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The articles listed below appear to be more or less the same as two articles which appeared in volume 3:1 (January 1972) of our journal and appeared in print at about the same time. This was without our knowledge and we regret that the authors did not adhere to the accepted conventions in this regard.

Nihal Amarasinghe: "The Impact of High Yielding Varieties of Rice on a Settlement Scheme in Ceylon," Tropical Agriculturist, vol. cxxx:2, April-June 1974

Susantha Goonatilake: "Environmental Influences on an Industrial Organization in Ceylon," Scottish Bankers Magazine, May 1974.



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The 1848 'Rebellion' in Ceylon: The British Parliamentary Post-Mortem; Part II*

K. M. DE SILVA.

Grey's oft-repeated assertion that he would take Torrington triumphantly through the Committee — a confidence which seemed proof against increasing evidence that Torrington's veneer of competence was wearing very thin in the aftermath of "rebellion" and in particular, after the appointment of the Committee — was based partly at least on his determination to thwart the Committee at every stage. At first the policy of obstruction had been confined to a straightforward refusal to appear before them as a witness, and to the more devious tactics of not providing them with anything more than the barest minimum of information on the affairs of the colony available at the Colonial Office. Before the end of 1849 however there was an escalation of this policy to one of opposition by dilatory tactics when Grey created difficulties with regard to the summoning of witness from Ceylon at the request of the Committee.

At the end of July 1849 the Committee had unanimously accepted a resolution moved by Hume:

That the Chairman be authorised to communicate with Her Majesty's Secretary of State as to the necessary witnesses to be ordered home to give evidence before the Committee to be appointed in the ensuing session.

Since Hawes himself had accepted the position that it was proper for the Chairman to communicate with the Secretary of State with regard to the summoning of witnesses, the Committee had no reason to expect that the Colonial Office would raise difficulties. On this assumption Baillie wrote to the Colonial Office on 28 November asking for the presence of H. C. Selby the Queen's Advocate of the Ceylon government, and Capt. Albert Watson in particular, as well as Lt. Col. S. Braybrooke and Lt. J. Henderson both of the Ceylon Rifle Regiment, E. S. Waring who had been Police Magistrate of Matale at the time of the "rebellion," and John Selby (a lawyer brother of the Queen's Advocate).

Much to Baillie's surprise and annoyance the Colonial Office replied, through Hawes, that the procedure adopted was irregular, viz., that there were doubts whether the Committee could delegate to its Chairman the power of communicating on its behalf in this matter with the Colonial Office. This was not so much a refusal to comply with Baillie's request as a suggestion that the Committee and not the Chairman should name the witnesses. The Committee was asked in the meantime to proceed with the examination of witnesses already in England, till these doubts were resolved.

Grey's resort to these delaying tactics can only be understood in the light of his and Russell's (but more particularly Grey's) uncritical receptivity to the highly exaggerated reports sent home by Torrington in which Dr. Elliott's

^{*} The first part of this article appeared in volume 5:1.

efforts to organise the collection of evidence to be placed before the Committee were viewed as part of a concerted attempt to undermine the influence and prestige of the Ceylon government among the people of the colony. In his correspondence with Grey and Russell, Torrington dwelt at length, and without restraint, on the dangers inherent in "the agitation produced in the minds of the natives by Dr. Elliott.....' Grey's dilatory tactics were adopted in the expectation that the Committee itself might be persuaded to prepare a revised list of witnesses in consultation with, and through negotiation with Hawes and other members receptive to the influence of the Colonial Office. There was the hope that some of those in the list prepared by Baillie would be deleted, in particular John Selby who was a close associate of Dr. Elliott's in the latter's campaigns against Torrington in the aftermath of the "rebellion."

The plan misfired. The list of witnesses was not revised. All that the Colonial Office gained was a delay of a few weeks. But as against this there was a further, and substantial, erosion of confidence in Grey, which had the effect of converting the simple question of summoning witnesses to appear before the Ceylon Committee, into a political issue of formidable proportions. In February 1850 the Russell Ministry was confronted with two major issues in Parliament both, or either, of which could have brought about its downfall: these were, the Don Pacifico controversy, and the question of witnesses for the Ceylon Committee. The two politicians immediately concerned, and in the limelight, were Palmerston and Grey. Palmerston emerged triumphant and unscathed over the Don Pacifico affair despite the fact that many groups in Parliament viewed his bullying tactics with distaste. Greville, no admirer of Palmerston, declared that:

.....he bears a charmed life in politicks(sic), he is so popular and dexterous that he is never at a loss, nor afraid nor discomposed. He is supported by his own party; the Peelites will not attack him for fear of hurting the Government; and he is the pet of the Radicals, to whom he plays continuous court, giving them sops in the shape of Liberal speeches... unmeaning verbiage of different sorts...¹

He went on to contrast Palmerston's with Grey's position.

He is as unpopular as the other is popular. The H[ouse] of Commons swarms with his bitter enemies, and he commands very few friends. Notwithstanding his great and undeniable abilities, he is always committing blunders, which proceed from his obstinacy and conceit — his contempt for the opinion of others, and the tenacity with which he clings to his own; and while those who know him are aware that a more high-minded, more honorable [sic] and conscientious does not exist, he has contrived to make himself pass for a shuffling trickster whose word cannot be relied on.

This last question of the Ceylon witnesses is indeed well calculated to confirm such an impression, and to heap additional ordium on his head. It is wholly without excuse, damaging to him, damaging to the Government, and will animate and embitter the personal hostility with which he is pursued to a degree that will probably bring him to grief in the course of this session, and perhaps the whole Cabinet with him.²

^{1.} Greville Memoirs, VI, p. 197.

^{2.} Ibid., p. 198.

The purely routine motion introduced by Hawes on 6 February 1850 for the re-appointment of the Committee on Ceylon for the next session developed into an unusually acrimonious debate. The debate itself narrowed down into two themes. One of these — and much the more important of the two — was the question of the Ceylon witnesses. The second emerged when Baillie in the course of the debate³ raised the question of certain proclamations issued by Captain Watson or under his instructions, threatening with death and confiscation of property anyone who did not deliver to the state the property of two Kandyan chiefs, the Maha Nilame and Golahella Rate Mahatmaya both of whom were in the custody of the government on charges of alleged complicity in the disturbances. It was tactically unwise for Baillie as Chairman of a Parliamentary Committee to make a charge of this nature against a potential witness before the Committee, in this manner. Spokesmen for the government, Hawes and Russell most notably, were, in the course of the debate, to make the most of the opportunity thus afforded to call in question Baillie's impartiality as Chairman, and to divert the debate from the issue on which the government's case was exceptionally weak — Grey's handling of the question of the Ceylon witnesses.

Fortunately for Baillie, Hawes made a rather feeble defence of the Colonial Office on the issue of the Ceylon witnesses. Hawes gave the house his own version of the discussions in the Committee and his interpretation of the meaning of the resolution it had passed with regard to witnesses. He pointed out that the names of the persons to be summoned had been sent to the Colonial Office only on 28 November, three months after the Committee's sittings had closed; that Grey had not refused to comply with this request, but merely suggested that witnesses should be named by the Committee and not by the Chairman; and that in the meantime the Committee could proceed with the examination of the witnesses already in England. Two arguments Hawes advanced in support of Grey's decision: one that the process would be expensive, costing about £400 to £700 per witness; the other was a suggestion that the Committee might have doubts about the sagacity of summoning one of the witnesses in the Chairman's list.⁵

But he was on much stronger grounds in his criticism of Baillie's reference to Watson's proclamations, that it was an unusual step for a Chairman of a Committee to take, and one that was bound to create prejudice against the witness who would appear before him.

Joseph Hume, who followed Hawes, was more belligerent than Baillie had been. He began by taking the Colonial Office to task for its disingenuous attempt to lay aside the understanding reached earlier, by its claim that the Chairman had not been given the power to nominate on behalf of the Committee.⁶ The argument of expense was disposed of by demonstrating that even if all the witnesses named were summoned, it would cost no more than a mere £2,800.

The keynote of his speech was the very effective demonstration that the witnesses named were all indispensable for the completion of the Committee's inquiries. Watson and H. C. Selby — named by the Committee generally, and not by himself or Baillie — were important in the highest degree, the former

^{3.} For Baillie's speech, see Hansard, 3rd series, CVII, columns 420-428.

^{4.} Ibid., columns 428-435.

^{5.} The witness referred to was John Selby.

^{6.} Ibid., columns 435-441.

because he was accused of burning villages and of confiscating property, the latter because of the account of his intervention on behalf of the *bhikkhu* who was executed by order of a court martial.

At this stage Disraeli made an astutely timed entrance into the debate in support of Baillie and Hume.⁷ Explaining in detail the stages by which the Committee and had come to adopt the resolution with regard to witnesses, he pointed out that the government's response was lacking in candour and was calculated, it not to thwart the Committee, at least to evade a properly conducted inquiry. Disraeli himself was so convinced of this that he called upon the House to support an amendment he sought to move to Hawes's motion. The amendment read as follows:

This House deems it expedient to express its disapprobation of the manner in which Her Majesty's Government have evaded the understanding of the last session, for the further production of witnesses in this investigation.

Russell, who intervened at this point, began with a statement of the line of policy he had followed in the debate of July 1849, explaining why Graham's suggestion of letting Baillie withdraw his motion, had not been accepted by the government and why it was decided instead to call upon the House to reject it. This was done, Russell declared, in order to prevent any misunderstanding of the government's position, for if Baillie had been permitted to withdraw his motion, there was always the possibility that it would have been misinterpreted as an act of support for Baillie's motion. But once the motion had been rejected, he (Russell) nevertheless supported the idea of reviving the Committee, and in fact the Committee resumed its sittings on the day after Baillie's motion was rejected.

The Committee had resolved that the Queen's Advocate of Ceylon and Captain Watson and such other witnesses as might be necessary should be summoned and that communication be had with the Secretary of State for that purpose. In Russell's view the Committee in adopting this motion had gone beyond the scope of the inquiry, and indeed beyond the regular powers of a Parliamentary Committee. The Committee's decision in proposing further witnesses Russell continued, implied one of two things: the Committee had decided that Baillie should communicate with the Secretary of State, stating his reason why the persons named should be summoned as witnesses, and securing the Secretary of State's concurrence for the purpose; or that Baillie should have discretion for about six months to command the Secretary of State on this question. This latter view, Russell felt was incompatible both with parliamentary practice, and the terms of the Committee's mandate accepted in July by the government and endorsed by the house. On the other hand, if the former view was to be accepted then Baillie could have no cause for complaint as he had given Grey no statement of reasons for calling the witnesses.

The Prime Minister appealed to the House to remember that the situation in Ceylon was highly inflammable, and that the parliamentary inquiry affected not only the character of the governor of that Colony but also the authority of England in all parts of the world. He informed the House that persons in the colony had not scrupled to say that they had the authority of the Committee to send home for the purposes of the inquiry, whom they pleased, including judges of the Supreme Court, not to mention the Chief Justice. They had spread through the island's native population reports that they had it in their

^{7.} Ibid., columns 441-444.

^{8.} Ibid., columns 444-449.

power to punish the Governor, and to have persons recalled to England; and had asserted that the legal authority of the government need not be heeded. Indeed they had declared that they were in communication with Hume and the Committee, and would destroy the Ceylon government and send Torrington home to be punished.

These comments of Russell's were based on the highly coloured letters that Torrington had sent to Grey on the situation in Ceylon, and especially with regard the activities of Dr. Elliot in the latter's efforts to gather information against the government.

Torrington had even written to Russell⁹ on the same theme, but Russell had reacted by rebuking him for the tone of the letter and the lack of moderation and balance it had displayed.¹⁰ But the Prime Minister had nevertheless based this part of his speech at least on alarmist reports relayed by Torrington through Grey.

Russell did not lose the opportunity of scoring a point against Baillie by criticising the latter's introduction of a charge against Watson on the question of the proclamations, as conduct unbecoming of a Chairman of a Parliamentary Committee.

Graham once again assumed the role of mediator, ¹¹ arguing on the one hand that in delegating its authority to its Chairman the Committee had gone beyond its powers, he expressed surprise that Hawes in the Committee appeared to have concurred in that decision; and on the other, he urged that the inquiry should continue and be as full as possible, with all witnesses whom the Committee required being summoned with no consideration for the expenses likely to be incurred. And while he declared his intention to vote for the reappointment of the Committee, he expressed his determination to vote against Disraeli's amendment.

If Graham's speech reflected the continuing Peelite commitment to the government cause, John Bright's¹² was indicative of the Radicals' ambivalence to the Russell Ministry, and the convolutions, if not contradictions, this led to on critical occasions such as this debate. The Radicals would embarrass the government, and even wound it, but stop short of toppling it; there were fewer restraints in their attacks on individual Ministers, especially unpopular one like Grey.

Bright began with the declaration that he would not give his support to Disraeli's motion since it amounted to a vote of censure against the government. But this forthright assurance was the prelude to an unemotional and judicious criticism of Grey and the Colonial Office which had a most damaging effect on the government at a time when it was teetering on the brink of parliamentary defeat.

First, he expressed his disagreement with Graham's contention that the Committee was bound by Russell's precise words—he felt that it could exercise the discretion usually allowed to a Parliamentary Committee of empowering

Grey MSS: Torrington in his private and confidential letter of 15 October 1849 to Grey (in K. M. de Silva, ed., Letters on Ceylon 1846-50 The Administration of Viscount Torrington and the 'Rebellion' of 1848, K. V. G. de Silva & Sons, 1965, p. 179).

^{10.} See Grey MSS: Grey's private letter to Torrington, 24 November 1849 (ibid., pp. 180-82)

^{11.} Hansard, 3rd series, CVIII, columns 448-450 (H. of C., 6 February 1850).
12. Hansard, 3rd series, CVIII, columns 450-452 (H. of C., 6 February 1850).

the Chairman to deal with certain issues on its behalf, and that it had done so rightly in this case. Secondly, he delivered a cogent attack on Grey, declaring that there was "a pretty general opinion on both sides of the House that the course taken by Earl Grey, if not intended to evade inquiry, at least laid him open to a strong suspicion of it."

The conclusion of his speech contained the astute suggestion that if Disraeli would substitute for his motion the words, "That the witnesses whose names were handed in to the Colonial Office be forthwith summoned to attend this Committee", Bright would vote with him, and the opinion of the House as regards the failure to summon witnesses would thereby be sufficiently shown. But he would not vote for Disraeli's motion as it stood, and he did not wish to vote with the government without explaining his reasons.

Disraeli saw the advantages in Bright's suggestion, and expressed his willingness to withdraw his own amendment if the House would allow it. Russell was equally determined not to permit this. He insisted on dividing the House on Disraeli's amendment which was easily defeated, by 140 votes to 65. But when Bright's amendment (moved by Hume) that the words "And that Lt. Col. Braybrooke, Lt. Henderson, E. S. Waring Esq., and John Selby, Advocate be summoned to attend the said Committee," be added to original motion, was moved it was defeated only very narrowly by 109 votes to 100.

Bright had picked on Grey's attempt to evade the summoning of witnesses as the crucial flaw in the government's case, and the one on which it was most vulnerable to parliamentary criticism if not condemnation.

Greville¹³ paid tribute to the acuteness with which Bright had gauged the feelings of the House.

The Government was only saved from a defeat on Wednesday morning by the bad tactics of Disraeli, who moved so strong a resolution that few would support it. Bright then moved one more moderate, and was only beat (sic) by nine; had the more moderate one been moved at first, it would have been carried...

The government sought to extract political advantage from Baillie's reference to the proclamations allegedly issued by Watson. On 7 February Russell read out in Parliament a letter from Watson to the effect that the proclamations referred to by Baillie "were utterly spurious" and claiming that "he never issued or authorised such a proclamation and that (Baillie) had been misled by an unprincipled forgery." Watson added that the

other allusions which have been made to supposed acts of mine, by both Mr. Baillie and Mr. Hume, are alike devoid of all foundation in fact, and so soon as an opportunity shall have been afforded to me in the approaching Committee, I shall have no more difficulty in disposing of them than I have in denouncing the fictitious proclamations by which these Gentlemen have been so grossly imposed on.¹⁴

Russell no doubt realised that the sympathies of the House were with Watson, especially because the allegation had been made in open House by the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee before whom Watson was to appear

Greville Memoirs, VI, p. 198. See also J. L. Sturgis, John Bright and the Empire (London, 1969) p. 85.

^{14.} Hansard, 3rd series, CVIII, columns 641-643 (H. of C., 7 February 1850).

as a witness. The immediate effect of Watson's denial was no doubt to strengthen the government's position. Greville noted that "...Grey has had a success in the Ceylon Committee in the evidence of Captain Watson, who proved the proclamation attributed to him to be a forgery...' Watson's letter, he felt "threw so much discredit on Baillie's evidence that Graham...thought it would be fatal to his case...' But Greville was not without his reservations on this matter, for he added that Charles Villiers,

who is on the Committee says that this does not affect the question of Torrington's incapacity and unfitness for his post which will infallibly be proved by unexceptionable witnesses.¹⁵

When the Committee resumed its sittings in February 1850, it began with a thorough cross-examination¹⁶ of Captain Albert Watson, ranging over the period of his duties at Matale after the outbreak of the rebellion, and covering questions such as: his part in the confiscation and sequestration of property (especially that of the two Kandyan chieftains and the Maha Nilame and Golahella Rate-Mahatmaya); the burning of houses, allegedly on his instructions, by junior officers such as Henderson and Brook; martial law and the courts martial; and above all the proclamations. Watson proved to be—from the government's point of view—an unsatisfactory witnesses. Despite Hawes's guidance and watchful protection, cross-examination by Hume and Baillie forced Watson into contradictory statements and damaging admissions. This was especially so on the crucial question of the proclamations.

It was Watson's claim that he knew nothing about these proclamations till he saw the report of the Commons debate in *The Times*. Not only did he deny any previous knowledge of the proclamations but he also declared that he had never signed any proclamations at all. His replies under cross-examination, at first, sufficed to satisfy most members of the Committee, and there seemed no reason to doubt Watson's claim that the signatures appearing on the proclamations were not his but forgeries. But a clumsy attempt to attribute these forgeries to a specific culprit proved to be Watson's undoing. Contradiction followed contradiction till Watson's credibility as a witness was shattered beyond recovery.

At the end of Watson's evidence the Committee called upon the government to appoint a Royal Commission to visit Ceylon to investigate on the spot matters relating to the proclamations; this was an expression of a lack of confidence in Watson as a witness. The government's motives in very readily and swiftly acceding to this request were rather more complex.¹⁷ And once again

^{15.} Greville Memoirs, VI, p. 201.

For the cross-examination of Watson on 14 February 1850 see, B.P.P. (1850) (605) XII, 66, pp. 5-14.

^{17.} Two civil servants of the East India Company were sent to Ceylon as members of a Royal Commission appointed to examine all matters relating to these proclamations After an exhaustive investigation they came to the conclusion that Watson had indeed issued the proclamations under his signature. See B.P.P. 1851, (99) XXIII, 51, 1851 (534) XXII, 65, for their report and the evidence taken by them.

Subsequently, however, a court martial exonerated Watson. See B.P.P., 1851, (1413) XXXV (Command), The Court Martial of Capt. A. Watson.

Watson subsequently rose to the rank of Lt. Colonel. In 1859 he was appointed Superintendent of Police at Galle. In 1862 and again in 1863 he tried to evade responsibility for irregularities by denying that he had issued orders, and by throwing the blame on subordinates who had acted on his instructions. After the second offence he was dismissed from service. See L. A. Mills, Ceylon Under British Rule, 1795-1932 (O.U.P., 1932), p. 193 fn. 4.

we need to turn to Grey's private correspondence with Torrington for a frank exposition of the motives that lay behind the decision. Grey wrote to Torrington as follows:

.....I have no doubt that we shall utterly discomfit Hume and Baillie, tho[ugh] you will see that my refusal to send for witnesses at the dictation of the latter led to a very awkward division in the H[ouse] of Commons. The truth is I made a mistake in refusing to do what he asked or at all events in doing so in the manner I did-I was influenced by your account of the power wh[ich] the Elliot party were endeavouring to exercise in the Colony of assuming the power of sending for whom they pleased, but not having this from you officially I c[oul]d not use it wh[ich] was unlucky— The result shows how necessary it is for us with such adversaries to play our game with the greatest caution and what a scrape a slight mistake may get us into-Happily the enemy have far more than neutralised the effect of my blunder by the false move they have made in bringing forward the forged proclamations-it was most providential that we had Capt[ain] Watson on the spot, and our being able to get his evidence at once reported to the House is a great advantage-I hope the enquiry into the forgery wh[ich] I was too happy to promote will be the means of thoroughly discrediting Dr. Elliot "18

By the end of February 1850 only one thing in his relations with the Parliamentary Committee gave Grey cause for concern and even this was carefully concealed from the Committee who, had they hit upon it, would have found positive proof of some of their criticisms of the Ceylon government and its handling of the riots. He outlined the implications of the problem in a private letter to Torrington on 25 February thus:¹⁹

.The worst thing that has happened is the detection by Sir D. Dundas of the legal error in the transportation of the insurgents sentenced by the Courts Martial. I am very sorry that this blot has been hit but being so I had no alternative but to write a confidential despatch you will receive; this had not been mentioned to any of the clerks in the office except Mr. Smith and it is most important that the error sh(oul)d not be made public if it can be avoided wh(ich) I doubt-Pray show the Despatch to as few persons as possible-The more I consider the subject the more inclined I am to the opinion that your best course will be to pass without delay an ordinance giving an amnesty to all concerned in the rebellion including those transported provided they do not return within a given time and with a little ingenuity I think you might make one of the clauses wide enough to protect all the public servants from any actions for false imprisonment wh(ich) might be brought against them by persons on whom sentences of imprisonment were passed and yet without exposing to the public the technical error wh(ich) makes this protection necessary.

In the meantime the Committee ambled along well into April 1850 and Hume and Baillie had no cause to believe that it would end its sittings with any tangible results achieved. They were being thwarted partly by Hawes's masterly organization of the defence within the Committee itself, and partly by

Grey MSS: Grey to Torrington, private letter of 25 February 1850, (K. M. de Silva, ed., Letters on Ceylon, 1965, p. 196).

^{19.} Grey MSS, Grey to Torrington, 25 February 1850 (K. M. de Silva, ed., Letters on Ceylon, 1965, pp. 196-97).

Tennent's skilful exposition of the Ceylon government's case and his demolition of Anstruther (and to a lesser extent Wodehouse). So well had Tennent acquitted himself that Grey who had been far from anxious to see Tennent appear before the Committee, generously acknowledged the debt which the Colonial Office and Torrington owed him for this. And Grey was now more inclined to be critical of Wodehouse than he had been earlier on. Thus in a private letter to Torrington of 24 April 1850,²⁰ he observed—with regard to these two officials—that:

.....I am bound to admit that now I know more of it I think you have more reason to condemn (Wodehouse) than I had supposed; it does appear that there is a want of consistency between the opinions he expressed at the time in the Colony on your measures and those wh(ich) he has since given upon them to the Committee. This is very wrong and must lower one's opinion of his character but it makes no difference in my view to the policy of acting towards him with the most perfect civility—As to Tennent on the other hand I am inclined to think you are rather harder in your judgement than he deserves; I believe he means no mischief, quite the reverse and then he has given his evidence exceedingly well in the Committee.

As for the Committee, he reported that it "is going on most favourably. I hear and I trust we shall finish it in triumph and then proceed with all the measures of improvement wh(ich) it has so much obstructed." He was even more confident of the outcome in a letter of 20 May.²¹

Nothing has occurred here for a long time wh(ich) is likely to occasion any fresh difficulty to you. Ceylon has been in a g(rea)t measure forgotten and the inquiry of the Com(mittee) is proceeding very tediously but in a manner highly satisfactory to us. Tennent has proved as I am assured by Haves (for I have been quite unable to read the evidence) a very good witness and his cross-examination by Hume and Baillie has been a signal failure on their part.....²²

At the same time he believed that he now had "proof conclusive.....that both Wodehouse and Selby are in league with Hume and Baillie and are giving all the aid ag[ai]nst us they can." He informed Torrington that he had "no intention of allowing such a gross violation of their duty to pass with impunity but I must allow the Comm[itt]ee to terminate its proceedings before I take the steps I meditate."

^{20.} Ibid., p. 207.

^{21.} Ibid., p. 214.

^{22.} Tennent's evidence was carefully rehearsed in the presence and under the guidance of Hawes and Wilson. Tennent himself disclosed that:

[&]quot;Previously to each days attendance, I held a consultation with Mr. Hawes, at which the course of my examination was agreed on, my draft of intended evidence read and every suggestion of his adjusted as to its details and the points it was to embrace or omit; its forms of expression being already with him in my pre-arranged notes....

During the progress of my Examination Mr. Hawes conducted it in person, with the exception of the two topics of Finance and Commercial Policy, on which, by his direction I placed myself in similar communication with Mr. Wilson the other member of Government who sat on the Committee. To Mr. Wilson I submitted in like manner previously prepared memoranda on these heads, and after consultation with him I gave replies to such questions as he addressed to me in the Committee".

Tennent to Grey, letter of 17 December 1850, printed in B.P.P. 1851 (1301) XXV (Command) p. 8.

But the situation changed dramatically within a month, and all the efforts of Grey and Hawes in protecting Torrington came to naught in a most unexpected manner. Tennent was the unwitting cause of the trouble. As part of the 'official' case against Wodehouse, Tennent persisted with the argument that Wodehouse had advised in Ceylon measures which he had criticised before the Committee. Wodehouse's evidence was disparaged by a process of demonstrating with the aid of documentary evidence that he had been all along the confidential friend and adviser of Lord Torrington. In the process of establishing his case against his bete noire Tennent referred to certain letters in his possession from Torrington.

This charge of "inconsistency, nearly amounting to dishonour" having been fastened on him, Wodehouse felt obliged to inform the Committee that he could prove that Tennent's statement respecting himself was not correct, and that he had in his possession confidential letters from Torrington which he believed would help prove this, and he proceeded to quote extracts from those letters.

It must be pointed out that Wodehouse did not voluntarily produce these letters. He had merely referred to them to show that he had never been particularly close to Torrington. But Torrington's letters to Wodehouse contained material totally distinct from the matter which the latter wished to make use of for his defence and which unfortunately were severely—and indiscreetly—critical of other persons.

Hawes realised at once the dangers involved in the reference to the letters, and objected strongly to their production, but the Committee spurred on by Baillie and Hume decided on a course of action which left Wodehouse with no alternative but to produce the letters or forgo all chance of defending himself against Tennent's charges. The Committee informed Wodehouse that he would not be allowed to quote passages from the letters, because the context might possibly alter the sense which they seemed to bear in an isolated form, and that he must either retract the passages he had already quoted or produce the letters in full. Wodehouse replied that he had no wish to produce the letters but at the same time felt compelled in self defence not to retract the passages he had quoted from them. And so that letters were produced with disastrous consequences.²³

Gladstone for one felt that the decision to compel Wodehouse to produce the letters was too rigorous and very injudicious, and that the Committee had blundered in doing so.²⁴ The decision had been taken in Gladstone's absence and as soon as he learned of it, he expressed his deep regret that this had been done. Baillie in a speech in the House of Commons on 27 May 1851, defended the action of the Committee, and he pointed out that the decision had the support of Sir Robert Peel, who had said that it was not his own opinion alone but that of Sir John Jervis, the then Attorney General whom he had consulted, that the Committee could adopt no other course than that of compelling the production of the letters.²⁵

With the production of Torrington's private letters to Wodehouse, Tennent felt obliged to retaliate with the production in turn of some of Torrington's private letters to him; once again the motive was self-defence. But the effect of all these private letters with their unkind and indiscreet comments on per-

^{23.} B.P.P., 1850 (605) XII, pp. 7-9.

^{24.} Hansard, 3rd series, CXVII, column 207 ff. (H. of C., 29 May 1851).

^{25.} Ibid., column 15 (H. of C., 27 May 1851). This speech was made after Peel's death.

sonalities in Ceylon, proved to be ruinous for Torrington as well as for Tennent and Wodehouse themselves. The issues involved and their implications were delineated with remarkable clarity in Grey's private letter to Torrington of 19 June 1850.²⁶

Grey deplored the decision of the Committee to compel Wodehouse to produce the confidential letters from Torrington. He declared that

There c(oul)d not be a more scandalous breach of confidence than that wh(ich) Mr. Wodehouse was guilty (of) making use of these private and confidential letters and the conduct of the Comm(itt)ee in calling for them in spite of the remonstrance of Hawes was also most improper.....

But improper or not, the letters produced on the minds of the Comm(itt)ee an impression most unfavourable to Torrington)." "I cannot but say how much pain this disclosure has given me" Grey informed Torrington and how deeply I lament that when.....

there was every prospect that your public acts w(oul)d have entitled you to an honourable acquittal and that your administration of the Colony w(oul)d have a ppeared after the most searching inquiry to have been highly creditable to you, the production of such a letter as that wh(ich) you wrote to Mr. W(odehouse) sh(oul)d have so fatally damaged you in the opinion of the Comm(itt)ee. How often I have warned you that you are allowing yourself to be needlessly excited by the attacks made upon you and that your case was so good that you had only to play your game with steadiness and coolness to be sure of triumph in the end.

He pointed out to Torrington that he was

altogether at a loss to understand how you c(oul)d possibly in writing to anyone (much more to a person you had so little reason to trust as Mr. W[odehouse] express yourself, with respect to the principal officer of your Gov(ernmen)t with whom you were living on a footing of apparent friendship and confidence, in terms wh(ich) nothing but the clearest proof of his having been guilty of the treachery you imputed to him c(oul)d have justified—I am bound to say that I think Tennent has acted most like a gentleman in the manner in wh(ich) he has received the utterly unexpected disclosure that you had been writing to his bitterest enemy in the way you have done. His evidence on the subject makes apparently the best case for you that was possible......

Taking good care not to underestimate the gravity of the consequences of these disclosures for Torrington, Grey warned him that despite Tennent's efforts to make out a case for him on this issue,

I fear that if the adoption by the Comm(itt)ee of some very strong resolution against you founded upon this letter can be prevented at all, it will only be on the ground that it is unjust to condemn you unheard, tho(ugh) in fact it is the general opinion that no explanation you can make can relieve you from the censure to wh(ich) the letter in your own hand wh(ich) has been produced makes you liable.....

Grey himself, when writing this letter, must have recalled the prophetic warning that Mc Carthy had given him a in private letter of 13 December 1849 that Tennent, in his evidence before the Committee was likely to over-reach himself.²⁷

^{26.} Grey MSS (in K. M. de Silva, ed., Letters on Ceylon, 1965, pp. 218-19).

^{27.} See above, p.

Torrington was now clearly vulnerable, and a hostile report from the Committee seemed almost as inevitable as his recall from Ceylon. But a hostile report carried with it the danger of associating the Colonial Office in the condemnation of Torrington, and was therefore fraught with dangerous political repercussions in the volatile parliamentary situation that existed at the time. For this reason, if not for any other, Hawes set about the task of preventing the Committee from carrying a report hostile to Torrington. Torrington's recall was inevitable, but it became Hawes's business to have it attributed, officially at least, to factors as creditable to him as possible.

Hume did not make Hawes's task any the easier by the skill and moderation with which he drafted a report for submission to the Committee. This brief report28 in four short paragraphs—succinctly summarised a formidable case against Torrington. It declared that the riots, confined to just two districts in the island, could hardly be described as a "rebellion;" and went on to charge that in these circumstances, whatever justification there may have been for the declaration of martial law on 29 July 1848, its continuation till 10 October was "unnecessary and unjustifiable." More importantly, it noted that, after making all allowances for the difficulties with which the Governor was faced at the time of the riots, he had displayed a want of judgement not calculated to secure the goodwill and affection of the inhabitants, or to hold out any prospect of his future usefulness in the colony: and it concluded that a Royal Commission should go out to Ceylon to seek out changes in the administration and government of the island. Sir Joshua Walmsley's report of the same date followed in outline and detail the basic features of Hume's report, except that with regard to Torrington's actions at the time of the riots, Walmsley's criticisms were even stronger. In addition to this there was a paragraph calling upon the Committee to support the principles underlying the fiscal changes attempted in Ceylon in 1846-47.

The two reports by Baillie and C. B. Adderley were much less comprehensive than these, restricted as they were to a few themes which though tendentious and discreditable to Torrington were nevertheless matters of detail rather than principle.²⁹ The report drafted by Lord Hotham seemed less hostile than any of these.³⁰ It called upon the Committee to affirm that

notwithstanding the utmost diligence and perseverance on (their) part... they find themselves still unable to make a full and complete report upon any of the various matters into which they were directed by the House to enquire...

If this conclusion would have given heart to Torrington and the Colonial Office, they would have found cold comfort in the rest of Hotham's report. Like Hume and Walmsley, Hotham himself called for the appointment of a Royal Commission. He called the earnest attention of the government to the evidence gathered at the Parliamentary Committee's inquiries; and he urged that the Committee be reappointed at the commencement of the next session unless measures should in the meantime be adopted which may obviate the necessity of further investigation.

This last recommendation of Hotham's gave rise to considerable controversy. In this speech in the House of Commons on 29 May 1851, he pointed out

^{28.} H. of C. Select Committee, 3rd Report from the Select Committee on Ceylon, 1850 (605) XII, p. 13, Hume's report of 18 July 1850.

^{29.} Ibid., pp. 13-14.

^{30.} Ibid., p. 13.

that because of a printing error the word 'measure' had appeared as 'measure' in the original report. 31 Baillie had argued—on the basis of the misprint in the original report as Hotham pointed out—that the 'measure' Hotham had in mind was quite clearly a change in the governorship in Ceylon. If Hotham objected to Baillie's interpretation on the ground that he spoke of 'imeasures' not 'measure', he nevertheless conceded that a change in the governorship in Ceylon was indeed one of the measures he had in mind. Grey himself in his private correspondence with Torrington explained that this was the meaning attached to Hotham's resolution, which the Committee eventually adopted as its report.

Hawes alone drafted a report, the longest by far, which was a sustained defence of Torrington's policies in Ceylon, and by implication of the Colonial Office.32 There was little chance that the Committee would adopt a report of this nature, and Hawes himself practically conceded it, in the very defensive tone he adopted in the last few paragraphs, and the rather damaging admissions he made. Thus, while calling upon the Committee to express general approval of Torrington's measures, Hawes's report acknowledged the fact that some evidence at the Committee's sittings tended to inculcate Torrington. It went on to add that there was still no reason to doubt that he had acted in the public interest. Then again there was the question of the publication of Torrington's private letters to some of his officials. The most that Hawes could do was to argue: that these letters were confidential; that they related to personal matters without any direct bearing on the present inquiry; and that Torrington had had no opportunity of explaining how these letters came to be written. And then came the most damaging admission. Hawes declared that these letters showed that there was considerable dissension among the island's civil servants, dissension which the production of the letters would undoubtedly aggravate, and that this underlined the need for the prompt interference of government. The implication was clear—Torrington would be recalled.

It needed all Hawes's resourcefulness to prevent the adoption of Hume's report. Eventually Hotham's report with minor (largely verbal) amendments was adopted as a compromise. In his speech to the House of Commons on 27 May 1851 Baillie claimed that the adoption, and indeed the preparation of Hotham's report was the result of consultations between Hotham and the Colonial Office, but Sir James Hogg, another member of the Committee, as well as Hotham himself, denied that this was so. Hotham emphasised the fact that he had produced the report on his own, though he was less emphatic in his denial of consultations or agreement with Hawes in its adoption. Indeed, it is difficult to see how it could have been adopted as a compromise without any consultations with Hawes.

Once again the clearest account of what happened at this time is contained in Grey's private correspondence with Torrington, in particular his letter of 24 July 1850.³³ He began by informing Torrington that "At last the Celyon Comm(itt)ee is over and I am happy to say that we have got out of it much better than we had at one time any reason to expect."

"I enclose the resolutions wh(ich) were carried," Grey continued,

and also wh(ich) were determined that Hawes sh(oul)d move and thus place on record on the minutes of the Comm(itt)ee tho(ugh) he did not

^{31.} Hansard, 3rd series, CXVII, columns 233-236 (H. of C., 29 May 1851).

H. of C. Select Committee, 3rd Report from the Select Committee on Ceylon, 1850 (605) XII. pp. 14-15.

^{33.} Grey MSS: in K. M. de Silva, ed., Letters on Ceylon, 1965., pp. 222-23.

press them when he found it w(oul)d have been impossible to earry them and by accepting what was moved by L(ord) Hotham he c(oul)d get rid of the very hostile resolutions moved by Hume.

So far I can congratulate you on having escaped pretty well from the Comm(itt)ee. but I grieve to tell you that thorugh) with much difficulty, the carrying of any (resolution) condemning your conduct has been averted, it is the conviction of every member of the Committee that after the disclosure of the private letters and what passed between yourself, Wodehouse and Tennent, it is impossible that you sh(oul)d with advantage continue to hold the gov(ernmen)t of the Colony. This is the meaning implied by the resolution that a Royal Commission ought to be sent to inquire into the state of the island unless some change of circumstances sh(oul)d take place...and also that the evidence sh(oul)d not be reported to the House at present-It distresses me still more to tell you that I cannot deny that I think the Comm(itt)ee right in their opinion and that I must therefore act upon it. The last of the resolutions moved by Hawes (and wh(ich) was drawn by myself) expressed accurately my views of the case, and while I think you are entitled to great credit for your public measures and that there cannot be a doubt of your having throughout acted to the best of your judgement for the public good, still the fact of your having written such letters about the principal officer of your gov(ernmen)t without communicating to him what you thought of him renders it impracticable for you to carry on the gov(ernmen)t for the future with advantage. I cannot say how deeply I regret the necessity of coming to this conclusion and that you sh(oul)d contrary to my repeated advice have taken up so bitterly an attack upon Wodehouse for his evidence of last year-If you had not done this but contented yourself with sending home the papers necessary for the explanation of your conduct, not allowing Tennent to come over and thus proventing all these personal matters from being brought forward my conviction is that we sh(oul)d have closed the Comm(itt)ee six weeks ago with complete success.

"Though I have kept these matters as yet perfectly secret", he added,

I propose advising the Queen to appoint Sir G. Anderson to succeed you in the Gov(ernmen)t of Ceylon and this will probably be notified to you officially by the mail of next month.....you sh(oul)d be relieved as soon as possible after it is known that you are coming away—I will in my official despatch do full justice to all that you have accomplished for the good of the Colony and will endeavour to put the decision that has been come to on the grounds most favourable to you.....In the present state of things it is I am sure by far the best thing for yourself as well as for the Gov(ernmen)t that you sh(oul)d come home since nothing else w(oul)d avert a very serious attack at the commencement of the new session.....I do not intend to allow either Wodehouse and (sic) Selby to escape [with] impunity; their conduct having in my opinion been infamous and I doubt whether even Tennent will be able to return to the Colony.

Grey wrote to MacCarthy, in a private letter of 19 August 1850,34 about "the distressing close of the Ceylon Committee (which however, after the unfortunate disclosures which were made, ended better than might have been expected).....," and about the decision to recall Torrington. "I have written to L(ord) Torrington," Grey informed MacCarthy,

^{34.} Grey MSS: in K. M. de Silva, "The Private Correspondence of the Third Earl Grey ... and C. J. MacCarthy ... 26th March 1847 to 24th October 1850," J.R.A.S. CB, new series, vol. 10. 1966, pp. 82-83.

to advice him to leave the Colony as soon as he can after receiving the official announcement of his recall which goes by this mail. When he goes away the Gov(ernmen)t will devolve upon you until the arrival of Sir G. Anderson, which will be delayed for some time.....

"I need hardly say," he added:

that while you are in the temporary administration of the Gov(ernmen)t the less you do the better, and that you clearly ought to originate no measure of importance until the Governor arrives. I trust then, I shall be able to place you in a more important post than you have hitherto occupied, as if Tennent is not allowed to return (and this is what I contemplate) I propose to appoint you to succeed him at a reduced salary. I am sure you will do all you can to support poor Lord Torrington under a blow which I fear he is far from having the strength of mind to withstand.

Torrington's recall should, under normal circumstances, have served to satisfy all but the most virulent of Grey's critics and these after all were not so very many. But against the background of a steady weakening of the Russell administration, and the increasing determination of the opposition groups to exploit any issue to hasten the government's demise, the affairs of Ceylon seemed still full of potential for this purpose. The fact that the reasons officially given for Torrington's recall had so little bearing upon the charges brought against him by Baillie and Hume, charges which were seemingly sustained by the evidence that had emerged during the committee's investigations, afforded the government's opponents an opportunity of squeezing more political advantage out of the affairs of Ceylon.

By the first quarter of 1850 the end seemed in sight for the Russell Ministry. The unexpectedly small majority which the government mustered over Disraeli's motion of 19 February for the appointment of a Committee to revise and amend the Poor Law to mitigate the distress of the agricultural classes, greatly encouraged the Protectionists³⁵ who regarded it as "the harbinger of future success." And then came Peel's death. It had the effect of removing the one solid source of external support for Russell's Ministry. Few contemporaries doubted that Peel's death was a heavy blow to the government for it was bound "to start a thaw in the Peelite ice-pack." 38

The second half of the year was dominated by the religious agitation which developed over the decision of Pope Pius IX to create twelve Sees for England and Wales. Russell's dramatic and impulsive intervention in this issue, and his shrill denunciation of "Papal aggression" brought some temporary political advantage to the government. In the long run however the political consequences of Russell's action were little short of disastrous. The Peelites deplored it, and the Irish Catholics were mortally offended. The Russell Ministry lost support among both these groups (but much more with the Irish) in Parliament. Thus the anti-Catholic agitation did nothing to stabilise Russell's or his Ministry

N. Gash, Reaction and Reconstruction, (O.U.P., 1952) pp. 196-97; and The Greville Memoirs, VI, p. 207 (23 February 1850). The motion was defeated by a majority of just 21 votes.

^{36.} The Greville Memoirs, VI, p. 207.

^{37.} Greville was the one notable exception. He argued that Peel's death "is more likely to remove than to create difficulties in the way of Lord John (Russell)..." See The Greville Memoirs, VI, p. 243 (1 July 1850).

^{38.} D. Southgate, The Passing of the Whigs, (London, 1966), p. 217.

try's hold on the House of Commons. The agitation subsided without any substantial addition of support for the government in Parliament or the country at large.³⁹

Indeed by March 1851 the government's position was seen to be extremely weak, so hopeless indeed that Russell felt obliged to resign office after a defeat in Parliament on an issue of extra-ordinary triviality.⁴⁰ The government continued in office only because Stanley the Protectionist leader was unwilling or unable to form an administration. And so the Russell Ministry resumed office in a more descrepit and transitional state than ever. It was in this context that Ceylon emerged once more as a issue in Parliamentary affairs.

Greville on 18 March 1851, analysed the situation thus:

The Government is now so weak and powerless that its feebleness is openly talked of in Parliament, as well as derided in the Press. A day or two ago we appeared to be on the eve of an immediate crisis. Baillie gave notice of a motion of censure on Torrington and Grey on which J[ohn] R[ussell] declared that he would not go with the Budget or any public business with this vote hanging over their heads (which if carried involved resignation) nor till it was decided. Baillie withdrew it, and business will go on. Nothing is more extraordinary than the conduct of many of their own friends, and the levity with which almost everybody follows his own particular inclination or opinion, regardless of the condition of the Government and of the grave questions which are looming in the distance.

By April, however, knowledgeable politicians (Graham for example) felt that Stanley was ".....quite ready to take the Government, and that Ceylon was the case on which he meant to give them the mortal stab....."42

Clearly the Protectionists, like the Radicals were quite sanguine about the prospects of toppling the Russell administration on the issue of the Ceylon Committee, and having regard to all that had happened whenever this question came before Parliament in 1849 and 1850, they had very good cause to be so optimistic.

Baillie introduced his motion afresh at the end of May. The motion concentrated on: a condemnation of martial law, its imposition, and prolonged continuation; the courts martial, their establishment, their conduct, and the needless severity of the punishments inflicted by them. To these were added a criticism of Torrington's conduct over the execution of Kadahapola Kuda Unanse. Grey's "conduct.....in signifying Her Majesty's approbation of the conduct of Lord Torrington during and subsequent to the disturbances," was condemned as precipitate and iniudicious, tending to establish precedents of rigour and severity in the government of Her Majesty's Possessions, and injurious to the character of this Country for justice and humanity. 43

^{39.} For this episode, see *ibid.*, pp. 218-27; Gooch, Later Correspondence, London: 1930 I, pp. 47-65; N. Gash, Reaction and Reconstruction, 1952 p. 197.

^{40.} The resignation was precipitated by a defeat over Locke King's motion for the extension of the Country franchise. In 1850 a previous debate on the same motion moved by him had resulted in its defeat with the aid of the Peelites and Protectionists, but in 1851 most of these independent allies marked their displeasure or indifference by abstaining on the division, and the government was defeated by 100 votes to 52 despite Russell's promise made in the course of the debate to introduce a similar motion himself.

^{41.} The Greville Memoirs, VI, p. 283.

^{42.} Ibid., pp. 289-90 (2 April 1851).

^{43.} Hansard, 3rd series, CXVII, column 254 (H. of C., 29 May 1851).

The debate that ensued had an air of weariness and boredom about it. This was perhaps inevitable in the circumstances, because the facts and the arguments had become tiresome to the members interested in the affairs of Ceylon.

To the vast majority of members, however, the interest in the debate lay in its possible effects on the fate of the government.

Baillie's speech⁴⁴ introducing his motion, lacked his customary zest and fire, as if he was far too conscious of the possibility that the support he had enjoyed in the House on previous occasions when the affairs of the Ceylon committee were being debated had been considerably eroded by the fact of Torrington's recall. He began on a defensive, almost apologetic tone by explaining that the problems of Ceylon could not be allowed to rest where they were left by the Ceylon Committee at the end of the previous session of Parliament; and that a Committee appointed by the House had an obligation to fulfil, namely to discharge the important duties entrusted to them by completing its assignment.

Given the nature of his motion, it was inevitable that his speech should concentrate on the courts martial, and the execution of the bhikkhu on which latter point he made a vigorous defence of Selby. Though he proceeded also to a recaptulation of the circumstances in which Wodehouse had produced before the Committee the private letters from Torrington which had precipitated the latter's discomfiture, the main argument of his speech and the chief charge he laid against the Ceylon government was that a number of men had been executed by improperly constituted courts martial, and without the presence of judge advocates at the great majority of these trials.

Joseph Hume, ⁴⁵ like Baillie began on an uncharacteristically diffident note, conceding that the Committee's work had been carried to a most unusual and improper length. But this, he urged, was the fault of the government which had first refused to listen to the complaints of the inhabitants of Ceylon, and had afterwards thwarted the inquiries before the Committee by every means in their power. He had served on many Committees, Hume declared, but never on a Committee "where the Government party took such means to prevent the elucidation of truth..."

The tone of his speech, however, became much more positively belligerent than Baillie's, and at the same time his statement of the case against the Ceylon government had a coherence and vigour that Baillie's had lacked. There had been no rebellion in Ceylon, Hume insisted, or if there had been one, it was an exceptionally mild one. Torrington's taxes had precipitated the disturbances (he emphasised the fact that he had no quarrel with Torrington's reform of the fiscal system of the colony) and the Ceylon government itself had conceded the validity of this charge by subsequently repeating some of the taxes. Equally emphatic was his insistence that the operation of martial law was illegal from beginning to end, and that it had been prolonged without any substantial consideration save that of passing a Bill of Indemnity, designed to prevent a searching inquiry into the operation of martial law. Once the Bill of Indemnity was approved no prosecution could be instituted against those who might have abused their powers under martial law.

^{44.} Ibid., CXVII, columns 6-33 (H. of C., 29 May 1851).

^{45.} Ibid., columns 81-92.

Hume had been preceded by two speeches in support of Torrington. The first of these, by Serjeant Murphy, was an overt and self-confessed defence of Torrington on the lines of a lawyer speaking to a brief. He was an intemperate speech lacking in sophistication, and combining a blustering defence of Torrington with crudely partisan personal attacks on those who had in any way contributed to Torrington's discomfiture. These victims ranged from Wodehouse and Selby to Anstruther and the Chief Justice, Sir Anthony Oliphant. Murphy's speech was a recapitulation, without much refinement, of the case built up for the government by its spokesman before the Committee.

Roebuck who followed Murphy made a more restrained and balanced contribution to Torrington's defence.⁴⁷ Though he followed in broad outline the main themes of Murphy's speech, his was a more sophisticated performance, without the truculence and bluster which were to make Murphy so vulnerable to criticism. Roebuck could not refrain from ephasising yet again the novel theme he had introduced in previous speeches on Ceylon,⁴⁸ viz. that Ceylon was not a colony, in any proper sense of the term, but an outlying possession of England, one which had been obtained by the sword, and was retained by force. The administration of such an outlying possession, he emphasised, could not be judged by the normal usages and rules of "constitutional" government. He for one, would test the government of a possession like Ceylon by its results, and would only ask whether security had been obtained by the least possible expense of pain and suffering to the community.

More painstaking, if more conventional in his approach, was the speech by Sir James Hogg,⁴⁹ a member of the Ceylon Committee, who defended Torrington without resorting to personal attacks on the latter's adversaries in the Ceylon government. He made a reasoned if somewhat conventional case for Torrington in the Kadahapola Kuda Unanse episode.

Hogg launched a purposeful counterattack on Baillie on the question of martial law, urging that Baillie was mistaken in attempting to draw a parallel between martial law and the common law of England. Martial law, Hogg argued—quoting as authority the British Judge Advocate—was the absence of all law. Martial law could not be the subject of regulation. When Martial law was proclaimed, the officer commanding was expected to use his discretion, and to approximate its administration as near as was possible to the regular course of justice.

By far the most sustained and formidable critique of Torrington and the Colonial Office was the speech by Sir Frederick Thesiger, 50 It was all the more effective for its general sobriety of tone. But most impressive, however, was his sure grasp of all the finer points of the Ceylon Committee's work of investigation, and his amazing acquaintance with the evidence contained in the massive volumes it produced.

Thesiger began with a statement of the reasons that compelled Baillie to introduce his motion; this explanation he outlined with a clarity and incisiveness which neither Baillie nor Hume had demonstrated in their own speeches. Baillie's motion, Thesiger argued, could only be considered as being directed against the policy of the Colonial Office. If Torrington had continued to be

^{46.} Ibid., columns 33-59 (H. of C., 29 May 1851).

^{47.} Ibid., columns 67-80 (H. of C., 29 May 1851).

^{48.} See Hansard, 3rd series, CVIII, columns 653-657 (H. of C., 6 February 1850).

^{49.} Hansard, 3rd series, CXVII, columns 130-145 (H. of C., 29 May 1851).

^{50.} Ibid., CXVIII, columns 153-179.

Governor of Ceylon, Baillie would no doubt have framed his resolution so as to vote an address for his removal. On the other hand, had Torrington been removed from office by the Secretary of State on the ground of the latter's disapproval of the particular measures of which complaint was now made, he had not the slightest doubt that Baillie would not have considered it worth his while to bring forward any motion on Ceylon affairs at all.

A cogently argued justification of Baillie's motion was followed by an impressive demolition of the case for Torrington built up by Hogg, Roebuck and Murphy. The disturbances, Thesiger pointed out, were not a well-organized or widespread conspiracy for the overthrowing of British rule in the island. Indeed the Ceylon government itself had in the earlier despatches described these events as a "brush" or a "skirmish", but with Tennent's systematic attempt to build up a case for Torrington, evidence was concocted to demonstrate the existence of a widespread conspiracy against British rule in Ceylon.

The punishments inflicted by the courts martial, in the absence of judge-advocates, were not merely illegal, but also a cruel and vindictive travesty of justice. During the time they were in full operation the civil court was sitting at Kandy presided over by the Chief Justice who had been requested by the Governor to go on circuit for the express purpose of holding these trials. There was thus not the slightest pretence for claiming that there existed any urgency for the summary and almost instantaneous punishment of the persons convicted by the courts martial. The execution of Kadahapola Unanse by a court martial was a miscarriage of justice, and Thesiger defended Selby against the charges levelled against him on this incident by Torrington's supporters.

The siger set a standard which few of the better known and more experienced and accomplished Parliamentarians reached in this debate. Gladstone for instance, 51 did not have The siger's grasp of the essentials of the situation in Ceylon but his speech was more eloquent if also more verbose. And he excelled in the fervour with which he drove home his criticisms, and the tone of moral indignation which lent added force to these. He began by deploring the personal attacks on the Ceylon civil servants, Wodehouse and Selby, whose honour, he insisted, was just as worthy of protection as Torrington's. Wodehouse was defended over the question of the private letters. Gladstone laid the blame squarely on the Committee in compelling Wodehouse to produce them.

At the same time Gladstone expressed his desire to refrain from attacking Grey for his support of Torrington generally, a support which any Secretary of State was likely to have given. Nor was he willing to pin Grey down on the despatches he had sent to Ceylon. This part of Baillie's motion he left severely alone, and concentrated his fire on the courts martial.

Gladstone took up the position that there had been no rebellion in Ceylon, or if there had been one, it was one of the shortest ever known—it could properly be said to have lasted only two days. It was not 'a vindictive atrocious or murderous rebellion'—not one British life was lost—as evidenced by the fact that the 'rebels' when excited and maddened by 'rebellion' had merely tied the arms of the one European (whom they had caught) behind his back and attached his feet to a verandah. In this situation, the executions of eighteen men by the courts martial were totally indefensible and illegal. The Ceylon Government in his view

^{51.} Ibid., CXVII, columns 204-220.

"seem to have regarded martial law solely in the aspect of its convenience to themselves......as a means of obviating the difficulties and as a justification of any accusation that might be brought against (its) acts....."

Besides, the executions under martial law seemed all the more reprehensibe because the victims were not chiefs or priests—who were alienated from the government—but merely the common people, "tools of their superiors, men who felt no discontent but were driven on to rebellion by those whom they respected as their superiors". The chiefs and priests, moreover, had a justifiable sense of grievance for "...in matters which were nearest to the feelings of these men, you have chosen to break faith with them..." There was the supremely important issue of Buddhism, where the government had bound itself.

to take some qualified care of the property connected with the Buddhist religion and unfortunately just before the period of the outbreak (not supported by the advice of the civil servants of the colony but opposed by them all) in the teeth of the advice of every practical man, you suddenly threw up all charge of the property connected with the maintenance of their religion, and refused to constitute any new legal staff for its management. Was it possible to adopt a measure more calculated to alienate the people.

Gladstone was followed by the Attorney General⁵² whose speech was brief, and surprisingly opaque even with regard to the courts martial on which he concentrated his attention. From the Government's chief legal adviser it was a lackadaisical performance. Then, after a brief intervention by Lord Hotham, a member of the Committee, clarifying the circumstances in which his resolution came to be adopted as the final report of the Committee, ⁵³ the Prime Minister made a feeble and ineffective defence of Torrington against the criticism of Gladstone and Thesiger.⁵⁴ His speech like that of the Attorney General, lacked conviction. Perhaps they were both doubtful of the merits of the case they were being called upon to defend, weary of it all, and anxious to bring the debate to a final vote. But Russell's speech was not entirely without a streak of defiance especially in his insistence that the government—and any government for that matter—was in duty bound to support Governors of distant colonies who were zealously performing their duties. Whatever the decision of the House upon the motion before it, Russell declared

I believe...that the rules and maxims which we have laid down must be the rules and maxims by which any Government will be guided which seeks to preserve this empire; and that if any Government was to take the dastardly path of sacrificing a Governor because there was a clamour raised against him, got up with great perseverence and industry—I believe that the Government, while it would sacrifice the colonies, would meet with the reprobation of the people of England.

He was followed by Disraeli, who once again demonstrated his partiality for sardonic humour as a method of attack.⁵⁵ The government, Distaeli declared, was placing itself in a strange and anomalous position in that

^{52.} Ibid., CXVII, columns 220-26.

^{53.} Ibid., CXVII, columns 233-36.

^{54.} Ibid., CXVII, columns 236-43.

^{55.} Ibid., CXVII, columns 242-49.

they stake their existence now on supporting a man whom they have already withdrawn from his government, and not for the faults of which he is accused!... They have withdrawn him and for what? A perfect Minister, the best of administrators of finance, the man who has put down rebellion, and delivered his dependency in a state of unparalleled prosperity and peace to his successor—a man who has fulfilled the highest duties in the most complete manner, is recalled? I believe there were two letters written to two persons; I believe he called one man a fool, and the other a knave; and I am not quite sure that the letters may not have crossed, and the wrong man got each of them. There was a contemptible piece of scandal, that none but an old maid in a country town would have listened to, and for this you sacrifice this able statesman, who did what your own Chancellor of the Exchequer never could do—gave you a surplus revenue, and that which your Secretary for Foreign Affairs has hardly contrived to do—kept you at peace.....

The caustic wit, and the superb sense of irony in this speech had little or no impression on the floating vote in the House. When the motion was pressed to a division, the government emerged triumphant by 282 votes to 202, an unexpectedly large margin. Equally unexpected was the size of the attendance at the voting, ⁵⁶ a strong contrast to the small attendances that characterised crucial debates in the House in 1849 and 1850. Greville explained the government's success by the cuphoria induced by the Great Exhibition,

.....all politics have appeared flat, stale and unprofitable. This has turned to the advantage of the Government.....who were finally set on their legs by the excellent division they got.....Everybody now admits that they are quite safe for this session, after which we shall see, but though they are considered, and really are, a weak Government, their weakness is strength compared with that of the other party, which is hopelessly distracted and disorganised.....⁵⁷

This was as good as explanation as any. But one is inclined to think that the heavy attendance at the division indicated a determination on the part of politicians exasperated and bored by the regularity with which the affairs of a distant colony took up their time for over two years, to end it all in one final heave of relief. Weariness and boredom can account for the government's success with ever greater plausibility than a sense of cuphoria.

For over two years the weight of events and every day's news at home and in the colony had changed the mood and manner in which the case had been handled. Both sides had indulged in fine hair-splitting arguments and the exhaustive quotation of precendents. These seemingly interminable debates had created the impression that Parliament was, in a real sense, an arbiter in colonial affairs. But Parliament as arbiter was more a matter of appearance than reality. In this instance what was significant was not that as a result of nearly two years of investigation and debate Torrington and Tennant, along with Wodehouse, had been recalled, but the ease with which Grey, despite every disadvantage that confronted him on personal and political levels, nearly succeeded in bringing his protege unscathed through the ordeal. What it did show was that even when circumstances were so much in favour of the Legislature, the government of the day, weak as it was, could still call upon large reserves of support to protect its own control of affairs in the colonies.

^{56.} Cobden and Bright were notable absentees.

^{57.} The Greville Memoirs, VI, p. 294 (31 May 1851).

Policies Pertaining to the Marketing of Food Grains in India: The Experience of 1973

BARBARA HARRISS

Introduction

1973 witnessed the paradoxical situation of swiftly rising foodgrains prices in a year of increasing production. The General Price Index rose 3.5% in 1971. This rate trebled in 1972 and further doubled to 21.3% from mid 1972 to mid 1973. In August alone foodgrains prices rose by 5.2% though prices of rice went up by 7.7% (Dept. of Statistics, Tamil Nadu). Partly this has been due to inflation. Ungenerous monsoons in 1970-72 resulted in shortages of agricultural produce. Sluggish production in the non-agricultural sector exerted a cost-push aided and abetted, firstly, by a necessary prodigality in public sector expenditure on defence and on Bangladesh refugees, which has increased purchasing power, secondly, by strikes, thirdly by the externally imposed rise in the price of oil and fourthly, by a massive electricity cut (acknowledged to have resulted from lack of official appreciation of demand trends) which have reduced non-agricultural production. Shortages in essential inputs have further contributed to a rise in prices in the agricultural sector; and no compensation was provided because of the truism that a rise in prices does not necessarily result in a rise in agricultural production (Nadkarni, 1973, pp. 140-143.)

However, a contributory factor in the concatenation of forces which produced this situation has been the management of the foodgrains sector, with which this review will be most concerned. In this sphere, the Indian Government has to face two kinds of problems:

- 1. The economic problem of providing foodgrains to the vulnerable sector of the population (defined as those earning less than Rs. 300 per month and therefore not paying income tax) in an inflationary situation without contributing to the cost push in the non-agricultural sector and without also denying to producers "fair' incentive prices for their surplus.
- 2. The less publicised physical problem that the vulnerable sector amounts at present to over 466 million people and that if they are to be fed at a standard of 8 kg per capita per month (266 grammes a day or roughly 10 oz.), the marketed surplus required approximates to 53 million tonnes or 2,432 million bushels¹ (Johnson, 1969, p. 21), while the total supply at present amounts to 1400-1600 million bushels leaving a large shortfall in nutritional terms. Even if, in fact, this figure is an overestimate because landless labourers are paid in kind, the fact that it is so large—up to 900 million bushels—underlines the responsibility of policy makers in this field.

All Indian metric quantities have been converted to local Sri Lankan ones using the following assumptions: 1 bushel equals 47 lbs. 2.2 lbs equal 1 kg, 45.9 bushels equal 1 metric tonne (1000 kgs). Rupee values, however, are *Indian* rupee (1 Sterling equals Rs. Indian 18.6 equals Rs. Sri Lankan 15.75).

This review will discuss the objectives of policies made in 1973 by the Central and State Governments in order to cope with these problems. The experiences of these policy choices will be chronicled by using source material from three independent, high quality newspapers.² Some evaluation will be made of these practical experiences and, finally, some alternative strategies will be suggested and criticised.

Objectives of Foodgrain Marketing Policy

The explicit objectives of the All-India Congress Committee when they decided on October 10th, 1972 to nationalise the foodgrains distribution system were as follows:

- to eliminate foodgrain dealers and their habits of hoarding and speculating in times of scarcity;
- (ii) to stabilise prices so that producers get remunerative prices and so that foodgrains are supplied to the working class consumers at a reasonable level;
- (iii) to augment food production and to increase the quantity of foodgrains in Fair Price Shops (FPS):
- (iv) to avoid increasing imports;
- (v) to allow the amassing of buffer stocks in all types of foodgrains to have a regulatory effect on traders and foodgrains prices (*Hindu*, Dec. 19th, 28th, 1972, Jan. 16th, 24th, Feb. 28th 1973; *Economic Times*, March 9th, 1973).

Organisation of Implementation

The mechanism of this nationalisation was described thus: "Take-over will be achieved through monopoly procurement dovetailed into an effective system of retail distribution, holding of buffer stocks and price policy in association with an intensive programme for improving agricultural production in all relevant (wheat, rice, sugar cane) essential commodities," (A.I.C.C. in Singh, 1973, pp. 97-100).

- 1. Timing: Wheat procurement was first to be nationalised in time for the rabi (maha) harvest. This meant that in some States, surplus wheat States, there was monopoly procurement while in the rest, various kinds of public buying agencies were operating within a dual marketing system. In the meantime retail sales of wheat all over India were to be controlled. Also while the wheat trade was taken over in totality, rationing had to be brought in gradually, firstly in urban areas where public distribution networks had the thickest mesh, afterwards diffusing to rural areas.
- 2. Prices: Support prices (Rs. 16/bl for wheat, Rs. 11.5/bl for "standard" varieties of paddy) had been fixed in advance as usual by the A.P.C. in anticipation of a dual market (Agricultural Prices Commission, 1973). These

^{2.} In India there is a great interest in agriculture and the standard of journalism on these matters is high. The information provided by the high-quality newspapers is as reliable as that of the Guardian or the Times in Britain. Nor are the newspape, s mere political mouthpieces as in some European and Asian countries. The newspapers I have relied on are the Hindu, the Indian Express and the Economic Times.

prices were support prices rather than procurement prices, and nationalisation was announced after farmers had made cropping pattern decisions for the 1972-73 rabi season. The adoption of support prices as procurement prices under monopoly procurement left farmers no legal way of compensating themselves for what was generally perceived as a low rate of return in the controlled system. Normally non-leviable cereals are sold with some degree of price hoist in the restricted but still open market.

3. Government Trading: The Food Corporation of India (FCI) acting as an agent for State and Central Governments alike was to increase its purchasing activity from 460 to 550 million bushels over 1973. States were encouraged at first to develop State Trading Corporations to follow an identical buying pattern to FCI, and to provide competition with it. Food and Civil Supplies Departments and Co-operatives were to be strengthened prior to performing a greater role in purchase and distribution. Each State was to be a wheat zone with cordoned borders. Within the States, discretion was allowed for the formation of smaller units, known as district zones, to check the movement of grain from surplus to deficit areas. The Centre was to build within FCI godowns, a buffer stock whose eventual size has been targetted at anywhere between 450-900 million bushels by the Union Agricultural Minister. Wheat would reach the public through private retailers, big retailers procuring their supplies directly from growers, and small retailers and retailers in deficit areas obtaining Government stocks. A ceiling of Rs. 20/bl was set for the private sector, whose "areas of operation" were to be "well defined." Bank credit was to be curtailed to the private sector in an effort to phase out these traders altogether. To be phased in was a greatly expanded system of Fair Price Shops, retailing wheat at Rs. 19-19.6/bi. A kind of social implementation was also envisaged in the need to "induce an awareness among farmers about their responsibility to help the community in a crisis" which reveals the extent of official perceptions of the farming community as "public servants," an idea not actually held by most farmers (Hindu, Dec. 28th 1972, Jan. 18th, Feb. 2nd, 19th, 23rd, March 9th, 16th, Nov. 1st, 1973).

Experience

The production of rabi wheat was 1193 m. bls, of which 460 m bls was marketable surplus. Targetted procurement was at 367 m. bls but by August 1973 there was a 50% shortfall in actual purchases. The main reason for this was that only in Punjab and Haryana did the procurement machinery approximate a monopoly position, and were the targets reached. Most wheat producing States had neither time, resources or inclination to drum up more than a moderately policed levy (*Indian Express*, May 28th 1973). So right from the beginning there was a dual market in wheat as well as the black market.

1. Marketing Behaviour of Farmers: Farmers reacted predictably to this array of marketing channels by refusing to bring in wheat to the procurement agency. By mid-August an unprecedented 2 m. tonnes of rabi wheat was still in the hands of the farmers. Free market wholesale wheat prices soared to Rs. 25.6-Rs. 38/bl which accentuated the relative lowness of the APC's support price. This had been taken over as the procurement price. As long as there was no price control on retail prices, farmers could expect a higher price than the official procurement price, and diverted supplies to the open or to the black market. When retail ceilings were eventually fixed, farmers held back. According to the Task Force on Wheat Procurement, this reticence was not due to the fact that, because take-over was announced during the rabi season, farmers

had already pledged their crops elsewhere. In fact in Rajasthan the maximum that FCI could have procured was 40% of marketable surplus for that reason (*Hindu*, Feb. 23rd, May 30th 1973). Both February and March saw farmers protesting in Delhi in favour of retaining private traders (Hindu, Feb. 23rd, March 6th 1973). Apart from the fact that some farmers are also traders, the strength and complexity of the relationship, social and economic, between farmers and traders is not widely recognised by policy makers. Traders provide timely credit at low or no interest rates, they may organise transport to market. Commission agents will store farmers' surplus for short periods to ensure high price offers especially if they are to receive percentage commissions rather than flat rate ones. They arrange bids and may give advance payments. If we presuppose that traders hoard (a practice that has been proved many times by economists to be too capital intensive for the average wholesaler, and physically difficult for the commission agent) the general price rise that would result is to the advantage of the farmer. There is evidence to show that official concern switched from private traders to producers during the course of 1973. There were fears that wheat farmers would switch to coarse grains whose open market prices during 1973 were double per bag those of wheat.

- 2. State Trading: The division of India into zones resulted in both the States and the Centre indulging with various degrees of enthusiasm in buffer building. State buffers were used for bilateral trade agreements, fortunate States like Tamil Nadu negotiating coyly with suitor States such as West Bengal, Karnataka and Kerala (*Indian Express*, July 20, Sept. 18th 1973). Between States, formal movement restrictions in wheat were resurrected. Rajasthan, U.P., and Karnataka divided themselves internally into zones and the multiplication of borders led to widespread smuggling; 90 m bls. of wheat was alleged to have reached Gujarat, Rajasthan and Maharashtra where by July open market prices varied from Rs. 32-47/bl, from Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, M.P., and U.P.
- 3. Retail Sales and Consumer Response: The failure to achieve targets led to shortages in F. P. shops first in rural areas and then in urban ones. Wheat then disappeared from the open market and demand, diverted to other foodgrains, caused a rise in the prices of rice and coarse grains. Consumer consternation manifested itself in food riots in Bombay and Maharashtra resulting in complete closure of 10,000 shops including 1,600 F.P. shops, only to reopen after a decision was made by both wholesalers and retailers to sell essential commodities on a no-profit, no-loss basis for 3 to 4 months. But by end of August, rice, for instance, was still at Rs. 2.27-2.77/lb in Bombay (Indian Express, Aug. 4th, 23rd 1973). In Andhra there were similar riots by both industrial and white collar workers against retailers, which resulted in the latter being put out of business. In September rioting diffused to Karnataka, while in Kerala which has to import half her foodgrains requirements of 3.5 m bls. per month, the State Government faced with a month by month dwindling of the level of promised supplies from FCI, was forced to reduce the ration in F.P. shops, originally at the nutritional minimum of 10-12 ozs, per capita per day to a third of this. In August there were 215 famine affected coastal villages and black market rice was fetching Rs. 4/lb (Indian Express, July 23rd, Aug. 8th, 15th; Hindu, Aug. 19th, 31st 1973).

We can conclude that monopoly procurement increased on-farm consumption, that movement restrictions encouraged smuggling and that ineffective implementation of procurement machinery by the States concerned not only raised wheat prices but also those of other foodgrains. In all cases the "vulnerable" sector was the loser.

Reorganisation

1. Measures taken by Central Government: The Central Government phased out immediate nationalisation of the rice trade, began to free private trade and restrict the activities of producers. It also gave more latitude in food policy decisions to the States.

By May it resorted to securing imports from U.S.A., Canada and Argentina at high world market prices. About 200m bls were imported by August at a cost of Rs. 160 crores of foreign exchange. This was less in weight than in other recent years but the cost was greater and the imports were relatively unpremeditated as production had been reckoned as sufficient even to cover drought stricken areas. The difference between procurement and import prices antagonised farmers. In May the Centre also proposed to nationalise coarse grains, taking on a further administrative burden in order to dissuade wheat farmers from switching cropping strategics.

Since India was still in an official State of Emergency after the Bangladesh war, in August the Defence of India Rules and the Maintenance of Internal Security Act were invoked against hoarding and blackmarketing producers (although arrests made under the DIR and MISA have been on traders and not farmers). From January to June the policing machinery seized a total of three lakhs of bushels of foodgrains worth about Rs. 64 lakhs (*Indian Express*, Aug. 4th, 13th 1973). This amounted to 1.8% of the marketable surplus. It is probably relevant to wonder whether the costs of these policing operations was equivalent to or exceeded the returns when losses through State storage alone are said to average 5% of the marketable surplus.

By August 28th the Political Affairs Committee and the Economic Policy Committee of Congress recommended a deferment of the rice take-over. This was described by the Communist Party of India as "a surrender to the kulak-blackmarketeering lobby." On the heels of this decision was one to lengthen further the decision making leash of the regions.

2. Measures taken by State Government: As early as April the U.P. Government unilaterally refused to fix rerailers' wheat ceiling prices and encouraged loans to private traders. Later it relaxed inter-district as well (Hindu, April 30th; Indian Express, June 21st 1973). In June although the Chief Ministers agreed on an All-India support price of Rs. 63 per quintal of paddy (Rs. 13.50/bl), each State was allowed individually to select procurement prices. The Centre quite naturally advocated a level varying from Rs. 0.85-Rs. 2.14/bl higher than support prices in direct relationship to the degree of achievement of targets. In fact the States pressed for a rise in procurement prices of Rs. 3.2 to Rs. 4.3 per bushel, deficit States such as Kerala were strongly in favour of a high procurement price, since if food zones facilitate partial procurement in surplus States with their artificially low free market prices, they do the reverse in deficit States. Surplus States such as Tamil Nadu advocated a Rs. 2.14 ren in procurement levels in order to "protect the interest of the consumers." (Is fact as the compulsory procurement system in Tamil Nady amounts to under 20% of marketed surplus, it protects under 20% of non-producing consumers. while the rest pay a free market price hoisted by an amount which compensate traders for their levy 'losses.' A rise in procurement price results in a lower levy hoist on the free market and also benefits the farmers as consumers). The Centre approved a procurement price at Rs. 2.14 above the support price for paddy and coarse grains; States were allowed to work out the exact levels for various varieties. So by October 5th procurement prices ranged from Rs. 2.35

(Karnataka) to Rs. 3.42 (Bihar) above that set by the A.P.C. as support price. A rise in procurement prices necessarily implied a rise in the issue price in FP shops since the distribution of rice and coarse grains is not subsidised after the fashion of wheat. In mid October the issue price from FCI railheads and godowns was raised from between 25% (Rs. 21.36 to Rs. 26.7/bl) for coarse grains to 33% (Rs. 27.34 to Rs. 34.18/bl) for superfine rice (Indian Express), Sept. 16th, 18th 1973). Differential raising of the issue prices is designed to reduce demand for high quality rice or at best exact an indirect tax from those who do demand it. By the end of 1973 the issue prices in FP shops were now close to those operating in the open market in many States. This reduced the practical competitiveness of Fair Price Shops just as it raised the cost of living for the poorest.

In the same way the Centre let the States make up their minds over what machinery to select for future procurement of rice. Chief Ministers were asked to choose between total take-over, procurement from millers, procurement from farmers and procurement from both farmers and millers. There is no special merit in the last policy. Assam, Kerala and Maharashtra, all deficit States experiencing difficulty in securing supplies from the Centre opted to take over the rice trade in totality. Karnataka is operating a graded levy on farmers, the levy rate rising steeply with land owned. The fear of widespread smuggling resulting from misdeclaration of land ownership, has kept Karnataka faithful to its policy of district zones. Punjab and Haryana have a 90% levy on millers while the remaining States have set up State procurement operations for partial procurement to meet the needs of their internal FPS system and (if past performances are a guide) to go a small way to meet targetted contributions to the Central Pool (Indian Express, Sept. 16th, 18th 1973).

Evaluation

Given this factual background it is now possible to make some assessment of the individual elements of foodgrains marketing policy—

- 1. Public Distribution System: ("to eliminate foodgrain dealers and...... hoarding" and "to increase the quantity of foodgrains in Fair Price Shops"). Those institutions which take over from private trade must be of equal or superior efficiency in linking supply with demand.
- (i) Parastatal Boards: Handling costs in FCI are greater than in the free market. In Rajasthan, administrative costs for purchase, storage and distribution by FCI amount to Rs. 0.22 per bl, and elsewhere in India vary' from Rs. 0.21 to Rs. 0.42. "6.5 crores are needed to handle 320 m bls of grain." These funds are supplied by the Centre. Private traders are known to have lower operating costs than FCI for both administration and for storage. Allegations are made in the press about corruption (purchase officers underbilling farmers are sharing the difference and explaining off the discrepancy later as loss in storage (Hindu, Feb. 19th, 23rd; Economic Times, March 9th 1973) and mismanagement (which forced the resignation of FCI's Chairman in late 1972). In August 1973 for instance the FCI is alleged to have let rot in storage between 1.6 and 3.5 lakh bls of imported wheat which cost Rs. 50,000 merely to dump on municipal nightsoil grounds. In September, Tanjore farmers, whose kuruval cropping pattern was based on consideration of Tamil Nadu State's classification of Karuna and ADT 27 paddy as "fine," were confronted with FCI's procurement price based on the Centre's pronouncement of their being "coarse." A month after kuruvai harvest had begun, procurement was being

held up and high yielding varieties such as Ponni, Jaya and Kannagi had yet to be classified (*Hindu*, Dec. 19th 1972, March 9th 1973; *Indian Express*, Sept. 7th, 21st 1973). By November 9th however, FCI had exceeded its procurement target of one lakh tonnes in Tanjore under a more liberal procurement policy than at the beginning of the year.

(ii) Fair Price Shops: At the opposite end of the system to FCI is the network of Fair Price Shops. In 1972 there were 165,000 such shops and 40 m bls of foodgrains were issued each month through them (Singh, 1973, pp. 40-41). Offtake before nationalisation in 1973 was at 46 m bls a month and rose to 68 m bls afterwards (Hindu, Jan. 16th 1963). Taking the output of a very good year. 1968, as an example, total wheat procurement in 1968 stood at 1092 m dls with rice at 1526 m bls. This amounts to 1285 bls to be distributed in each existing Fair Price Shop but using Singh's data for Lucknow, if all monthly income to FP shops were from wheat and rice (and probably half is from sugar in fact) the average shop would sell 69 bls per month. So it can be estimated that an eighteenfold expansion would be necessary for complete monopoly distribution by FPS. This is not being planned, even though according to Singh a FPS is easy to set up. Foodgrain dealers simply acquire a licence and receive a quota of FCI supplies in accordance with the number of cardholders attached to their shops. His survey of the Lucknow FPS system revealed that before the take over the FPS sector was supplying relatively less wheat than rice to the vulnerable sector. Both shopkeepers and consumers stated that if free market prices approached issue prices in a dual market, FPS would be unable to compete with the open market, not on grounds of proximity and convenience, but on more basic grounds of quality considerations. In any case, in 1972 only 32% of customers, however "vulneradle," bought their full rations from FPS (Singh, 1973, p. 65).

Besides an increase in the number of FPS, take-over requires considerable increases in turnover in existing shops. This means a concomitant increase in employees. If private sector foodgrains dealers are allowed to become retailers in FPS (and there is every evidence in the Luchknow study that this has happened the negative employment effect of take-over might be slightly comminuted.

(iii) Controls on the Free Market: At the start of wheat nationalisation wholesalers alone were to be made redundant, and retailers to have their activities curtailed. It is not difficult for wholesalers to become retailers since the licencing classifications are not regionally standardised and allow in some towns for a "wholesale-retailer" category. Also many wholesalers hold retailing licences too as a useful insurance against redundancy; this is also a recognition of the fact that almost universally in the private sector wholesalers will participate in retail trade whenever opportunity arises, since profit per bag is much greater for re-tailing than for wholesaling. The Union Agriculture Minister's statement that "as no wholesalers would be allowed to operate there would be no hoarding and profiteering" underestimates the skill of retailers in this respect. Retailers' stocks of wheat were limited by the size of deposit they contribute to Govern- ment, this being in strict relation to declared turnover. Any retailer stocking in excess of his limit is then automatically "hoarding." This is a summary definition, bypassing the fact that the line between legitimate stocking in order to ensure a continual supply outwards in a situation of fluctuating supply in-wards, and hoarding, is hard to define. Lastly the curtailing of bank credit to retailers has the kick-back effect that traders search for credit from "private sources" payment of whose high interest rate increases free market prices or in this case lowers the allowed profit margin.

(iv) Conflict between Centre and States: While "food should ultimately become the responsibility of the State," "food distribution should be looked at from an All India angle and not on a regional basis," (*Indian Express*, Sept. 16th, July 26th 1973). These two ministerial pronouncements reflect the conflict between Centre and States over procurement and distribution machinery, which has in 1973 emasculated the Centre.

The multiplication of procurement agencies does not theoretically result in a greater amount procured at a fixed rate (although it might do in practice by a more intensive scatter of buying points) and it creates complications in trading by introducing bilateral trading negotiations into the system. The events of 1973 show these to be a hit and miss, time consuming business. In theory to have one high quality organization dealing with the two separate systems of buffer stocks and fair price shops would be most simple. But in a situation where administrative inefficiencies exist or are perceived to exist, the present multiplication of agencies might create competition in quantity procured if not in price.

- 2. Monopoly Procurement, Levies and Trading Zones ("to stabilise prices" and "to augment food production").
- (i) Price Determination: As a means of achieving the stated ends monopoly procurement runs against the economic problem of establishing a procurement price which is reasonable to the producer and results in an issue price which is reasonable to the consumer. The concept of "reasonableness" is a very thorny one, depending as it does on establishing a return on production costs. Costs of production may vary enormously between farmers; there is no special merit in selecting the average costs of a sample of farmers, nor is there in the concept of "bulk line costs"—the minimum cost covering the average costs of farmers producing a major part, e.g. 75% of the marketable surplus, for in both cases such costs vary regionally as well as individually and temporally What constitute production costs are difficult to determine, since it is well known that if family labour is imputed at current wage rates, family farms often appear to run at a loss, because in fact the marginal cost of this kind of labour is less than that of hired labour. If family labour is imputed at market rates the procurement price may be excessively high, e.g. at a rate exceeding that of the market in a free market situation; and if it is not included in most calculations the procurement price may be unfair to small farmers. A similar kind of problem arises from the fact that farmers avail themselves of a spectrum of technologies, that for HYV's being conventionally supposed to be of lower cost per unit output. A procurement price based on it would be unfair to farmers of whatever size category or form of labour organisation who use a "traditional" technology; while a procurement price which adequately rewards the "traditionalist" may also be interpreted as a lack of incentive to innovate and increase production. Furthermore in a rapidly inflationary situation with unstable input prices very careful monitoring of production costs would be necessary for all technologies since relationships between the various factors of production may alter the relative profitability of different technologies and by extension alter the level at which procurement prices represent a "reasonable" return to farmers.

At present "support prices" (the level at which Public Distribution Authorities must intervene to buy in a dual market, and equal to the procurement price under a system of monopoly procurement) are determined bi-annually by the Agricultural Prices Commission. According to Nadkarni the support price has been based on "costs of production," farm harvest prices, prevailing market

prices, and trends in the market prices of competing crops and inputs (1963, pp. 182-187) together with the pragmatic success of the preceding year's level. From time to time the basis of recommendation has changed. The latest report, for kharif 1973-74, took into account firstly that to minister to the FPS and to build a buffer, procurement would have to be more than doubled "which argues for an increase in the existing procurement prices" and secondly that input prices "may have risen by 8%" per annum (A.P.C., 1973, pp. 7-8).

- (ii) Ripple Effect on Other Crops: Then if monopoly procurement is restricted to a few crops (and in this case it was to be wheat, rice and sugar cane) farmers compensate for what they perceive to be low relative prices in the controlled sector by altering their cropping pattern to uncontrolled crops, the very antithesis of the rationale (iii) and (iv) for nationalisation. Monopoly procurement cannot control a farmer's decision-making yet and the only solution to this kind of problem in theory is the nationalisation of all competing crops, which in practice is a heavy responsibility.
- (iii) Monitoring Free Market Input Prices: A similar problem arises where inputs are supplied in an unstable free market resulting from supply shortages and in elasticities. In this case the profitability of procurement prices will continually be eroded. Here the solution is either complete nationalisation and monopsony distribution with the aim of spreading thinly whatever there is, and/or subsidised distribution to bring down costs to the farmer, though this burdens both Central funds and administrative capacity. The final solution is to raise production of inputs commensurate with demand although, going back down the chain, if the raw material for the input industries is also in short supply, this is easier said than done. The point here is that once monopoly procurement is entered into in an inflationary situation in theory it will become necessary for the public distribution authority to spread its net over a wider and wider area of the agricultural economy in its effort to mediate between the antagonistic demands of farmers and consumers.
- (iv) Levies: The more popular option of levy procurement from the farmer at less than market prices acts as a kind of tax on those particular farmers who produce leviable crops. In this sense it is socially discriminating, and because of this it encourages procuring authorities to cover an increasing number of crops. Levy procurement from millers and traders penalises the majority of consumer s since open market prices are higher than they would be without the levy. To penalise farmers in some States, consumers in others and traders in States with monopoly procurement shows the ad hoc nature of food policy as at present conceived. And the fact that the vulnerable section is at present a small percentage of the unprotected population who subsist on the balance of marketed surplus, highlights the need for a balanced long term policy.
- (v) Geographical Restrictions on Trade: On this aspect of the implementation machinery—that of State and intra-State zonation—Dandekar says: "Total production of all the foodgrains for the country as a whole is much less variable than the production of a single crop in a small region...a single marketin itself may help to achieve a considerable degree of stability in the prices of foodgrains' (1967, p. 43). However this is referring to a free market situation. Under a system of zones the procurement authority is responsible for supplying deficit zones or States with production from surplus areas. In practice procurement has the general effect of increasing on farm consumption and of evasion of the controlled market. In practice Governments have transferred much less than the market would have done in its attempts to equalise the

profits of trade. The usual argument for zones, that prices are lower in surplus States when zones are imposed so that procurement is made easier only holds true for a dual market situation and not for the implementation machinery that was proposed. The smaller the zones, the longer the borders, the more easy to smuggle and the more difficult to police.

(vi) Administration: Procurement from whom? To procure from millers and traders is most practicable but monopoly procurement from traders at a fixed lower level lower than "market rate" is a nonsense. To procure from farmers themselves is less feasible than procuring from traders at open market rates but is the only feasible course of action if procurement prices are controlled at a level equal to or lower than present wholesale purchasing rates. Farmers cannot be forced by monopoly procurement to part with their surplus in the short term except by their own financial exigencies; though in the long term with a stable distribution policy then speculative activity would be ironed out. Procurement for whom? The physical problem of covering the total foodgrains requirement of the vulnerable population is tantamount to impossible without resorting to expensive imports. More will be said about the existing system when we cover buffer building activities.

Lastly there are many practical difficulties, not only the potential leakage of surplus into the blackmarket a process whose economic justification is excellently described in V.K.R.V. Rao et al's "Inflation and India's Economic Crisis" (1973, pp. 20 30) but also the problem of replacing the existing informal economy of unlicenced traders, about whose efficacy in linking supply and demand little is known. Direct farmer to consumer dealings could side step the distribution system. Again there is no information on how prevalent such practices are or could become. There is the organisational problem of creating and storing a separate buffer stock to smooth out fluctuations in production both temporal and spatial while operating a public distribution system which ensures a continual flow of foodgrains to "vulnerable" people however defined, and even if it is the total non-farming population. There is a real difficulty over the quality, training and aptitudes of the civil servants turned marketers who man the system. It is easy to criticise trading practices in the private sector but it is less easy to acquire their intellectually and practical skills.

- (vii) Employment: Monopoly procurement would indeed "eradicate the foodgrain dealer." Estimates of the number of traders, clerks and coolies that would be displaced ranged as high as 5 million (Hindu, March 12th 1973) Whether such unemployment is socially or politically desirable ought to be considered, as ought the social objection to monopoly procurement—that per se it is not redistributive since rich and poor consumers alike would purchase at the same issue price. Monopoly procurement would seem to be socially undesirable, economically unnecessary and operationally infeasible in the long term.
- 3. Buffer Stocks: ("to avoid increasing imports" and "to have a regulatory effect on traders and foodgrains prices")

In a situation of price instability on the world markets the import of foodgrains is increasingly costly in foreign exchange. In 1973 wheat cost Rs. 26/bl to import, Rs. 9.4/bl more than domestic procurement prices. The creation of a buffer stock from domestic production becomes a necessity. At various times throughout the 60's closing stocks, after the FPS system had been provided for, were considerable, 115 m bls in 1960-63, 45 m bls in 1964 rising from 90-200 m bls from 1965-69 and reaching 440 m bls in 1971. However buffer stocks have

largely been seen as stores to feed the FPS system. This system, apart from its justification in terms of social welfare, helps to prevent rising foodgrains prices from exerting an inflationary cost-push. In theory this system should swallow a predictable quantity of foodgrains each year, rising continually with the rising numbers of vulnerable people. In practice due to imperfect coverage and competition from the free market, the quantity distributed varies. Demand shoots up rapidly wherever and whenever harvests fail.

The function of a buffer stock ought to be the eradication of spatial and temporal fluctuations in production. If this were done, and if in years of glut, foodgrains were purchased from the free market system while in years of scarcity they were released onto it in order to conform to a secular trend in production, the FPS system could supply a much less variable demand than at present, because, ceteris paribus prices, would be stabilised. In a situation of a virtual monopoly procurement and dual distribution, as at present, the strain placed on FP Shops in catering for the demand of vulnerable sector together with widely fluctuating demand from both this sector and the remainder (demand fluctuating in inverse relation to quantities available on the semi free retail market) is considerable.

As envisaged at the time of wheat take-over the buffer was to be built on the residue of FCI stocks after monopoly procurement at a fixed price. Fixed prices are necessary because of a fear of soaring free market prices in times of scarcity. There would be no scarcity in the free market if a buffer were accumulated such that the buffer authority could buy and sell within stated ranges of over and under production, taking account of production level probabilities. Once free market fluctuations were ironed out much of the existing policy of controls would become unnecessary. However, major problems in a positive, as opposed to a residual policy of buffer building are the mechanism, finance and size of the buffer. Nadkarni writing in 1970 noted that if a buffer were built up from nil in the first year in a free market, assuming a buffer of 460 m bls and average harvest it would result in an unacceptable price rise on a free market consisting of approximately 1600 m bls (1973, pp. 151-52). The effect in a totally controlled market would be a 30% shortfall in supply through the FPS system and in a dual market if the buffer were compulsorily purchased at procurement prices it would result in a far greater price rise in the residual free market than in a truly free market situation. On the other hand if a buffer is built gradually it may be economically ineffectual as at present. The Union Agricultural Ministry is planning a buffer of 826-918 m bls to be built up during three years of monopoly procurement, optimistically assuming a cumulative annual surplus of 275 m bls extracted from the market. This would be a 19% reduction of the available marketable surplus in a situation where supply does not meet nutritional demand. Nadkarni's solution was that "resorting to foreign assistance to build initial stocks at least to some extent may be necessary" (1973, p. 200), but this was written before the current and anticipated international shortages in wheat. This being so it would be worthwhile to work out the costs of acquiring 50% of the buffer from the world market, and the rest from the domestic free market to set this against the probable costs of not acquiring a buffer (in terms of future imports, and in terms of the costs to society of a rise in free market prices in a dual system suffering shortfalls of supply) and to select the least damaging and least inflationary strategy. This would not be easy. The most important variable is the size of the buffer. Here a lack of reliable time series data makes itself particularly felt since it is important that probabilities of various levels of production be calculable, and it is made more complicated by the fact that pockets of land within India are

achieving high rates of increase in marketable surpluses using technologies somewhat more independent of the monsoon than "traditional" technologies for which there is longer time series data. Nadkarni has fitted a linear trend to fifteen years of production data 1955-1969: Y = 67.48 + 1.49x where Y is production of cereals and x is time with 1961-62 season equal to 0 ($R^2 = 0.63$), and he calculated the difference between observed and expected values. He notes that the maximum shortfall occurred in a run of two years between 1966 to 1968 and involved a total production deficit from his trend line of 918-1101 m bls. He rejects a buffer of this size on the ground of low probability of this sequence ever recurring, suggests a buffer of 459 m bls with the possibility of importing 90-140 m bls in low probability instances of unproduction (Nadkarni, 1973, pp. 147-149). However a buffer stock of 440 m bls in December 1972 was reduced to 114 m bls by April 1973. And perusal of a graph of trend line deviations plotted against time shows swings of increasing magnitude: moreover deviations from Nadkarni's trend line are not normally distributed but are skewed to the left so that a buffer of 459 m bls is likely to be low. Also a linear trend by which to measure over and under production may be a less accurate description of production trends than a non-linear equation. Until a decision is taken on the most accurate trend line and on the operational feasibility of acquiring a buffer larger than 459 m bls (a buffer covering 2 consecutive years at one standard deviation below Nadkarni's trend line would be over 505 m bls) the building of a buffer is likely to be of secondary importance to the operation of the FPS system.

Alternative Means of Implementation

Alternative systems have been suggested by the Swatantra Party (*Hindu*, Feb. 19th 1973), the Communist Party of India (*Economic Times*, March 9th 1973), and the Federation of All-India Foodgrain Dealers Association (*Indian Express*, June 28th 1973). Swatantra suggested—

- (i) the abolition of all zonal and local restrictions
- (ii) the continuation of supply of subsidised foodgrains to poor sections. The last suggestion implies that some kind of procurement would be necessary but presumably at free market rates. They remain quiet on how this would operate especially in the absence of a regulatory buffer stock.

CPI advocated-

- (i) graded procurement levy on rich farmers
- (ii) remunerative prices for growers
- (iii) involvement of retailers
- (iv) total rationing of towns and cities and FPS in country areas
- (v) strict control of mills
- (vi) adequate numbers of purchasing centres, and
- (vii) popular control over implementation

Measures (iii), (iv) and (v) amount to monopoly procurement. Measure (i) would be difficult to enforce if rich farmers decided to grow sunflowers or cocktail onions. Also in view of (iv) a graded procurement levy which implies a free market for unleviable foodgrains would be impossible on economic terms and would have to be substituted by a complete levy which disregards welfare considerations. If a free market is intended under this system, it would be the

rich who would profit nutritionally from it. Remunerative prices for growers (ii) are probably best achieved in the free market. (iv) is impossible unless everyone is to be equally malnourished or unless there are regular large scale imports which they do not mention.

F.A.I.F.D.A. put forward (i) association of private trade in procurement and distribution with a 50% levy at a fixed price constant over the whole country (ii) licensing all wholesale and retail dealers (iii) putting ceilings in stocks and fixing purchase prices and resale prices (iv) removing all movement restrictions (v) setting up advisory committees linking Government, traders, farmers and consumers. If the latter is a goodwill measure it need not have been included since the whole proposal reads as a masochistic emasculation of private trade. Proposal (i) is feasible though whether the levy need be as high as 50% depends on a difficult decision on how much of the vulnerable sector can realistically be supplied. Also because farmers costs vary regionally, the price that they will accept from traders will vary and traders in different parts of India will make different losses on this levy and will therefore hoist the residual free market prices on differing amounts (ii) licencing does little but provide the Government with a small amount of revenue plus some information in identifying the dramatis personae of the private system. Its economic effect is neither here nor there. Removing all movement restrictions but severely controlling the price structure of the distributive margin would prove impossible because the physical pattern of trade would vary according to seasonal patterns of production and demand and it would be difficult to include all potential transport costs in prior calculations of margins. It would also be difficult to cost in advance the services rendered by so large a present variety of trading enterprises that typologising is virtually impossible. These measures were obviously designed to eradicate smuggling but they raise a host of different problems. There is no mention made of subsidising foodgrains to the poorer sectors, nor is there mention of a regulatory buffer stock.

Conclusion

The foodgrain marketing prices adopted by Centre and State in 1973 have by and large failed to meet their original objectives.

An efficient distribution system should maintain stocks to regulate the market. If this is successfully done, and fluctuations in supply ironed out, it will automatically control the speculative activities of traders and therefore artificial scarcities and price hikes. The market may then be left as free as possible, with the buffer stock agency buying from the free market in times of production over and above a secular trend line or curve, and supplying the free market in times and at locations of underproduction. It would be necessary to define regions only for the purpose of determining their individual trends in production. Once the private sector recognised that supply was maintained spatially and temporally on a production trend there would be no scope for speculative regional transfers or for "hoarding." This implies a large buffer stock, possibly acquired through imports as well as widely explained and publicised free market purchases. It implies an increase in the warehousing and storage capacity and quality. It also involves extremely well planned stock acquisition and logistically co-ordinated implementation as well as the continual monitoring of the supply and demand situation. This would be no less employment generative than the present systems of distribution.

In India an efficient distribution system must also supply subsidised foodgrains to the poorest. It is not possible to supply more than the very worst off. The main difficulty in India's foodgrain marketing system is that without extensive imports the average annual supply still does not meet nutritional requirements. When foodgrains are diverted from the free market to the controlled market, the supply in the free market diminishes, prices rise, card holders rush to Fair Price Shops on a first come first served basis and supplies dwindle there. The two systems are like the ends of a see saw pivoting on a limited supply. A decision about who should be classified as the "poorest" awaits a geography of poverty, and a decision on the feasibility of serving rural areas, (not so difficult if co-operatives are enlisted). Then the quantity needed for this system and for the buffers should be calculated, together with the quality of foodgrains desirable. If this system were to depend on a levy at sub free market rates from farmers, those producing non-leviable crops would profit from a general hoist in free market prices. Those producing leviable crops, especially if they be high yielding varieties, would lose a price incentive to innovate. If this system depends on purchases at free market prices from private traders, subsidised sales to the poorest sector would have to be financed by general taxation or by a special "levy." It is Nadkarni's contention that since the terms of trade have been moving from the mid '60's towards the producers of marketable surplus, whose profits are not taxed, some grades tax on the agricultural sector would be in order. His conclusion is that "agricultural taxation has been inadequate and insincere" (Nadkarni, 1973, p. 166). An income tax on the rural sector, as advocated by Nadkarni, would be an uneconomic activity costing more to administer than would be collected in revenue. However a graded tax on land owned is a more feasible idea, especially in the context of the current revision of the responsibilities of village level accountants and other such government personnel; and the changes in their composition.

The sooner a clear, unfluctuating policy is spelt out, the sooner will private traders invest their savings in enlarging and modernising their firms. No solution to the problems of foodgrain marketing is easy since its success depends ultimately on increased production incentives which depends as much on factors external to the market, such as the quality of agricultural extension and the types of agrarian systems, as on the workings of the market itself.

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Weightage in University Admissions: Standardisation and District Quotas in Sri Lanka 1970 - 1975

C. R. DE SILVA

The Historical Background

At the attainment of independence from British colonial rule in 1948, Sri Lanka had a fairly developed system of primary education which provided instruction for well over a million students; a sizeable advance from the 1930 figure of half-a-million. Secondary education, on the other hand, was relatively backward with enrolment in grade IX to XI barely exceeding fifty thousand. University education was even more limited for the total undergraduate population at the University of Ceylon (established 1942) amounted to only 1554. Thus, although external examinations of the University of London continued to be held in the island, a University degree holder was a relatively rare commodity and even secondary education was at a premium. Indeed, persons possessing educational qualifications of at least the secondary level were largely in demand due both to a policy of 'Ceylonisation' pursued by national leaders in the second quarter of the twentieth century and the expansion of the bureaucracy with the introduction of social welfare and development policies at about the same period.

The small number of persons receiving secondary and higher education was combined with a grave imbalance in the distribution of opportunities for education. The wealth, religion, location of residence and socio-cultural background of parents seemed to have had a considerable bearing on a student's access to secondary and higher education. Many of these imbalances had come into being because of historical reasons. For example, the intensive educational activity of Christian missionaries in the mid-nineteenth century had gained them an early lead in this sphere. As early as 1868, 65 per cent of all children attending schools were Christian and only 27 per cent Buddhist. British policy, which since 1884 left the development of secondary education largely to private schools, enabled the Christians to maintain their lead in education. However the, growth in the number of missionary schools and the Christian predominance was checked during the second and third decades of the twentieth century, partly because of Buddhist and Hindu agitation and the educational drive which their religious revivalists had continued from the late teenth century onwards and partly as a result of the increase in state schools

Much of the information supplied in this section is drawn from Education in Ceylon: A Centenary Volume Colombo: Ministry of Education, 1969.

D. L. Jayasuriya, "Developments in University Education: the growth of the University of Ceylon 1942-1965," *University of Ceylon Review (UCR)*, XXIII, Nos. 1 and 2, April and October 1965, p. 149.

rich who would profit nutritionally from it. Remunerative prices for growers (ii) are probably best achieved in the free market. (iv) is impossible unless everyone is to be equally malnourished or unless there are regular large scale imports which they do not mention.

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The foodgrain marketing prices adopted by Centre and State in 1973 have by and large failed to meet their original objectives.

An efficient distribution system should maintain stocks to regulate the market. If this is successfully done, and fluctuations in supply ironed out, it will automatically control the speculative activities of traders and therefore artificial scarcities and price hikes. The market may then be left as free as possible, with the buffer stock agency buying from the free market in times of production over and above a secular trend line or curve, and supplying the free market in times and at locations of underproduction. It would be necessary to define regions only for the purpose of determining their individual trends in production. Once the private sector recognised that supply was maintained spatially and temporally on a production trend there would be no scope for speculative regional transfers or for "hoarding." This implies a large buffer stock, possibly acquired through imports as well as widely explained and publicised free market purchases. It implies an increase in the warehousing and storage capacity and quality. It also involves extremely well planned stock acquisition and logistically co-ordinated implementation as well as the continual monitoring of the supply and demand situation. This would be no less employment generative than the present systems of distribution.

In India an efficient distribution system must also supply subsidised foodgrains to the poorest. It is not possible to supply more than the very worst off. The main difficulty in India's foodgrain marketing system is that without westernised groups; the urban elites as against the rural peasants or the estate workers, the Christians against the Buddhists and so on. Finally, there remained the inescapable fact that education cost money in books, clothes, transport and the like apart from the loss of earnings which otherwise might have swollen family income. Thus, it was largely the middle and upper classes of each group that were able to make the fullest use of whatever educational facilities open to them.

It was unlikely that such imbalances in opportunity would long remain unchallenged in a plural society with a parliamentary democratic structure of government. In fact such imbalances were already under attack both directly and obliquely by 1948. The national legislature had already approved a scheme of free education designed to reduce the inequalities in educational opportunity deriving from the relative wealth and poverty of parents. This involved the abolition of all tuition fees in almost all secondary schools and in the University. The immediate effect of the scheme was limited due to the paucity of secondary schools. Nevertheless, when taken together with the expansion of secondary education, the provision of more secondary schools in hitherto neglected areas and the change-over in the medium of instruction from English to Sinhalese and Tamil, it was to have a significant impact in the two decades that followed 1948.

Table II: Schools having classes up to grade XII by district and province in 1972 (Schools teaching science up to grade XII given in parenthesis).

AND DESCRIPTION OF THE PERSON	-	-	-	
Colombo		192	(42)	
Kalutara	-	63	(17)	Western Province —255 (59)
Kandy	100	108	(15)	
Matale	10.00	27	(3)	
		35	(8)	Central Province —170 (26)
Jaffna	*34	49	(34)	
Mannar	100	2-	(1)	
Vavuniya		9	(4)	Northern Province — 60 (39)
Anuradhapura		48	(3)	
Polonnaruwa	4.4	10	(1)	North Central Province — 58 (4)
Galle		93	(11)	
Matara		- 64	(10)	
Hambantota	2.	30	(2)	Southern Province —187 (23)
Batticaloa	-	26	(11)	
Trincomalee	152	7	(1)	Eastern Province — 33 (12)
Kegalle	**	77	(15)	
Ratnapura	4.4	49	(5)	Sabaragamuwa Province 126 (20)
Bandarawela (Badulla)	4 4	30	(6)	TI - D
Moneragala	- 1. 1	18	(1)	Uva Province — 48 (7)
Kurunegala	9.4	101	(12)	N. I. W
Chilaw		48	(7)	North Western Province —149 (19)
Total	- 1	1086	(209)	

Soutce: Adyapana Sankyalekana pilibanda sankyathi sangrahaya 1973

The expansion in secondary education during this period was spectacular. Between 1950 and 1960 alone the number of students in grades IX-XII rose from 65,000 to 225,000. By 1970 the number had reached 351,000.7 The effort to provide secondary schools in relatively undeveloped areas had commenced

7. Adyapana Sankyalekana pilibanda sankyatha sangrahaya 1973 Table 9.

UCR XXIII p. 95; M. Maheswaran, "A Survey of the Background and Interests of Students in a University Science Faculty, 1969/70", JNESC, XXI, pp. 26-27.

in the 1940's when 54 central schools were established in rural districts. By 1970 this effort had yielded considerable results and schools teaching up to grade XII were established in most parts of the island though the facilities available in many schools in outlying districts could not bear comparison to the better schools in developed areas.

The change over in the medium of instruction was completed in schools in relation to Arts subjects by 1959 and for science subjects a few years later. By 1963 a majority of students at University following courses in social sciences and humanities were being instructed in the national languages and by early 1970's the change was extended to science-oriented courses.

To these developments should perhaps be added the take-over of private schools by the state in 1961. This measure, precipitated largely by Buddhist agitation against state subsidies to Christian missionary schools gradually resulted in the loss of the privileged position in relation to secondary school facilities which the Christians had long enjoyed.

All these factors taken together tended to reduce the desparities in educational opportunity that had characterised the education system of the island in 1948. The results were clearly reflected in University education. For example the Buddhists who made up 43.2% of the University student population in 1948 and 50.3% in 1958 gained 74-77% of University admissions in the years 1966-1970. The proportion of Christians had correspondingly fallen from 41% and 24% in 1948 and 1958 respectively to 7-9% in the period 1966-1970. The percentage of Tamils (almost exclusively Sri Lanka Tamils), entering the University had fallen to under 16% by 1969-1970 while the proportion of Sinhalese had risen to over 80%. Similarly the Western Province and the Northern Province which provided 60.8% and 14.2% of University undergraduates in 1948 supplied only 33.3% and 8.6% in 1968-1969.8

On the other hand several other developments created new problems relating to educational opportunity and its value as a means of social mobility. The expansion in secondary education in the 1950's in most areas had been largely in Arts subjects. This resulted in great pressure for admission to the social science/humanities courses at University level and the state responded by creating two entirely new Universities; Vidyodaya and Vidyalankara (1959) and by establishing a second Arts Faculty of the University of Ceylon at Colombo (1963). The number of Arts students rose from 436 or 49% of all admissions in 1958 to a peak of 5345 or 84.1% of all admissions in 1965. Such expansion promptly led to a surplus of graduates of this type and a backlog of unemployed Arts graduates began to build up.9

In this context, admission to the science-oriented courses rather than just to the University became the prize and here the educationally developed areas had a distinct advantage in the teaching staff and facilities available as well as in the number of schools. As late as 1966/67 the Western Province provided 50% of the total science intake to the University and the Northern Province a further 30% (see Table VII). These figures might well have been swollen by students from other provinces who entered the University through schools located in the Western and the Northern Provinces. Yet they do provide

^{8.} The figure for 1948 and 1958 are from UCR, Vol. XXIII, pp. 147-149. The rest are from Table VII and VIII below.

^{9.} For a discussion of some aspects of this question see G. Uswatte aratchy, "From Highway to Blind Alley—A Note on Youth and Higher Education", Marga, Vol. II, No. 3, 1972, pp. 75-85.

a pointer to the continuing imbalance of educational facilities in science subjects in secondary schools in the different regions of Sri Lanka. Such imbalance also probably accounted for the fact that almost 40% of places in science-oriented Faculties and almost 50% in the Engineering and Medical F. culties were gained by Tamils, most of whom came from Colombo and Jaffina. 10

An answer to this problem could well have been the greater provision of science teaching facilities in less developed areas. Indeed, the need to do this had been recognised by education authorities by the early sixties and the number of schools teaching science up to grade XII had increased from 50 in 1958 to 146 in 1967 and 209 in 1972. However, progress was slow, partly because equipment was expensive and perhaps even more so because science teachers proficient to teach in the national languages, especially in Sinhalese, were not easily attracted to the relatively ill-paid teaching profession. Thus even in the early 1970's of the schools that prepared students up to grade XII in any subject, over 70% did not have science classes up to that level.

By the 1970's adjustment of this imbalance was beginning to look more difficult than before. The unfavourable economic situation had forced the government to limit expenditure on social welfare. The cost of education to the state had risen from Rs. 105.6 million in 1950 to Rs. 472.4 million in 1969/1970. By the latter year education accounted for 16.2% of the budget and 4.47 of the. gross national product.¹¹ In the context of a shortfall of capital for investment there seemed no prospect of obtaining extra funds as in the 1950's and the 1960's to alleviate problems of unequal opportunity.

The need for economy affected University admissions in another direction too. Total University admissions have been virtually stagnant from about 1964¹² and although science admissions rose by 50% from 1966 to 1974 this had hardly compensated for the rise in the number of those seeking admission. With increasing competition and rising admission standards, good teachers and equipment became more important than before.

Nevertheless, the efforts of the Department of Education seemed to bear some fruit. Despite the limitations in the evidence available regarding the provincial breakdown of University admissions, ¹³ the statistics for the period 1966 to 1970 seem to indicate that admission of students to science-oriented courses from all provinces other than the Western Province and the Northern Province rose both percentage-wise and in absolute numbers. ¹⁴ Yet the overall change was not very great and there were those who were disturbed at the thought that even in 1970 some 70% of all science students either entered from schools in the two above mentioned provinces and/or had their residences in them. ¹⁵

The comparatively large number of Christians gaining admission for science-based courses could also be explained largely in terms of facilities. The Christians were concentrated in the Western and Northern Provinces.

J. Hallak. Financing and educational policy in Sri Lanka (Ceylon), Paris: Unesco., International Institute for Educational Planning, 1972, p. 75.

^{12. 1964=3382} admissions, 1974=3533 admissions.

^{13.} See footnote 4 above.

^{14.} See Table VII.

G. Uswatte-aratchi, "University Admission in Ceylon. Their Economic and Social Background and Employment Expectations," Modern Asian Studies, Vol. VIII, No. 3, 1974, pp. 298 and 317.

Efforts to aid students from areas with inferior facilities continued. The science practical test at the G.C.E. (Advanced Level) Examination (grade XII) was abolished in 1971 and students were thenceforth graded according to performance at written theory papers. The curriculum reforms implemented after 1972 also had the effort of gradually ensuring that science would be taught to all students from grades VI to IX.¹⁶ This was expected to attract more talented youths to science courses in senior secondary schools in rural areas and perhaps eventually attain a more equitable distribution of science placements by area. However, the effect of this curriculum reform was to be felt only when the first group of students who followed the revised curriculum entered the University in 1978.

Table III University admissions to science-based courses 1971

		Number admitted	Minimum total mark for admission
Engineering—Peradeniya	Sinhalese	86	227
	Tamil	60	250
Engineering—Katubedde	Sinhalese	60	212
	Tamil	53	232
Medicine & Dentistry—Peradeniya & Colombo	Sinhalese	154	229
	Tamil	127	250
Biological Science—All four Universities	Sinhalese	151	175
Agriculture—Peradeniya Veterinary Science—Peradeniya	Tamil	63	181
Physical Science—All four Universities	Sinhalese	178	183
	Tamil .	92	204
Architecture—Katubedde	Sinhalese	16	180
	Tamil	28	194

Source: Hansard Vol. 83 Book 5 Col. 514-578 (6-1-1971)

Meanwhile, the question of marking standards in the different media began to be raised. As long as English was the medium of examination, allegations of favouritism towards a communal group were rare but once Sinhalese and Tamil became the media, the scripts in each language came to be marked by examiners belonging almost exclusively to that ethnolinguistic community. In the 1960's at least in some subjects there was an attempt to ensure a uniform standard of correction by using English-medium scripts as a measuring device but soon the number of English-medium candidates fell to such levels that this became impracticable. However, a detailed scheme of marking was drawn up by the controlling chief examiner for each subject and the work of each marking examiner was checked by one or more chief examiners responsible for scripts in that language. Each chief examiner was expected to acquaint himself with the marking guidelines and to scrutinise the work of marking examiners under his charge by moderating a sample of the first few scripts he had corrected and by calling for a random sample for checking after the marking examiner had finished his task.¹⁷ The procedure appeared to have satisfied the authorities at the Department of Education, but in 1970 when it was rumoured that one hundred out of one hundred and sixty two students selected

^{16.} Adyapanaye Nava Maga, Colombo; Ministry of Education 1972, p. 7.

^{17.} In the case of science subjects such as Physics, Chemistry, Botany and Zoology the variability in marking is further reduced because 50% of marks awarded for each subject is given for answers to Multiple Choice Questions and a further 30% for structured essays leaving only 20% to be gained by the traditional essay type answers.

for the Engineering Faculty were Tamil medium candidates an outcry developed that over-assessment prevailed in the Tamil medium. An investigation failed to unearth any evidence to substantiate this allegation but the government chose to bow to the agitation and to a threat of communal violence on the campus. A lower qualifying mark was set for Sinhalese medium candidates so that a 'politically acceptable' proportion of places in science-based university courses would be secured for them. (See Table III).

The uproar which followed from the Sri Lanka Tamil leaders and a few University academics 18 made it clear that this procedure could not be repeated with impunity. The next few years were thus spent in evolving a more 'acceptable', or at least a 'more defensible' formula. In the next three years three different schemes were tried out. They were as follows:

1973 - Standardisation of marks

1974 - Standardisation of marks+district quotas with modifications

1975 — Standardisation of marks + district quotas

These three schemes, like the procedure for admissions for 1971/72 represent a departure from the practice of selection on the basis of actual marks obtained at an open competitive examination which had hitherto prevailed. It also represented a change in state policy. Hitherto the reaction of all governments in the island to demonstrable inequalities of educational opportunity was to attempt to reduce them by improving facilities available to underprivileged groups or areas. The schemes of the 1960's seemed to go beyond this and introduce weightage to the performance of different groups of candidates at public examinations. It is proposed in this paper to examine these devices and to analyse the effects of their introduction.

Standardisation

Standardisation is a statistical method of adjusting marks scored by candidates.¹⁹ In any given set of marks it is possible to find two characteristics: the mean (or average mark) and the standard deviation (or the average difference of all marks from the mean).²⁰ If two or more groups of marks when represented by a graph display a random curve (or a bell-shaped curve) it is possible to use the above mentioned characteristics to compare them meaningfully. It is also possible to adjust any number of given sets of marks to conform to a common profile by using a formula. The formula used for standardisation of marks for purposes of the University admission in Sri Lanka is as follows:

H. Cruz, "Some Trends in Science Education and Scientific research in Ceylon," Proceedings of the Ceylon Association for the Advancement of Science Section D. Natural Science. Vol. II 1970 pp. 17-19; A Memorandum on Discrimination submitted to the International Commission of Jurists by the Tamil United Front of Ceylon, Colombo: 1973, pp. 29-30.

^{19.} The paragraphs explaining standardisation are drawn largely from the Ministry of Education Report on the Standardization of Marks for University Admissions, Colombo; 1974 (?) and the Memorandum to the Sectorial Committee on Social Overheads on the Standardization and District Quota scheme for admissions to the University, University of Ceylon Science Teachers Association, Peradeniya, Feb. 1975 (Mimiographed), see also M. Sivasittamparam. A Rebuttal of Ministry of Education Report (undated) on Standardization of Marks for University Admissions released in the National State Assembly, Colombo: 1974.

^{20.} This is usually calculated by finding the square of each candidate's deviation, getting the average of the total obtained by adding the results and by finally calculating the square root of the average. (Standard deviation = square root of mean of squared deviations from the mean).

$$X^{1} = \frac{SD^{1}}{SD}(X - M) + M^{1}$$

Where X^1 = any standardised mark SD = standard deviation obtained, SD' = standard deviation required, X = any raw mark, M = mean obtained and M' = mean required. The mean required was fixed at 50 and the standard deviation required was fixed at 12.

What the Ministry of Education does is to group the raw marks obtained by candidates at the G.C.E. 'Advanced Level' Examination according to the subject sat for and then according to the medium in which the examination was answered. Thus for example the Sinhalese-medium marks for Physics are separated from Tamil-medium and English-medium marks for the same subject and each group is standardised separately. This procedures ensure standardisation both media-wise and subject-wise. For instance if the mean and the standard deviation was 48 and 8 in Sinhalese-medium Physics marks, 55 and 8 in Tamil-medium Physics marks and 45 and 5 in Sinhalese-medium Chemistry marks, candidates obtaining 48 marks in the first category, 55 in the second and 45 in the third will all obtain a standardized mark of 50. Once this process is completed all standardised marks are integrated into one list that determines the priority for selection to the University.

The Ministry arguments for subject-wise standardisation are twofold. Firstly there is the claim that as the full scale of marks is not always utilised in some subjects, comparisons of marks obtained in different subjects becomes more meaningful when standardised. For example a candidate will almost certainly never score a raw mark of 100 or even 95 for History at the G.C.E. (Advanced Level) Examination though he could well do this for Mathematics. Secondly, there is the possibility that question papers of different standards might be set for different subjects and that in correction too may be more lenient in one more than in the other. These arguments possess some validity (see Table V). However, it must be borne in mind that standardisation will result in distortion if the two sets of raw marks did not have roughly the same distribution. Moreover, judg ments regarding differences in standards of question papers and of correction must necessarily be subjective and one cannot eliminate the possibility that groups of students sitting for different subjects may have different levels of ability.

Medium-wise standardisation has roused much greater opposition. To illustrate the reason for this it might be useful to take an example worked out by the University of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) Science Teachers' Association in a memorandum sent to the Sectoral Committee on Social Overheads.²¹ Two groups have been selected, Group A with a mean of 55 and a standard deviation of 6 and Group B with a mean of 45 and a standard deviation of 10. The following table would illustrate that the ranking of candidates would change substantially once the standardised marks are integrated into one list.

No.		Group	A		Gro	up B
			Standardized Mark		Raw Mark	Standardized Mark
	A1	75	90	B1	56	63
	- A2	60	60	B2	54	61
	A3	55	50	В3	50	56
	A4	42	24	B4	46	51
				B5	35	- 38
				B6	24	25

^{21.} Memorandum, op. cit., p. 7.

Table IV G.C.E. (Advanced Level) Examination Results 1973

	Subject Medium	Sat	Fail No.	Failed No. %	Grade No.	N %	Grade No.	0%	Grade No.	% %	Grade No.	4%	Total No.	Passes %
Pali Sir	nhalese	664	59	8.89	275	41.42	220	33.12	66	99 14.91	-	1.66	6005	91.11
Pali Ta	mil	0	1		1		1		1		1		1	
()	halese	568	1115	20.25	274	48.24	131	23.06	46	8.10	2	0.35	453	79.75
	Tamil	250	76	38.80	110	44.00	36	14.40	9	2.40	1	0,40	153	. 61.20
	glish	94	27	28.73	30	31.91	17	18.09	17	18.09	3	3.19	19	71.28
	halese	10878		51.82	4285	39.39	844	7.76	100	0.92	12	0.11	5421	48.88
	Tamil	940		44.79	378	40.21	126	13.40	15	1.60	0	1	519	55.21
	English	63		82.50	10	15.87	-	1.59	0	1	0	1	=	17.46

Statistical Report: General Certificate of Education (Ordinary Level) and (Advanced Level) Examinations 1972 and 1973. Source:

TABLE V —GENERAL CERTIFICATE OF EDUCATION (ADVANCED LEVEL) EXAMINATION, 1972 SUBJECT STATISTICS FOR SCIENCE

M Sat. Failed Grade S Grade C Grade B Grade A Pass No. P.C. No. P.	1972													The same	Ţ	Fotal
NO. P.C. NO.	SUBJECT			sat.	Fai	led	Gra	s epi	Gra	deC	Gra	de B	Gra	deA	Pa	sass
TTHS T 2092 966 46.18 624 29.83 268 12.81 159 7.60 75 3.59 1126 E 260 180 69.23 61 23.46 13 5.00 4 1.54 2 0.77 80 MATHS S 4014 2817 70.18 851 21.20 215 5.36 91 2.27 40 1.00 1197 T 2068 1305 63.10 504 24.37 170 8.22 64 3.09 25 1.21 763 E 220 180 81.82 13 15.00 5 2.27 1 0.45 1 0.45 40 1.00 1197 S 7225 5469 75.70 1520 21.04 198 2.74 34 0.47 4 0.06 1756 T 3345 2312 69.02 80 113 3.44 4.61 54 0.75 8 0.11 2351 E 416 264 63.46 128 30.77 20 4.81 4 0.96 0 0.00 152 S 3450 1207 34.99 1499 43.45 653 18.93 89 2.58 2 0.06 2243 T 1292 441 34.13 518 40.09 288 22.20 43 3.33 2 0.15 851 E 272 130 47.79 99 36.40 40 14.71 3 1.10 0 0.00 152 T 1290 707 54.81 416 32.25 148 11.47 18 1.40 1 0.08 583 1					NO.	P.C.	No.	P.C.	NO.	P.C.	NO.	P.C.	NO.	P.C.	NO.	P.C.
T 2092 966 46.18 624 29.83 268 12.81 159 7.60 75 3.59 1126 E 260 180 69.23 61 23.46 13 5.00 4 1.54 2 0.77 80 MATHS S 4014 2817 70.18 851 21.20 215 5.36 91 2.27 40 1.00 1197 T 2068 1305 63.10 504 24.37 170 8.22 64 3.09 25 1.21 763 E 220 180 81.82 13 1500 5 2.27 1 0.45 40 100 1197 S 7225 5469 75.0 1520 21.04 198 2.74 34 0.47 4 0.06 1756 F 487 385 79.06 86 17.66 13 2.67 3 0.62 0			S	6911	2503	60.09	1101		324	77.7	178	4.27	63	1.51	1666	1
R 260 180 69.23 61 23.46 13 5.00 4 1.54 2 0.77 80 MATHS S 4014 2817 70.18 851 21.20 215 5.36 91 2.27 40 1.00 1197 T 2068 1305 63.10 504 24.37 170 8.22 64 3.09 25 1.21 763 E 220 180 81.82 13 15.00 5 2.27 1 0.45 40 1.00 1197 S 7225 5469 75.70 1520 21.04 198 2.74 34 0.47 4 0.06 1756 T 3345 2312 69.12 900 26.91 115 3.44 14 0.42 4 0.06 1756 RY 7238 4887 67.52 1955 27.01 334 4.61 54 0.75			T	2603	996	46.18	624		268	12.81	159	7.60	75	3.59	1126	
MATHS S 4014 2817 70.18 851 21.20 215 5.36 91 2.27 40 1.00 1197 T 2068 1305 63.10 504 24.37 170 8.22 64 3.09 25 1.21 763 E 220 180 81.82 13 15.00 5 2.27 1 0.45 4 0.06 1756 T 345 2312 69.12 900 26.91 115 3.44 14 0.42 4 0.06 1756 T 3345 2312 69.12 900 26.91 115 3.44 14 0.42 4 0.06 175 R 487 385 79.06 86 17.66 13 2.67 3 0.62 0 0.00 102 R 487 67.52 1955 27.01 334 4.61 54 0.75 8 0.11 235 <			В	260	180	69.23	19		13	5.00	4	- 1.54	7	0.77	80	
T 2068 1305 63.10 504 24.37 170 8.22 64 3.09 25 1.21 763 E 220 180 81.82 13 15.00 5 2.27 1 0.45 1 0.45 40 S 7225 5469 75.70 1520 21.04 198 2.74 34 0.47 4 0.06 1756 T 3345 2312 69.12 900 26.91 115 3.44 14 0.42 4 0.12 1033 E 487 385 79.06 86 17.66 13 2.67 3 0.62 0 0.00 102 T 3317 1987 59.90 1035 31.20 246 7.42 46 1.39 3 0.09 1330 E 416 264 63.46 128 30.77 20 4.81 4 0.96 0 0.00 152 S 3450 1207 34.99 1499 43.45 653 18.93 89 2.58 2 0.06 2243 T 1292 441 34.13 518 40.09 288 22.20 43 3.33 2 0.15 851 E 272 130 47.79 99 36.40 40 14.71 3 1.10 0 0.00 1524 T 1290 707 54.81 416 32.25 148 11.47 18 1.40 1 0.08 583 E 270 150 55.56 71 26.30 43 15.93 6 2.22 0 0.00 120	APPLIED MATHS	*	S	1014	2817	70.18	851		215	5,36	91.	2.27	40	1.00	1197	
E 220 180 81.82 13 15.00 5 2.27 1 0.45 1 0.45 40 0.45 40 0.45 40 0.06 1756 T 33.45 2312 69.12 900 26.91 115 3.44 14 0.42 4 0.06 1756 F 487 385 79.06 86 17.66 13 2.67 3 0.62 0 0.00 102 RY 7.238 4887 67.52 1955 27.01 334 4.61 54 0.75 8 0.11 2351 RY 7.238 4887 67.52 1955 27.01 334 4.61 54 0.75 8 0.11 2351 RY 7.317 1987 59.90 1035 31.20 246 7.42 46 1.39 3 0.09 1330 R 416 2.64			T 2	890	1305	63.10	504		170	8.22	64	3.09	25	1.21	763	
RY S 7225 5469 75.70 1520 21.04 198 2.74 34 0.47 4 0.06 1756 T 3345 2312 69.12 900 26.91 115 3.44 14 0.42 4 0.12 1033 E 487 385 79.06 86 17.66 13 2.67 3 0.62 0 0.00 102 102 T 3317 1987 59.90 1035 31.20 246 7.42 46 1.39 3 0.09 1330 E 416 264 63.46 128 30.77 20 4.81 4 0.96 0 0.00 152 243 T 1292 441 34.13 518 40.09 288 22.20 43 3.33 2 0.15 851 E 272 130 47.79 99 36.40 40 14.71 3 1.10 0 0.00 152			E	220	180	81.82	13		5	2.27	-	0.45	-	0.45	40	
T 3345 2312 69.12 900 26.91 115 3.44 14 0.42 4 0.12 1033 RY 7 238 4887 67.52 1955 27.01 334 4.61 54 0.75 8 0.11 2351 T 3317 1987 59.90 1035 31.20 246 7.42 46 1.39 3 0.09 1330 E 416 264 63.46 128 30.77 20 4.81 4 0.96 0 0.00 152 S 3450 1207 34.99 43.45 653 18.93 89 2.58 2 0.06 2243 T 1292 441 34.13 518 40.09 288 22.20 43 3.33 2 0.15 851 E 272 130 47.79 99 36.40 40 14.71 3 1.10 0 0.00	PHYSICS		S	7225	5469	75.70	1520		198	2.74	34	0.47	4	90.0	1756	
RY S 7238 4887 67.52 1955 27.01 334 4.61 54 0.75 8 0.11 2351 T 3317 1987 59.90 1035 31.20 246 7.42 46 1.39 3 0.09 1330 E 416 264 63.46 128 30.77 20 4.81 4 0.96 0 0.00 152 S 3450 1207 34.99 1499 43.45 653 18.93 89 2.58 2 0.06 2243 T 1292 441 34.13 518 40.09 288 22.20 43 3.33 2 0.15 851 E 272 130 47.79 99 36.40 40 14.71 3 1.10 0 0.00 1524 T 1290 707 54.81 416 32.25 148 11.47 18 1.40 1 0.08 583 E 270 150 55.56 71 26.30 43 15.93 6 2.22 0 0.00 120			3	345	2312	69.12	900		115	3.44	14	0.42	4	0.12	1033	
RY S 7238 4887 67.52 1955 27.01 334 4.61 54 0.75 8 0.11 2351 T 3317 1987 59.90 1035 31.20 246 7.42 46 1.39 3 0.09 1330 E 416 264 63.46 128 30.77 20 4.81 4 0.96 0 0.00 152 S 3450 1207 34.99 1499 43.45 653 18.93 89 2.58 2 0.06 2243 T 1292 441 34.13 518 40.09 288 22.20 43 3.33 2 0.15 851 E 272 130 47.79 99 36.40 40 14.71 3 1.10 0 0.00 142 C S 3387 1863 55.00 1109 32.74 389 11.49 26 0.77 0 0.00 1524 T 1290 707 54.81 416 32.25 148 11.47 18 1.40 1 0.08 583 E 270 150 55.56 71 26.30 43 15.93 6 2.22 0 0.00 120			ш	487	385	90.64	98		13	2.67	3	0.62	0	00.00	102	
T 3317 1987 59,90 1035 31,20 246 7,42 46 1,39 3 0,09 1330 E 416 264 63,46 128 30,77 20 4,81 4 0,96 0 0,00 152 S 3450 1207 34,99 1499 43,45 653 18,93 89 2,58 2 0,06 2243 T 1292 441 34,13 518 40,09 288 22,20 43 3,33 2 0,15 851 E 272 130 47,79 99 36,40 40 14,71 3 1,10 0 0,00 142 C S 3387 1863 55,00 1109 32,74 389 11,49 26 0,77 0 0,00 1524 T 1290 707 54,81 416 32,25 148 11,47 18 1,40 1 0,08 583 E 270 150 55,56 71 26,30 43 15,93 6 2,22 0 0,00 120	CHEMISTRY	:	7	238	4887	67.52	1955		334	4.61	54	0.75	00	0.11	2351	
E 416 264 63.46 128 30.77 20 4.81 4 0.96 0 0.00 152 243 T 1292 441 34.13 518 40.09 288 22.20 43 3.33 2 0.15 851 E 272 130 47.79 99 36.40 40 14.71 3 1.10 0 0.00 152 T 1290 707 54.81 416 32.25 148 11.47 18 1.40 1 0.08 583 E 270 150 55.56 71 26.30 43 15.93 6 2.22 0 0.00 120 120			I 3	317	1987	59.90	1035		246	7.42	46	1.39	3	60.0	1330	
T 1292 441 34,13 518 40.09 288 22.20 43 3.33 2 0.05 2243 T 1292 441 34,13 518 40.09 288 22.20 43 3.33 2 0.15 851 E 272 130 47,79 99 36,40 40 14,71 3 1,10 0 0,00 142 (, , S 3387 1863 55.00 1109 32.74 389 11,49 26 0.77 0 0,00 1524 T 1290 707 54,81 416 32.25 148 11,47 18 1,40 1 0,08 583 E 270 150 55,56 71 26,30 43 15,93 6 2.22 0 0,00 120		-	m	416	264	63.46	128	204 000	20	4.81	4	96.0	0	0000	152	
T 1292 441 34,13 518 40.09 288 22.20 43 3.33 2 0.15 851 E 272 130 47.79 99 36.40 40 14.71 3 1.10 0 0.00 142 C S 3387 1863 55.00 1109 32.74 389 11.49 26 0.77 0 0.00 1524 T 1290 707 54.81 416 32.25 148 11.47 18 1.40 1 0.08 583 E 270 150 55.56 71 26.30 43 15.93 6 2.22 0 0.00 120	BOTANY		23	450	1207	34.99	1499		653	18.93	68	2.58	2	90.0	2243	
E 272 130 47,79 99 36,40 40 14,71 3 1,10 0 0,00 142 7 3 3387 1863 55,00 1109 32,74 389 11,49 26 0,77 0 0,00 1524 T 1290 707 54,81 416 32,25 148 11,47 18 1,40 1 0,08 583 E 270 150 55,56 71 26,30 43 15,93 6 2,22 0 0,00 120		-	1	292	441	34.13	518		288	22.20	43	3.33	7	0.15	851	1111
T 1290 707 54.81 416 32.25 148 11.47 18 1.40 1 0.08 583 E 270 150 55.56 71 26.30 43 15.93 6 2.22 0 0.00 120			177	272	130	47.79	66		40	14.71	3	1,10	0	000	142	
707 54.81 416 32.25 148 11.47 18 1.40 1 0.08 583 150 55.56 71 26.30 43 15.93 6 2.22 0 0.00 120	ZOOTOGY		ro ro	387	1863	55.00	1109		389	11.49	26	0.77	0	0.00	1524	-
150 55.56 71 26.30 43 15.93 6 2.22 0 0.00 120			-	290	707	54.81	416		148	11.47	18	1.40	-	80.0	583	
			m	270	150	55.56	71		43	15.93	9	2.22	0	0.00	120	-

Source: Statistical Report G.C.E. Ordinary Level and Advanced Level Examination 1972/73.

TABLE VI-GENERAL CERTIFICATE OF EDUCATION (ADVANCED LEVEL) EXAMINATION, 1973 SUBJECT STATISTICS FOR SCIENCE

PURE MATHS	0	4464	2269	50.83	1451	32.50	503	11.27	170	3.81	11	1.59	2195	49.17
		2178	845	38.80	999	30.58	324	14,88	216	9.92	27	5,83	1333	61.20
	H	205	142	69.27	40	19.51	14	6.83	4	1.95	3	2.44	63	30.73
APPLIED MATHS		\$ 4307	3206	74.44	912	21.17	148	3.44	28	0.65	13	0.30	1101	25.56
	I	2140	1420	66.36	526	24.58	132	6.17	48	2.24	14	0.65	720	33.64
	H	177	138	77.97	32	18,08	4	2.26	7	1.13	-	0.56	39	22.03
PHYSICS	S	7920	5447	87.89	1832	23.13	517	6.53	103	1.30	21	0.27	2473	31.22
	H	3388	2305	68.03	826	24.38	209	6.17	43	1.27	2	0.15	1083	31,97
	H		154	44.90	136	39.65	37	10.79	12	3.50	4	1.17	189	55.10
CHEMISTRY	S		5222	65.40	2357	29.52	346	4.33	47	0.59	13	0.16	2763	34.60
	H	1130	2219	66,30	954	38.50	153	4.57	21	0.63	0	0.00	1128	33,70
	Ë		164	55.22	108	36.36	17	5.72	7	2.36	-	0.34	133	44.78
ROTANY	S	200	2163	55.35	1609	41.17	128	3.28	7	0.18	1	0.03	1745	44.65
	F		718	56.85	200	39,59	45	3.56	0	0.00	6	0.00	545	43.15
	E		108	59.34	19	36.81	7	3.85	0	0.00	0	0.00	74	40,66
ZOOLOGY	S	614	2263	58,48	1466	37.88	126	3.26	15	0.39	0	0.00	1607	41.52
	T		762	60.48	426	33.81	70	5.56	7	0.16	0	0.00	498	39.52
	田		131	74.43	42	23.86	en	1.70	0	0.00	0	0.00	45	25.57

Source: Statistical Report G.C.E. Ordinary Level and Advanced Level Examination 1972/73.

Several reasons have been advanced to defend such a procedure. It has been argued that differences in language result in the same question being comprehended differently or with greater difficulty. This is possible but such problems are usually detected and adjustments can be made in the marking scheme to compensate for them. Another claim is that there is a disparity in facilities available for candidates of different media. Here too there may be a grain of truth but it must be recalled that disparities amovng schools teaching in the same medium are often wider than disparities between media. Also, the application of standardisation could well hurt a Tamil medium science student at Matale simply because his fellow Tamils enjoy excellent facilities in Jaffna. The same could happen to a Sinhalese medium Arts student from Kurunegala. Finally, it has also been stated that marking standards in the different media might well be different. In view of the marking system outlined earlier such disparities, if they did exist, could not have been large ones. In fact an examination of the data relatingly to the G.C.E. (Advanced Level) Examination of 1972 and 1973 in science subjects seems to throw doubt in this theory. In 1972 for instance the biggest difference in the percentage of passes between the Sinhalese and Tamils occurred in Pure Mathematics, the subject in which marking is closest to being objective. In 1973 the percentage passes in the two media were almost identical except in the case of Pure Mathematics and Applied Mathematics (See Table V & VI). This last fact seems to lead us to a further consideration; that what media-wise standardisation achieved in 1973 was to relatively reduce the Tamil medium raw marks and to relatively increase the Sinhalese medium raw marks in Pure and Applied Mathematics, the two subjects for which standardisation has probably the least justification.

What of the effects of standardisation? Some idea of this might be gained by comparing the area and ethnic group analysis of data for University admissions in 1970/71 with that of 1973. It seems clear that standardisation did not lead to better chances for schools in backward and rural areas is sometimes alleged. In fact the provincial distribution of places remained almost unaltered except for a fall in the share of science admissions from the Northern Province. It is in the ethnic breakdown that the real impact can be seen. The percentage of Tamil students entering courses in Engineering fell from 40.8% in 1970/71 to 24.4% in 1973. Of course the total extent of this decline cannot be attributed to standardisation. The proportion of Tamil students entering the Engineering Faculty had tended to decline in previous years. For instance they had secured 48.3% of the places in 1969/70. However, the percentage decline for Engineering (40.8% to 24.4%) was much steeper than in the case of Tamil students entering the Medical Faculty (40.9% to 36.9% This was largely because the intermedia differences in raw marks were greater in Mathematics than in any other science subject. Therefore, at least the difference in the rates of decline could be attributed to the process of standardisation (see Table VI & VIII).

The District Quota System

For the purpose of University admissions in 1974, the Ministry of Education introduced a new scheme—the district quota system. It was held that all those who passed in three of the subjects sat for at the G.C.E. (Advanced Level) Examination and obtained at least twenty five per cent in the fourth subject should be considered candidates 'qualified' for University admission. However, as there were insufficient places in the University to accommodate all

A district quota system, however, had been used to determine admissions to technical colleges and polytechnics since 1972.

'qualified' candidates a limited number were to be chosen according to standardised marks on a district basis. The allocation of vacant places to districts was according to the percentage of total population of the island resident in each district. Separate quotas were fixed for each district for each of the following: medicine and dental surgery, engineering and applied science, physical science, biological science and arts (see Table IX). The district to which a student was deemed to belong was decided according to the student's school record. A student who had spent three years in Grades X-XII in any district was regarded as belonging to it. However, two years in these grades were thought sufficient if the parents had been resident in the same district for at least three years. Students who came to urban schools on scholarships were entitled to be counted for their home areas.

The main justification advanced in favour of the district quota system is that it would favour the rural and the underprivileged child who had hitherto been shut out of the university through lack of adequate opportunity. This argument does not stand up to careful scrutiny. Districts have been delimited for purposes of general administration and each district contains a rural and an urban segment. Thus a district quota in itself is no guarantee that the rural student would benefit; all places allotted to a district might well go to students from the urban area. Neither is it correct to assume that the urban/rural distinction necessarily coincides with a good school/poor school division. Three hundred and nine out of the one thousand and forty four state schools in Colombo district have enrolments of less than two hundred students each and are poorly provided in many respects.²³

In fact, it could be argued that the more undeveloped the educational structure of the area, the greater would be the role of affluence in promoting educational opportunity. For example in the Anuradhapura District there are only three schools which teach science up to grade XII. In Polonnaruwa district there is only one. Thus students in these areas need to be either fortunate to be born near one of these schools or have parents affluent enough to send them to school from long distances or to board them near the school. In educationally developed districts the relative proximity of schools tends to reduce the importance of wealth as a factor in educational opportunity. Viewed from this angle the district quota might well be interpreted as a device to aid the affluent in underdeveloped areas at the expense of the under-privileged in the developed areas.

Moreover, it has pointed out that if the idea was to compensate certain areas for the lack of facilities it would be fairer to base the quota on the student population presenting themselves for the G.C.E. (Advanced Level) Examination and not on the total population. A recent study has revealed that there are great variations between the student population percentages and the total population percentages.²⁴ The following table obtained from it gives quotas based on total population and on student population (in parenthesis).²⁵

 ¹⁹⁷⁴ School Census, Statistics Division, Ministry of Education, Sri Lanka. For the
best defence of the district quota system so far published see C. M. Madduma Bandara-Saravi sisunge pradesheeya vyapthiya saha distrikka kramaya pilibanda adahas keepayak. Sri Lanka Samajavadi adhyayana kavaya. No. 4 1974

^{24.} Memorandum, op. cit., p. 5.

^{25.} This calculation does not take private candidates into account, but their inclusion is not likely to change the statistics to a very great extent.

Total Vacancies	Medicine 225	Bio/Science 320	Engineering 290	Physical Science 330
Colombo	46 (77)	66 (111)	60 (108)	66 (114)
Kandy	22 (18)	31 (26)	28 (24)	32 (27)
Jaffna	13 (43)	18 (59)	17 (56	19 (62)
Anuradhapura	6 (1)	9 (2)	8 (1)	9 (2)
Badulia	11 (2)	16 (3)	14 (3)	17 (4)

It is clear that the district quota system as presently designed gives students in some areas, places in the University heavily disproportionate to their numbers, because many others living in that area have either dropped out of school or have been diverted to other courses through lack of facilities or have been provided with no schooling facilities at all. This development is a result not only of basing the quota on population but also of ignoring the fact that students in certain districts are already channelled along certain lines of study. In 1973 in Kurunegala district, for instance, only 273 students sat for science subjects while 1729 did so in arts. In Jaffna, in contrast, science candidates numbered 1,397 and Arts candidates only 649. Yet Jaffna would obtain 5.77 percent of both arts and science places in the university and Kurunegala 8.17 per cent. In this respect it is perhaps timely to recall that although the discussion has hitherto centred on groups and areas, in the last analysis, examinations are sat for and universities are entered by individuals. The fact that more science students entered from his district would be no consolation for an arts student at Kurunegala who is deprived of his place because of a badly designed district quota system.

University education is state-subsidised in a variety of ways. Opportunities for University education are also limited. It is therefore necessary that the best possible material be chosen for training. This objective does not seem to be achieved by the district quota system. For example in the G.C.E. (Advanced Level) Examination for 1974, 398 students from Jaffna qualified to enter Medicine/Bio. Science courses and 575 to enter Engineering/Physical Science courses. The places open to them according to the district quota were 34 and 37 respectively. In contrast, in Ratnapura, 16 students who qualified for Medicine/Bio-Sciences had 30 places open to them and the 19 who qualified for Engineering/Physical Science had thirty two places. It is quite possible that some of the students from Jaffna came from schools less well equipped than the best schools of Ratnapura.

The strongest argument in favour of the district quota system seems to be that it would help promote the development of hitherto undeveloped regions. Many qualified professional men and teachers have been reluctant to serve in outlying areas partly because they wished to secure a better education for their children. With district quotas providing greater chances of access to higher education for those who remain in school in under developed-districts, the movement from the provinces to the capital and the more urbanized areas might be checked. Yet it must not be forgotten that the few thousands who proceed for tertiary education form but a fraction of the 360,000 six-year olds entering school annually. No amount of adjusting results at grade XII will touch the problems of a vast majority of students without proper educational facilities. Indeed, one of the dangers of the district quota system is that it will be viewed as an excuse to postpone the provision of better facilities for such students.

Much has been written in the newspapers recently on the impact of the district quota system. However its full implications are as yet difficult to grasp. In 1974 the last year for which we have detailed statistics of admissions the district quota was modified by allocating the unfilled places in the various districts according to national ranking as depicted by the standardized G.C.E. (Advanced Level) Examination marks. This modification enabled Colombo and Jaffna to gain 93 additional placements in 1974. It has been stated that the unfilled quotas in 1975 will be distributed among students in other districts in proportion to the district quotas.

There are several gaps in our knowledge of the working of the district quota system. For instance the Ceylon Daily News 22 of December 1973 quoted the Minister of Education, Al-Haj Badi-uddin Mahmud, to the effect that district quotas would not apply to Muslims. This might well explain the sudden rise in the number of Muslim students admitted to science-oriented courses in 1974 but the rationale for such a decision, if it was really made, has not been subsequently explained. On the whole, however, there is sufficient evidence to attempt an analysis of the impact of combining district quotas with standardisation.

In the first place the distribution of University admissions by province changed especially with regard to science-oriented courses. Of course the change as depicted in Tables VII & IX might be slightly exaggerated due to the different bases on which they have been compiled. The statistics up to 1974 give the province of the schools for the school candidate and that of the residence in the case of the private candidate. The 1974/5 quotas operate on a slightly different system as explained above on page 17. Nevertheless the change is clear and it appears more striking if statistics are broken down according to district. Jaffna, Colombo and Galle lost, and many of the other districts gained, in science admissions. In Arts, in contrast, one of the biggest losers was Kurunegala district.

Ethnically, there is little doubt that the major blow fell on the Sri Lanka Tamils. The Tamil share of Engineering admissions for instance fell from 24.4 % in 1973 (standardisation only) to 16.3% in 1974 and is likely to fall to 13.2% in 1975 if the district quota system is applied without modification. The parallel figures for medicine would be 36.9% in 1973, 25.9% in 1974 and 20% (estimate) in 1975.26 The percentage losses in Dental Surgery and Agriculture are even greater. (see Table VIII).

Much less attention has been devoted to the impact of the district quota system and of standardisation on two other sub-groups; the plantation Tamils and the Kandyan Sinhalese. The reason for this is largely that separate statistics have not been compiled by any authority on these sub-groups. However, it seems indisputable that the plantation Tamils who have by far the poorest schooling facilities in the island, were badly affected by standardisation. In 1970/71 when admissions were made on raw marks, eighteen plantation, Tamils entered the University of Ceylon, Peradeniya (Arts-12, Engineering-2 Medicine-1, Dental Surgery-1 and Science-2). In 1971/72 when marks were

^{26.} This estimate seems confirmed by a medium-wise analysis of new admissions to the Medical and dental faculties in 1975. The provisional figures (as of May 1975) listed 227 Sinhalese medium, 59 Tamil medum and 11 English medium students.

adjusted the number fell to twelve, (Arts 8, Medicine 1, Dental Surgery 2, Agriculture 1) and with standardisation admissions to Peradeniya fell to eleven (Arts 7, Engineering 1, Dental Surgery 2, Agriculture 1). The district quotas seem to have had a slight beneficial effect in raising their admissions to 13 in 1974 (Arts 10, Engineering 1 and Science 2) but it may be noted that their admissions to science-oriented courses seem to be steadily falling.²⁷

If the plantation Tamils were losers the Kandyans were certainly gainers at the expense not only of the plantation Tamils who live in the same area, but also at the expense of Low Country Sinhalese and Sri Lanka Tamils. There is little doubt that up to 1973 the Kandyans were under-represented at the University but with the introduction of district quotas they gained a distinct advantage. The quotas allotted to many Kandyan districts were swollen by large number of resident plantation Tamils whose estate schools gave them but a fractional chance of a secondary education, much less of entering the University. Thus it is likely that the Sinhalese living in Kandyan areas will obtain relatively easy access to the University in 1975 by the operation of a weighted quota system. The high drop-out rate in the Kandyan provinces seems to ensure that these places would be reserved for a relatively small group of grade XII students, many of them from the more affluent classes.

The iniquities of the system apart, the new procedure for University admissions can also be criticised for the secrecy which shrouds it. Although the University is supposed to formally admit students, University authorities are merety provided with a list of standardised marks and a district quota table and expected to be satisfied with this. University academics have no access to answer scripts or even the raw marks. This represents a sharp contrast to the procedures adopted before 1970 and has given rise to an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust which has undermined the confidence in the fairness by which even the existing rules are applied.

The political impact of the district quota system has been little short of disastrous. It has convinced many Sri Lanka Tamils that it was futile to expect equality of treatment with the Sinhalese majority. It has immensely strengthened separatist forces within the Tamil United Front and contributed to the acceptance of a policy of campaigning for a separate state in early 1975. It has kindled resentment against the Muslims in both Tamil and Low-Country Sinhalese areas and rendered relations between the Kandyan and Low-Country Sinhalese more fragile than before.

The tragedy has been that the Ministry of Education had already set in motion policies which could well have gone a long way towards achieving the principal professed aims of the district quota system within a few more years without all its inequities and heartburnings. The abolition of the science practical test for the G.C.E. Advanced Level in 1971 had already reduced the advantage held by schools in Jaffna and Colombo. By 1974 every educational district in Sri Lanka had at least one science graduate teacher for every twenty science students studying in grade XII. In 1972 the Ministry had initiated a policy of reserving most of the big urban schools for secondary education. Since admissions to such schools were reserved for those who were successful at the Grade V scholarship examination, the schools were to be open not only to students of the urban area where they were located but also to all rural students of the district. These measures, however, have to be combined with both an upward

Information provided by M. Sinnatamby, Lecturer, Department of Economics, Peradeniya Campus.

revision of the stipend paid to each government scholar to compensate for inflation and an increase in the total number of scholarships. Such a policy would have avoided a great deal of resentment and heart burning, while ensuring substantial equality of opportunity.

In the context of the above discussion it seems clear that both standardisation and the district quota system have done more harm than good. Both should be abandoned forthwith. However, once standardisation is abandoned a close check should be kept on marking standards in the different media, for communal passions, once aroused, cool but slowly, even in the most intellectual of climates. Perhaps the conversion of question papers at the G.C.E. (Advanced Level) Examination to those with multiple choice question might be an answer. If the district quota system is removed something perhaps needs to be done in the interim to help students who are studying in secondary schools without adequate facilities. It is possible to categorise schools of this sort and to reserve a percentage of University places for them, the percentage being decided according to the proportion of grade XII students stydying in such schools. In the last analysis however, unequal opportunity can only be removed by the provision of better facilities for the under-privileged.*

^{*} This is a revised version of a paper presented to the Ceylon Studies Seminar (1975 Series No. 2, Serial No. 54) in March, 1975

ADMISSIONS TO UNIVERSITIES

	(Cla	ssified by	province	(Classified by provinces of origin and course of study)	and cour	se of stud	(y)			
Course of Study	W.P.	C.P.	N.P.	N.C.P.	S.P.	E.P.	Sab.	Uva	NWP	Total
				1966-1967						
Medicine .	130	00	69	1	15	3	1	-	3	230
Dental Surgery	12	7	6	1	-	1	1	1	-	25
Engineering .	. 48	10	71	1	00	00	3	2	2	152
Architecture	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Agriculture	9 .	1	9	1		1	7	1	1	18
Vet, Science	∞	1	∞;	1	-	1	1	1	m	50
Phy. Sc./Bio. Sc.	191	22	99	7	38	7	=:		7	345
Total Science .	395	43	229	7	99	18	17	4	91	06/
	50.0	5.4	30.0	0.3		2.2	2.1	0.5	2.0	0000
Arts Oriental Studies	06/	204	740	33	17/	40	767	20	+07	7023
(excluding Law)	15	•		1		1	,	-	1	36
Total Arts	8111	386	243	55	727	40	293	39	264	2858
70	28.6	13.5	8.5	1.9	25.4	1.4	10.2	1.4	9.1	
GRAND TOTAL	1206	429	472	57	793	58	310	43	280	3648
	33.2	11.7	12.9	1.6	21.7	1.6	8.5	1.2	7.4	
				8961-1968						
Medicine	. 134	00	89	1	12	4	1	1	4	231
Dental Surgery	. 19	1	33	-	1	7	-	1	-	27
Engineering	. 55	6	58	1	12	2	1	60	7	149
Architecture	1.	10	12	1	*	1	10	1	10	18
Agriculture	0	1-	101	1	+	1	7	1	7-	25
Phy Sc /Rio Sc	107	46	3.5	-	15	9	1 %	"	72	415
Total Science	418	99	222	2	79	17	23	1	38	872
3	47.9	7.5	25.5	0.2	9.1	1.9	2.6	8.0	4.5	
Arts Oriental Studies	. 1023	340	151	19	596	29	260	99	322	2854
(excluding Law)	0,1				-	-			,	3.4
Law Total Arts	1041	343	154	- 89	600	30	260	199	375	2888
	36.1	11.9	5.3	2.4	20.8	1.0	8.0	2.2	11.3	
GRAND TOTAL .	1460	409	376	2,5	629	47	283	53	363	3760
	38.8	6.01	10.01	0.1	18.0	6.1	0.7	1.9	7.6	

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Tab.		233 2396	1 297 10.7 316 8.8		2.33 2.33 2.34 2.44 2.44 2.44 2.44 2.44 2.44 2.44
E.P.		2.4421 1.4428 3.368	1.8 6.1 9.1		w w w w w w w w w w
S.P.		10 2 4 5 1 1 2 4 5 6 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	1 674 24.4 756 21.2		20 15 10.7 53.8 53.8 53.8 53.0 623 623 623
N.C.P.	6961-8961	1111111111111188	2.5 71 2.0	0261-696	12 - 22 C 42 42 C 2
N.P.	19	73 145 124 127 26.8 26.8	3.3	19	67 27.8 27.8 27.8 27.5 27.5 27.5 27.5 27.5 27.5 27.5 27.5
C.P.		15 16 16 16 17 17 17 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18	328 11.9 390 10.9		14 66.9 33.9 33.9 34.7 34.7 39.8 39.8
W.P.		110 10 52 7 7 7 171 171 866 886	22 828 30.0 1188 33.3		119 10 10 10 168 369 46.6 632 282 1028 1028 379
		111111111	11111		112:11:11:11:11:
Course of Study		Medicine Dental Surgery Engineering Architecture Agriculture Vet. Science Phy. Sc./Bio. Sc. 70al Science Arts Oriental Studies	Law Total Arts GRAND TOTA		Medicine Dental Surgery Engineering Architecture Vet. Science Phy. Sci-Bio. Sc. Total Science Arts Oriental Studic (excluding Law) Law Total Arts CRAND TOTAL

	Total		247	151	120	25	433	2454	48	2502	3457		22.1	274	13	27	1099	2190	49	6077	3338
	NWP		4	C) m	1	0	12	2.6	8	340	365		4	1 4	4	15	4.4	3.7	210	14.3	360
	Uva		1	1-		-	∞ =	1.2	18	2 % 7	2.7				- 1	1,	07	55	63	2.6	. 6.1
	Sab.		4.	_,-	10	101	19	3.0	1	0/7	8.7		010	79	14	1 4	29	2.6	177	10.9	272
	E.P.		2	14	1-	-	32	3.4	110	5.	27.7		2	19	10	10	20	30.	25	4.	25.
	S.P.		20	17	CI <	t (1	109	11.4 547	- 072	21.0	657		23	33	11 2	7 4 7	127	493	4 407	22.9	624 18.7
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	N.P.	197	89	48	8 <u>7</u>	t w	230	24.1	136	5.4	366	197	50 .	27.	23	9 18	249	7.75	4 07	3.5	9.8
	C.P.		<u>4</u> "	17		1-:	8 4	300	30.1	.12.0	382		24	.23.	- 9	w 2	114	308	3.55	14.0	12.8
	W.P.		125	19	13		196	45.2 684	36	29.1	33,3		11.5	119	28.7	205	506	637	659	29.4	34.9
			1			: ;	: 1											: 1			
Table VII (Contd.)	Course of Study		Medicine Dental Surgery	Engineering	Architecture Agriculture		rny, Sc./Bio. Sc. Total Science	Arts Oriental Studies (excluding Law)	Law Total Arts	200	GRAND TOTAL		Medicine Dental Surgery	Engineering	Agriculture	Phy. Sc./Bio. Sc.	Total Science	Arts Oriental Studies (excluding Law)	Law Total Arts	CDANID TOTAL	Share IOIAL

Table VII (Contd.)

· Course of Study · · ·	W.P.	C.P.	N.P.	N.C.P.	S.P.	E.P.	Sab.	Uva	NWP	Total
				1973						
Medicine Dental Surgery	137	∞ c.	54	ا ع	27	401	4 (1	-0	-1	255
	811	29	49	4	35	6	= "	7	- 18	275
Agriculture	16	4 m	4 4	m	15.		o eo	-	- 73	88
Vet, Science Phy Sc / Rio Sc	228	32.3	€ 50 € 50 € 50 € 50 € 50 € 50 € 50 € 50	14	65.3	100	15	100	28	463
Total Science	537	18;	251	4.	151	24	4.	600	57	1177
Arts Oriental Studies	566	314	138	191	449	33	219	99	253	2199
(excluding Law)	14	1			~	-	2	1	6	44
Total Arts	580	321	4.	161	457	34	221	99	262	2243
GRAND TOTAL	25.8	411	392	17.5	4.0.7	2,8%	265	25	319	3420
%	32.6	12,2	11.5	5.0	17.7	1.7	7.8	2.2	7.3	
				1974						
Medicine	111	410	40	(1)	36	10	4	- 1	∞	265
Engineering /	92	4	34	2	41	15	32	∞	33	307
Architecture 5" Agriculture										
Vet. Science	237	104	48	15	107	18	57	19	7	9/9
Total Sci	463	201	133	22	191	43	103	28	1112	1296
Arts Oriental Studies	578	360	10.5	98	312	118	231	142	249	2236
(including Law)	25.8	16.1	7.0	3.9	14.0	5.3	10.3	6.5	11.1	
GRAND TOTAL	1041	561	230	3,1	503	161 4.6	9.4	173	361	3532
									1	1

* seven candidates of the group opted to do Physical Science. Source: Planning and Research Unit, University of Sri Lanka.

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NEW ADMISSIONS TO UNIVERSITIES Classified by ethnic origin and Course of Study

Table VIII (Contd.

The Country of the Co		THE RESIDENCE							
Course of Study	Si	Sinhalese	Ta	Tamil	Moor	Moor/Malay	Oth	ers	Total
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	0. %	
		1971-1972	372						
Phy. Science, Bio. Sc. and Architecture	. 29)	139	(31.2)	5	(1.1)	m	(0.7)	446
Engineering	. 17	_	95	(34.7)	5	(1.8)	3	(1.1)	274
Medicine	124	_	87	(39.3)	2	(2.3)	5	(2.3)	221
Dental Surgery	. 2	_	26	(53.0)		(2.1)	-	(2.1)	49
Agriculture	. 48	(58.6)	32	(39.0)	7	(2.4)	1	1	82
Vet. Science	17	_	10	(37.0)	1	1	1	H	27
Total Sc. Group	. 68(_	359	(33.6)	18	(1.7)	12	(1.1)	6901
Arts Oriented Studies (excluding Law)	. 203	-	102	(4.7)	53	(0.4)	4	(0.2)	2190
Law	42		5	(10.2)	- ;	(5.0)	-	(5.0)	49
Iotal Arts Group GRAND TOTAL	2073	(92.6)	107	(14.1)	45	(2.2)	25	(0.5)	3308
		1973							
Phy. Science, Bio. Sc. and Architecture	350	_	115	(23.6)	10	(2.1)	9	(1.2)	487
Engineering	. 20		19	(24.4)	5	(1.8)	7	(0.7)	275
Medicine	. 150	(58.8)	94	(36.9)	9	(2.3)	2	(2.0)	255
Dental Surgery	. 25	_	23	(46.9)	-	(2.1)	1	1	49
Agriculture	. 41)	45	(51.1)	7	(2.3)	1	1	88
Vet. Science	20		0	(13.0)	1	1	1:	1	. 23
Total Science Group	79.		347	(29.5)	24	(5.0)	13	7.7	1177
Art Oriented Studies (excluding Law)	2019		178	(5.5)	4:	(7.0)	CT -	T. 5	7199
Total Arts Groun	2000		136	(18.1)	1	(2.5)	- 0	(6.2)	22/13
GRAND TOTAL	2846	(83.2)	483	(14.1)	26	(2.1)	21,	(9.0)	3420
	,								
Phy Science, Bio. Sc. and Architecture*	49	0	145	(22.0)	8	(2.7)	2	(0.3)	099
Engineering	22		46	(16.3)	4	(4.9)	1	1	283
Medicine	187		89	(25.9)	00	(3.0)	3	(1.1)	263
Dental Surgery	34		14	(28.6)	-	(2.0)	1	1	49
Agriculture	8		11	(11.1)	2	(5,1)	1	1	66
Vet, Science	. 23	(71.9)	6	(28.1)	+	1	1	1	32
Applied Science	1		-	(5.9)	1	1	1	1	17
Art Oriented Studies	. 1934		226	(10.0)	84	(3.7)	9	(0.3)	2250
GRAND TOTAL	. 2992	(81.9)	520	(14.2)	130	(3.6)	11	(0.3)	3653

* Includes the number admitted to follow the course in Mathematics and Statistics at Jaffna Campus. Source: Planning and Research Unit, University of Sri Lanka.

Table IX District Quotas for University Admissions

District	Population Medicine	Medicine	Dental	Bio-Sc.	Phy. Sc.	Engineering & Applied Sc.	Arts
Colombo Kalutara Kandy Matale Nuwara Eliya Galle Mataira Matara Matara Mannar Vavuniya Batticaloa Annparai Frincomalee Kurunegala Polonnaruwa Badulla Moneragala Retnapura	202 203 2777 2777 2777 2777 2777 2777 27	\$E50 8 E T 0 E T 14 8 E 8 L 0 E T E 5 E	0w4-uwu-w-u4w-uw	88E 85258851501482245451	. 855 8 4 5 5 6 5 6 5 6 7 7 7 7 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 5	87%L174%L174%244%%%4457	752 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 2
TOTAL	00.001	225	49	318	331	290	

Source: Planning and Research Unit, University of Sri Lanka.

Table X Population percentages by district race and religion

Population of District	2,672,620 731,824 1,187,170 316,342 453,243 737,451 588,284 341,005 77,882 95,536 272,790 1,028,107 191,939 1,028,107 191,939 1,028,107 16,315 16,315 16,315 16,315 661,710 652,094 12,711,143
Others 13,957	101010000000000000000000000000000000000
Malays 41,615	0.0000000000000000000000000000000000000
Burghers 44,250	000000000000000000000000000000000000000
stooM naibal 814,62	£1.4££1.001.4££744.757.74.10£75
Ceylon Moors 824,291	8.66 8.66 8.66 8.66 8.66 8.66 8.66 8.66
slimsT nsibn! 885,291,1	22, 24, 25, 25, 33, 35, 27, 27, 35, 37, 37, 37, 37, 37, 37, 37, 37, 37, 37
SlimaT noly9O 1,415,567	6.3 6.3 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
Kandyan Sinhalese 3,700,973	23.10 62.10 62.10 62.10 62.20 63.00 63.00 63.00 63.00 64.00 64.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00
L. C. Sinhalese 5,445,706	80.1 85.8 11.2 12.0 12.0 83.4 96.2 96.2 0.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 17.3 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11
	Colombo Kalutara Kandy Matale Nuwara Eliya Galle Nuwara Eliya Galle Matara Hambantota Jafina Mannar Vavuniya Batticaloa Amparai Trincomalee Kurunegala Puttalam Polonnaruwa Moneragala Rolomaruwa Moneragala Ramapura Regalle

Source: Census of population 1971 Preliminary Release No. 1 Jan. 1972.

		stridbbud 072,732,8	subniH 2,239,310	smilsuM 146,656	R. Catholics 883,111	Other Christians 103,576	Others 7,635	Population of District
Colombo		69.4	4.5	7.0	15.9	2.1	0.2	2,672,620
Kandy	: :	61.7	26.0	o ∞ ∞ ∞	2.7	4.0	0.0	1.187.170
Matale Viiwara Fliva	:	73.2	17.2	6.9	2.3	0.3	0.0	316,342
Galle	: ::	93.9	2.2	3.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	737 451
Matara		93.8	3.1	2.5	0.4	0.1	0.0	588,284
riambantota Jaffna	1	97.2	0.4	2:2	0.5	0.0	0.0	341,005
Mannar		3.4	29.9	28.8	37.6	0.7	0.0	77,887
Vavuniya	- 地方	14.8	65.4	7.3	6.11	9.0	0.0	95,536
Amnarai	* * *	3.7	6.4.9	24.3	00.0	1.3	0.0	258,104
Trincomalec		27.9	32.7	32.4	7.7	0.0	0.0	191 930
Kurunegala	7	90.0	1.7	8.4.8	3.1	0.3	0.1	1,028,107
nuradhanna		45.4	8,4	10.4	28.8	0.5	0.1	379,787
Badulla		58.7	34.7	3.0	7-1	7.0	0.0	589,207
Polonnaruwa		88.7	2.8	7.1	1.3	0.1	0.0	163 858
Moneragala	***	0.06	7.2	2.2	0.5	0.1	0.0	191,505
Katnapura Kegalle	: :	83.0	10.3	1.5	1.6	0.4	0.0	661,710
TOTAL		67.4	17.6	7.6	6.9	0.8	0.1	12.711.143

Source: Census of population 1971 Preliminary Release No. 1 Jan. 1972.




Diagram 1 — University admissions classified according to ethnic groups 1969/70 — 74 (absolute numbers)




Diagram 2 - University admissions classified according to ethnic groups 4969/70 - 1974 (percentages)

Labour and the Politics of Labour in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries

MICHAEL ROBERTS

I

Albert Soboul, George Rude, Richard Cobb and Eric Hobsbawm, among others, have established an exciting tradition of historical writing on working class movements and urban mobs. Working with historical material that is more limited than those available to researchers in Western Europe, Kumari Jayawardena has continued this line of interest in The Rise of the Labour Movement in Ceylon, a history book which surveys working class agitation in Ceylon during the period 1880-1933. Within the working class, the primary focus of Kumari's work has been centred around the manual labourers in Colombo and their leadership, mostly outsiders drawn from what she describes as the "Ceylonese middle class." Relatively little attention is paid to the white-collar workers, while the workers on the plantations are allotted only one chapter. This was no arbitrary choice. It was dictated by the patterning of actual events. The manual work force of Colombo was in the forefront of what little pressure and agitation there was. If, therefore, her thirteenth chapter on the labour movement in the plantation sector might seem like an afterthought, it was in fact a rightful location for this segment of activity: despite the size of the plantation work force, the plantation labour movement was very late in its emergence and was, in the early 1930's, a little squib of a movement which merely spluttered and puttered.

Lest these comments might suggest a relatively narrow historical theme, let me hasten to eliminate this notion. In describing the reasons for the emergence of working class agitation and the manner in which the movement developed as well as her accounting for its successes and failures, Kumari Jayawardena treads a broad historical canvas. She surveys the influence of religious revivalism and the nationalist political awakening. She pays considerable attention to the economic backdrop, to cost of living, unemployment, periods of prosperity and the main facets of Ceylon's dependent capitalist economy. She discusses the attitudes of employers and officials as well as relevant government policies, and describes their effects on the labour movement. She describes the social service movement. She seeks to clarify the social structure. Her book is a tour-de-force. In the course of her narrative a considerable external influence is also unfolded: whether in the form of external ideological forces such as Theosophy, British Rationalism or Indian nationalism, or of specific incidents abroad such as Japan's spectacular technological advance and victory over Czarist Russia, or of specific organisations such as the Theosophical Movement and the British Labour Party, or of specific individuals such as D. M. Manilal (that bumbling rolling-stone of a Gandhian who1 is incorrectly described

Hugh Tinker, "Odd Man Out: The Loneliness of the Indian Colonial Politician—The Career of Manilal Doctor," Jour. of Imp. and Common. Hist., vol. II:2, Jan. 1974, pp. 226-43.

here as a Communist), Annie Besant, G. W. Foote, Colonel Olcott or A. A. Purcell, the foreign impact on the history of our island colony is revealed to have been sharp and continuous. These foreign influences combined with indigenous factors to produce a historical scenario in which religion, politics and the labour movement were "closely interrelated," with the religious influences on the labour movement "predominating in the years before 1915 and politics predominating in the latter phase" (p. 358).

The book is presented in straightforward and lucid prose. The spice and the culinary frills are in the quotations. These are many, yet often brief and mostly judicious. They add to rather than subtract from the fluidity of the tale. A substantial use of sub-titles provides the barriers and sign-posts which guide the reader and highlight the variety of factors, processes and events—a very necessary feature this in such a multi-faceted story.

In producing this book the author has consulted a wide variety of sources. These were mostly English-language sources. Primary sources in the vernacular are noted, but it is evident that cursory and limited use has been made of these.² To those familiar with the vast body of periodicals and newspapers in English as well as in Sinhala and Tamil, it will be known that an exhaustive survey of the literature over such a broad span of time is an impossible task. One can sympathise with the author's choice. Yet one could reasonably expect her to have made more substantial incursions into vernacular sources for specific events and on specific occasions. For instance, to take a few possible examples, one cannot but feel that some reconnaisance into the Sinhala newspapers run by Goonesinha, the Kamkaru Handa and the Vīrayā, during the period 1928-33, the Sinhala Bauddhaya and Sinhala Jatiya in the years 1912 and 1915, and the Sarasavi Sandaräsa at some stage in the 1890's and 1900's would have garnered handsome results.³

Kumari Jayawardena has also made some use of the techniques of oral history (i.e., information derived from interviews) to build up her story. Her conversations and correspondence with A. E. Goonesinha and James T. Rutnam seem to have been particularly fruitful. As such, she lays claim to have been one of the pioneers in the use of these techniques for Ceylon history. If one has any quarrel it is that she did not use these methods of eliciting views and data as extensively as she might have—for several active participants in the politics of the 1910's and 1920's were still alive in the 1960's.

The volume of scholarly literature on the Buddhist revival that has appeared in recent years has been so rich that our knowledge of this movement has advanced considerably. Readers would be well advised to consult the article by L. A. Wickremeratne (1969), the several essays by Heinz Bechert (1970 and 1973), the article by Gananath Obeyesekere (1970), the essays by Kitsiri Malalgoda and Michael M. Ames in the Social Compass (vol. XX:2 1973) and the dissertations by Malalgoda, P. V. J. Jayasekera, Sarath Wickramasuriya, Tissa Kariyawasam and Sarath Amunugama to gain a fuller understanding of this historical process. Most of these works were not available to the author by 1969-70, but her failure to use Wickremeratne's "Religion, Nationalism and Social Change in Ceylon, 1865-1885'' and Obeyesekere's "Religious Symbolism and Political Change in Ceylon' must be noted. In general, there

There are only 4 citations from Sinhala sources in the whole book; and of these, 2 were taken from police reports.

As indicated by the use made of these sources by L. A. Wickremeratne, 1969 and P.V. J. Jayasekera, 1969. Also see Reberts, 1974b, pp. 4-5.

are several other publications about Lanka which she has failed to consult: S. J. Tambiah's long and notable chapter on Sri Lanka in the book edited by Lambert and Hoselitz (1963); Ralph Pieris on "New Elites in Ceylon" (1964); S. Arasaratnam's perceptive essay in the book edited by Philip Mason (1967); Tissa Fernando's dissertation (1968), his mimeographed paper on the temperance movement (Ceylon Studies Seminar, early 1970) and another of his articles on the 1915 riots (1969); Henry M. Oliver Jnr. (1957) and Donald Snodgrass (1966) for the economic background; Obeyesekere's chapter on the "Ideology of Status" in his book on land tenure (1967); and Robert Kearney's first book on Ceylon (1967). Some of these would undoubtedly have provided her with added insights, incentives, and lines of inquiry.

The author has chosen to present a straight narrative history with considerable attention to an analysis of causal factors. For the most part, the material is arranged with reference to chronological sequence, but she does not permit sequence to imprison her and is ready to move out of a rigid adherence to a chronological structure. On a few occasions there is carelessness in her application of evidence relating to a specific year (or period) to another year (or period). Thus, in support of a statement made in 1895 by West Ridgeway (a Governor) to the effect that there was no disloyalty to the Queen and her conclusion that "there was no nationalist movement at that date," she refers to a pamphlet written by one W. S. Goonewardena in 1911 which expressed fervent Empire-loyalism and opposition to the type of political agitation occurring in India (p. 76). It is not that her contention is incorrect or that there were no equivalents of a W. S. Goonewardena in 1895; but that Goonewardena's pamphlet is not valid evidence for 1895. Again, a Governor's reference in March 1920 to the increase in the price of rice as a factor which had caused strain and might lead to a "breaking point" (the Governor's words) can hardly be described as a as a "forecast" which anticipated the outbreak of a strike (railway workers) on the 27th February 1920 (see p. 221). Nor should a statement by a missionary in the early nineteenth century relating to the large number of Government Christians be held applicable to the period under review (see p. 38), for it refers to an inheritance from Dutch times4 which dissipated itself soon (though receiving new increments on a small scale in the century that followed). Such failings have not been entirely absent in the scholarly literature on Sri Lanka in recent decades, 5 and my references to this type of error are the natural, if snooty, reaction of the historian, trained as he is to exercise scrupulous care in the use of Time as a variable.

There are occasions when the author indulges in statements of some consequence without any supporting evidence, even though these are open to challenge. For instance, her insistence that Indian immigrant labourers on the plantations "were never a settled labour force until the 1930's" (p. 21; also see p. 332 where she dates it as "late 1920's") and her related conclusion that this feature was one of the factors contributing towards the absence of labour agitation on the plantations till the early 1930's (p. 21) are highly debatable viewpoints; indeed, it seems to have been derived from a process of circular reasoning rooted in the fact that labour agitation on the plantations commenced in the 1930's. Yet plantation labour was beginning to show some of the characteristics of emigrant

^{4.} Denham, from whom the quotation is taken by the author, in fact had this in his historical section and follows it with the observation: "The consequence was that the number of Christians given in the early records is out of all proportion to actual fact," (Ceylon at the Census of 1911, Colombo: 1912, p. 266).

^{5.} E.g., instances of indiscriminate telescoping of evidence from different periods can be found in W. A. Wiswa Warnapala, 1974, espe. pp. 16-22.

settlers as early as the 1870's and the permanent work-force requirements of the tea industry (as distinct from the coffee industry) must have contributed to this trend.6 Again, it is unmitigated assumption to state that "with urbanization and the creation of an urban proletariat there was a loosening of caste bonds" (p. 24).7 And her unqualified statement that there "was no restriction on religious instruction" in missionary schools (p. 36) is both unsupported and incorrect.8 A different order of error is represented on those occasions when the author's interpretation of the evidence appears uncritical and debatable. As this essay will illustrate later, Kumari Jayawardena accepts much too readily the evidence of certain "middle class" eyewitnesses and Sir Robert Chalmer's opinion in concluding that the working class rioters in Colombo on 1915 were not influenced by religious motives (pp. 172-77).9 To quote approvingly D. B. Dhanapala's 10 appraisal of the Anagarika Dharmapala's influence over the Sinhalese generations of the early twentieth century (p. 114) is to rely on the shallow foundations of popular historiography of the 1950's, influenced as it was by the heightened religio-cultural revivalism of that era; true, there is evidence elsewhere in the book of Dharmapala's influence; his historical role must not be buried or underestimated; that "militant Buddhists" were guided by him is undoubted; but that "militant Buddhists" constituted a majority of the adult generations of the period 1890's-1920's (as implied) is questionable; indeed, insufficient allowance is made for the insufferable conservatism of the "middle class" (both Christian and Buddhist) of this era and the fact that many influential men considered (incorrectly) Dharmapala's thinking to be shallow and merely polemical; indeed, the author's assessment of Dharmapala's role is somewhat exaggerated and not immune from the retrospective romanticism and intense Sinhala-Buddhist patriotism to which most of us were subject in the 1950's and 1960's—an influence which would tend to project conditions of the present back into the past.11 Again, to accept the statement of the President of the Estate Staffs' Association in 1931 that the plantation workers were "seething with discontent" as a factually-valid representation of conditions (p. 347) is to rely uncritically on the exaggerated and alarmist cries of those opposed to Natesa Aiyar and his Estate Labour Federation. This is partially contradicted elsewhere by her observation that the situation in 1931-33 was not explosive and her conclusion that the plantation labour force was much too "depressed" a community to be able to assert itself vigorously in a period of economic depression (pp. 353-54). Yet again, the Government's decision in 1913 to withdraw a new regulation which prohibited village headmen from joining temperance societies (p. 144) was not due solely to the agitation against this measure that was mounted in Ceylon (with support activated within Eng-

See Roberts, 1966, p. 120. By 1911, the proportion of females in every 1000 persons on the estates was 458 (vs. 542 males); while 153,940 out of the total estate population, comprising 30% of the whole, were born in Ceylon (E. B. Denham, 1912, p. 493). The Sinhalese constituted only 7.5% of the estate population at this stage. Also see Vijaya Samaraweera, 1974.

^{7.} For elaboration, see Roberts 1974b, pp. 23-25.

^{8.} From the 1860's the grants-in-aid to missionary schools stipulated that religious instruction should be restricted to the first hour of teaching each day, during which time attendance should not be made compulsory. See L. A. Wickremeratne, 1970, p. 89 fn. 47 and Sessional Paper VIII of 1867, pp. 24-25 and 35.

^{9.} Infra., pp. 185-86.

^{10. &}quot;The Makers of Modern Ceylon, Anagarika Dharmapala," Ceylon Causerie, Oct.-Nov. 1960.

^{11.} Also see K. M. de Silva, 1973a, p. 384.

land); Tissa Fernando has shown how the presence of an advocate of temperance, Sir William Harcourt, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, was another decisive factor.¹²

These criticisms must, however, be fairly evaluated. They are essentially minor nit-pickings. Any major work has its quota of little errors. Specialists on particular events would be able to pinpoint some errors of this type in most historical books if they chose to go through each book with a tooth comb. In a book which covers such a broad span of time and pioneers a new field, Kumari Jayawardena is surely entitled to some leeway. It is sufficient that the book does not have too many of these errors.

There are more substantial criticisms that can be presented, however, and these can be interwoven with some ideas which I wish to present. In this essay it is proposed to survey the politics of labour in the period 1880-1933 in considerable detail. No apology is needed for the length of this review exercise. It befits an important book.

H

With the development of capitalism and wage-labour relationships in British times a working class emerged. Distinguishing between "the urban proletariat," the clerical workers, and the plantation workers, Kumari Jayawardena sketches the economic background and marshals data which illustrate the size and characteristics of these three categories of workers. A brief explanation is provided as to why combination and agitation among the latter two categories remained non-existent or limited during the period under review. 13 In describing the evolution of associations and agitations among certain segments of "the urban proletariat," the author emphasises how the development of "factory-type organizations" provided the essential backdrop, while the political climate and religious revivalism served as powerful catalysts. The early manifestations of labour discontent were sporadic and isolated; these strikes were "protests against changes by employers in set patterns of activity" or against government regulations rather than efforts to gain better conditions of work (p. 92). The period 1915-23 turns out to be a watershed. From the 1920's, working class agitation in Colombo took on greater vigour, with major strikes in 1920, 1923, 1927 and 1929, and the formation of the Ceylon Labour Union in 1922 and the Ceylon Labour Party and the All-Ceylon Trades Union Congress in 1928, providing highpoints. It is evident that A. E. Goonesinha's espousal of the urban labourers was an important factor in this development. Some attention is devoted to the differences between the labour leaders of the era before 1915 and the era 1915-1933 (pp. 225 and 366-67). It is also emphasised that the period after 1915 witnessed a considerable secularisation of working class agitation in that religious influences declined in importance; if, therefore, the epitome for the period before 1915 is "Religion, Politics and Labour Unrest," that for the period after 1915-23 is "Politics, Labour Agitation and Religion." During both periods the differences in stance and technique between two groups, whom the author identifies as "moderates" and "radicals," are illustrated. Indeed, this is one of the recurrent themes in her narrative and it is made clear that in the competition for leadership between the two from the

P. T. M. Fernando; 1971, pp. 131-34. An earlier version of this article was available as a Ceylon Studies Seminar paper from June 1970.

The treatment (pp. ix, 13-16, 19-23, 354, 357-58 & 366) is sketchy and largely directed towards the period before 1915. For commentary, see Roberts, "Fissures and Solidarities," 1974b.

1920's, the militancy of the radicals met the needs of the hour and secured the hearts (and voices and votes) of a significant segment of the manual work force in and around Colombo.

In keeping with an old-fashioned strand in Marxist thinking in Ceylon, the author reveals a certain partiality for economic determinism and a tendency to apply Marxist theory as a mechanical model of determination (rather than Marx's dialectical model).14 A case in point would be her analysis of the communal riots in Colombo during May-June 1915. Despite several items of evidence to the contrary, 15 she insists that the rioting in Colombo "took on the complexion of 'mob' activity rather than religious rioting' and agrees with the Governor, Robert Chalmer's view that the rioters in Colombo were "actuated by little or no religious impulse." In her support she has, besides the conclusion drawn by Chalmers, (i) H. L. de Mel's statement that the mob in Colombo "seemed to aim at destroying the Coast Moor boutiques" and were bent on plunder rather than on attacking the Moors themselves, and (ii) an analogy to Eric Hobsbawm's conclusion that the movement of food prices was an almost infallible indicator of popular unrest in Paris during the French revolution; and the consequent argument that the increase in prices resulting from the first world war led to much discontent, particularly against Moor traders (pp. 172-77). That economic pressures and economic discontent must have influenced the working class rioters in Colombo is amply illustrated and widely accepted.16 That these same men had no religious considerations is extremely dubious. In the first place, a more critical attitude would have led one to question H. L. de Mel's evidence. One of the conservatives of his day, it is reasonable speculation that his interest would have been to preserve the honour of the Sinhalese "middle class" in the face of the charges of sedition which so many Britishers were levelling at them (and at the leaders of the temperance movement in particular); such a stance meant an attempt to lay the blame on the criminal element¹⁷ and, as its corollary, to focus on the urge for loot and plunder. In any event, it is not difficult to marshal data against his opinions. Within Colombo, for instance, there were fires reported at two mosques; at least 15 Moors were killed and at least 124 were wounded. 18 In the second place, the manual work force in Colombo, and the railway workers in particular, had been subject to the propaganda of the Sinhala-Buddhist revival-

^{14.} This tendency in Sri Lanka (as observed by the reviewer) does little justice to the width and complexity of Marx's thought. Both Marx and Engels stressed that material or economic conditions were restrictive rather than prescriptive and did not mean to assert an inevitable and direct causal relationship between economic activity and ideology. Engels also allowed that the "ideological conception" could "[react] in its turn upon. the economic basis and [could], within certain limits, modify it." See especially the letters from Engels to J. Bloch and to Conrad Sohmidt in 1890 (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected Works, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970, pp. 682-89). Several authorities deny that Marx relied on monistic economic determinism. As the Polish scholar, Jordan, notes, Marx might have argued that "economic power is eo ipso political power" (Dahrendorf's words), but he did not say that political power is eo ipso economic power. See Z. A. Jordan, 1971, passim and espe. pp. 36-38 & 56-57. Also see T. B. Bottomore, 6th edn., 1970, pp. 20-21 and Istvan Meszaros, 1971, pp. 86-87.

^{15.} See Roberts, "Hobgoblins," 1970a, pp. 62-64.

See ibid., p. 62, the other essays in A Symposium on the 1915 Communal Riots, June 1970, and K. M. de Silva, 1973a, pp. 390-91.

^{17.} A conclusion which Kumari Jayawardena, quite rightly, rejects (pp. 173-75). For support see Roberts, 1970a, pp. 76-94, espe. 93-94. Here, both of us have been attacking straw dummies. The views expressed by Ramanathan and D. C. Vijayavardhana were not based on serious historical scholarship.

Dept. of National Archives, Sri Lanka (DNA, Lanka), lot 76/146, Fire Reports in Colombo and letter from the S.P., Colombo to the Special Commissioner, 7 October 1915 with enclosures and minutes.

ists during the decades before 1915. Among those members of the elite who guided workers in trade union affairs at this stage were Martinus C. Perera, D. C. Senanayake, Arthur V. Dias, Charles Batuwantudawe and the Anagarika Dharmapala, all of whom were active propagandists in the religio-cultural revival.19 The literate members of the urban proletariat presumably constituted part of the clientele of the Sarasavi Sandaräsa, the Sinhala Jatiya and the Sinhala Bauddhaya. A wider audience would have been reached by Dharmapala and Harischandra during their propaganda tours and by Charles Dias and John de Silva through their plays, several of which were enacted at the Tower Hall in Maradana, a working class suburb of Colombo (where the railway workshops were also located). As the author herself has illustrated so vividly (pp. 170-71), all these publicists struck a deeply chauvinistic note and consistently assailed the Moors, the Tamils, the Cochinese, the Europeans, and all foreigners. John de Silva prefaced the enactment of his plays with an abusive speech which extolled the virtues of the ancient Sinhalese, and attacked Tamils Moors and those who aped the West.20 In short, a number of racial bogeymen were created. Its influence on the working men is demonstrated by the author herself when she reports that some railway workers had shown hostility to cheap Indian labour in 1912-1913 and assaulted Indian railway workers (p. 174). Nor is it insignificant that Marshall Wickremasinghe, a railway fitter and a working class activist (pp. 158, 179-80 and 272), lived at the Young Men's Buddhist Association,21 one of the centres of Buddhist activism and temperance work in the 1910's. In the face of such evidence, could it be argued that the Gampola Perahera case and its aftermath had no influence on the urban workers? The author's denial of any religious hostility on their part is surely myopic and suggests a rigid attachment to economic determinism. Another instance is provided by her observation that the "wage rise that occurred after the Minimum Wage legislation of 1927 was a key factor in liberating the (plantation) worker from his semi-feudal ties" (pp. 365-66). The benefits of the wage rise, in fact, were "shortlived" (p. 350; cf. p. 334) and it is obvious that the principal factors contributing towards the beginnings of unionisation among the plantation labourers were political: the impending (1928-31) franchise and the adoption of their cause by some members of the resident Indian elite, and the extension of their political weightage from 1931 (as her own account in chapter 13 suggests).

Her attention to the economic influences on the strikes that occurred in the 1920's is justified, but reveals a measure of inconsistency. The unrest in Colombo in the period 1919-1920 is attributed to the "post-war economic dislocation" and the rise in the cost of living (pp. 219-21); and rising costs are also treated as an influential factor in the strike of railway workers in 1912 (p. 151). Yet elsewhere we are told that "the growth in economic prosperity in the midtwenties (which made the employers willing to grant concessions)" contributed towards "the upsurge of labour unrest" in the period 1923-1929 (pp. 281 and 308). In short, labour unrest has the best of both worlds — a case of heads it wins, tails it does not lose, come rain, come sunshine, there is cause for an upsurge of labour. Her reference to prosperity and the optimism it generates as a causal force in labour agitation also seems at odds with her acceptance elsewhere of Hobsbawm's views on the manner in which prices influence

^{19.} Roberts, "Hobgoblins," 1970a, p. 63 and V. K. Jayawardena, 1972, pp. 95-96, 140, 143-45, and 157-58. Also see Wickremeratne, 1969, pp. 135-39 for evidence of the antipathies to alien traders revealed in the 1880's.

^{20.} Sarath Amunugama, 1973, p. 273.

V. K. Jayawardena, "Pioneer Rebels among the Colombo Working Class," Young Socialist, vol. 4:3, Nov. 1968, p. 83.

popular unrest; and the implication that lower prices and better times produce a lessening of unrest (pp. 112-13). While on this subject, it could be noted that the economic depression of the period 1929-33 had a restrictive effect on the labour movement (pp. 310 ff), in contrast to the period 1919-20. There was unrest in the period 1930-33 as well. It was just that severe unemployment made strikes and militant action difficult and financial conditions led (and permitted) Government and employers to take a tough stance. Yet the contrast leads one to make the general point that we should not remain satisfied wich such generic, catch-all phrases as "economic crisis" or "economic dislocation" in pinpointing causes for labour unrest; and thence takes us to the hackneyed truth that the outlines of a crisis need to be spelt out because different forms of economic crisis would affect labour unrest differentially. These points are implicit in much of the author's description, but perhaps could have done with a more deliberate development.

A few quibbles might be taken up at this stage. The author lays a certain degree of stress on the role of literacy in producing leaders among the workers and in contributing to the occurrence of strikes (pp. ix-x and 290). That literate workers were found among the printers, railway workers and hiring car drivers is amply demonstrated; but no evidence is supplied that literacy was a pronounced feature among the port workers, laundrymen and carters referred to on pages ix-x. Again, there is a recurring allusion to the "feudal" nature of the relationship between employers and workers on plantations; and the latter are even described as "new serfs" (pp. 332, 357, and 21). "Feudal" is a commonplace in the conceptualisation embodied in the literature of the Left Movement within Lanka. Little allowance is made for the culturally loaded implications of this concept and the fact that its usage entails a Westernisation of our thinking. It is also converted into a convenient catch-all into which we dump anything that is not capitalist, or modern, or what-have-you. If one needs a residuary dustbin (we usually do), it would be better to use a neutral term such as "pre-capitalist," or some such term as "traditional." In this connection, the standard view that the kangany system epitomised the feudal nature of employer-employee relations on plantations needs to be reviewed and properly explained. There were two characteristics (see pp. 17-23) that might justify the description of these relations as "feudal," viz. the fact that the plantation labourer was partly paid in kind (rice, currystuffs, and lodgings) and the fact that he may not have been able to leave of his own free will because of the indenture that arose out of his passage being subsidised by his employer or his employer's agent (the kangany). But the degree to which these bonds were effective and the extent to which spatial mobility between plantations was prevented are uncertain and await a study in depth. And there is enough evidence to indicate that the kangany system did not prevent a regular trickle of immigrants to jobs outside the plantation sector, for example, to the work of domestic servants or unskilled labourers in mercantile and government establishments.22 We must also ask ourselves whether non-market restrictions on the mobility and freedom of the proletariat are entirely absent in fully-developed capitalist systems? In another sense, too, the kangany system amounted to a combination of workers and may have given a group under a kangany some bargaining power²³ (restricted later by the tundu system however). In this regard it might be worthwhile examining to what extent the role of the kangany

Roberts, 1966, p. 120 and my chapter in U.C., History of Ceylon volume III, ed. by K. M. de Silva, 1973, pp. 100-01.

Cf. Ravindra K. Jain, 1970, pp. 282-84 & 423-24. Also see The Labour Commission, 1908, Colombo: Govt. Printer, 1908 (a biased source) and V. K. Jayawardena, 1972, p. 29.

compares to that of the jobber or labour contractor in certain industries in highly urbanised and industrialised settings. With no expertise in this field I cannot make specific comparisons. All I can do is to suggest the need for a searching comparison because of the light it might throw on the tendency to treat the kangany system as a feudal and pre-capitalist form of relationship between workers and employers.²⁴

The author's handling of the strike at Lake House in 1929 is somewhat askew and provides the reviewer with the opportunity of stressing the role of geographical space and location in the success or failure of strikes. The failure of this strike is attributed to D. R. Wijewardene's obduracy and his ability to secure replacements and blacklegs (pp. 322-23). By placing this item within chapter twelve and within the rubric of a sub-section beginning on page 321, it is also implied that the economic depression of the period weakened the power of Goonesinha's Labour Union (see p. 321 especially). Yet, this strike took place in late March 1929-merely two months after the tramway strike against Boustead Brothers during which a measure of working class solidarity was revealed, violence erupted, and some successes were achieved by the workers (pp. 291-301). The strike might have been more properly discussed within the ambit of chapter eleven. Certainly, there is room to doubt whether the depression had much influence on this event. The causes for its failure lie elsewhere. The other reason mentioned by the author remains valid: Wijewardene's patron-client networks and his ability to use such employees as Santiago Silva (a foreman, better known as "Santiago Baas") and Piyadasa Sirisena to find compositors and replacements from the skilled labour in other printing establishments in Colombo undoubtedly contributed towards Goonesinha's failure on this occasion.25 Nor should we lose sight of the fact that Wijewardene was a Ceylonese employer, and one with a nationalist image, in contrast to the Bousteads; as made evident elsewhere in the book, a strike against a government institution or a British capitalist concern could easily take on a nationalist colouring; against a Wijewardene this was not possible. But the most crucial determinant was the nature of the work-site. At the Lake House printing works it was possible for the replacements to "live in" for a long period and it was easier to marshal police protection.26 In contrast, the British executives and friends who attempted to man the trams were dispersed, on the move, and exposed. Police protection was difficult and attempts to provide it finally provoked a serious clash with the crowds of strikers, supporters and onlookers. In passing, it might be noted that the workers at the railway locomotive sheds confronted similar disadvantages in their strike activities because their work-sites could be more effectively patrolled or sealed off by the police; the outcome of their strikes in 1912, 1920 and 1923 may have been influenced in some degree by this disadvantage, though it should also be recalled that their greater numbers and greater militancy gave them a force which the workers at Lake House did not possess. In sum, then, it can be concluded that the author might have paid more specific attention to the degree to which

^{24.} Among the literature which one might use as a point of departure are: Richard D. Lambert, Workers, Factories and Social Change in India, Princeton University Press, 1963; W. E. Moore & A. S. Feldman (eds.), Labor Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas, New York, 1960; and A. L. Epstein, Politics in an Urban African Community, Manchester University Press, 1958.

Reviewer's interviews or conversations with Messrs. Piyasena Nissanka (20 July 1968),
 H. A. J. Hulugalle (Jan. 1974), P. C. A. Nelson (28 Jan. 1974) and J. S. Gomes (10 May 1973).
 Also see V. K. Jayawardena, 1972, pp. 321-24.

^{26.} This point was emphasised and brought to my attention by Mr. J. S. Gomes.

the outcome of strikes was conditioned by (i) sheer numbers; and (ii) the form and location of the work-site or, in the words of exaggerated caricature, the 'geo-politics' of the institution or industry concerned.

III

Limitations of the Urban Working Class Movement

It is evident that in the period before the year 1920 working class agitation in Colombo was sporadic and limited. Combination, protest and strike action were ad hoc activities flaring up occasionally and withering away subsequently. Rarely did associations survive the crises that produced them. There was little continuity in the arena and the thrust of these activities.²⁷ There was no over-arching organisational foundation or even a working class association functioning as a nucleus for future growth.

Following Goonesinha's espousal of the Colombo working man's cause and the formation of the Ceylon Labour Union in September 1922, some organisational foundations and a measure of continuity were evolved. This factor, Goonesinha's militancy, the several instances of strike action (still rather ad hoc) in the years that followed, his advocacy of universal adult suffrage and the support he was given by Drummond Shiels and the (British) Labour Party brought both Goonesinha and working class agitation to the important reaches of the political waters. The formation of the Employers' Federation in October 1928 and the collective agreement signed by this aggregation of capitalists and the Ceylon Trades Union Congress in June 1929 were an index to these developments. So were the two pieces of restrictive trade union legislation drafted by the Government of Ceylon in 1929 (but disallowed by the Secretary of State) and the pressures which led to these bills (pp. 301 ff.). So were the condescending and snide remarks of the author of Commercial Ceylon who referred to "one of the so-called labour or strike leaders" who had succeeded in becoming, "to all outside appearances, not a [sic] insignificant figure in the field of politics."28 It would be necessary, however, to set these events in the total political context before we can assess the political influence exerted by Goonesinha and his working class associations in the latter part of the 1920's. The political context should encompass the pressures and manoeuvres of other political groups, and their interaction with each other and the ruling British elite. Our historians have as yet to turn out the details needed to answer this question. It would be useful to have this question in mind however. From it would flow associated queries regarding the extent to which Goonesinha's working class activists were a threat to the British political regime and regarding the degree to which he challenged and modified the capitalist order. To questions phrased in this style, Kumari Jayawardena's book would suggest that Goonesinha's immediate and contemporary influence was limited; though in processual terms and in the light of the previous situation it was of considerable political significance. By way of illustration, it could be noted that there were only 28 European firms represented at the meetings which initiated the form-

28. S. E. N. Nicholas, 1933, p. 87. He also stated that the office bearers of the labour associations were only interested in furthering their own interests and collecting money from illiterate labourers for this purpose.

However, from 1912 a section of the workers at the railway locomotive workshops provided some continuity. See pp. 155-58, 217-18, 220-23 & 242 of the book under review and V. K. Jayawardena, 1968.

ation of an Employers' Federation in 1928;29 and though the representative nature of this organisation was soon extended, it encompassed only a few non-European firms. 30 Indeed, it seems that Goonesinha's ability to challenge Ceylonese firms was weak. Nor is it insignificant that Goonesinha himself had links with certain mudalalis in the Pettah fish market and with other members of the petty-bourgeoisie in Colombo such as K. D. David.31 We are left with a mere suggestion of an answer, however, simply because the author does not address much attention to such questions. We are told that the Ceylon Labour Union claimed a membership of 40,000 in 1926 but are warned against taking this as an accurate estimate (p. 257). It is stressed that the harbour workers in Colombo "were the most active supporters of A. E. Goonesinha" after 1923 (p. 286). It is noted that the All-Ceylon Trades Union Congress "had seven member unions—the Ceylon Labour Union and the unions of chauffeurs, printers, hotel workers, mariners, tramwaymen, and mercantile clerks" (p. 300; also p. 290 n.). It is observed that 20,000 workers were on strike at the height of the general strike in March 1923 (which was a failure). that 13,000 harbour workers stayed out for 3 weeks in 1927, that several mass meetings and a spectacular procession were held in 1927, and that the tramway strike in 1929 "ended in a popular upsurge of violent resistance to authority" (pp. 244, 286-87 and 291). Beyond these occasional pieces of information, we are provided with little data regarding the distribution of working class support for Goonesinha in Colombo, and the shortcomings thereof. Nor is there an overall appraisal of this problem.

Throughout, the author's main interest is centred around the evolution of working class associations and the several factors which contributed to this process at various stages in the period 1880 to 1933. The activists and their agitational activities draw her continuous attention. With the exception of her first chapter (devoted largely to the period before 1915 however), it is a history of the working class movement, not that of the working class. Such a focus is unexceptionable. Yet the occasional glimpses which she has supplied us with regarding the features which hindered the development of working class organisations and weakened their ability to exert pressure on the bourgeoisie (see pp. ix-xii, 13-16, 65, 105-07, 245, 323-34, 345, 354 and 357-58) are not adequate in themselves. Without losing its main thrust, the book could have done with a more integrated survey of the weaknesses displayed by the working class movement. Such an approach would have complemented the author's principal interests and helped to bring out the shortcomings in Goonesinha's support-base. It would have led to an attempt to gather more data regarding the constituent units in the Ceylon Labour Union and the All-Ceylon Trade Union Congress; and to set this data against the distribution of larger "factory-type organizations" and various categories of workers in Colombo during the 1920's and early 1930's. Such an approach would also have led to more thought being devoted to the non-activists-to those working class men (and workshop units) who (which) did not join the associational and protest movements of the

^{29.} Reports on meetings of the 28th October 1928 and 7th January 1929 in Minute Book of the Employers' Federation (at its office). This figure represented 17.7 per cent of the total number of European firms listed in the Colombo "Mercantile List" in Ferguson's Ceylon Directory for 1929 (my calculations).

^{30.} A count of those present at annual meetings up to April 1931 gave a total of about 49 firms but the representation was, in fact, much wider because of a system of having affiliated associations representing specific interests or trades (e.g., Harbour Interests, Stores & Mills Association etc.) However, it was obviously an European group. Of the 49 only 6 were non-European.

^{31.} Interview with Mr. G. Alfred Andries. Also see fn. 52 below and the author's references to Podisingho and Banda Appu (p. 288).

1920's. It must be conceded that it is difficult to gather information on such matters, but it is evident that the author has not pursued the channels of exploration that remained available³² as diligently as one might have wished. Besides the data which they might have yielded, such explorations would also have provided her with a useful foundation for a survey of working class consciousness.

For any working class movement, the degree of working class consciousness is a crucial dimension. The absence of a systematic effort to gauge the nature of working class consciousness or the factors operating to retard its development remains an important weakness in the book under review. To be sure, occasions of (urban) working class solidarity are consistently emphasised. There are a few references to commitments and attitudes which bear on this question (see espe. pp. 11-13 and 357). But there is no comprehensive overview. In the circumstances, the author's references to "the class conscious and militant urban working class" of the late 1920's and their "maturity and selfconfidence" (pp. 297 and 362) appear to be casual conclusions; and more in the nature of a hypothesis than an empirically-grounded verdict. It is also a questionable hypothesis. There were many factors operating to create dissension and segmentation within the urban working class in Colombo; while other contributory explanations could be adduced for the militancy which they revealed during certain strikes in the 1920's. It is doubtful whether their proletarian-consciousness and their solidarities were either deep-seated or widespread. Class consciousness was not entirely absent. But it appears to have been at a fledgling stage.33 At best, it seems to have been no more than the type of solidarity and understanding which Lenin described as "trade union consciousness" (which was to be distinguished from a higher form, "Social-Democratic consciousness' or socialist consciousness).34 Even that is subject to question.

In another essay I have attempted to enumerate the factors which retarded the development of a collective identity and diluted the intensity of the workers' commitment to their class interest during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.35 These factors were presented as a set of hypotheses in need of further investigation. Such investigations should also attempt to assign relative weights to the several factors which obstructed and moderated working class consciousness, while distinguishing the spans of time during which the more influential factors were operative. With the fund of knowledge which she has brought into The Rise of the Labor Movement in Ceylon, Kumari Jayawardena has shown that she is more than qualified to take on this task. As it is, we should be grateful to her for a lucid explanation of the more important side of the coin: the confluence of forces and factors, both indigenous and foreign, which permitted a segment of the working class to partially circumvent the variety of handicaps they faced and move forward in their struggle, sporadically perhaps but nevertheless defiantly, and in a manner which paved the way for further strides in the decades after 1933.

^{32.} See Roberts, "Fissures and Solidarities," 1974b.

^{33.} For elaboration, see ibid.

^{34.} See "What is to be Done" in V. I. Lenin: Selected Works in Two Volumes, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952, pp. 233 ff. espe. pp. 233-34, 258-60 & 262 63. Trade union consciousness is described as "the conviction that it is necessary to combine in unions, fight the employers and strive to compel the government" to pass necessary labour legislation, etc.; whereas "Social-Democratic consciousness" involves also the desire to abolish "the social system which compels the propertyless to sell themselves to the rich."

^{35.} Roberts, "Fissures and Solidarities," 1974b.

IV

Leadership from Outside the Proletariat

A striking feature of Kumari Jayawardena's narrative is the attention devoted to the leaders of working class association and protest. Within the limited strands of protest in the plantation sector, the formation of the All-Ceylon Estate Labour Federation in 1931 and the emergence of certain demands seem to have been largely due to the influence of K. Natesa Aiyar. In the sporadic protests of the era before 1915, a handful of moderate and radical leaders stand out as mediators or representatives for the working class, while Dharmapala's militancy of language provides a background refrain. Outshining them all is Alexander Ekanayaka Goonesinha (1891-1967). As one of the leaders of the Young Lanka League in the period after 1915, Goonesinha acted as a political gadfly and revealed that he was an "aggressive nationalist" and social critic with a penchant for invective. These lines of thinking eventually led him to take an interest in working-class problems; and with the formation of his Ceylon Labour Union in 1922 and the general strike of 1923 we are launched into "the new era of aggressive trade unionism founded on radical politics and nationalism" (see chapters 8 and 9). "Under his leadership labor branched out as an independent political force" (p. xv); he became a "popular hero" and the unquestioned leader of the manual workers in Colombo; so much so that the British officials and capitalist employers were forced to afford recognition to a man whom they had scorned as a "dangerous agitator" in the early 1920's. In bringing out Goonesinha's role, Kumari Jayawardena has rendered an important service to our historiography. In taking note of the leadership provided by those outside the working class and by those "middle class leaders already engaged in rousing public opinion on religious and political issues" (see especially pp. xiv-vi, 64 ff. and pp. 358 60), she has highlighted a characteristic in the history of Lanka's working class associations which has continued to the present day.36 By way of further embellishment, however, one wishes that she had taken the opportunity to explore the role of personality and charisma in relation to the growth of the working class movement. Following Max Weber's attention to charisma as a type of authority, the literature on the role of charismatic leadership has attained considerable volume. 37 These theories may or may not be valid for the subject of her book. But Dharmapala and Goonesinha seem to present rich veins of potential for a study of leadership of a charismatic type; the degree to which some manual workers conceived Goonesinha to be a leader and saviour is strikingly suggested by their reaction in February 1929 to the rumour that he had been assaulted by the police (p. 296) and the manner in which some of the unemployed gathered round his house and his office and demanded relief during the lean year of 1931 (p. 314). It is regrettable, therefore, that the author did not bring together her perceptive comments on the techniques utilised by these leaders (e.g. see pp. 114-16, 125-26, 228-30, 234-48, 292-97, 313 and 360-61) and her body of knowledge on their roles in the working class movement in such a way as (i) to examine the degree to which charismatic authority can be identified and (ii) to appraise more thoroughly the relative influence of personality in the congruence of factors which led to labour agitation in the island.

^{36.} Robert N. Kearney, 1966, p. 405 and 1971, chap. 3, espe. pp. 42-52.

^{37.} E.g. Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa, Politics of Independence, New York: Vintage Books, 1961, pp. 85-102; Edward Shils, 1958; Ann Ruth Willner, 1968; L. I. Rudolph & S. H. Rudolph, 1967, Part Two; and for a critique of the earlier popularisation, K. J. Ratnam, 1964, pp. 341-54. Also see Howard Wriggins, 1969, passim. For Weber see The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, ed. by T. Parsons, New York: Free Press, 1947, pp. 324-63 and H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber, 1970, espe pp. 245 ff & 295-96.

Since the styles and the programmes of leaders appear to have influenced the labour movement in some measure, it follows that divisions and personality clashes among these leaders may have had a detrimental effect on the movement. The split between Goonesinha and Natesa Aiyar in 1928 (p. 342) was one such incident. But the author does not supply us with any information on the splits within the Ceylon Labour Union and, more latterly, the Ceylon Labour Party. In fact, Goonesinha's small circle of active lieutenants was eroded by at least one major defection: that of P. Givendrasinghe (or P. G. de Silva).38 Together with M. L. M. Reyal, Richard Wickremasinghe, Marshall Perera, and T. W. E. Javasinghe, he was one of Goonesinha's right hand men in the 1920's, 39 but broke away at some stage around 1928 (see clue, p. 304); the reasons are not clear, but may have been due to personal jealousy and to Goonesinha's domineering tendencies. 40 Thereafter, Givendrasinghe became one of Goonesinha's most "bitter enemies." ⁴¹ Besides taking an active interest in the work of the Ceylon National Congress, he seems to have teamed up for a while with a new labour leader who appeared on the horizon as an opponent of Goonesinha's, namely, with Dr. R. Saravanamuttu. Using the foundations provided by (a) the family's medical services to the people of Colombo North and (b) the large number of Ceylon Tamils and Indians resident in the northern wards of the city, Saravanamuttu set up the Independent Labour Party as his personal vehicle. 42 Goonesinha's chauvinist politics in the period after 1929 are known to have eroded his support among the Malayalis and

He was a member of the Executive Committee of the Ceylon National Congress in 1926, 1927 (no data for 1925 and 1928-30), 1931 and 1932; and of the Working Committee in 1943.

- 39. One of his supporters during the late 1920's and early 1930's was K. D. David (a mudalali and boutique owner). C. H. Z. Fernando, Dr. E. V. Ratnam, and Dr. S. Muttiah were financial patrons and sympathisers. George E. de Silva was also a fellow-traveller. Both de Silva and Muttiah also had feet firmly placed within the Congress camp and the former even served as its President in 1930. Victor C. Corea's association with Goonesinha seems to have petered out by the late 1920's.
 - For the information on Goonesinha's political support I am mostly indebted to Mrs. Caroline Goonesinha, Miss Ira Goonesinha, G. Alfred Andries, James T. Rutnam, Sir Senarat Gunewardene and A. W. H. Abeyesundere.
- 40. Based on interviews with James T. Rutnam (25 July 1974) Sir Senarat Gunewardene (27 July 1974) and Mrs. & Miss Goonesinha (31 August 1974).
- 41. Interviews with A. W. H. Abeyesundere (1 Sept. 1974) and Mrs. Goonesinha (31 August 1974). Also see p. 304 of the book under review.
- 42. Nicholas notes that the ILP followed "the principles of their brethren just across the water" (1933, p. 88). Note that in 1953 Tamils constituted more than 40% of the population in Kotahena West and Kochchikade, while Indians made up more than 40% in St. Paul's, Pettah, and Kochchikade, (B. L. Panditharatna, "A Geographical Description and Analysis of Ceylonese Towns," C.J.H.S.S., vol. 4:1, 1961, p. 84). Also see table 4 in Roberts, "Fissures and Solidarities," 1974b.

^{38.} P. G. de Silva, later Priyascela Givendrasinghe (c. 1890-1954) was from Ratgama on the southern coast. He came to Colombo about the year 1910; and at one stage taught Sinhala at Ananda College. In the 1920's he was generally described as a "journalist." He revealed his political interests initially as a member of the Total Abstinence Central Union and subsequently as a member of the Young Lanka League when he participated in the protest against the poll tax. He parted company with Goonesinha in the mid 1920's ("almost 15 years ago" according to a 1940 news item) and was thereafter a lieutenant of R. Saravanamuttu. He sought election to the Municipal Council on several occasions without any success, till in December 1940 he secured the Maradana North seat (defeating a Labour Party candidate), a success which he repeated thrice thereafter. He also contested the Colombo Central constituency at the general elections of 1931, 1947 and 1952 without success. (Data from news items of 10 Dec. 1940 and 9 July 1954 from *The Times of Ceylon* office which were kindly secured for me by Mr. Donovan Moldrich).

other Indians in Colombo⁴⁴ and must have brought grist to Saravanamuttu's mill; certainly, Saravanamuttu (or his wife) had little difficulty in winning the Colombo North seat with substantial majorities in 1931 and 1936.⁴⁴ There can be little doubt that Saravanamuttu's thrust weakened Goonesinha's lines of support, while Givendrasinghe's defection may possibly have lost him some links with the Salagama vote in Borella and the Modera-Mutwal area. Saravanamuttu and Givendrasinghe participated heartily in the vilifying attacks on Goonesinha that were so common at this stage: for it was widely imputed that Goonesinha lived off the cash which the workers donated, an allegation that was epitomised in the nickname, "Mutti Kasi," which his opponents, among them Lake House, Piyadasa Sirisena, Givendrasinghe and Saravanamuttu, peddled and retailed with enthusiasm.⁴⁵

There is room to speculate that, as he found his feet, Goonesinha preferred to be the king of his roost. Perhaps using his personal knowledge on this point, E. F. C. Ludowyk refers to Goonesinha's "personal rule" and elsewhere notes: "The masses had to have a leader, they got more than they bargained for—a boss."46 And he seems to have been that species of boss which prefers to be a whale among the minnows. Little attention appears to have been devoted to the building up of a cadre of decision-takers and executive lieutenants. He was autocratic by nature and reluctant to delegate responsibility.47 His Labour Party itself is seen by Ludowyk to have been less a political party than "an umbrella lending dignity to the heterogeneous elements clustered under it." 48 These features were surely of consequence in the relative decline of Goonesinha's power in the 1930's and 1940's. There were other factors which assisted this process, of course; 49 for one, a process which can be described as "the embourgeoisement of Goonesinha"—this was a gradual development for which the foundations were provided by his marriage in 1923 to a daughter of a mudalali and plumbago merchant named Gunumuthu Simon Andries 50 who had set up residence in Kehelwatte (Pettah)—and was reflected in his life-style (e.g. saloon car and elegant suits) in the 1930's—in brief, having penetrated the ranks of the national clite by 1929-31 Goonesinha seems to have

- 43. Interviews with A. W. H. Abeyesundere and G. Alfred Andries (1 Sept. 1974). The latter (b. 1895) was one of Goonesinha's brothers-in-law and a half-brother of Mrs. Goonesinha (b. 1898).
- He secured a majority of 5795 votes in 1931 and Mrs. Naysum Saravanamuttu had a majority of 4943 in 1936. Dr. Saravanamuttu was also the Mayor of Colombo in 1937 and 1941-42.
- Information provided by Mr. James T. Rutnam, Sir Senarat Gunewardene and A. W. H. Abeyesundere. Also see Nicholas, 1933, p. 88 and (re government officials in 1923) V. K. Jayawardena, 1972, p. 252.
- 46. 1966, pp. 151-52.
- Stressed by his daughter, Miss Ira Goonesinha (31 August 1974) and suggested by James T. Rutnam (25 July 1974) and V. K. Jayawardena, 1972, p. 258.
- 48. 1966, p. 153. This statement applies to the Ceylon National Congress and the Liberal League as well.
- 49. What follows is an impressionistic appraisal.
- 50. Andries (c. 1850-1909) originated from Kosgoda but made his money as a trader and a plumbago mineowner in the Ruanwella locality during the late nineteenth century. His second and third marriages were to two sisters named Rupasinghe, daughters of an ayurvedic physician in Welitara. He set up residence in Dam Street, Pettah and purchased several properties in Colombo besides a few estate properties in the Karandeniya-Elpitiya locality. He constructed the original buildings for the Puravarama on his property in Dias Place in 1906. (Data from interviews with Mrs. Caroline Goonesinha and Mr. G. Alfred Andries; and a visit to the Puravarama temple). According to Mr. G. Andries, each of the children from the third bed, including Miss Caroline Andries, received about three-four lakhs worth of property from G. S. Andries's legacies.

attempted to emulate the ostentations of the nouveaux riches;⁵¹ for another, the precarious and possibly limited nature of his financial support;⁵² fourthly, the growth of the Left Movement and the rather different approaches of Philip Gunawardena and his troopers in the 1930's and 1940's; fifthly, and paradoxically, the widening of the political arena after the introduction of universal adult suffrage (a radical demand which Goonesinha pioneered) in 1931 and the consequent reduction in the importance of Colombo and the necessity for networks of influence in rural areas;⁵³ and finally, but even more debatably, the detrimental effects of the depression of 1929-31 to which Kumari Jayawardena calls our attention (chapter 12).

In drawing her narrative to a close in 1933, Kumari Jayawardena does not seem to have considered such a survey necessary. While retaining this dateline, however, she could have allowed for the continuity of the historical process by providing us with a brief review of the factors and forces which weakened Goonesinha's labour organisations during the 1930's. As it is, an unwary reader might be led to conclude that Goonesinha's strength had declined irreparably as a result of "the mass unemployment" produced by the economic crisis (chapter 12, espe. pp. 310-11 and 330-31), for she states categorically that "by 1933 the 'Goonesinha era' had ended.' Yet there is room to doubt whether many contemporaries could have forecast that his power was on the wane. Despite the factors which I have referred to above, Goonesinha, the labour boss of Colombo, was still a force to be reckoned with. The Colombo South Youth League (that is, the L.S.S.P. in embryo) and the Sama Samajists discovered this to their cost when they challenged Goonesinha's leadership during the 1930's. According to the official "history" of the L.S.S.P. it is recognised that, "in this clash, Mr. Goonesinghe [sic] was generally the victor" and in the late 1930's the L.S.S.P. is said to have met with severe setbacks in the trade union field because of the successful use of anti-Indian chauvinism by Goonesinha as well as leading notables in other political associations.54 While these conclusions need to be subject to more searching investigation, such admissions within a booklet devoted to aggrandisement and propaganda (moderately and intelligently, and, thus, all the more effectively) carry considerable weight. They contradict one of the author's contentions.

^{51.} My conclusions from interviews with Mr. A. W. H. Abeyesundere and Sir Senarat Gunewardene. Goonesinha was also involved (c. 1927-28) in the operations of a bus company within Colombo which sought to reduce fares through cheap season tickets (communicated by Mr. W. J. F. Labrooy).

^{52.} This is a subject on which it is difficult to gather detailed information. Around 1923 he was in danger of being brought to court as a civil debtor, so his marriage was opportune. His wife's inheritance, collections among workers, and donations from wealthy supporters (e.g. C. H. Z. Fernando, E. V. Ratnam, S. Muttiah, some mudalalis in Colombo such as K. D. David, and, more latterly, such persons as Drs. C. W. S. Fernando and C. J. C. de Silva) seem to have been his principal sources of support. But we need to know the specific spans of time during which his patrons supplied him with funds and the sum of his finances at various times.

Also see K. M. de Silva in U. C., History of Ceylon volume III, 1973, pp. 496-97 & 505-07.

^{54.} A Short History of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party, 1960, pp. 62 & 11. J. L. Kotelawala is named as one of the leaders who pushed a communal line, but other names (e.g. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike and the Sinhala Maha Sabha) are studiously omitted. Also see G. J. Lerski, Origins of Trotskyism in Ceylon, Stanford University, 1968, pp. 145, 148-50 & 159.

V

Radicals and Moderates: Good Guys and Bad Guys

The workers of Colombo were so disadvantageously placed that they were led to rely for leadership on "the politically conscious elements of the local middle class" (p. xi; also pp. 66 ff, and 358). These leaders were drawn from the "modern section" of the Ceylonese middle class rather than the "traditional section;" and within the moderns, from the "moderates" or "radicals" rather than the "conservatives." In using the terms "conservative," "moderate", and radical, however, the author rightly cautions us against treating them as clear-cut divisions (p. 90). As her narrative indicates, the radicals of yester-year were also prone to mellow into the moderates of "today" (notable examples being H. J. C. Pereira, Hector Van Cuylenberg and Martinus C. Perera).

In detailing and assessing the activities of these radical and moderate leaders, the author's heart is obviously with the radicals. Her distinct preference for the radicals is supported by a tendency to lay laudatory accents on militant courses of action—for the gains secured by violent or militant protests are consistently stressed. Such partialities no doubt stem from the dominating milieu within the circles of the radical intelligentsia during the 1960's and 1970's. But they were also the preferences of a significant segment of the manual workers (but not the clerical workers) in Colombo during the 1920's, if not earlier. Given the exploitation to which the manual workers were subject and the difficulties they faced in extracting improvements in their working conditions, militancy and radical middle class leadership were undoubtedly functional. However, a few qualifications must be noted:

- 1. Militancy and militant strikes did not always pay off and even produced reverses on a few occasions (e.g. pp. 245 and 322-32); while the tramway strike of 1929 provoked a bill which sought to introduce to Ceylon "the main restrictive provisions of the British Trade Union and Trade Disputes Act of 1927," but which did not become law as a result of a sheer accident: namely, the advent of Lord Passfield (Sidney Webb) as Secretary of State for the Colonies (pp. 301-09). Conversely, negotiation and moderate techniques secured gains (pp. 153 ff., 209, 219, 223 and 284). In other words, the criteria of pragmatic politics should weight one's accents of appraisal.
- 2. The appraisal of Dharmapala's influence (pp. 112-14) carries a measure of over-assessment, particularly in relation to the temperance movement. 53
- 3. If Goonesinha provided the manual workers of Colombo with "the militant leadership they were looking for" (p. 254), it must also be stressed that the workers provided Goonesinha with an asset he was searching for; namely, a foundation and a trampoline for a vault into the upper levels of the indigenous political elite—a status he had not quite achieved in the period before 1923. 56

The radicals certainly presented demands and revealed traits which were more beneficial to the working class than the measures favoured by the moderates: for instance, the abolition of the poll tax, sturdy trade unionism, and universal suffrage. The latter was especially significant. As early as 1914 Goonesinha hat, demanded that "the control of government must reside in the

^{55.} Supra, p. 183.

See Roberts, "A New Marriage, An Old Dichotomy: The 'Middle Class' in British Ceylon?," 1975.

people themselves;" and his attention to the conditions of "the poor" in the 1920's (pp. 236-38) was eventually backed up by his call for universal adult suffrage—a demand which he pioneered in lonely splendour. By comparison, the moderates who took an interest in the working class have little claim to praise.

In comparing the broader political roles of the moderates and radicals, however, the former have been given Cinderella like treatment and been painted in more lurid colours than the historical evidence justifies. As a corollary some of Goonesinha's activities are overplayed. On one or two issues it even appears that the author has either delved into the source material in the most cursory fashion, or skilfully circumnavigated the more stubborn bodies of data to suit her own goals.

Thus, the author does not seem to have realised the extent to which the merchants and capitalists in Colombo supported the carters in their strike against a new municipal regulation in 1906-a feature which must surely have contributed towards its success and towards the carters' militant solidarity (another reason for its success).59 Again to say that "the radicals led the popular agitation against the Salaries Scheme" in 1922 (p. 242) is to push matters a little too far. The protest was initiated by the moderates-both the unofficial Legislative Councillors and the leadership of the Ceylon National Congress. The walk out of the 14 territorially elected Councillors on the 29th September 1922 was a dramatic affair and was preceded and followed by anti-Government rhetoric in the newspapers controlled by the moderates.⁶¹ It led to a special session of the Congress on the 22nd-23rd October 1922. In helping to organise a mass signature campaign (p. 242) Goonesinha was therefore one of the many hands and voices in the substantial phalanx of elite opposition to a manifest expression of colonial domination. Again, to state that the Young Lanka League (1915-late 1920's) was "the only body which showed real concern over working class wages and conditions" (p. 237) is to dismiss the Ceylon Social Service League (b. 1915), the Ceylon Workers' Welfare League (b. 1919) and the Ceylon Workers' Federation (b. 1920), in cavalier fashion. as hundred per cent hot air.

^{57.} The quotations provided by the author at this point suggest that Goonesinha's conceptual emphasis was in terms of "the poor," "the lower classes" and "the people" rather than the workers.

^{58.} See V. K. Jayawardena, 1972, p. 264. He was not the only person to ask the Donoughmore Commission for universal adult suffrage; so did J. E. Ludowyk from Galle (personally communicated by Dr. Mrs. T. Mettananda). Among those who supported manhood suffrage in the decade before 1928 were H. J. C. Pereira (CDN, 17 Dec. 1919), Revd. A. G. Fraser, and the Cosmopolitan Crew (1927, before Don. Comm.).

^{59.} See Roberts, "Fissures and Solidarities," 1974b.

^{60.} As in the quotation from p. 237 that follows, the emphasis has been added.

^{61.} See especially the CDN, Ceylon Morning Leader (CML), and Dinamina of the 28-30 Sept. and early October. The CML headlines of the 29th Sept. were entitled "Autocracy Unmasked;" and the CDN of the 29th Sept. carried the captions: "Unofficials Driven to Non-Cooperation" and "Public Galleries Cleared Amid Uproar," while subsequent issues carried photographs of the 18 Councillors who voted against the budget. The walk-out was followed (a) by public meetings organised by the Congress branches or the mahajana sabhas at such places as Kurunegala, Rambukkana, Galle, Anuradhapura and Jaffna, and (b) by the resignation of the 14 territorially-elected Councillors. The CDN of the 7th October carried reports on several public meetings under the heading "The Country Roused," and dwelt particularly on the meetings held at Jaffna and Galle.

Then, Kumari Jayawardena has this to say of the Ceylon National Congress:

the interests of the middle class were considered to be paramount, with occasional gestures being made to the workers in terms of labor laws. But even on the question of labor, the Ceylon National Congress was lukewarm. It was Arunachalam's influence that directed Congress attention to labor problems at the 1919 sessions, but after his retirement from politics, such matters were dropped and the Congress leaders adopted a policy of open hostility to the new leaders of the working class who emerged in 1922 (p. 197).

She adds: "From 1923 until 1928, the lack of enthusiasm among the Congress leadership for labor and trade union matters was clearly evident" (p. 262). "Middle class" interests were certainly paramount within the Ceylon National Congress. The hostility of the moderate leaders to Goonesinha was probably due to their class interests (but could also be the reaction of front challengers to the prospect of another force, and one led by a man from the Hinna caste, joining them up-front rather than supporting them from behind).62 Nor is it entirely unreasonable to conjecture that Arunachalam (classed as a "radical") was responsible for the wide-ranging resolution on labour problems which was accepted at the first session (1919) of the Congress; but he does not appear to have been the sole motor force: the sub-committee which framed the resolution included C. H. Z. Fernando (relatively radical) and several moderates; 63 while the resolution was moved by a moderate, E. W. Jayewardene; and the speeches in its support constantly harped on the need to bring the island's labour laws into line with those of other countries and were particularly critical of the manner in which the Government of Cevlon and the (foreign) plantation owners treated their workers.64 In any event, labour questions were not jettisoned after Arunachalam's departure. A request that the Government should appoint a Commission to inquire into labour conditions and propose reforms was sponsored by the Ceylon Workers' Federation in March-April 1923. Several moderates associated themselves with Muttiah and Goonesinha at the 1927 sessions in sponsoring a resolution on minimum wages, maximum working hours and workmen's compensation. 65 While a comprehensive motion on the protection of Ceylonese labour was accepted by the annual sessions of the

^{62.} Thus Frederick Bowes had this to say of the 1923 strike: "There were two helpful factors—one that the high caste people and the politicians were not in sympathy with the strike—the fact that this low-caste agitator had come to the front irritated both classes alike..." ("Bows and Arrows," c. 1924-25, pp. 410-11). Bowes also refers to Goonesinha as an "unknown agitator" and "a clever low-caste scoundrel" (pp. 403-413). For the operation of caste prejudices and "high-caste" snobbery also see the book under review p. 236, the George E. de Silva MSS Memoirs (typescript available at the Peradeniya Campus Library, c. 1951-52), and P. V. J. Jayasekera, 1969, passim.

^{63.} The others present at the sub-committee meeting (19 Nov. 1919) were Sir P. Arunachalam, M. A. Arulanandan, E. T. de Silva, A. St. V. Jayewardene, E. J. Samerawickrame, and J. W. de Silva. At the subsequent Ex. Co. meetings which confirmed the various resolutions, besides those already named, Francis de Zoysa, James Peiris, F. R. Senanayake, H. A. P. Sandrasagara, D. R. Wijewardene, G. A. Wille, Armand de Souza, Dr. E. V. Ratnam, and D. B. Jayatilaka were present. See Minutes of the C.N.C. in DNA, Lanka, 60/39.

Ibid., and CDN, 17 December 1919. Among those (assigned) who spoke were C. H.
 Z. Fernando, H. J. C. Pereira, Peri Sunderam and Armand de Souza.

Handbook CNC, 1928, p. 899—a conscious reiteration of the 1919 resolution. G. K. W. Perera, A. S. Perera, Martinus C. Perera, Marshall Perera, and P. Givendrasinghe spoke in support.

Congress in 1931.⁶⁶ In brief, labouring conditions were a consistent, if secondary, theme of interest in the Congress platform from 1919 to the 1930's. One can hardly describe these measures as "occasional gestures." Nor is it insignificant that a young politician such as Susanta de Fonseka should in the State Council (in 1931) press for a factory act, a housing act and a workmen's compensation act on the grounds that "contented labour" was a "national asset" and that workmen were entitled to satisfaction on such essentials.⁶⁷

To make this point is not to deny that the moderates were less enthusiastic than Goonesinha in espousing the cause of labour. Their differing attitudes on the franchise is a case in point. Cursory references to labour problems in presidential speeches, such as E. W. Perera's reference in 1926 to labour problems as "other matters of moment which I have no time to touch upon" (quoted, p. 263), are more problematic pieces of evidence. Unlike today, the 1920's were part of an era in which political issues were considered more important than economic ones. As the author herself tells us, the "resolutions passed at the Trades Union Congress and the speeches made by Goonesinha and other officials at the sessions reflected a greater interest in political issues than in purely trade-union matters" (p. 278). Such an emphasis was also apposite and necessary. The Ceylonese political elite was engaged in the task of knocking at the doors of colonial power. This had to be essentially a political course. The Samasamajists recognised this in the 1930's as well:

In every colonial country the foremost question that confronts every oppressed section, including the working class, is the incidence of Imperialism. Consequently the political movement constantly tends to supersede the purely economic. This is also our concrete experience in Ceylon. Therefore the Party, while building the organs of working class economic action and providing their leadership, is at present compelled, in the particular context of Ceylon experience, to admit the unavoidably dominant importance of political struggle. 68

Other instances occur in the work under review of a devalorisation of the moderates, through acts of omission as well as commission. The Congress leaders are rightly criticised for their reluctance to propose an extension of the franchise. This attitude undoubtedly derived from their class interests—the fear that universal suffrage "might lead to an erosion of [their] positions of privilege" (p.265), though it may also have been due to some brainwashing in British-style schools and the ideological influences of British constitutional history and colonial theory with its emphasis on gradualism and the linking of education with the fitness to govern. Yet the readiness with which the

^{66.} DNA, Lanka, 60/89-90 and CDN, 19 Dec. 1931. The resolution was proposed by E. A. P. Wijeyeratne, seconded by A. W. H. Abeyesundere, and supported by S. Nissanka, B. Desabanda, George E. de Silva and G. K. Martin Silva.

^{67.} Hansard, State Council, 8 Oct. 1931, p. 545. De Fonseka contested the 1931 elections as an Independent and does not appear to have been a member of the Congress at this stage, though he was later.

From the presidential address of Dr. Colvin R. de Silva at the 2nd annual conference of the L.S.S. P., 18 Dec. 1937 in Colvin R. de Silva, Samaa Smajism Explained, Colombo: Luxman Press, 1939?, p. 18.

For aspects see Ali A. Mazrui, Towards a Pax Africana, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson: 1967, espe. pp. 7-8. Also note E. W. Jayewardene's and J. H. P. Wijayaratnam's remarks at Ceylon's First Congress of Literary Associations, Cofombo: W. E. Bastian & Co., 1914, pp. 24 & 66; and Handbook CNC, 1928, p. 686.

moderates accepted⁷⁰ the Donoughmore Commission's recommendation of universal adult franchise is mentioned without any emphasis (p. 267), while the subsequent pages more or less associate the Congress with the diehards and conservatives (such as Wille and Tambimuttu) who strongly opposed this recommendation. A more serious omission, however, is the author's failure to mention the vigorous stand taken by some moderates, and by the Ceylon National Congress in particular, in favour of the income tax during the period dating from the 1910's, and particularly in the years 1930-32. Indeed, she gives an entirely contrary impression: for reference is made to the "storm of protest from the wealthy" in 1930 against the proposal to introduce an income tax and to the fact that the Legislative Council deferred the matter till the first State Council met; and these actions are contrasted with the Labour Party's support for the proposal (p. 315). In fact, the demand for an income tax scheme had been pressed for by several moderate nationalists since the early twentieth century; and in asking for a Commission to examine the "inequitable" and "unsatisfactory" system of taxation by means of a resolution accepted at the first sessions of the Congress in 1919, the Congress leaders were pursuing the same goal. In presenting this resolution, James Peiris continuously emphasised the inequalities in the existing scheme of taxation and the fact that the "poorer classes" were overtaxed—providing two third's of the revenue according to his estimates. He also spoke of "the great injustice done to the people of the country by allowing outsiders to exploit its resources and carry away large sums out of the Colony without sharing the burden of taxation." And he unequivocally called for an income tax, presenting it as "a national demand" supported by several associations and "the public Press-at least the Ceylonese Portion of it."71 The Ceylon Daily News (16 December 1919) also devoted a separate editorial to the support of this motion. Throughout the discussion on the subject in the years 1919-32, those who supported the idea of an income tax saw it as a measure of inherent justice that the rich should "contribute something to provide for the bare necessities of the poor" and as a means by which they could tax the foreign (British and Indian) capitalist interests in Ceylon and siphon away some of these foreign profits for use within the island. 72 It was, in short, a thrust against the foreign rulers and their cohorts. But it had the potential to hurt the local bourgeoisie as well. So that a measure of indigenous opposition to the income tax proposal also arose. In combination with some European and Indian representatives, this opposition was able to defeat the income tax bill at its third reading in the Legislative Council on the 17th December 1930, thereby reversing the verdict of the second reading

^{70.} With provisos regarding the Indian immigrant labourers which led them to all manner of gerry-mandering proposals when the franchise issue was debated in the Legislative Council (see Hansard, Legis. Council, 1928, pp. 1923 ff). For earlier indications of their unwillingness to consider the Indians as permanent residents or Ceylonese, see D. S. Senanayake's dissent in an official report on immigration (Sessional Paper XII of 1926 and an attempt to amend a resolution on the franchise at the Congress sessions in December 1927 (Handbook CNC, 1928, pp. 900-01).

^{71.} CDN, 15 December 1919. The motion: "The Congress is of opinion that the present system of taxation is unsatisfactory and its incidence inequitable, and urges on the Government the appointment of a Commission to undertake a comprehensive revision of the taxation with a view to lighten the burden that falls heavily on the masses." It was seconded by Armand de Souza and supported, in Sinhalese, by Arthur V. Dias.

^{72.} CDN, 15 & 16 December 1919; Henry M. Oliver, 1957, pp. 15-16; Hansard, Legis. Council, N. H. M. Abdul Cader on the 15th July 1927, p. 1018; and State Council, 1931, pp. 444, 454-55, 546, 1350 ff. and 1414-21 among several examples (covering George E. de Silva, V. S. de S. Wikramanayake, D. S. Senanayake, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, etc.); and DNA, Lanka, 60/87-88 and 60/89-90. The quotation is from Susanta de Fonseka's speech in 1931.

and affirming an amendment accepted on the 9th December 1930 which postponed the application of the bill. What is significant about this struggle is the corrective it supplies to Kumari Jayawardena's brief commentary. At the crucial vote on the 17th December 1930 most (five) of the Congressmen, with two exceptions (A. C. G. Wijeyekoon and D. H. Kotalawala), voted for the motion; and among those who voted against were the ex-radicals and "radicals," K. Natesa Aiyar, C. H. Z. Fernando and C. E. Victor Corea. 73 The Labour Party's vociferous and hostile reaction to these decisions was matched by that of the Ceylon National Congress; and the annual sessions of the Congress in December 1930 were marked by a verbal clash with some intruders who spoke for the local and foreign interests hostile to the income tax; while several Congress speakers implied that evil machinations and a conspiracy had been responsible for the adverse vote in the Legislative Council.74 This verdict was quickly overcome by the new State Council, however, and an incometax scheme became law in 1932. If, therefore, the income tax proposal was opposed by some "moderates" (especially from the minority communities and those in the Liberal League), it was backed by other moderates, and particularly by the Congress leadership. Nor is it insignificant that, in the eyes of the latter, it was an expression of economic nationalism and distributive justice.

On some occasions, therefore, the moderates have been treated shoddily. To this degree one finds glimpses in this book of what one can describe as "celluloid history," with the moderates cast in the role of the "baddies."

Nevertheless, Kumari Jayawardena highlights (pp. 73-79, 88-90, 256-57, 261 ff., and 364-65) some important attitudinal contrasts between the radicals and the moderates. To my mind the most valid and outstanding differences were (1) in the type of trade unionism they were ready to support; (2) in their political methods and political style; (3) possibly in the depth of concern for the masses; (4) possibly in the sources of their foreign ideological inspiration; and (5) certainly in their attitudes to the franchise question (pre 1928). These contrasts, of course, were interrelated and overlapping. To this list, one can add the observation that most of the radicals seem to have suffered from some social disability or were apostates or mavericks by individual temperament. Comparisons are difficult, however, because the radicals were a mere handful:

^{73.} Hansard, Legis. Council, 17 Dec. 1930, p. 2250. Strangely, among those who voted against were H. R. Freeman, K. Balasingham, N. H. M. Abdul Cader and A. Mahadeva. Equally surprising are Wille's and Tambimuttu's votes for. The rest of the votes in favour of the income tax were those of the 13 officials and 5 Congress stalwarts. Among those who voted against were the former Congressmen, E. W. Perera and T. B. Jayah. At the earlier division on the proposal to postpone the date on which the bill was to be implemented (23 for, 22 against), Freeman joined the officials and the Congressmen (six, A. F. Molamure being present on this occasion) in voting against.

^{74.} DNA, Lanka, 60/87-88, and 60/89-90; CDN, 15 December 1930 and 19 December. 1931; Hansard, State Council 8-9 Dec. 1931 espe. Bandaranaike's speech, p. 1363. According to C. W. W. Kannangara, the individuals who let them down were Wijeye-koon, Natesa Aiyar and Subramaniam, while he and D. S. Senanayake had to exert themselves to prevent others "being got at" (DNA, Lanka 60/88). Wijeyekoon and D. H. Kotalawala were specially castigated for the way in which they cast their votes.

^{75.} This is, of course, difficult to appraise.

^{76.} Dharmapala had a game leg, i.e. he was a nondiya (a word which, in its derisiveness, captures the social pressures one faces as a result). Goonesinha and George E. de Silva faced social disabilities from their caste origins. As the author notes, Lisboa Pinto and A. E. Buultjens were rebels against the religion of their birth or the established religious order. Valentine Perera (brother of Fr. S. G. Perera) was also an anti-Catholic 'Catholic.' Speculations and slurs were cast on Dr. S. Muttiah's parentage (personally communicated by Mr. James T. Rutnam).

and the moderates many. There were several shades and permutations of opinion among the latter and it is all too easy to reach invalid generalisations on the basis of opinions expressed by one or two.

Three of the distinctions made by the author are difficult to sustain. It is difficult to maintain that "the radicals were exclusively from the professions" and that many came from "lower middle-class backgrounds" (p. 74; also pp. xiii and 260). Dharmapala emerged from a merchant capitalist family which also developed plantation and property interests; C. E. Victor Corea and C. H. Z. Fernando came from families with plantation interests and continued to interest themselves in such investments after becoming lawyers; the latter was also an active member of the Low Country Products Association from the 1910's and became its President in 1930; while Dr. S. Muttiah (b. 1889) and Dr. E. V. Ratnam (b. 1876) seem to have been wealthy professionals by the late 1920's.77 Nor can it be maintained that the radicals alone were concerned about the denationalisation of the western-educated (pp. 75-77) and that they identified themselves with the indigenous culture and religion in a manner which differed from the moderates (implied on pp. 74-75). The comments by several moderates on the theme of denationalisation78 as well as the activities of the Cevlon Social Reform Society (1905-c. 1910) and the Total Abstinence Central Union79 indicate that some moderates displayed similar interests.

Nor can it be argued that their political objectives were different; for without providing any substantiation, the author contends that the radicals. demanded "immediate home rule" or "complete self-government" (her words), while the moderates merely wanted "a greater measure of responsible government" (pp. 193 and 364). This is an important issue. The evidence, however, does not support such a conclusion, particularly in relation to the crucial period after 1920. To take one radical: as late as 1922 the Anagarika Dharmapala was stating that their "goal" should be "self-Government and Home Rule under British protection." To take the moderates: it is true that in 1917 the Ceylon Reform League cautiously defined its objective in terms of a more "effective share" in the Government for the people of Ceylon;81 and the author may have followed a fashionable route in seizing upon such evidence and that provided by James Peiris's memorial in 1909 to illustrate how limited the aims of the moderates and the Congress leadership were, thereby branding the moderates of the 1920's with statements made much earlier. 82 Yet by 1919 the goal was redefined as that of seeking for the people of Ceylon "responsible Government and the status of a self-governing member of the British Empire." while the annual conferences of the Congress in 1926 and 1927 made "full

^{77.} For some data see Sampson Abeyesooriya (comp.) Who's Who, 3rd edn., 1928, pp. 69-70, 136 & 169. C. H. Z. Fernando had at least 4 plantations covering 600 acres (in sum) in 1927 (Ceylon Directory for 1927) and had married the eldest daughter of H. Bastian Fernando, a leading landowner and merchant.

^{78.} See essays in the Ceylon National Review from 1906-1910, especially those by A. K. Coomaraswamy, W. A. de Silva and Mudaliyar A. Dissanaike. Also see E. T. de Silva, "The 'Nationalist Programme," Ceylon National Monthly, December 1917, vol. V 2, pp. 29-30.

^{79.} See aims of the CSRS as appended to the *Ceylon National Review* and also its annual report for 1905-06 in *ibid.*, vol. 2, July 1906, pp. 5-7; and also *ibid.*, vol. 4, July 1907, pp. 92-93, and P. T. M. Fernando, 1971.

^{80.} A. Guruge (ed.), Return to Righteousness, Colombo: 1965, p. 511.

^{81.} Handbook CNC, 1928, p. 98.

^{82.} This is a deduction because the author does not indicate, either in her book or in one of her essays (1971, pp. 197-200), the sources from which she derived her conclusions on this point.

responsible Self-Government' their principle demand. This formulation of their ultimate political goal was no different from the full self-government sought in 1926 by the Progressive Nationalist Party, an association which the author describes as a radical body (p. 256). Nor does it differ from that of another mushroom association, the Young Nationalists' League, which assembled at some stage in 1926 and decided that the attainment of "full responsible government" should be one of its aims. In this connection it is important to remember that the term "responsible government" was commonly understood to mean the status achieved by such states as Canada, Australia and Ireland—a status known and seen to be that of independent nationhood and political sovereignty. "Responsible government" was also, not uncommonly, equated with "swaraj." Indeed, the speeches of moderate Congressmen are replete with references to the goal of swaraj. And as C. W. W. Kannangara observed in 1929:

[from] the earliest days of the Ceylon National Congress, its sole and ultimate object was the attainment of Swaraj as soon as possible... Swaraj meant becoming masters in their own house...They need not be afraid of using the word "Swaraj." Let them call it Full Responsible Government or Self-Government. It was the same. 86

The interchanging of these slogans seems to have been a widespread practice, though some activists were beginning to see distinctions between "swaraj" and "responsible government" by the late 1920's. In 1928, for instance, C. E. C. Bulathsinhala differentiated between the two and demanded "complete Swaraj" on the basis of "the right for self-determination;" by the achieved no prominence as a radical and can probably be treated as a second-rung Congressman of moderate political leanings. The fact remains that there was considerable woolliness and variation in the contemporary interpretations of political goals and political structures. Nor should it be forgotten that the Indian National Congress, a favourite reference model, did not define the term "swaraj" as "Complete Independence for India" till December 1929; before that, one had even found references to "Swaraj within the Empire."

83. *Handbook CNC*, 1928, pp. 774 & 899. The phraseology in 1927 was "full responsible government," Also see pp. 627-32 (1924) & 692-93 (1925).

84. From handwritten report in the possession of Mr. James T. Rutnam. The President was James T. Rutnam, Secretary: Raja Ratnam, and Vice-Presidents: Bertie Karunaratne and J. D. Dharmasena. The last-named was also a member of the Ceylon Labour Union in the mid-1920's and Karunaratne seems to have been President of the Printers' Union of Ceylon in 1927 (Handbook CNC, 1928, pp. 722 & 780).

For the period 1923-27, see Handbook CNC, 1928, pp. 515, 595, 627, 632, 656, 681, 710 711, and Ceylon Morning Leader, 13 March 1923 (Francis de Zoysa) and CDN, 1 October 1923 (M. A. Arulanandan).

For the period 1929-32, see DNA, Lanka, 60/87-90 & 60/92, Times of Ceylon, 21 Dec. 1929 and CDN, 16 May 1932.

Such evidences must be used as a corrective to a statement by E. F. C. Ludowyk (1966, p. 160) to the effect that Congress had resolutely rejected "the minority which bandied about expressions like 'independence' and 'Swarai.'"

86. CDN, 23 December 1929.

87. The Swarajist, 13 April 1928 (inaugural issue). His second number (28 April 1928) also carried a message from S. Satyamurti, "the Indian Swarajist leader."

88. C. E. C. Bulathsinhala (circa 1882-1972) was from Kotte. He is best known as an astrologer and soothsayer but was also a member of the Executive Committee of the Ceylon National Congress in 1927, 1931 and 1932 (no data for 1928-30) as a repesentative of the Slave Island branch of the Colombo Vehiclemen's Union.

 See C. H. Philips (ed.), The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1858 to 1947 Select Documents, O.U.P., 1962, pp. 228 & 237-38; Ceylon Morning Leader, 29 Dec. 1924; and Judith Brown, "Reply to D. Baker's Review," South Asia, no. 3, August 1973, p. 140. One must, therefore, pay meticulous attention to the contemporary perceptions, in all their confusions and variations, in analysing the political declarations and incantations and the political symbolism of the period. This task requires, among other things, a study of British constitutional history and the process by which power was devolved in the white dominions, with specific attention to the terminology which these processes spawned. Without such tools and without such methods, the danger is ever-present of reading present-day notions into the vocabulary of the early twentieth century.

The reasons for these shortcomings in the author's presentation of the moderates are not for to seek. In part it is a case of the heart ruling the head. 91 In part it stems from the nature of the book under review: being a history of the working class movement, the author's familiarity with the literature produced by the trade union leaders and the radicals would naturally have been greater than her knowledge of the literature emanating from the moderates. Since there were more activists in the moderate camp, the literature they produced has also been more voluminous. The very scale of the source material presents problems for all historians and makes comprehensive coverage difficult. 92 Finally, the author's limited familiarity with the articulations and activities of the moderates seems to have been compounded by inattention to the contemporary perceptions and images in the political vocabulary that was commonly in use.

VI

Backcloth: the Social Framework

Kumari Jayawardena uses the class concept to depict the social structure which serves as a backcloth to her study. Her basic division is between the "middle class" and the "working class." Her concept of the middle class is novel and differs from the popular and widespread conceptualisation which views them as the indigenous educated and indigenous rich who challenged the colonial rulers. Following the Marxist scheme of placing all those who command certain factors of production in one social category and on the argument that the British and Ceylonese capitalists had "clearly demarcated" arenas of influence and therefore did not come into "serious conflict," both the Ceylonese and British elites are placed in one social category: the "middle class." 93 Yet,

^{90.} For which, see K. C. Wheare, *The Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status*, 5th edn., O.U.P., 1953; R. M. Dawson, 1937; Nicholas Mansergh, 1969.


^{91.} Elsewhere, too, a clear indication of such partialities is provided by her astounding statements that (i) "By 1931, the Ceylon bourgeoisie had achieved its main demands for franchise and political representation" and that (ii) the "leaders of the Ceylon National Congress, turned to collaboration with the imperialists (and) acquiesced in the Donoughmore reforms, enthusiastically participated in the 1931 elections and accepted Ministries in the new legislature" (see "The Origins of the Left Movement in Sri Lanka," 1971, p. 200). For evidence against, see E. F. C. Ludowyk, 1966, pp. 169-71; K. M. de Silva, U. C., History of Ceylon volume III, pp. 502-504; the report on the special sessions of the Congress (14th May 1932) in the CDN, 16 May 1932; Hansard, State Council, February 1932 onwards, espe. pp. 568, 1494 ff.; reports on the annual sessions of the Congress, 1931-33 in the December issue of the newspapers; DNA Lanka, 60/148 & 183; and C. O. 54/916/14264, espe. the Memo from the Board of Ministers dated April 1933.

^{92.} This article does not claim a comprehensive coverage. More penetrating research will produce corrections and embellishments.

^{93.} See pp. xiv & 73. This argument is repeated in V. Kumari Jayawardena, 1971, p. 199; in this essay, her conceptualisation is in terms of the "Ceylonese bourgeoisie" rather than the "Ceylonese middle class;" in contrast to her book she refers to the "conflict on land questions" between the British and the "local bourgeoisie," but observes that this issue had been resolved by 1930; and in further contrast to some of the statements in her book (eg: pp. ix, xiii, & 73), she also refers to the "absence locally of industrial or mercantile capitalists" (p. 200, emphasis added).

having lumped these elements together, they are immediately separated: for this social formation is then sub-divided into the British and Ceylonese "sections;" the latter in turn is sub-divided into the "traditional" and "modern" segments -or "elite groups" or "strata" as they are sometimes referred to (pp. ix, xii-xiv, 66, 70-75, and 359-60). The social framework as a whole therefore turns out as follows:

Figure I



This social background, however, is at times (especially pp. 3-4 and 112-13) marred by descriptions which reflect another scheme and which refer to a "lower middle class" in a manner which is discordant with the picture depicted in the diagram.94 More serious issues are raised, however, by the coupling of British and Ceylonese elites in one social grouping and by the use of the conceptualisation of modernity and tradition as polar types in order to distinguish sub-groupings.

The author, it appears, has a picture of the island economy that is rigidly dualistic. This cannot be sustained.95 Nor can one accept the contention that there was a "relatively harmonious pattern of relationships" between the British and Ceylonese capitalists (pp. xiv and 73). Attention must not be paid solely to one side of the coin: the prevalence of common interests. The other side of the coin, the areas of economic conflict, must also be taken into consideration. That such conflict was not as sharp as the corresponding struggle in India96 does not mean that it was non-existent or that the economic fields

^{94.} For elaboration, see Roberts, "A New Marriage, An Old Dichotomy," 1975.

^{95.} See Roberts, "Aspects of Ceylon's Agrarian Economy in the Nineteenth Century," 1973, pp. 162-64; and B. H. Farmer, "Peasant and Plantation," 1963, pp. 9-12. For the attitudes revealed by the Ceylonese elite see *supra*, pp. 197-201; Henry M. Oliver Jnr., 1957; and Roberts, "A New Marriage, An Old Dichotomy," 1975.

^{96.} As so commonly stressed and as I have recognised in "Reformism," 1974a, pp. 15-18.

of activity were strictly demarcated. Besides, there was an important field of friction in the racial arrogance of the British and the racial discrimination in recruitment and staffing policies in the administrative services. Such actions and policies involved questions of national honour and self-respect, besides generating economic constraints for the educated Ceylonese.⁹⁷

Even if one allows for a blurred border zone between the "modern elite group' and the "traditional elite group," the author's definitions of the two categories leave room for confusion. The Kandyan radala aristocracy of the early twentieth century could be fitted into her traditionals as well as the conservative wing of her moderns. The vernacular literati in urban centres, a social force of some political significance, are missing. But the most questionable feature is the alleged modernism of the western-educated, urbanised modern elite group and the extent to which the modern moderates could be said to have "developed capitalist attitudes which are typical of a nascent bourgeoisie which reinvests rather than consumes the economic surplus" (pp. 359-60 and xiii). The author's dichotomy between the traditional and the modern does not pay adequate attention to the persistence of traditional values and traditional practices mutatis mutandis at all levels of the indigenous society. Primordial attachments to one's ethnic group, casteism, a resort to astrology and sorcery, such features continued to prevail among the Western-educated as well. Above all, merchants and capitalists, lawyers and plantation owners, the so-called moderns and the so-called traditionals, were all influenced in lesser or greater degree by an "ideology of status." These practices and norms converted the Western-educated as well as the businessmen into hybrid types. They transcended modernity and tradition; and in this sense were mongrels or amphibians.99

It is a matter for future investigation as to whether this hybrid pedigree and the resultant amalgams left their mark on the manner in which trade unions and British parliamentary institutions functioned in Ceylon during the twentieth century.

VII

These criticisms notwithstanding, The Rise of the Labor Movement in Ceylon remains an important work which does much to clarify certain aspects of the island's political development. It lives up to its claim and provides us with an understanding of a previously neglected field of our history. Its particular strength lies in its graphic explanation of the evolving forces and factors which encouraged a section of the manual work force in Colombo to involve themselves in political protest and trade unionism during the period under review.

^{97.} For elaboration of these arguments see Roberts, "A New Marriage, An Old Dichotomy" 1975.

^{98.} See Gananath Obeyesekere, 1967, chapter 9 and Roberts, "A New Marriage, An Old Dichotomy," 1975.

^{99.} See Roberts, ibid. However, the nature of the amalgam needs greater probing in depth. As Richard G. Fox notes in his perceptive criticism of the thesis presented by the Rudolphs, it is not sufficient to speak of the persistence of "traditional features;" one needs greater specificity; one needs to know whether the traditional adaptation is at the level of structure, function, or ideology. See Fox, 1970; and also Fox, 1967.

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BOOK REVIEWS

MENDIS ROHANADEERA: Sri Lankayê Sangha Samvidhanaya (Madhya Kalina Yugaya) Sangha Organisation in Sri Lanka (From the invasion of Māgha up to the arrival of the Portuguese, 1215 A.D.-1505 A.D.), Gangodavila: Dipani Press, 1974.

This book (in Sinhala), according to the author, is based on a doctoral thesis presented to the Vidyodaya University of Ceylon and was done under the supervision of Professor Hema Ellawala. Here, it may not be out of place to mention the fact that Mr. Rohandeera worked for a spell under the supervision of R. A. L. H. Gunawardana of the Peradeniya University and it is perhaps during this time that he had the privilege of consulting the unpublished doctoral dissertation by Gunawardana on the "History of the Sangha in Ceylon from the reign of Sena I to the invasion of Māgha (833 A.D.—1215 A.D.)".

The contents are divided into four chapters. The first is on the sources utilised by the author, while the second and the third chapters attempt to give the history of Buddhism during the period 1215 to 1505 A.D. and the fourth, consisting of 72 pages, deals with the organisation of the Sangha. To my mind, the title of the book, "The Sangha Organisation in Sri Lanka," is a misnomer for only one out of four chapters and 72 out of 256 pages deal directly with this topic.

As acknowledged by the author, the chapter on 'Sources' leans heavily on the findings of Amaradasa Liyanagamage in "The Decline of Polonnaruwa and the Rise of Dambadeniya," However, one misses the critical skill of Liyanagamage. The historical evaluation of these sources is not Rohanadeera's main concern, his major pre-occupation being the working out of exact dates for the books in question. This no doubt is useful, but does not compensate for the absence of an appraisal of their usefulness as historical sources. This chapter is not without its merits. There is a useful comparison of the Dambadeni Katikāvata with the Katikāvata of Parākramabāhu I. Rohanadeera's comments on the Pūjāvaliya are most interesting and here he makes a very real contribution. He succeeds in establishing the point that by and large the accounts of Viyjayabāhu III and Parākramabāhu II in the Cūlavamsa are straight translations of the Pūjāvaliya into Pali and convincingly argues against the theory of a common source for these two texts. He points out that the process of documentation can be seen in the Pūjāvaliya itself and argues that a scholar such as the author of the Pūjāvaliya would not have adopted verbatim a section from an original source, which would no doubt have been in Sinhala.

The two chapters on the history of Buddhism have little to commend in them. There is not much that is new and in no way do they add to our knowledge of the state of Buddhism during the period in question beyond what can be gathered from the University History of Ceylon and the work of Liyanagamage. In fact Rohanadeera's work lacks the historical perspective of the earlier texts. He gets so involved in detail that he misses looking at prob-lems in their totality and leaves his readers entangled in a bewildering array of names and dates. Fixing dates and identifying names seem to be his speciality.

The last chapter dealing with the organisation of the Sangha is the most important section of the book, but having read through the thesis of R.A.L.H. Gunawadana (this is now in Press), much of Rohanadeera's effort seem to be an almost complete waste of time. He starts off by giving the titles of the Sangha hierarchy, headed by the Sangharāja or Mahāsāmi, but immediately divests himself of the responsibility of discussing this institution on the plea that he has had to devote a separate book for it. To leave out any discussion on the institutional head of the Sangha community in a book entitled "The Sangha Organisation in Sri Larka"is, to say the least, a strange omission. This topic has been dealt with at some length in Gunawardana's thesis. The evolution of the monastic institutions known as $m\bar{u}la$ is the main problem dealt with by Rohandeera in this chapter. This has been tackled with much greater erudition by Gunawardana and Rohanadeera cannot make a claim to much originality. In one instance, however, he offers something new where he tries to explain the terms mūlāyatana and mūla-vihāra.

That the history of Buddhism up to the tenth century A.D. has been worked out by E.W. Adikaram and Walpola Rahula and that the history of the Buddhist Sangha from the tenth century to 1215 A. D. forms the topic of a thesis done by R. A. L. H. Gunawardana are Rohanadeera's rationale for his choice of subject, "Sangha Organisation in Sri Lanka (1215-1505.") This book, however, is no grand finale to the history of Buddhism of the period prior to the arrival of the Europeans in Ceylon. The two chapters on the history of Buddhism are

very weak and the chapter on the organisation of the Sangha ignores many important aspects of this topic. One would have expected that problems such as monastic property and its administration, the relations between the State and Sangha, and the relations between the Sangha and the laity would have found their due place. These topics have been completely ignored, leaving a huge gap for some future historian. In fact, there is ample scope for a fresh look at the evidence relating to the history of Buddhism during this period.

Appended to the book is a useful bibliography. The index is extremely poor and serves little purpose. The printing and binding leave much to be desired. Many printing errors are noticed in the English words, even the title page is not free of them, A.D. being printed as D.A. The copy of the book sent for review has been erroneously bound; pages 81-112 are missing and pages 113-128 are duplicated.

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C. R. DE SILVA: The Portuguese in Ceylon 1617-1638, Colombo H. W. Cave & Co., 1972, viii, 267 pp. (bibliography and index inclusive) No price indicated.

This is a revised version of a thesis presented for the Ph.D. Degree of the University of London and as such a certain high level of scholarship can be expected. An examination of the work fully justifies such expectations. It forms a valuable sequel to another London University thesis entitled Portuguese Rule in Ceylon 1594-1612 (published in Colombo, 1966) by Tikiri Abeysinghe.

The work consists of eight chapters inclusive of an introductory chapter and a conclusion. Three chapters deal with events and developments between 1617 and 1638 in a chronological order, three others consider the Administrative Structure, Revenue and Expenditure, and Religion. There is in addition a Bibliography, which contains inter alia helpful comments on the primary authorities, and a fairly extensive index. The absence of a Glossary would, however, be keenly felt by any reader who has no special knowledge of the field of study. In this situation it would have been helpful if words such as "xerafim" and "arroba" were also included in the index so that the reader could more easily get at the pages where elucidations of such terms are given.

Whilst one is impressed by the meticulous attention in this work to historical detail, one cannot help being disappointed by the rather inadequate proof-reading. The consequences are sometimes serious, as for instance when a footnote is misplaced (p. 232 n 198) or completely lost (p. 235 n 209). A shortcoming of a different nature is that a fair amount of material, which on account of their nature and importance should have been incorporated into the text, has gone into footnotes (e.g. part of footnotes 49 and 51 p. 168, footnote 96 p. 181, footnote 29 p. 242). Nor can one see the justification for referring the reader to two whole chapters for the simple statement that during twenty-one years the Portuguese received 38 elephants as tribute from Kandy (p. 203). A more serious lapse is the decision in the chapter on Revenue and Expenditure to omit certain items from consideration on the ground that they have been "adequately discussed in other works" (p. 170). It is pertinent also to point to an element of confusion in the revenue and expenditure accounts (which seems to have been taken over unnoticed from the Portuguese accounting system itelf). On the income side, the cost of packing of cinnamon has been deducted from the total revenue derived from that commodity, thus suggesting a net income (pp. 227-228); but under the accounts for the fixed annual expenditure the cost of packing cinnamon has once again been entered (p. 231.)

We may now turn to a consideration of some of the broad themes and conclusions in this work. The author points out that though the period under review has been generally accepted as one of decline in Portuguese fortunes throughout the world, in Sri Lanka itself there was a substantial increase of Portuguese power. Though not quite a new revelation the author does bring this point out more clearly than before. The claim that during this period the Portuguese evolved more efficient methods of maximising their revenue has to be toned down somewhat by noting that the increase in revenues was largely the result of an increase in the price assigned to cinnamon, contrived by the Conde de Linhares, the Viceroy at Goa, and not due to any improvements effected in the island.

The changes made by the Portuguese in the economic system of the country do not appear to be as significant and important as is claimed by the author. Even if the principal revenue of the Portuguese administration came from cinnamon that did not imply any significant change in the traditional organisation of land. It is incorrect also to state that a state monopoly of the import trade in cinnamon was first established by the Portuguese as it appears to have existed under the Sinhala rulers. Similarly state trading in arecanut and a system of

state purchase of that commodity were undoubtedly anterior to the Portuguese. Portuguese activities certainly did temporarily disrupt, dislocate and in some respects pervert traditional economic arrangements, but the system in its essentials survived those vicissitudes. The claims on behalf of changes in the social sphere appear to be only less exaggerated. The movement of refugees from one region to another did not "deal a severe blow to the bonds of traditional society" if what one is thinking of is the structure of traditional society as a whole and not the dislocation of individual relationships at the time. With regard to the concepts of monogamy and sanctity of marriage referred to, the impact of the later Dutch rule appears to have been the more significant factor.

It should be noted that the above criticisms largely relate to the interpretations attempted in the last few pages of the work. The rest of the work provides a very comprehensive account of the political, military, administrative and, to a lesser extent, of the economic and social activities and developments connected with Portuguese rule during this period. There are many historical revisions of varying degrees of significance. Information given by Portuguese chroniclers and conclusions reached by them as well as by more modern writers such as Paul E. Pieris and the Rev. S. G. Perera are at times confirmed or elaborated on, and at times modified or completely revised. One of the most interesting facts that emerge from Dr. de Silva's monograph is the extent to which the Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon by Fernão de Queyroz provides valuable data on the period. The author has also taken special pains to set Portuguese activities in the island in their proper context, taking into account not only local developments and factors, but also those in India and Asia Portuguesa as a whole, as well as those in Europe. By way of conclusion one could say that by and large the work constitutes the most solid and scholarly contribution on the particular period hitherto published and will remain the standard work so long perhaps as no considerable body of new material is discovered and utilised by another scholar.

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Lucy Jacob: Sri Lanka, from Dominion to Republic, Delhi: National Publishing House 1973, pp. 247, Price Rs. 35-00

Though it has attracted the attention of both parliamentarians and political parties in the past twenty years, Sri Lanka's foreign policy has not been subject to academic examination. The reason perhaps derives from the heavy orientation towards the study of constitutions in the Political Science research at the Universities. The more important reason, however, has been the absence of a national interest in foreign policy research in the first decade after independence. The regimes which came to power in the period between 1947 to 1956 expressed their commitments to a foreign policy, the corner-stone of which was the continuation of the Island's conventional relations with Britain and her Dominions. This was certainly a malformation in the arena of our foreign policy, and it displayed characteristics of isolationssm—which in fact meant that the young nation was isolated from the socialist world. This aspect of our foreign relations, in particular, conditioned the attitudes and postures of the foreign policy of Sri Lanka in the first decade after independence.

Lucy M. Jacob. like myself, is alive to the failure on the part of scholars to examine the subject of the Island's foreign relations. She, therefore, says in her preface that "the non-availability of a comprehensive work on the subject prompted me to undertake the present study" (p. vii). In the course of her assessment of the foreign policy of Sri Lanka in terms of her relations with the United Kingdom, Jacob makes a special effort to analyse the motivations which underlined the Island's foreign relations with the United Kingdom. Her seven chapters—in addition to the equally important seven appendices—attempt to explain and analyse the issues in terms of their bearing on various aspects of Sri Lanka-United Kingdom relations. Because of the periods and the subjects which they cover, chapters two and three stand prominent; it is in these chapters that the whole theme—the concept of change expounded in the sub-title of the book—is to be seen. This section, therefore, merits special attention.

Though they examine the issues of the Island's foreign policy from the point of view of the political colouration of the particular regimes, these two chapters contain ideas analysed from the position of domestic compulsions. The defence agreements, which became the crucial issue of foreign policy of this period, have been closely examined. In her attempt to explain their key-role in this special relation with the United Kingdom, Jacob discusses them in terms of arguments both for and against these agreements (pp. 23-30). The reasons which influenced D. S. Senanayake and his Government to maintain closer links with the Commonwealth have been examined in order to project the theory that both colonial tradition and

constitutional status gave birth to a foreign policy, the key-stone of which was "one of sympathy for the United Kingdom" (p. 35). It was this sympathy which, in my point of view, generated "antipathy" towards the countries of the socialist bloc. The anti-socialist foreign policy postures adopted by the regimes of D. S. Senanayake and his heirs (and that of his nephew in particular) are well-known. Some of these policies were projected in the name of a "middle-way" (p. 42). Quoting copiously from documents and pronouncements devised by those responsible for these anti-socialist postures, Jacob discusses the attitude of regimes of the period to such international issues as the Korean war, Indo-China war and SEATO. Kotalawela's inclination to join SEATO has been succintly described and Jacob, displaying yet another admirable aspect of her book, does not fail to assess the impact of domestic forces which militated against the execution of this idea.

Though it became no campaign issue in 1956, the foreign policy of the United National Party had its impact on the political change of 1956. The year 1956, here in this context, is singly important for its role in the emergence of a new phase in the Island's foreign policy. In addition to its new vistas, it produced the basic characteristics relating to the birth of non-alignment and a global outlook in the Island's foreign policy. The establishment of diplomatic relations with socialist countries was in fact the most important achievement of this period. Its impact however has not been subject to adequate treatment in her book. While examining the general impact of the post 1956 policy, Jacob does not fail to emphasise the Island's relations with the United Kingdom. Three issues—the withdrawal of bases, the establishment of a Republic and the nationalisation of some foreign-owned interests—have been used to explain this aspect of the change in relations with the United Kingdom. The nationalisation of some foreign-owned interests, Jacob sees as a point in an anti-West policy; but here she fails to analyse the impact of "demestic compulsions."

The chapters four and five deal with economic and cultural relations between Sii Lanka and the U.K., and they are replete with factual data relating to economic and trade relations. Education has been chosen as a special area of co-operation to discuss the nature of cultural relations between the two countries. The postscript, which has been written with a view to up-date the book, is an inadequate addition because no attempt has been made to discuss fully the significance of the electoral overturns of 1965 and 1970. This, in my point of view is necessary to justify the title—"From Dominion to Republic."

Jacob's work on the whole is an important contribution to the study of foreign relations of Sri Lanka, and above all, it has come out in the context of an awakening interest in the study of foreign relations in Sri Lanka. It is, therefore, certain that the issues raised in Lucy Jacob's study will generate both discussion and comment.

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