கவனிக்க: இந்த மின்னூலைத் தனிப்பட்ட வாசிப்பு, உசாத்துணைத் தேவைகளுக்கு மட்டுமே பயன்படுத்தலாம். வேறு பயன்பாடுகளுக்கு ஆசிரியரின்/பதிப்புரிமையாளரின் அனுமதி பெறப்பட வேண்டும்.
இது கூகிள் எழுத்துணரியால் தானியக்கமாக உருவாக்கப்பட்ட கோப்பு. இந்த மின்னூல் மெய்ப்புப் பார்க்கப்படவில்லை.
இந்தப் படைப்பின் நூலகப் பக்கத்தினை பார்வையிட பின்வரும் இணைப்புக்குச் செல்லவும்: Lanka Guardian 1993.11.15

Page 1
ANKA
GUJAR
VO. 1 6 No. 14 November 15, 1993 Price F
WAR AN
LAKSHMAN J K. PREMACH G. G. PONNA S. VINOTHAL D. STHADTH SHANKAR RA M. KANAGAR MAVA SENA
an MANGALAM
PE0AGCE0 : MOHLAMME
NORWA AS MIDID
EAST AND POWER-S
- A. M. N.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

DAN
Rs...10.00 Registered at GPO, Sri Lanka QD/43/NEWS/93
D PEACE
AYAKODY ANDRAN MBALAM
NGAN
AN
\JEE
AJAN THIRAJAH
d OONESINGHE
D AND THONDAMIAN
- Mervyn de Silva
LE-EAST MEDIÁTOR
- Stephen Rosenfeld
SHLARING
avaratna and Sumanasiri Liyanage

Page 2

akkigf COLOGINE
NP
MÍ
fh
f

Page 3
TRENDs
A move against child abuse
An accurate reading of the extent of child abuse and child prostitution in the country is now being attempted by a countrywide survey by the Department of Probation and Child Care. After that a rehabilitation program will begin, with UNICEF assistance, official sources said.
BRIEFLY. . .
Master card Swindle
Four local banks in Colombo were swindled for over Rs 25 million with forged Master Cards by two Tamil youths who laterchannelled the money to the LTTE in the North, Crime Detection Bureau (CDB) officials said. The amount represents just three months takings and the operation would have continued but for the chance arrest of the two youths in a routine round-up in the City.
improving the EP climate
Prime Minister Rani Wickremasinghe thanked Sri Lanka's Security forces for building a suitable environment for elections in the Eastern Province next year. He was speaking to the troops at the Sinhapura army camp in the Batticaloa district, during an inspection tour.
The Prime Minister Said that the terrorist problem was being systematically overcome by the strategies adopted by the security forces So much so that other Countries with similar problems were now following Sri Lanka’s example.
Power shock ahead
Electricity rates are due to go up again. The World Bank has dictated a 30 per cent raise in rates and the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) has had to agree, Board officials have admitted despite earlier Treasury denials.
The World Bank has asked the CEB to up the rates by 100 percent
by the end of 199 cent increase in
year.
Cholera epic
The cholera ep now under Contro lists reported that( hospital had com a peak of 200 sor
Death threat
LSSP leader Be not want protecti notwithstanding ne nas been rece Sama Samajisth afternis OWn SeCU politicians have b the presence of p Sources said.
Trouble at D.
DUNF Genera PremaChandra lu member while lea rking Commitee party. Mr Premac that he was pro\ meeting by a majc the suspension C PrOVincia COun( Weera Premaratin
Compromise,
Parliament Sp med called for CC kingasolution tot problem. Mr Moh party was interes problem. He wa Abdul AziZ memC BMICH.
The Speaker was elected to majority Sinhala from which it wa
Was not a COmni
Review of \
Criteria of univ be reviewed by a inted by the gove Wijetunga recent merit should be for admission to
* Weightage shoult

5 after the 30 per December this
demic slows
demic in Jaffna is bl... Visiting journacases at the Jaffna e down to 30 from ne Weeks earlier.
S for Bernard
}rnard Soysa does on from the state he death threats iving. The veteran as decided to look rity because other een killed despite olice guards, party
UNIF meeting
| Secretary G.M. Inged at a fellow vinganunrulyWo
Meeting of the handra Said later /Oked. Earlier the brity vote approved of DUNF Western Cill member Ediri
e.
says Speaker
eaker M.H. Mohaimpromise in seethe North and East amed Said that no sted in solving this s speaking at an rial meeting at the
also said that he parliament by the
Buddhist voters, is evident that he unalist.
varsity entry
ersity entrance will committee appoirnment. President tly said that while the main Criterion universities. Some be given to edu
cationally disadvantaged districts.
Several university professors are expected to be on the commitee. Professor Kingsley de Silva of Peradeniya University is expected to be the chairman.
Universities: more spent, less admitted
Governor of Wayamba (North Western Province) Dr Karunasena Kodituwakku, a former university
vice-chancellor said at the Sri Jaye-ps.
wardenepura colours presentation ceremony that government speinding on university eduation had been escalating while queues for
admission had been lengthening. In
1979 the expenditure had been 1 95. million; now it was Rs 1061 million,
リ。
and there was awaiting list of 30,000 鬣 霹
to enter the universities.
However, there was now a prospect of solving the problem as a result of the reconstitution of the
Universitity Grants Commission, the is.
former Vice-chancellor Said.
GÜARDIAN 1
Vol. 16 No. 14 November 15, 1993 .
Price RS. 10.00
*
-
Published fortnightly by
Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Ltd. No. 246, Union Place Colombo - 2.
Editor: Mervyn de Silva .
Telephone: 447584
Printed by Ananda Press 82/5, Sir Ratnajothi Saravanamuttu Mawatha, Colombo 13. Telephone: 435975
CONTENTS
News Background 3 Select Committee 4. Mid-East Peace 11 Correspondence 12 J. R. Years (14) 13 Ayodhya and After 15 The Scholars Tale - Vll 16 Consociational Solution (3) 17 George Claessen 19

Page 4
DRU(
Amendment to Drug Regulation No. 34 of of Monday the 6th July 1992.
“No person shall dispense a prescription a drug.”
MSJ goes down in the history of Drug Rai to collaborate with the Government on Generic M
decades of Brand Manufacture for the biggest multin
to almost exclusive Generic Manufacture for the pe. - now serve a wide spectrum of Health Services fro
remotest Govt. dispensary and General Practitioner
There is no glamour in illness - not for the safe, rational treatment, not market incentives.
Illness does not spare either rich or poor, p
The Bibile-Wickremasinghe drug reforms v into therapeutics. Generic prescribing and Generic di of Drug Rationalization Policy.
In Good Times and Bad Times, Epidemic from MSJ have been a dependable source ofreliej
M. S. J. Industrie Factory and L
P. O. BC
Colomb
 
 

1984 in Govt. Gazette Extraordinary No. 722/3
which does not specify the Generic Name of
tionalization in Sri Lanka as the first Company Manufacture. MSJ Swiftly moved over from two lational Drug Companies operating in this region ople of this country, Our range of Generic drugs in the big city Clinics and Base Hospitals to the
in the country.
sick anyway. The sick need swift, cost-effective,
atient or physician.
vere designed and adopted to re-introduce ethics ispensing were the main levers of implementation
and Disaster, War and Peace, Generic Drugs in illness for over a third of this century.
s (Ceylon) Ltd., aboratories
X 430
о 15.

Page 5
NEWS BACKGROUND
STOP
As we go to press the LTTE has mounted a fiel the naval base at Nagavanthurai. The first reports pla sources claimed had also lost over 400 fighters. Rein area, where some 100-200 soldiers were reported missi
War and peace:
Mervyn de Silva
he multi-party select Committee,
appointed on a private member's motion tabled by Mr. Mangala Moonesinghe a Sinhala MP of the Sri Lanka Freedom party, the largest opposition party, has failed to reach "consensus" on "apolitical package" acceptable to the Tamil parliamentary parties. Isthis the end of the road for "jaw-jaw"? Does this leave no other option but "war-war"? It does seem so. But this much is certain. It was the best chance that came our way in the long, desperate quest for peace. Consider the following:
i) The resolution was introduced by a Member of the Sri Lanka Freedom party, the party which introduced the Sinhala Only Bill in 1956, and therefore regarded as the authentic champion of majority Sinhalainterests. (It is also the party which gave the foremost place to Buddhism. Nobody can challenge the credentials of the SLFP on the National Ouestion.
ii) Its chairman was recognised by all the parties in parliament as a moderate on this and Connected issues, and respected by most MP's as an honest, clean and plain-speaking politician.
iii) All the parties and the parliamentary groups that mattered with the conspiCuous exception of pro-LT TE members, approved the initiative and looked forward to a productive outcome.
if it was soon exposed to criticism, the reason was the time-consuming and tortuoisly legalist nature of the exercise. Time was running out. The Tigers' appeared to believe that the longer they fought, the greater the army casualities and larger the territory the LTTE would hold. In other words, a negotiated settlement from a position of strength was the LTTE's best option, seeing that the actual chances of expanding the LTTE's area of undisputed control to the entire Eastern province were
remote. But the LTT that it could deny t preferred objective East SO that LT TE terrorism and/or Sm vity, more by nightt
While the army'. considerably streng it was merely confir camps, the East ren territory. Hence the "tiger's "neck" - th biggest since OPEF before the arrival of
So much for the politico-military situ, initiative was possib and/or the LTTE be of forces, on the g could be changed ir logic also governet "militarists" in the g nce eStablishment. dent PremadaSa \ external implicatio and the importanc w-jaw to retain mod (votes in the all-im mber/January pr opened the door to
The "Shot' Was army took large ca enough damage on that the failure to a aims was a Setback reversal.
These two develc of the Mangala Moc to deliver, and the A the government a C if that path was ch of strength have n for the two "mino "neutral umpires" o torS. Mr. ThOndam

PRESS
ce, surprise attack on the army base at Pooneryn and ved army casualties at over 300. The LTTE, government orcements, including commandos, were rushed to the
hga
BeSt ChanCe OSt
E foughton confident he (Sinhala) army its - Control over the activity is reduced to all-scale guerrilla actinan day.
s position has been thened from the days led to heavily fortified lains fiercely disputed decision to go for the e Kilali offensive, the ATION LIBERATION the IPKF.
military aspect of the ation no "diplomatic" le as longasthe army je Ved that the balan Ce round and politically, its favour. The same d the thinking of the Overnment and DefeThe death Of PresiNho understood the ns of these options, 2 of emphasising jarate minority support portant poll in Deceesidential Contest, the militarists.
fired last month. The usualties but inflicted the enemy to ensure chieve the maximum nota defeat or major
pments - the failure nesinghe Committee rmy's inability to give hance to negotiatesen, from a position W made an opening ity" leaders to play independent mediaan is a Tamil but an
Indiam plantation Tamilleader who is also
a Cabinet Minister. Mr. Mohammed is a UNP'er who has served the party as a Cabinet Minister. But today he holds the
office of Speaker, whose job in the House is to hold the scales evenly; in short, the
"neutral umpire'
In a recent speech at a Muslim Maha
Vidyalaya on Prophet Mohammed's bi
rthday, Mr. M. H. Mohammed said: You
cannot solve problems by killing people.
Any problem can be solved through nego
tiation. What of the price we are paying in terms of human life, in the ongoing war. What of the cost to the gove
rnment? The war is the stumbling
block to the country’s progress... allt
political parties should rise over above sectarian politics.... Our President is a leader who welcomes negotiation'.
While Mr. Mohammed is a Muslim, Mr.
శ్లో
Thondaman is a plantation Tamil. In an
interview with Roshan Pieris, the Tourism minister who is also boss of the CWC, the largest trade union of plantation labour,
said:
"I am getting impatient, and so are the Tamil-speaking people, about the problem in the north and east.
"Are you for a referendum?"
"I am all for a proper referendum, not an apology for a referendum...' in the referendum on a north-east merger, the population balance reminds one of BOSNIA, except that the Muslims are only a third in the E.P. But that third can decide the final verdict - yes or no to a merger. While the religion ISLAM reminds one of Bosnia, language is crucial. Unlike the muslims in the Sinhala areas, the muslims in the east speak Tamil. Nonetheless, the religion, is a stronger force right now than language certainly in situations of violent conflicts where collective identities are Crucial.

Page 6
SELECT COMMITTEE
Proposal for a Solutio North-East Question
Hon. Mr. Speaker
1. refer to the letter sent by Mr. Mangala Moonesinghe, Chairman of the Parliamentary Select Committee for resolving the ethnic issue to you and appearing in the Hansard - Column 3245 of 16th Dece"mber 1992. In this letter it is Stated that the members of the Select Committee representing the UNP, the SLFP, the SLMC, the CP and the LSSP as well as Messrs. K. Sirinivasan MP and Basheer Segudawood MP have reached agreement on the establishmentoftwo separate Councils for the North and the East and
to treat the North and the East as two
distinct provinces and on a scheme of devolution similar to that which obtains in India in the administration of the States. The letter also states that the MEP's representative supported the de-merger
, of the North and East and that the two
members representing the six Tamil political parties and the members representing the CWC did not agree with these conclusions.
Since we are opposed to the merger of the North and East, we have been advocating the de-merger of the temporarily merged provinces ever since this temporary merger was effected. therefore welcome the decision of the six political
parties that these two provinces be de
-merged. The two provinces were tempo
rarily merged by means of an emergency regulation. I recommend that they be de-merged without delay also through an emergency regulation.
2. Devolution of Power to Provinces
The above-mentioned letter States that the five parties referred to have agreed that a Scheme of devolution similar to that which obtains in India in the administration of States be adopted. In this connection wish to point out that in view of the
differences between india and Sri Lanka
not least the vast difference in size between the two Countries and the situation arising therefrom, the Indian pattern is not necessarily suitable for Sri Lanka. I wish to refer in particular to the devolution of power in regard to law and order and state land which for reasons stated below. I consider should be vested in the Government and not devolved in provinces.
(a) Law and Order in the 13th Amendment to the Constitu
tion the subject of Order”, including til powers to the exte ndix I is devolved the first place, this Over law and Orde ncils results in a pri ties with Consec expense. There wi Police Commissior Vince and a Natic SSion. Each Police nsist of three pe persons will be a functions that are rmed by five pers Public Service CO
the result of this (
to set up in the
forces each under and atenth policef na Division. Alth called the head of Force will not be a to any officer in a force, since the D. Of the PrOVincia PC nsible to and und Chief Minister of th that under this set. of law and order become extremely ssible. For exampl tted in One Provinci escapes into a di Police in the first
able to apprehen( they have no juris province. Even the province may not
alleged offender
extends only to crir that province. In a ration of the Chief
nce Will be neCeSS
Furthermore the ( gration and the Sn including arms, ar will be solely the Provincial police force fails in its du Government will very security of th ngered.
The Security of h ddhist worship si Seruwila and Dee
 
 
 

in to the
"Police and Public he exercise of police nt specified in Appe
on the province. In levolution of powers rtO ProVincial COuoliferation of authoriJuent unnecessary Il be as many as ten ns, one for each Pro)nal Police Commi
Commission will Cosons so that thirty ppointed to perform
now largely perfoons comprising the mmission. Secondly evolution would be country nine police
a different authority Orce called the Natioough the I.G.P. is the Sri Lanka Police ble to give any order ny Provincial Police I.G. who is the head lice division is respoer the Control of the e Province. It is clear -up the maintenance
in the country will difficult, if not impoe if a Crime iS COmmie and the perpetrator fferent Province the Province will not be d the perpetrator as diction in the second Police in the Second be able to arrest the
if their jurisdiction mes Committed Within ny event the co-opeMinister of the Provi
ary.
Ontrol of illicit immihuggling in of goods, mmunition and drugs responsibility of the force. If this police y for any reason, the pe helpless and the e State will be enda
istoric places of Buuch as Nagadeepa, Javapiand the nume
*
rous archaeological sites in the North and East will depend on the Provincial police force and if these are in danger of being damaged or destroyed and the provincial police force fails for any reaSon So that We may have a situation similar to that which occurred in Ayodhya while a separate police force for lack of state may be appropriate in India in view of the vastness of the country and the size of the States, to have ten police forces in a small country like Sri Lanka is not only an unnecessary extravagance but as pointed out above, far from improving the maintenance of law and order, it will prove, a hindrance to effective crime prevention and even endanger the very security of the country.
For the above reasons strongly feel that the maintenance of LaW and Order Should be under the Control of the GOvernment and not be devolved to the Provinces.
(b) State Land
Land is one of Our most Valuable resOurCes and unlike in India it is a Scarce resource. State land should be developed in accordance with an integrated plan covering the whole country. The devolution of power over state land to Provincial Councils results in Such land being split into nine parts making integrated development in the interests of the whole country and all its people impossible. Furthermore, the benefits from state land should be available On an equitable basis to all citizens of Sri Lanka irrespective of the community to which he belongs or his place of residence. This is rendered impossible by the devolution of power over state land to Provincial Councils. For instance in the Western Province where represent landlessness is acute, there is hardly any undeveloped State land available for alienation. It will be impossible to Solve the problem of landlessness in the Western Province if Provincial COuncils where state land is available refuse to alienate such land to citizens from outside the Province as they are entitled to do under the present laws.
Devolution of all power over state and land on Provincial Councils on the Indian pattern will result in even merger

Page 7
land development schemes (such as the Mahaweli scheme) coming under the Provincial Council Which Will then have the power to restrict settlement in such schemes solely to persons resident in that Province. In that event the benefits from irrigation Schemes on which the country and all its taxpayers have spent vast sums of money will accrue to a Small section of the people this would be unfair and quite unjustified.
Paragraph 2:1 (a) of Appendix II in the
13th Amendment to the Constitution empowers a Provincial Council to initiate irrigation and land development Schemes within its Province utilizing Water from rivers flowing through more than one Province. This may lead to disputes between Provinces in regard to the sharing of river waters. As we are aware the sharing of river waters has been the cause of serious disputes between states in India (e.g. the Cauvery waters dispute). For the above reason I am firmly of the view that control over all state land should be Vested in the Government and should not be devolved on Provincial Councils.
I am also strongly opposed to the demand of Tamil politicians that the demography of a Province should not be altered as a result of Settlement in Colonisation Schemes. In this Connection I can do no better than quote the reply sent by the Government to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi dealing with this
demand by the Hansard of 20.C
"The Settlem Settlement Sc y alterthe der iar area. Th Lanka is una view that in
major settlem ensure that t District for ins this principle of landlessn Solved and WC tion between
lidifying of the Tamils that th Provinces be traditional hO) Sri Lanka G accept. From economic Sta the demogra district shoulc ttling of persc Schemes inth PrOVinces Car Sri Lanka GO land Settleme 5.3 Of Hansa
I entirely agree COnsider that Should not be di
(a) Archae(
Ancient and and sites are should thereft
Joint response by7 Tamil poli Report' submitted to the Parlia by its chairman on 11.3.93.
The long-awaited interim Report, which Was Submitted to the PSC in a 'Draft” form by its Chairman, is both a revelation as well as a non-event. It is revealing in the sense, it confirms the lack of will of the Sinhala polity represented in Parliament, regardless of whether it is the ruling UNP or the major opposition, the SLFP, to come to grips with the legitimate grievances and aspirations of the Tamil People.
it is a non-event in the sense the so-caled "Draft' is a mere elaboration of the note handed over to the Speaker of Parliament by the Chairman of the PSC on December 16 1992 containing what was termed the "majority decision" of the PSC. The handing over of the note by the Chairman, which was done without coinsulting the PSC, can only be interpreted as a response to the non-acceptance by the Tamil Parties on December 14, 1992,
made public thro "majority decision Meeting of Decem the presently mer Vince.
We do not Cons repeating our ba: been placed adini collectively as we respective Tamil Ver, We COnsider i atleast briefly to th sadly lacks substa made public, so : to the Sinhala Pe nal Community a and apprehensior
(1) Firstly, the si sion” contained ir port, which prima already merged N

TULF and appearing in 2.86:
ent of people in land hemes must necessarinography of the particue Government of Sri ple tO SubSCribe to the settling of persons in ent Schemes One must he demography of the tance is not altered. If s followed the problem ess Would never be uld result in discriminaCommunities and to soclaim of the Sri Lanka e Northern and Eastern long to them as their meland which View the OWernment does not both a political and nd-point, the view that phy of the province or j not be altered in SeIns in major Settlement e Northern and Eastern not be accepted by the vernment as a basis for ent". (column 86, para d 2002.86).
With the abOVe.. | aSO the following subjects evolved.
ological sites
historical monuments part of our heritage and prebe placed under the
Control and protection of the Government. No power over these should be devolved on Provincial Councils.
(b) Ports
For security reasons all ports should be under the Control of the GOvernment. Under list II only major ports are placed under Government contrOl.
3. The Unit of Devolution
When devolution was first proposed a few years ago were of the view that the unit of devolution should be the Regional District as envisaged in the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact. However, by
the 13th Amendment to the Constitution,
the Province was made the unit of devolution. But I still consider that a demarcated Regional District is the best unit of devolution for this country and that the vast
expense incurred on maintaining Gove- it is
rnors, Chief Ministers and Ministers of Provincial Councils is totally unnecessary. My view is that the question of making a
regional unit of devolution should receive
serious consideration even at this stage. However, whatever the unit of devolution,
the powers devolved on Provincial Cou- :
ncils in respect of the matters referred to above, namely, police and public order, state land, archaeological sites and ports should be withdrawn and wested in the
Government. -
Lakshman Jayakody M.P. for Gampaha District Member of the Select Committee
tical parties to the “Draft Interim
mentary Select Committee (PSC)
ugh the media, of the ' reached at the PSC ber 11, 1992 to de-link ged North-Eastern Pro
derit obligatorytokeep sic position which has initum before the PSC, I as individually, by the Political Parties. Howet necessary to respond e Interim Report which nce and haS nOW been as to reach out directly pple and the Internatiohd explain our position S.
o called "majority decithe "draft' interim Reily seeks to de-link the orth-Eastern Province,
-
(ie "the establishment of two seperate units of administration for the Northern and Eastern provinces") is only a reflection of a bias against the continuation of the merger that had already been built-in into one of the main terms of reference of the PSC (ie "to arrive at a political solution to the question involving the devolution of power to the Northern and Eastern Provinces").
We, the Tamil Political Parties, nevertheless, decided to partake in the efforts of the PSC at solving the National Question since we believed that a ConsenSUS could emerge that would address the legitimate grievances of the Tamil-speaking People and, thereby, satisfy their legitimate aspirations.
But it is now clear to us, based on reports that we have received from various Sources, including our own reports
5

Page 8
on the ground situation, that the de-linking of the presently merged North-East Province has already been set-in motion as a political decision.
In the above context, the "majority agreement" of the PSC totally disregards the unanimous demand of the Tamil Parties as regards the need for a unified politico-administrative entity for a clearly defined territorial unit. We are of the opinion that such a unit, which has historically been apredominantly Tamil-speaking Region, is essential to safeguard and foster the identity, security and the socio-economic advancement of the Tamil-speaking People.
In addition, the "majority agreement" is a reflection of a process that is already taking place-aprocees of fragmentation of a unified politico-administrative entity and geographical region that was conceded to and accepted by the Tamil People and its polity as an alternative to the demand for “Eelam”.
Further, the ground reality also exposes the futility of the attempt by the Chairman of the PSC to affix the term "draft' to the
interim Report so as to give the misleading
impression that the search for the everelusive "consensus" is still on. By tabling an interim Report, "draft" or otherwise, the process has in effect been brought to an end and fore-closes any further consideration of Substantive matters.
(2) Secondly, as far as the devolution package is concerned, we note with Some relief that the "draft" interim Report has Conceded that on the basis of evidence
that it had received fro “the devolution COntem slation relating to Provi not been fully implem what is inconsistent anc "majority agreement" to of devolution on lines obtaining in the Indian
Here it must be cle: knOWS the basis Of the lr in relation to the Sche that the basic unit of linguisitc region - exc the Hindi-speaking Reg re of its sheer size CO as a single State. It m that Sections like 2,3,4 Lankan Constitution, against meaningful de found in the Indian CO in the Context of the "m at the PSC, where the ( Tamil linguistic Regio politico-administrative e gated, the scheme of mmended can hardly b lines of the Indian Cor note With COncern tha devolution contemplate members in the PSC, b taken during the delibe nducive to crucial Sub and Order and land bei
(3) In addition to the a compelled to place on be a case of deliberat "draft" interim Report. individually identifies t sing the so-called "ma (ie the UNP, SLFP, SL
TULF Response
Objective
The objective of this presentation is to explain:-
(a) to the people of Sri Lanka and the international Community why the T.U.L.F. or the Tamil peoples cannot accept the so called "CONSENSUS" resolution presented by the Parliamentary Select Committee;
(b) that there is no political will among the two principal Sinhala Political Parties - U.N.P. and S.L.F.P - to solve the Tamil National question; and
(c) the rationale of our fundamental demand -
6
(i) an unbifurcated
Province (ii) a Federal Syste
Historical Backgrour
No Sooner than S received independenc began to experience always feared WOuld predominantly Sinhal: rnment. The Plantati were disfranchised in Parliamentary repres where they had been \ pendence. The writin clear and Mr. S.U.V. C ssociated himself with

m public servants plated in the legicial Councils had 2nted". However, misleading is the “adopt a scheme similar to those Constitution”.
ar to anyone who idian Constitution, me of devolution, devolution is the ept in the case of ion which by natuld not be treated ust also be noted 75 & 76 in the Sri which militates volution, are not institution. Further, ajority agreement" oncept of a single in with a unified ntity has been nedevolution recoe based along the stitution. We also at the Scheme of 2d by the majority based on positions rations, is not cojects such as law ng fully devolved.
bove, We also feel record what Could e distortion in the While the Report he Parties compriajority agreement" MC, CP, LSSP as
well as the "independent members' K. Srinivasan and Basheer Segudawood), it fails to identify the 7 Tamil Parties which had collectively placed the 4-PT Formula before the PSC, while only referring by name to the CWC and the TULF. We see this as yet another childish attempt at trying to conceal a Tamil consensus on the question of the unit of devolution.
in view of the above acts of Commission and Ommission, not to mention bad faith, We the 7 Tamil Political Parties have decided to reiterate our opposition to the So-called "majority agreement" contained in the "draft" interim Report submitted by the Chairman of the PSC. In any event, the "majority agreement" by no means suggests a Tamil-Sinhala consensus, but yet another shabby attempt at unilaterally imposing a Sinhala sectarian opinion on the Tamil People. The Tamil Parties represented in the PSC have therefore, also taken the decision to diSSOCiate themSelves from the contemplated future proceedings of the PSC.
We, instead, appeal to the secular democratic forces working amongst the Sinhala People as well as to the international Community to mediate a Solution to the National Question that is just, rational and equitable.
Sgd. K. Premachandran EPRLF G. G. Ponnambalam (JR) ACTC S. Vinothalingan TILLO D. Sithadthan DPLF Shankar Rajee EDF/EROS M. Kanagarajan ENDLF Mavai S. Senathirajah TULF
North-East
sm of Government.
id:
ri Lanka (Ceylon) e, the Tamil people what they had
happen under a a Buddhist GOveon Tamil peoples 1948-49; they lost entation in areas roters prior to lindeg on the wall was Chelvanayakam dithis immoral politi
cal fraud and announced the formation of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi (Federal Party). It was clear to him, and the Tamil people who supported him, that only in a Federal set-up could a minority national group, such as that of the Tamils, expect a fair deal; and democratic environment to live in. It was evident that after the fate that befell the Plantation Tamils the axe would fall next on the other Minority national groups, especially the Tamils from the North and East.
The next Scene in this Continuing tragedy is post independent - Sri Lanka unfolded itself with the enactment of the more withering "SINHALA ONLY." Act. which

Page 9
rendered the Tamil people virtually illiterate and reduced them to a position of unequals placing the Sinhalese people in a distinctively superior position; this notwithstanding the resolution passed in the State Council on 25.05.'44 that Sinhalese and Tamil shall become the Official Language of Ceylon with Messrs. D.S. Senanayike, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, J.R. Jayawardena among others voting for it.
Evidently the Sri Lanka Government had begun to depend on a purely SinhaleSe Electorate and dismissed the rest of the people in the Island as unnecessary beings living on sufferance.
Apointerto this attitude, had been made manifest in the State Council prior to independence when a Pan-Sinhala Board of Ministers was insensitively constituted to administer a really pluralistic multi-ethnic population.
The passage thereafter of the "Sinhala Only Act" in 1956 also introduced with it a new phenomenon, the use of violence to coerce and subordinate a minority which merely articulated a desire to be considered as equal citizens. This phenomenon of using majoritarian violence to render minorities Submissive later on became recurrent; and not merely the Tamils from the North and East but even the Plantation Tamils and the Muslims too
became grist to the mill of such progressi
vely worsening Sinhalese violence. For instance, the Tamils were victims of predatory violence in 1958, 1961, 1977, 1979, 1981 and 1983. The Plantation Tamils were unfortunately victims of every orgy of Sinhalese racial violence, but more so particularly in 1979 when they were driven to seeksanctuary in the Vanni and Trincomalee Districts. The Muslim people also suffered long after the pre-independence 1915 riots from recent Sinhalese racist assaults in Gampola (1975), in Puttalam (1976), Galle and Beruwala (1992).
Since 1977, sadly enough, ruthless violence was organised and let loose on the Tamils by the Sinhala State through its own instrument that should actually protect the civilians - the Security Forces.
Not only non-viol against discrimin administration We. Sinhala terrorism any apparent Ca wanton Sinhala C nding the loss of sufferings wrough mils, the Tamil Pol fully and tenacious a peaceful solutio inequality and dis and justice, by en with ruling Sri Lan all these negotiati nought.
The first was t lvanayakam Pact some promise of a of the Tamil peo political status. Bu following the intole by some of the Si mprising a few me Clergy and oppo The next betrayal the Dudley-Chelve met With the Same the intolerance ar by extremist elem the ranks of the G
The situation in t sing discriminati ties
in the nineteer quite clear to the leadership, that t faith anymore in th Seventies ushere heaped upon the discrimination and lar sufferings
(a) discriminatio dents and in contra for Sinhala student to the Universities
(b) drafting and neither With the le the Representativ any sensitivity to Tamil people;

int protests by Tamils atary legislation and e Suppressed by Such but also even without Se there haVe been nslaughts. Notwithstalife, property and the on the humiliated Taitical Leadership hopely struggled onto reach n to these problems of :rimination with dignity tering into discussions ka Governments. Alas; ons however ended in
he Bandaranaike-Cheof 1957 which held out laying a few of the fears ple in regard to their t this Pact was torn up rance and threat posed nhalese extremistS COmbers of the Buddhist sition political leaders. of trust OCCurred When anayakam Pact of 1965 | aboritive fate owing to d opposition mounted ents within and without OVernment.
he seventies: increaon againstthe minori
Seventies it became Tamil people, and their hey cannot place their e Sinhalese State. The d in a period which Tamils more and more further repeated regu
against Tamil stustafavoured treatment sin making admissions
adopting a Constitution gitimate participation of s of the Tamils nor with the aspirations of the
(c) removal of Articles 29 of the 1947 Constitution and abolition of the Senate both Of Which had afforded SOme Semblance of deterrence to the enactment of discriminatory legislation injuring racial and religious minorities;
(d) enshrinement of Buddhist as the fo
rmost religion of a multi-religious hitherto
secular country;
(e) embodying Sinhala as the only Official Language in the Constitution itself;
(f) politicisation and greater Sinhalisa
tion of the Public Service to the disadvantage of the minorities in particular the Tamils; and
(g) declaration of the State as Unitary thereby pre-empting the possibility of power sharing with the minorities in a multi-ethnic seciety.
As a result of all these invidiously discriminatory and partisan actions, the Tamil
ماة ة
people lost confidence in the Sinhala Sta
te; the Tamil Youth, in particular withdrew their trust in parliamentary processes and Sought other ways and means of gaining redress to their grievances which already had been demonstrated by discontented Sinhala Youth in the JVP uprising in 1971.
In 1974, the discontent and distrust of
the Tamil Youth got incurably exacerbated because of the unjust, suppressive
and brutal handling by the government authorities of the peaceful international Tamil Cultural and Research Conference held in Jaffna in 1974. The removal of
Article 29 and abolition of the Senate do
not constitute mere Constitutional amendments but are unilateral acts of retraction from a solemn understanding or compact that formed the bedrock on which the British commended for acceptance the Constitution of 1947 to the minorities. The Tamil leadership being prudently apprehensive of the fragile and vulnerable position of the minorities under a permanent Sinhala majority rule following the transfer of power had lobbied for “balanced representation". As feared, since 1972 the distinctively eminent place acco

Page 10
rded to Buddhism coupled with the constitutional entrenchment of Sinhala as the Official Language destroyed the secular character of a multi religious and multi linqual polity; and instead elevated the Sinhala Buddhists to a superordinate status resulting in making the minorities unequal to them, permanently relegated to an inferior level with no prospects of sharing power as equal citizensin a national polity.
Politicising of the Public Service in the context of Sinhala being the Language of Government and Administration resulted in the almost total marginalisation of the Tamil Public Servants who were not proficient in Sinhalese, a language unfamiliar to them, and drastically reduced the cnances of entry of the Tamil speaking people into the Public Sector.
The declaration of Sri Lanka as an "Unitary State" was a deliberate and malicious ploy to foreclose any ways and means of responding constructively to the aspirations of the Tamil people who saw in a Federal set-up alone, the possibility of peaceful co-existence as equals in a united country. It is not to our surprise that in this stipulation lay the seeds of the later notorious Sixth Amendment of 1983 which viciously excluded from Office the
elected representatives of the Tamilpeo
ple who refused to subscribe to the co"ncept of an Unitary State.
Response of the Tamil leadership to the inequities piled on the Tamil minority in the seventies.
The cumulative effects of the degradation that the Tamil people had to suffer since independence in the fields of public and national life and driven the Tamil Leadership to take two cardinal steps:-
(a) the Leader of the Tamil people, Mr. S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, resinged his seat in Parliament and challenged the Government to have him contested at a by-election on the issue of the acceptance or rejection by the Tamil people of the 1972 Constitution; and
(b) having won the by-election by a co
8
nvicing majority and the ved a mandate to rejed of 1972, he declared t alternative now but for to strive to regain their
Mr. S.J.V. Chelvana tion was duly endorse at its Vaddukkoddai CC
The end of the term regime in 1977 left the hopeless state withou sight whatsoever to at problems. The discont in particular saw no ho
remedy of their grieva
parliamentary processa ever increasing faith i measures; the Tamil Were disSatisfied andre despondent faced with ment Of the Sri Lanka-B ty in every sphere of p life.
The post 1977 positi and the crisis worser
Having experienced tion, suppression and through an escalating rism, the Tamil peopl flickering light of hope it were held Out in the Manifests of 1977. This sed the plight of the Tar dged that several grie the Tamil people to der so as to live as citize peace and dignity. U.N.P. promised to con Conference to seek SC ssing problems of the
Nevertheless, the p Constitution only stiflec the contrary subordina ple to the Sinhala Stat elevating the Sinhala dominant group; and t inference was Convenie Constitutional status ( even more strongly rei it wellnigh impossible Status Without reCOurs

reby having receiit the Constitution hat there Was no the Tamil people lost sovereignty.
|yakam's declarad by the T.U.L.F. nvention of 1976.
of the S.L.F.P.'s Tamil people in a it any Solution in ny of their severe anted Tamil youth pe of gaining any tnces through the and began to place n extra-legislative people in general mained Sullen and n the aggrandiseBuddhist Communiublic and national
on: hopes belied
S
an era of alienasilencing of them use of State terroe, yet saw some n the promises that U.N.P.'s Election Manifests diagnomils and acknowlevances compelled mand a Tamil State ns of the island in Consequently the Vene around-table lutions to the preTamil people.
Ost election 1978 i any hope, and on ted the Tamil peoe still further, while
Buddhists as the he round-table co2ntly forgotten. The of unitariness was nforced by making 2 to change that e to a referendum
in a country where the Sinhala Buddhists remain an overwhelming preponderent permanent majority, and the inevitable foregone one sided result of such a referendum will offer no help whatever to meet the Tamil minority's hope and legitimate aspiration.
The Status of Buddhism was constitutionally given a more favoured position by making it incumbent on the State to foster and further the faith. As an earnest of this four BO-leaves were introduced into the Sri Lankan Flag, the original design of which itself had already hurt the sentiments of the minorities. Representation accorded to the Tamil people in Parliament was further diminished by allotting an equal number of territorial seats to all provinces, regardless of their extent while the disfranchisement of the Plantation Tamils already had decreased representation of the Tamil people. What had been provided in an earlier prescription for distributing seats as a safeguard for the minorities was now contrarily perverted to enhance Sinhala representation resulting in 74% of the Sinhala people being able to enjoy 82% of the representation in the Legislature.
The grafting of an highly centralised Executive Presidency on a Parliamentary Democracy, as was done, has not only COntributed to the deValuation Of StatuS of Parliament but also rendered it weIl-nigh impossible for the Tamil people to realise their aspiration to share political power through the means of devolution and federalism.
As outlined above, diverse forms of discrimination and outlawing from the polity were perpetrated through the enactment of a new and the use and misuse of that constitution.
In addition, administrative actions Continued to be taken SO as to discriminate further against the Tamils and alienate them, while the might of the security forces was deployed to ensure the fulfilment of these unjust objectives by suppressing the peaceful protest of the Tamil people of the North and East.
(To be Continued)

Page 11
Chairman Sees a federal SC
The interim report of the Parliamentary Select Committee, mandated to find a consensus solution to the national question will be presented to Parliament after October 15. In an interview. With Rita Sebastian Chairman of the Committee, Mangala Moonesinghe, for the first time Since he Chaired the discussions answers questions ranging from Why he moved the motion for a Select Committee, to the overallachievements of two years of deliberations, he sees federalism on the Indian model as a possible constitutional solution to the conflict.
Q: What made you move the motion in Parliament for a Select Committee to find a consensus political solution to the national question?
A: I felt the country was in the mood for a peaceful resolution of the national conflict, having judged the tempo in Parliament even among extremist groups. For the first time there was an opportunity to get the elected representatives, of all shades of opinion, to Collectively pursue the possibility for a peace through discussion. Had I moved this motion 5 years ago it Would not have been accepted unanimously by all parties. That alone is an achievement. Not since independence has the opposition and government sat down to find a solution. Earlier attempts, first in 1957 when the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) reached agreement with the Tamil parties it was opposed vehemently by the United National Party (UNP) in opposition. In 1966 when Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake with S.J.V. Chelvanayakam came to an agreement the SLFP in power sabotaged it. So you the Sinhala parties have been playing politics with the national question.
Q: How did the public respond to your appeal for their participation in the deliberation?
A: 300 or more memoranda Came in. We classified them under political parties, other organisations and under those who came before the Committee and gave evidence.
Q: Did the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as reported submit a proposal?
A: No all other Tamil parties responded but the LTTE maintained a noble Silence. So it was clear that the LTTE was not prepared to participate in any negotiations. It is unfortunate that the LT TE did not make use of this body comprising both government and opposition, for any agreement with such a body would have been an agreement with both government and opposition. So it was now very clear that with the LTTE not participating there would be no easy resolution of the conflict.
Q: How then can you achieve peace when the main party to the conflict
hasn't participate tiations? A: The Committe for other options tc would take longer, devising new strat Q: How Succes Se? A: That mainly V the area of conflic try to return that a rmalcy.
Q: How were yo
A: Jaffna MP, MI 2 separate units, its 98%. Tamils, ar thnic east Where t ntation of all three federal structure. 45 members of t agreed to 2 separa and a Constitution Indian model. The majority, agreed t of the COnCurrent | and de VOlve them ncils. This Was One and the provinces riably the centre a powers depriving t and thereby nullify of devolution. G: What were agreement? A: Having heard nce, the Committe wherever possible east, local election Q: What purpo ctions serve? A: Both in the no been no elections People are mostly a Governor admini it would be healthy in the elections SC get used to adminis and also throw up For instance a Tam which is an entity elect its own repre own area. So by democracy like W South With the Jan: (JVP). G: When did th ther with Ceylor (CWC) Preside move out of the A: When it was Provincial COuncil: G: What about Congress (SLMC A: They agreed of the two provin their mind and mc ttee. But there are

lution on the Indian Model
d in the peace nego
!e had to now look out achieve peace, which and which also meant egies. sful was that exerci
las to free one part of t namely the east and rea to peace and no
u going to do that?
. Srinivasan proposed One for the north with hd one for the multi-e- here is equal represecommunities, within a At that stage 40 of the he Select Committee ate Provincial Councils similar to that of the Committee also by a D diminish the powers ist or eliminate it totally to the Provincial Couarea where the Centre had dual powers. Invassigned to itself all the he Provincial Councils ing the whole purpose
the other areas of
the army give evidee was of the view, that , both in the north and IS must be held.
Se WOuld O'Call elle
rth and east there haVe for the past 6 years. in refugee camps. Only strates these areas. SO for peopleto participate ) that they once again stering their own affairs, some new leadership. lil Pradesheeya Sabha, of governance could sentatives to governits
bringing in a civilian that happened in the atha Vimukti Peramuna
e Tamil parties togeWorkers Congress ht S. Thondmanan Select Committee?
agreed to have two S for the north and east. che Sri Lanka Muslim )? at first to the delinking xes, but later changed Ved Out of the Commia number of Muslims
and Tamils in the Select Committee. The idea for 2 separate Councils came about When some of the Sinhalese and Muslims gave evidence before the Committee. Their contention was that the Controversial merger had taken place without asking the people. So they wanted a referendum to decide the issue.
It is unfortunate that these parties should have taken a negative attitude and moved out while the whole purpose of the exercise was to see whether other options could be looked into like a re-demarcation of boundaries where you can still achieve a merged north east. Or you could have a separate constitutional structure where you have 2 Separate Councils and Apex body elected by the 2 Councils with administrative powers over the north-east. It would thus satisfy both demands, a merger and de-merger. None of these parties were willing to explore the possibilities. Q: How would your Committee seek to achieve peace given these conStraints?
A: Since the LTTE has not come forward peace will have to take a more, protracted and circuitous route. There is peace in the south and economic activity is nothe uptake providing jobs and income to the population. The strategy of the Select Committee therefore is to provide the infrastructure for development in the east. There is on hold 580 million US dollars already pledged for development of the north east by the international community.
There is a possibility of 2 highways, one to Trincomalee and one to Batticaloa. This would immediately generate plenty of jobs for people in the province as well as attract Tamils from the north to the east in Search
of jobs. Already as a result of the Mahaveli
development Strategies in the east new " agricultural exports all adding to the incomes of the rural people. The Australian government has already started building an international airport in Hingusakgoda to service the new exports and once tourism develops the east will naturally benefit. Trincomalee can also be made into an export processing Zone and an industrial enclave which will attract foreign investment and provide the foundation for an economic take-off. So if peace cannot be hammered out at the table, peace will be brought to a greater geographic area which will generate new employment and increased incomes leaving terrorism Without the people.
Q: Will the proposals of the Committee be debated in Parliament? and, will some of them be implemented?
A: It is possible that Parliament might appoint a smaller group of MPs to sit with a technical team to implement a constitutional change with a concept of federalism on lines similar to the Indian constitution.
9

Page 12
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doorstep ss from selected stands
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0.504

Page 13
MID-EAST PEACE
Norway's Rol
Stephen S. Rosenfeld
WASHINGTON
Norwegian diplomacy made a Crucial contribution insetting up secret Israeli-Palestinian talks and, beyond that, in steering those talks toward agreement. In all the celebration of Middle East peacemaking, however, the assumption seems to be that the facilitating and mediating role of Small, independent Norway is over. Is it? The question bears centrally on how the peace process had best now proceed.
it had become almost an article of faith that only a vigorous American role could induce suspicious Israelis and Palestinians to make, to the United States, the necessary concessions that they could not make to each other. The well-publicized onest of Secretary of State Warren Christopher's direct personal involvement earlier in the summer had been widely and positively taken as confirmation of U.S. seriousness as Well American essentia
lity.
The unique superpower status of the United States makes it the dominant actor, by acts forgone if not by acts committed, even When its Visible role is Subded. But at the cutting edge of day-to-day policy initiative, there is room for play. This we could see, looking backward, when Norway's part in the yearlong back-channel Middle East negotiations was revealed.
At first the common impression was that the Norwegians had by Some quirk of circumstance found their way to a gambit that by chance and good fortune happened to pay off. But then it became clear that the Norwegians had given us all a lesson in practical statesmanship.
Their access and their acceptance came not from chance or intrusiveness but from the protracted deliberate cultivation of contacts and the building of credibility with Israel's Labor Party (by Norway's Labor government)as well as with Palestinians (through Norway's work in humanitarian relief and peacekeeping).
One can guess that the evident disinterest of this Nordic country in a particular Middle East outcome helped make Oslo palatable as a go-between. This is on top of the deft professionalism of Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen Holstandhisaides.
They brought into Sametexts, the tw in the World.
suspect there tion. In dealing V could try and fail Without all the dra that attend Amel gional diplomacy Norway, it woulc World.
The progress change that cor between tWO Sn' joins in. The sm shifting some of ting with each o Shot's favor.
Some of that f rning to Washing only unavoidable move On. We Art gic and economic the horses, includ and a diplomatic dness. We have cially after the Ra and with all his affairs, is now pla Middle East enga
But what intrig lis and Palestinia gically liberated mmering out, pri the path-breakin cognition and fir: lf-rule.
The parties re after all, in the n OWn national des habit of their de main profoundly cing the indepen as they seek to kthrough, it may that the two will voice and large States every ste
if this is so, the to prepare to stay of the parties' p some other ap might still offer a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Se
the same room, and the omostdistrustful parties
Was a further Considerafith Norway, the parties in relative obscurity and ma, weight and publicity ican participation in re... if the exercise failed in not be the end of the
may also reflect the mes over a negotiation all-fry when a big shot all-fry can hardly avoid heir focus from negotiather to seeking the big
amiliar and reflexive tugton is bound to be not but useful as events ericans have Our Strateinterests. We have, still, ling money and a military practiced in evenhandea president who, espebin-Arafat extravaganza emphasis on domestic inly tempted by highwire agement.
Jesme is whether israehs may not feel psycholoby their success in haactically by themselves, g accords on mutual rest-stage Palestinian se
Igularly claim to speak, ame of carving out their tinies. Given the fact and pendency, they may reambivalent about practidence they profess. But Consolidate their breano longer be so certain need the inevitably loud weight of the United ) of the way.
an Washington will want a bit removed from Some roceedings. Norway or propriate world citizen hand. This might trouble
some Americans, and not just for reasons of pride: The United States has reason to be involved in the making of any large and risky Middle East settlement it will be called on to underwrite. Already Mr. Clinton has been jumped by critics citing the secret Norway talks as evidence of his irrelevance or ineptness. The right response is that Middle East peace comes first.
- The Washington Post
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11

Page 14
Norway's peace brokers forge
A Norwegian team of four, headed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Johan Jorgen Holst, played a vital role in bringing about the historic peace agreement between Israel and the PLO which was signed in Washington on 13 September.
The basis for parts of the agreementwhich could be the first step along the path to lasting peace in the Middle East - was in fact laid in the minister's private home. The Norwegian contribution has by no means gone unnoticed in the US capital. "The world is indebted to Norway," President Bill Clinton said at a press Conference.
Direct Israeli-PLO negotiations started in Madrid in October 1991, constituting what Johan Jorgen Holst called "the front door to peace". What the world did not know was that Norway had opened a back door, playing an "honest broker' role in negotiations which formed an alternative to the deadlocked talks in Madrid, and later in Washington. President Clinton's administration was aware of the Outlines of what was happening in Norway, but by its own wish, was not informed of the details.
Johan Jorgen Holst described Norway's role in the peace process at a press conference in Olso, reveling that no less than 14 Israeli-PLO meetings lasting 23 days had taken place in Norway under conditions of deepest secrecy, 11 of them
during the past fou delegates' task was to h. proposal for an agreeme accepted by both sides. to mediate when the t need of it," said Holst. B minister Shimon Pe delegation leader A characterized the Norwe as indispensable.
According to Holst, Were COnducted in t preparatory phase from January 1993, an "acad January to March of thi negotiations from Aprilt
FAFO led the way
Norway's direct involv mediator Came about th Norwegian Trade Union Science and Researc FAFO had been Worki living conditions for Pa occupied territories, C Norway's former Mini Affairs Thorvald St secured them contac Israelis and the PL( Sufficient Confidence alternative diplomatic ch
FAFO played a major intermediary in up to 2 a day between the si traditions of shuttle dipl followed Shimon Peres
CORRESPONDENCE
1948-49 Disenfranchisement
A.M. Nawaratna Bandara and Sumanasiri Liyanage state in their paper, "Sri Lankan Conflict" Consociational Solution” (LG, Oct. 15) that the main objection to the Citizenship Act No. 18 of 1948 and the Parliamentary Election Amendment AC NO. 48 Of 1949 “Came not from the famil representatives but from the parliamentarians of the Left parties". This is only apartial truth, initially highlighted by Kumarijayewardene. A clarification is warranted so that the views of the Tamil MPs who opposed the 1948-49 Disenfranchisement Acts are properly interpreted.
In my view, the phrase "main objection" should be qualified in terms of the number of MPs who were elected to the 1947 parliament. As all know, the number of MPs representing the Sinhalese constituencies were higher than that of the number of MPs representing the Tamil constituencies. 1947 election returned 15 MPs from LSSP and BLP. Three MPs represented the CP. Of these 18 MPs representing the Left parties, around 10 owed their election to the support of the Indian Tamil voters. So, one can easily comprehend why the MPs of the Left parties opposed the 1948-49 Disenfranchisement Acts. With all due respect to their principled stand on the rights of ethnic minorities in 1947, one could infer that the opposition to the 1948-49 Disenfranchisement Acts provided by the Left MPs was just a knee-jerk
12
reaction to a "life-death" situa representation in parliam (especially the post-1960 b and CP on the issues of eth that the 1948-49 response C just that.
Among the two major parti the Tamils in the 1947 parliar has 7 MPS. Of these Chelwanayakamand C. Van the 1948-49 Disenfranchise frOm the TC to form the Fe MPs (which included S. Thor the Ceylon Indian Congress Acts. Arithmetically speaking the parties of Tamil interests Acts, while 5 MPs supportec Suntharalingam, one of th ministers in the D.S. Senana from the Cabinet in 1948 to e to the two Disenfranchisem
Osaka BioScience institute, Japan.
Ancestral
Mr. A.Y.S. Gnanam, inale October) reveals how (when J. R. Jayawardena had veste in Grandpass (then ow

ed Mid-East breakthrough
r months. The
ammer out a draft
nt which could be "Our mission was wo Sides felt the oth Israeli foreign res and PLO Abu Ala later egian contribution
the negotiations hree phases, a January 1992 to emic" phase from s year and direct O August.
ement as a Secret rough FAFO, the Centre for SOcial ch. Since 1988, ng on a study of alestinians in the ommissioned by ister of Foreign oltenberg. This its among both O and fostered to Open up an hannel in Oslo.
role, acting as an O telephone calls deS. In the best omacy Holst also to Stockholm and
Helsinki when the Israeli foreign minister paid official visits to the Nordic capitals last month. He met with Peres in the evenings and continued his secretive efforts.
On 20 August, Israeli and PLO representatives initialled atentative peace agreement in Olso, in the presence of the Israeli foreign minister, Shimon Peres.
Family atmosphere
The Oslo team of four Consisted of tWO married couples, Holst and his wife Marianne Heiberg, who led the FAFO study group, and FAFO head Terje Rod-Larsen and his wife Mona Juul, Who Works in Holst's secretariat. Holst speaks highly of the contribution of the other three and is also firmly convinced that the family atmosphere helped break down the barriers of suspicion and reserve and gradually got the adversaries onto good, even intimate, terms.
When the going got hard, talks were broken off to allow the participants to take a stroll in the nearby woods or to enjoy a good meal together, in order to restore the convivial atmosphere.
The role of Norway's peace brokers has been praised throughout the world and at home Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland called it "the biggest triumph in the history of Norwegian foreign policy. All four mediators were President Clinton's guests when the agreement was signed in Washington.
- Norway Now
ation threatening their ent. Later eventS ehavior of the LSSP nic minorities) proved if the Left parties was
es which represented ment, Tamil Congress seven, two (S.J.V. niasingham) opposed 2ment Acts and Split deral Party. All the 7 daman) representing opposed the 1948-49 g, 9 MPs representing opposed the 1948-49 d these Acts. Also, C. e two anni Cabinet yake regime resigned 2xpress his opposition ent ACtS.
Sachi Sri Kantha
homes
etter to the island (27th he was president) Mr. ed his ancestral home ned by Mrs. R.T.
Abeysekera) in the government only to be foiled by President Premadasa's decision to divest the property. One Wondershow the country's interests would have been served by such an acquisition at the taxpayers' expense.
We recall that the house at Turret Road where Mr Jayawardena grew up was sold to the Chinese government for its embassy and, later, during Mr. Jayawardena's regime was acquired by the government with taxpayers' money, at ten times the price which the Chinese had paid for it, for the purpose of making it a J.R. Jayawardena Museum. A grateful public setting up a museum posthumously for a departed leader is one thing. For an elected politician transiently in office to use taxpayers' money to set up a museum to perpetuate his name is quite another matter
More recently we read that Mr. Jayawardena had gifted his house in Ward Place "to the nation" - but this too was for the storing and exhibition of J. R.J. artefacts.
When Sir John left his Kandawela estate to the nation he did not stipulate that it should be used to perpetuate his name. It was used by a grateful nation to set up a Defence Academy.
it would seem that to Mr. Jayawardena the perpetuation of his name is a "national purpose". Piyalı Gamage
Colombo 4.

Page 15
THE J. R. YEARS (14)
The Presidentii
Arden
у mid-1982 J.R. Jayewardene's mind was full of the general election
that was due in a year. He had many ideas. On 8 July cabinet spokesman A. de Alwis, Minister of State, announced a whole lot of changes that were to be made in the election laws. Coming after Kalawana and Panadura, the ruling party's plan to meddle with the election laws on the eve of the general election was cause for alarm. The proposals included:
1.
Shortening the period between the announcement of parliamentaryellections and the date for nominations from 14 days to 7;
Shortening the period between the announcement of presidential ellections and the date for nominations from 16 days to 7;
Shortening the period between nominations for parliamentary ellections and voting from 3-9 weeks to 2 weeks; and
Shortening the period for nominations for presidential elections and voting from 1-2 months to 2 weeks.
(All these changes Would confermaterial advantages on the ruling party which could prepare its candidates before announcing the dates for nominations and voting).
Making the allocation of radio and television time to parties discretionaryby administrative decisioninstead of mandatory;
Changing the defamation laws making it obligatory for newspapers
a) to provide financial security for damages claimed in defamation actions against them; and
b) to cease publication until security was provided. (A mere unfounded action coupled with a demand for heavy damages could silence a neWSpaper at election time.)
7. Changing th 21 day perio which elec change parti assuring a si 8. Allowing the parliament e at his Sole di
9. Authorising t seek re-elect term of 6 ye 4 years,
10. Abolishing p P.R. election the parties c mbers from and
11. Changing thi
i) to mak election a pe civic rights merely to hav but also to b civic rights Committed a
ii) to make of parliamen petition is fil from the mor and
iii) to make Such a Candi district (i.e. n injunction be court of appe of the party c Would be dis was made th disability hac Of one Candi
The proposals r The C.R.M. pointe rnment to uSeitS di to bring about fai election laws sho

Y , V) ',
(%
*、
ஆ
’ LA
al Election
2 Constitution to allow a d after elections during ted members could es “for the purpose of able government"; president to dissolve a lected by popular vote, scretion, at any time;
he serving president to tion before his statutory ars, after the expiry of
riority in party lists for is so that after the polls ould nominate their meanywhere in their lists,
e law on civic disability;
ea candidate in whose rson deprived of his/her participates, liable not fe his election Setaside, be deprived of his own for 7 years as having Corrupt practice;
2 it illegal for a member t against whom such a ed to sit in parliament, ment the petition is filed;
! votes for the party of date invalid in the entire otto be counted) on an 2ing applied for in the al. (i.e. every candidate Oncerned in the district qualified if an allegation at a person under civic intervened on behalf date).
aised a howl of protest. dout that “for the govesproportionate majority r-reaching changes to ortly before a general
election without the Consent of the other parties would be a travesty of democracy".
After the cabinet meeting of 21 July 1982, the presidential secretariat issued a communique stating that the cabinet had approved a bill to amend the constitution to enable the president, at any time after the expiry of 4 years of his term of office, by proclamation, to declare his intention to seek election for a further term. The president told his party M.P.'s that there
had been no decision on the other ame
ndments proposed.
A possible reason for the president's hesitation was the report that Mrs. Bandaranaike had said that she Would throW a spanner in his works by publicly canvassing for U.N.P. candidates
The Daily News reported that authoritative sources had said that several propoSed amendments had been Sent to the attorney-general for his opinion, some of which were considered to require a referendum. (22 July 1982)
Since the proposed third amendment providing for two seats for Kalawana had now been dropped, the amendment now proposed would be the third. Abill entitled "The Third Amendment to the Constitution" was gazetted on 16 July 1982.
On 22 July the U.N.P. government completed five years in office. On this same day a public meeting had been arranged at the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress Hall in Colombo. At this meeting Professor Sarachchandra, a well-known public figure and a former Ambassador to France, began a lecture entitled "The Decline of Lankan Culture in Recent Years'. The speaker started off with a reference to the government's open economy policy when a gang of thugs in the audience rushed to the platform and beat up Professor Sarachchandra and several others on the rostrum, including some Buddhist monks.
13

Page 16
The opposition newspaper Aththa next day carried a list of the government-o-
wned vehicles which had been used to
transport the thugs to and from the meeting.
A person called Piyasena Jayaweera, described as an "assistant' to the Minister of Industries Mr. Cyril Mathew made a statement to the press that he accepted responsibility for trying to stop Professor Sarachchandra from "attacking government policy". (The Nation 30 July 1982).
Neither the president not the prime minister made any statement about the incident. Commented the Nation: "it will be recalled that President Jayewardene ordered the army last month to forcibly take over a temple in Getambe belonging što a Buddhist monk who allegedly criticised the president at a public meeting. These troops are still in occupation of the temple while the government is taking action to cancel the lease agreement covering the temple land".
On 9 August the C.R.M. petitioned the Supreme Court stating that the proposed third amendment was inconsistent with the sovereignty clause in the constitution (Article 3) and therefore required both a two-thirds vote and a referendum (Article 83). lt submitted, inter alia:
"In the case of the 1978 constitution, there are two independent instruments of state power deriving their authority directly from the people. These are the president of the republic on the one hand and parliament on the other. Parliament has neither privity nor status in the delegation of executive power from the people to the president. It is therefore the inalienable right of the people to decide and determine the nature and the Content of the office of their delegate viz. that of the president, through whom they exercise their executive power".
The supreme Court took the view that the amendment maintained the Sovereignty of the people because election by the people was made a precondition of holding the office of president and, therefore, ruled that Article 83 was not applicable i.e. no referendum was required.
The third amendment became law on
27 August 1982 and by a proclamation issued on the same day the president
14
declared his intention ( ction for a second term inted Professor Wiswa W Dias Hewagama:
"The passage of the and the Proclamatio demonstrated the Cor litical manipulations powerto suit the pers the incumbent Presic it was guided and desire to take advant situation in the countr Of Which Vas the utt Opposition forces. T the context of its unpr. early presidential ele to the disarray in its
the challenge of findin date whose nation match that of the dent....The most imp had brought about th ranks of the Oppositi the ranks of the S.L. which came in the w; tion of civic disabilities naike in October 198( existence a major cris in the annals of the S
(Recent Politics ir
When following his ction victory in 1977 J without loss of time gotg to eliminate Mrs. Band political scene, he col hoped for such a total ( in the enemy camp whe re-election.
Due to in-fighting in who got the S.L.F.P.nc dential candidate was ctor Kobbelkaduwa, a who had neitheranatior Bandaranaike’s blessi shadow ministers, fo S.L.F.P. Was the priva Bandaranaike family, c ssible moment to try democratic base and leave Mrs. Bandaranai altogether. It was a V failure and was entire worse, it ruined the p chances. Kobbekaduw of the C.P., the M.E.P. groups; he was the fro tion candidate against
 

of seeking re-elein Office. CommeVarnapala and Dr.
third amendment n which followed Istitutionaland po
of the party in sonal ambitions of ent and above all motivated by the age of the political y, the main feature er disarray of the he Opposition in eparedness foran ction, due largely own ranks, faced ga suitable candiall stature could incumbent PresiOrtant factor which is confusion in the On was the split in F.P., and this split ake of the imposiSon Mrs. Bandara), had brought into sis unprecedented S.L.F.P'.
Sri Lanka: 1983)
tremendOuS elleJ. R. Jayewardene |oing with his plans aranaike from the ld Scarcely have discombO/bulation in he came to seek
he party, the man mination aspresihe lack-lustre Heformer minister, hastature nor Mrs. ng Some of her rgetting that the te property of the hose the worst poto give it a wider even, if possible, ke out of the party enture doomed to ely misconceived, arty's presidential ra had the support and some splinter nt-running opposiJayewardene and
put up a Surprisingly tough fight Considering all his disadvantages. It is not outrageousto supposethathadhe Mrs. Bandaranaike's goodwill and tacit Support (tacit because she was legally disqualified from openly supporting a candidate) Kobbekaduwa might even have won. Contributing to Kobbekaduwa’s electioneering difficuties was another hopeful aspirant to office Colvin R. de Silva of the L.S.S.P. who received almost no votes at all (less than one percent of the total polled) but was able grievously to injure Kobbekaduwa’s chances. As Warnapala and Hewagama relate it:
“Dr. Colvin R. de Silva ... brought forward the famous "law point' of the election campaign, and besides providing the U.N.P. with a powerful campaign weapon and creating further Confusion in the ranks of the S.L.F.P. it weakened and damaged Hector Kobbekaduwa’s campaign. Dr. Colvin R. de Silva to confuse the mind of the electorate in respect of the candidature of Hector Kobbekaduwa, stated that the Candidate of the S.L.F.P. had been nominated by a party the leader of which was 'a person who had been deprived of her civic rights. His argument was that Kobbekaduwa if elected could be unseated on the ground that he was the nominee of a political party whose functioning president had been deprived of her civic rights. This view was published in the course of the campaign.... The newspapers controled by the government, seeking to take full advantage of this controversy, made it a battle between the L.S.S.P. and the S.L.F.P..The Secretary of the L.S.S.P. Bernard Soysa stated that "the unseating of Kobbekaduwa could result in J.R. Jayewardene being declared elected President' and this interpretation, according to him, was made on the basis of the electoral laws... This law point of Dr. Colvin R. de Silva more than any other issue in the campaign damaged the electoral prospects of the S.L.F.P".
(Recent Politics in Sri Lanka).
J.R. Jayewardene won with 52.9% of the votes cast but only 42.37% of the votes in the register. Kobbekaduwa received Over 39% of the votes cast which, considering his mediocore image and all the obstacles he had to face was an impressive performance.

Page 17
India : Ayodhya
Shelton Kodikara
AE from the ban on the RSS (Rashtriya Swyamsevak Sangh) VHP (Vishwa Hindu Parishad), and Bajrang Dal, now lifted except in the case of the Bajrang Dal, the most important short-term impact of Ayodhya was the Centre's imposition of presidential rule in the four BJP-ruled states of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Himachal Pradesh. The UP Chief Minister, Kalyan Singh, had himself been a witness to the Babri Masjid demolition and, unlike Some other BJP leaders, did not have regrets over the incident. On the contrary, he acclaimed it as a matter of pride for Hindus. However, the extent to which the BJP leadership can be held solely respoinsible for its failure to redeem its assuranCeS that the kar SeVa On 6 DeCember 1992 Would be performed without prejudice to the existing Babri-masjid structure, is a matter of debate. The BJP is not alone in assigning part of the blame for the aberrant behaviour of Hindu activists at Ayodhya on the Narasimha Rao government's own ambivalence and Vacillation on the issue of constructing a Rammandir on the spot where the Babri Masjid existed. Some have argued that the presidential proclamation taking over the state of Uttar Pradesh should have been enacted before the destruction of the mosque on a calculation of probabilities, and not post facto as as actually done. Constitutional proprieties may not have permitted such a course, for the relevantArt.356 provided only for a contingency after "a situation had arisen", and not when "a situation was likely to arise". Prime Minister Narasimha Rao himself declared in the lok Sabha that curbs would have to be placed on "non-secular" parties which might introduce religious issues into lectoral politics, and that Art. 356 Would have to be amended to allow the Central take-Over of a state government if a situation had arisen in which the constitutional machinery could not be expected to function according to expectations. He said:
There will have to be a national debate on the place of non-secular parties in India. For if a party takes Lord Ram as an issue and the contending parties in an electoral battle do not do so, it becomes an unequalfight.
Dr. Kodikara is Sri Lanka's foremost scholaron India and Indo-Sri Lankan affairs.
The Country C: electoral verdict he is. (Hindusth
Prime Minister through Parliamer tion separating proved to be ab (1993), but he ha that he Would “Spá legislation passe( and politics are efforts are being said, and he affi preventing politic mileage through m News, 4 Septemb
Constitutional may or may not of Ayodhya-type protagonists are sques in other pla and Mathura, Wh dhya, alleged to Hindu temples ex point is that a senic cabinet, Arjun Sin upon the Congres the nation for what in Ayodhya. Arjur a lone voice in th advocacy of a S against the Hindu espoused by th appears to have ngress party. Prin Sent stance about tion of religion an be partly a tactic under Arjun Singh
Electoral Prospe
It is yet too pre any degree of cert the Communal vio that were connect electoral prospect Significant as ar trends in India mig although the BJP's political party mig! both nationally anc dhya its electoralp improving. An Indi poll conducted in reCaSt thatif an el time, the BJP wol fifty seats (from its
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

a and after
innot afford an unfair Let Ram remain where an Times 22 Nov. 92)
Rao's attempt to get it the proposed legislareligion from politics ortive in late Angust reiterated to his party reno efforts" to get the eventually. "Religion already separate, but made to mix them", he med the necessity of parties from "getting isuse of religion". Daily er 1993).
amendment, however, prevent the recurrence Vandalisms. Hindutiva alredy targetting moCes, such AS Varanasi ich are also, like Ayobe built on sites where isted before. The moot or minister in Rao's OWn gh, should have called is party to apologize to was allowed to happen Singh's is now rather le government, but his tronger secularist line tva challenge than that e the Prime Minister a following in the Cone Minister Rao's prelegislating the separad politics may, in fact, o drag the carpet from 's feet.
CtS
mature to assess With ainty how Ayodhya and lence and bomb blasts ed to it might affect the s of the political parties. indicator of political ht be the possibility that s image as a rSponsible ht have been tarnished dinternationally by Ayorospects seemed to be a Today MARGopinion mid-January (1993) foection were held at that uld have gained about
present 119), Congre
ss-I would have lost twelve seats (from its present 245) and the Janata dal would have also lost about twenty seats (from its 1991 election figure of 55) in a Lok Sabha of 537 members. Intra-party divisions are surfacing in all three of these parties, though least visibly in the BJP (where also electoral tactics and strategy could potentially be divisive), and local leaderships and regional caste and religious compulsions may be determining in a very volatile political situation. The MARG poll appears to have been supported to some extent by the May by-elections for sixteen State Assembly seats and parliamentary elections for two seats. The BJP gained two Assembly seats in Gujarat at these elections, retaining two others, showing a higher poll percentage in this state than in the 1991 elections, and polling higher also in the Karnataka constituency of Yelahanka, which was retained by Congress with the slim majority of 500 Votes.
Congress-l on only four of the sixteen constituencies contested, though its victory in the parliamentary constituency of Jalandhar in Punjab, where it beat the Akali Dal candidate by a big margin, Was impressive. Congress also conceded two Assembly seats to the Telugu Desam in Andhra Pradesh, and one to the Samajwadi Janata Party in Haryana, leading Opposition commentator to applaud what they deemed to be an anti-Congress WaVe.
The Patna parliamentary seat was retained by the Janata Dal with an impressiwe majority, also lending support to the thesis that regional factors (in this instance the JDascendancy in Bihar and the strong anti-Brahmin stand of Janata Dal Chief Minister Laloo Prasad Yadav) may have been dominant at these elections. The BJP candidate in Jalandhar, for instance, lost his deposit, and the BJP has yet shown no signs of making any headway in the southern states or in West Bengal long an undisputed political domain of the CPM. Yet, the emerging trend is that the BJP will improve its showing in the Hindi belt, and this can only be at the expense of the Congress party. That the Ayodhya events have eroded the Congress support among the Muslims of the North is certain.
But this volatility is the prevailing characteristic of electoral politics at the Centre
15

Page 18
in India. Three things determine which party will win elections in India - one, the party machine, two, the charismatic personality, and three, the vote-winning slogan. Both Congress and the BJP have the party machine. On the level of charismatic personality, it seems that the BJP has settled for L. K. Advani, while who will lead the Congress-l at the next general ellections is by no means certain at present. As for the vote-winning slogan, the BJP Certainly has a big advantage in playing
the Hindu card, though, as mentioned above, whether it will be allowed to play it now remains to be seen. All indications point to the possibility that India's next Parliament, too, will be hung, and that the next government in New Delhi might possibly be a coalition.
international Repercussions of . Ayodhya
: The Ayodhya events had an immediate impact in souring still further India's relations with Pakistan and Bangladesh, which were already strained due to other causes, by injecting the religious dimeinsion, which had always been a latent factor in these two Islamic states. In Pakistan, it embarassed liberals and democrats who had been anti-authoritarian,
who had held up India's secular ideals, and for whom the two-nation theory now seemed to be vindicated. In Bangladesh, too, it dented further the Mujib vision of a secular polity and seemed to strengthen Ziaur Rahman’s image as architect of Bangladeshi nationalism. Begum Khalida Zia asserted that "the situation arising out of the demolition of the historic Babri mosque is fraught with the possibility of an adverse impact on Indo-Bangladeshi relations", and the Bangladeshi President himself, in addressing an opening session of Parliamnent, went on recordsaying that "the government strongly condemned the demolition of the historic Babrimosque by fundamentalist Hindus' and demanded its reconstruction at the previous site. (Hindusthan Times, 10 January 1993, Sunday Magazine)
A more concrete reaction was Dhaka's postponement of the seventh SAARC summit meeting, already once put off from December 1992 to January 1993 because of the situation in Ayodhya, because Muslim activists in the city vowed not to allow Prime Minister Rao to attend the summit unless he laid the foundation stone of the destroyed mosque in Ayodhya before leaving for the summit. The summit meeting, however, was held later in April 1993.
in Pakistan, already in August 1992, the National Assembly had unanimously ado
16
pted a resolution, ag entered a strong prote ncern and anguish ove secrate and demolish Masjid by Hindu extrem Hindu, 30 August, 199 ction of the mosque or Indian Consul-General rachi was wrecked by Pakistani government India to cut down its Ka
Our Hero ut May be only In his darün Regarding t
Money bein And Greed The process Aidsjor aji
Cooked app Smooth sai PriuCalte hiri Ensured thu
From Public VCIS"nt COn. The Mono V And fodder
The C-in-C Prepoisedp And Free M Putting Dre
Throat-cutt Workers ar Pre-emptive To be audi Of Uoices p. From Citize For those u Were Wall,
Reading th Julius' pick A Pardon f Jay-Wot-T,
SO CCanne D And Julius

ainst which india st, expressing co}r "attempts to dethe historic Babri ist elements“ (The 2) After the detru6 December, the 's residence in Kaunruly mobs. The t, further, asked rachiconsulate by
more than two-thirds, from 64 to 20, a request which India itself reciprocated by asking Pakistan to reduce its own High Commission staff in New Delhi by 25. (Ibid. 10 January 1993)
These responses to Ayodhya on the part of Pakistan and Bangladesh were regarded by India as interference in its internal affairs.
The Scholar’s Tale
Part VI
as "nt exactly Cynical
cold and clinical g differential diagnosis he Prime Cause and the Pisease
g the malignant factor the ghastly Vector ses uvere hardly Academic ull blouvin epidemic
pointments and promotions guaranteed, ling upithout Lau's penalties ng of Public Haue-Nots e Bulge on the Private Haue-Pots
: Service to Private Army sidered democratically barmy irate begot Cabinet and Bench for the street and trench.
did"nt aluaUS press the button programmes pointed the baton Carket Troopers suung into action aming Dons in hospital for traction
ing uas not strictly metaphorical ld Students tasted the horrible 2 deterrent to being alive and able ple CaboUe the Free Market babill
raising profit and professional Picking 2ns, sitting ducks, for public plucking.
vise enough to bemoann the plucking by clucking
Posters disguising our Pol-Pot as Lenin.
e end of his self-appointed term
3 as running-mate uvas thus Ex-Comintern
or Treason ujas not all that he earned publicitu uvas'nt one percent spurned
emocracy's D-day of the Presidential Election
uas delivered by Ceasarian Section.
(Continued)
U. Karunatilake

Page 19
CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY (CONC
Power-sharing i
A. M. Navaratna and Sumanasiri Liyanage
T find a Solution to the Crucial issue of the amalgamation of the Eastern ProvinCe With the Northern PrOVince, we can find a compromise formula by way of introducing a consociational system into the provincial structure. The "Sirinivasan Proposals" which envisage a federal system of government with more powers to the provinces may not be the only compromise solution to this particular issue. Even his proposals could be improved by introducing consociational features into them. The docision taken by the majority parties in the Select Committee and also included in the Indo-Lanka ACCOrd to hold a referendum in the Eastern Province is nota properapproach to the problem. Since there is no political settlement to the existing secessionist Conflict, at least a general agreement to normalise the situation in the Northern and Eastern provinces allowing the Tamil leaders from the North to participate in this exercise it can only create further mistrust in the minds of the Tamil leaderS.
As a compromise formula, we propose a power-sharing government for the Eastern Province, enabling the three communities in the region to share executive power in the provincial administration. Under this Scheme the three main offices in the Provincial Council, namely, those of the Governor, the Chief Minister and the Chairman of the Council may be held by representatives of the three ethnic Communities in rotation. The ministerial posts in the Provincial Government may also be shared by the three ethnic groups on the basis of proportionality or equality. To select their representatives to hold these offices, the members of the Provincial Council may form three electoral colleges on the basis of their ethnicity irrespective of their political party affiliations.
This power-sharing arrangement may be further strengthened by forming three regional councils for the three major communities in the Eastern Province, and then make provision that the Provincial Council is formed by joining them in the uppertier of the Provincial administration.
This same pattern of power-sharing frame work can be extended to the other provinces by the Constitution. For example the Constitution may direct the Chief
Ministers in the allocate a giver portfolios to the minority ethnic minorities Constit of the provincial ction, the political an understandin rties.
C. Te Centra
The current de the Presidential Presidential and more precise) an the Cabinet Par deat With here rring the bestwa tional features in It is fairly clearth and Cabinet syst blish a power-s Centre, by allocal central administ the President, t Prime Ministerar the Tamils and President Can bé required number ministers to repre ties, inviting the the government. sident and the problem if thes through popular need the mainte registered electo may lead to pract tive Consequenc the power to ch Members of Parli electoral College Vice-President b gureheads. In su minister become the Cabinet of M to the actual bas
in this situation be required, but nal provisions to executive among and to appoint th from the Tamil C. ker Of the Parli community. This suitable form of a power-sharing sidential Cum Ca
 

UDED)
in the East
rovincial government to number of ministerial
representatives to the groups, if one of these ute more than 20 percent opulation. In this conneleaders must try to reach g with the minority pa
Government
bate on the suitability of system (or the hybrid Cabinet systems to be d the re-establishment of imentary system will be at the same time Concuy to implement consociathe central government. at the hybrid Presidential em Can be used to estanaring executive at the ing the main posts of the ration, namely those of he Vice President, the ld Deputy Premiership to the Muslims. Also the 2 directed to appoint the of Ministers and deputy Sent the national minoriminority to participate in The Selection of the PreVice-President poses a e were to be elected election. The parties will nance of a communally rate to elect them, but it ical difficulties and negaes. If Parliament is given Oose them, dividing the ament intO ethnic-based s, the President and the eCOme COnStitutional fich a situation the Prime Sthe real executive While inisters transforms itself e for power-sharing.
, Vice-President may not there can be constitutiootate the post of nominal
the major communities, e Deputy Prime Minister immunity and the Speament frOm the Muslim shows that the most overnmental system for executive is not the Prebinet system but the Ca
binet form of government. Within the Cabinet system the political executive is elected by the Parliament from its members, so the ultimate control and the responsibility for a good governance lies within the purview of the legislature.
In the light of the recent experience of the Presidential executive in this country, especially taking the weakly functioning civil society structure and the nature of the Sri Lankan political culture into account We suggest a Cabinet form of government capable of providing a democratic environmentinathird world setting and to create
consociational tranquillity at the centre, as * *
suggested above by allocating the Deputy Premeirship to the Tamil minority, the Speaker to the Muslim community and a
number of ministerial portfolios to the mi
nority ethnic groups. This doesn't mean that the Prime Minister can appoint members from his/her own political party to the Cabinet to represent the minority ethnic groups. It may perhaps be the only option left to the Prime Minister if the minority parties refuse to participate in the government. Or, the constitution may direct the Prime Minister to Offer thOSe portfolios to the ethnic parties representing minority areas. Yet another suggestion is to give the Chief Ministers of the Western, North-Western, Southern, Eastern and Northern Provinces place in the Cabinet, or direct the Prime Minister
to invite them into the Cabinet When it
COnsiderS matters relevant to the PrOVincial government or ethnically controversial issues.
D. The System of Representation
The above discussion implies that consociationalism is not compatible with the first-past-the post system used during 1947-77 period to elect the members of the legislature, and also the absolutemajority system like the "alternative vote".
which has been used for the Presidential
election since 1982, or any other adjustments of the majoritarian method. We have learnt many lessons from the majoritarian system of representation which gives the party in power more than their due in the legislature.
The most unhealthy development was the arbitrary change of constitution that took place in 1972 and 1978, which strengthened the party in power. For the Tamil
17

Page 20
minority, this led to the exclusion of their community from benefiting from most of the government welfare programmes and the patronage enjoyed by the majority community, ultimately culminating in the "Sinhalisation of the Sri Lanka state'.
Proportional Representation (PR) is the most acceptable form of representation for the adoption of a consociational political system. It is now fairly clear that the PR system allows the minority parties to wield influence over the affairs of the government, and the party in power needs to get the support of the opposition parties Or at least the individual members of the opposition parties to decide on a matter of national importance, i.e. the amending of the constitution. The most significant feature of this system is that it prevents any party getting a two third majority in the legislature. It will require co-operation,
Compromise and Consensus among the
leaders of the majority and minority politi
a cal parties.
Most of the weaknesses identified during the 1989-1993 period by implementing the present system of representation
can be removed by introducing necessary
changes to the PR system. The creation of Small Constituencies which elect not more than six or seven members may avoid most of these difficulties. This will enable both the elector and the member of the Parliament to establish a close relationship but not at the expense of the minority. The people can enjoy their right to preferential voting without being confused because they have to select only six Or seven Candidates from the list.
Since the system has been organised not on the basis of the "rigid party list system” which does not allow the electorateto re-arrangethe party list by preferential vote, there is nothing unprincipled in giving the members of Parliament the right to cross-over. The Constitution must make special provision to allow these memberStO entertheir names ina national listas independent members or members of another party. Such a scheme together
with the PR system would facilitate coali
tion arrangements which would influence the electorate to accept the fact of
co-co-co-operation between the political
parties as well as the individual members in Parliament.
E. The Creation of a Constitutional Council
This not only introduces the mutual veto method into the Sri Lanka situation but also provides certain safeguards for the smooth functioning of the consociational system. We have to expect deadlocks and disagreements which may create constitutional and political crises.
18
Our proposal is to Cre nal Council, the membe, certain professional qui quired to represent mi the Working of the Cou rship of the council s shared by the three con members Of the Centra form three electoral Coll their ethnic affiliations (ir party membership) to e of the Council. The leg andexecutive programr dered by the Constitutio they go to the relevantb may act on the basis of c as Well as that of natio of opinion that a legisla proposal is harmful to h relations or Controversia view of one Community, ethnic group can veto S this way it can prevent c flaring up in the wider SO cise certain issues, allo legislature and the exec te their original proposa
4. Conclusion
We are aware that SC salsand options Outline involve new problems a difficulties. Those prob have to be examined in Though, power-sharing themselves, may not re blems of the Sri Lanka they will probably reduc Ethnicity has been man cal leaders of all the ethr benefit and Survival. H stage, conflicts based challenge the very surv ders, Althought the pos cannot be completely serious disadvantages a the Current ethnic Conflic War situation between enabling outside forces entire South Asian re broad perspective, th option is the creation of r-sharing arrangement. most severely divided blood do not lead inelu blood" (Horowitz, 1985:
Bibliography Akram-LOdhi, HarrOn A. Chauvinism in Sri Lank ntemporary Asia, 17 ( Gramsci, Antonio. (197 the Prison Notebooks, N tional Publishers.
Hoole et al. (1990) The The Tanni Crisis in Sri Account, Claremont, C Studies institute.

ate a Constitutiosof which posses lifications but rehority interests in Cil. The membehould be equally munities, and the
legislature must ges according to espective of their ect the memberS slative proposals hes may be consihal Council before )dies. The COuncil Dmmunity interest all interest. If it is tive or executive armonious ethnic from the point of the Council or One uch proposals. In Ontroversies from ciety and depolitiwing the national utive to reformula.
me of the propodin Section 3 may nd administrative lems and issues a separate paper. arrangements, in solve all the proln ethnic Conflict, e ethnic tension. ipulated by politinic groups fortheir Owever, at Some on ethnicity may ival of those leasibility of partition ruled Out, it has nd may transform tinto a permanent
the two states, to destabilize the gion. Within this e only possible a genuine poweif so, 'even in the
society, ties of ctably to rivers of 684).
(1987)"Class and a", Journal of Co2), pp. 160-186. ) Selections from ew York: interna
Broken Palmyra: Lanka: An Inside V: The Sri Lankan
Horowitz, Donald L. (1985) Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Jennings W Ivor. (1947) The General Election of 1947, University of Ceylon Review, 6 (3), pp. 133-165.
Kadirgamar, Santaseelan. (1989) "Ethnic Politics in Sri Lanka' in Kumar David and Santaseelan Kadirgamar, Ethnicity, Hongkong.
Lewis, Arthur. (1965) Politics in West Africa, London: Allen and Unwin.
Lipjhart, Arend. (1977) “Majority Rule versus Democracy in Deeply Divided Societies", Politikon, Vol4No2, pp. 113-126.
— (1979) “Consociation and Federation: Conceptual and Empirical Links', Canadian Journal of Political Science, Xii: 3, pp. 499-515.
- (1990) "Power-Sharing Approach' in Lipset, Seymour Martin. (1960) Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, New York: Doubleday.
Mac Mahon, Arthur. (1969) Delegation and Autonomy, New Delhi: The Indian Institute of Public Administration. Parliament of Ceylon. (1956) Hansard, ColombO.
Rondinelli, Dennis A. (1984) “Decentralization in Comparative Perspective Theory and Practice in Developing Countries, International Review of Administrative Science, 17 (2), pp. 133-145.
Russell, Jane. (1982) Communal Politics under the Donoughmore Constitution 1931 - 1947, Dehiwala: Tisara PrakasakayO Ltd,
Samasamajist. (1955) The English Paper of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party, 20th October.
Sherwood, Frank P. (1969) 'Devolutionas a Problem of Organizing Strategy in Ro
bert. T Daland (ed) Comparative Urban
Research: The Administration and Politics of Cities, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, pp. 60-87.
Smith B C. (1985) Decentralization: The Territorial Dimensions of the State, London: George Allan and Unwin.
State Council of Ceylon. (1939, 1944) Hansard, Colombo.
Youth Congress. (1939) Communalism or Nationalism: A Reply to the Speech deliVered in the State Council. On the Reforms Dispatch by G G Ponnambalam Esq., Jaffna.

Page 21
GEORGE CLAES Saint of painting
George Claessen is only one of two survivors of the 43 Group. He has lived abroad since 1947 and this celebrates his first ever one-man retrospective (1938-1991) in Sri Lanka.
George Claessen was born on 5 May 1909 and spent the first thrity eight years of his life in Ceylon. His forebears were of European extraction, long resident in the island, and his immediate family had strong leanings towards the visual arts. After leaving school his early working life was spent in various parts of the Country where he developed, besides a life-long love affair with the land of his birth, his great appreciation of nature and its living forms, as well as his acute powers of observation. While in Anuradhapura as a young man he spent most of his leisure rooting about among the ruins, Scattered around. He put some of histhoughts about them in a series of nostalgic articles which the Times of Ceylon published in 1937. He began to paint only in his 29th year on joining the Port Commission in Colombo as a draughtsman. His primary and skills were founded on the basic strengths of drawing, but he soon exhibited his versatility as a painter in many media. A few of his early works were accepted for hanging in the annual exhibitions of the Ceylon Society of Arts, and "Self-portrait" (1941) is one of them.
inevitably he became one of the nine artist founder members of the '43 Group which Celebrated the Golden Jubilee of its inaugural meeting in Lionel Wendt's house on 29 August this year. He was its Honorary Treasurer, and it is a congenial and happy coincidence that his first-ever one-man show in his native land is taking place in the same month, fifty years ago, when the Group had its own first exhibition. He has remained loyal to its aims over the years (despite exile since 1947) and
it needs to be sa and support have if this show. Now Richard Gabriel (t only two survivors the venerable ar having died on almost obsessive of an artist's life b in the mid-forties, man possessed i migration to Austr honing his deftne and his delicate painter.
At the end of 1 of having a Sma drawings publish and abetted by tw Arthur Van Langé Writer. The forme tous ForewOrd, ar deserves to be q rstanding of the power of the artis a drawing, after th creates alonging qualities whichth satisfy. The drawi possess these C rupees the proce enterprise enable to be met in th08 an entire meal a nty-five cents, ar Subsidise Claess grate to Australia artistic pastures. and, even thoug having his first o 1948, he found abandoning a te new Zealand, he early part of 1949 by the need to tr. Soon after, and fo by August 1949, Since then. in a month he said: '. unexpected even

SSEN
and drawing
id that his enthusiasm inspired the organisers in his 85th year he and orn in 1924) remain the of 1943, George Keyt ld prolific painter-sage 31 July this year. The dedication to the pursuit ecame a ruling passion
and he worked like a n the years prior to his alia in November 1947, ess as a draughtsman and Sure touch as a
946 he had distinction Selection of his best ed in book form, aided to close friends, the late 2nberg and the present r Contributed the feliciIdits opening paragraph uoted for its true unde
simplicity, grace and st: "The appreciation of le first sensationis past, or serener, more lasting 2 artist is called upon to ngs of George Claessen |ualities". Sold at four 2eds from this quixotic d the cost of production se halcyon days, when Lion House Was tweId the balance used to en's singular urge to miin Search of less infertile He settled in Melbourne, n he made a mark by he-man show in March the going tough, and, mptation to proceed to eturned to Ceylon in the 1. Restless and spurred avel he left for Bombay und his way to London Nhere he has remained letter to me the same By a series of the most tS I am now in London
where I wanted So much to be - there Seems to be no armour against destiny. I am only just beginning to settle a bit, and must start painting in earnest soon. It's my great chance to develop and must not fail for want of trying at any rate". And so he has done diligently, indefatigably,
with a fervour undiminished, and to use
his own words "always seeking to discover”. And in a letter of February 1980: "You know only too well that We are always beginning and forever travelling
because there is never any destination".
స్రి
In these years he has explored all forms - of depictive expression and graphic cra*
ftsmanship - oils, water colours, pastels,
gouaches, drawings in pencil, ink, Crayon
and chalk, Woodcut prints, etchings, and dry point. His entire work, especially as a draughtsman, is dominated by a subtle
intimacy and a suggestive use of line to
capture form and explore movement. His painting is distinctively marked by an unusual sensibility and his pictures revealan unaffected purity and arefined innocence, suffused by a tranquil and introspective rumination. He first began to experiment with pure abstraction in Australia, and he found this form of expression developing strongly in London into styles of a lambent effulgence. His work is also permeated by an aura of uncompromising and deep religious conviction. He has written two books of poetry as well, intriguing as the voice of a searching mystic, who reacts primarily in the language of a different Muse. Poems of a Painter was published by the Mitre Press in 1967, and Poems about Nothing by Arthur Stockwell in 1981. His insatiable appetite for self-e-
xpression since 1938 has led to a diverse ...
and extensive oeuvre, but since the bulk of his pictures are in England, this exhibition is able to display only a small selection of his work in all media up to 1991. But it would be true to say that they represent, individually and collectively, the precision and sensitivity of his observation, the dignity of his conception of humanity, the vigour and delicacy of his feeling for natu
19

Page 22
ral forms, and his tender and sympathetic approach to men, women, and lesser living creatures.
What I have written here is an affectio
nate tribute to an artist have known for half a century, and, more so, the garland
of a friend who has kept in touch through
many vicissitudes of our respective lives. It is in no wise to be construed as an attempt to unravel his techniques or to
offer analyses or interpretations of his art.
I have tried to present the man as artist,
devoted ever to the true manifestations of art in his life. I have not cluttered up this
brief essay with details of the exhibitions he has participated in - these are listed
for convenience separately, as also are
a selection of extracts from reviews which
.............8; shed a proper professional light on his
sendeavours. And, more pertinently, Clae
*్య
ssen's own aphorisms on art Which provide insights into his theory and practice of art. I am grateful to the organisers for
giving me the opportunity of contributing
this introduction, and, I can only hope that
in doing so I have fulfilled in some trifling
measure my debt to George Claessen, who once remarked in a letter of 29 October 1985: "Anyway our friendship is a permanent thing - come what may". He
could only have meant on both sides of
, the Styx - but, till we're ferried across that Stygian stretch some timeless day,
of thirty six pictures will remain a transcendental presence in our transient residence on earth.
lan Goonetieke
MARGINALIAFROMA ANTER’S NOTE BOOK
The mind of a true artist is only conce
rned with abstraction. He is born blind.
:
Artists follow the movement of their own
and the world's destiny. Their best work
is a manifestation of an outer force which
seeks expression through the assembled
logic and sensitivity of their minds.
One must be ready to carry a painting
to a final Conclusion in every detail and solve every problem to the last point conviction. Only a design built up of fanatically sincere line, form, colour and texture can successfully hold a painter's spiritual vi
SO. స్టోన్లో
20
First you teach your rrectly. You have an up - you conquer form. produce may be rather Then gradually your down. Your emotions g your method of expressi one way left for you and back to unlearn all you have to go back to you become gauche again. mbo). Vol.2, No.2, Nove
As in life, there is an a and assimilate in Art. faculties they are endow ssess an advantage, b to assimilate in the for their beginning. The comes by probing their inding a personal logic sensibilities in themselv Note". Stanhope institut tion Catalogue, London,
A SELECTION OF
"Claessen sees broa profundity which char work; and above all is ability to transmit effecti of an extremely sensi objects and scenes of humility before the mo nding characteristic o approaches his subjec amazed (and Consequ sion of the child though childish about the way sters his peculiarperson
the work here reproduce
re that one feels justified if the remainder of his
standard here displaye the moment our outstal Justin Pieris Daraniyagi of George Classen Dra ylon Daily News, 17 De
"George Claessen's be overwhelming in the all great Art they carry intheirarid simplicity. C usually small in size de skill as a draughtsman. a careful and pair
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Self to draw Cosurge of courage Some work you good of its kind. Courage breaks O out of reach of ion. There is only you take the road have learnt. You ur ChildhOOd and Harvest (Coloimber 1947, p.42.
phabet to absorb Artists owing to ved with may pout they too have mative stages of in development own integrity, fiand uncovering es. ("A Personal te Gallery ExhibiOctober 1975).
= TRIBUTES
dly with an innate acterises all his Oossessed of the vely the reactions tive mind to the everyday life. His del is an OutStaf his work... he it with the fresh, ently curious) withere is nothing in which the regiall emotions and... ediS Of Suchtextudin observing that work is up to the d, he is surely at nding draftsman”. ala (from a review Wings (1946). Cecember 1946).
pictures may not ir impact, but like a slow message aessen's pictures pend much on his
He is at all times staking worker,
although his compositions never betray any ststematic planning. Rather do his forms appear to float in large but well balanced spaces. Much attention has been paid to the human form, treated with tenderness and understanding". Aubrey Collette (From a review of George Claessen Drawings (1946). Times of Ceylon Sunday Illustrated. 15 December 1946.
“George Claessen's paintings are quintessentially calm, deliberate, contemplative. if ever there were paintings where light shines through contact with the inner light of a man at peace with himself, these are they. They are not professional but Confessional. It has been said of these pictures that "there is nothing there". This is probably so; but it is so, in the sense that the mystic reality of No - thing is preciselytheir subject. They are not figurative; but neither are they abstract (in the ways we usually understand this term). They are precise renditions, with the utmost reality, of that state of Being which is beyond Appearance... Perhaps a painting is no more able to elicit such a response than any other worldly happening: but it cannot be less than a mark of the utmost simplicity, of utter humility, of the deepest conviction, for a painter to reach so uncompromisingly toward the unreachable". G M Butcher. (From the introduction to Catalogue of the New Wision Centre Gallery Exhibition, London, June 1962).
"George Claessensets out to prove that Abstract Painting as in the work of Kandinsky, Malevich and Poliakoff is still very much alivetoday. An immediate Presence emerges from these canvases. While truly abstract they have about them an undefinable spirit; "Truth, Beauty, God if you like". This unseen but very real presence pervades all his pictures... The colour is pure, the composition is in classic mould, the brushwork is expressive of the truly great draftsman he is... He is a truly universal artist; a man of vision, of musical harmonies, of a temperament so rare and tender; rarely tragic; full of hope and a "food who in persisting in his folly has become a wise man'. He is our Saint of painting and drawing”. Ivan Peries in September 1986.

Page 23
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