detail, in *Atthasalini* (p. 97f).





## 9. The Guardians of the World

(*lokapāla*, F37, 38)

This group is formed by the two factors Moral Shame (*hiri*) and Moral Dread (*ottappa*). In their first-time enumeration as "Powers" (F29, 30; see p. 35), they may be regarded as Guardians of the *Self*, i.e., as protectors of the wholesome character of the other mental factors, arising at the same moment. That means, they refer, in that case, mainly to the inner world and to individual ethics. Here, in their character as Guardians of the *World*, their relation to the outer world is emphasized. They appear here as the guardians and regulators of the relations between individual and society, i.e., they refer to social ethics. The presence of Moral Shame and Moral Dread in each wholesome moment of consciousness forms a protection against the deterioration of the moral average of mankind. They are, as it were, the brakes of the mind-vehicle and the restraining forces against the unrestraint of their opposites, Shamelessness and Unscrupulousness. The more spontaneous and strong the voice of Shame and Conscience speaks within man\*) the less force and coercion will be required for maintaining a high moral level in society. Therefore, these two qualities were rightly called by the Buddha "Guardians of the World."†)

We wish to draw the attention of the reader to the beautiful exposition of these two qualities in *Atthasalini* (p. 124f.)

An inner connexion of this group with the precedent and the subsequent one could not be established. This holds true also of the following groups.



\* i.e. to express it in the language of the Abhidhamma, when these two factors are parts of spontaneous consciousness (*asankhārena*).

† See *Angutt. Nik.* II, No. 7, from where the name of this group is derived.



## 10. The Six Pairs of Qualitative Factors

(*yugalakāni*, F39-50)

The twelve factors, beginning with "Tranquillity of Mental Concomitants" (*kāya-passaddhi*, F 39), do always arise together, and occur only in "good" consciousness (see p. 29\*); they are common to all types of it (*sobhana-sādhāraṇa*). In Atthasalini, they are sometimes called, for short, "the six pairs" (*cha yugalakāni*). We shall now describe them singly, by way of their own distinctive features and through their opposites.

### Description of the Six Pairs

*Tranquillity* is the quiet, equable and composed condition, firstly of consciousness in general (*citta-passaddhi*, F40) and, secondly, of its single concomitant factors (*kāya-passaddhi*, F39). It refers, therefore, (1) to the tranquil "ground-tone" of the mind, (2) to the quiet, smooth and even "way of functioning" of the mental factors, undisturbed by agitation and restlessness. According to Atthasalini, it is opposed to anxiety (*daratha*) and to the Hindrance of Agitation (*uddhacca*). We may add that, in its aspect of a "good conscience", it is also opposed to the Hindrance of Worry (*kukkucca*), caused by a bad conscience or scruples. As to the influence of Tranquillity on single mental factors, we shall give only two examples: (i) In the case of Joy (*sukha*, *somanassindriya*), the presence of Tranquillity means that Joy will be a "tranquil happiness", without admixture of agitation (*uddhacca*) which would render it unwholesome (*akusala*). (2) Energy (*viriyindriya*), in connection with Tranquillity, will be a "quiet strength", displaying itself in a well-balanced, measured, and, therefore, effective way, without boisterous or uncontrolled exuberance, spending itself quickly and often in vain.

Within the *Sensuous Sphere* (*kāmāvacara*), Tranquillity is the inner peace, bestowed by any moral act or thought, i.e., the peace of an unruffled conscience. It is also the equability of the mental functions, necessary for an effective work on the field of Clear Insight (*vipassanā*), e.g., for an unwavering and cool, i.e., reliable and dispassionate judgment. Atthasalini (p. 130) says: "The manifestation (*paccupaṭṭhāna*) of Tranquillity is the unwavering and cool state (*aparipphandana-sītibhāva*) of consciousness and concomitants."

Beyond that, Tranquillity prepares the entry into the jhanic consciousness of the *Sphere of Form* (*rūpāvacara*), by being a pre-condition to the Factors of Absorption "Joy" (*sukha*) and "Concentration" (*cittakaggatā*). With regard to that it is said in a stereotype passage of the Suttas, often preceding the treatment of the Absorptions: "...being of a t r a n q u i l mind, he feels happiness (*sukha*) and a happy mind finds concentration." (Digh. Nik. No. 9).

Finally, Tranquillity is the seed, present in every wholesome consciousness, that may grow to full unfoldment in the Factor of Enlightenment "Tranquillity" (*passadhi-sambojjhaṅga*) which, in its perfection, belongs to Supermundane Consciousness (*lokuttara-citta*).



2. The *Agility* (lit.: “lightness”, *lahutā*) of wholesome states of consciousness is based on one of the fundamental qualities of mind in general: its “lightness” and movability, distinguishing it from the heaviness and inertia of matter (see also p. 56).

The Agility of good consciousness signifies (1) the buoyancy of the mental condition in general (*citta-lahutā*, F42, and “the capacity of the mind to turn very quickly to a wholesome object or to the Contemplation of Impermanence, etc.” (*Mūla-Tīkā*). (2) In the case of the single mental factors (*kāya-lahutā*, F41), it signifies the swiftness of their functions; their capacity to act and to react quickly, e.g., to seize at once an occasion for doing a good deed, or to grasp quickly the implications of a thought or a situation. It is the basis for such qualities as presence of mind, ready wit, etc.

Agility is said to be the opposite of the Hindrance or Defilement (*kilesa*) “Rigidity and Sloth” (*thīna-middha*) that causes heaviness (*garutā*) and hardness (*thaddhabhāva*); i.e., to a general sluggishness, dulness and apathy of consciousness as well as to the slowness of its various functions, causing, e.g., slowness of apprehension or response, intellectually as well as emotionally.

A noteworthy passage in the *Mulā-Tīkā*, the old sub-commentary to the Abhidhamma Pitaka says: “Agility, in its operation is a condition of swift emergence from the Subconscious (*bhavanga-vutthāna*).”

3. *Pliancy* (lit. “softness”, *mudutā*) is, for the general condition of mind (*citta-mudutā*, F 44), its susceptibility, elasticity, resilience and adaptability which bestow on mind a greater and longer lasting efficiency, a “sounder health” \* than it could be expected to possess when the consistence of mind is rigid. “Soft conquers hard,” says Laotse (*Tao Te King*, v. 36, 76). It should also be remembered how often mental insanity is caused by an excessive rigidity and lacking pliancy or resilience of mind.

The Pliancy of the Concomitants (*kāya-mudutā*, F43) consists, e.g., in the adaptability of the respective functions to the various tasks put before them. It is, further, the high impressionability or sensitiveness of the perceptive and cognitive faculties and of moral emotion. It is the capacity of the intellectual faculties to learn and to unlearn, ever anew; to be benefited by experience. It allows to get rid of inveterate habits and prejudices, pertaining to thought, emotion or behaviour. It contributes to the devotion and self-surrender in Faith (*saddhā*); to the gentleness and forgivingness in Non-Hate (*adosā*) or Love (*mettā*). By force of its aspect of sensitive susceptibility, it increases also the imaginative capacity of mind which, again, is an important factor in the development of intuition.

\*) To understand this figurative expression, it should be known that one of the connotations of *kusala*, “wholesome”, given in Asl, is *arogyā*, i.e., (mental and moral) health.



Agility and Pliancy may be regarded as a kind of counterpart to Tranquility. When the Commentator named "anxiety" (*daratha*), as one of the defilements particularly countered by Tranquillity we propose to introduce as the opposite of Pliancy and as a counterpart of *daratha*, the canonical term of *khīla*, meaning: barrenness, obstruction, stoppage. Here, in these negative counterparts, the expectant tension of "anxiety" stands against the oppressive dulness of being hopelessly obstructed. Expressly, the Commentary names as opposites: the Defilements *ditṭhi* which here may be rendered best as "dogmatism" or "opinionatedness", and *māna*, i.e., "conceit". Both defilements are said to cause hardness or inflexibility (*thaddha-bhāva*). Against dogmatic rigidity, Pliancy appears as open-mindedness. Conceit, and any other egocentric hardenings of the heart, are countered by Pliancy, in its aspects of humane accessibility, appreciation of, and making allowance for, others. The "manifestation" (*paccupaṭṭhāna*) of Pliancy is said to be "non-resistance" (*appatighāta*) which may refer, e.g., to the "non-resistance" against appeals or impulses to selfless action; to the readiness to yield in arguments etc.

Pliancy of mind counteracts the tendency of the human character and intellect, to become rigid: it widens the boundaries of the so-called Ego by admitting into it new elements from the world of Non-Ego; it is a precondition of true tolerance that includes under-standing.

4. *Workableness* (*kammaññatā*, F45, 46) is that medium consistence, or that tempered state, of consciousness and its concomitants, in which neither firmness nor softness are excessive. Perfect "Workableness" of mind means that these two qualities, firmness and softness, are just in the right proportion which warrants the greatest efficiency of the mental functions, and which is most suitable for the formative and transformative work of spiritual development (*bhāvanā*). This is expressed in the *Mūla-Tīkā* as follows: Workableness signifies that "specific or suitable degree of Pliancy or Softness (*mudutā-visiṭṭhā*, resp., *anurūpa-mudutā*)" which makes the gold, i.e., mind, workable. "If the mind is in the flames of passion, then it is too soft to be workable, like molten gold. If, on the contrary, the mind, through influence of conceit, etc., is too rigid, then it is comparable to unannealed gold."

An excessive rigidity of mind, being *too little* impressionable, will resist any attempt to transform or to reform it. On the other hand, an excessive pliancy will make the mind *too easily* impressionable, and in such a condition of mind, impressions will not be retained sufficiently long for leaving any noticeable effect, but will be quickly obliterated by new impressions.

Therefore, to anyone who aims at an effective transformation of consciousness through spiritual training, it is most important to achieve, as perfectly as it is possible in the case of a beginner, that medium quality of mind which is implied in the term "Workableness".



Atthasalini says that the opposites of Workableness are "all those remaining Hindrances that render the consciousness and its concomitants unwieldy." This may refer particularly to Sensual Desire (*kāmacchanda*) and Hate (*vyāpāda*). Sensual Desire "softens" the mind, makes it "shapeless", effaces its characteristic contours, dilutes and dissolves. Hate (aversion, resentment, etc.) represents the other extreme: it hardens, contracts, imprisons, alienates. Therefore, in proportion to the degree in which that medium state of Workableness has been achieved, the mind will be assisted in "uprooting" the two Unwholesome Roots of Lust and Hate.

5. *Proficiency* (*pāguññatā*, F47, 48) is, according to Dhammasangani, the fitness and competence of mind and mental factors, and is, according to Atthasalini, opposed to their "sickliness" (*gelañña-bhāva*), caused by such Defilements as Lack of Faith or Confidence (*asaddhiya*) etc. That is to say, it is opposed to a feebleness of the mental and moral constitution and to inefficiency which appear also as inner uncertainty and lack of self-confidence. The sommentarial explanation, by "sickliness", points again to the fire-mentioned meaning of *kusala* as "moral and mental health".

The inner certainty, assurance and efficiency when doing a good deed, which is expressed by the factor Proficiency, will be increased in the measure of the repeated performance of that act, resulting in its spontaneity. We may generally say that all these last-mentioned five pairs, but particularly Proficiency, will be higher developed in all those good states of consciousness which are classed as "spontaneous" (*asankharena*).

6. *Uprightness* (*ujukatā*, F49, 50) is opposed to insincerity, hypocrisy, etc. This factor excludes a state of consciousness from being called "good" when selfish secondary motives are hidden behind thoughts, words and deeds of moral significance. The inclusion of the factor Uprightness serves to emphasize that the ethical, i.e., karmic, quality of a state of consciousness is determined only by an unambiguous intention (*cetanā*). An example will make it clearer and will also show how the abstract, but penetrative, analysis of the Abhidhamma may be used for the practical purpose of an introspective scrutiny of motives, etc.: Let us suppose, a charitable act has the secondary or even the primary object of winning fame for the donor. Then that moment of consciousness in which the selfish motive appears, will be karmically unwholesome, being rooted in Greed and Delusion. But the state of consciousness accompanying the actual performance of the charitable act will be mostly karmically wholesome, because the actual forsaking of the object to be given away, will generally imply Non-Greed. This type of consciousness would probably have the following classification: "without (right) knowledge", being induced by desire for fame; "non-spontaneous", being preceded by deliberation referring to a secondary motive; probably, emotionally "indifferent", as there will be scarcely much joy in such a case. Through these classifications, the thought in question is included in the 8th Type of Wholesome Consciousness which is also, with regard to its quality, the last and lowest, though, in the case of



the other Types, the order of enumeration does not always correspond to the order of valuation.

### *Interrelation of the Six Pairs*

The Six Pairs are in mutual relations for which the following examples may suffice.

Tranquillity and Agility balance each other: Tranquillity is for Agility the moderating, Agility for Tranquillity the stimulating influence.

Pliancy is, as we have seen, a fundamental condition of Workableness, while the requirements of the latter set a limit to the desirable degree of Pliancy of Softness.

Uprightness prevents the Agility and Pliancy of mind from falling into insincerity; while Agility and Pliancy take care that Uprightness does not grow unimaginative and rigid, thus impairing the adaptability of wholesome consciousness to actuality.

Proficiency gives to Agility that sureness and smoothness of movement which comes from long practice. On the other hand, Agility, implying the capacity to admit modifications and changes, prevents that Proficiency becomes one-sided specialisation and an inflexible habit, thus limiting the adaptability as well as the potentialities of mind.

### *Verification of the Six Pairs in the Suttanta*

Only the pair of *Proficiency* could not be traced to the Suttanta. The abstract noun *pāguññatā* does, to our knowledge, not occur in it at all. The adjective *paṇṇa*, being more characteristic for a later period of Pali literature, is to be met only very rarely in the Sutta Pitaka, and in such insignificant contexts that our term will certainly not have been derived from these passages. It is possible that the Suttanta-use of *kusala*, resp. *kusalatā*, in the connotation of "skilful" (e.g., "skilful in the doctrine of the Aggregates etc.", *khandh'ādi-kusala*) might have contributed to the inclusion of that mental factor into the List, only under a different name.

We have already mentioned (p. 51) that *Tranquillity* occurs in the Sutta as a condition for the Factor of Absorption "Happiness", and as a Factor of Enlightenment (*bojjhanga*). In explaining the latter, both kinds of Tranquillity are mentioned in Samyutta Nikāya XLVI, No. 51: "There is, O Monks, a tranquillity of the mental factors (*kāya-passaddhi*) and a tranquillity of consciousness (*citta-passaddhi*).

The *Agility* or lightness (*lahutā*) of mind, in general, is spoken of in the following passage: "I do not know, O Monks, of any one thing that is as lightly changing (*lahuparivattam*) as mind (*cittam*)." (Angutt. Nik., *Eka-Nipāta*). This passage has certainly influenced the definition of our mental factor *lahutā*, in Dhammasangani §42, by *lahu-pariṇāmitā*, being synonymous with the Sutta term *lahu-parivattam*. The context of that brief Sutta passage from the Anguttara



Nikaya suggests that not only the general idea of the transitoriness of mind is implied in it, but also the particular aspect of its being capable of quick transformations or modifications, being a quality of mind which should be used in the service of moral and spiritual development. This quotation, namely, is preceded by the well-known passage, saying: "I do not know, O Monks, even of one thing, that, if developed and cultivated, is as pliant (*mudu*) and workable (*kammaññu*) as the mind." Therefore, we think to be justified in quoting that first passage as a source for our term also in its exclusive relation to wholesome consciousness.

An increased feeling of lightness (*lahuka-saññā*) is mentioned as being present when the Buddha employed his supernormal powers (*iddhi*): "When, O Ananda, the Exalted One subordinates the body to the mind, or the mind to the body, and a feeling of happiness and lightness descends on the body, at that time, O Ananda, is the body of the Exalted One lighter (*lahutaro*) and more pliant (*mudutaro*), better workable (*kammaniyataro*) and more luminous (*pabhassarataro*)" (Samy. Nik. LI, No. 22). In this and the previous passage, we find also other terms belonging to the Six Pairs. We shall refer to these quotations later on.

*Uprightness* is frequently mentioned in the Sutta as part of a compound formed with the balancing quality of *Pliancy*. In that compound slightly different expressions are used: *ajjava-maddava*, expressly explained in the commentary by *ujutā ca mudutā ca*. Here, however, *maddava* has not so much the psychological meaning of "pliancy of mind and concomitants", but has to be understood in the ethical sense of "gentleness", which however is intimately connected with the psychological faculty "Pliancy", as we have seen above (p. 52). This twofold concept, "straightness and gentleness", occurs, e.g., in the Anguttara Nikaya (*Duka-Nipāta*, No. 68), being probably the source for its inclusion into the compendium-like *Sangīti Sutta* of the Dīgha Nikaya, and into the Suttanta Duads of the Dhammasangani §§1339-1340. The definitions given in the latter text, relating to *ajjava-maddava*, agree to a great extent with those given for our two Pairs of *ujutā* and *mudutā*, in the same work (Dhs §§44, 45; 50, 51). Furthermore, these two terms (*ajjava-maddava*) appear in the Anguttara Nikaya (*Catukka Nipāta*, No. 112) among the four qualities of a noble horse, comparable to those of a noble monk, the other two qualities being "swiftness" (*java*) and "patience" (*khanti*). These latter two are likewise complementary qualities, corresponding to our factors Agility and Tranquillity. In the Sutta Nipāta we find: v. 250: "... delighted in straightness linked to gentleness" (*ajjava-maddave rato*); in v. 292, they are given as qualities of the noble Brahmins of old; in v. 143 (*Mettā Sutta*), synonymous expressions appear among the qualities of an ideal monk:

*Sakko ujū ca sūjū ca suvaco c' assa mudū anatimānī*

"Capable he be, and upright, upright fully well,  
Easily admonished, gentle and not haughty . . ."



The first part of this verse refers to firmness and strength, the second to gentleness of character. It furnishes an excellent, though mostly overlooked, example how, with regard to the formation of character too, the Buddha advocated a Middle Path on which seemingly contrary trends of character are harmonized into complementary qualities.

*Pliancy* and *Workableness* of mind are very frequently occurring in the Sutta, mostly mentioned together. We have already given above (p. 56) two passages and shall quote only two more:

“With a consciousness, thus purified and cleansed, without blemish and stain, *pl i a n t* and *w o r k a b l e*, steady and unshakable, he turns his mind to the extinction of passions” (Majjh. Nik., No. 51; first part is stereotyped, also in many other connections).

“There are, O Monks, five defilements of gold, owing to which gold is not *pl i a n t*, not *w o r k a b l e*, impure, brittle, and cannot well be wrought upon... Likewise, O Monks, there are those five defilements of mind, owing to which the mind is not pliant, not workable, impure, brittle, and cannot well concentrate upon the extinction of passions. Which are those five? Sensual Desire, Illwill, Rigidity and Sloth, Agitation and Worry, Scepticism,—these are the defilements of mind, owing to which...” (Samy. Nik. XLVI, No. 33).

Perhaps passages like the last one have not only been the source of the two Pairs of Pliancy and Workableness, but may also have stimulated the composition of the entire group of Six Pairs of qualitative factors and their inclusion in the List of Dhammas. We may also attribute it to the last-quoted passage when Atthasalini, in its treatment of the Six Pairs, frequently refers to the Five Hindrances (*nīvarana*), and when the Sub-Commentary (see p. ) uses the simile of the gold to illustrate the consistence of mind necessary for the purpose of spiritual development.

### *The Purification of Mind.*

Each wholesome thought, but particularly the systematic culture of mind (*bhāvanā*) is, as it were, a process of elimination and refinement by which the gold of consciousness is gradually freed from blemishes and alien dross, approaching in that way its genuine state of purity, spoken of by the Buddha in the following words:

“Pure (or: luminous, *pabhassaram*), O Monks, is this consciousness\*, but it is defiled by intruding (or: alien, *āgantukehi*) defilements; ... and it is (now) free from intruding defilements.” (Angutt. Nik., *Ekaka-Nipāta*).

Everything evil or unwholesome is to be viewed as the “intrusion of a foreign element” that disturbs by agitation the Tranquillity of mind, excludes by obstructing: its Agility, by hardening: its Pliancy, by unbalancing: its Workableness, by weakening: its Proficiency, by deflecting: its Uprightness. From that it follows that the Six Pairs of Qualitative Factors belong in their totality only to good consciousness,

\*explained by the Commentary as the subconscious mind (*bhavanā-citta*).



and only as an inseparable group they are included in the List. It might be objected that there is keen-witted Agility and adaptable Pliancy also in a crook when thinking of some fraud. But, in that case, these qualities are subservient to greed or hate, present in the same moment of consciousness, and, consequently, they will have a defiling effect on the mind of the evil-doer. Therefore they are not to be identified with the purifying qualities treated here. Besides, "Agitation" (*uddhacca*), being a constant factor in each case of unwholesome consciousness, will exclude the presence of Tranquillity, and also the other five Pairs would scarcely be complete in any unwholesome state of mind, owing to the action of the typically evil factors. Therefore, the Six Pairs in their totality, cannot enter unwholesome consciousness. But it is just the harmonious completeness (*sāmaggī*) of all the six pairs that gives to them their peculiar character and makes them typical aspects of good consciousness. Only if all of them are present, they will be able to exert their refining, tempering and balancing influence on the structure of a good state of consciousness. To be sure, they will not always be equally strong or perfectly balanced, but, in a minimal degree, they are present in each case of good consciousness (*sobhaṇa-sādhāraṇa*).

To contemplate the nature of these Six Pairs of Qualitative Factors will be of great practical help to those who strive for the purification of mind. In that contemplation, particular attention will have to be given to the balancing of these factors, as briefly dealt with in the paragraph about their interrelation (p. ). The Sutta about the qualities of a noble horse (see p. ) and other passages quoted above will show how the postulate of harmonization of character is inherent in the Buddhist Scriptures, also in cases where it is not expressly formulated in abstract terms. The balance of the Six Pairs is complementary to the "Harmony of the Spiritual Faculties" (*indriya-samatta*), the first referring to the formal or structural quality of consciousness, the latter to its actual functions.

In concluding this chapter, we wish to stress it again: that prominent feature of the Buddha's teaching, its being a Middle Path, refers not only to transcending the extremes of thought and conduct but has to be applied also to the formation and transformation of character.



## 11. The Helpers

(*upakāra*ka, F51, 52.)

## 12. The Pairwise Combination

(*yuganaddha*, F53, 54)

We suggest that the intention in including these two groups has been to show that the mental factors present in any wholesome state of consciousness which is associated with knowledge, opens the chance of practising different methods of spiritual development (*bhāvanā*) for which two examples are given here. They exemplify the *potentialities* of the respective wholesome thought which belong as much as its actualities to the dynamic structure of a state of consciousness.

We have derived the name of *Helpers* (*upakāra*ka), given here to *Mindfulness* (*sati*) and *Mental Clarity* (*sampajañña*), from *Atthasalini* (p. 131 : *upakāra*-*vasena*) and from the *Mūla-Tīkā*. These two factors refer to the practice of the *Satipatthana*-Method. *Mūla-Tīkā* makes a noteworthy comment, expressing well the character of *Satipatthana* as *The Only and Unique Way* (*ekāyano* maggo): "These two factors (*sati*-*sampajañña*) are 'helpers' (*upakāra*ka) for any meditator, in any subject of meditation and at any time, because they remove obstacles and enhance spiritual development."

*Calm* (*samatha*) and *Insight* (*vipassanā*) are the two complementary parts of Buddhist mental culture. They also signify the different starting points for meditative practice, to be chosen according to the disposition of the disciple (*samatha*- or *vipassanā*-*yānika*, i.e., having *Calm* or *Insight* as vehicle). Finally, they are the two main headings under which the traditional subjects of meditation may be classified. Though all these points may well be considered in this connexion, in *Atthasalini*, however, these two factors are viewed as phases of a particular method of meditation, called the *Pairwise Combination* (*yuganaddha*). This name has been given to it, because in that method periods of *Calm* alternate with periods of *Insight*. When, in the phase of *Calm*, e.g., the *First Absorption* (*jhāna*) has been attained, then the meditator does not enter at once the *Second Absorption*, nor does he endeavour to do so, but he inserts now a period of *insight* (*vipassanā*) which consists in a discerning retrospection to the past meditative experience, i.e., the phenomena appearing in that jhanic consciousness are viewed as impermanent, unsatisfactory and impersonal. This alternation of *Calm* and *Insight* is continued either through the whole sequence of *Absorptions*, or until, in the course of it, one of the *Stages of Sanctity* (*ariya*-*magga*) is reached.



### 13. The Last Duad

(*pitṭhi duka*, F55, 56).

The two components of this group, Exertion (*paggāha*) and Undistractedness (*avikkhepa*) have already been frequently mentioned before, under various synonyms or aspects. There would not have been any need to repeat them again, if not for the purpose to point out for a last time that these two factors are the fundamental requirements of spiritual progress. By joining them into a separate group it is emphasized that they should not only be strong singly, but that they ought to be well balanced with regard to each other. It is the harmony of the two Spiritual Faculties "Energy" and "Concentration" (cf. *indriya-samatta*, p. ), in other words The Middle Path, which is here stressed again. This explanation is confirmed by Atthasalini (p. 131): "These two terms have been included in order to express the union of Energy and Concentration (*virīya-samādhī-yojanatthāya*)." The Sub-Commentary adds: "Because these two factors are evenly joined (*samañ-yuttā*) sluggishness as well as agitation are absent in every wholesome state of consciousness."

It should, however, be noted that both factors may appear also in unwholesome consciousness where, in different "environment", their karmic quality and their application are, of course, likewise different.



## 14. The Supplementary Factors

(*ye-vā-panaka*, F57-65)

The concluding passage in our text, called in Atthasalini "the addition" (*appanā*), runs as follows: "These, or whatsoever (*ye vā paṇa*) other conditionally arisen, uncorporeal phenomena there are at that time, these phenomena are karmically wholesome." Hereby supplementations of the List are admitted, implying that the enumeration of mental factors given in it, is not to be regarded as exhaustive. Such additions have, in fact, been supplied by the Commentaries (see Asl. p. 131 f.) and have been named "the whatsoever-factors" (*ye-vā-panakā*), in allusion to the above-quoted passage. Atthasalini mentions that these factors "are to be found in various passages of the Suttanta."

The nine Supplementary Factors which may appear in good consciousness can be seen from the table, p. . There are another seven factors\*) which occur only in unwholesome Consciousness, in addition to the first three of the set of nine. All of them have been incorporated into the condensed and systematical version of the List of Dhammas, as given in Visuddhi Magga and Abhidhammattha-Sangaha. The first three factors—Intention (*chanda*), Decision (*adhimokkha*) and Attention (*manasikāra*)—have rather important places in that later version of the List: "Attention" belongs to the seven Factors common to all Consciousness (*sabbacittasādhāraṇa*); "Decision" appears in 78 of the 89 types of consciousness; and "Intention" too is one of the most frequently occurring factors. All three of them are mentioned in that earliest List of Dhammas given in the Anupada Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya (see p. ). In particular, the factor Attention has been very prominent in the Sutta period. It is mentioned as one of the three typical representatives of the Aggregate of Mental Formations (*saṅkhāra-khandha*), e.g., in the *Sammā-Diṭṭhi Sutta* (Majjh. 9) †) which is likewise ascribed to that great early *Abhidhammika*, the Elder Sariputta: "Feeling, perception, volition, sense-impression and attention,—this, O brethren, is called mind (*nāma*)." Also in postcanonical books, e.g., *Milinda Pañhā* and *Netti Pakarāṇa*, Attention is mentioned (see p. ). In view of all these facts, it is surprising that not at least "Attention" has been included in our List. Considering the prominent place taken by this mental factor in the Canon, oversight has to be excluded and an intentional omission to be assumed, also in the case of the other Supplementary Factors. But we have not been able to form any convincing opinion about the reasons. Obviously, in the first composition of the List, these factors must have been thought to be dispensable, but have again been admitted by the later redactors.

\*) i.e., Agitation (constant in all unwholesome states), Envy, Avarice, Rigidity, Sloth, Doubt and Conceit.

†) See "Right Understanding" (*Sammādiṭṭhi*), Discourse and Commentary, Translation with Introduction by Bhikkhu Soma; Colombo 1946, Buddhist Literature Society (Buddha Sahitya Sabha).



It might be of interest to compare in this respect the Lists of Dhammas which were composed by later Buddhist Schools. In the Lists of both, the hinayanistic Sarvastivadins (Vaibhasika) and the mahayanistic Vijnanavadins, the three neutral Supplementary Factors (Intention, Decision and Attention) and the unwholesome ones are present. In the List of the Sarvastivadins, the three neutral ones are included among the "factors common to all consciousness" (called there *mahābhūmika*), differing in that respect from the Theravadins who admit only Attention to that group. The Vijnanavadins, agreeing in that point with the Pali List, have relegated Decision and Intention to a group of inconstant neutral factors.

This concludes the treatment of the single groups forming the List of Dhammas in the Dhammasangani.



## 15. Graduations of Intensity among Parallel Factors

Having dealt with the single groups among which the various parallel factors appear, we may now point to some facts showing that the multiple enumeration of apparently identical factors serves also to express a difference of intensity or quality. To our knowledge these facts, as registered in the following table, have not yet been noticed. There is no mention of them in Atthasalini and *Mūla-Tīkā*, and also not in any later literature as far as it could be established.

If we take a set of parallel factors, e.g.:

Mental One-pointedness, Faculty and Power of Concentration,  
Path Factor of Concentration (Right and Wrong), Calm and  
Undistractedness,—

and if we look for their definitions, as given after each principal sentence of the Dhammasangani, then we shall find that these definitions are almost identical for all these parallel factors, in nearly all cases of occurrence. There are only the following differences: in unwholesome consciousness, Right Concentration is replaced by Wrong Concentration in the text of the definition itself and not only in the enumeration of factors; In supermundane consciousness (*lokuttara*) the Factor of Enlightenment "Concentration" (*samādhi-sambojjhaṅga*) is added. These divergences do not refer to differing intensity. But one case of a varying definition does, and it is unique, in this respect, among all other factors: in the case of 17 weak types of consciousness (see the foll. table), the definition of Mental One-pointedness, usually composed of ten terms, stops with the first term "stability" (*thiti*). If we would judge only by comparing the definitions, the last-mentioned single exception would only prove the general rule that no differentiation as to intensity is intended, among the parallel factors. But the definitions in Dhammasangani are not a sufficient criterion as they are rather rigid stock formulas undergoing only those very few changes mentioned above. Due to their rigidity, even some minor inconsistencies between the definitions and the structure of the respective states of consciousness do occur, as we shall see later on. Therefore, for deciding the question as to degrees of intensity among parallel factors, we shall also have to examine and to compare the actual occurrence or omission of those quasi-synonyms in the single states of consciousness. There is only one set of parallel factors, beginning with Mental One-pointedness (see above), which allows to survey, in that respect, the whole field of consciousness (i.e., wholesome, unwholesome, karma-resultant and functional). We supplement it by one variation occurring in the case of Energy (*virīya*) and tabulate the result as follows:



# 64 GRADUATIONS OF INTENSITY AMONG PARALLEL FACTORS

Type of Consciousness		Parallel Factors	
Tab. No. *	Description	present	absent
32	unwholesome, associated with doubt	Mental One-ptd. (defined only by "stability")	Concentration as Faculty, Power, Path Factor, Calm, Undistractedness.
34-38 } 50-54 }	5 sense-perception † }	do	do
39-55	Receiving of that sense perception; resultant †)	do	do
40	Investigating and Registering (joyful)	do	do
54-56	Investigating and Registering (indifferent); Rebirth & Death-Consc., Subconsciousness †)	do	do
70	functional: Adverting to the 5 sense object	do	do
71	functional: Adverting to sense-& mind-objects; Deciding	(a) One-ptd. (complete definition); Concentration as Faculty; (b) Faculty of Energy	Concentr. as Power, and Path Factor; Calm; Undistractedness.  Power of Energy; Effort as Path Factor; Exertion.
72	functional: the state of mirth in an Arahat	do	do

This tabulation permits the following conclusions:

(1) Among the set of parallel factors, denoting "Concentration", three degrees of intensity are noticeable:

- (a) Mental One-pointedness, standing alone; in that case, its definition is always limited to "stability", signifying the weakest degree of concentration; see Tab. No. 32ff.
- (b) Mental One-pointedness, joined only by the Faculty of Concentration, as in Tab. No. 71, 72; the definition has nevertheless the complete number of terms).
- (c) Mental One-pointedness, with the entire set of parallel factors.

(2) In the case of Energy (*virīya*), there are only two graduations of intensity; there is no weaker degree of it than the Indriya-aspect, as

\*) See Nyanatiloka's Table of the Five Khandhas (Obtainable from "Island Hermitage", Dodanduwa, Ceylon).

†) twofold, as resultants of wholesome or unwholesome Karma.



Energy is not a general factor like Mental One-pointedness. This implies: Energy has always a certain controlling influence, but Mental One-pointedness, in its weakest state, has not. The two graduations are:

- (a) Faculty of Energy, standing alone, as in Tab. No. 71;
- (b) " " " , with the entire set of parallel factors;

(3) According to the use of the two terms in the Abhidhamma, the Faculty-aspect of a quality may be present without the Power-aspect. This applies, however, only to the case of the two ethically neutral Faculties, "Concentration" and "Energy", and occurs only in two types of consciousness (Tab. No. 71, 72). This implies: the three exclusively wholesome Faculties (Faith, Mindfulness and wisdom) appear always together with their Power-aspect.

(4) The Powers, Path Factors, Calm, Exertion and Undistractedness occur exclusively (a) in karmic consciousness (wholesome and unwholesome), (b) in those "strong" karma-resultant (*vipāka*) and functional (*kriya*) states which correspond in their structure exactly to the eight wholesome karmic types; they are the 8 main resultants of wholesome Karma (*mahā-vipāka*) and the eight functionally-active states occurring only in the Arahat (*kriya-javana*).

If the facts tabulated above, and especially our conclusions (1) - (3), had been noticed, they would certainly have been mentioned in Atthasalini. These facts, namely, would have necessitated more differentiated definitions as those given in Atthasalini, with regard to Mental One-pointedness and to the Faculties and Powers of Concentration and Energy, taking into consideration the above graduations of intensity.

The cases of separate occurrence of the Faculties, without the Powers, cannot be explained by an unintentional omission of the Power-aspect by scribes, because we are able to check here the correctness of the textual tradition through reference to the Chapter of Summary (*saṅgaha-vāra*) in the Dhammasaṅgani, where always the number of Faculties, Powers, etc. is listed.

The definitions in Dhammasaṅgani include the different aspects, i.e., the parallels, of the respective factors. But when comparing them with their actual occurrence in the given state of consciousness as shown in the List, some minor inconsistencies between definition and List are to be found: In Tab. No. 71, 72, the definition of Mental One-pointedness includes the Faculty as well as the Power of Concentration, but the latter is not present in these types as a separate factor, as the above table shows; there is a corresponding divergence in the case of the Faculty, resp. the Power of Energy. This illustrates our previous remark that the definitions cannot be used as a sole criterion for determining the quality of the respective factor.

The facts pointed out in this chapter contribute to support our thesis that the multiple enumeration of mental factors in the List is not merely a dispensable elaboration, but that each parallel factor has a more or less important individual significance, partly in various respects.



## 16. Concluding Remarks

These investigations started from the question: Why is the List of Dhammas in the Dhammasangani filled with so many quasi-synonyms, and what purpose do these synonyms serve? This leads to the other question: Are there any reasons for making still use of these original, somewhat cumbersome Lists, after their handy abbreviation and systematization in the Visuddhi-Magga and the Abhidhammattha-Sangaha?

The answer to these questions may now be given in the following summary of our investigations.

The enumeration of parallel factors has an individual and a relational significance; i.e., it concerns, firstly, the particular nature of the single factor itself, and, secondly, the various connexions or relations of that factor.

### I. Individual significance

(1) The multiple enumeration illustrates the *different functions and ways of application of a single quality*. This is the only explanation given in Atthasalini (see p. 12ff.); all the others which follow are inferences and conclusions drawn from a close examination of the sources.

From the point of view of a theoretical and abstract psychology, the inclusion of mere functions and aspects may appear as superfluous or even as a proof of "loose thinking" and of "unscientific procedure". But for the ultimately practical, i.e., spiritual, purposes of Buddhist psychology it is most essential to stress the several important functions and applications of qualities. But, even theoretically, the more advanced psychology of our own days recognizes this procedure, e.g., in those succinctly coined words of *Prof. James Ward* which have been chosen as a motto to this treatise: "A difference in aspects is a difference in things." This is a remarkable approach to the dynamic psychology of the Abhidhamma.

(2) The multiple enumeration, makes it possible to register varying *degrees of intensity* in the actual functioning of a single factor. See the last Chapter "Graduations of Intensity."

### II. Relational significance

(1) The multiple enumeration, together with the arrangement into groups, show the *internal relations* of a factor, i.e., its variegated connexions with other factors present in the same moment of consciousness. These internal relations include: common functions, e.g., the controlling function of the Faculties; common purposes, e.g., the liberating purpose of the Path Factors. This implies two postulates of great practical importance: the postulate of the co-operation of several factors for the achievement of a common purpose of a worldly or spiritual nature; further, the postulate of the supplementation and harmonization of isolated qualities, wrongly conceived and practised as opposing forces, instead of complementary ones.



(2) The multiple enumeration and the arrangement into groups suggests, by implication, to pursue and to investigate the *external relations* of factors and groups; i.e., the connexion of a given moment of consciousness to past and future ones. This includes the close investigation of the conditioned as well as of the conditioning nature of a single state of consciousness,—a task which has to be undertaken with help of the terminological tools provided in the Paṭṭhāna. The conditioned nature of a phenomenon points to its external relations to the past, while the conditioning aspect draws the attention to the external relations extending to the future. But it should be kept in mind that in both cases also internal relations are involved, i.e., conditions obtaining in the present, (support, mutuality, etc.).

(3) The multiple enumeration and the arrangement into groups may help to find out the *potentialities* of a factor, or a group, or of the entire state of consciousness. Properly, this point is already included in the last-mentioned one, namely in the external relations extending to the future. But, for the sake of emphasis, it is mentioned here, separately. *In order to do full justice to the dynamic nature of consciousness, not only its actual functions, but also its inherent potentialities have to be considered.* Particularly in Buddhist psychology which is, or should be, completely subservient to the practical task of spiritual development, it is imperative to look out for the “seeds” embedded in a given situation; i.e., to examine whether a state of mind possesses the potentiality for the good and better or for the bad and worse. To give an example: an *actual*, but limited, control wielded by the Spiritual Faculties implies the *potential* increase of that control; an *actual*, but weak, liberating influence exercised by the Path Factors implies the *potential* strengthening of their liberating effect. Besides, potentiality means sometimes that the respective state of mind *gravitates* to the direction indicated by the “potentiality”. Therefore, by giving due attention to the “potentiality”, one may foresee future developments and either assist or counter them, in time.

These and other considerations will show that the elaborate original version of the List of Dhammas, as given in the Dhammasangani, is not in the least rendered superfluous by its condensation in the Visuddhi-Magga and its systematization in the Abhidhammattha-Sangaha. To be sure, neither the reverse shall be suggested here: that those later versions should be abolished in favour of the original one. Their handiness is a great advantage, and in many cases it will be fully sufficient to make use of them, instead of the elaborate original. These later versions have also made the valuable contribution of incorporating the Supplementary Factors. On the other hand, it has to be regretted that, to our knowledge, the use of the original and canonical Lists has, in later Abhidhamma literature, been completely superseded by the condensed version. Owing to that, several important and fruitful lines of thoughts have been left undeveloped which are implied in the particular features of the original version, or derivable from it. There is, e.g., the arrangement of the factors into groups which has been particularly emphasized in these pages. Having been nearly obliterated in the later



condensed versions of the List, it should be given its deserving place again. The arrangement into groups is not only relevant with regard to the details of the subject matter, but it is also of great general and methodical importance. By grouping, namely, a synthetical or relational element has been introduced into the pre-eminently analytical Dhammasangani. It serves as a corrective and as a complementary principle. This is required, because—as we already said at the beginning of this treatise—a composite thing is not yet sufficiently described if only its single parts are enumerated separately, without due attention to their internal and external relations. If wheels, axle, carriage, etc., are being placed separately on the ground, they cannot be called “a cart”. Only if the parts of a whole are shown in their purposeful combination, if not in their actual operation, are we dealing with realities and not with artificial abstractions. In our analytical endeavours we should never forget the fundamental, though temporal, “unity of experience”, i.e., the internal relations, and the greater “unity of the continuous flux”, i.e., the external relations. This should be always remembered by those engaged in the study of the Abhidhamma.

In investigating the ingenious combination of the analytical and synthetical method in Buddhist philosophy, only a modest beginning has been made here. These pages wish to be an appeal that research in that direction may be continued. For those who want to do this work thoroughly, a tremendous preliminary labour is waiting: to convert the abstract formulas of the Paṭṭhāna into terms of actuality, by giving, for the relations treated there, concrete examples in a sufficiently comprehensive selection.

---



## IV

## ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF TIME

## 1. Time and Consciousness

The schema of the Dhammasangani—"At a time when..." (see p. )—implies the close connection between time and consciousness, being described as a mutual relation in a verse quoted in Atthasalini:

"Through Time the Sage described the Mind,  
And through Mind he defined the Time;  
So that, after such definition was given,  
He may expound now the things according to their  
divisions."

*Samaye niddisi cittam cittena samayam muni  
niyametvāna dīpetum dhamme tattha pabhedato.* (p. 57)

The state of consciousness, classified in the first part of the schema-sentence of Dhammasangani (see page ), is, in its existence, *limited*, as well as *described* by Time. The duration of that mind-defining time-period is circumscribed by the simultaneity of the single mental factors, enumerated in the second part of the sentence ("...at that time there is:..."). In other words, a state of consciousness lasts as long as the combination of its single factors. This represents the *limitation* of consciousness by time. Its *description* too is only possible by reference to time, namely just to the temporary simultaneity of the single factors. But on the other hand, these mental factors, in other words: the internal relations, determine, on their part, the time, by furnishing the measure of the time-unit which consists just in the duration of that temporary combination of factors. The conclusion to be drawn from that mutual relation between Time and Consciousness, may be formulated in the words of *Bertrand Russell*: "We cannot give what may be called *absolute* dates, but only dates determined by events. We cannot point to a time itself, but only to some event occurring at that time." ("Our Knowledge of the External World") Our Commentator (Atthasalini p. 58) expresses the same idea when, in explaining the word *samaya* (rendered in our translation, p. , by "time"), he says: "Chronological time (*kālo*), denoted by reference to this or that (event) is merely a conventional expression... As it has no existence in itself (or: cannot be found in reality) one has to understand it as a mere concept." (*Tam tam upādāya paññatto kālo vohāramattako... so pan'esa sabhāvato avijjamānattā paññattimattako evā'ti veditabbo.*)

But "chronological time" (*kālo*=*pavatti-kālo*, "duration") is only the first of five meanings which, according to Atthasalini, the term *samaya* expresses in the case of our Dhs-sentence. The other meanings are as follows:

(2) **C O N C U R R E N C E** (*samavāyā*) of circumstances, i.e., the completeness of conditions (*paccaya-sāmaggī*) necessary for the occurrence of the respective state of consciousness. E.g., for the arising of visual



consciousness are required: visual organ, visual object, light, attention, etc.—This meaning of *samaya* relates the given moment of consciousness to the present, i.e., to co-existing conditions.

(3) **Condition** (*hetu*), i.e., the combination of those Modes of Conditionality which are operative in the respective case. E.g., for visual consciousness, the visual organ and object are conditions by way of pre-nascence (*purejāta-paccaya*); visual consciousness (*dassana*) is related to the preceding perceptual phase of incipient attention (*āvaijana*, “adverting the mind”) by way of immediate contiguity (*samanantara-paccaya*); for the subsequent phases of that visual experience, the visual consciousness is a condition by way of Inducement (*upanissaya*), Object (*ārammaṇa*), Predominance (*adhipati*) etc.—This meaning of *samaya* relates to all three divisions of time. The future is likewise included, because every state of consciousness is not only conditioned, but is itself a condition of subsequent states.

(4) **The right Moment** (*khaṇa*) refers only to wholesome consciousness. It means: the right occasion for additional wholesome activity for which the present moment of wholesome consciousness is capable of being an inducement, a support and starting-point. Whether this “right moment” is utilized or whether the potentialities inherent in it are lost, this is dependent on the present or absent awareness of that opportunity.—This connotation of *samaya* refers only to the future.

(5) **Aggregation** (*samūha*), i.e., the momentary union of the single components of consciousness, being the “constellation” which determines the psychological time, just as the constellation of stars defines the astrological time of birth.—This meaning of *samaya* refers only to the present.

The simultaneity of mental factors referred to above, is not a static juxtaposition of self-contained units, as in a mosaic. Their simultaneity results rather from different processes of psychic movements, meeting temporarily in the constellation of the present moment, overlapping each other partly, but without achieving complete congruity, just as there are also no truly congruent triangles in nature.

A glance into the “antecedents” and the subsequent “life-story” of the factors of a single moment of consciousness will show us (1) that the simultaneity of these factors has to be conceived as something fluid and not static, (2) simultaneous factors, as far as they are variable (non-constant), meet each other at quite different stages of their own “life-history”: Some factors might already have been parts of precedent moments, but are disappearing with the dissolution of the present one; some arise only now and re-occur in future moments; and again; the life-time of others may be limited to this moment only. Such a differentiation is certainly of significance, just as it makes a difference whether we meet with certain people or ideas in youth, manhood, or old-age.



The fact that parts of other moments of consciousness may, as it were, spread over the present one or extend beyond it, makes for an intricate interlacing and a close organic continuity in the world of mental things. There are no "empty spaces", no disconnected events in the universe of the mind, though the connection may often be very loose and remote. Even if a psychic event breaks in quite unexpectedly, it does not arise from nothingness but is related to a, perhaps distant, past which is bridged over by subconscious mental processes. Here we meet again the "third dimension" of mind, its "depth" with regard to time, to which we referred already before (p. ). A minimum of psychic continuity is always given at least by the seven "factors common to all consciousness". But we have also to keep in mind the element of diversity in those seven factors. In their repeated occurrence they are not identical in the strict sense, but are greatly variegated when viewed in their actual manifestations. They are "common" factors only as concepts, abstracted from actuality for the purpose of methodical exposition. But, nevertheless, there is enough (relative) identity in them to serve for maintaining the continuity of the mental process. Also with regard to the forementioned connexion of an unexpected event to its conditions in the past, we must not forget the element of diversity. Taking this in account we have spoken intentionally of the event as being related to a past event, and not as being caused by it which will happen only in certain cases. Otherwise we should land in complete determinism, resulting in the view of a static world. Though there are, in the strict sense, no completely new events, there also no fully identical repetitions in the material and mental universe. The truth is in the middle, i.e.; in the Middle Path of Dependent Origination: "Both these two extremes the Perfect One has avoided and has shown the Middle Doctrine (*majjhena dhammam*) which says: On Ignorance depend the Karma-Formations. . . " (Samy. Nik. XII, 35) That is to say, the Middle Path of the Buddha appears here as the law of conditionality, as the fact of correlation which is really implied when we speak, somewhat vaguely, of continuity. It is, in fact, the energy inherent in the conditions (*paccaya-satti*) which creates what is called continuity or continuum.

To effect continuity, is a prominent function of consciousness that was recognized already in Atthasalini. Among the traditional categories of definition, the "manifestation" (*paccupatthāna*) of consciousness is said to be "connecting" (*sandahana*) which is explained as follows: "Consciousness presents itself as 'connecting', because when any later state of consciousness arises, it does so in immediate succession of the preceding state; therefore is 'connecting' its manifestation." (p. 112) \*

\*) This holds good also of subconsciousness (*bhavanga*). The word *anga* in the compound *bhavanga* is usually explained in the Commentaries by *karana*, "cause"; accordingly the entire term would mean literally "cause (or condition) of (continued) existence". But we should like to suggest that *anga* may here as well have the alternative meaning of "link", and, consequently, *bhavanga* would signify "link of existence".



This implies that each state of consciousness is "open" to the past as well as towards the future: it has "depth" in time. Consequently, a moment of consciousness has no rigid boundaries, but nevertheless it does not lack distinctive "individuality",—in the same way as the point of intersection of several multicoloured beams of light shows a characteristic mixture of colours. The shade of this combination of colours will change at once if only one of these beams of light moves in a different direction or varies its intensity. Likewise, when a change of direction or intensity occurs in the case of the components of consciousness, the "colour" of the subsequent mental state will be different. Apart from the divergent past and future "life-story" of the single components of consciousness, also in the point of their intersection, i.e., in the given moment of consciousness, there is no motionless stability or self-identity. A single moment too moves through three phases: (1) the Arising (*uppāda*) or the nascent state (2) the (relative) Stability (*thiti*) or state of continuation, which may be understood as the point of culmination of the respective process or as the point of the closest contact in the temporary combination of mental factors, (3) the gradual Dissolution (*bhanga*) of that combination. In other words, these three phases represent the approaching and departing movement in the mutual relationship of the mental concomitants. It corresponds to the changes occurring in that greater temporary combination, called "personality", and in the still greater one of society where a similar rhythm may be observed. We have spoken of it previously as the alternating process of assimilation and dissimilation.

Here, in this context, our purpose was only to explain the first statement of the commentarial stanza (p. 69): "Through Time the Sage has described the Mind. . ." We have found that this statement has a twofold meaning: Firstly, a moment of consciousness is limited in its duration by the simultaneity of its concomitants, and only by that simultaneity of factors a description of it can be given; secondly, a moment of consciousness, in its full significance, i.e., with all its implications, can only be explained in terms of time, i.e. by referring to all three divisions of time, viz: past, present and future. Because of the conditioned nature of consciousness, no present mental state is self-sufficient or self-explanatory.

The second statement of the stanza says: ". . . through Mind he defined the Time." That is to say, the *time* mentioned in the second part of the Dhs-sentence (i.e. the duration of the mental factors in their momentary combination) is referred to, and thereby defined by, the state of *consciousness* as classified in the first part of the sentence. Here, time is "denoted by reference to" consciousness (cf. *upādāya paññatto kālo*; p. 69). But quite apart of the denotation and definition of the particular time-period in terms of consciousness, time in general can be conceived only as the conscious experience of it. This subjective, or better, psychological character of time becomes particularly distinct when time seems to pass either very slowly or very quickly; slow, in a mental state of dulness or expectancy; quick in the case of interesting activity or mental absorption. Other examples for the deciding influ-



ence of the psychological factor in our experience of time are the contraction of time in dream as well as in the flash-like retrospection on one's entire life in the face of death. It is also evident that there will be a different time-experience and time-value in the life of an ephemera, a dog, a man and a 200 years' old tortoise. To the insect living but a single day, the morning, noon and evening of that day will have the same significance as childhood, maturity and old-age have for man. Each creature, at the end of its life span, will have the feeling to have lived a "full life", irrespective of the number of the hypothetical, "objective" time-units. *William James* says in his "Principles of Psychology": "We have every reason to think that creatures may possibly differ enormously in the amount of duration which they intuitively feel." We may tentatively say that time-value or time-experience is dependent on the intensity of consciousness and on the life span, the first being a more "subjective", the other a more "objective" factor. This shows again the interweaving of these two forces—subjectivation and objectivation — in each aspect of life, illustrated by us previously through the internal and external relations present in each moment of consciousness.

The above examples for the psychological character of time suggest that there exist different planes of time in correspondence to different levels of consciousness. A few provisional remarks relating to it are given in the following chapter.



## 2. Planes of Time.

“It is now held that each series of events has its own time order, and it is difficult to relate the one to the other since there is no common standard time.”

*Jeans, “The Mysterious Universe”*

In view of our observations in the last chapter it seems that the Buddhist teaching about the relativity of time is not limited merely to the statement that time is a relational concept, related to, and inseparable from, the events occurring in it. By way of inference we may assume that Buddhist philosophy does also acknowledge different planes of time, though they are not mentioned *in abstracto*. This puts the relativity of time on a still wider basis.

Any phase, or aspect, of any life process has the inherent potentiality of an increase or decrease in the scale of its varying intensity, extending far beyond the horizon of the respective point of observation. Science has shown that there are sound-and light-waves beyond our perceptual capacity, to be ascertained by deduction, experiment, or by an apparatus more sensitive than our human sensorium. In the same way, we cannot suppose that time is limited to the radius of the human time experience and that there is no increase or decrease in its intensity. There are certainly time-planes below and above the range of average human consciousness which may likewise be either inferred by deductive methods, or actually experienced in the “experimental situation” of meditative practice in which the range and sensitivity of average consciousness may be greatly expanded.

In the Buddhist Pali literature we have met so far only two examples of express references to different time-planes and these are extreme cases below and above average time experience. The circumstance that they are extreme cases might be accidental and to be attributed to the author’s still uncompleted survey of the Scriptures under that point of view; or it may be explained by the fact that the differentiation as to time levels will be more evident in such extreme cases and cannot be neglected when the respective phenomena are investigated. These two cases are (1) matter, (2) the meditative Attainment of Cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*).

(1) Matter.—In the post-canonical Abhidhamma literature it is mentioned that the general duration of a material phenomenon is that of 16 moments of consciousness,—in other words, one material time-unit equals 16 mental time-units of average human consciousness. The number of 16 moments should not be taken as a definite time measure, the less so as also the unit of one moment of consciousness is only metaphorically defined as “the billionth part of a flash of lightning.” It is only the ratio of 1: 16, i.e. a comparative relation, which is expressed here. In the same way, a complete process of five-sense perception (*pañcadvāra-vīthi*) has been hypothetically determined as lasting 16



moments\*), in order to fix the proportional duration of the single phases of that process, e.g., Impulsion (*javana*) occupying seven of these sixteen. It is most probably with intention that the relative duration of a material unit has been determined as equalling that of a complete perceptual process, i.e., 16 moments. The choice of the number 16 might have been influenced by the fact that, in India, "sixteen" was and is a very popular measuring unit of space, time etc., and is also frequently used in metaphorical speech. †) A Westerner with his decimal system, would have chosen "ten" as a starting point for distributing proportional values.

By the ratio 1: 16, an estimate of the relative velocity of corporeal and mental processes is given, the first being considerably slower than the latter. The Commentary to Vibhanga says: "In corporeal things change is difficult and cessation slow, in mental things change is easy and cessation quick."

To circumscribe in that way the time rhythm of corporeal things in terms of consciousness is justified (1) by the second definitory principle laid down in the commentarial stanza: "Through Mind he defined the Time"; (2) by the close connexion between Time and Consciousness corresponding to the connexion between Space and Matter. But there is yet a third point which is important to remember when material processes are referred to, or explained by, mental ones: It is a fundamental idea of Buddhist philosophy that there cannot be existence of matter without a karmic consciousness desiring life in a material world. "If, O Ananda, there would be no Karma maturing in the Sensuous Sphere, could sensuous existence (*kāma-bhava*) appear?—Truly not, O Lord." (Angutt. III, 76).

This, of course, must not be taken to imply an idealistic conclusion, because Mind, like all component things, is a conditioned phenomenon and cannot be regarded as a sole cause, be it of matter or of anything else. But, avoiding the extreme beliefs in a primary matter or a primary mind, we may say that both matter and mind are manifestations of karmic energy, in varying distance from the culminating point of that energy. We may also express it in that way that around the centre of generative karmic energy, several peripheric circles are revolving. As closest to the centre we have to imagine the karma-resultants proper (*vipāka*) which are only mental states. It follows now the circle of that matter which is directly produced by Karma (*kammaja*—or *kamasamutthāna-rūpa*), being only one division of matter in general. After that comes matter produced by consciousness (*citta-samutthāna*), by food (*āhāra-samutthāna*) and by physical influences, as temperature etc. (*utu-samutthāna*). The latter too, though most distant from the

\*) leaving aside the preceding moment during which the object existed without being perceived (*atitam ekacittakkhanam*) which properly does not belong to the *vithi* itself.

†) See, e.g., the well-known passage in *Itivuttaka*: "Just as the light of the stars is in its value not the sixteenth part of the light of the moon, likewise all those meritorious actions forming the basis (of rebirth) are, in their value not the sixteenth part of Love, the Liberation of Heart."



centre, must be assumed to have still its connexion with the karmic force.

Though the rhythm of matter is so much slower than that of mind, the life-time of a single material unit is still not within the range of our direct perception, as little as that of a mental unit. But nevertheless it is due to that increase in duration that the continua of anorganic matter which are directly perceptible, produce the impression of relative constancy. And this impression of the constancy of matter, linked with the innate human longing for permanency, has not only allowed the poet's mind, so sensitive to the fleetness of short-lived things, to find a spell of soothing rest in the contemplation of the "eternal hills", but it was also responsible for the theories about primary matter and for the belief in an objective and abiding material world. The probability that this our earth may still be there, long after after all human, animal and plant life has ceased to exist, is only in degree, but not essentially, different from such evident facts as that the work may survive the worker, an effect its cause etc.

(2) The Attainment of Cessation.—While matter exists on a time-level, or better, changes in a time-rhythm, slower than that of mind, comparable with the infra-red of the spectrum, there are also vibrations, corresponding to the ultraviolet rays, which are so completely beyond the range of average human consciousness that in the Buddhist psychology of meditative experience they are only spoken of in terms of negation and exclusion similar to Nibbana. We refer here to the Meditative Attainment of Cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*), by which the temporary cessation of perception and feeling (*saññā-vedayita-nirodha*) is implied. As between any two points in the Round of Samsara, there are also gradual transitions to that highly abstract, ultra-conscious state. These transitions are the four Non-corporeal Absorptions (*āruppa*). Here the rate of mental vibrations is already so intensified as to interrupt temporarily the contact with the world of matter and its peculiar time-rhythm. This temporary interruption may refer either to the brief periods of meditative Absorption in the case of a human meditator, or to an inconceivable life-span, in the case of a rebirth in the Uncorporeal Worlds (*arūpa-loka*).

Just in this context namely, it deserves to be remembered that what is now an exceptional meditative experience, may, if the affinity to that experience is sufficiently strong, become the normal status in a new existence. Peripheral events may become the centre, and exceptions the rule of a new life in a higher or a lower sphere. The territories of the Samsaric spheres have fluid boundaries. "Neighbouring" spheres may widely overlap. The human life, e.g., is in certain aspects, but constantly, regulated by laws pertaining to the realm of matter, to the vegetable and animal kingdom. The human mind requires the regular tidal movement between the peak of its strenuous activity during the day and its subsidence into the subconsciousness of sleep. The interpenetration with higher regions, surpassing average human consciousness, is much less extensive and much more seldom. There are those rare contacts with the realm of higher spirituality and intensified con-



consciousness: in meditation, religious inspiration, artistic intuition etc., followed too quickly by a relapse into the relative dulness of every-day consciousness. So there is, firstly, an actual and regular interpenetration with lower spheres including their different time-levels, and, secondly, there are the potential or rare contacts with the higher planes of existence and time which may extend up to the Four Uncorporeal Absorptions. The last of them (which may be followed by the Attainment of Cessation) is called *Nevasaññā-nāsaññāyatana*, "The Realm of Neither Perception nor Non-Perception" ("the ultimate limit of perception", Anagarika Govinda). The two-fold negation in the name of this meditative state has to be understood as referring not only to the function of perception, but to all components of consciousness. Here consciousness has reached such a degree of refinement that even the name "consciousness" is no more fully appropriate and is retained only because there is still a residuum of sublime mental activities, directed on the most abstract and sublime object imaginable: the previously obtained experience of the Realm of No-thing-ness, being the precedent stage of attainment. Here the tension between subject and object will naturally be so exceedingly low that all what we call consciousness and time is on the point of vanishing completely. Consciousness, namely, means to be aware of an object; and "time-experience" means: being aware of the relative movements of the subjective and objective aspect of a perceptual process.

The border-line of Consciousness and Time, reached in that fourth of the Non-corporeal Absorptions, is definitely transcended by the *Attainment of Cessation*. This is drastically expressed by the exclusion of that meditative state (1) from the normal time-order of subsequent mental states, (2) from the systematization of all "things" in *Dhammasaṅgani*.

The first point, exclusion from the normal time-order, is stated in the *Paṭṭhāna* (*Pañha-vāra* §§4, 5) in the following way: "After emergence from the Attainment of Cessation, the (previously obtained) wholesome state of the Realm of Neither Perception nor Non-Perception is a condition for the attainment of Fruition (of *Anāgāmitā* or *Arahatta*), by way of proximity resp. contiguity (*anantara-*, resp. *samanantara-paccaya*)." That is to say, the intermediate state of Cessation is not counted when the time-relation of the two other states is said to be one of immediate succession. The obvious conclusion is that the state of Cessation must have been assumed to take place on quite a different time-level. This is emphasized by the statement that, from the view of the human time-rhythm, the Attainment of Cessation may last for seven days.

As to the second point, the exclusion from the "Enumeration of Things" (*Dhammasaṅgani*), we read in *Atthasalini* (p. 346): "It is said that in this Triad (of wholesome, unwholesome and neutral things) the following does not obtain: the three characteristics, the three concepts, the space obtained after the abolishing of the *Kasina*, empty space, the object of the Realm of No-thing-ness (being "Infinity of Space") and



the *Attainment of Cessation*." The Sub-Commentary (*Mūla Tikā*) remarks that all these are not included because they are no "real things" (*sabhāva-dhamma*). "There is no real thing (*sabhāva*) which is not contained in the Triad of the Wholesome etc." Furthermore, *Visuddhi Magga* (p. 709, PTS) remarks that the Attainment of Cessation can neither be said to be conditioned nor unconditioned (*sankhata-asankhata*), neither mundane nor supermundane (*lokiya-lokuttara*). Why not? Because it does not exist in reality (*sabhāvato natthitāya*). But because it has been entered into by the meditator, it is said to be 'produced' (*nipphanna*) and not 'unproduced' (*anipphanna*)."

When in the above passages the quality of a "real thing" is denied to the Attainment of Cessation, it does certainly not mean that this state is "unreal" in the sense of a hallucination or imagination. We shall therefore better speak of it as being "differently real", because all the data of our experience of reality, and even of the most sublime states of Absorption, are absent in that state. In the same way, Nibbana may be said to have no "existence" in terms of the *khandha*-world, but when denying its reality we would fall into the error of annihilationism (*uccheda-ditthi*).

In this context we wanted only to put on record that the Buddhist psychology of meditative experience knows of a time-level leaving our own so far behind that it can only be spoken of by way of a paradoxical statement, namely by its assignation to, as well as the annullment of, seven days of our own calendar.



### 3. The Conception of the Present in the Abhidhamma

(About the term *uppanna*, "arisen")

We have observed previously (p. ) that Buddhist philosophy does not stop short at the rigid and "two-dimensional" concept of Time, and particularly of the Present, as offered by analysis. Through its philosophy of relations, involving a synthetical method, it adds the third dimension of "depth in time". The Present which, for analysis, tended to become an insignificant point of intersection between past and future, having a most elusive and even illusory nature, is now charged with energies coming from the past and with a significance extending to the future,—both in varying degrees, starting from very weak connexions up to a definitely determined course which is however limited to a very few cases.\*) To express this dynamic view of Time, special terms were required, besides the conventional and therefore too static concepts of past, present and future. We proffer the opinion that it was for this purpose that the "Triad of Things Arisen, not arisen and bound to arise" (*upannā, anuppannā, upādino dhammā*) was included in Dhammasangani (§§ 1035-37) and that the commentarial four categories of *uppanna* were formed which shall be treated here.

But the Triad of Things Arisen was not intended to supersede the Triad of Things Past etc. (Dhs §§ 1038-40). The latter has an importance of its own in the much more frequent cases when it is necessary to distinguish between the three periods of time and the objects existing in them. Also as a corrective against the opposite extreme, this Triad of Things past etc. is required: namely for insisting on the (relative) differentiation of the three periods of time against the tendency to obliterate them completely. This tendency (as well as its opposite) appears again and again in the history of philosophy, and the following emphatic words of the Buddha might well have been directed against similar contemporary ideas:

"There are, O Monks, three unconfounded appellations, expressions and designations,—unconfounded before, they are now unconfounded, and cannot be confounded; they are not rejected by wise ascetics and Brahmins. Which are these three? For that corporeality (feeling etc.) which is past, gone and changed, 'It has been', this is here the statement, the usage, the designation; not does apply to it the statement 'It is', not does apply to it the statement 'It will be' . . ." (Samy. XXII, 62).

Within the Buddhist fold the philosophical trend to obliterate the distinction between the three periods of time came very much to the foreground in the early hinayanistic school of the Sarvastivadins (resp. Vaibhāsika) who maintained that the *dharmas* (conceived as the ultimate unchangeable elements of existence) persist through all three periods of time which have only conventional validity, and that the things appearing

\* i.e., the eight Stages of Sanctity (*ariyamagga* and *ariyaphala*), the five evil actions entailing determined results, and three kinds of pernicious views.



in these three time-periods have only phenomenal existence. These ideas are obviously in contradiction to two basic conceptions of the Buddhist doctrine: impermanence and unsubstantiality. In view of such consequences it is therefore imperative not to forget the relative differentiation of time, manifested in the fact of Change or Impermanence. True to the principle of the twofold method, we are stressing this complementary aspect just here where we are going to speak of the other, more neglected aspect, namely that of the relations between, and the partial interpenetration of, the three periods of time.

Before dealing with the term *uppanna* which is particularly relevant in that connection, we shall mention briefly the three divisions of the term *paccuppanna*, "present", as treated in Asl. p. 420 (parallel passage in Visuddhi Magga, p. 431, PTS). These three kinds of the Present are given in an order of increasing duration: (1) The momentary present (*khana-paccuppanna*) extending only over the three phases of a single moment of consciousness: this is to be regarded as "present" in the strict sense, though not actually perceptible. (2) The serial present (*santati-p.*), comprising a series or continuum (*santati*) of moments. Asl. records the definition of two schools. The first (the Reciters of the Medium Discourses) says that it lasts for 1-2 continua (*santati*) which are defined by examples, e.g. as the time required for things to become visible after an abrupt change from day light into a dark room, or conversely. The second school of thought (the Reciters of the Grouped Discourses) distinguishes material and mental continua. The former are explained by the above and other examples; the latter by the duration of 2-3 processes of Impulsion (*javana-vithi*) i.e., by 2-3 processes of a complete perception, each lasting 16 moments. Though we should hesitate to ascribe actual perceptibility to a duration of 2-3 processes while, on the other hand, the above examples imply a duration somewhat too long for conveying the idea of "present", we must suppose that the second division, the "serial present", is intended to refer to the actual experience of a "Now".—The third division stands apart: it is the Present with reference to the present life term or present birth process (*addhā-paccuppanna*).

We are turning now to the term *uppanna* for which a fourfold division is given in Asl. p. 66, having a parallel passage in Visuddhi Magga p. 687 PTS.

(1) *Vattamān'uppanna*, i.e., presently or actually arisen; or: *uppanna*, being grammatically a past participle, to be taken here in the meaning of a present tense for which *vattamāna* is the grammatical term. It is identical with the "momentary present" (*khana-paccuppanna*; see above).

(2) *Bhūtāpagat'uppanna*, i.e., "arisen", in the sense of "gone after having been". Atthasālini and the Sub-Commentary paraphrase the first part of that compound (*bhūta*) by *anubhavitvā*, "having experienced", and, alternatively, by *bhavitvā*, "having been". In the first case, it is explained as follows: "By greed etc., or their opposites, wholesome and unwholesome Karma experiences the taste of the object



(*ārammaṇarasam anubhavati*). We suggest that the "experience of the taste" refers to the evaluation of the object by greed, non-greed etc., which, as the Sub C<sub>y</sub> stresses, can be performed only by karmic consciousness, i.e. in the phase of Impulsion (*javana*). This evaluation impresses a strong mark upon the entire cognitive process, and, together with that associated mark of evaluation, the image of the first perception is taken up by the subsequent states of consciousness. This may happen in two ways. To bring about the result of a complete perception, such as we are actually aware of, there is required a sequence of several perceptual series (*vīthi*), of 16 moments each. The later *vīthis*, being repetitions or variations of the first one, will naturally be influenced by the evaluating act of the first *vīthi*. Further, on occasion of a later encounter with the same or a similar object, the first-time association of it with a feeling of attraction or aversion will greatly prejudice the later evaluation of it. In such ways a certain part of past karmic energy (*kammavega*), quite apart from its maturing later into karmic result (*vipāka*), is transmitted to present states of consciousness. In so far this past evaluating experience (*anubhavitvā*), though "having gone" (*bhavitvā*) has present significance. Being active within the present, it may well be regarded as belonging to that qualified conception of present, implied by the term *uppanna*.

When *bhūta* is explained as *bhavitvā*, "having been", this second category of Things arisen refers to everything conditioned (*sankhata*) which, after having passed through the three phases of its existence in the present, "has gone". If only this last explanation had been given, we should be inclined to think that *bhūtāpagat'uppanna* refers merely to the use of the word as a past tense. But against this supposition speaks firstly the rather involved term *bhūtāpagata* which would have been unnecessary for expressing such a simple matter; secondly and particularly, by the emphasis on the evaluating function of karmic consciousness, the first part of the compound (in the sense of "having experienced") receives a greater stress than the second part expressing the fact of "having gone".

We therefore suggest that this second category of *uppanna* intends to express the share of past mental states in present ones, particularly that of the active, i.e., karmic, mental states.

(3) *Okāśakat'uppanna*, i.e., "arisen", in the sense of "occasion given". It includes (a) that *by* which an occasion is given, (b) that *for* which an occasion is given.

(a) The first is the Karma of the past *by* which an occasion for the arising of its corresponding karmic result is given. Asl (p. 66) says: "Though being a thing of the past it excludes any other karmic result and gives occasion only for its own result". That is to say: though being past it exercises still a selective and purposive activity. Though not being "real" in the sense of present existence, it has, on account of its being "active" in the above sense, to be included in that wider conception of "actuality" as implied by the term *uppanna*. This past karma "by which an occasion is given", is identical with that of the previous division ("gone after having experienced"). The difference is



that here the persisting actuality of the past Karma refers to its corresponding karmic result (*vipāka*), while in the previous category the other effects of that past Karma have been considered.

(b) That “for which an occasion is given” is just the corresponding karmic result of the past Karma. Though being a thing of the future it nevertheless counts as “arisen” in the sense of having a definite occasion or chance of arising. It is identical with the “Things bound to arise” (*upādino dhammā*), belonging to the above mentioned Triad of Dhs (*uppanna-ttika*). About these “Things bound to arise” Asl says (p. 360) that they are not to be regarded as non-existent (*natthi nāma na hoti*). This is another proof of the dynamic conception of actuality and time, to be found already in the canonical Abhidhamma and its earliest commentaries.

In this third category of *Okāsakat’uppanna*, the relation between certain things of the past and of the future, leaving out the present, is shown, both being regarded as “arisen”.

(4) *Bhūmiladdh’uppanna*, i.e., “arisen”, in the sense of “having obtained a soil”, i.e., a fertile soil for the actual arising. This applies to the potential defilements (*kilesa*) which are potential in the sense of possessing a fertile soil from which they may actually sprout when the other conditions of their arising are given. This soil (*bhūmi*) is provided, in all three planes (*bhūmi*) of existence, by the individual’s own Groups of Existence (*khandha*), as long as the respective defilements are not yet completely eliminated by one of the Stages of Sanctity (“Stream Entry” etc.). Visuddhi Magga, in an instructive elaboration of our passage, lays particular stress on the fact that this fertile soil for the arising of defilements consists in the individual’s own life process and not in the outer world of tempting objects. Here we have a noteworthy reiteration of the fundamental Buddhist doctrine that man is not bound by the external world, but only by his own craving. Not only the actuality, but also the potentiality of bondage is centered in the individual, i.e., in the subjective side of the impersonal life process.

In order not to leave any doubt about the meaning of the term “soil” (*bhūmi*) in this context, we shall elucidate it by the example of the visual perception of a pleasant form. Let us suppose that this perception was not followed immediately by conscious craving or enjoyment because it was superseded at once by a much stronger impression on the mind. Nevertheless, this “deferred” defilement of Sensual Desire (*kāmarāga*) for beautiful forms may spring up at any later moment, e.g., when that previous visual perception is remembered. The “soil” for its appearance was provided by the Groups existing at the time of the previous visual perception: the Group of Corporeality being represented by the eye, etc., the four mental Groups by the visual consciousness, and by the visual perception, the feeling, the will, etc., connected with it. Until the Fetter of Sensual Desire (*kāmarāga-samyojana*) is exterminated on entering the Path of the Non-Returner (*anāgāmi-magga*), this defilement adheres to the continued process of the individual’s Five Groups, is dormant or latent in them, is at their basis or



root, forms, as it were, the sub-soil of that "soil". By all these latter terms we have paraphrased the Pali term *anuseti* (cf. *anusaya*, proclivity, tendency, bias) which, in this connection, is used in Visuddhi Magga: *tesu tesu (khandhesu) ... kilesajātam anuseti*, "the species of defilement adheres to the respective Groups of Existence."

These potential defilements may be compared with dangerous microbes infesting the body, which, though in a latent state, may become active at any moment when conditions are favourable. It is this soil of the Khandhas impregnated with potential defilements, which is meant by the Abhidhammic categories of "Things favourable to Defilements, to Cankers, etc." (*sankilesikā*, resp. *sāsavā dhammā*) and kindred terms occurring in the Triads and Duads of the Dhammasangani.

The fourth category of *uppanna* refers to the potential future. It differs from those future things of the third category "for which an occasion is given" in so far as these latter things are related to an actual Karma of the past while the fourth category refers only to the proclivity of things. The things of the third category are therefore in a much higher degree determined than those of the fourth: because, apart from the cases which are absolutely determined (see p. 79 note), also all the other varieties of karmic result will arise with certainty if not effectively counteracted before maturing. They are therefore in greater proximity to the border line of factual reality than the proclivities of the fourth category. This relation to factual reality was probably the principle underlying the sequence of enumeration of the four categories. Beginning with factual reality, i.e., "things presently arisen" (*vattamān' uppanna*), the other three divisions follow in an order of a decreasing degree of actuality.

It is of importance to note that, according to Visuddhi Magga (p. 689 PTS), only the things of the fourth category (*bhūmiladdh'uppanna*), i.e., the *potential* defilements, may be overcome, or more correctly stated, may be prevented from actually arising.

As a historical sidelight it may be added that by the commentarial exposition of *uppanna* the views of the Sarvastivadins about the co-existence of the dharmas in the three time-periods are reduced to their justified measure. It is shown here which parts of the past and the future have or may have active resp. potential significance for the present and may therefore be regarded as actualities, though not realities. But it is certainly not accepted in Theravada, and it is also not tenable, that this can be said of *all* things past and future. It is quite possible that this disquisition about the term *uppanna* was partly intended as, or used for, a refutation of the Sarvastivadins who most probably have been in existence already at the time of the ancient commentaries on which those of Buddhaghosa have been based.

It should be mentioned that the commentarial fourfold division of *uppanna* does not appear in the explanation of the Triad of Things Arisen (*uppanna-ttika*) but on occasion of the first sentence of Dhammasangani: "...*kusalām cittam uppannam hoti.*" It is said that



in that context, the first category of "presently arisen" does apply. In the canonical Triad itself, *uppanna* is defined exactly by the same words as *paccuppanna*. But as the definitory terms are rather non-committal we must not necessarily conclude that here likewise the meaning of "presently arisen" holds true. Also the statement in Asl that the Triad of Things Arisen extends over two time-periods (i.e., present and future) does not necessitate that limitation to "presently arisen", because also the commentarial conception of *uppanna* does not comprise the actual *things* of the past, but only their persisting energy, i.e., their conditioning influence, still active or latent in present and future. It has further to be noted that in the commentarial conception of the term *uppanna*, the "Things bound to arise" are, though not mentioned under that name, only a sub-division, belonging to *okāśakat'uppanna*. In the Triad, however, they are not included in the term *uppanna*, but form a separate class. Though, as we see, Asl does not relate in any way the four categories of *uppanna* to the canonical Triad, we think to be justified in doing so, because both groups of terms are obviously intended to introduce a more elastic and dynamic conception of time. So we suggest that the commentarial four categories may be taken to cover the same field as the *uppannā dhammā* and *upādino dhammā* of the canonical Triad. For any further development of abhidharmic thought, it seems to us of importance to bring into relation, and, if possible, into agreement, the terminology of the different periods of the Abhidhamma literature, as far as justified philosophically, even if no complete historical proof can be furnished, as in our present case.

### *Concluding Remarks*

The past course of a movement and the direction to which the process moves belong doubtlessly to the co-determining factors of a present situation. In so far, parts of the past and of the future are, though not "real", yet actual, in the sense of being presently active. In the life of the individual as well as of mankind, this fact is illustrated by the powerful influence of traditions and of ideals; the one being the "surviving" past, the other the anticipated future. But there is still another "unreal" factor acting upon the Present: It is the potency or potentiality of a situation, comprising its unmanifested possibilities, its neglected aspects, the deliberately excluded alternatives, the roads open but not pursued. Because in no case all aspects and potentialities of a situation can manifest themselves simultaneously, some of them may well appear in the next moment, others in a near or a distant future, either after having been remembered and taken up consciously or after undergoing a subliminal process of maturing. But the significance of these potentialities is not restricted to the future, they are operative in that very moment. E.g., the excluded alternatives will influence the speed, the energy and the duration of the movement proceeding in the direction decided upon. This influence may be retarding or impelling, according to circumstances. That is to say, these potentialities are co-determining factors of, what we may call, the "specific weight" of the given situation; and on this "specific weight" depends



the measure of influence which the respective moment of consciousness itself is able to exercise. It is further relevant in this connection, whether there was conscious awareness of the different potentialities and alternatives, or not. Here enters the Abhidharmic distinction of spontaneous (*asankhārena*) and non-spontaneous (*sasankhārena*) actions. \*)

The fact that the potentialities of a situation cannot be excluded from a dynamic concept of actuality was recognised not only in the commentarial period of Pali literature, as illustrated above in our exposition of the term *uppanna*. The cognizance of that fact is impressively documented in the probably oldest part of the canonical Abhidhamma. In the so-called *Mātikā* ("Table of Contents") which is elaborated in *Dhammasangani* and forms also the basis of *Yamaka* and *Paṭṭhāna*, there are no less than nine terms referring to the *potentiality* of defilements differently classified. We have already mentioned

the Things favourable to defilements (*sankilesikā dhammā*)

" " " to the Cankers (*sāsavā dh.*).

The remaining terms are :

the Things favourable to the Fetters (*samyojanīyā dh.*)

" " " .. .. Bondages (*ganthanīyā dh.*)

" " " .. .. Floods (*oghanīyā dh.*)

" " " .. .. Yokes (*yoganīyā dh.*)

" " " .. .. Hindrances (*nīvaranīyā dh.*)

" " " .. .. Wrong Conception (*parāmaṭṭhā dh.*)

" " " .. .. Clinging (*upādānīyā dh.*)

By those profound early thinkers who outlined that remarkable system of reality laid down in the Abhidhamma, it was obviously regarded as indispensable to distinguish not only Things which are, e.g., Defilements or not, Things which are presently associated with them or not, but to include also, in a special category, those Things which are favourable to Defilements, i.e. which provide for them the fertile soil (*bhūmi*), in the sense explained above.

Atthasalini, commenting on the *Mātikā*, gives the following interesting definitions :

" Things favourable to Clinging are those which, when becoming objects, are favourable (*hita*) to Clinging, owing to their connexion with (or affinity to) Clinging (*upādāna-sambandhena*).

" Things favourable to Defilements. By offering themselves as (lit : making themselves to) objects for a defilement, they are susceptible for it (lit.: deserve it, *arahanti*); or: because they have adapted themselves (*niyutta*) to a defilement, they cannot get beyond being objects for it."

According to these instructive explanations, those Things providing the fertile soil for defilements are, as it were, in tune with the respective defilements; they fit into each other like cog-wheels; their relation is like that of bodily susceptibility and the virus.

\*) See also p. where the importance of the factor of potentiality has been dealt with, in another context.



Only in the light of a dynamic view of actuality, admitting the factor of potentiality, and by a dynamic conception of time, admitting the partial interpenetration of the three time-periods, the importance and the implications of the above Abhidharmic terms will be fully understood. In calling attention to these neglected, but important terms and pointing out some of their implications, our intention was only to make an appeal for further investigations from a textual and philosophical point of view.

---

THE BUDDHIST WORLD PUBLICATIONS  
P.O. Box No. 1076, Colombo (Ceylon).  
Telephone. 9478.  
Telegrams. METTA COLOMBO.



# ERRATA

---

*N.B.*—The errors should be corrected before the text is perused.

- Page 13, line 24. For p. 9 read p. 11
- Page 16, line 2. For pp. 11-12 read pp. 11-13.
- Page 17, line 19. For (see page—), read (See page 59).
- Page 27, last line. For (p. 46) read (p. 61).
- Page 30, line 4. For (see p. 20 read (see p. 25)).
- Page 33, line 9. For (see p. 24) read (see p. 30).
- Page 35, line 38. For (see p. 18) read (see p. 22).
- Page 38, line 17. For (see p. —), read (see pp. 32, 33).
- Page 44, line 22. For see p. —), read (see p. 63).
- Page 44, line 30. For (see p. —), read (see p. 50).
- Page 51, line 3. For (see p. 29\*) read (see p. 36\*).
- Page 51, para 2, line 1. For *Tranquillity* read 1 *Tranquillity*.
- Page 58, para 2, lines 5 & 6. For (p. —) and (see p. —) read (p. 55) and (see p. 56).
- Page 60, line 10. For (cf. *indriya-samatta*, p. —) read (cf. *indriyasamatta*, p. 38).
- Page 61, para 2, line 2. For p. — read p. 13.
- Page 61, para 2, line 21. For (see p. —) read (see p. 27).
- Page 69, para 1, line 2. For (see p. —) read (see p. 11).
- Page 69, para 2, line 2. For (see p. —) read (see p. 11).
- Page 69, para 2, line 20. For (p. —, by “time”) read p. 11, by “time”).
- Page 71, para 1, line 10. For (p. —) read (p. 9).
- Page 79, para 1, line 1. For (p. —) read (p. 9).
- Page 85, foot-note. For See also p. — etc. read: See also p. 67 etc.







