THE TEMPORAL
AND SPIRITUAL
CONQUEST OF
CEYLON

FERNAO DE QUEYROZ

TRANSLATED FROM PORTUGUESE BY
S.G. PERERA

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OF THE
CONQUEST OF CEYLON

CHAPTER 1.

P 662 BEGINNINGS OF THE HOLLANDER CONQUEST IN CEYLON, F 339
THE LOSS OF BATECALOU, THE ATTACK ON GALE,
THE RECOVERY OF MALVANA, AND THE FLIGHT OF
THE KING OF CANDEA FROM RUANELA

If hitherto we have had in Ceylon a long and internal war with the variety of successes we have related, which lasted a whole century to the destruction and ruin of both the Portuguese and Chingalā nations, though with very unequal conditions, because the Portuguese were few in number and because our reinforcements had to come from Portugal which is at a great distance and was almost always distracted by other wars and expeditions, from this time forth up to the time when this Island was completely lost, there was seen nothing but bloodshed among the three nations that combatted therein, the Portuguese, the Hollander, and the Chingalā nations; and though our forces were insufficient at the time we are treating of to overcome the native enemy, we were compelled to divide these [forces] against the Chingalāz and the Hollander who had gained such ascendancy and power in these seas that he was able at one and the same time to make war on us in Goa, Ceylon, Malāca, and in all other parts wherein he could do us injury, with a hatred as deadly as if this conquest had been his by right, or as if the Portuguese nation had ever invaded his home; for this is the nation from which we received most injury outside Portugal in the other three parts of the world, for no other reason than that of might and self-interest.

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and merely to see themselves lords of the seas and lands
which we had discovered and of a conquest which our sword had rendered easy for them. For when they came into these seas, there were no pirates in them to make any considerable opposition, and the Kings, who formerly dominated them, were almost all so worn out and consumed by our arms that they were only able to use them to wreak their Vengeance by giving them favour and protection in all the wars they waged against us; in which matter they left no stone unturned to prejudice the Catholic Faith and the Portuguese dominion under the shadow of which it was successfully spread in those distant regions, divided into such a large number of Kingdoms and Monarchies. They persuaded these nations by means of the misleading examples of the new world and by showing them in the maps, that we first entered [a country] with the Faith in order to get possession of it afterwards by means of arms, an expedient whereby they did more harm to the Catholic Church than to Portugal, not only because of what they wrested from her and perverted, but much more because of what they diverted, and which was the complement of the persecution in Japan and the extinction of Portuguese trade from its ports, as they admitted in the reply which they gave to the Ambassador of D. João IV., King of Portugal, the principal author of these deceptions being Francisco Caron, a double traitor, to God and to his nation, who came by his end on the rocks of the bar of Lisbon and, as they say with good reason, lost as a heretic the one and the other life within sight of the crown which he most perfidiously insulted.

And whoever considers that this war against the Batavians was at the cost of Portuguese blood only, and that in the field encounters the loss was never in keeping with the forces with which we combatted, but was ever to their or our total destruction and ruin, will see that to the soldiers this was the most terrible war which human gallantry ever sustained; and if the force with which Holland contended with the Portuguese had not been so large and overwhelming, and if she had had justice and reason on her side, she could have made a greater display of the victories which her rebellion, industry, discipline, power, and valour had achieved. In Europe we have often seen royal armies defeated with the loss of four or five thousand men, and often with less, but in the encounters of Ceylon the number of the vanquished who outlived the battle was very small, and on account of the inequality of forces, they became so desperate in their resolution that valour exceeded the bounds of discretion and degenerated into rash precipitancy, heedless of any saner doctrine than that of desperate casing [viz.], to Kill and Die; thus staking everything in one bold resolve for lack of forces and often of discipline, for the hand accustomed to fight Asiatics never learnt to adopt the right methods of fighting with the Europeans, and relying on offensive methods for victory, our militia never became accustomed in this war to use defensive arms which the Flemings ever made use of against the rigour of our sword.

At this time D. Antonia Mascarenhas received intelligence that the Hollander had come on the invitation of the Chingalá and was in Batacalo, for at the end of the Spring of this year of [1638] three ships set out from this bar of Goa and, reaching that port, sent word to the King of Candeia, who, finding himself victorious, at once hastened to come down in person on that praça erected to keep off the natives from that port rather than to sustain European batteries. Then came five other ships, and that small garrison found itself besieged by the two nations without any hope of reinforcement. The Hollander mounted batteries on land, and though the praça was not capable of resistance, the captain Manoel Pinto, a casado of Colombo, resisted for many days till driven by the destruction and damage he had received, he surrendered conditionally and was landed at Negapatam along with those who survived.

To impede reinforcements and to divert the Portuguese, the Candiot King ordered 4000 archers of Talampitam to harass the garrison of Manicaravá. The Portuguese General, already a prey to greater anxieties, ordered the Captain-Major, who resided in Manicaravá, and the Dissásas to come down to Colombo, for the security of Gále, Colombo and Nigumbo (for of other places they now cared little). And those of Manicaravá did so, and were pursued by the enemy, though without receiving any loss. They dismantled the stockades and demolished the fort of Malváns; and the forces being divided into two bodies, one garrisoned the coast of Colombo, the other that of Nigumbo.

There arrived very opportunely Francisco de Mendonça Manoel, Captain-Major of six Galliotas which he was bringing from Goa to relieve that Island, with more than 300 soldiers, and put into port in Nigumbo. The Captain-General was thus able to reinforce the veteran companies and to form eight new ones consisting of the number usual in that warfare, wherein each company did not exceed 30 men and often did not number even that, as we have already remarked.
And as he had received intelligence that the enemy intended to carry Gâle by surprise, he ordered the Captain-Major of the Field, Domingos Ferreira Beliâo, to march to Gâle with the arrayal along the coast of the Island, it being now the month of December.

But before they reached Gâle, the Hollander came in sight of that bar with eight ships, two pinasços and a chavirão, while in the praça there were not 100 men capable of bearing arms. Coming to anchor one afternoon, they got into the launches, but as a shower came down on them, they returned to the ships. At daybreak the ships gave sail and entered that Bay in war array, where they moored within range of the battery of the praça which fired and was fired upon the whole day with little loss to us and some loss to them, for we had little artillery, though we replied to them from three places. The Commander Costra got into a launch to take soundings of the bay, the better to reconnoitre the fortifications and a place for landing. He went around it and found it manned by the men of Francisco Antunes, and as he passed the entrance to the bay, where the Captain Vicente da Silva was, a shot killed three Hollander musketeers and wounded another, and seeing that Vicente da Silva received them with bagpipes, which he had brought from Colombo for the novena of Our Lady in the Church of the Fathers of the Society of Jesus, he thought that there were greater forces in the praça and an equal resolution, as he betook himself to the ships and held a council; and as his lieutenant and councillors said that it was not a fit occasion to take, Gâle he desisted from the undertaking and sailed out, and our people attributed this success to a particular favour of Our Lady.

After this the Captain-Major of the Field arrived and provided that praça with the necessary, and returning to Calatârê, he went inland to subdue the newly revolted lands, for the Chingalâz had occupied the stockades and the fort of Malvâna, and the King had fortified himself in Ruânā. The Portuguese first attacked Malvâna, in which was a garrison of 5000 men, and carried it without any loss to us and with much loss to the enemy. Leaving a fresh garrison there, he marched to the Pagode of Atanagulâ with various encounters on the way, but all successful. The King had

40,000 men at Ruânâ in a place which was almost triangular in shape and was protected on two sides by two rivers which joined there and formed a plain more than six fathoms higher than the river, with two openings through which they descend to the water and which the Chingalâz call tokas. On the other side, this platform was crossed by a deep channel of water, from one river to river, and at the two entrances were built two large stockades with watch towers to defend them. There the King had built a city, already considering himself Lord of the lowlands of the Island and intending to abandon Candeia for this place; to attack which it was necessary to descend to the river from the opposite bank, to cross it neck deep in water, to reach the foot of the stockades and to attack them in spite of the many thousands of the enemy who defended them.

None of these difficulties was able to thwart the determination of the Captain-Major, and everyone in that small army was anxious to face the Enemy, both because the King was there, from whom they wanted to take revenge, and because they understood that they would find good booty. It was Holy Saturday, and the Captain-Major ordered all to confess and communicate. They began the march in good order at Sunset, and after marching the whole night, they were near the fortifications of the enemy at day dawn. But when they were about to attack, on Easter Day, they learnt that the King, after midday of the preceding Saturday, had retired in all haste to Candeia, knowing from spies the determination of the Portuguese. For he questioned a renegade who was with him, named Raja Pasca Modellar: What the Portuguese meant by going to confession before giving him battle; and he replied that they did so when they attacked with the determination to conquer or to die; whereupon the King resolved to flee, because it seems that Heaven gave him strength against us only within the central highlands. The Captain-Major then ordered the Captain Domingos da Cunha with 10 companies and with the Dissâvas of the Seven-and-four Cornal to follow the enemy; and

1 At the confluence of the Gurugal-ôys and the Kelâna river. See photograph in Cave's Book of Ceylon, I., p. 196, No. 285. On 24 March, 1800, Macdowall and his party halted there, and the place is described in the Journal of the Embassy (Percival 387-389) and called “Resue Ori Palaqomby watty” or the “Kings Royal Garden (Falangumoa Uyana).” It is now a coconut Estate belonging to the Hon. Sir James Fergus.

2 Sin. òota, ford, ferry.
marching with all haste, they came upon his rearguard and the victuals of the arrayal; and when our men fell upon them, the enemy fled, leaving in our hands all the baggage and two aleis laden with the equipage of the King, with which they returned to the Captain-Major; and together they entered Ruwâlê, where on the feast of Easter they lodged, the Captain-Major lodging in the Palace of the King, whence on the following days he sent by raft down the river to Columbo many of the fabrics which could be useful there.

CHAPTER 2.

HOW FRANCISCO DE MENDONÇA MANOEL WAS ELECTED CAPTAIN-MAJOR, HOW THE HOLLANDER AND THE CEINGALÔ TOOK TRINQUELEMALÈ AND CAME UPON NIGUMBO

From this post of Ruwâlê the Captain-Major despatched the Dissâva of Sofragao to guard his district from his station, and he himself marched with the arrayal to Alauâa where for the same purpose he left the Dissâva of the Seven-Corlas with two companies; and passing to Manicraurâ, he garrisoned that post with the Portuguese companies and ordered the Dissâva, of the Four-Corlas to occupy that of Petigaldenim, one league from Manicraurâ. Thence he sent word to the Captain-General that it was time to give pay to the soldiers, which he did in person, thanking the officers and soldiers by word and deed for the work they had done in the service of His Majesty; and by the end of the month he returned to Columbo. A few days afterwards the Captain-Major fell ill, and entrusting the arrayal to the Sergeant-Major Lazaro de Faria, he retired to Columbo for treatment. Domingos Ferreira Beligo was a native of Cochin of well known valour and great services, but by this time unct for the marches of Ceylon, being broken down by years and P 870 worn out by labours, and he resigned his post, representing to the Captain-General that, considering the reasons for his retirement, he should be satisfied, seeing that he had twice subjugated the lowlands of Ceylon, for he found himself so aged and broken down that only on board a galion or from the forecastle of a ship could he maintain the honourable career he had followed. The Captain-General recognizing well his merits and the good reason he had for resigning the office, named as Captain-Major of the Field, Francisco de Mendonça Manoel, who in other wars had given good proof of being equal in valour to the blood he had inherited from a father and ancestors, [were] Lords of the House of Mouraô; and in the following May he took charge of the arrayal at Manicraurâ.

From there he made two incursions into the lands of Canda, from which he returned with success. But from June onwards the soldiers began to reap the fruit of the labours they had undergone in those marches and conquests, for the pestilential disease of beriberi attacked them from which died more than 300 and many of them so rapidly, that they did not even have time to make their confession. Thus everything was preparing for the great ruin. For this reason the arrayal moved from that post and passed to that of Alauâa. The Captain-General feared that the Hollander would fall upon the small praça of Triquilemalè in the course of his cruise in May from the bar of Goa which he was besieging all these years. To forestall this danger, he sent Luis de Carvalho in the preceding March with some foists to reinforce but he, proceeding on his voyage, found news in Jafnapatalô that that praça had been lost. For the Belgas, contrary to the plan he had followed in other years of the siege, on the 16th February of this year [16]39 gave sail for Ceylon and doubling the point of Gâle fell upon the fort of Triquilemalè and being joined by the Chingalaz, after 40 days of bombardment, forced it to surrender, for very small was the force with which Francisco Deça, a casado of Columbo, tried to defend it, who however exacted the condition that each should go out with what he had, and that they should be taken to the coast of Choromandel.

The Viceroy of India never thought that it behoved them to dismantle a praça, even when they saw it exposed to the utmost danger without any remedy, as all considered this to be which is not only contrary to the practice of great Captains but also contrary to the wisdom of King D. Manoel, who, merely for the convenience of the state and before other European nations dreamt of passing to India, in the last year of his reign ordered the three praxas of Calicut, Columbo and Pasem to be dismantled; and he was of opinion

1 The word is said to be Sinhalese, Ribeiro. Pat. Hist. 56, Cl. Hob-Job, v. v.
that the Governor Afonso de Albuquerque should abandon Goa for certain political reasons and especially because it was very unhealthy, foreseeing, it would seem, with a prophetic spirit, that this place would be the greatest enemy of the state of India and of the lives of the Portuguese whom he valued more than any other human consideration. And though the experience of almost two centuries has shown that there is not the same inconvenience in other inland places near these bars, up to this day we see no attempt to remedy this great evil, though every reason, Christian and political, efficaciously demands it. Nor do I declare here the place which I most approve, for as there are three that can come in question, it does not seem easy to many to decide which should be preferred, and though in my judgment in one of these are found greater conveniences, military men always want their own choice to be preferred, as it seems to them (as in other things) that they alone are able to give an opinion in these matters, but as it is a subject which calls for so great circumspection, it is best to thrash it out in council, and it is high time to begin to do so before Goa puts an end to India. But of this we shall speak again with better reasons.

On the 24th of October of this year of 1639 two Hollanderships were sighted from Columbo following a galliot which was making for land. They had sailed out from Tríquelemê to come between Gâle and Columbo to impede the relief of those praças, under the command of Captain Arpê; and a little off Gâle they pillaged a champão laden with areca which had gone out from that port, and then set fire to her. Near Nigumbo they took two others which were bringing provisions for Columbo, in sight of which [Columbo] they passed both to and fro when they sighted the galliot. The Captain-General sent word to her that, considering the peril, she had better make for land on the coast of Columbo or Nigumbo, where they would find defenders. On board her was Gaspar Pereyra dos Reys going on his way to Malacca, but the wind had driven him to that coast, and as he was a good pilot and a man of valour and experience he replied: 'That he saw the enemy quite well but hoped in God not to fall into his hands.' And in that hurry, to explain his intention better, he sent by that very bark Antonio Rebelo, one of his soldiers: They all struggled for Columbo but one of the ships being lighter, turned her bow forcing Gaspar Pereyra dos Reys to turn to Gâle. Off Panaturê the wind fell and the ships despatched against her three launchings well manned, but being repelled with loss of men, they reinforced and returned to a second attack with the same result. The enemy must have lost some men of importance on this occasion, for giving it up he left the galliot, which without receiving any injury made for Gâle, and afterwards returned to Goa with the news of the fate of Cayaem and Nigumbo, which we shall now relate.

The Batavians, continuing the war in Ceylon, prepared in Batavia six large ships, three pinnaces, and a shallop with 1600 picked musketeers and 400 Malayas, Bandanese, and other nations, with another 400 seamen besides all the apparatus of war necessary for scaling praças. There came as General the Governor, Philip Lucas; as Admiral, Commodore Costra; as Master of the Field, the Captain-Major of Batavia, Adriano Cornelio, reputed among them for a man of great valour, with other Captains of renown who were accompanied by their chief Domine a man of letters and a counsellor. This squadron set out on 15th August 1639 making its way to the strait of Sincapura to take from Malacca more soldiers and other ships which were in those ports; and as the winds were not favourable, three months and a half were spent before arriving at Batacalou with many dead and sick. There they took refreshment and landed 200 men under the command of Captain Marte, to join the forces of the King in Candes and to come down in a body against our arrayal, so that when the ships arrived in Columbo, they might find it defeated and the coast undeneded; and doubling the point of Gâle, he moored off Morro, two leagues from Columbo, the fleet now consisting of 21 powerful ships and other smaller barks with nearly 3000 Europeans. There they remained eight days at anchor on account of the North wind which blew, firing many volleys on the land, both to inform the Candiots as well as to intimidate the native lieges. Afterwards they moored near Columbo in the afternoon, greeting the City with many shots but little damage, being well answered from land. At nightfall they went to Nigumbo and their flagship, trying to enter into the inner bank, ran aground between some rocks, but was refloated with great trouble after gutting. The same diligence did not avail them in the case of another large ship which being laden with spice for Moco went to pieces on another bank. They passed on to the village of Cayaem and there lost two large ships which went to pieces there. When he heard of the coming of the enemy, the General D. Antonio Mascarenhas put to the council: 'Whether it was advisable to bring down the arrayal to impede the landing of the Hollanders.' It was decided that it was not wise to take the troops away.
from the lands, but that the arraial should impede the junction of the two enemies, and that the train bands that were in Columbo should go to Caymel with a new company of the youths born in that City under the command of a Captain of experience, and there was one who boasted that with his fishermen of that port he was able to impede the landing of the Hollander. Antonio Barboza Pinheyro, set out with the company of the youths of Columbo and the Sergeant-Major, Lazaro de Farías, with some soldiers and some militia. The company went to the other side of Madampé and the Sergeant-Major remained on the side of Nigumbo. And when the intention of the Hollander was quite clear, the General also hastened to the assistance of Caymel with the black troops of his guard and with those of Nigumbo, which together formed a squadron of 1000 Lascars.

On the 10th of December the Belga showed signs of wishing to land under cover of his artillery, and there was much musketry fire on both sides. On the following morning (it is not known why or how they so quickly thought themselves P 678 safe) the General sent all the black troops who were there to the lands of Chilao to punish some villages. The Sergeant-Major, Luís Correa, and Antonio Teixeira de Sepulveda, with some Portuguese of Columbo, remained under cover of a rampart of sand to shelter themselves from the many balls with which the ships were sweeping the shore, and Antonio Barboza Pinheyro remained with the students of Columbo in another trench at the point of Madampé on the other side of the river. And though it stood to reason that the enemy would land on the side of Nigumbo, on hearing from the Patangatim of Caymel about the absence of the Lascars and of the little resistance there was in Madampé, as they only wanted to place foot on land, after the dawn watch the flagship gave a signal with a gun and a lanthorn at the mast. All armed themselves and at dawn of day the Hollander landed in four smacks and launches on that beach under cover of his artillery, at a distance from the trench of the students who were unable to prevent it. Antonio Teixeira de Sepulveda and Modellar Antonio Afonso with their men came on the scene from the other side, but they found 600 men already on land, divided into six bands, armed with breastplate and morion, who marched along the beach while the launches full of men accompanied them in the water; and though they gave and received volleys, P 679 the Portuguese seeing the odds and that the Lascars jumped into the river when some of their comrades were cut down, before the Modellar could intervene, retired to the bar, and on this occasion a shot carried off one arm of Antonia Botelho Gazeo, a soldier of great merit, who had already been a Captain, and who died of it. The rest waded the river, but 13 were intercepted by the launches which had entered it, and among them Antonio Barboza Pinheyro and Antonio Teixeira de Sepulveda, who, being brought to the flagship, the Governor told them: 'That the island was already his, as they had so successfully effected a landing; That the King of Candea would not tarry, but would be there with all his might and with the 200 Hollanders who were with him.' This event took place on the 12th of December [1630], and the Hollander at once erected a stockade and two trenches, and mounted artillery on that side of Madampé commanding the bar, and taking water and refreshment, he also provided himself with the cattle that were in that village.

Our arraial was at this time in Aranduré, one league from Manicuru, awaiting the King of Candea, with 350 Portuguese soldiers and with the men of three Dissas and of Râna, because the Dissâs of Maturé was in Anguratô with three companies, when the Captain-Major received advice to march at once to the coast of Caymel, and should he meet with an occasion of attacking the enemy in his fortifications or of dislodging them therefrom or from the country, to do so because it was very convenient not to suffer a palm of land on that side which might prejudice the two neighbouring praças and the reinforcements which might come along that coast; and that the General was awaiting him in Nigumbo to arrange the necessary things; and this he did. The Portuguese in India cannot now reconcile this haste in attacking any superior force and the remissness in forestalling it. The enemy led nearly 3,000 Europeans besides the Asiatics; he was awaiting the forces of the Chingala invited and led by 200 Hollanders; and such being the state of the war, I leave it to those who profess it to consider whether it was right to risk so small a force in a field battle, and whether it was not better to secure the praças therewith and the approaches to Columbo, which the Portuguese called the Pases, and to defend our fortune either under the protection of the former or within the latter. The enemy meanwhile sacked some villages of that district and killed some Christians of the country, and fortifying himself at the mouth of the river, prepared leisurely and cautiously to attack by sea and land the little
he was doing and gave the signal to attack. This reckless
decision gave rise to great disasters. The enemy heard
the instruments of war and various musket shots fired at some,
whom our men came across and killed, as they were found out
of their quarters, and at once he took up arms, and formed into
a half moon within the quarters. The Portuguese marched,
or rather ran, without keeping ranks and without any order save
that in which each found himself; and they were so worn out
that they were scarcely able to breathe, and they came up few
at a time against an enemy formed in battle array, from whom
they received notable loss.

The Captain-Major, being unable to prevent this disorder
and thinking that the advance guard was already engaged
with the main body of the enemy, advanced with the vanguard
in better order, though with as much fatigue, for the Belgas
did not show themselves except within their ramparts. There
he attacked them with grim determination and succeeded in
capturing the first rampart, causing such dread and perju-
deration to the Hollanders that many threw themselves into
the river. But when they found out how small the Portuguese
force was, and now slack they were through fatigue, being
ashamed to flee from so few men, they returned to form
themselves in the second rampart, where they defended them-
selves with greater pertinacity and valour. When [the
strength of] the fortifications, the force and resistance were
perceived, all experienced men realized that there was evident
danger of a complete defeat, and after much persuasion they
prevailed upon the Captain-Major to retire to the pass from
which he had decided to attack, though the enemy with his
artillery commanded the three passes that were there. Before
they could gain it the enemy pressed with all his force and
with loss on both sides, and as the demands of his men
increased with the danger to which they were exposed, the
Captain-Major, seeing his destruction clearly before his eyes,
ordered the retreat to be sounded, and marching to Nigumbo,
he crossed the river a little above Caymel. In this encounter
died the Dissàva of the Four-Coelas, Manoel Vas Barreto, and
of the captains of companies, Antonio Godinho, Antonio
Valente and 13 Portuguese soldiers. Others mention more,
but I follow an eye-witness who had the curiosity to take note
of these events. *The wounded were the Dissàva, Jorge F 2060
Coelho de Castro, who by the valour with which he fought
tried to undo the disorder of the attack, the Sergeant-Major,
Antonio Diniz, Antonio de Amaral de Menezes, Nicolas
Fernandes, Miguel de Serra, Francisco Deça, Manoel Martins
and other soldiers. Four were captured.*

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CHAPTER 3.

OF THE ENCOUNTER OF CAYMEL, AND THE FALL OF
NIGUMBO

Francisco de Mendonça Manoel, who was a gentleman with
hopes equal to his gallant disposition and valour, was intent
on making the Hollanders embark, and marched day and night
with such haste, like one going to his doom, that no cooking
was done during the three days he spent on the road; but
realizing the inequality of his forces, he attempted to gain,
before he was perceived by the enemy, a narrow pass in which
he thought there was some advantage, and meanwhile he tried
to obtain fuller information about the fortifications and the
force and intentions of the enemy. In the advance guard
came Jorge Coelho de Castro, and when he came within a P 304
league of Caymel, he met two Ternezees and a Hollander
who had wandered away from their camp in search of *sura
(for so they call the liquor distilled from the palm tree).
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He seized them and ordered their heads to be cut off and
stuck on spears, and without further ado, without waiting for
orders or heeding the fatigue of the men or reforming them, for
they were walking in disorder, or minding the inequality of
the forces or the intentions of the Captain-Major, like one
more accustomed to war with the Chingalâz than with Euro-
peans, he simply sent word to the Captain-Major about what
When our advance guard sounded the retreat, there attacked from the other side of the river some of our men, whom the General had sent from Negombo under the command of Antonio de Almeida de Carvalho, and falling upon the launches, they set fire to three of them, but only two burnt. The enemy lost in this encounter 74 Hollanders, and 30 were badly wounded; and while the King came, they thought it safer to maintain the post than to follow the Portuguese. On the 28th of December the rebels, D. Baitezar and D. Cosme, arrived with a good number of lascars. They at once constructed a bridge over the river so pass to Negombo, and all moved on, the King who had arrived moving along the interior, the Hollanders along the shore, and the ships along the coast. Reaching the palm groves of Negombo, they opened trenches around the fortalice, and on that very night they landed seven cannon of 18 to 30 pounds, and meanwhile on the 3rd of January the King joined the Hollanders.

Negombo was rather a fortified house than a regular fort, with a few guns not one of which exceeded six pounds. Its Captain was Jorge Fernandez de Abreu, the Lord of the neighbouring islet. The General, D. Antonio Mascarenhas, ordered the arrayal to march to the other side of the estuary where the river forms there at a focial-shot from the fortalice so that it might be easier for him to reinforce Colombo, which it was more important to defend, and he placed in Negombo 45 of the most sick men incapacitated from work, under the charge of Captains Pedro Coelho de Miranda and Bernardo da Costa with some Canarese. In the Island of Jorge Fernandez de Abreu, which was at a musket shot from the fortalice, he left three companies, and at their head Diogo de Souza de Castelbranco, entrusting the Captain Antonio Jorge with the defence of the bridge, by which those of the Island and of the fort communicated, and with the relief of the fortalice should it be necessary, with a force of black troops for the defence of the bar and to protect the people of the country who were gathered there; and leaving everything prepared in this way, before the enemies arrived, he left for Colombo.

The sixth of the month dawned with three batteries mounted, intended to cause terror rather than for use, and each day the enemy continued to advance the approaches always plying their artillery, whereby they razed the parapets, walls, and bastions on the land side. Those of the praça replied with the few and small artillery they had, repairing the damage with palm trees and earth. But as the whole wall was weak and meant only against the enemies of the country, and the praça was greatly reduced, these industries of the beleaguered availed little, and the batteries dislodged the guns and broke the mounts.

The Captain-Major went several times to the fortalice in company with the other Captains to see the state in which it was, and he animated those who were defending it, and supplied it with what was necessary and sent information of everything to the Captain-General. On the ninth of February Antonio Mascarenhas sent him a sealed order, which was understood to be an order to withdraw the garrison of the fort and to blow it up. He received the letter at four in the afternoon, and when he was about to read it to the Captains, the enemy fired simultaneously with seven mortars from the batteries, and forthwith were heard repeated volleys of musketry. Thereupon the Captain-Major in all haste ordered all to return to their posts, and as he embarked for the fortalice, he saw from the middle of the creek that the enemy already master of it, was hauling down our banners and flying his own.

For at the appointed hour, when their flagship gave the signal from two guns simultaneously and by a square flag, the enemy assaulted the praça, and with him the King's men bringing ladders to the walls where they made good resistance. Within it was Antonio Jorge de O Buche [who had come] to ascertain the designs of the enemy, and remembering that he had been entrusted with the bridge, with order to destroy it, in case the Belgas scaled the fortalice, he came down with one of his soldiers, and together they opened the door, but he trusting, it seems, that the soldier would close it, went in search of his company to the appointed place, where he did not now find it, and the enemy who was surrounding the fortalice from all sides, seeing the door open, entered by it without resistance. Was there ever in human history a similar case! Can it be denied to be a chastisement when in war such a thing cannot even have the appearance of neglect? The enemy found an open door to our ruin, because what appeared to be the negligence of this Captain was a thing fully decreed by God; and well could the Hollanders say that in Negombo they were received as friends, since they were received with open doors. Captain Jorge Fernandez de Abreu tried to undo this disorder, but he found the enemy within the praça, where he was wounded and remained a captive with the rest. The Island was at the same time attacked by the Chingalaz, and many died there, and others were drowned, and some were taken prisoner; and those who were able to escape, swam the river, but the Captain-Major
was unable to assist them because of the hurry and because the pass of the bridge was taken. But seeing everything lost, he collected those who had escaped from the one and the other encounter, and went to lodge in Matuál, a quarter league from the inner pass of Colombo. The General ordered the arrayal to be reformed with Captains and soldiers, and he was able to muster 19 companies, none of which exceeded 30 according to the style of Ceylon, as we have remarked. He also manned a galliot and six manchusas to protect the river of Matuál, in case the enemy should seek to enter by it.

The disposition of this war gave rise to much discussion in India. For seeing that the Captain-Major was ordered to come down [to the lowcountry] it seemed most convenient even before the encounter of Caynel, and much more after it, to reinforce Nigumbo with a good garrison and artillery, to construct stockades and trenches around that praça and in that Island [in which the arrayal could lodge]; and under cover of them to await the attack of the enemy in the fortification, and to deliver such assaults as circumstances might show to be convenient; and if they should be obliged to abandon the praça, to make a second resistance in the island which was always judged to be more defensible, as small boats were ever at hand in which the men, in case of final disaster, could retire to the Island by the draw bridge, because at the last moment there is no time to break down a strong bridge. They were persuaded that both the one and the other enemy would sooner have been lost there than have driven us from our fortification after giving us time to repair them, because the river was ever free, and refreshment and munitions which Colombo could send would never fail us. But owing to these doings, though lesser numbers excuse whatever misfortune, since there was no lack of valour, the disorder can only be attributed to a chastisement [of God].

After this last event, which did not cost him more than two men, the Belgas repaired the damage done to the fortaleza and supplied it with artillery, munitions, provisions, and 120 soldiers, under the command of a valiant Captain, as it was not at all capable of a larger garrison. They had agreed to give up the praça to the King of Candeia, who aggrieved at this and the other injustices, went two leagues away with his army. The Commander Costra went to compose these differences as best he could, and, after his return, Governor Philipe Lucas gave over two ships and a pinnace, which alone were at this time kept there, as the rest had gone to different parts either

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1 Philip Lucas Val. 119.

BOOK V.

CHAPTER 4.

How the Hollander came upon Gale and the Captain-Major in pursuit of them

Thé Commander Costra despatched five ships which on the 1st of March came to anchor before Colombo, and while he remained in Nigumbo, making the necessary preparations for the expedition to Gale, there came to him another of the ships which were upon the bar of Goa, and getting all his force in twelve ships, he carried therein more than 3,000 Europeans. On the 5th of March he left Colombo for Gale, where he arrived at dawn on the 8th of the month, and that same morning there arrived a pinnace with reinforcements from Batacalou. Afterwards while the field battle was going on, there arrived four other ships from the bar of Goa, and two others at the time of the siege, [all of which together formed] a force more than sufficient even for a far greater enterprise, but in the affairs of Ceylon they always acted [in a way to

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1 Nicolaes Molinesus W. L. R. II. 118, 332.
make things more than sure. As soon as General D. Antonio Mascarenhas saw the enemy set out, he understood his purpose and despatched the Captain-Major of the Field, Francisco de Mendonça Manoe, by land to Gâlé, 18 leagues beyond Colombo, wherein there are three rivers to cross by boat besides others which cannot often be waded; and though it was thought that they would encounter the forces of the Chingalaz, they found the way altogether unobstructed; and marched in such haste that some soldiers remained on the way and returned to Colombo, as they were not able to endure the march. This array had 323 Portuguese soldiers divided into 12 Companies which were now mere numerous than was customary against the Chingalaz. The Sergeant-major was Joã de Sepulveda, the Ensign-major Valentim Pinheyro. There went also the four Dissâvas with 1,600 Lascârins of the country and Râna with 200 Canarese firelockmen and 100 Caffirs, armed with bows and arrows. This black troop, already intimidated by the preceding events, was of little use in the battle that was fought in Gâlé, except the Canarese who fought like valiant comrades.

The fortalice of Gâlé, erected against the Chingalaz, and against Asiatic pirates rather than against European batteries, stood on the North side of the bay, where the ground rises to a high point so steep by nature that it admits of no ascent on the side of the sea, and thence the land slopes to the interior of the Island. Within there was an expance large enough for a city. From the open coast to the water of the bay, the high land was crossed by a stretch of wall which might be 300 fathoms long, and at the two extremities, where the wall had a greater slope towards the open sea and towards the bay, there were two watch towers upon rock, for on the northern point of the open coast a man could pass out of the wall with water up to the breast, and on the southern point in the bay one could do so with greater ease, wherefore there was built there another stockade with a wooden watch tower. This stretch of wall had three bastions on the land side of the fortalice, and from the watch tower of the bay to the bastion of Sant-Iago, the wall was of stone and clay, three palms thick, and on this occasion it was overlaid with palm trees. From the bastion of Sant-Iago to the bastion of the conception, which was in the centre, and by its position formed a cavalier to the first, there was a mud wall lined on the inside and outside with curtains three palms high, built of stone and mortar, and at the level of the ground it had a thickness of 14 palms. The third portion of this wall, stretching as far as the bastion of Santo-Antonio, was also of mud and was

lined, only on the outside, with a similar wall of stone and mortar. From thence to the watch tower of the open coast the wall was of stone and mortar, only four palms thick, and it was hot 18 palms up to the parapet. The Bastion Santo Antonio was recently built with sufficient height and a regular platform. The Conception had a large platform but low, with a weak 

castizo. The Sant-Iago was much smaller, low, and its walls were weak. From this bastion up to the fortalice, which was called the Retreat, there ran, along the bay, a wall altogether of mud, four palms thick and one fathom high, which scarcely deserved the name of parapet. Within, in the retreat, were the houses of the captain and a good esplanade and 20 pieces could play therein. The praça had also a bastion cavalier over the gate, a work of little use, as the walls were of thin and because there was a rising ground within firelock shot, where was built the first praça, which contrary to the opinion of many was dismantled in the time of Constantino de Sá de Noronha. Upon the bay was a breastwork, which, though strong on the water side, was unprotected on the land side, and was only 7 palms high. At the extremity of the town and commanding the bar, there was a bastion on a rock with wretched parapets and without any guns, because in the whole praça there were only 14, including two stone mortars, two pieces of 20 pounds, one of 18, one of 16, another of 14, and four of 12, and the others of 6, besides seven other falcons, each with only one chamber, which being scattered about at such a great distance, were all abandoned, and many were the places where the enemy was able to disembark. There were no guns in the three creeks [which are] around the bay which is a large one and beyond reach of the batteries of the fortalice, nor anywhere in the whole compass, or within it, where with good weather one can land on the ridge of rocks. These walls were built by Pero Velozo who was the first captain appointed by a despatch of the King to that praça with the title of captain-major of the isola de Gâlé, a post which was afterwards held by Fernão de Mendonça, when his uncle Diogo de Melo de Castro was General, who added stone angles to the bastions; for with such delays were these works carried out in India. While fate was preparing its ruin.

As Captain of that praça, there was Lourenço Ferreya de Brito, a casado of that place, selected 28 days previously by the council of Ceylon after they had realized the intentions of the enemy. It had a garrison of 80 Portuguese casados, including the sick, the aged and the hale, and 30 country-born soldiers of the train bands and Topazes with three companies.
which had gone as a reinforcement, and 300 Chingalë Lascars. With the help of this force [the captain] after taking charge of the place, laboured at the fortification without any rest day or night, making the most urgent repairs and fortifications. There was little powder, few balls, many of a calibre different from that of the guns. There were not 20 muskets and arquebuses, a few more spears, and so of other things. There was not a vintém 1 of public money or money of the King, and the work that was done was done at the cost of the inhabitants, though the place was so well suited for a magnificent fortification (such as the Hollanders afterwards built), though the material lay at hand and labour abundant and so cheap, that it did not cost the King more than a measure of rice, and though there were so many advantages in maintaining that praça that it was discussed by statesmen whether it was not good to establish the headquarters of the government of India there. I desire to give details of everything in order that Portugal may know the how and the why we were ruined in the East; even after it became so infested by European nations, for if we pass to the other praças, we shall find similar negligence.

Much as the captain-major of the Field hurried, the enemy, who came by sea, arrived before him, and foreseeing this from Aímacão, which was half way, he sent ahead the Dissava of the country troops of the coras of Gâle, Francisco Antunes, with his Lascars, who were able to reach Gâle on the morning of the eighth of the month on which the enemy reached that bar. Without mooring, the enemy entered by midday and saluted the praça in battle array and continued bombarding from six ships, two pinnaces, a shallop and 17 launches, and when it had been answered from the praça, and this diversion was over, he entered by the Channel, hugging the hill of Unavato beyond reach of the guns of the fortalice. The pinnaces and shallop, moored at the end of the bay, continued to sweep the shores and the neighbouring woods, and under cover of their artillery, the launches landed the men they had brought, beyond Magâle and behind the Islets, and returned a second time to bring more men.

1 The Captain of the praça sent the Dissava, Francisco 2 3878 Antunes, with his men to open trenches at the place where the enemy landed, and when he saw the forces they were bringing he also sent the three companies of the garrison to reinforce the Dissava and to obstruct the landing. But as the circuit of the bay was large and the enemy made no delay,

when they arrived at the spot, they found already on land more than 700 European musketeers and 400 Malays and Bandanese in good array and with field artillery in the vanguard, who seeing how small our force was, came to meet it. The Portuguese, realizing the odds, retired fighting with the enemy, with deaths and wounds on both sides, and there was such confusion on certain occasions that some were taken prisoner. The Hollander kept on advancing, accompanied by the launches along the water's edge, till they arrived at Fiéigále, where the launches landed the artillery; and the Belga took up his quarters in the bazaar; and a shot from the cavalier, in which Vicente Paez de Mendonça was, sent to the bottom a launch laden with artillery. In the course of the ensuing night, the enemy at all risk laboured at a stackade and rampart near the shore of the bay, on which he planted two pieces of 30 pounds, directed against the bastion Sant-Iago and five of lesser calibre to guard the fortifications. At nightfall a pinnacle approached the breastwork to see if there was any resistance and whether the ships could do so also, but on receiving some shot and losing the mizen mast, she retired and the ships did not approach.

The Dissava Francisco Antunes at once returned to join the Captain-Major of the Field whom he encountered in Giníure, two leagues from the praça, and exchanging letters that night with Lourenço Ferreyra de Brito, they agreed to attack the enemy at daybreak at the signal from a gun from the fortalice, and that those who were able to sail out from the praça would do so and attack them in the form which we shall presently see. Gallant resolutions indeed! As if it were the same thing for one Portuguese to cross swords with four or six Hollanders in a street and to attack them with the same odds in their trenches! The captain-major halted two musket shots from the quarters and spent the rest of the night preparing the things necessary for the assault, for fortune makes no delay when she is making for destruction. The enemy was already on land with all his forces quartered, with ramparts and sand and thorns, and our force was so inferior that a little reflection would have made them abandon this resolution (of which up to-to-day I do not know who the author was) and it would have made them dispose the warfare in a different way, had Heaven not decreed this loss as a chastisement. He found the captains and soldiers very courageous, and as this could not have been due to despair, it can only be attributed to the gallantry which the Portuguese nation ever maintained in India. But to declare his opinion and to show that this was most convenient, he made them this short address.

1 A coin worth 20 reis, but in Goa, 12 reis.—H. W. C,
CONQUEST OF CEYLON

| You all know that, by the same action and valour, we serve two very different masters [viz.] God, by fighting for the Faith against heretics, and the King, through loyalty to whom, we battle with his enemies. I cannot deny that they are more in number, that they are Europeans, and well billeted, dexterous in arms, with picked leaders; but it is no novelty for Portuguese to vanquish any other nation with lesser forces, and in India especially we have not yet lost that distinction. We do not generally use European discipline in Asia against the natives, but with Europeans we must needs observe it, and by fighting in good order this day, we shall find support for victory, a refuge for rest, and whatever be our fortune in battle, a sure shelter, so that we may try the advantage which a pitched battle can give us if we fight wisely and it is in our power to follow up the victory which we hope from God, or to forestall the destruction, if our fate be different. Faith, love, blood, gallantry and honour, unite us all, for we are of the same belief, of the same nation; while they have only fear and self-interest, being of diverse nations. Few are the victories due to numbers, but many are those achieved by valour, and as the latter is fully acknowledged in the Portuguese, we can doubt of it only if we forget what we are. Let not India say that we avoided an enemy, for arms accustomed to victory look at the heart rather than at the face; and he who does not know the colour of fear, does not distinguish Europeans from Asians. And they cannot yet boast that they have vanquished us in fair battle; and the present inequality can be made up for by our Faith and the justice which we defend, and the strength which all recognize in the Portuguese. It is not my purpose to add courage to a nation which has ever been in need rather of the curb, but only to represent to you all that we must fight like those who consider the victory assured, and keep proper discipline like those who have an enemy to fear. It is well known that none of those here present will refuse to fight with sword and spear against five or six of them in a street, and the inequality does not become greater, if we come to vie hand to hand; and if on the strength of their good fortune they show themselves cavaliers, their defiance will stop here. In the Portuguese fashion let us attack them face to face; let us meet them breast to breast, and always in good order, and I shall be answerable for the victory." The address being over, our arrayed came within musket shot of the enemy, and there, in perfect silence, they awaited the signal from the praça. But as the natives had been bought, they found the enemy as prepared as the Portuguese who attacked.

CHAPTER 5.

OF THE BATTLE WHICH FRANCISCO DE MENDONÇA MANOEL FOUGHT WITH THE HOLLANDERS AT GÁL

The signal being given from the praça at peep of dawn, they assaulted jointly at the same time. Three companies with some casados, 80 Caffirs and 300 Lascarins, who with their Captain, Manoel Braz, had arrived that night from Maturé, and at the head of all Vicente da Silva, sailed out from the fortalice and attacked with all resolution; but when the enemy fired a volley of artillery, the lascarins and almost all the Caffirs ran away. The Portuguese, however, advanced and gaining the rampart, in spite of Captain Marte and 200 Hollanders and 100 Bandanese, they captured the artillery; and here the Belga losing by death his Marte, the rest gave up the post and took to the water, and three launches which were there were sent adrift to oblige them to conquer or die. In this conflict, the enemy further reinforced his squadron, and after a long resistance and many deaths on both sides, there dying on our side the Captains, Francisco da Silva and Francisco Valadas, two Ensigns and not a few soldiers, (considering the few there were), and others being wounded, the enemy regained the post at the cost of much blood and many lives. The Captain of the praça, seeing that the remnants of the three companies were retiring and that on all other sides the battle was raging with full fury, sallied out, appointed as head of that force Beriosmeu Depa, and making them turn upon the enemy, returned to the fortalice with the wounded, and they sustained the fight on that side with valour.

The middle wing was under the command of Captain Jorge Fernandes, who was captain of one company, and there were three other Captains, Joao de Siqueyrca, Afonso Vaz Gago, and Inocencio Mendes, besides the Dissavas of the Four-corlas and of Soffragao, Antonio da Fonseca Pereira and Francisco de Faria. The enemy had in those ramparts three companies of Hollanders and 100 Bandanese, which made 400 men, under the command of Captain Friz, a man of great renown among them. Here they fought with fierce resolution on both sides,
the whole brunt falling on the Portuguese, because of the lascars few were those who fought; and we lost the Dissava of Sofragaō. The Commander Jorge Fernandez was wounded and taken prisoner along with Captain Joao de Siqueyra and four soldiers, as they were wounded in the field and rendered incapable of retiring, when the arrayal retreated to the fortalice.

The Captain-Major attacked with the remainder of the arrayal, taking with him the Dissava of Maturé, Francisco Antunes and [the Dissava] of the Seven-corsas, Francisco da Silva, and Râna with 200 Canarese, relying especially on his eight companies, of which the Captains were, Andre Monteyer, captain of the advance guard, who was an intrepid cavalier and died in battle before the captain-major, Antonio Jorge, Antonio Rodriguez de’ Andrade, Valentim Pinheyro, Lourenço Veloz, Manoel Correa, Manoel Fernandez Madeja and D. Francisco de Menezes. The enemy had in those trenches 800 European soldiers in eight companies, with companies of Topazes and Bandanese under the command of Commander Costra and of the Master of the Field, Andriao Cornello, and other leading captains. The night spies found them divided into two bodies, but as our men were drawn up in three at the time of the attack, they received them in the same manner, which shows that nothing was hidden from them. Our men advanced with a valour corresponding to that of their brave Captain, and as the fight began on all sides at the same time, there was fought on both sides one of the most sanguinary battles that were ever fought in India, for the Batavian brought on this occasion great leaders, picked and well-armed men, while our men never used merely defensive weapons in India; and from the main body of their arrayal they sent the necessary reinforcements, whenever the danger was seen to be great. This first fury lasted on all sides for more than an hour and a half [the men fighting] face to face and breast exposed, and the enemy had the advantage in numbers and in position, being in their own trenches. Those of the praça who measured the damage from the time, from the successive charges, and from the play of other arms, seeing the pertinacity of the one in defending themselves and of the other in driving them from the trenches and from the bazaar where they were quartered, thought that few would be left alive on either side, and the reason why it was not so, though the soldiers were dexterous in the use of arms, is ascribed to the thick smoke of the musketry which in the stillness of the morning prevented the soldiers from taking good aim.

The Captain-Major finally drove the enemy from his lodgements, capturing his artillery and two cannon which they had there; and had he been content with this victory, Gâlo would never have been lost. Once outside his trenches, the enemy reformed into a large squadron, and the Portuguese met them in a palmgrove and kept up the battle to the great loss of the Hollander. To clinch the victory, Francisco de Mendonça Manoel ordered the Ensign-major to attack the enemy from the rear with four companies of the garrison, while he invested them in front; and the Hollander, unable to stand the fury of the Portuguese, made for the water, fleeing rather than retiring, leaving on the field more than 900 killed and taking with him a proportionate number of wounded. The Portuguese continued to press them, till many threw themselves into the sea, whence the ships and 35 small barks were giving courage to their men and wounding ours by continuous volleys of artillery and musketry, the whole resembling a bell. The shallops brought officers and munitions and not only reinforced those on land, but even prevented them from throwing themselves into the sea, and gave continuous volleys of the one and the other balls to our men.

| Gallantly strode the Captain-major like a god of war with sword and shield, up and down the shore amidst the Portuguese companies, ordering the soldiers to fire even on the shallops of the enemy, so that they might not relieve their men, whom he already considered beheaded and captured, and it would have been so had the arm of God not been stretched against us on this occasion also, because in the midst of so many bullets, a random shot from one of the shallops hit him on the head with such force, that giving a horrible leap, he fell dead on the spot, at the time when the enemy was already hoisting the white flag. Francisco de Mendonça Manoel was a gentleman greatly beloved by all, and as he fell within sight of the greater part of the arrayal, a page of his, a Fleming, whom fate had brought thither, (God knows whether it was to spare the lives of his country-men), went clamouring through the ranks of our companies in a funereal voice that the Captain-major was dead, and there was no one in that perturbation to close his mouth. Afflicted by this event and intent on what they saw and felt, they all in confusion ceased to use their arms against a twice conquered enemy, giving him time to reform and land fresh reinforcements. Many of those who were badly wounded retired, and as some captains were killed, even some of the hale did the same, and the cries of the others did not succeed in making them hold on. And finally, without direction and without order, in scattered groups, they retired.
to the fortalice, and with them came the others, as they were few, giving up so great a success and a victory so certain, if only the sergeant-major, whose duty it was, had the authority and the promptitude to supply the place of the Captain-major, and had carried it out with the same ardour, because the enemy was so despondent that he did not profit by this disorder, and so many were their dead, that [stretched] one upon another they obstructed the path of our soldiers, that short space being covered with more than 800 dead bodies; and the number of the wounded was in proportion.

When the Portuguese retired, the enemy reoccupied his quarters, for they did not even halt there. We lost in this encounter 76 of the best soldiers, including some gentlemen, Ensigns and sergeants, and the captains already named. The wounded were Sebastião D’Orta, Captain of Calaturé, D. Francisco de Menezes and Manoel Fernandes Madruga, Captains of companies, who died prisoners from sickness and ill-treatment along with more than 60 soldiers, Ensigns and sergeants. Though in this encounter the Portuguese fought with great gallantry, in spite of the odds being against them, and their having to vie with an enemy who was entrenched as that arrayad had only gone to reinforce Gále, which they could have entered without difficulty and whence under better conditions they could have made repeated and powerful salis, delivering gallant assaults on the enemy, [as there was then no reason to believe that the King of Candia would again involve the whole of his forces, which was engaged and scattered in maintaining the lands, because he saw the ill requital of any benefits] by the Hollanders, though matters had not reached such a pass as to enable him to decide whether it would be more convenient for him to have to do with the Hollanders alone than with both nations, a decision to which he came later, in other parts of India this resolution was considered to be precipitate, whoever it be that decided upon it. For to add to these reasons, the burning of the galleons in this bar of Murmugà was already known in Ceylon, and that the enemy was slackening this siege and diversion, and was more free for the enterprise of Ceylon and of Malacca which he kept up together. [These are] considerations which called for greater hesitation in exposing Portuguese forces. On the other hand it was known that a reinforcement of two fleets of rowing boats was already on the way, and it was more convenient to await better conditions in the increase of that arrayad. Finally if that force with which we fought, had only gone to Gále, it would have been impossible for the Hollander to take that práça.

But to show the niceties of honour which the soldiers of India ever maintained, I will here describe the end of Antonio Jorge o Buchia, of whom we have already said that he opened the gate of Nilumbo. This captain was sentenced in Colombo to run the gauntlets in the arrayad with points on his feet and a distaff at the waist. "This sentence was carried out in spite of the fact that he had acquitted himself well on other occasions. He behaved afterwards as if he were a mad man, and as such he went about the camp, daad, and without speaking a word to any one, ill-clad, without arms and hatless, up to the time when the Hollander, dislodged from his quarters, reformed for the first time outside the bazaar of Gále. Then was seen Antonio Jorge in spick and span attire, as if he were again in his right mind, which made them wonder at him and made Captain Manoel Correia say to him, "Ah! Master Antonio Jorge: what is this? A very fine gentleman you are!" To which he replied: "Antonio Jorge lives disgraced in the world. He must either die with honour or recover the loss." And without waiting for the others to attack, he levelled the spear which he carried in his hand and rushed furiously into the thick of the squadron of the enemy, causing them such havoc and creating such an uproar, that when they were attacked by our men, they had no composure, so long as he was alive, to fire their volleys upon us, and at last he fell in the midst of that large squadron and ended his life, after having wrought notable slaughter. To such things does honour lead, those who esteem it.

CHAPTER 6.

CONCERNING THE SIEGE OF GÁLE BY THE HOLLANDER AND OF HOW THAT PRÁÇA WAS STORMED

The Belga set against the three bastions, six cannon and other pieces of lesser calibre, [battery]ing with much fury and pestilence the bastions of Saint-Iago and the Conception. From these [bastions] they replied with much damage to themselves, for most of the shot killed men and destroyed the gun carriages, while the soldiers of the galleons aimed well, because the four black gunners knew little, and the best of them died on the spot, the rest in the scaling. Of those who
were able to take up arms, the chief was the Sergeant-Major, Joao de Sepulveda, whom the Captain of the praça invited to the council along with the others who could give counsel, and he laid before them all the state of that fortalice, the weakness of its fortifications, the loss they had sustained and could receive from the batteries of the enemy; [pointing out] that he thought it best to try their hand a second time in the field with the Hollanders, before they fortified themselves further and received further reinforcements; for if they were not able to force them to embark, when the arrayal was in a more flourishing state, the principal reason was the death of the Captain-Major which gave rise to the retreat at the time when, though worn out and crippled, they were victorious, and as he knew that the enemy had received greater loss, though less in comparison with their larger forces, they could hope that God would give them success this time, for as they were so near the walls, even if they should not achieve all they intended, they could not be altogether defeated; and even if the enemy remained in the field, they could at least leave their artillery spiked, for which he had given the necessary order.

This resolution seemed greatly out of keeping with the time and occasion, considering that there were few Portuguese to sally out from the praça; and though the council consisted of more than 15, only three were for this opinion. The rest maintained: 'That what was not effected the first time could not be done the second time, since the enemy was victorious and elated and our men intimidated and exhausted; that our best soldiers were gone, being either killed or wounded in the battle; that there were few casados wherewith to reform the arrayal; that the black troops must not be reckoned upon, for though a few of them fought the first time, none would fight a second time; that since that arrayal had come to reinforce the praça which was so greatly in need of a garrison, considering the large circuit it occupied, the men should be posted in the different posts and the damage done to the walls should be repaired, because meanwhile reinforcements might arrive, which they said would be large and [they said also] that the Governor Antonio Telles de Menezes was coming in person; and if they kept up till then, which would be no small thing, victory would be assured; that the siege could not be carried on for many months, as the winter was approaching and that, with such scarcity of soldiers, it would be a great thing to be able to defend themselves, but that victory in the field was impossible.' It was therefore settled by a majority of votes that it was not convenient to sally out a second time against the enemy. Of all this the Captain of the praça sent word to the General who was in Colombo, in a light vessel in which went Sebastiao D'Orta da Guerra, Captain of Calutur, as he was wounded and because he was a practical person, who could give an account of everything and negotiate the necessary reinforcement of money and shot, of which the four pieces of 12 pounds and the one of 14 and another of 16 had soon run short; and the blacksmiths were again busy making them.

The best proof of the scarcity of men for service is clearly seen from this following distribution. In the watch tower in the open coast, was Francisco Praza, a casado of Gale, with eight companions. In the bastion Sao Antonio, Antonio Lourenco Forte, also a casado of that praça, with 14, and Captain Baltolameu de Sa with 28 soldiers; and in the watch tower between this bastion and the Conception, Captain Antonio Jorge with 21 soldiers, and behind that rampart, the Dissava of the Seven-Corlas with four soldiers and his lascarins; in the bastion of the Conception, the Captain Lourenco da Costa, a casado of the place, with 16 companions of the train band and the Captain Francisco Goncalvez Velho with 26 soldiers; and because Lourenco da Costa was badly wounded on the second day of bombardment, his place was taken by another casado, Simao de Campos. In the curtain which leads to the bastion of Sant-Iago there were three watch towers, and in the first was Captain Antonio Rodrigues de Andrade, with 28 soldiers, in the second Captain Lourenco Veloxo with 27, in the third Captain Afonso Vaz Gago with 26, of which numbers their companies consisted. The inner side of this wall was garrisoned by the Dissava, Francisco Antunes, with six companions and with his lascarins. In the bastion of Sant-Iago, a post of greater danger, there was Captain Pedro Carvalho, a casado of Gale, with 16 companions, and Captain Valentim Pinheiro with his company of 29 soldiers. At the foot of this bastion, in the main guard, was Bernado Goncalvez, a casado of that country, with four companions, and in his charge there was a stone mortar and a falcon, which swept the field and commanded the rampart. There was also near this bastion, Domingos da Silva, a casado of the fortalice, with two companies consisting of 80 Caifirs to help where there was need. In the watch tower of the wall, which runs along the bay, there were 25 soldiers under the command of Antonio Rodriguez, the Ensign of D. Francisco de Menezes, as the latter was wounded. In the inner Stockade there was Antonio da Fonseca Poreyra, Dissava of the Four-Corlas, with six

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1 1639-1640.
companions and the men of his Dissāva, and Captain Domingos Soares de Misquita with a company of 27 soldiers. Sebastião Rebelo, a casado of the place, with the men of the Galle-Corla was on the rocks of the bay near the retreat with some muskets on supports. In the retreat was the Factor João de Melo de Azevedo, and his clerk; and in its main guard, and as a watch over the powder, was Captain Antônio Pereira, a casado of the praça, with 10 very old companions. In the cavalier of the retreat was Vicente Paes de Mendonça, a casado of Galle, who had only six companions. In the breachwork Rosario, was Manoel da Fonseca Monis, with 12 pieces, who had also in his charge the neighbouring creek. In the bastion of Santa Cruz, upon the bar, was Captain Vicente Mendez with a company of 24 soldiers and Rana with his Canarese. And as on the sea side of that bastion, at the extremity of the town, the enemy could land, the Captain Bartolomeu Fereyra de Abreu, a casado of that praça, was placed there with 12 companions and muskets on supports, because there was no artillery, and the Dissāva of Sofragaão, Afonso Carvalho, with his men. And there was not a man in the praça who could serve but was occupied. There were also three patrols, one of Captain Manoel Rodrigues, also a casado, who had 10 companions; another of the Sergeant-Major [consisting] of 25 soldiers under the command of Estêvão de Souza, whose Captain Manoel Fernandez Madeira was wounded; and the third of the Captain of the praça, which consisted of 20 Portuguese of whom the Captain was Diogo de Silveira Leão, a casado of the place. They all had orders that in cases of greater danger each should assist his neighbour, and that the patrols should assist all according to need. Totalling all this force, including casados, old and young, able and ill, who could bear arms, merchants and visitors who happened to be there and had not come with the arrayal, it made 210 persons who had Portuguese blood, for the majority of those who were stationed were Topazes, and when the enemy scaled the praça, ten of them were already in bed. The men who came from Columbo numbered 323, excluding those killed in the battle, and of this number more than 70 were in hospital wounded, and though some give a larger number to the arrayal, we Portuguese were ever less than we reckoned ourselves. The black troops were of little use for this work, while all the whites who were there were not enough to garrison a city round which the Belga had set a cordon by sea and land, and which could be attacked on all sides; and as he knew this disadvantage, he attempted to carry it at a time when it was not easy for the neighbours to reinforce, and there was no place free from danger from which to withdraw the garrison; and he assaulted the bastion of Sant-Iago most of all, as it had no terrace for more than 12 men to fight together, and as it was very low, besides being easy to scale, it was more exposed to grenades and other devices for setting fire.

The men of the praça, therefore, began to cut down the palm trees in the gardens of the town, and on the second night of the siege they lined, on the outside, the bastion of Sant-Iago which was already greatly damaged. On the following night, in the same way, they repaired the bastion of the Conception, and the other damaged ones in turn, though the enemy did not cease his fire or alarms upon those thus engaged; and as the walls were very weak and there were shots near the gate of the fortalice, which passed from one side of them to the other, the labour of rebuilding was intense, and, in order to drive the enemy away, they directed towards the land the artillery which was mounted on the posts of the sea. On the second day of the bombardment, the enemy also began to throw grenades of 60 pounds and various artifacts into the praça, whereby they greatly intimidated the black troops. As it was a contrivance they had never seen. And they did other damage, even succeeding in setting alight the handsome houses of Lopo da Gama, where they raised a great fire. At the same time a body of Hollanders attacked the bastion of Sant-Iago, and the men who were working there wounded some with flintlocks, so as not to betray themselves with matches by night, but receiving another valid charge, they retired.

Lourenço Ferreire de Brito sent some lascarins to deliver assaults by night, by dint of gifts and promises, but they only served to disquiet the enemy with some sallies and to betray what they were doing. It was seen from the praça that natives were coming to put themselves under the obedience of the Hollanders, and that some men-at-arms went over to them, as for instance the rebel Dissanaca Modellar and others, and before the scaling, the Dissāva of Maturé [placed] by the King of Candia. On the third day of the bombardment, the 11th of March, there arrived three more of those powerful ships which were blockading Goa by sea, which again landed 600 quaketeers on the same spot of Magâle. On the 12th of the month, at noon, there came a Holland with a drum and a white flag making his way from the trenches to the wall, and with him the Captain of Batescalou, João Festa, with a letter. Lourenço Ferreire de Brito well understood what it might be, and lest there should be some disturbance, he directed them to be ordered to return to their quarters. But either because
they remained longer than was necessary, or because all do not know the courtesies of war, one of the Captains of the bastion of Sant-Iago ordered [his men] to fire muskets on them, and he was reprimanded for it, though he had not been fully obeyed, because those who fired did not want to kill them; and being called by their companions they returned.

The enemy, who found himself strong enough for anything, took occasion by this insult to refuse quarter therewith; and he resolved to storm the praça when only the bastion of Sant-Iago had been razed, and all the battered walls without parapets and very low. After ten days of bombardment and after approaching nearer on the 11th and 12th, he brought from the ships many ladders and sailors to plant them. At the beginning of the dawn watch the Captain received information that launches from the ships were making towards the town, and two spies told him that the Belga was busy in his quarters and was serving out ladders. He at once ordered the signal of alarm to be sounded and it was reported that in the bastion of Santa Cruz they were fighting with the launches which attacked on that side. He well understood that this was a diversion and a feint to get the men to hasten thither, and he ordered Manoel Braz to tell them not to come to the coast but to assist each other if the danger required it. After this alarm the enemy came attacking the walls with 1,100 Hollander musketeers and 300 Bandanese and Malays, and with great gallantry and resolution, though wounded by many shot, they laid ladders to the two bastions of the Conception and Sant-Iago, and on the rest of the wall up to the beach of the bay. Commander Costra led the right wing, and the left, on the side of the bay, was led by the master of the field, and all the officers did the work both of Captains and soldiers. After receiving the first volley of artillery from afar, they fired on them with swivel guns, and a stone mortar of the main guard which commanded [that part] up to the bay, carried off almost the whole squadron of 300 men who attacked on the beach, but at the second shot it burst and carried away a part of the curtain through which the Batavian was finally able to advance easily after pressing on that part with all his might. In the curtains and bastions there began a cruel and sanguinary battle, with sword and fire, of which the enemy had many devices being determined not to turn back, while their officers threatened them with death, and for those encounters instead of bhang, which the Asiatics use, they gave them wine to drink with powder, thus supplying by loss of sense the lack of courage to those who have no courage by birth; and these are the men whom God used for our scourge!

The Captain of the praça, thinking that the enemy under cover of his ships might attack along the beach with rowing boats, visited those posts, but seeing that there was no danger there, he ordered those on guard over the bay to go to the walls, which they did; and all fought with reckless courage, so that the Hollander officers cried out to their men "Conquer or die." In this conflict Captain Manoel Barbosa was killed by a shot on the breast while he was hurling the ladders of the enemy; and whenever one lost his life on one side or on the other, another took his place. And as the bastion of Santo-Antonio was not attacked, it valiantly assailed [those who attacked] the Conception which it commanded, and the same was done by those of the neighbouring forts of artillery and musketry. All the others were occupied in defending their posts, as it was always dangerous, especially at night, to quit them, and the Dissavas were busy animating their men, but the latter gradually abandoned them in the darkness. Antonio Fernandez da Cunha, an old resident of Gale and a whiteman keeper of the Castle of that praça, went with the patrols of his brother-in-law, Manoel Rodrigues, to aid the bastion of the Conception, but his hand was pierced by a spear. Simão de Campos with his companions and Francisco Goncalves Velho with his soldiers, fought with such valour with sword and spear and muskets and pots of powder, that the enemy could not enter through that place, for as the bastion had a terrace, they were able to attack and defend themselves.

Knowing this weakness as well as the others already pointed out, the Hollander assaulted the bastion of Sant-Iago more than the others, and there the struggle was kept up most fiercely, and many of the enemy fell, and others who were burnt went to the water and fell dead, but as it had but a small terrace, the fire darts as well as the many grenades which the enemy hurled did much damage, and the greatest of all was that the grenades set fire to the barrels and cartridges and pots of powder which we had there, and burnt many Portuguese. The Sergeant-Major at once sent the Dissavas of Mat. of Coria to bring powder, munition and pots of fire, for that bastion, and the Captain of the praça, seeing that the scorched and the wounded men were retiring and that there were few men in it, at once hurried thither with the men of his patrol, and as it could contain only a few, he reinforced it thrice, because being scorched by the many grenades which the enemy hurled with great facility, because it was open and low, they were obliged to retire, and on the third occasion when he relieved it, he was wounded by four bullets, from which he fell
almost dead with his right arm almost broken and himself rendered incapable of directing any longer. As the storming continued, some casados and soldiers were killed over and above those scorched, and one can scarcely believe what is related to have been done by a young Portuguese boy of Gâle. Here the Captain and the Ensign-Major, Valentim Pinheyro, fought with great courage, and though it was first thought that he did there, it was afterwards found out that he rallied out of Gâle badly wounded with others, as we shall describe, and that on the way to Columbo he was taken by the natives and led to Candas where on the order of the King, and because he refused to apostatize or to worship idols, he was ordered to be impaled and lived three days in that torture praising God with great courage and inveighing against idolatry. But as there was no one at hand to defend it, the bastion was entered by the enemy, who making use of our artillery dislodged the men who garrisoned the curtains of the wall.

The Hollander at once pressed on that place and on the wreck with great forces which he had reserved for this purpose; but when he sought to come down from the bastion to the main guard he was stoutly opposed by the Dissâva, Antonio de Fonseca Pereira, with those whom he was able to get together from the garrison of the bastion, from the patrol of the Captain, and others who were succouring. Here Captain Bernardo Goncalves was so badly wounded that he soon died; the Captain of the Caifirs Domingos da Silva died also. Francisco Goncalves, a merchant of Negapatao, there received seven wounds, till at last after a long and doubtful conflict, the one who had the greater forces got the upper hand; and as the Belga now had large forces within the walls and had become master of the main guard, the survivors withdrew to the retreat. Here the Sergeant-Major was badly wanted with his patrol, but he must have been occupied elsewhere, and as there was no one to give information to the other posts there was no one to help either, for as all this happened before it was fully day, and as the danger was not clearly realized, and as the enemy did not desist from any of the neighbouring ones, there was none even from the most remote to give any assistance. It is no small misfortune to have to command in similar conflicts, and it was no small misfortune that this cavalier lacked presence of mind on two occasions of such importance, namely on the field and in the praça, because the enemy could never have been better overcome if only there had been some one to play the part of a furious Mars.

In this way the enemy entered the little bastion of Sant-Iago. Though our men had previously repelled him twice, being reinforced, he attacked it a third time, and when they carried the bastion, the retreat was already being scurried, so that it might clearly appear that another arm\(^1\) was against us, for all admit that the resistance lasted a little longer, they would have retired and embarked in disappointment, and that the storming had cost them, at the foot of the walls before they entered, more than 450 Europeans, including in the number more than 15 Captains and nearly all the Malays and Bendane, and that they lost there nearly 700 men, and that more than 500 Hollanders came off wounded, of whom the greater part died. Our men were ever persuaded that had Captain Lourenco Ferreyre de Brito not risked his life so much, or had he been alive for half a watch longer, till the light of day made the enemy realize his loss, and our men the danger which most needed attention, the enemy would not have gained his object.

Having captured the main guard, the Hollander opened the gate of the fortalice, and those who were outside entered by it, and they again formed into two squadrons: one under the master of the field advanced to the Misericordia, and the other hugged the ramparts which the soldiers, being driven by the artillery of the surrounded bastion, had abandoned after the death of the two captains, Lourenco Velozo and Antonio Rodriguez de Andrade, and many of their soldiers. This squadron arrived at the bastion of the Conception and the Portuguese, sallying out, halted at the entrance to the street, where the battle was renewed with many deaths of the enemy, there falling on our side many casados and soldiers. Here Philip Ferro das Neves, a veteran casado of the fortalice, did deeds worthy of praise, for rekindling the valour of his better days, he sold his life at the price of many lives. There fell also Domingos da Cunha, pierced through the breast by a chain bullet shot after fighting with the utmost valour. Owing to the loss of these cavaliers and others, the enemy was able to become master of this bastion in which he left a garrison, as he had done at that of Sant-Iago.

\(^1\) I.e., God's arm.
Thence he advanced to the bastion of Santo-Antonio, to which some of our men had retired, and from which the Sergeant-major had sallied with some Portuguese, and encountering the enemy and seeing his plan, had retired, but not to the bastion. The enemy seeing that it might cost him blood, sent for the wife of Antonio Lourenço Forte, and when she was brought to his presence, he asked her: 'Who will be responsible for these lives?' But she did not reprove the decision of her husband, nor would he have admitted any other than death. Francisco da Silva, Dissava of the Seven-Corlas, being abandoned by his lascars, fell at his post at the foot of the bastion. They arrived at the gate, where one of our falcons with a shot killed many Hollanders, but they paid for it with more than 30 men; and captain Antonio Lourenço Forte, who, with some companions, fought bravely, and captain Bertolameu D’Eça, fell in this conflict, as the enemy did not spare the lives of those who surrendered. Leaving a garrison there, the Hollander continued the storming.

When the Dissava of Maturé was returning with the munitions he had gone to fetch for the bastion of Sant-Iago, and had arrived at the Misericordia, he came upon the detachment of the Master of the field and also some black troops and those of Rana whom the Captain of the praça, before he fell mortally wounded, had summoned from the beach to reinforce the bastion of Sant-Iago; and he tried to form them in order to attack that detachment, but he was not able to hinder them, because the artillery of the bastion and the musketry of the advancing detachment swept the whole street, and seeing himself alone, he went towards the bastion of the Conception and encountered the Sergeant-major, who told him that the two land bastions were already taken. Together they returned to the Retreat, and meeting various parties of the enemy, they escaped towards the open coast with 15 Portuguese, and there they were taken. From the churchyard of the Misericordia the squadron of the Master of the field descended to S. Domingos, where the Portuguese and the Caffirs, who had been able to retire from the captured posts, were assembled, and though the captain of the breastwork and the Dissava of the Four-Corlas attempted to attack that party along with these and fired their muskets at the enemy who were descending, yet seeing that the majority withdrew in order not to throw away their lives uselessly, since it was a hopeless enterprise, they went up to the retreat, where at last 60 men surrendered on terms, seeing the little use of so few men making a stand.

The enemy meanwhile was storming the town in various parties, killing some Portuguese in cold blood, though they were ill in their beds; and sending a detachment to the mouth of the bar, he fell on the rear of those who were still fighting with the launches and shallops; and the latter seeing themselves attacked afresh, retired to the bastion of Santa Cruz in which there was much artillery, and there they defended themselves from the one end and the other with deaths on both sides, till they were overpowered by a large force of Hollander; whereupon seeing that they could not escape, when all the rest of the praça was taken, they also surrendered with the rest. The launches came to land and soon disembarked all the men, and the whole praça fell into their hands; because besides the dead already mentioned, they killed captain Lorenzo da Costa who, wounded as he was, hurried to the bastion of the Conception at the time of the storming and many Ensigns and Sergeants; and on account of the loss of so many officers, the enemy was more free to storm the praça; and if they had had the good sense to gather all the men in the fortified and under its shelter, the enemy was so broken up and hurt, that it is believed that he would have been the conqueror after having been the conqueror.

When they attacked the fortress, they had order from Commander Ostra not to give quarter to the besieged on the score of the insult done to his envoy, but when the Commander came within the walls, considering, it seems, the valour with which they defended, and the changes which fortune is wont to give in war, he ordered proclamation to be made by beat of drum not to kill any person in cold blood, which they interpreted in the manner we described. When everything was already in the hands of the Hollander, he ordered the Portuguese soldiers to be embarked, because, as soon as the enemy entered the bastion of Sant-Iago, the black troops went to the watch tower on the open sea, and some by swimming and others wading, escaped to their villages or to Colombo and with them went a few Portuguese, after they had lost all hope, so as not to be killed in cold blood, and on the road to Colombo they were either killed by the natives or taken prisoner to the King of Candea, only one escaping who succeeded in getting into one of the dhowneys which General D. Antonio Mascarenhas had sent with munitions to Gâle; and returning with this information, gave him this sad news.

The Hollander turned out of the praça all the natives of the country who were there with their families, and some Portuguese women mixing with them went also with their
little children, fleeing death, and many CCamas1 carried the children whom they were nursing when they saw the Mothers and the Fathers in the power of the enemy. The enemy gathered the rest of the Portuguese in the Church of the Misericordia and in the church of the Mother of God, of the Fathers of the Society of Jesus, placing a guard on both. The clerics, religious, vicars and inquirers of convents of the fortalice were in all 19, and on the following day they were embarked. The Father Luis Pinto, Superior of the Society of Jesus, and Father Antonio de Pedrosa, Chaplain of the arrayal, showed on this occasion that valour could give a good account of itself in any state; in which also the Franciscan Father, Friar Antonio de Nossa Senhora, distinguished himself; and neither they nor the others failed in the piety proper to their profession, in confession and other succours of the body and soul. The Portuguese casados were embarked next with their families, and among them Captain Lourenço Ferreira de Brito who, as all admitted, would have died, were it not for the good care which the Hollander Commander ordered to be given to him, himself visiting him and treating him and all his folk with all honour.

This praça was assaulted at the dawn watch on the 18th of March 1640; the battle at the ramparts lasted two hours and the storming till 10 o'clock. There died at their posts, or at those to which they were afterwards called and where they assisted, the Captains, Manoel Barboza, Bernardo Goncalves, Domingos da Silva, Lourenço Veloso, Antonio Rodrigues de Andrade, Antonio Lourenço Forte, Bertolameu de Melo, Francisco da Silva [and] Lourenço da Costa. In the defence of the ramparts died 24 casados. They killed in cold blood Joao Rodrigues Leyrató, the former captain of that praça, who was ill in his house, with two or three others. Nine Portuguese lads of Gale were killed also. Such was the mortality of the enemy that it is certain they did not celebrate the victory and they used to say: “In Malaca much gold, in Gale much shot.” And in order that this victory might cause greater stir in India, in revenge for the many men they had lost, they distributed those who survived in 13 sail which they had there along with 27 shallows and launches. Of these ships three went to Batavia, some to Maláca, one to Achem, another to Maçulopatas; two [went] to take elephants in Batacolou in return for which they dismantled the fortalice of Triquinimale and afterwards that of Batacolou to appease the King; but after taking Columbo and falling out with him, they again seized them. And on account of these delays, and with no small suspicion of their being given chumambó1 or oyster [shell] lime with the rice, many prisoners died.

These miseries extended to all, because in the ship “Travér” alone, which went from port to port as far as Batavia and where being the last to set out, carried the sick of the hospital, there died 63 Portuguese; and another which went to Maláca, and which carried more than 100 wounded Hollanders, only three escaped with their lives, some dying of their wounds, others of berebere; and of the 30 Portuguese, 20 succumbed, and in the same proportion in the other ships. And as of all the Hollanders who attacked the praça, not 50 remained unscathed, (because though our bullets, being generally of arquebuses, do not do as much damage as theirs from muskets, yet on account of the greater expedition with which our men wielded them, they made up for the greater damage of musketry,) and besides those who died within the praça in great number, so great was the mortality in these voyages that nearly all the infantry of the enemy perished. The wives of the Portuguese who died on the voyage and in Batavia in the space of one year (for after that died many others) were 25, children 35, the captains killed in the storming 11, wounded] and captured five, of whom two died in captivity. The casados of Gale wounded in the storming 11, of whom three died prisoners. The soldiers born in Gale wounded in the scaling were 4, of whom 2 died. Stranger casados wounded in the scaling, three. Captains captured on the same occasion 18, of whom three died. Soldiers captured in battle and in the storming who died in the voyage and in Batavia, 95.

Such was the end of the fortalice of Gale, a terrible spectacle to those who beheld it or think of it, and ever lamentable to the state of India. For, besides other political considerations, who is there that does not feel for the affliction of so many women at the sight of their husbands, sons, brothers and relations, killed in these streets, or others who gave up their souls to God and were killed under their own eyes, which made some offer their own throats, either to deliver them or to escape from the affronts which they already experienced and dreaded? The Chingalá rebels, who also entered the praça, did not spare even the innocent, and at the sight of this carnage the white ladies D. Thomazia Countinha and Joana do Couto died of grief. The streets were littered with the dead Portuguese and Hollanders, some scorched to death by fire, others torn to pieces by shot, and others riddled with bullets; and

1 Tam. chumambó, Anglice “chumam,” prepared lime.
the Caffirs had to spend three days in burying them, 10 or 12 in each pit. There was no one there who did not wish to die where so many had fallen, especially honourable ladies, in order to escape being outraged and affronted by heretics, as happened to them in Batavia, where clad in poor clothes, going about barefooted in the streets and thrown among slaves in poor huts, they were put to Auction day after day, being often ordered to assemble, at one time to be counted, at another to receive a mat, again to receive a plate or a porring of good cloth, and sometimes a cloth of the most miserable slaves, without any other clothing to cover themselves with. For the measure of rice, wretched and rotten, and the bazurco for curry these ladies who had been wealthy had even to go to the house of the one who distributed it, and bear insulting words and not a few blows. For want of medicine and nursing not a single pregnant woman escaped, and the same fate befell nearly all the children, and persons of the weak sex and delicate breeding died without any wound.

The religious and the soldiers were put in the jail between Javanese; and the soldiers chained two by two, laboured at the walls with plenty of blows. The casados in the same way, in workmen's breeches, had to find shelter in stables where their wives shared with them the poverty and the alms given them. The sick were placed in a hospital which among them is misery itself. The council ordered that all the orphan boys and girls and the widows be taken to the orphanage and instructed in the sect of Calvin. The execution of this order raised a desolate wailing in the street of the slaves among those Catholic women, and such that it moved the very heathen to pity. They were drawn up in lines and by dint of blows made to go to their kirk (quebra) to hear their sermons and to assist at their prayers. They forbade them beads and images, believing that by these means they were able to make them remain in Batavia, but through the exertions of Father Luis Pinto and others, after nine months of prison, they gave the children leave to quit the orphanage and exempted them from attendance at the kirk. They afterwards allowed ransom to those who could pay, but not to the soldiers, though some obtained their liberty under the name of merchants, and after a long period of imprisonment, they allowed it also to the religious. A few days after their arrival in Batavia, they told the soldiers that there would be no ransom but that they might serve the company on the pay given to the others, and that otherwise they would be sent to Holland, and in order to bring them to accept this, they gave them worse treatment and greater punishments. About 20 were prevailed upon, as they were not able to bear the troubles of the prison, the reproaches of captain Lourenco Fereira de Brito having no effect on them nor the warnings of the religious, who however kept others back; and though they offered ransom, about 80 were sent to Holland, making use of their services on the voyage as well as of those who accepted pay for want of men for the 10 large sh. ps which alone returned out of the 24 which had come that year; for no less was the expense with which they kept up this war.

I wished to give this information about the treatment of the Hollander once for all, so as not to have to repeat it at other times; because though even among them there are men of honour and of good nature, the knaves and common people are insufferable, and in the case of our greater folk, we always found greater hatred in the Zealander whom the people call Pichelingres, and so great are the insults which the Portuguese nation has received from the United Provinces in all the four quarters of the world, that we shall not come up to what the world expects of us, if by all means that are lawful and suitable, we do not endeavor to recuperate and recover what we have lost in India. They fought on these occasions like Hollander of this century; but whoever measures our forces and expects more from constancy and human valour expects impossibilities. I cannot deny that good counsel was partly wanting in the resolutions which they took, and that good sense was wanting in one person in the conflicts of greater importance, but one who expects more from casados and train-band men and from so few soldiers, does not know what the Hollander are, nor does he consider the esteem due to the Portuguese nation.

This defeat was manifested by God, on the very day that Gale was taken, to his servant Pedro de Basto in the bleeding and woeful figure of an Ecce homo as we have shown in his life, and whoever considers well all the blood that was shed there, the scourge of the State of Ceylon and of Portuguese honour on that field and in that praça, and how much our reputation was exposed to shame in the East, seeing the sceptre and Crown of Ceylon turned to a mockery of fate, and a disgrace to the Faith among heretics and infidels who do not know it, will find that this misfortune cannot be represented by a better or more appropriate figure than an Ecce Homo; for God thereby showed clearly that on the one

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1 Vida 385.
2 A representation of Christ after the scourging. Ecce homo.
3 Behold the man. John, XIX., 5.
hand He chastised us with three spears1 as was also declared  
by Him, on the other hand He felt it no less as is here repre-  
sented; and that the wounds inflicted on His feelings were  
no less than the scourges of our punishment, for as He cannot  
fail in Himself, He felt compassion for what his justice  
punished, and the more justly He afflicted us, the greater was  
the grief He represented Himself as suffering. We can be  
quite sure that if we cure these wounds like Christians, we shall  
cure those of the State also, for He was pleased to represent  
this latter and the former in His own person as if they were  
the same and had been His, and that if we are disposed to  
mend, we shall find a man to favour us and brandish in our  
favour the spears that were drawn against us. They also say  
that some time before this disaster a figure was seen to pass  
through the streets of Gâle crying out: 'Woe to thee O Gâle.'  
And it was but right that the grief and regret over so great a  
loss should be represented by sighs, to show that though there  
was the privilege of Sanctuary for the guilty, there is none for  
sin save sighs of repentance.

CHAPTER 8.

P701 Of how Columbo was reinforced and of the other  
Things which took place there and in Gâle  
till the arrival of a new General in  
Columbo

With the Chingalà enemy in sight, General D. Antonio  
Mascarénhas made a muster of the soldiers who had remained  
in Columbo to cure themselves of the wounds received at  
Caymel, who together with the others who were there, excluding  
the officers, made up . . . 2 Whereupon he ordered  
the residents of Columbo to enlist themselves, and he found  
800 men able to bear arms, though some were so despondent  
of the preservation of Columbo that, considering the puissance  
of the Hollander, they thought of going over with their  
families to the opposite coast, which the General prevented.

1 Vide 382. One day when [the Brother] was praying to God  
for the welfare of the State and the Christianity of India, Christ Our  
Lord appeared to him with three spears in his hand saying 'All these  
three spears have to be broken in Ceylon.'

2 Blank in Ms. Word illegible.

With the soldiers he formed four companies, manned four  
manchuas and a galliot to protect the river, from the pass of  
Nacolegâo to the bar of Matuãl, and sent information to Goa  
of the state in which Columbo and Ceylon were. He also attended to the fortification of the City and the defence of the most essential posts, digging trenches with all the diligence which the time and the structure permitted.

If the reinforcements which came from Goa on this occasion had had a different fate, neither Gâle nor the lands which were usually obedient would have been lost, and the Hollander would have met with a different chastisement. For early in February there set out from Goa, Manoel Mascarénhas Homem with 15 rowing ships, with the title of General of Jafanapatoa and with order to assist Ceylon in person and with the necessary reinforcement. In Cochin he was joined by a large galliot with 600 St. Thomas Christians, whose Captain was a valiant Topaz, named Christovão Teles, whom His Majesty had honoured with the habit of the Order of Christ in reward for his services. There also embarked in it, under the influence of his zeal, D. Friey Miguel Rangel, Bishop of Cochin; and they reached Tutuorim in the beginning of March, whence the galliot at once set out for Manãr. While Manoel Mascarénhas Homem was preparing the relief of Ceylon, he received the news of the loss of Ngumbu and that the Hollander was moored in Columbo; and as he was getting ready to go in person to relieve that praça, there arrived D. Braz de Castro with eight ships, being appointed to the post of General of Ceylon, because the disposition of the war in that Island was not approved in Goa. These two Generals, cousins and Captains of fleets, at once set out to relieve Columbo, and whilst crossing that gulf of 35 leagues, they were overtaken, in the middle of it, by such a furious storm that they were only able to make for Manãr, where some ships ran aground with the loss of some men, and there they remained to winter. The galliots also, after a great deal of hunger and thirst, landed the men in Manãr, and on the very day on which the storm burst upon the fleets, she reached Tutuorim under great danger, and being supplied with provisions on the 12th of April, she entered the bar of Columbo, the prophecies that he was going to his doom not sufficing to prevent [the Captain] from undertaking that voyage; and this little reinforcement was a great relief to that City which at this time was in great confusion owing to the delay of the two Generals, for the state of the garrison and of provisions was such, that it would have been in great peril, had the Hollander turned upon it with fresh forces and together with the Chingalà laid siege to it.
D. Antonio Mascarenhas sent the galliot to Tuticorin, asking her captain to inform all along that coast in what state he had left him, and that that praça was short of all necessary things, that he had nothing more to write about himself or of it, because, though he had done so several times, his letters had had no effect; that by ending his life in it, he would fulfill the obligations of his office and the homage which he had given for the whole of that Island, the state of which was well known to him, so that he was able to tell it to those who took pity on Ceylon, so much recommended by His Majesty, as all knew. On the seventh of May the galliot arrived at Tuticorim and her captain wrote with all details to the Ouvidor of Cochin, Agostinho da Almeida, the owner of the galliot, about the state of affairs in Ceylon. When this news reached Goa, it appeared to the Governor, Antonio Teles de Menezes, that the two Generals had begun to winter too soon, and that they might have done more to try to get to Colombo; and by a courier he ordered them to hand over the fleets to the captain of Jafanapataro, Antonio de Mota Galvão, and come to Goa to give an account of themselves. Referring to the same shortcoming, the Bishop, D. Friey Miguel Rangel, said to D. Antonio Mascarenhas on disembarking in Colombo that D. Braz had built a sepulchre over himself. While this relief delayed and there were fears that the enemy would arrive before it, they only held what was within the passes of Colombo, and there was scarcity of everything in the city. But God helped them with two ships of provisions from Bengal and Trangâbar; and D. Diogo Coutinho who had come from Mascate to Negapatam, there loaded four besteyros at his cost, wherein he relieved Colombo; and the city celebrated it as if it were a great relief, the news of which soon resounded throughout the Island.

It was known also that the Hollander Captain of Gâle had gone to Canoea, accompanied by 10 or 12 Hollanders, to urge the Chingalal King to descend upon Colombo, and as the insolence of that nation was already great, and the King did not approve what he proposed, he, without minding the place where he was, fell out in such a manner with the King and with those of his Council that on quitting his presence, the latter ordered [his men] to speak him and the rest of his company. He had left in his place in Gâle a French Catholic named Miguel Santamen; and there was still in that praça, along with other women, a Portuguese lady, a widow, born in Gâle, with two young daughters. Between the Frenchman

and this woman there was an honourable affection and she invited him to surrender the fortalice to His Majesty [saying] that he would be sure to receive great rewards for it. The Lieutenant wished to effect the business, but when he revealed it to some of his own nation, he found they were of a different opinion, and as it was a matter of so grave consequence, being unable to do what he wanted, he climbed over the walls one night with two or three others who joined him, and went to Colombo taking with him some Caffirs and Topazes; and the fears greatly abated on the information which he gave of Gâle, where he had left the garrison without a captain, disunited and exposed to the invasion of the first array that should come there, and though so it promised to be, yet he added that, if they did not believe him, they might take him prisoners in chains. D. Antonio deferred the decision to time and to a reinforcement, and the winter passed up to the fifth of September, and Santaman always behaved faithfully which, the Portuguese knew how to reward with house, honour, and profit, till he fell in Mascate, though we owe little thanks in this conquest to his countrymen, for it was especially they who in the service of the Hollander Company made war on us, as we have related.

As soon as winter permitted it, Antonio da Mota set out with the whole fleet and with four galliots, leaving João Alvares Brestão in his place, who going from Cochin in the beginning of April with provisions for Colombo, had also been driven leeward and had reached Jafanapataro by way of the outside of the Island, after getting rid of a part of the provisions of the storms. This fleet consisted altogether of 24 fozas in which he carried more than 800 men, and passing the Channel of Utifar, he reached Tuticorim where there was awaiting him the Bishop of Cochin, D. Friey Miguel Rangel, with some men and a great supply of provisions which he had got ready at his own cost. They set out thence with a good wind, and with similar good fortune on the fifth of September, they reached Colombo, which was again relieved, seeing so good a reinforcement, and great were the demonstrations of joy of that people afflicted by repeated misfortune. The soldiery was immediately distributed into companies, and the captains exercised them in the militia. The Prelate who on account of the intimate dealings he had with the Vegetable captains, Pedro de Basto knew what God had revealed to him not only about the chastisements of India but especially about those of Ceylon, led by the great trust he reposed in him and by his knowledge of his spirit, sought to placate the wrath of God, and
as soon as he arrived, he ordered a penitential procession consisting of all kinds of people of that city, in which he himself walked barefoot with a rope round his neck and a Cross on his shoulders, along with many other penitents. Beginning from the Mother Church, the procession made its way in this manner through the whole city, and on its return to the same Church, he mounted the pulpit and moved both by zeal and grief, sentiments ever powerful on similar occasions, made a long sermon to reprove sin and move to repentance and amendment of manners and to persuade confidence in the divine mercy.

The effects of these pious demonstrations were seen in the success which followed. For two days after this procession and the confessions which all the people made, God disposed that a ship of Meca should approach that port on the 11th of September, and the General thinking she was a Hollander ship wanted to go in person to meet her, but the captain Antonio da Mota who considered that the enterprise belonged to him, told him in a kindly way: 'That so small an occasion was not for his person and office; that he was going on board and that he hoped in God to conquer, if she were an enemy ship.'

He sailed out with 12 ships, while the others were getting ready, and though the ship tried to defend herself, she was boarded, and he found that she was bound for Musulapatao and had come from Meca with much gold and silver, therewith they forthwith gave double pay to the arrayal. There also arrived in Colombo Jeronimo da Silva with two galliots of reinforcements from Goa, with provisions and money and men; and if they rejoiced at the reinforcement, they rejoiced not less at the person of the Captain, because of the qualities he possessed. And we can affirm that in the four following years they were masters of Ceylon to such an extent that they considered the opposition of both the enemies a jest.

The General found himself with more than 800 men; and in order not to let the enemy remain at the door, as well as because he knew that Galle was already reinforced, as that promontory enjoys two winters and two summers and ships can enter and leave it all the year round, he at once began to think of recovering Negambo. With all diligence he provided the arrayal with what was necessary, ordered the artillery and the rest of the train and munitions to be put on barks and manch纳斯 with a crew under the command of Miguel Santamart, so that they might set out for Negambo from the side of Macau, while Antonio da Mota Galvão entered the territories through the pass of Betal and expelled the Chingalás enemy till he came to a halt within sight of Negambo, as was decided in council.

Meanwhile there arrived in Goa as Viceroy of India João da Silua Telo, Conde de Aveiras; and either because the disposition of the war of Ceylon was enshrouded in reports from a distance, or because in truth there was need of better counsels, it came to pass that the Conde obliged D. Phelipe Mascarenhas, the elder brother of D. Antonio, to undertake the Government of that Island at a time of such great risk to reputation, for none doubted that the wisdom of D. Phelipe was great and that he was the person who in those times deserved to be entrusted with that undertaking, which he could greatly help with the riches he possessed, making up by his ability and knowledge for any lack of military training. He set out from Goa with four galliots and 200 Reynolds who had arrived that monsoon, and as he arrived at the bar of Cochir in a thunderstorm, such as is wont to take place there, a bolt struck his galliot. There he had a meeting alone with the holy man, Pedro de Basto, and as he was so pious about that war, the latter comforted him and told him, among other things, that he would have in one day two victories, and afterwards [he said] to Francisco de Brito de Almeida: 'That if D. Phelipe kept the good resolutions he had, he would be the most fortunate Portuguese that ever set foot in Ceylon.' Such is the power which the dispositions of men have with God, and these two warnings of Heaven did not fail to be of some effect.

1 Twenty-fifth Viceroy, 1640–1646.
2 Reino, 'one from the Kingdom,' a term applied to new comers from Portugal. It was also used to distinguish the European Portuguese from the country born.
3 Vida, 120–140.— When Dom Phelipe Mascarenhas set out from Goa as General of Ceylon, he arrived at the bar of Cochir, and sent a message asking the Prelate to send Brother Pedro de Basto on board, and in order to give him that pleasure and because it was not easy to refuse, the Superiors ordered the Brother to go and have speech with him. When he came near the Flagship, the General took the Brother into a barlo in order to speak with him intimately, leste il tete, because at that time the Hollander was master of Galle and Negambo, and as war was raging in all its fury in that Island, the General was pretty anxious about how he should succeed there. The Brother encouraged him as well as he was able, and among other things, which remained in the memory of Dom Phelippe, we know that he told him that he would have two victories in one day; and that he would return from thence with greater honour from His Majesty, because he saw him between two gilt columns.
4 Vida 398.
D. Phelipe Mascarenhas put into the port of Columbo when the [artillery] train was already embarked and the arrual had already begun to cross to the other bank; and as the new General had the same intention [as his predecessor] there was no delay, and with his brother, some gentlemen, and the reinforcement he had brought, he marched along the beach and joined the others at Nigumbo. There were there 31 companies, in which were 1185 men, of whom, the serjeant-major was Lazaro de Pavia, and in addition the Dissavas of all the colas and the one of Nigumbo, with less men than were usually put in the field, because the lands were in revolt, as had already happened in Gâle. On the way they drove from Urugampola the rebel D. Baltezar, who had joined the Hollander and who fled before the Portuguese arrived. When they were already in sight of Nigumbo, the Captain-major, Antonio de Mota, informed the General and Miguel Santaman of his arrival, and he sent a letter to the captain of the praca in which he said: 'That he had arrived there, and that the General was coming along the beach without delay and another Officer with the artillery and provisions by river to restore that praca to its legitimate Lord the King of Portugal and that he informed him of all this so that before experiencing the rigour of arms he might deliver the fortalice in the state in which it was, for which he would give him all good passage according to the commission he had from the General of Ceylon D. Phelipe Mascarenhas.'

The reply of the Hollander captain, they say, was: 'That he found himself well fortified and well garrisoned, and that it was not right for him to surrender a praca for which he had given homage to the Company at sight of mere threats, since he was free from damage, had a good force and plenty of arms, munitions and provisions; and if he had the order he spoke of, he might set to work, and the battle would show to whose side fortune was inclined.' As soon as he despatched the convoy he ordered three volleys of artillery and musketry to be fired, the third one with shot; and at once he turned out more than 400 useless persons who had retired to the praça on the news of our arrayal. The captain-major gave them passage into the interior, and as he knew that the rebel D. Baltezar was in Gâleilui, two leagues from Nigumbo, he ordered the Dissavas to be on the watch.

He at once began the work of trenches and ramparts which was done in one night, and the morning found the artillery placed therein in spite of the many volleys of artillery and musketry which the enemy fired; and on the third day there arrived the General who left Captains Luis Goncalves de Souza with the Reynolds in the Island of Jorge Fernandez de Abreu to protect it and to disturb the enemy therefrom with musketry. Then he came to the arrayal and formed of it four other bodies, to which he appointed the captains Domingos Ferreyra Beliago, Jeronimo da Silva, Joao Alvares Breta and Antonio de Amaral de Menezes, which with that of Luis Goncalves de Souza made five; and he hemmed the fortalice in such sort that no message could come to it during the siege by land or sea. Four cannon were mounted where-with they went on battering the fortalice so stoutly and with such damage that, though the Hollander replied with the same energy, on the fourth day at midnight, the sentries on the forlorn hope saw the factor sally out with a tambour and a lantern to treat of surrender. The captain ordered his commissaries to say that he was willing to surrender the praca. The General summoned the officers of the arrayal, his Brother also assisting at it, and they settled the military conditions which were best for reputation. D. Antonio Mascarenhas was of opinion that the fortalice should be carried by storm and without quarter, in revenge for what they did in Nigumbo and Gâle and of those killed in cold blood. But the General persisted in saying that he would rather lose a deal of treasure than risk a single soldier and that if it were necessary to buy the praca with all he had he would do so for that reason. The Commissaries returned and delayed no longer than was necessary to take the arms and knapsacks. Meanwhile the arrayal formed outside the batteries at a distance from them, and its gallantry and elegance could have caused envy to the most florid April. (What an opportunity our confidence was to a treacherous enemy!) Captain Paulo Rebelo had order to enter the praça with the Ensign-Major and his company, as soon as the Hollander sailed out, and to plant the banner of Christ, and the Belga (had order) to give up his banners along with his arms within our trenches. Everything was carried out accordingly and the arrayal fired three volleys when the banner was hoisted. There sailed out 214 Hollenders, and
the General entered the praça to give thanks to God in the
Hermitage which was in it. This recapture took place in
the November of [1640], and it was the first praça which we
took from the hands of the Hollander in the Eastern State.

The General immediately received tidings that D. Baitezar
was marching with his army, because he had been agreed that
he should fall upon the arrayal while it was engaged in the
assault, but as no further tidings had reached him, he thought
that the volleys fired as a salute were given in the assault
we were delivering on the praça, from which also it may be
seen how wise it was to receive their surrender. D. Phelipe
Mascarenha, who well remembered what was told in the bar
of Cochim by his Prophet, Pedro de Basto, when he promised
him two victories in one day, with great joy and confidence
at once ordered Captains Pedro de Souza, Rodrigo Mateo,
Antonio da Mota de Oluyerra and Manoel de Souza Falcao
with their companies and the Dissavas of Nigumbo and
of the Seven Corlas with the black troops, to rally out to meet
the enemy. 'He does not come at a bad time,' said Pedro
de Souza. They set out in all haste, and soon sighted and
gave battle to that large host of Chingalas with such fury
that they broke and fled. D. Baitezar was killed (and therein
lies all the success) at the hands of a Lascarin fisherman who
cut off his head, and to whom was given the honour which
belonged to the former. In him the King of Candaea lost
the best captain he had, and we, our greatest enemy. The
General who was sure of success awaited the news with joy,
and as soon as he heard it, he thanked all for the good service
they had rendered to His Majesty saying to the Hollander
Captain: 'Such is the fate of those who confederate with the
Hollander Company against the Lieges of the King my Lord.'
During this time the Most Holy Sacrament was exposed in
the Mother Church of Columbo and [in the other churches
of the Religious; and thus both in the city and in the arrayal
they gave thanks to Our Lord for these repeated successes
with double satisfaction and three volleys of artillery were
fired; and in Nigumbo the soldiers rested during the following
days.

Afterwards the General divided that army into two
detachments, one under the command of Joao Alvare Bresto
with 10 companies and the Dissava of Maturé to reduce
those lands to obedience as far as Alencio, the other with
21 companies and the Dissavas of the Seven and Four Corlas
and of Sotrango commanded by Antonio da Mota Galvao,
Captain-Major of the field, who penetrating into the Seven
Corlas and the other districts of his jurisdiction kept clearing
them of the Candiots and subjecting them all successfully,
in which were spent the last days of November and the whole
of December of that year of [1640] when the Restoration
of Portugal took place. The General retired to Columbo
with the exempted troops who accompanied him, after
garrisoning the fortalice of Negumbo and beginning his
government with as much good fortune as was experienced
in Portugal at the same season.

The King of Candaea was waiting with a powerful arrayal in
Ruanela where he had again rebuilt a city, and thither the
Captain-Major went with his arrayal to meet him, but the
latter withdrew to Candaea before they sighted him, so as
not to try conclusions with the victors, as the principal object
of his league with the Hollander was frustrated for the while.
[The Captain-Major] remained there for some days, while
the country rendered obedience, and as he came to know
that in the Seven Corlas and in the country of Gale the natives
had kept in the woods a large quantity of cinnamon in the
storehouses for which the Belga had spent large sums of
money; he ordered it to be brought with no further expense
than that of the transport; and it was so plenteous that a
part of it was consigned to the fire. While it was being
brought, he went to Mataguma and thence to Alauva. Joao
Alvare Bresto halted at Calatur where he captured a Hollander
launch and routed some captains of the King of Candaea
who were making fresh incursion into those lands.

The General, to whom the Hollander enemy gave more
concern, was preparing for the siege of Gale, and he ordered
the Captain-Major to leave 10 companies in Alauva with the
Dissavas of the Seven and Four Corlas and to approach
Gale with the 11 companies that remained and the Dissavas
of Sotrango and Maturé, together with the men of Joao Alvare
Bresto, laying to it a slow siege and blockading it until there
should be a time and opportunity to carry that praça. D.
Antonio Mascarenhas, because he was greatly feared by the
Natives, went to remain in Alauva, and that garrison thought
itself safe because of his presence, though he was displeased
that the war with the Hollander was entrusted to another.
His brother did not grudge him posts and honour, but he
feared the effects of his precipitate valour, more adapted for
Chingalas than for European warfare, wherein dexterity and

1 After the sixty years' subjection to Spain a daring and successful
revolution in Portugal placed John, Eighth Duke of Braganza on the
throne. On 19 Jan., 1641, a convention assembled at Lisbon declared
him rightful heir to the Crown, which he assumed under the name of
John IV.
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constancy are wont to prevail over might. The Captain-Major traversed the Island through its most rugged parts near the Peak of Adam, without penetrating to the centre or to the summit of that mountain, and at the end of a march of nine days, towards the beginning of March, near Alega he encountered Joao Alves de Brega. Afterwards passing within view of Galle, with banners flying and drums and tambours beating, they halted near the point of Unawatuna where the enemy [once] disembarked, more than half a league from the praça. There they remained for some days, often provoking the Belga to take the field without his resolving to do so. When the month of June was past, in order to supply himself with victuals, he marched to Accoraza and in a few days returned upon Galle, but seeing the wariness of the enemy, in a short time he went to lodge in Matara. There he received orders from the General to leave eight companies there with the men of its Dissava in charge of Antonio de Amaral de Menezes, and to go to Sofragao with the rest of the army to secure that frontier and to get the precious stones in that country. Now it was already December of [16]41, and in the meantime the lascars were kept in }

BOOK 5.

of Sofragao with 500 men of his guard, having previously sent tidings of his arrival to Antonio da Mota. When he was in Sofragao, he ordered some of his men to be spared for being traitors to him in not keeping their promise to accompany him. Thence he was led to Columbo by two companies of Portuguese, and the General ordered him to be lodged outside the city, in the parish of S. Sebastiao, in a suitable house till he embarked for Goa with D. Alvaro de Ataide. And as D. Felipe had little confidence in his constancy, and as the affairs of Ceylon did not make progress with the Hollander, he was never reinstated in his Kingdom, but becoming a Christian here, as we have already said, and being maintained by the King, he died in this city after having kept up the authority of a King, for he did not lack the valour to be such, if only he had the sagacity of his brother.

The year [16]42 began and everything continued in the same prosperity. In the month of July when our arrayal was encamped six leagues from Galle, the Hollander made some sallies to procure some refreshment. Antonio de Amaral de Menezes, hearing of this, marched with seven companies to the village of Vacuola in the neighbourhood of the praça, where the captains Miguel Godinho Touron, Joao Rodrigues Carvalinho, Manoel Marquez, Manoel de Souza Faleao, Marcos da Costa, Ferriao dos Santos Ribeyro, Antonio Cardozo, a company of Topazes, and about 100 lascars under the command of Joao Cardozo, Captain of the advance guard of the Dissava of Matara, who with some companies and some lascars remained in guard of the camp. Of all these the enemy had tidings from spies. He sallied out of the praça on the Second of August with 900 men, the Portuguese being 180, and attacked them unexpectedly. But they received him in such good order that they made a gallant resistance battling for some hours with musketry, until Manoel de Souza Faleao, breaking through seven or eight lines with a dart, ran it through the eye of the Leader Revira who was in command, and returning to his men cried out saying: "Sant-Iago, Cavaliers, the Captain Major of the enemy is killed." They all charged the enemy with such fury that they drove him from the field, routing him

1 A name which still survives in 'San Sebastian ward' of the Colombo Municipality.
2 Where the Author saw him, p. 17.
3 Wakwella.
4 Captain Wrathe de Rivire. In the Gallic Dutch records there is no mention of this engagement, but there is mention of "our last expedition to Bacquel," J. XVII. 299; and "the disaster of the 9th of August last," J. XVII. 264.
in such manner that almost all were killed or captured, and they followed them right up to the walls of the praça upon which they fired three volleys of musketry.

There we lost 30 Portuguese and some were wounded, who being taken to Columbo were assisted with all necessaries by the General, who wrote his thanks and promised rewards to the soldiers who took part in this action. In't our lascars remained neutral, giving us to understand that had the victory gone to the Hollander, they also would have been against us. In any other warfare the action of Manoel de Souza Falcão would have been found fault with, but there is no persuading another course to the captains and soldiers of India, because they persist in saying: 'That when forces are unequal, only reckless daring can gain the victory, that as the European enemy is equally dextrous in fire arms, though inferior in hand weapons, if the war has to be carried on with muskets and arquebuses, those who are less in number must necessarily fall first.' There is, however, one argument against them, for when the proportion was the same, a few against many, in the lighter encounters and in the battles of importance, which we fought with the Belga, we always obtained the victory in the former, but were overcome in the latter, which proves to me conclusively that it could only be due to lack of European discipline against more numerous enemies, for we must not always look for miracles, and for a chastisement of Heaven it is enough to let the natural causes and dispositions act.

CHAPTER 10.

ANTONIO DE AMARAL DESTROYS THE MOORS OF MATURE.


To give some rest to the soldiers who suffered incredible hardships in this method of siege, Antonio de Amaral set out for Maturé leaving the Hollander anxious to take satisfaction for the defeat he had received, for which purpose the latter leagued with 200 to 300 Moors who were settled in Maturé and

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Peil of whom there were some also in the ports of Aicaó and Calaturé, after Constantino de Sà had driven them out of Ceylon, having come thither from the Maldive on occasion of the subversion of some of those islands. The Hollander promised them plenty of money, favour, and shelter within the fortalice of Gàle, where there were some already, and supplied them with the necessary arms in order that on a certain day, when the arrayal was hearing Mars and disarmed, they might attack and behead them. God did not permit that plot to remain unknown, because one of the Moors disclosed it; and the truth of it being ascertained, the Captain ordered all to take up arms and surround the bazaar in which they dwelt, and they were all slain and their property captured and confiscated, and the women and young children sent to Cilumbo. The Hollanders in Gàle also suffered great privation on account of the slow siege laid to them, and not a few of them fled to us. D. Felipe Mascarenhas tried all manner of means to recover Gàle, not sparing promises out of his own as well as of royal property. But as those of Gàle did not accept these terms, he repeatedly put before the Council and those most experienced in the Island, the war, and the manner of surrounding that fortalice; and the majority were of opinion: 'That it was not convenient to abandon the posts of Manicaruvà and Sofrásó, because the Chingalà might at once cause a revolution in those lands and reinforce the Hollander with whom he was in league; that the fortalice of Gàle was strong by position, and now that it was reinforced by the Belga, it was much more difficult to carry it by assault, and not less difficult to besiege, as the train of artillery had to be carried for 18 leagues over large sandy plains and many rivers and we had no fleet to secure the artillery by sea; that it was not convenient to undertake this ineffectual expedition both because of the reputation that would be lost and because of the inconstancy of the Natives; that for a slow siege by land the small light arrayal that was in that Province was enough, as there was no power in Ceylon to impede its being reinforced by sea as often as they liked.'

There was one, however, who wrote to the Viceroy, the Conde de Aveiras, that the fortalice of Gàle was destitute of troops and the greater part of them infirm; 'that it could be recovered with little trouble and less cost, if we attacked it with any force at all; that D. Felipe delayed the war without reason, being more interested in private affairs than in those of the service of His Majesty.' These zealous persons often receive credit because of the want of knowledge or experience [of the Governors], and this complaint was far
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removed from truth, because on account of the liberality with which he spent his own, and because of the plenty he had, the Chingalas and the Hollanders used to call him the 'King of Gold.' The zeal which characterized the Conde, kindled by these informations, made him write about this matter a letter which could have given rise to a result similar to the death of Constantino de Sá de Noronho, had D. Felipe not acted with greater self confidence than not with less grief. The Count had assisted Ceylon as well as he was able and he promised again not to fail in reinforcing the Island, as he always did, with the earnestness which the possibilities of the State permitted, and after this promise he added that he regretted much to hear that the expedition to Gâle had not been carried out owing to the opinions of those who were consulted, from whom it would be good to ask on what occasion and at what time that praca could be better recovered than when it was so afflicted and in need of men as it was represented to be, and when the few it had were sick, while our arraial was so well provided? And if they replied that they were of this opinion because of the truce made with Holland, he would like to know, besides that the conclusion of such a truce had not yet been proclaimed in Goa, save the news of it from Portugal, how a truce could well be observed with the Hollanders if they were masters of Gâle. And if it appeared to the Councillors that to begin the siege was to aggravate the war, contrary to the wishes of His Majesty, he considered it a manifest error, since we only recovered what they took from us and only did what was our duty; would to God that the State of India had been in a position to recover Malaca, which was again lost and the rest of the Archipelago, for he would never consider what the Councillors represented as an obstacle, if he thought it was not what was conducive to the service of His Majesty.' And he concluded after other arguments. "I ask you again and repeatedly to carry out the enterprise of Gâle till you wrest from the hands of the Hollanders that fortalice of His Majesty, and this it is that is conducive to his royal service."

D. Felipe Mascarenhas replied to this letter with expressions of just resentment and dignity, further declaring the reasons which moved him thereto, which were based principally on those pointed out. And though there was one who advised him to place the battering artillery in three galliots and set sail for the Cape of Comorim and turning back make for the point of Gâle at a place where the artillery could be landed, and he showed himself pleased with this project, he did not agree with the opinion of the Count, and continued the slow siege till January, when the enemy again assembled his force at the bar of Columbo and the lands began to revolt in the absence of our garrisons; because neither did the words of His Majesty cease to compel, nor the warning that the ship of the voyage from the Kingdom came with Hollanders passports, nor did the enemy cease to detain ships in the bar of Gâle in winter and in summer from the beginning of December onwards, nor did Francisco de Seyxas Cabreyra, who was expected in August, arrive earlier than the 13th of October with fresh reinforcements at a time when there were already four ships in Gâle awaiting another ten and those which were coming from the bar of Goa, five of which were already in the bar of Columbo. To add to this there were no provisions for the arrival in the District of Gâle, and it was necessary to send them from Columbo, to the companies of Antonio de Amaral. He ended by saying: "I tell Your Lordship all I think—So long as there are ships in the bar to prevent us from carrying artillery thither by ships, Gâle cannot be taken; and I think that even those who were of the contrary opinion already realize that had we gone to Gâle, we should already have lost this Island as matters stand, for the enemy squadrons arrived at the time we could have done it, and even if we had escaped, we should have lost the artillery and the ships, and the retreat would have been very risky and laborious, because the black people would have failed us in everything, as they did on other occasions, while those of the country are enough to destroy us in a journey of 18 leagues with many broad rivers of which there is only a log for a bridge. Nor is Gâle in the straits which they have represented, for there were always above 400 men, and I wish I had been spared from having to say that I could never set 500 men against that praca, even if I abandoned all the rest of the Island, leaving Columbo surrounded up to the gates by the Natives, who already consider themselves lords of the lands and free from the Christian yoke." And after giving a full account of all that had been done, he gave thanks to Our Lord that he had not precipitated matters as those of the opposite opinion desired.

In the preceding September, on the Feast of Our Lady's Nativity, news from Portugal reached Gâle that D. João IV, the Restorer had been acclaimed King; how he had at once sent an Ambassador to Holland and had settled a truce and suspension of arms for 10 years, while the conditions of peace were being adjusted; and that each party should meanwhile retain what it held. The Count Viceroy at once ordered this truce to be published in the other pracas of the State. But
the Hollanders, who still continued the siege of this bar, determined to await order from Batavia, whither the Count sent Diogo Mendes de Brito and Friar Gonçalo de S. Joseph, who in the time of the Conde de Linhares had exchanged the Desanroy of the Sea of Goa for the habit of the Observance, to settle the confirmation of the truce. But they returned without concluding the business, and this siege continuing, there anchored in this bar seven of their ships on 18th September [1642], and on 28th February of [1643] they published the truce with the States on the advice which they received from Pedro Boroeel who had been in Gâle and had come as Ambassador to Goa, where he arrived on the 15th of April with four other ships with order to confirm it, but with some conditions, unreasonable and discreetible to the Portuguese nation. For being a Legist, he held the law of Turkey and that of might and said: 'That as they were Masters of the fortalice of Gâle, they had a right to the whole Province which he called the Kingdom of Gâle, profiting by what he had read in Barbuda, one of our ill-informed Authors, and that according to the terms we should put them in possession of that Kingdom in accordance with Calvinistic reasoning.' By this they sought nothing less than the supply of cinnamon which is made in that Province as far as Sofрагød.

To this proposal they made reply according to the agreement: 'That if outside the fortalice of Gâle they had a palm of land they might keep it; but that they could not give them what they did not conquer and did not possess'. The Belga, who knew that we were again engaged in Portugal against the powers of the House of Austria, while he was bettering himself in Ceylon by alliance with the Chingalâ and in the whole of India, which he enjoyed by means of the force introduced into it, on this specious pretext left the true unconfirmed, reducing like a good Field Juristic the right of law to that of arms; and the arrogance therewith this Braggart behaved is incredible, for as he had experienced little trepidation, he already thought it very easy to master in a short time the whole of India, but this presumption of his was not enough to prevent him from showing his meanness by taking away with him all the ornaments of the house in which he was lodged.

While these things were taking place here in Goa and in Batavia, D. Felipê Mascarenhas had information in Columbo in the last days of December [1641], that there were sailing along the coast of Baticalou and Gâle, 13 Hollander ships with other smaller craft with the news that they were making for Columbo and Nigumbo. He at once ordered D. Antonio Mascarenhas to come down from the post of Alavua to Nigumbo, and Antonio de Amaral, who was near Gâle, as well as Antonio de Mota who was in Sofragaö, to come to Columbo, and these captains arrived and halted between the City and Matuâl. The Belga arrived on the 9th of January [1642], and after saluting the city and making a slight delay, made for Nigumbo followed by the arrayal under Antonio da Mota Galvaö who joined Antonio Mascarenhas in Nigumbo. The latter seeing the enemy enter the shallows to land men on the following morning, ordered the shallows to guard the shore and to open trenches that would withstand cannon, as all agreed to give battle to the enemy there. Those of the country gave the enemy information of all this, and it appearing to him that he could not gain his purpose, he set sail for Gâle, and then pursued the course indicated in his orders without mending the trouble or the cost, because it is their wont to act over cautiously; and as he did not set foot on land, our (lands) remained obedient. By order of the General, Antonio da Mota returned to Gâle with the Dissávas of Sofragâo and Maturé to continue the slow siege of that praça and to keep possession of the country. The Dissávas of the Seven and Four Cais set out with 10 companies to Alavua which D. Antonio Mascarenhas governed a second time at the request of his Brother. From Gâle Antonio da Mota despatched the Dissava of Sofragâo with his men and four companies to secure those frontiers and to recover the precious stones, and thus they went on till the end of January [1643], when, on the information of Pedro Boroeel, there began the cessation of arms, and the dealings of the Hollander's of Gâle with the Portuguese who were residing in Acónavana, about a league and a half from that praça. They were engaged on the orders of the General in transporting provisions and preventing the incursions which the rebel Esquerra Modellar and his Brother were making into these lands, each with more than 500 men. Antonio da Mota set traps for them in diverse places, and falling upon them on the same day and at the same time with the soldiers and with the lascarins divided into two bodies, with little trouble he cut off the heads of both the Brothers and of the rest who could not escape, and peace was restored to the lands and that frontier cleared. Afterwards he passed to the place of Couraçà, whence he sent some companies of black troops to remain in Maturé, Acúmena and Beralapatanota, where lived Gaspar Figueyra da Sarpa with 500 Tascarins and 50 Portuguese soldiers.

1 Akureasa, da Couraçà in the text.
In the early days of May, there came information to João Matheus, Captain of Gále from their Ambassador that the truce was not confirmed in Goa, and immediately there arrived also the 11 ships with which he had set out. Before declaring war, however, he selected 500 soldiers (others say 700, which is more likely, for he had as many) of the garrison and of the fleet, with the black troop who were in the praça under the command of João Vanderlas, better known by the name of João Flaz, and two other leaders called Duncâla and Camoti, and as soon as the information that the truce was not confirmed was given to Francisco Antunes, Dissav, of Maturê, he [the Hollander] despatched this detachment by sea and by land to Belgaô with the intention of taking the Portuguese unawares in the village of Couraça. On this occasion there was in Gále Ignacio Sarmento de Carvalho, who suspecting these designs, in spite of all that João Matheus did to divert him, came in all haste to give information and help to the Captain-Major in the encounter; with whom there was also Lourenço Ferregira de Brito and the arms, advice, and experience of both played a great part in the victory which was obtained as follows.

CHAPTER 11.


This Hollander detachment set out from Gále by sea and land and reached Belgaô in one night, where they formed up and took the road to [A]couraça, the camp of the Portuguese, not as it was better and more used. It was the 11th of May [1643] when the enemy sighted our arraival, which consisted of 200 soldiers, many of them young, natives of Colombo and Gále, though skilled in arms; and though they heard volleys of musketry which they were firing on...
the resistance was greater. He satisfied himself with carrying off a piece of it and giving and receiving wounds from spear and sword, and when his Ensign was also killed, he was ordered to retire. José Gomes de Lomos then went in, but was forthwith wounded by a shot which passed through his right shoulder. The other captains then followed in the following order: Pedro de Faría, Marjos da Costa, Francisco Pajardo, who, before he began to exchange fire, was wounded by a shot through the breast from which he died, Luís de Azevedo, António da Mota de Oliveira, Fernão das Santos Ribeiro, António Cardoso and André Veloso, all of whom fought with emulation and with all valour and resolution. The enemy several times attempted to advance seeing the damage received by this method of war, often shouting out: “Make for the open field; make for the open field”; and once he attacked with such force that he drove our men from the position in which they fought without however [making them] turn their face. The Captain-Major—who fully realized the advantage of this mode of fighting, not only did not take notice of the words of the enemy, but pressed upon him thereupon with all his force till he drove him back and captured the lost position without ever giving it up again; and as the wind was calm and they fought under the shade of trees, the smoke of the muskets was at times so thick that on firing a volley the muskets of the one encountered the faces of the other. So great was the carnage among the Hollander that the dead bodies covered the living. He persisted, however, both because of the advantage of numbers and because they were persuaded by José Matheus that the Português would give up the field in the middle of the fight.

António da Mota considering the state of the enemy and his own, that all were already worn out from so hard fought and continued a battle, and finding that the others agreed with his opinion, ordered them to give 'Saint-Jago' which all did with one voice, and after firing a volley of musketry they charged with the sword with such dash, order, and courage that they at once felt the Português arm, and driving them from the position they put them into a disordered flight, our men giving them chase cutting off the heads of those who resisted and capturing those who surrendered till there being none left to conquer, the Captain-Major ordered them

1 According to the Gallo Records (J. XVII., 425) Tyger Janes was appointed Corporal “seeing that at Acuiras he bravely acquitted himself against the enemy and brought off and carried into their town one of our flags which otherwise might easily have fallen into the enemy’s hands.”

2 Kleyn-Zutphen.

3 The Dutch losses were nearly a hundred men.
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the Dissāva of Maturē with four companies to the frontier of Acecumena, nine leagues from Gāle, and the arrayal kept up this slow siege from June to the Christmas of the same year, when there arrived in Gāle the General Francesco Caron with 19 ships reinforced besides with many other smaller vessels in which he brought 3000 European troops.

Meanwhile D. Antonio Mascarenhas fell ill, and the Portuguese thought that it was from grief, because the General, his brother, removed him from the opportunities of encountering the European enemy. He came to Colombo to be treated, where he was in a dangerous condition and when he became better, he retired to Betal. The General sent in his place Joāo Alvares Bretaō, and because of this change it was rumoured throughout the island that D. Antonio was dead and that the arrayal was attacked with smallpox, adding moreover that Antonio da Mota also fell in the encounter of [A]couraça. This news reached Candea with such assurance that the King determined to come down upon the lowlands and to make himself master thereof with all his forces. Joāo Alvres Bretaō heard of this move and he discussed in Council what should be done; for in truth the force stationed there was limited and there was no lack of sickness. Many were of opinion that they should retire to Colombo. After listening to them the Captain-Major gave his opinion, repeating the Portuguese proverb: 'From the Chingaláz one does not ask how many they are; but where they are!' 'Wherefore,' he said, 'I am of opinion that we should go to meet the King, marching half a league each day till the reinforcement which I have asked from Senhor D. Felipe Mascarenhas arrives, because so long as it is known that we seek out the enemy, everything will be in suspense, but if they see that we retire, they will all rise up against us, as has happened in past wars.' They agreed with his view, and spread the news and spent that day in getting ready, the next in distributing munitions having also ordered the natives to clear the roads; and afterwards they marched along the hill of Dinavāca and halted at its foot.

D. Felipe Mascarenhas continued to send farcastico reinforcements, four or five drums with as many banners and 20 or 30 men; then others in the same way, thus succouring by reputation and not with men, because of the scarcity, for these demonstrations were enough to make the natives give out that there were large reinforcements. Afterwards he asked his brother to go to the arrayal both to believe the

rumour of his death, and because of the fear the Chingaláz had of his person; and as he excused himself on the score of his health and present weakness, D. Felisio insisted saying: "Brother, the service and credit of the King is at stake. Either you or I." "If that is so," replied D. Antionio, "it behoves me to go," and without further delay he put himself on the march; which was greatly praised in him, and rumour not only proclaimed his arrival, but also that the reinforcement would be of 20 companies. This industry was enough for the King to retire, and thus matters went on till the arrival of the Hollander squadron.

CHAPTER 12.

OF THE SQUADRON OF FRANCISCO CARON WHICH CAME UPON NIGUMBO AND HOW D. ANTONIO MASCARENHAS RESOLVED TO GIVE HIM BATTLE

As soon as this Hollander force reached Gāle, the Captain of the praça, Joāo Matheus, desiring to avenge the past ill success, persuaded the Commander Francisco Caron to land 2,000 men to hold the road against the arrayal, but D. Antonio da Mota Galvaō marched the whole night of the 27th December and stealing a march over the enemy, arrived at daybreak far beyond the post of Guindurē where he awaited him. The Belga re-embarked and made sail for Colombo, and our men who were marching along the coast, coming upon the shallop and launches, and when the depth admitted even upon the ships, fought along the way as far as Calatūrē where they met D. Alvaro de Ataide whom General D. Felipe Mascarenhas had sent with some reinforcement as soon as he had news of the enemy, foreseeing the danger there might be in this journey; and from there they marched without delay as far as the Morro where the Captain-General awaited them, and the arrayal remained there three days, awaiting the companies which had remained in Acecumena and the bagage, which marched more slowly. At last they arrived without waiting a single man, though they had to make their way through

1 O Geral in Ms., omitted in printed copy.

The Mound of Mapana, i.e., Mount Lavinia. Moratuwa was also called Morro.

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rough and unused roads to avoid any of the two enemies, and the Captain-Major for this purpose had recourse to the intercession of the souls in Purgatory and had some Masses said for that intention. The arrayal arrived in Colombo, and on the order of the General halted on the other side of the city in the Tanque Salgado. The General also ordered his brother D. Antonio Mascarenhas to come down from Anuva with all haste to Nigumbo and fortify himself in the Island of Jorge Fernandez, which D. Antonio did with great pleasure in order to have an opportunity of facing the European enemy, because as the licence of India spared no one, though the valour of this gentleman was well known, he was not a little disheartened because it was said that in the recent events in the time of his government he was not present at any of the encounters with the Belga, and that after his brother began to govern, he was found fit only to oppose the Chingalas, though D. Felipe did not seek anything else but his credit, and dispassionate judges cannot reasonably condemn his valour, although, as we already pointed out, his disposition was not approved.

The Hollander also was compelled by the wind to make a halt off the Morro, and arriving afterwards in the bar of Colombo, he gave and received from the city some volleys of artillery, and after a little delay he made for Nigumbo, whither the General at once sent three companies of the arrayal of Antonio de Mota to reinforce D. Antonio. The enemy dropped anchor between Nigumbo and Caymel, and D. Antonio informed the General of all his doings, till one Friday, the 8th of January, 1644, he informed him for certain that the enemy sought to land there and not in any other place nearer Colombo, as could also have been feared. Antonio da Mota was of opinion, as soon as he communicated with the General, that Nigumbo should be dismantled, and D. Felipe Mascarenhas also thought that it was the best thing to do, but as there was an order to the contrary from Goa he did not make up his mind to do so. On receiving the last news, he sent the Captain-Major, Antonio da Mota, with four companies to Nigumbo to help D. Antonio with his counsel, experience, and valour, and to secure the Island and the praça.

1 The Salty-tank, Sin. lunu-pokuna, a part of northern Colombo now included in the Graving Docks.
there might be people to defend it, and that the arrayal could minister the necessary reinforcements from the Island till the General, who could not be long, arrived to direct that war as it might seem best to him for the service of His Majesty. All agreed with this proposal as it was the only wise thing, and among others the two captains D. Antonio and Antonio da Mota; and when it was written and signed by all, D. Antonio put it in his pocket. Then Captain Mota ordered four of his companies to garrison the stockade outside the fortalice which served as a barbican to it for its greater safety; and the rest of the force remained in the Island, and he entered the praça to see its state. From there he saw the advance of the enemy and after visiting his companies, he emerged to the field with three solders and stood at a little distance from the stockade noting the passes and dispositions from which he saw clearly that their intention was to storm the fortalice. Here they gave him a message from D. Antonio ordering him to set fire to all the thatched houses which were in the bazaar lest the enemy should take cover under them. Antonio da Mota replied that the enemy was marching towards the fortalice and that it was not convenient at that time to set fire to the thatched huts, because the smoke might hide them. Afterwards, they say, when another message was sent that the enemy was making for the praça, D. Antonio who was with his Confessor Friar Basilio, a Religious of the Observance, sent at once out of the barracks where he was conferring and said: "I must go to meet the enemy. The enemy is marching upon the fortalice. Let the arrayal pass at once to the other bank"; and he was the first to take the road to the bridge leaving in the Island the captains Jeronimo Vieyra and Thomas Antunes with their companies to protect it and Gaspar Moreyra with the jidea to guard the bridge, and there was no one to prevent so rash a determination, for so unreasonable and presumptuous are the points of honour in India in this matter that, though all knew the mistake, they preferred to pay for it with death and disaster rather than be wanting in it; and without making any further attempt to know the force or the dispositions of the enemy as good discipline demanded, they rushed headlong to death as if they had been in a desperate situation and they had awaited for this as the only means or victory. Had they kept the order of D. Felipe Mascarenhas, on the admission of the Hollanders themselves, the result would have been different, for finding it afterwards in the pocket of D. Antonio, Francisco Caron said, holding it in his hand after the victory, to certain Religious of ours (who while going to China in an English ship had been taken in the Strait of Singapore): "This captain of yours must have been pig headed, for if he had obeyed the order of his General, contained in his resolution, the force of Holland would have fallen here this time"; and such also was the opinion of practical men in Ceylon, that we should either have defended the praça, after fortifying the Island with trenches and redoubts, or have overtaken the enemy in his march or have worn him down by various assaults, for the King of Candeia did not move, and 1,400 Portuguese in the open field would not consider it a great feat to vanquish by musket and sword and spear the 2,300 Europeans whom the enemy placed on the field on this occasion, for it was only a few even of the sailors who remained in the ships. But the failures of his time, the desire of revenge, and the desire to make it his affair, seduced D. Antonio and his intrepid valour to such an extent that it blinded him to reason and the predicted fall of Ceylon.

The Batavian advanced in three battalions of gallant well armed men with steel weapons of defence, one from the bazaar and another from the shore with the field artillery between them and the third from behind the houses. In one of them were 800 carabiners and the other two consisted of 1,000 muskeeters each, besides Officers, and 300 pikes who were soon cut down. He sent a party ahead to reconnoitre our forces, but on discovering the Portuguese, they turned back in all haste to their men.

D. Antonio drew up his men in eight companies (we have already said that those of Ceylon did not exceed more than 30 men each), on the side of the beach with the pikes and halberd in the centre, and on the inner side of the river. Antonio da Mota [drew up] his seven companies with greater front than depth with the intention of fighting with halberd and sword. But they did not maintain this order in battle, because each of the Leaders kept following the divided and disordered Enemy, according to the dispositions of the field, pressing those who gave up the field or charged obstinately. Who can withstand the decrees of God! Here everyone followed the decision of a single man, as if there had been no other order, or as if a different plan had not been agreed upon, and as if the inequality of so few men, with only defensive arms; against so many equally dexterous in the use of fire arms and altogether well armed, had not been clearly foreseen. And though they were acting contrary to what they knew to be best, all acted with the utmost human valour, showing clearly that if God had decreed that they should be beaten, it could not humanly speaking be otherwise than by errors. All were equally valiant, but the captain and soldiers of Antonio da Mota had
more experience in the warfare against the Hollanders. Both the leaders inspired courage to the boldest, disposing and ordering matters with all wisdom under the supposition of giving battle. The two met and either to do him honour or to make him realize the danger and to see whether it could still be averted, it is related, that Antonio de Mota asked D. Antonio: "What have we to do, Sir?"; and that he replied: "At the enemy"; and as he still received the respect of a General over and above what was due to his person, this was the final sentence of his ruin. There is a striking similarity to what happened on the field of Alcazar Quibir when D. Duarte de Menezes, Master General of the Field, seeing the great inequality of the Mahometan forces, sent to ask the King D. | Sebastian: 'What was to be done,' and the King spurring his horse answered: 'At them'; and to D. Duarte: 'Do what I have ordered.'

What happened in this battle is so differently related that it cost me not a little labour to verify not only the truth, but even the probabilities; for as this resolution was generally reproved and as the witnesses are the very persons who carried it out, each of the parties tries to lighten the fault of its Chief so that the information is so conflicting that we can only relate what is constantly related, and what concords best with eye witnesses worthy of all credit.

CHAPTER 13.

OF THE BATTLE OF NIGUMBO AND THE FALL OF THAT PRACA

As soon as the Enemy came within musket-shot and the first volley was received, D. Antonio attacked the 800 carabineers and drove them from the field at the first charge and even captured their artillery, which was of no great loss, as owing to the confusion they themselves masked it. D. Antonio kept up the battle with sword and spear rather than with musket, because he relied greatly on the 60 halberds who were led by their Corporal Simão de Azevedo and who worked wonders that day; and they went so far forward in pursuit of the

1 Don Sebastian and his army were defeated and slain by the Moors in Morocco near the little town of Alcazar Quibir (El-Ksar el-Kobir) on 4 August, 1578.
CONQUEST OF CEYLON

others might conveniently increase in order to be equal to him. Any one who saw him court death, as others try to spare their own lives, would easily have foretold his death. Nor was this the first time that the judgment of one single man ruined us by measuring the general effects from one's own personal valour, and if this is a fatality in the Portuguese, it is no little proof of their fidelity. He obtained for us in this war, in his measure, what Portugal obtained in that with the African Xerifes and what Christianity did in the first centuries in that with the Asiatic Turks, because for the greater part they were overcome by those whom they despised or they were reduced to the fatal extremes of destruction, though the terms of defence were not uncertain, because as war depends as much on courage as on experience and discipline, it is of no small importance for its success to be able to realize the dangers fully. Even after his death, D. Antonio killed nine Hollanderse, because seeing a ring on his finger they struggled so much to take it that, without noticing the pointed steel which was on the shield nine were pierced by it as they struggled as to who should have it. There died also Simão de Azevedo, and many of those who had accompanied D. Antonio Mascarenhas in this last encounter even after they saw that retreat was not discreditable, for the fact that they did not seek to save their lives gave spurs to courage. Some made a way for themselves by the might of their arms through the Enemies and among them Miguel Santaman, as he did not expect quarter from them; some were taken prisoner.

This same squadron led by Joao Mateus and by the Master of the Field Tigre gathered all their men who were fighting, and forming afresh, they made for the small body of men who were with Antonio da Mota, who imagining himself victorious on the beach and wishing to join D. Antonio again asked in a loud voice: "What about Antonio Mascarenhas?" But when he saw the enemy who were making for him in the form of a large half moon, like one who has an overwhelming force, he realized the ill success of the other squadron, and knowing well the time and the danger, for there was no means of retiring, he turned to his comrades saying: "Come on my boys, let us go to the rescue of the fortress of the King." Then they tried to break through the midst of the

Batavians and delivering and receiving charges, with slaughter on both sides in spite of the unequal proportion, he lost more than a moiety of his soldiers. And he himself was pierced in the breast by two shot, of which he ended his life at the age of 73 years, the fortunes of that day being so powerful as to deprive us of two principal captains, and this valiant old man, who from his boyhood had fought in India with great reputation and in Ceylon with greater renown, came by his end in this enterprise because he had not the authority to oppose a resolution ruinous in the opinion of all. Antonio da Mota Galvão died indeed, but his fame will live for ever, which is the greatest temporal reward of valour, for thereby, feats of courage are eternalized, and from his boyhood he knew how to gain it, for in the expedition of D. Martin Afonso de Castro to Dachem he was with D. Nuno Alves Pereyra and handed to him the musket with which he put a ball into the eye of an elephant of war which was coming to crush him.

Of those who were still on their feet, some were able to escape along the beach breaking through the thick of arms, and in spite of all resistance about 20 reached the stockade, thinking it was still ours, and going in, they found it occupied by the Batavians who again fired upon them, and only | Joao Botado, Luis Taveira, Amaro Simões Pereyra, Francisco de Avelar, and Manoel de Souza escaped with their lives, whom the enemy for greater security, though they were badly wounded, bound to the same stockade while they stormed the praça. For that small garrison seeing that the squadron of D. Antonio was defeated, and that it would be the same with the other—for in war there is nothing which disheartens more than a general distrust of the plans of the one who commands, and such was already the opinion of all—and thinking it impossible to hold out the praça with 50 of the most disabled soldiers, such as are wont to be left in garrisons, without further ado or consideration, were led out by captain Antonio Gomes who did not even reflect whether it was not better to get into it the two companies of the neighbouring Island, or if the Island were judged more secure, to pass over to it. They crossed the river leaving in the praça its captain, Diogo de Mesquita, a man of great bravery and honour, though Antonio Gomez forgot on this occasion that he was his brother-in-law. And in this fordom state it was only the captains Ruy Lopez Coutinho, Joao de Sequeira and Manoel Lourenço who were able to go to his aid with 13 other soldiers, almost all of them wounded men, who went because Mesquita had represented to them the abandoned state of the praça.

1 Jan Thysen, now President of the Political Council of Galle, and acting as second in command to the General Francisco Carreto. Galle Records, J. XVII, 455.
2 William Van de Beeck, Captain-Major.
These few men made a gallant resistance to the Belga, who dreading the arrival of the General, though badly wounded and undone, yet animated by victory and the knowledge that the garrison had withdrawn, tried to capture it with all possible haste. He offered terms to Diogo de Mesquita, but he did not accept any save that of death. Whereupon seeing the danger done by these few men, he mounted the battering pieces he had brought and the field pieces at the gate of the fortress. With them he carried it, but Diogo de Mesquita replied to him with a large mortar charged with small shot, which did great havoc among those who were there ready to enter. Furious at this loss, the officers shouted that no quarter would be given, and when they attacked the gate, they were again burnt by barrels of powder which the captain flung on them; and as there remained nothing else, for him to do, he died sword in hand while some of his companions were killed in cold blood, and others were taken prisoner, when the enemy’s ire had been appeased by seeing the complete victory he had gained. The loss which the enemy had sustained and which he tried very much to hide, can be seen with great clearness from the men he led to Matual. These never was so great a change of fortune in war than was seen on that day, but precipitate decisions never led to any other result. One advantage the Hollander had over us in these encounters, that he attacked us with such overwhelming odds that even if he lost double the number of men, and three doubles of what we had, he was still able to gain the victory with those that remained, because as the blood of strangers bought with money does not give him pain, he does not mind the loss which greater gains cost him, and profiting by our disorders and temerities he obtained by this pertinacity what could not be helped for from constancy; and their officers do not spare their men when they flee, but first offer these as sacrifices for the victories which they obtain by their means. I do not excuse our actions nor can I condemn courage nor fail to praise fidelity, but since God has decreed our downfall, it was no small honour that out of the many means that could have led to our ruin he chose those that bring honour and repudiated those of infamy. The world will say that the Portuguese were ruined because they were few, and because of their mismanagement, but it will not say truthfully that it was because of lack of valour.

The news of this defeat reached D. Felipe Mascarenhas in the middle of the beach of the Island of Maniçoré, when he was marching for Nigumbo with all haste with all the forces of Columbo, and thither there went to meet him the two companies which D. Antonio had left on the Island, and Gaspar Mornyra after burning the bridge—which was also a great obstacle to those who were retiring and still more to those who were wounded—and sending the last to Columbo, he assembled those who were fit for fighting and ordered the word to be passed that they should march in all haste and turn back all they met, either because he did not yet know of the final loss of the praça or because he believed that, the Enemy being so reduced, he could, by means of the fresh forces he was bringing, at once improve the position and settle with the Belga half vanquished. But as he was a gentleman of sound judgment and saw the danger in which he was placing himself, especially after he had found out that the praça was taken, he yielded to the opinion of the gentlemen and cavaliers who accompanied him, and after gathering the wounded men, he put them in the rear guard and made them cross to the other bank of Matual, nominating Joao Alvarens Bremao captain-major of the arrayal and ordering all to be prepared for any eventuality, foreseeing like a prudent man, that after reinforcing, healing the wounded, and disposing the affairs of Nigumbo, the Belga would not fail to try his hand on Columbo also.

He betook himself to the city, and indoors, in his house, alone and retired, he gave scope to the full grief of this tragedy, bewailing the death of his brother as well as of its cause, for he alone was responsible for this disaster and the danger to Ceylon. At the same time the whole city kept him company with general lamentations for the Fathers, Brothers, husbands, relatives, and friends who were killed. I do not doubt that D. Felipe Mascarenhas after recalling to mind the conditional promises of Brother Pedro de Basto, and considering that so far he had been favoured with prosperous success and that this was the first of the losses that befell him in Ceylon, among the hidden causes attributed to himself some part thereof, because the express condition which the Brother made known to Father Marçal de Leyva, as we have said in his life, and we are sure was not unknown to the

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1 Vida 388. The Brother declared that many of the successes which he had promised to D. Felipe Mascarenhas were partly or totally conditional, to which he said to Father Marcel de Leyva: that if D. Philippe Mascarenhas carried out the resolutions he had made when he was going as General of Ceylon, he would be the most fortunate Portuguese that ever set foot in that Island.

2 Vida 140. The General, while leaving Cochim for Ceylon, left orders that a Mass should be offered daily for the Brother's intentions and Francisco de Brito da Almeida regularly communicated to Don Philippe whatever the Brother said or did about Ceylon.
General himself, when purified by these evidences could not take for granted sufficient faults without there being the knowledge of them, and since he was so sensible and tried a gentleman, [without] their acknowledgment. But he did not escape public reprimands on this occasion in that he put the two captains together, knowing the dissatisfaction of D. Antonio, when it seemed much better to send him his squadron only till the General arrived. But who could have thought that in a matter of such importance a despondency so ill founded was able to lead to such results.

CHAPTER 14.

THE BATAVIAN ATTACKS MAŬĂL AND RETIRES; THE GENERAL DESIGNS NIGUMBO WITH LOSS TO US, AND A TRUCK BEING DECLARED WITH HOLLAND HE COMES AS VICE ROY AND IS WRECKED.

On the following morning the 10th of January, after he had given to grief what was its due, D. Phelipe erne out, decked in a gala attire and rich jewels, so as not to fail in his duty as a Captain, and he mastered his grief, as if no misfortune had happened, and as if he had not lost a Brother of such hopes or an expedition from which he hoped to gain so much glory. He marched to Mutwał and ordered some artillery to be mounted upon the pass of the river, fortifying it with trenches and batteries for mounting cannon from the garden of Antonio da Mota as far as S. Joao. Commander Caron after fortifying Nigumbo and curing the sick, left the other ships in Nigumbo and came with 800 men who were with him, under the command of Joao Mathues and the Fiscal of the ships, along the coast of the Island as far as the mouth of the river of Mutwał, where they came to moorings either out of bravado, because that force was not enough to carry Columbo, or because he was really persuaded that he was able to have better results by passing to Columbo and carrying that praça this time. Our artillery did great damage, to the Enemy in their very quarters, and once when they were in Council a shot carried off three of the members, and every night launches were carrying away the maimed and wounded. And as Caron had come to his side a large body of Chingalá, a person of confidence and of great authority assured us that the General went one night to his house taking in the hollow of his hat a large quantity of gold, which sufficed to make the Chingalá retire. The Belga seeing at break of dawn that the Natives did not respond and that he had not a sufficient force to attempt anything without total defeat, on the following night, in all haste, ordered the train of artillery and men who were on land to be withdrawn, and when the prisoners asked the reason, though they knew it well, they replied: 'Within Columbo is Senhor D. Phelipe Mascarenhas, and it is not possible for us to take that praça.'

This was the last encounter of any consequence which the Hollander had in India in field battle with the Portuguese, and it was considered by them to be of such consequence that it appeared to Francisco Caron that by this expedition he had deserved the Generalate of Batavia on the death of Antonio Vindima who vindicated this vineyard for many years and pruned the Portuguese state in many places, but when that post was given to Joan Macaüicher, better known among us by the name of Massucar, he took offence and passed over with much capital to the service of the most Christian King and paved | the way to the final resolution which that Prince took of flying his banner in the Orient, of the justice and result of which posterity will be the judges. The Portuguese felt this loss, as was natural, both because these losses which we sustained in India were at all times a matter for great regret, especially because they were all at the cost of our blood, a grief which does not affect other nations so much and Holland least of all, for they take men from different Realms and States, as well as because our state was exhausted of soldiers and other things and there was no better opportunity for us to get the better of the European Enemy.

Caron sent word to the General to offer the body of his brother D. Antonio Mascarenhas, and he replied to him: 'That he would come in good time to Nigumbo to disinter with military honours his bones as well as those of the Captain Antoňio da Mota Galvaão where the Hollanders had buried them.' Through Lourenço Ferreyra de Brito the General

1 This sentence is obscure. I suppose it means that Don Philip must have realized that the loss of Nigumbo was a punishment, and that he must have known what the fault was that was thus punished, for there is no guilt without knowledge, and the conditional nature of the Brother's promise implied guilt.

2 1000.—Dutch Records, J. XVIII. 490.

3 The Constable-Major, Christiean Pauluxe, Jb. 488.

1 Cf. Dutch Records, J. XVIII. 504.
sent to inquire whether he was willing to liberate the prisoners of that encounter, offering to pay the price they demanded. The Commander excused himself on the ground that he had no orders from his superiors and D. Phelipe then recommended him to treat them well and to take good care of them and to give them any money needed for their expenses, that he would direct it to be repaid in any part of India where they presented the bill for it. To the Captains and soldiers imprisoned he wrote a letter which was read to them by the Fiscal in the presence of all the prisoners on board the flagship and it said this: "My comrades and friends, I do not regret the ill-success of the arrayal, the loss of the fortalice and the deaths of my Brother and of Antonio da Mota as much as I regret that I was not able to be their companion in the battle, for had it been so, it would either have fared better, or I should have ended my life with them. With the General of the fleet I treated about your ransom, and he replied that it was not possible, and so long as it cannot be so, I have asked him to assist your needs, with all that may be necessary, to be paid out of my purse whenever they like. To the courage with which you fought, the death of the 800 Hollanders, which they acknowledge to have lost in Nigumbo, bears witness. Now I hope in God that you will show more valour in patiently bearing your imprisonment from which I hope you will soon come out; and I promise you to do this clear duty to His Majesty Our Lord, &c. Colombo 14th February 1644. D. Phelipe Mascarenhas." This letter gave fresh spirit and great satisfaction to the prisoners and admonition to the Hollanders; and for these and other doings foreign nations as well as Orientals know him by no other name than that of Senhor D. Phelipe. How little is the benevolence wherewith great men can win esteem, especially in the case of the Portuguese nation, and of people who are of lesser account, considering the little consistency which they show in complaining that men of lesser quality are not esteemed among us, while they themselves do not know how to obey any except persons of higher quality.

The Belga again fortified Nigumbo and the neighbouring Island, and left nearly 600 men and a pinnace with a good crew in that bar; and before setting sail in the last days of February, he despatched two ships and one smack to this coast in which he embarked 45 Portuguese, the most nimmed in the recent conflict and some casados of Cochin and the 18

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1 West Coast of India.
Afterwards the Viceroy despatched the Captain-Major Jeronimo de Silva with fresh reinforcements, and he set out from this bar in the early days of May and successfully came into port at Colombo in the same month. Wherupon D. Phelipe Mascarenhas was able to muster an array of 1,300 men besides officers and black troops, and with the necessary equipment he set out for Negombo in the middle of June of this year [1644]. He sent by river pontoons of artillery, manchus, and other barks laden with all provisions, victuals, and munitions and the fabrics necessary for that war, and all went and lodged within sight of the fortalice. The enemy had built a redoubt in the neighbouring island, upon the river, with artillery and a garrison, whence they not only molested the men of the arrayal but even made it difficult for the reinforcements to come up the river. As it was therefore necessary to dislodge them from that place, on the eve of the feast of St. John the Baptist, the Captain-Major crossed the river, and at dawn assaulted the Hollanders, who though they defended themselves, were taken without loss to us; and some died in resisting, others were drowned and some saved themselves by swimming. Trenches being opened and eight cannon mounted, he began to bombard the praça which the Enemy had fortified all around, from the river to the sea, with a rampart, a fathom and a half broad, and with redoubts provided with artillery, and two cavaletes, at the two ends, one on the sea beach and the other on the bank of the river. In the first days of the bombardment the fortalice was razed, but it did not have the same effect on the rampart because it was of earth; and because through those were winter months on that side of the Island there was no rain at all, they attacked with all those engines loose on the ground.

The Captain-Major Fernão de Mendonça Furtado finding that he had lusty men, and carried away by the easy victory he had in the island, was of opinion that the fortalice should be carried by storm; and he succeeded so much by his reasonings, for he never lacked arguments and words, that he won some over to his opinion, and what is more, they came to speak so freely, that they proceeded to say that it was cowardice to wait so long; and finally they made the General forget the saying of the great Captain, Gonzalo Fernão de Cordova, 'That the greatest victory of a captain consisted in overcoming mistrust.' And as God prepared everything for the punishment of India, as had been so clearly prophesied, as we

said in another work and will point out in this, although it was much safer to carry that praça by a leisurely siege at a time when it could not be reinforced by sea, and there was no fear of this by land, and by getting near with approaches that irreparable invention of ancient warfare and modern, till a convenient breach was made, or by making the Enemy despair of holding out, it, a course recommended by the recent losses, by the lack of men in the State and by the scanty hope of any great reinforcement from Portugal, so long as the war with Castile lasted, not to speak of the reputation of war with Castile lasting, not to speak of the reputation of

P 735 so often lost, which were sufficient reasons to persuade one not to risk a single soldier without need. D. Phelipe Mascarenhas, against his own judgment and that of all the most experienced men, resolved to risk the flower of India in this assault, seeing that the difference of opinion had almost the appearance of a mutiny.

Having given the necessary orders at high noon, when the Sun burnt hottest and the Enemy was most forewarned by the signal of a gun, and the noise of our tambours and clarinets, they faced the shot and the trenches and walls, and all attacked desperately. But the Enemy, who were apprised of their artillery in good time with small shot, and by repeated volleys, fired across the magazines that were mounting the ramparts, they wrought lamentable havoc on the Portuguese, killing some and maiming others, leaving but a few survivors free from wounds. Then quite at their ease they fell upon those who had climbed the ramparts and made the victory so dear and the continuation of the assault so risky, that the General, seeing the disaster so clearly, found himself obliged to order the retreat to be sounded; and he also was struck by a musket shot which by the mercy of God fell dead between the skin and the shirt. He ordered D. Álvaro de Ataide to collect the men who remained, and he did it so skillfully that the enemy did not dare to sally outside the fortifications in pursuit of those who were retiring. In this encounter died the Captain-Major Fernão de Mendonça Furtado whose rashness destined him for this misfortune, though his valour gave hope of better successes. There died Jeronimo da Silva, a gentleman whose courage, prudence, and Christianity made all consider him a suitable person for high posts in peace and war. There died Francisco de Mendonça, brother of the Conde de Val de Rey, in whom the estimation of India recognized the same qualities. There died other gentlemen and cavaliers of great hope; and

1 Vida do Ven. Ir. Pedro de Basto.
there fell also João Alves Bretão, who, besides other posts which he had deserved by his courage in the use of arms, had risen to occupy the Captaincy of Columbo which he then held. Finally the dead exceeded 900, and the wounded were so numerous that they had to raise the siege and return empty handed to Columbo so as not to leave that praça exposed to the last peril, if more men should fall in other encounters in Nigumbo. And D. Alvaro de Athaide who was now Captain-Major of the Field withdrew all with good order.

In Columbo the General ordered the arrayal to be reformed with Captains and soldiers, and when the wounded were healed, D. Alvaro toured the obedient lands and reduced the revolted ones. He overran the Seven and Four-corlas as far as Atapitim on the borders of Candaia, whereby he assured the obedience of many lands and the profit of cinnamon. The Chingalá King during this time remained neutral, because he had already discovered the little reliability of the treaties with the Hollander and feared that we should take satisfaction for the wrongs received. Therewith between him and D. Alvaro on some occasions political courtesies, and it is considered certain that he desired to use this gentleman as an intermediary for peace with the King of Portugal, but the time and circumstances disposed things otherwise, and D. Alvaro returned to Columbo being summoned for other enterprises. The news of the failure of the storming of Nigumbo reached Goa and the Count Viceroy at once treated, as he always did, about reinforcing D. Phelipe for the purpose of a fresh siege. He sent D. Antonio Lobo with seven galliots, men, arms, and money in the beginning of September, and he soon reached Columbo. The General at once planned the recovery of Nigumbo which he, being now more cautious, would have achieved, had he not received news of the truce which was effected in Goa between the two nations. And though peace is at all times much to be desired, D. Phelipe and his soldiers did not fail to regret that so good an opportunity was lost.

For when the relief had set out for Columbo on the 27th of September, there arrived in the bar of Goa the Hollander Ambassador Joan Maet Suycker who disembarked on 15th October with all ceremony. From the first visits to the Count in the Palace of Pangim till the 10th of November, the conditions were adjusted, and they were at once published in Goa; and the Ambassador left full of honour and well rewarded, for the Count was very happy to have to hand over the State in peace to his successor, D. Phelipe Mascarenhas, after having sustained it in so bitter a warfare, as may be gathered from these writings. The Ambassador soon reached Columbo where he was well treated, and the truce published, and he went his way to Gâlé and Batavia, and the Count informed D. Phelipe of the election which His Majesty had made of his person, while he negotiated a fleet to fetch him. Everything was speedily done and D. Manoel Pereyra came as Captain-Major, with many gentlemen, and cavaliers as captains of rowing ships with a goodly soldiery and they reached Columbo in safety. The new Viceroy embarked in it, and when he set sail in foul weather against the advice of many, there broke out such a tempest, that it wrecked him with all his fleet off the coast of Calapiti: where some gentlemen and soldiers perished, and very considerable was the loss of wealth on that occasion, and the peril to the Viceroy, who saved himself in a baién. This misfortune obliged him to winter in Jafanapatão, whither the Count sent another fleet, in which he embarked with better fortune and after providing for the fortalice of Jafanapatão and Manár he crossed to Tutucorim and thence to Cochim where he disembarked and remained some days and found that the servant of God, Pedro de Basto, was already dead, at whose grave he made the demonstrations of love and piety which we described in his life. Thence he went to Goa, taking in his company another fleet of Jafanapatão and that of the Cape, of which the Captain-Major was D. Martim Afonso Manoel with the fleets of Ceylon and of the coast of Coromandel. Providing necessaries for the fortalice of Canarão, Mangalor, Barcelõr, Cambolim and Onôr, he ordered visits to the Kings of the country, and with the addition to his following of the fleet and fortilla of Canara he entered Goa with more than 600 sail of rowing ships on Christmas day [1645] and made his solemn entry on the 1st of January [1646].

Such were the good and ill successes which Ceylon experienced in the war with Holland from the year [1638] to that of [1646], not taking into account some circumstances of lesser import. Such were the successes with the Hollander during the life time of the venerable brother Pedro de Basto, which he prophesied in the manner which we have related in another work. Such the truce which was settled with him for 10 years. For realizing that it was not so easy to

1 Viceroy, 1646–1651.
2 This word is not found in any dictionary. There is a Bengali word baulā, which means a kind of boat. Anglice 'Bolia.'
3 Vida 141.
carry Colombo as they thought in the beginning, and understanding that the more they straitened the Portuguese into fewer praças the greater was the resistance they found in them, and that as King D. João the Restorer was engaged only with the slow warfare which Castile waged against Portugal in the first years after his acclamation and the apprehension of his great dispositions, he would not fail to aid India with sufficient reinforcements to sustain what he held there; and finally seeing that though fortune favoured them in the enterprises already mentioned, it was always at the cost of much blood and of great expense; and that the introduction into India of the European warfare which was already being practised in Portugal was a foregone conclusion, since the reinforcements came to us from that Kingdom, and that by making use of that warfare we should give them greater ado with lesser forces, and seeing that there was in Ceylon the cinnamon which they desired, though in those times they, were at peace, and that their maritime power had become formidable throughout all the known world, they came to these terms, which their policy approved, and which was not less convenient to us, because at this very time we had to deal with other enemies, who profiting by the distractions caused by Hollander arms in diverse parts, occupied our lands, because among these nations there never existed any friendship other than present convenience.

CHAPTER 15.

THE EARLY SUCCESSES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GENERAL MASCARENHAS HOMEM

The Viceroy, D. Phelipe Mascarenhas, was succeeded in the Government of Ceylon by Manoel Mascarenhas Homem, and though the truce with the Hollander was in vigour, he ever considered it good State policy to maintain peace with the Chingal King without any quarrel of importance which has come to our notice. On the contrary knowing that he was at enmity with the Hollander, because they did not fulfil the compacts which they had made about the conquest of Galle, for which purpose he had assisted them with his army from without, at the time when that praca was surrounded and scaled, and that he had already vindicated himself by killing Commander Costra with ten or twelve Hollander, who after the capture of Galle had gone as Ambassador to Candaia, seeing that one who did not keep faith in treaties would not observe the law of nations; and on the advice of the Councilors of Colombo approved in the Council of the State of Goa, the General sent as Ambassadors to Candaia, with a good present D. Jeronimo de Azevedo and Father Sebastiao de Fonseca, Rector of the College of the Fathers of the Society of Jesus in Colombo, to make peace anew and to prevent a league with the Hollander. But the King moved by a different policy without giving them audience, informed the Batavians of the terms which the Portuguese offered him, it appearing to him that by means of this rivalry he would get better terms for himself; and after keeping them three years and having received a fresh embassy from the Hollander, he sent back the Portuguese Ambassadors without any good result.

In this manner our General went on up to the year 1550, when six Hollander were sent by the Captain of Galle to Colombo to announce that the truce was over and that from the fourth of October onwards there would be bitter war between the two nations. While all expected that, at least in outward manifestations, the General would show himself pleased and glad and would order the news to be celebrated with salvos of artillery, he showed so broken and crestfallen a spirit, that he surprised all and the Hollander not the least; and as they were insolent, on their way to Galle they did not fail to show it to the Portuguese. The rumour soon spread that the Enemy intended to occupy Calcutre, and by dint of warning and importunities the General was made to send 120 soldiers, but by a strange and unheard of military disposition, without any distribution of captains and companies; and Andre Velho Pereira, Dissava of Maturé, with some black troops; and with order to retire if the enemy should seek them out, on the ground that it was not a time for loosing a single man. The river of Alisho was the boundary which separated us, and our men occupied those lands as far as Colombo. On the first news of the march of the Hollander, he sent a fresh order to the Portuguese to retire to the other side of the river of Calcutre, and that the Chingal troops alone should remain, which seemed so strange to the Portuguese and so unexpected to the Hollander, that for three days he suspended the march keeping a sharp look out, thinking that the movement of our men was for the purpose of falling upon them; and in order to secure themselves from any strategem, they sent spies who assured them of the retreat. Then making a bridge over the river they crossed it without opposition, and without a shot they mastered the lands and fortified
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of Columbo was rendered impossible by the loss of the lands. That the Hollander had not such large forces that we could not destroy them or make them retire to the walls of Galle, for they had 950 soldiers and the enemy in the two praças and in the field only 900. That to let him come within view of Columbo hastened the ruin of Ceylon and consequently of India. That to shut themselves up in the praça was a thing that should be done only in case the Hollander placed all his forces in Ceylon. That the residents of Columbo had nothing left to them save their gardens, and that in those of Calaturè alone the King had lost more than 200 bahars of cinnamon, which were made and were in the hands of the Enemy. To these and other remarks he only answered by saying that he had a letter from His Majesty to defend the city, as if there were no Captain and he had not the appointment of General of the Island.

This came upon other forebodings, because during the whole time of the truce, he proceeded in such a manner in the disposition of war that zealous men began to say that he did great harm to all by appointing boys as Captains, leaving aside veteran soldiers scarred by shot and wounds who had shown great valour in the conquest, and that he obliged others to obey those who did not know how to command them, but withdrew from them a part of their ordinary sustenance to spend it in gala attire, walking about in the streets of Columbo; and that from lack of necessities many had died in quarters and in the hospital; and the worst of all was that these things were said to have been done on his orders. To these the General gave no reply but only said that he had other Captains for the time of war. This was now going on, and there was seen no change to the great shame of the Portuguese name. Nor did he think of repairing the walls of the City, which in many places required parapets, nor was there any other preparation for war. The Preachers clamoured from the Pulpits out of zeal for the faith and for the service of His Majesty, the former out a sense of duty, the latter of blood, which does not boil less under religious habits than under uniforms. The casados and soldiers openly distrusted this government, thinking it inevitable that these dispositions would cause the final ruin of Columbo and Ceylon, and they were already half mutinous. Then the rumour spread that the arrayal of Manicaravâ had risen against the Captain-Major, Lopo Barriga, son-in-law of General Manoel Mascarenhas Homem on this ground; 'That the General was a traitor and had sold the City of Columbo. That they wished to depose him, not only to secure that praça of His Majesty but also the Island.'

Calaturè with artillery, a ditch, and trenches, letting some of our Chingalâz remain with them. The Portuguese were lodged in front of the eminence of Calaturè, and [the enemy swept them with one and the other shot, while our men had no permission to fire a single musket, nor to fortify themselves with a trench, and the soldiers [thereupon] taxed themselves to erect a rampart to protect them. Again, they had order that if two other ships appeared on the sea they should again retire. And though little by little this body of men was increased in order to escape complaints in Columbo, they always brought orders not to provoke the Enemy, a decision which made the men wonder.

And as in a few days there appeared three or four Enemy sail, they crossed the river of Panaturê and lodged near the Morro, two leagues from Columbo, and this was done in such haste that the knapsacks of the soldiers and many candis of rice were left behind for the use of the Belga, who seeing such disorders, sent their black troops to reduce to obedience the abandoned lands, sending the Cattle, women, and children, to Galle. And when the Natives saw that the Portuguese did not attempt to defend them, they themselves abandoned the lands. The same fate had the garrison of Anguriatôta, which defended the lands of Malvâna, and owing to the hurry with which they were ordered to retire, there also they left a quantity of rice. On the same orders the garrison of Sofragâo retired leaving the palmyras (or penthouses) provided and the belongings of the soldiers, which those of Candeia seized when they reduced those lands to obedience. And all this at a time when the City was short of provisions, the bar blockaded by four ships and the lands lost; and had some ships of Goa and Tuticorin not entered that bar three or four days before those ships appeared, that City would soon have perished. The captain of the black troops was a Moor, one who spoke Portuguese it is true, but without hands and feet and nose and ears, who afterwards passed over to the Enemy and as he had experience of the country and knew our plans, he did us great harm by his advice, though many excused him because of the many occasions on which he sent to ask reinforcements from the General.

Seeing this coldness (for I do not wish to say more now) the military men in Columbo were surprised and astounded, and some in the streets, others in the house of the General, approached him for these proceedings, saying: That by these retreats he added effrontery to the foe and that the preservation

\[1\] Sin. pottayama, granary.
In this sense they wrote to the City [calling upon it] to depose the General as a traitor, and that they proclaimed it and called upon them in the name of the King whose loyal Lieges they were, and that they resorted to this means out of zeal for his service. They wrote the same to the Superiors of the Religious [orders].

But this was not done so peacefully as to be without bloodshed. For having passed the word to keep their arms ready at the relieving of the day break watch, the mutineers went with muskets and matches ready to the quarters of the Captain-Major, and placing a dagger to his breast, they warned him not to stir or he would be killed, and thus they dragged him from the arraial in deshabile and sent him to Columbo. He was a good natured gentleman who had served many years in India but was unfortunate in his kinship. Some captains who were not trusted with the secret attempted to rescue him, but his nephew, Luis Alvares de Azevedo, was killed by spears and Jacinto de Madureyra with four musket shot, and two others were wounded.

The City was all in perturbation over this news. The relatives and the few friends of the General condemned the soldiers; the others said that they were quite right, and that an open Enemy of the Crown could not have done worse. The General acted by sending a Capuchin religious to the arraial offering pardon for the deed, provided they would settle down peaceably, as but as they did not consider themselves guilty, after listening to him, they refused the pardon, saying that the General was a traitor, and that while they were quite enough to defend the territories of the King, he was infamously betraying them to the Enemy; that they knew he intended to betray the City, and all clamoured aloud: 'We do not want such a General. Long live the Faith of Christ. Let traitors die. Long live King D. Jcaô.' After this religious, he sent others, with fresh offers, but they received the same answer.

The Candiots profiting by this mutiny, at once sent to offer them posts and lands or passage to any place they liked, but they answered like Portuguese. At this time Jao Batado, Diasâva of the Four Corias, retired, and soon afterwards the Diasâva of the Seven. The soldiers thought this was manoeuvred by the General to remove the Natives from them so as to let them be killed, for in the marches of the arrayal they were over the beaters who spied out the camp and cleared the ways. Seeing, therefore, that those of Candea were assaulting and knowing that Gaspar Figueyra de Serpa was in the neighbourhood in one of his villages, they sent a band of soldiers to fetch

m to be their commander, and as he refused, they brought him in fetters. Great was the esteem they had for Figueyra as a valorous, experienced, cunning, and liberal person. To add to his experience he was a Columbo born man, being the son of Bertholame Figueyra whom D. Jeronimo de Azevedo dubbed a knight in Candea for the valour with which he fought at the crossing of the river. He began services as a soldier, and afterwards as Ensign under D. Phelipe Mascarenhas in the recovery of Nigumbo and was with him in Matuul. On his order he went to defend the passage of Calatur for the Hollanders and held the post of the Captain-Major Joao Pervyra de Sousa to the satisfaction which all expected from him. He was Commander of a separate detachment of Chingalaz and some Portuguese in the arrayal of Matuul and had reduced some rebellious Corias in that country and in those of Soprago; and he was victorious in various encounters, though he had lesser forces, and killed and captured many even of the Chingalaz leaders. In the assault of Vâlâwe he was captain of the advance guard with two companies, and after cutting off many heads, he made them abandon the place, took many prizes and recovered ours. By ambuscades he killed many of those who sailed from Galle. He was with Antonio de Amaral de Menezes in the victory over the Hollanders at Vaccela, and as he had risen through the ranks of soldier, Captain Head of a detached band and Captain-Major in the course of thirteen years, always giving great proof of his worth, he was here preferred by the soldiers also who pretended to justify their intention of standing up for the honour and credit of Portuguese arms.

He led them to Columbo taking charge of the advance guard which covered the baggage [train] of alias and oxen laden with provisions, and consisted of 1,000 souls, and as the Enemy had occupied the other roads, he marched by the hills of Duravaca. The Chingalaz came in great haste, and [Serpa] being attacked saved the advance guard and the baggage and assisted the rear guard, where they fought for a long time; and as there came a great shower of rain, the dash of the enemy was greater, but he gained the approaches of the roads and having animated the soldiers by word and example, beat them back with such constancy that after three hours of battle they fled in disorder, with no small loss; and on our side one was wounded. All of which was attributed to the good management of the Captain-Major.

Meanwhile in the City, in diverse meetings of all the states, they were discussing some means for pacifying them, and though these were placed before the soldiers, they continued
to be of the same opinion, as they had taken on oath to for the Faith of Christ and not to recognize the General. In the centre of the squadron one of them carried a large crucifix which they called their Captain-Major and General; and when any one came to treat with them, they told him, that to be heard he must first pray to the Holy Crucifix. They elected ten as a council of war, but they decided nothing without the approval of the majority. A proclamation was issued that neither prostitute women nor wine should be allowed in the arrayal; and crimes were punished with rigor.

The General persisted in telling them, 'That he had given homage for that pracça which he must not and could not give up without the order of His Majesty, and that if they attempted to make him do so by force, he was resolved to resist.' Various religious and secular persons pointed out to him the danger in which he placed himself and his household; that it was not for His Majesty's service to lose Ceylon by losing Colombo, that if there should be an outbreak, whether he got the victory or was vanquished, all would be lost; that if he had good reason to think that it was not a time to risk a single man, which is the plea which he alleged for abandoning the lands, how could he then make up his mind to lose so many and everything? That the arrayal consisted of about 1,000 Portuguese, and that with the Chingalas pioneers, and the slaves of the King there would be about 2,060; and if with these men and the rest who were in the city he thought he could not take the field against the Hollander, how could he expect that he would overcome them, or defend the pracça without them. But to vent his passion, he looked upon all who said this as his enemies, and branded them as traitors, and trusted his life to a few relatives and to some others whom he had gained over, the lands meanwhile being like a house without a master, and the majority going over to the Enemy for greater security, for few were those who came to Colombo with some cattle.

Then there increased the despondency of the Citizens who had sons and relatives in the arrayal who were thought to be the cause of this revolt, because they saw in Ceylon what they had never experienced. The General to show some courage and to instil terror, made his confession showing his determination to die in the attempt. He went to the College of the Society of Jesus to receive communion, and from there he went to the Mother Church ordering a proclamation to be made, that whoever would not repair thither would be considered a traitor. When all were gathered, in wild, angry, words he said: ‘That whoever would not come and throw himself at

his feet, of whatever state he was, would be killed and consumed and his house razed.’ He ordered the Prior to expose the most Holy Sacrament and imposed an oath on all present, that is all who were in the City, and first of all on the Prelates of the Religious orders, and on some other religious. And while his intention was to make them swear to defend him, many of those who did so, swore to defend the Faith of Christ and the honour of the King and the common weal. After this act the cleric Pero da Costa mounted the pulpit and recommended peace and concord with the head. Afterwards he left the Mother Church, distributed the men-at-arms to the posts of greater danger, and got the artillery ready and distributed powder and shot freely.

CHAPTER 16.

THE SAME MATTER CONTINUED

Lo! the news arrived that the arrayal had crossed the river at Calâne. The General resolved to take the field with the men he had; and as such rash deeds were never noted in him, it was supposed that he must have relied on the respect due to his office; but it was too late and he had few on his side. The Religious, who were the most disinterested, seeing that he was going to his doom, went in large numbers with Crucifixes begging him not to risk his person, that they would go to pacify the soldiers, more in order to give time to cool his passion than because they hoped to succeed; and in fact they returned with the same disappointment as the earlier envoys. The confusion in the City could scarcely be imagined. The majority said that they did not want to fight against Christians and Portuguese, the cautious folk retired; the soldiers of the City blamed these disorders, because though they received no food, they had to watch day and night in the troublesome time of the monsoon, and many fled to the arrayal and others wished to do the same, but were prevented from doing so, because the gates were closed and there were many sentinels because when the rumour got about that the casados sought to give entry to the arrayal, the General trusted only his own relatives, and not a slave could one send out to fetch some sustenance for life; and the General was beginning to hate every one, thinking that they all favoured the rebels, and
whichever counsel they gave him in this matter was for him a species of treason, and he looked upon those of the arrayal as a pack of scoundrels and mongrels.

They then sent to ask provisions of which there was great scarcity. He showed himself stern, and to one who represented him that, driven by desperation by hunger, they might do something mad, either by marching upon the City or by going over to the Enemy, he replied that it would be merely losing the crew of a Galloon. But when the Prelates and members of the Chamber and chief citizens insisted, he allowed them to give a small quantity as an alms. They began to think that the General being ruined, sought to ruin all others with him; and that now there was no question of the service of God or of the King; but they could not make up their mind, seeing that everything was preparing for greater disasters, as the soldiers had sworn afresh to die one for all and all for one, and that if there should be one death, they would make the streets run with blood and not cease till they had killed the General with all his household for getting ready to give them battle, imputing to them the crime of which they accused him. They had kept with them some religious who had gone to pacify them, whom they begged to remain in patience, and with great zeal they remained in patience, hoping to reap good fruit by their presence, and so in truth they did, by deterring them several times when they wished to storm the City and in other outbreaks, and even of these Religious the General began to think and speak ill. The arrayal finally came within sight of the City and halted in a pasmodre within gun shot, captained by Gaspar Figueyra de Serpa, who, he always believed, was the one who got up this mutiny in order to become Captain-Major of the field; and it was because he and the others knew that in similar cases he would have to pay for it with his head that they took the precautions above-mentioned; and the shortage of provisions being added to this, they resolved to approach Colombo. It is known, however, that Gaspar Figueyra justified himself by his deeds, and that the General Francisco de Melo de Castro had issued most honourable certificates about them, and his successor employed him in a greater conflict, as we shall see. Nor is his cause less justified by a certificate of the Father Commissary and Visitor, Friar Francisco de Madre de Deus of the Seraphic order, in which he states that when the praça of Colombo was taken, he spoke to the Hollander General Lodging in his Convent to give him audience and that when he had received it and he asked to let him go to Goas, he replied, that about this Gaspar Figueyra had spoken to him; but that he counselled him the contrary, because Manoel Mascarenhas Homem, his declared Enemy, was at the head of the government. And when the Father related this reply to Gaspar Figueyra, he replied, ‘The Governor says that I say and ask Your Paternity, to tell him in my name that the greatest kindness that he can do me is to order me to be put in fetters and in that state to be handed to Senhor Manoel Mascarenhas Homem at the bar of Goa.’ So confident was he in his proceedings, though he was mistaken, because even after the death of the Governor, according to what a Viceroys related to us, he sent one of his relatives to kill him with poison, because he did not dare to kill him with the sword, and that in India he never did a more noble deed than that of a careful merchant, though there was occasion and obligation to do so.

The General, considering that now it was not only his honour that was in danger, but even his life, disclosed greater regret over this proceeding, which, if it were the greatest, was not the first in Ceylon, nor will it be so in India, so long as military discipline is wanting, though the Portuguese rarely went to those extremes without great cause being given for it, and in the case of Manoel Mascarenhas Homem, presumption and cunning had the better of his judgment, and he did not hide some personal grievance about a Benefice which was in his family and was given to another. And though it was a most futile cause, his mind was affected by the approval of these novelties in Portugal, though there is nothing which is more reprehensible and which can be one of the justest causes for the punishment of that Kingdom, than that Benefices had become hereditary, and that the goods of the Church were not distributed according to the intentions of the Pontiffs. Of this, however, History gives other proofs. Thence the arrayal again called upon the City to depose the General, because he was a traitor; and when they again asked for provisions, with his permission they sent them in small quantities by women, because the men joined them; but as soon as they saw them, they ordered them to turn back with their loads, because they did not beg charity, but what the King had ordered to be given to them as to his soldiers and lieges, and that they would soon come to the City to get their supplies.

Without further delay, on the last day of November, they formed in the field of St. Thome and marched to the city. Everything was in arms, by order of the General three pieces

1 So called from the Catholic Church of St. Thomas that stood there, the precursor of the present St. Thomas Church. The Raj. 21 states that in lower Boralugoda lies Santumiptiya. Santumiptiya is now corrupted into Gintupitiya.
were fired from the bastion of S. João, by which Columbo was afterwards entered by the Enemy, and they were levelling an
espalhafato [gun]. One shot fell in the midst of the squadron, and though it did no hurt, the rumour ran at once that many
infantry were killed. The City suddenly mutinied, in which all was one outcry of men in the streets, women at the windows, shouting to take steps before more Christian blood was shed. They came to the Chamber of the City and by a prompt decision, they entered the neighbouring Church of the
College of the Society of Jesus, calling upon the Fathers to
come out with the most Holy Sacrament so that all might
be in a body to ask the Captain-General to stop the war.
Confused voices resounded: ‘Is it possible to kill so many
Christian men? Because of one man, must so many die? Is
Ceylon to be ruined by the passion of one? Let us all die
before we let them kill our children, our brothers, relatives and
friends, on whose lives the King depends to be Lord of Ceylon,
and let us not allow the Hollander to triumph over Portuguese
blood.’ It is not an easy matter to adjust politics in such a
pass nor to judge rightly about what ought to prevail on this
point. The Fathers moved by zeal for the Common weal,
which should always be preferred, and foreseeing what might
ensue from such disorders came out with the most Holy
Sacrament, accompanied by the Officials of the City, with its
guard and many people and many tears of all that people at
sight of the manifest peril to all. When they reached the
door of the General’s house and he appeared at a window, the
erk of the Chamber said to him: ‘Senhor Captain-General, the
Sacramental Lord comes with the City and people to ask you
to stop the artillery and warfare and not to let so many Portu-
guese be killed.’ The Father who was carrying the Lord, took
up the supplication imploring him by the Sacramental Lord,
whom all acknowledged and adored to avert the dangers which
prudence foresaw would result from the resolution he took.
He interrupted him in a loud voice, calling upon him to retire,
and rebuked him for this action. Such is the fate of all
demands which are not to the taste of the powerful, though
they be moderate and pious like this one. He added that the
people must not mutiny (as if they had not done so already),
that otherwise he would consider them traitors, and at once he
ordered an espalhafato piece to be directed upon those who
accompanied the Lord, and he encouraged his men to fight and
defend his person. From his room a firelock was fired which
caused a slight wound, and as an Ensign prevented the piece
from being fired saying: ‘That those people had not come to
fight, but to beg for public tranquility,’ he was instantly

ordered to be arrested. But soon Mascareñas realized that
with greater credit to his piety he should have heeded this
request, which he was soon obliged to do through fear.

For when the people saw that there was no hope of remedy,
that the Lord was exposed to fresh insults, and they were in
peril of losing their lives, they turned back shouting ‘Long
live the Faith, and death to traitors.’ They met another
crowd of men with the Religious of St. Francis who, with a
crucifix reared aloft, were coming to make the same petition.
and when they heard of what had happened, his action caused
such resentment (for it was not the first of this kind from
that gentleman) that many of his partisans joined the
people, and asked the Religious not to retire with the Lord lest
the City be lost. A voice exclaimed: ‘Hasten to the Queen’s
Gate to save the infantry!’; and the Religious of St. Francis
were also of opinion that the Lord should go, so that His
presence might avert deaths. Already the companies raised
by the General had abandoned their posts to join the arrayal,
and those of the garrison went away from the gate which was
opened by the people. The Religious and the clerics held the
gate and warned everyone not to do any hurt or kill anybody,
and they did not let any one enter till they had first promised
before the Lord not to attack the General nor anything belong-
ing to him nor any body in the City. They kept their word
and entered peacefully without any bloodshed. The General
seeing the infantry and the City against him, sent word by
Diogo de Sousa da Cunha to ask them not to make further
commotion saying that he would retire to the Convent of
St. Dominic, because he now thought it wiser to seek a shelter
for his life, since he was not able to maintain his authority.
The citizens and soldiers were satisfied with this decision, and
the General found better welcome from the Fathers of St.
Dominic than he had given to one of their Religious whom he
ordered to be arrested in the Convent, because he was thought
to have some dealings with the Pagan King for no better
reason than that he was in a parish near Candaia.

Gaspar Figueira at once garrisoned the City, and on the
following day, the people, the Prelates and the officers of the
Chamber, having assembled in the Mother Church, after a long
conference it was settled not to open the vías of the General,

1 Letters of Succession. The Royal despatches were called vías
because they were sent in duplicate or rather in quadruplicate. The
vías of succession were sealed letters containing the names of those who
were nominated to succeed a Governor or Viceroy in case of the death of
the actual holders of the office. Three names were given.
but to elect three men to conduct the war, till a new General should come from Goa; and by a unanimous vote were elected Gaspar de Araujo Pereyra, D. Francisco Raulin de Moraes, casado, and Francisco de Barros, a soldier. The reasons they had for not opening the vias of the General have not come to my knowledge, and in similar cases the wisdom of such a course is doubtful, as unanimous consent when genuine always has a great value. When the Viceroy Conde de Obidos was deposed in Goa they found the vias unsigned and consequently the names of the substitutes were missing, which the King was wont to write with his own hand; which if the people had been able to foresee, it would have been wiser not to open them, but who could have thought that there would be such carelessness in a matter which should have been the first care of a minister. When the Conde de Sarzedas died, they found there were no vias and who would have imagined that a similar forgetfulness would be repeated. They proceeded to the election and through the tricks of the Secretary it was at night, with very few members, and was approved only by them, a circumstance which was enough to show that there was a lack of the light of judgment in it, as we shall see. Princes cannot see everything, nor can accidents always secure wisdom; and as the danger was greater in these places so far from Portugal, the precaution should be great and greater also the need of true reports.

The Eleitos confirmed Gaspar Figueyra, as Captain-Major of the field and Joao Botado de Seyxas in the Four-Corlas. Antonio Mendes Aranha in Bocra, and Manoel Gil in the Corla of Aliour; as Dissava and Captain-Major of Materre Francisco Antunes, and Manoel Guerreiro Neves for the Seven Corlas. The Eleitos swore that the person of the General and his family and relatives would be detained in a bastion set apart for the purpose with a guard awaiting the order of the Viceroy, to whom they wrote the things they had done. The captains of the infantry took oath, while the Lord was exposed to obey the Eleitos and not to do any hurt in matters relating to the General.

1 22nd October, 1653.

2 3rd January, 1656. In the absence of vias they elected Manoel Mascarenhas Homem, the deposed Governor of Ceylon. In the following May the letters of successors arrived and the three nominated were the three successive Captains General of Ceylon, Manoel Mascarenhas Homem, Francisco de Melo de Castro and Antonio de Souza Coutinho. The two last were in Ceylon at the time.
In Columbo they owned how many men they had, which [is the number] we have already given; that the ships had only the sailors and gunners: That the news that they had lost twenty ships in Amboyno was true; that even in Nigambo they did not know of the deposition [of the General], that had known it, they would not have sailed out from Nigambo with only 60 men; which news rejoiced the City for the time. The rest escaped to the jungle and our men went in pursuit of them till within musket-shot of the praça of Nigambo, devastating its vicinity, but they did not stir out of the foralice. Those lands returned to obedience with the coria of Alior; and some cinnamon which we had made there was saved. Afterwards they decided to desist from that slow siege, and leaving the Dissāva of the Corlas with seven companies at the pass of the bridge of Zutugurē, the Captain-Major set out with seventeen in search of the Enemy arrayal on the first of January [1653]. The Belga had information of it and retired into the stockade of Anguratōta which they had built to protect the cinnamon in which that place abounds. It was garrisoned by 114 Europeans, 90 Bandanese and 300 Chingalas. Our men crossed the river with great difficulty, dividing the men into three bodies under Gaspar Figueyra, Antonio Menéndez and Francisco Antunes, so that the enemy might not escape nor be reinforced. The first to arrive was Antunes who, at the cost of one killed and four wounded, gained a redoubt made for a passage to the river, and as the second was immediately taken by the others, they were altogether surrounded. Then with approaches they placed the stockade in great peril, but as the fortifications were of thick wood and received little damage, Figueyra ordered gun platforms to be erected whence he attacked them without loss to us. The siege began on the 6th of January, and the Captain-Major fearing that the Enemy might combine all his forces, ordered a piece to be brought from the City which was mounted on the ninth day. Knowing, however, that the Batavian had already 800 Europeans and 1,000 Chingalas in the village of Tibán, less than a league from the stockade, he ordered the besieged to be called upon to surrender, under pain of receiving no quarter. They at once gave in, only on the verbal promise of their lives, and they were handed over to Francisco de Barros who had come with the piece and a company of casados from Columbo. Besides the dead there were one hundred and five Hollander prisoners, 24 Bandanese and 300 lascars, all brave and picked men. Our men awaited the enemy, but he, who is wont to act with caution, retreated to Calustê with little credit, though he had the advantage of numbers, and he was so intimidated that in that campaign he did not place his arrayal in the field, giving room to the Portuguese to seek out the Chingalas who with a numerous army were taking possession of our lands.

On seizing this good success, the soldiers asked for their pay, complaining principally of the two Eleitos, Francisco de Barros and D. Francisco Rolim. For this purpose the Captain-Major returned to Columbo. They [the two Eleitos] withdrew into two convents, but the third Eleito, Gaspar de Araujo, settled the matter, and as there was no public money, the casados contributed and paid two [instalments of] quarterage. Francisco Antunes meanwhile with only 25 soldiers and 60 Chingalas remained in the lands of Reygaê and Salpâti relying on the promise of Figueyra that he would send six companies as soon as pay was given; but the promise was not fulfilled. Thence he had sent some men to roam about and destroy the Enemy lands, and remaining there for more than three months, he extricated himself seven times from the ambushes which they laid for him by means of the great experience he had of the country, and he delivered several surprise attacks on the rear guards and did all the harm he could in narrow passes with the death of some Enemies. The Batavian, seeing that he could not drive him away, made the lascars cross the river and by a sudden sally succeeded in taking prizes unopposed in the outskirts of the City, as the arrayal was absent.

João Botado de Seyxas, who was in the Four-Corlas with only four companies and 200 lascars, was attacked by the Dissāva Comdūme with 3,000 men of the Candiot, and when the Chingalas measured spears with João Botado, the latter with sword and shield beat him back several times and finally killed him with a valiant stroke, and they were all routed, leaving many dead and a great many arms, and taking away many wounded men. Some of our men died also, among them Antonio Cortes who fought valiantly; and the Captain João Botado went to the City to be healed of a wound, while his place was taken by João de Gouvea.

At the end of January of [1655] Gaspar Figueyra de Serpa again took the field to recover the two Provinces of the Four and Seven-Corlas and to gather the large crops in the fields. Arriving at Malvâna, by his industry, he enlisted 900 lascars in two days, ordered Antonio Menéndez Aranha to maintain the lands of Gurutêble with four companies and united the
four of Manuel Guerreiro with the four of Joaõ de Gouveia, which made up 27 and consisted of 790 soldiers, besides Manoel Gil with more than 50 lascars. With this force he went in search of the Chingalas in the village of Arandurê, marching by Ruanêla and Bulategâma and sending out bands of lascars and soldiers who by sudden attacks cut off many heads and brought many prizes. When the Enemy received tidings of this march, he betook himself to a well-fortified hill in the village Vedaba garrisoned by 600 musketeers and firelockmen, spearmen and bowmen, with such fear and terror that, as our men were pursuing them, all the baggage fell into our hands, and many were killed or captured.

Thereupon the whole of Bolatêgâma and four other corlas of the Province of the Four-Corlas, which for ten years past had been under the Chingalas, made their submission. Then leaving the lands under their Dissava, he went with seven companies in search of the Enemy to Vedhabâ, a place so well protected and strong by position that our men thought it impossible to take it. Figueyra sent Manoel Gil with his Chingalas and some Portuguese to fall upon the enemy in the rear, while he did so in front. But as Manoel Gil had a longer distance to travel over rougher roads, Gaspar Figueyra attacked before he could arrive and was received by the Enemy with such resolution that after some deaths and wounds our advance guard began to retreat. At this juncture Antonio Madeyra Cabral lifted up a crucifix, which the arrayal always carried, and called upon all to follow it and to fight for the Faith of Christ whom they worshipped. The advance guard turned back at the time when Manoel Gil attacked in the flank and the stockade was carried, with the death of more than 100 Chingalas. The rest fled leaving all the spoils, some prisoners and a Royal standard. We lost six soldiers, among them Antonio de Babila, a retired captain, and an Arache, 12 Portuguese and two lascars were wounded.

Many lands of the Seven and Four-Corlas surrendered forthwith, and so great was the fear, that from many leagues they came to surrender with unheard-of obedience, among others those of Talampetim who had been in revolt for ten years past. In that place was collected by order of the King a large quantity of provisions whereof the arrayal sustained itself for four months. Leaving the Dissava of the Seven-Corlas there with six companies, the Captain-Major went in pursuit of the Enemy along the borders of the Four-Corlas, receiving obedience from the lands as far as the frontiers of Candeia. In various assaults he cut off many heads and finally he halted in Arandurê, whence by continuous inroads he disquieted the encampments and lands of the Enemy, and in the four encounters our men always came out victoriously. Thence he sent men to conquer the Port of Putalâ and Talepetim [a matter of great service to the King, for thereby he hindered the trade of Candeia; and gave free communication to our men with Jafanapata and Manar, and enabled the residents of Columbo to resume possession of their lands, and the King to resume the dominion and profit. He ordered Manoel Gil to cross over to the lands of the Enemy with six companies and 400 lascars to gather the harvest of Parnao. There he was attacked by 16,000 Chingalas, and the Enemy, seeing that he was not able to defeat the Portuguese, ordered a detachment of infantry to obstruct a narrow pass in the hill of Nosacaibe through which they had to return. But the Captain-Major with great foresight had ordered the pass to be occupied by four companies, and when our men were retiring and fighting, they found the four battling with the Enemy. They all joined and with the death of more than 300, they put them to a disgraceful flight and returned to Arandurê carrying a great deal of provisions for the arrayal and for the City without any loss, though the battle lasted nine hours. Thence Manoel Guerreiro went to Alâva with six companies, Joaõ de Gouveia to Piti-galdinê in the Four-Corlas with three, and as the lands were obedient, each had 60 lascars more and about a thousand remained with Figueyra, but the Portuguese arrayal was not a little reduced by sickness and the famine they suffered, over and above such continual hardships, for these perpetual disturbances prevented the cultivation of the lands, and the blockade of the Hollander by sea impeded the necessary succours from Columbo.

Meanwhile Francisco Antunes had retired to the City and in place of Antonio Mendez Aranha, Diogo de Souza remained in Gurubêbê with four companies and 150 lascars. Here a Dissava of the King of Candeia sought him out with 3,000 men; but he was routed with not a few deaths, while of our men only three were wounded. Diogo de Souza also fell ill and Andre de Seyxas was nominated Dissava and Captain-Major of Sofraga. He joined Francisco Antunes with another company formed of some discharged men and some soldiers who were in Malvina besides 150 Lascars. They went to the village Candagao in the country of Safragão where there were 8,000 men of Candeia who let our arrayal pass, because at Batugêdera, a little further on, was the King himself with 18,000 men. Our men made inquiries and
learnt of the arrival of the King which was confirmed by the fact that the Enemy gave them passage. The road by which they entered was already taken, and they returned by that of Toponavala to go down to Ruanëla and thence to the stockade of Canasturé. By ten o'clock the Chingalás seeing the route of the Portuguese attacked the rear guard in which was Francisco Antunes. Our men fought and marched to secure the path of the Hill of Toponavala which was so narrow that it had room for only one man. They were immediately surrounded on the flanks, but they acted with such good order that the enemy could not break their line. The Enemy sent 2,000 men by the hill to occupy the pass, but the Portuguese forestalled his design by sending two companies under the command of Andre de Seyxas who arrived first and held the post against the 2,000, till the arrival of Francisco Antunes, when, forming into a body, about six in the evening, they drove the enemy with not a few deaths, while on our side only two were killed and four wounded. The arrayal sailed out into a small field and a storm burst with heavy showers drenching the lunt and the soldiers were unable to prevent the greater part of the matches from getting wet. Antunes who foresaw that the Enemy would not lose this opportunity, put in the rear guard those who had their matches still lighting, and lit those they could. Then, at seven in the night, when all were tired out with hunger and fatigue, | the Enemy attacked them again, but he turned back at the first volley he received, and our men pursued them killing those they overtook. By nine in the night they halted in the fields of Jatiantota, and the Chingalás obliged them to remain in arms the whole night, till on the following day at five in the evening they went to rest in Ruanëla.

After five days Andre de Seyxas returned with four companies to Gurubébé and remained there till he was succeeded by Antonio Mendez Aranhú. José de Gouvea remained in Pitiáldim, Manoel Guerreiro in Alãua, Gaspar Figueira in Arandure, while Francisco Antunes remained without any settled post because the lands of Maturé under his charge were subject to the Hollander. Amidst these continual labours the Portuguese held the field at this time in Ceylon against two enemies, the Natives and European, while struggling with internal disunion besides the famine and sickness which followed from them, which would never have brought about the loss of Ceylon, had the power of the European Enemy not gone on increasing by sea and land while ours was diminishing.

CHAPTER 18.

SUCCESSES OF CEYLON UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF GENERAL FRANCISCO DE MELO DE CASTRO

In May 1653 there arrived from Goa General Francisco de Melo de Castro sent by the Viceroy D. Vasco Mascarenhas Conde de Obidos, though he was too old for so grave a charge, and as Captain-Major of the Field, D. Alvaro de Ateia, who was little pleased with his post, with 12 foits in which were 250 soldiers. On landing he ordered his predecessor Manoel Mascarenhas Homem to be released forthwith along with those who were imprisoned with him, without any other demonstration over the recent mutiny, because, as the causes and effects were notorious, it must have appeared to the Council that the whole thing should be passed over in silence, the only remedy when matters come to such a pass as to be wholly beyond cure and the danger is not prevented by the fear of mutual chastisement. D. Alvaro remained more than a month in Cumbuco with this reinforcement, giving an opportunity to Gaspar Figueira who was in Arandure on the frontier of the Four Corias, and to the other detachment on the borders of the Seven Corias] to decide to seek out the Chingalás who, it was said, was fortified in the impenetrable hill of Miegala; but as the intention of it and the preparation were enough to make him come to know of it, so it was also enough to make him abandon the hill and the stockade. Afterwards D. Alvaro went with the fresh soldiers and with Antonio de Melo, nephew of the General, to Malvâna.

| From Arandure the new Captain-Major sent Pedro de Souza with six companies to the lands of Nigunbo | accompanied by Manoel Gil with 150 Lascars, to make some cinnamon in opposition to the Hollander who held that praça. The Captain-Major remained four months in the same place, and when he returned to the city, the array was left under the command of Antonio de Melo de Castro who lacked not courage but experience; but in India kindship ever made up for both the one and the other. In a short time he came to know that the King of Candea was in Batugura with 24,000 men. He sent for the two Diasás, Manoel Guerreiro and José de Gouvea, and getting together 20 companies made up of about 600 soldiers and more than 14,000 lascars, he marched to our stockade in Canasture, where João de Abreu

Viceroy, 1652–1653.
Ferrao was stationed with a company; and he approached the royal army with the intention of giving him battle. In Canasturé he received a letter from a Dissava of the King of Candaia in which he asked permission to conduct through our lands the baggage of the King who wanted to go back to Candaia. Antonio de Melo hastily informed the General and those of the Council of Colombo were of opinion that what was asked should be given, and that we should not only do him the service which we were unable to prevent, but that, in order not to endanger the arrayal, we should under the pretext of giving him freer passage retire to Malvâna and there he arrived in the beginning of September. There were added to him in that place the companies which were with Pedro de Souza under the command of Joao Alonzo de Aguihlar, and those of Antonio Mendez Aranha who was in Gurubebélé. In the course of this march of the arrayal, a Dissava of the Candiots King fought with our rearguard, but because he did so without order, he was punished by the King.

In Malvâna D. Alvaro reformed some companies; and knowing that the King had returned to Candaia and dispersed with us, Manoel Guerreyro, Dissava of the Seven Corlas, set out with six companies and Joao de Guova Dissava of the Four Corlas with four companies, which consisted of little less than 300 soldiers and 800 lascars; and as the lands readily submitted, they divided the lascars equally and Guerreyro went to Alâaus, and Guvea to Pitigaldini, and from their posts they kept the lands in obedience up to December 1654. D. Alvaro left a company in Malvâna and sent three with Manoel Gil and his lascars to Tareculi, placed another in Mutual under the command of Antonio de Melo de Castro. In December [1655] there set out from Colombo Francisco Antunes and Antonio Mendez with 350 soldiers in 12 companies and about 60 lascars; and when they were two leagues from Colombo, in the post of Morro, Francisco Antunes went ahead with four companies to the lands of Salpiti-Corle which had been devastated by the Hollanders from Calaturé. He halted at Delota and after collecting with great trouble some dhonies and double canoes which were the boats of that river, he went to Diagao where Antonio Mendez Aranha joined him. They halted within sight of a Hollander stockade which was on the other side of the river with 100 Hollanders and 200 Chingalâs, who received them with goodly volleys of musketry. Our men pretended to pass by the post they were defending, and quickly crossed over to the other side. The Belgas then took to flight, and only some of their lascars lost their lives. The rest betook themselves to Calaturé where the Hollander had in that garrison 500 Europeans and as many lascars. Our men remained encamped in the stockade which they had abandoned, leaving two companies on the side of the river, while they received the submission of the lands of Passadem-coría, which up to that time had been subject to the Hollanders, and peopled Raggare-coría and Salpiticoría. Francisco Antunes moreover enlisted about 200 lascars and Nuno de Melo da Silva arrived from Colombo with a reinforcement of two companies. With this force they passed Calaturé without being attacked by the Belgas, and halted in Alicao where they killed some lascars, sentinels of the Enemy, and made prizes of men and cattle, and then returned to Diagao; and because it was convenient to remain divided on the two banks of the river, which is there deep and furious, Francisco Antunes erected a bridge of wood 90 fathoms long to join hands, in case the Enemy came thither, with the rest of the force which he was mustering in Calaturé, but seeing that they did not do so and because famine pressed them, they abandoned the post and passing within sight of Calaturé halted in Mâcâne, three-quarters of a league from that garrison.

On the following night there came a Hollander Captain on his way from Gâle to Calaturé with 100 Europeans and 100 lascars. On seeing the lights of our arrayal, he thought it was theirs and, coming to reconnoitre, he asked our lascars whose arrayal it was. The sentinel having given the alarm, they fired a volley on the Hollander detachment which replied. and abandoning the provisions they were carrying, fled at full speed to Calaturé. Their Captain who had come into our camp, seeing himself surrounded, in the confusion of the night, tried to cut a way with his sword and before they realized the danger, he stabbed six soldiery two of whom were maimed, as the obscurity of the night gave him the opportunity for anything, for they could not see who it was that attacked them nor whether they were few or many, but finally he ran into the spear of a new captain and there lost his life. When the day dawned, the arrayal went to the post in Alicao where also they made prizes of men and cattle and afterwards marched to the lands of Passadem-coría.

Meanwhile the Hollander mustered in Calaturé 800 Europeans and 1,000 Chingalâs, while our arrayal consisted of 370 soldiers and 200 lascars. Joao Vanderlans sailed out with this force in pursuit of it and Francisco Antunes changed his camp from day to day, because he realized the inequality and also in order to seek victuals, for they only found jak,
CONQUEST OF CEYLON

oranges, coconuts and yams, and when he found a defensible
site and provisions, he rested some time, and without quitting
the obedient lands, he went up along the river, a league and
a half above Calaturê, in order to get news of the reinforce-
ment expected from Goa. In his pursuit the enemy halted
at Tibúne half a league's distance from the
Portuguese arrayal. When Francisco Antunes
received tidings of this, he at once informed
António Mendes Araújo, so that he might abstain from firing the usual salute, lest the
enemy should come to know where they were; but António
Mendes did not heed this advice, as was his wont, which was
a blemish on his valor. At dawn of day Francisco Antunes
sent 15 lascarins to search for something to eat, as there was
scarcity of everything, and António Mendes, when he saw
them pass, thought that Francisco Antunes wanted to be
the first to come in conflict with the Enemy, and in his
displeasure he ordered the arrayal to take up arms and
march against the Belgas without heedning the inequality
of the forces; and though there were signs that the Enemy
had sent to reconnoitre by night the place in which our men
were, the arrayal marched, and Francisco Antunes took the
advance guard, and after crossing four bridges of one single
plank, they found a good site and halted, waiting till the others
formed because there was a similar bridge in front and near
it the water of the hill formed a hollow and made a pool near
the grove of the hill, which stood on the left side, all of which
made the site defensible. And as our black troops went
ahead to discover the camp, they came upon the Enemy
and turned back, and though some of the foes had crossed
the bridge, they were driven back by our musketry, and
Captain Manoel de Souza with his company secured the
pass of the bridge. Both sides now formed themselves and
began to play their muskets, the Belga having also a field
piece, and on this occasion as in others the Portuguese showed
that neither the fatigues of the march nor those of hunger
diminished their bravery. In the attempt to gain the bridge
there died some on both sides, and the enemy seeing he could
not get it, made for the Pool, and if the Portuguese had let
them get stuck in it, they would all have remained there, as
happened to those who entered it, but as they had not properly
sounded the pass, they attacked the Enemy in such manner,
themselves getting into it, that they made them retire,
and as the woods impeded one from seeing the other, it was
only when they discerned each other that the two parties

BOOK 5.

plied their musketry, and though they tried to pass several
times, from seven in the morning to three in the afternoon,
they were each time beaten back with great valor. At this
time Francisco Antunes heard the voice of a Chingalâ who
was crying out from the top of the hill saying: 'The enemy
is fleeing, leaving the held piece.' He at once rushed to
the bridge, but Captain Baltazar Fernandez who did not
know the reason for this novelty, held him back thinking
it was some mistake and saying that it was not right to
risk his person and the men under his command. While
they were struggling, the noise of arms ceased and they
clearly heard the same Chingalâ say that the enemy was
returning for the piece, and that leaving an ambush there,
they were retiring in good order; and as it was rather late,
Francisco Antunes desisted from crossing the bridge. Antonio
Mendes, however, sent two Chingalâ spies with a company
to discover the camp, and from the ambush they fired a
musket-shot on one of the spies, whereupon the company
retired, and the Portuguese did not continue this enterprise,
because they had lost 50 men, killed and wounded, and
because the force of the Hollander was much larger. In
this encounter we lost 19 soldiers, among them the captains
Manoel de Souza, Joaõ de Lafeira, Manoel Soares Mascarenhas,
who died on the following day of two bullets, and Josep
Sarmiento de Carvalho had his leg carried off by a shot and
died four days later. Five other Sergeants died also, and
others of whose names we have no information. The Captain
Antonio da Cunha of Lago fell wounded with five gashes,
Jann Mendez de Vasconcelos speared a Bandanese who
falling upon him plunged his crie into his left shoulder, and
the Enemy died, but he escaped with his life. On the field
were found 18 dead on the side of the Hollander, and about
20 other Europeans were killed besides the wounded, and
there remained also some arms. The Batavian retired,
because he received tidings of the reinforcement which had
come from Goa, presuming that we should march forthwith
upon Gale, but as he had so many advantages and was vying
with the Portuguese, this excuse seemed frivolous.

Our men, who did not yet know of the arrival of the
Galleons, returned to the post they had left, and Antonio
Mendes wished to cross over to the other side of the river,
but Francisco Antunes did not approve this course, because
on the other side also there were no provisions and we should
be obliged to evade the Enemy, as we sometimes did, if we
were attacked a second time, while it was necessary for the
credit of our arms to maintain the post. But Antonio Mendes

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1 Sin. éamba, lit. bridge-beam, plank or tree laid for a bridge.
did not listen to these reasons and crossing the river he received news from Columbo that five galleons and five
masted galliots had come. Francisco Antunes insisted again
that it was necessary to recross the river, because the Enemy
would doubtless abandon Calaturé in order to reinforce Qale
and Negombo and that they could have a good encounter
either in the passage of the river or during the retreat they
would make, and that the artillery and the stores of Calaturé
which in their haste they could not carry would come into
their hands; but even this time he was not listened to,
and the arrayal passed to Vidagama. It is a great pity
that valor is not accompanied by prudence and that vanity
is thought to be good sense. There they learnt that the
Enemy had retired from Calaturé taking by sea 12 pieces,
and powder and shot, with the provisions they had there.
Then Antonio Mendez realized his mistake, and marching at
once to Calaturé, he found only some burnt provisions and
everything else destroyed so that the Portuguese might not
profit by what remained. On the following day, it being
now the end of March [1654], Francisco Antunes went to Alcoa
with eight companies, Domingos Sarmento de Carvalho going
as captain of the advance guard. After five or six days
General Francisco de Melo sent Gaspar de Araujo Pereyra to
take over the arrayal and to remain in Calaturé.

Now we must describe the doings of the galleons. In
the beginning of March of this year, [1654], there set out from
Goa five galleons, none of them of great account, to relieve
Ceylon. As Captain-Major went Antonio Barreto Pereyra in
the galleon 'Nasareth', which carried 34 pieces, as Admiral
Alvaro de Navas in the galleon 'S. Joao' with 32. In
'S. Antonio' there was as Captain D. Antonio Soto-Mayor
with 18, and she was rather a transport ship than a war ship;
in 'S. Joseph', Francisco Machado D'oca with 30; and in the
galliots 'S. Filipe Sant-Iago' with 18, Antonio de Abreu
de Freytas. In the bar of Columbo they found three Hollanders
sail, and two avoiding an encounter, the flagship, a frigate
of 32 pieces, opened fire on us and trusting in her speed, she
came windward of our flagship, but seeing that Antonio
de Abreu took the wind and that the Captain-Major went in
pursuit of the others, she fell, without intending it upon her
bows. Antonio Barreto grappled the Enemy frigate and
Antonio de Abreu gave her some volleys from a distance.
The Belga realized the danger, and after standing the first
charge with great loss of men, gathered what remained under
the deck; and as the artillery of our flagship played too high,
it broke down her upper deck and killed many of her infantry.

On the poop of the enemy ship appeared one of his captains
showing his gallantry and pride, and our Captain-Major,
carried away by his well-known valour rather than by caution
or prudence, jumped on the ship and killed him. As he
returned, a raw recruit cried out to him by the name of his
office, and being recognized by the Enemy, he was wounded
in the thigh by a pike, and retiring to the gallery, he ended
his life in a short time, though the high spirit which charac-
terized him was worthy of a better fate. In this confusion,
usual among raw recruits, a cry arose that the bow was set
on fire by a chain shot, and in the meantime the Hollander
had opportunity to cut the grappling, and being very light,
she fled to Negombo, where, through negligence, she ran
aground on the sandbanks, from which she was afterwards
dragged and moored.

A similar fate befell the Admiral Alvaro de Navas with the
second ship of the enemy after giving her brave broadsides,
for none of the other galleons carried such heavy artillery.
He grappled her also and, boarding her, he captured the
forecastle, and the soldiers were so sure that they had captured
her, that when D. Antonio Soto-Mayor came, they cried out
to him to follow the other as was secure. On board there
were some Portuguese in the service of the Belga, who seeing
that the Hollander beggar quarter, opposed the proposal
as they were sure the Portuguese would not give it to them.
At this time our Admiral was already wounded in the forearm
from which, as it was badly dressed, he died in Columbo,
and while they were assisting him and some were thinking
that the Enemy was given quarter, others were continuing
to cut the cables, the Portuguese mixed with the Hollander
were able to cut the grappling, and a raw recruit of our
galleon, without noticing which cable he cut, cut off our own,
whereupon the Enemy profited by the opportunity to get
away, taking some of our soldiers who were not able to jump
into the galleon in time. D. Antonio went in chase of the
third ship which had already escaped Francisco Machado,
but after receiving several broadsides both from the one
and the other galleon, she escaped to the shoals of Negombo.
In fine all the three ships though badly damaged found a
refuge there, whither our men did not want to go, as some of
the galleons required greater depth (a well known in-
convenience in our ship building) and because the pilots
were not experienced in those seas. These events showed
clearly how much skill is able to do against us as long as
good sense is not altogether wanting. When the Hollanders
retired to Negombo and our men to Columbo, where they
anded the reinforcements they brought, so great was the fear of the Hollander garrison of Calcutaré, that immediately in the manner described it retired to Gile, leaving Antonio Mendez Aranha master of the praça. General Francisco de Melo de Castro appointed to the captaincies of the two galleons, Urbano Fialho Ferreyra to 'Nazaré', and Nuno de Melo to 'S. José', and as chief of all, Antonio de Abreu, because he was the senior Captain; and on the ground that the galleons had no port wherein to winter in safety, and that it was now too late to detain them longer or to undertake at least the siege of Negombo, which could not be relieved by land nor by sea with two ships, because the Enemy feared the galleons which were moored at the mouth of the bay of Columbo, besides other reasons given for this course, he determined to send them to Goa.

On their return voyage they came without mishap as far as mount Doli, though there were dissensions owing to questions of precedence, and seeing that owing to the proximity of the winter of this coast there might be danger in delay, each one tried to arrive as quickly as possible, but with that lack of order which in India was severely punished, and with the north-east wind on the bow they coasted along making for this bar; and when Antonio de Abreu and Francisco Machado D'oea had negotiated the Cape da Rama, they desisted 11 sail towards the North, and though they could easily have known that they were Hollander and could have lowered sail and waited for the other galleons to come up and unite with them, and if they thought they had no chance, they could have stolen a march over the Enemy by night, or if they thought they had they could have fought in good order and in unison, for it is known from various sources that not all Hollander ships were ships of war, but that some were laden with horses, our Chief without heeding any better counsel, in this emergency, on the 2nd of May ran the galleon against the rocks near the Rio de Sal, while Francisco Machado D'oea after receiving and giving broadsides to the Enemy, who having the wind in his favour, with all his squadron went to windward of him, and being deflected ran aground a little seaward of the galliot St. Phelipe, and both were burnt. In Goa they had tidings that the Hollaner had come to his factory at Vingural, and that he had dispersed a Flotilla which was going northward with the loss of some slow ships of burden, and though they informed the galleons, it was too late, I believe owing to the fault of some inferior minister to whom the matter was entrusted.

The Enemy coasted along, and off Ancolá and Mirzo espied two other galleons also separated, and dividing into two squadrons seaward of them, he fought with them the whole afternoon, and all the following night with the galleon St. Antonio. When it was broad day, the enemy flagship came to attack, but being well answered, she went away, and the whole day both sides were refitting, though our galleon was now unable to run sail, for the Hollander knowing that victory lay in this, fired very persistently on her masts and rigging. On the following night the enemy flagship gave signal and at dawn the Belga was not to be seen. The squadron which fought with Nuno de Melo who had goodly artillery, slackened on the first night, and the following morning Mello put into Mirzeo, but because he knew little of the bar, he ran aground and the men made for the shore. A ship followed her, but receiving a shot she blew up, and it is thought that they had hit the magazine.

By twelve o'clock on the third day of battle, after he had carried out repairs, the Belga returned with eight ships upon the galleon St. Antonio, which in this last extremity, being already aground, not far from the shore, had no other help but to be burnt, and though the others threw themselves into the sea, D. Antonio wished to be the last and to set fire to the galleon with his own hands, but as the train took fire sooner than he thought, when he was still on board ready to jump into the sea, the galleon blew up, and he ended his life with the Master Gunner, having shown in this encounter that the valour which with which he acted deserved a better fate.

The last galleon of Urbano Fialho Ferreyra had taken a pinnace of the Moors, into which he put some soldiers, and when he sighted the enemy about nightfall, he sailed off into the deep where the pinnace escaped, and afterwards he arrived at this bar. But as everything was preparing for the chastisement [decreeed by] Heaven, the Captain changing his mind, again made for land by night and went towards the islet of Onor, where the Enemy spied her and fought with her and fought with her a day and half, and after losing many men, the Captain refused to surrender and scuttled her, whereupon, as she was also riddled by shot, she sank. Such was the end of so disorderly a battle, for even if they had been more numerous, so long as they were disunited, they would all have been lost because of their unwillingness to turn back and because the enemy ships were lighter. In all the ships many died of shot or were drowned, and this disorder led to the beginning of the loss of Ceylon, for had these galleons been saved, the fate of Columbo could have been averted.
by means of the reinforcements which the new Viceroy Conde de Sarzedas brought, and the Hollanders would not have continued the siege of that praga with such alacrity. Such is the result of disorder. Such was the result in India of the lack of discipline, for they could not have failed to have known that an encounter was likely, since it was said that the Hollanders had gone in search of some English ships which were coming from Persia, and they could not return except by that coast. Fortunate in this expedition was their captain Richloff Van Goens, for after destroying and vanquishing the English, he was able to inflict such great loss on us as in a short time to bring about the complete downfall of the pragas of the South.

CHAPTER 19.

THE OTHER SUCCESSES OF THAT CONQUEST IN THE TIME OF THE SAME GENERAL

Never was the war of Ceylon more favourable in those times than at the arrival of the garrisons in Columbo, for Francisco Antunes at once took possession of the lands of Alcâém, Passadum-coral and Pitigâli which the Hollanders had seized in November [1652] at the end of the government of General Manoel Mascarenhas Homem and of the lands of Reygam-Coral and Salpiti-Coral, from the river of Calaturé to Columbo, which had been deserted on account of the proximity of the Enemy; and already the Hollanders would have given Nigumbo cheap, had it been attacked, as it had a very small garrison. But when they knew of the return of the garrisons, they garrisoned Nigumbo and taking all they had in Gâle, they halted in Alcâém on the other side of the river within sight of our arrayal, and they fired at each other with muskets on supports and hand muskets. Afterwards they brought three pieces of artillery from the fortalice of Gâle wherewith they continually did us damage. Francisco Antunes opposed them from a stockade on the bank of the river, and the Captain-Major of the Field, Gaspar de Araujo, joined him along with the Captain of Calaturé. A piece was also brought from Columbo to attack them with. The Enemy sent 100 Europeans and 100 Chingalâs to Pitigâli, as the river was navigable up to that place. Francisco Antunes also went to meet them with 100 soldiers and 100 lascarins, but as they came to hear of this, the detachment was ordered to return, and at daybreak there was not a person to be seen in their quarters. The Captain-Major thought that they had gone to reinforce their men against Francisco Antunes and sent an Adjutant with eight soldiers to the other bank to discover the camp; and they, seeing an ambush of the Hollanders, gave a signal to the others to cross without reconnoitering what force the Enemy had. About 60 men embarked with the Captain of the advance guard, Andre de Seyxas da Silva, and when a part of them were already on land, the Enemy saluted out from the ambush and killed 13 of our men, and the Ensign Vieente da Costa was taken prisoner with two shot wounds from which he recovered; the rest swam back. At this time both the captains excused themselves from the command, Gaspar Pereyra because he had accepted it [only] on the hope of besieging Gâle, and Francisco Antunes because he was disheartened at the sight of so many reverses of fortune. The former was succeeded by Antonio Mendez Aranha, the latter by Andre Veloso, Dias da Vida of Maturé, and the two took over charge on the 23rd of October [1654] when for more than six months they had been battering from the one and the other side of the river, which Antonio Mendez continued till the 16th of December.

At this time the Hollanders mustered more than 700 Europeans and a thousand Chingalâs besides some Bandanese from the reinforcements taken from a ship which, while passing from Malaca to Persia, was afterwards destroyed along with the Malavya Pirates on this coast, because they know that there were not in the arrayal more than 240 soldiers and 600 lascarins who would soon flee like the rest, as it actually happened. And one night they crossed the river without being noticed and divided their army into three detachments. One of 300 Europeans with as many Asiatios, went to meet our arrayal before dawn; another detachment with the same number of Europeans and Asiatios was placed at a narrow pass on the beach through which our men were able to retreat to Calaturé which was two leagues from that place; the rest of the troops went off as far as the rivulet of Calamâcra, save for 200 Chingalâs who went a league further to cut and obstruct with trees the hill of Macâne and to lay hands on those who escaped from the battle. As soon as the Enemy was perceived, our men took up arms and set on march, and Domingos Sarmento de Carvalho, captain of the advance guard, with the others who followed him, drove...
them away, and gained the beach, where the Belga was fighting with the rearguard, and our men were defending themselves with valour with the help of a piece which they directed upon them. They came upon the second detachment which received them with a discharge from the piece and with musketry, but Domingos Sarmento, Marcelo Fialho, Alvaro Rodriguez Borrachio and the others, after some volleys of musketry, broke through the Enemy with sword and spear, whereupon the enemy joined his comrades, and Domingos Sarmento passed to the rearguard. The Hollander kept pursuing them with two field pieces and musketry, but as our piece was larger and charged with small shot, these did greater damage among them. Finally they came upon the third detachment which was in ambush, and as it broke suddenly into the midst of our little army, its captain lost his Ensign with the banner who was killed by Domingos Vidal the Portuguese Sergeant, who afterwards carried it lowered, and those who escaped from this attack went to join the others. Then our men determined to charge the Enemy one more with sword and spear, and fought with fierce determination, and though they could not make him return, because of the force he had, they drove him back with such effect that he did not dare to follow them again, and as they were now out of his reach, they blew up the piece because it was not necessary. They found the road blocked at Macane, but they did not find the Chingalás, who, seeing that our men were coming unseathed, gave them passage, and at five o'clock in the evening of the 16th of December, worn out and dying of hunger, they reached Calaturé.

In this encounter we lost 19 soldiers, because the Enemy did not give quarter to the wounded, and our men engaged in fighting were unable to carry them. In this way died D. Alvaro de Castro, who had given good proof of valour on many occasions, and some officers whose names did not come to my knowledge. There came to Calaturé over 30 wounded. The Hollander lost about 70 men including officers, and more than 50 were wounded, and he remained master of the lands of Alcâm, Passadun-corla and Pitigálni. This retreat became celebrated, and on the admission of the enemies, the Portuguese fought with desperate valour. Up to this time Manoel Guerreryo and João de Gamboa remained undisturbed in their posts, but as soon as the King heard of the retreat of Antonio Mendez, he came down upon the frontiers of the Four and Seven-corlas and sent Panique Dissâva with 6,000 men against our men. João de Gouveia, hearing of this intention, went from Pitigaldini to join Manoel

Guerreiro in Alâva where were 250 soldiers and 800 lascarins. There they were attacked and driven to retire towards Columbo, as far as the pass of Nacolegâo, where they arrived on Christmas Day [1654], with the enemy behind them as far as Malvâna burning the neighbourhood and the Church and trying to lay waste, by capturing men and cattle, the three neighbouring corlas, because they were friendly to the Portuguese. The General had written a letter to the King of Candea, and because they did not know the reason why no answer was received, when Gaspar de Araujo Pereya, about whom we have already spoken, went to take charge of the arraval, he was ordered to write another letter to the King, in which he said: 'That the General had in Columbo a letter of the King of Portugal and another of the Viceroy of India, but that he did not send them, because he [the King] had not replied to the other, and that he was marching to Gâle with the reinforcement that came from Goa.' The King at once replied to the letter saying: 'That he did not reply to the General, because the letter contained a petition which a black of low caste had made to him (such carelessness does not seem credible unless it were a treachery of the one who wrote the letter in the characters and language of the country), and asking to send him the letter of the King and of the Viceroy, because if they were good, the reply would also be good, but that he would tell him that his Hollanders were very good soldiers! The General knowing that his letter was ambiguous like the mind of the King decided not to send him the letter, and this confirmed him in the trust he reposed in the Hollanders.

The General chose Gaspar Figueyra de Serpe as Captain-Major of the Four and Seven-corlas, realizing that God had given him strength against the Chingalás, and increasing that arraval with the 150 lascarins of Manoel Gil, and leaving the baggage, on the 1st of January [1655] he despatched the two Dissâva from Malvâna with two companies and 800 lascarins, and Manoel Gil with his men to seek Panique in Canapei, whither he had retired with 3,000 men. They fell upon him at the dawn watch and defeated and put him to flight with the loss of men, arms, and all the baggage; and our prisoners were liberated. The Enemy halted in Aranduré, and Figueyra went in pursuit of him so rapidly that our lascarins were able to cut off some heads, but he, who was the foremost warrior of Candea fled to the frontier without awaiting the combat. Figueyra then began by assaults to subdue the lands as far as Alâva and Bolategâma and those of Sofragaô subject to Ruanêla. Panique with
another Dissava of the Seven-corlas and with 8,000 men again fortified the Hill of Arandepola, in the heart of the Seven-corlas, on the provisions of which depended the sustenance of Colombo in those times. Our Captain resolved to seek him out, and taking six companies, and in them 100 soldiers, with the men of João de Gouveia, he gave three to Manoel Gil besides his own men, and there he enlisted more than 200 lascarins, and to Joaõ Coelho who was the Dissava of the Seven-corlas he gave a company and more than 200 lascarins; and he ordered them to attack on all sides at the same time on hearing three different signals. The Captain-Major arrived first, as he had a lesser distance to travel, and for a space of two hours he was well entertained by the Enemy musketry, but he took cover as well as he could till he heard the other signals, and when these were given, they all attacked at the same time. Manoel Gil met with no resistance, as the Enemy was charged on the other sides, and so great was his fear that many reduced themselves to bits in the precipices of the hill, and about 20 were killed by our men and the rest fled, abandoning arms, banners, and spoils. Figueira then marched along the frontiers of the Seven-corlas and continued assaulting the frontiers of Tumpâni against some rebels in other places; and having scared Panique from Balanê, he reduced the whole of the Seven-corlas as far as the ancient limits of the frontiers of Canchea which had been in revolt, some for 12 and others for 17 years, sustaining the array of three months without any expense to the royal treasury, which was greatly increased by the supplies of cinnamon, areca, and other things. But as the Enemy escaped to Vebora, when he was in Talampitim, he despatched from there the two Dissavas with 600 lascarins, but the Chingalá made a sally and obliged them to turn by falling upon their rear-guard. But when he came to know that the Captain-Major was making for him, he gave up the field and the hill of Balanê for a second time. Figueira punished the Natives, and all the Seven-corlas remained obedient. He remained some days in Randinivela and went to Arandure to rest, where he named Diogo de Souza de Castro Dissava and Captain-Major of the Four Corlas, and received a reinforcement of 50 soldiers.

The King decided to seek him out with 26,000 men, and informed his ally the Hollander to surround Calaturé at the same time. Gaspar Figueira who never turned his back on a Chingalá force, finding himself with 300 soldiers and 1,700 lascarins spread a report that he was coming down upon the Batavian and meanwhile made ready for this expedition. On the 10th of April with all dexterity and secrecy he went in search of the King to the highlands and on the third day's march, there fled before him a Dissava who had come to spy the movement of the Portuguese. Then he learnt that the Dissava of Uva was in Cuticapale with 8,000 men, and that a quarter of a league further there was the Dissava of Matale with 6,000, and that the King was following with the rest of his troops and all his Court, and had ordered encampments to be erected for 30 elephants, horses, tigers, and for two companies of Hollanders who were coming with him bringing also six field pieces. Without further delay the Captain-Major sent Joaõ Coelho de Castro with five companies and 8,000 lascarins against the Dissava of Matale, and with the rest he went to meet the force of the Kingdom of Uva with the order that, after defeating them, they should all unite and attack the force of the King. At one o'clock in the noon the Captain-Major came upon the Enemy, as he was going in the advance guard with 20 retired soldiers and the lascarins, who being driven back by the foe were retreating, but they were quickly repelled by the 20 Portuguese in so heated an engagement that a Chingalá succeeded in driving a spear into the one who was carrying the white shield of Gaspar Figueira, which was, as we said, the insignia of the Dissavas and the Captain-Majors according to Chingalá usage. Seeing this Chingalá carry away the shield, Manoel Fernandez de Oliveira, a retired captain, ran after him amidst spears and arrows and bullete and gave him such a blow on the head that he fell dead. As he was bringing back the shield, a bullet passed through his leg, but though he fell, he defended himself with valour till the advance guard came up and with a goodly volley dispersed the Enemy who were terrified to see the gallantry of a few men, and inferred therefrom the danger of measuring with the rest. Our men pursued them, killing, wounding, and capturing them, and gathering arms, banners, and spoils, till they reached Cuticapale, where they found the encampments prepared for the King, and killed some of those who were guarding them.

Joaõ Coelho found the Enemy in a fortified camp, and after exchanging a first volley, he at once charged them with spears and sword, whereupon they took to flight throwing away many arms, and as they fled towards Gaspar Figueira, he fell upon them and did fresh havoc. By four in the evening there appeared in the offing a gallant band of more than 10,000 men, and the Captain-Major, thinking that
they were those who had already been defeated, sent Manoel Gil with 650 lascarins and Captain Manoel Correa Castanho with his company, against them. They then went away till the Captain-Major lost them from view, but upon hearing continuous firing, he sent six other companies and 300 lascarins under the command of José Coelho de Castro, who found Manoel Gil surrounded by the Enemy and fighting them with spears, and Manoel Correa Castanho wounded by two arrows and with only the 150 lascarins of Alieur, because the other 500 of the Seven-corlas seeing a crowned Lion painted on a banner, which is the insignia of the King, had forthwith abandoned the field. These men were the advance party of the army of the King, and with them were the Hollanders who also fired their volleys and sustained the field till the King put himself in safety. They then abandoned the field, but returned to the charge with great fury, but were repulsed with such resolution that they were put to flight, and our men returned to join the Captain-Major as the night was falling. During the drowsy watch voices were heard in the neighbouring hills which in the name of the King called upon our lascarins to run away from the Portuguese, and that otherwise neither one nor the other would be left alive. Gaspar Figueyra like a Colombo born man, ordered the Caffirs to reply by mocking them, and as they fired some musket-shots, the trumpets were sounded, whereupon they withdrew thinking that they were being pursued. In the morning they collected the heads that were cut off and found 700, more than 320 prisoners, 300 muskets on supports many of them with the arms of Constantino de Sá de Noronha taken at the rout of Uva, 9 banners and other spoils. Of the Portuguese five were wounded, four lascarins killed, and more than 20 wounded.

CHAPTER 20.

The Last and the First Actions in the Time of the Generals Francisco de Melo and Antonio de Souza

They soon learnt from a Caffir, a fugitive from the arrayal of the King, and afterwards with greater certainty, that the King had put on mourning with all his Court, saying that it must not be put off till he had taken vengeance from the Portuguese, who if they had crossed over near the rivulet, as soon as they ceased pursuing the enemy, would have come in conflict with the King who was there with all his forces together; and when this was known, there were different opinions in the arrayal, though after so many hours of fighting and with so small a force it would have been not a little dangerous to attack a royal army. Gaspar Figueyra wrote a letter in the Chingalá language and in the name of the Modeliers of his camp, to the Grandees of the Court of the King, with such cunning that it was handed to the Baná Tarrala, Senneschal (Ayo) of the King and by him to the King himself, because in it they were accused of mismanaging the war and of endangering the Royal person. Thereupon he ordered four of his greatest captains to be hacked to pieces with axes, which did not trouble Figueyra. For full eight days the Captain-Major remained in those parts and then he made a tour through the ancient frontiers and halted in Motagall on the borders of the Four-corlas.

The King again despatched against him three, Dissávas by different routes, each with 6,000 men, to attack our men together from different sides. They all came within half a league of our arrayal and it happened that they were in arms and fired three salutes because that morning the Captain-Major gave the title of Modelier to some Araches who had done their part well in the preceding battle, and each of the Chingalá Dissávas, thinking that the other was fighting and because the firing ceased, that he was defeated, they all retired disgracefully. Upon this final disillusion, the King returned to Candaia to celebrate their famous procession called Pereira as he had arrogated to himself the title of Emperor like the ancient Kings of Cota, and for this procession there assembles the best and greatest part of the people of the Kingdom. The Captain-Major knew the day on which it is celebrated, and he penetrated into the rugged lands of Tumpâne, two leagues from Candaia, and after doing all the damage he could, he at once returned, as he foresaw the danger of his audacity. The King who had tidings hastily sent the Dissáva Feridine who divided his forces into two detachments and with one he hempered the rearguard and with the other he attempted to occupy a perilous mcockana in the hills through which alone our men could
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...retreat, but he found it held by the Portuguese. Then getting into the jungle for the space of an hour he fired somewhat, while our men went through that dangerous pass and wounded two soldiers and five lascarins. Figueréa halted in Veibora, and two days later in Aranduré, where in a new stockade he left 25 soldiers who were not able to march and 200 lascarins to protect them and the obedient lands. When he was in Mutapal he came to know that the Chingalá was making incursions into our lands and sent six companies and 500 lascarins to the borders of Tumipán, and though the Enemy tried to recover the prizes they had made, he had to retire with loss leaving five of our lascarins wounded.

The King seeing that he was not able to drive the Portuguese from his territories, with the intention either of cutting off reinforcements from Calaturé or of obliging the Captain-Major to reinforce it, wrote to the Hollander to lay a close siege to that garrison, and then he promptly descended from Candea with 26,000 men without passing through the rugged country of Tumipán. Gaspar Figueréa did not reinforce Calaturé, because he knew that the Hollander had no larger force than the one with which he recently fought Antonio Mendez Araujo, and the King was obliged to resort to another trick and send them two envoys. The Captain-Major received them with courtesy and caution, multiplying truncheons and banners and arranging the army in such a manner as to make the number of our infantry appear greater than it was; and when three salutes had been fired to the health of the Chingalá King, the envoys proposed: 'That the Emperor, their Lord, had ordered them to ask him to withdraw the arrayal to the low-country, because in that way they would gain his good will and bring him to make peace with the King of Portugal.' But the Captain-Major, seeing that they had not been empowered for anything beyond this, on the following day, sent the Sergeant-Major of the arrayal, Manoel Cabreya, along with the two envoys, with instructions, and a letter to the King in which he said: 'That he was highly pleased to find that His Imperial Majesty (the Hollander had given him this presumption) was desirous of making peace with the King of Portugal, his Lord, and that he had powers to arrange and to keep such a peace, but that, if he pleased, he would inform the Captain-General, and the King should send an Ambassador for the purpose, and he would at once retire to the low-country.' Manoel Cabreya found the King and all his Court in mourning, who despatched him the next day giving him an elephant and another for Gaspar...
many prizes of men in those hills the Captain-Major went to lodge in Talpitim, whence he again reduced those frontiers to obedience; and from there he facilitated the journey of the Captain-General, Antonio de Souza Coutinho, by preventing the Enemy from coming down to intercept his march by land from Jafanapata to Columbo, as we shall see presently. Gaspar Figueyra in this way spent seven months in these glorious exploits.

Here, however, ended the successes of this Captain born for the terror of the Chingalás, for he acted with great valour and experience and industry and such skill as the warfare with the Chingalás requires; and because he knew what money could do with them, he did not hesitate to spend what he had, and he had not a little, without sparing even the jewels and furniture of his house, to reward, bribe, and find out the designs of the enemy; and because there was no King's money, and even if there had been, they would not easily have given it him, he did it on his own account, for such was formerly in India the recipe for honour, and so did D. Antão de Noronha keep accounts, so long as the victuals of the soldiers did not become the perquisite of the Captains. What happened to him with the Hollander is certainly not through his fault. He afterwards took part in the siege of Columbo, and here with General Luís de Mendes Furtado in the battle of Arli in Salecte, which was remarkable for its consequences and because of the inequality, and finally he died in Goa, as we said, amidst poverty and ingratitude.

The advanced age of the General, Francisco de Melo de Castro, called for a successor from Goa, and Antonio de Souza Coutinho was elected for the post and set out from here with five galliots, but the weather or a mistake of the pilot brought him to the point of Gaê, whence two Hollander baxeyes sailed out to meet him, and on seeing them, our people turned, some to Columbo, others to the opposite coast of the Island. The General reefed sail with his bow towards the Hollander ships so that those of his convoy might follow him to the attack or defeat, but being scattered, and with the enemy upon them, the others continued their voyage, and the Hollander made a foist run aground in the orla of Gaê and captured another off the coast of Alicão, and another being pursued by an enemy store ship (charrún) which came on the scene, and not having a piece wherewith to defend herself, killed many men with musketry, but being ridded
with shot, was wrecked off the lands of the King of Candea, and the General, Antonio de Souza, with an enemy ship after him, put into Jañapatao. Thence he sent information to Columbo, and the Captain-Major of those lands, Antonio de Amaral de Menezes, accompanied him with some troops as far as Putalao where there was awaiting him Antonio Mendez Aranha with six companies and some casados of Columbo, and Diogo de Souza de Castro, Dissava of the Four-norias, with two companies and 500 lascarins, through whom Gaspar Figueyra wrote to the Captain-General about the dispositions of the King of Candea and how effective it would be if he passed through Mutapali and the other things that had happened, meanwhile ordering the roads to be cleared and taking measures to ensure the obedience of the Natives and even making a tour through those frontiers to show the King that he was now quite near. It is believed that the casados of Columbo dissuaded the General from this journey, because they were displeased with Figueyra for not allowing them the enjoyment of the recently conquered lands [on the ground] that it was many years since they were lost and that it was convenient to save the revenues for public expenses and the lands for the new conquerors. From there Antonio de Amaral returned to Jafanapatao and Diogo de Souza to Mutapali and afterwards to Columbo, his place being taken by Andre de Seyzas da Silva, and the General with Antonio Mendez Aranha arrived in Columbo on the 15th of August 1655; and Antonio Mendez went to Calatur when the men of the General's galleon.

The new General had no time for rest; because although there was kept up a ten years' truce in the East between the Portuguese and the Hollander nations, which was ever badly received and worse observed by the latter, since they robbed Tutucorim at a time when the truce still lasted, when its term was over, the Chingali King determined to drive the Portuguese altogether out of Ceylon, and again leagued with the Belga, who, in fulfilment of this treaty, landed on the coast of Ceylon between Maravia and Chilao on the 15th of September 1655, with 26 warships, of which 18 were men-of-war, besides other smaller vessels, under the command of Gerbert Hullg who had come from Holland in the preceding monsoon with the lordly title of Director-General of the whole of India and with order to reside in Batavia as Governor of the East (India) Company, a post which he put off till he should have conquered Columbo. He was a valiant soldier, a bold captain, rich and liberal, and so determined a person that when the Council did not fall in with his opinion, on the ground that it was risky, he took the consequence on himself, undertaking to make good any damage that might ensue. He had 3,000 Europeans, experienced and dexterous in arms, and with the various reinforcements which were added, the Hollanders employed in the siege of Columbo 4,000 Europeans, besides Bandalance and Malaya and about 16,000 Chingalas and over and above what fell into their hands, with a great abundance of all things necessary for a long siege, though he hoped to carry it by storm.

Besides the warfare which was kept up against the Chingali and afterwards against the Hollander, Columbo suffered in those years not a few misfortunes, because as everything was making for its ruin, there came a pestilence on the cattle of the villages so often destroyed, and as cultivation ceased on account of this and because of the disturbance of war, provisions ran short and their price was very high; and large sums were consumed in their purchase and transport, for the flotillas from the mainland and from Jafanapatao and the succours from Goa were insufficient, especially after the Enemy began to lay a slow siege to that bar, and Columbo was often on the point of perishing of famine. Such were the straits when the Belga came upon that Island, because only three rowing ships had come since the Winter; but on the 22nd of the same September, when the enemy was away from that bay, the Flotilla of Tutucorim reached it. However even though the praça seemed relieved in the matter of provisions, there was great lack of all other things, for there was little powder, little lead, very few matches, the mountings [of the guns] old, and not one planked for action, little iron and nothing at all of the other things necessary for a siege. There were a little more than 800 soldiers, of whom 300 were in Calatur under the command of Antonio Mendez Aranha, and Gaspar Figueyra de Serpa was in Mutapali with 350, and the best part of the infantry was outside the praça. There were very few lascarins, and the majority of them were little reliable. There were only 20 Portuguese artillerymen and ten Asiatics, nearly all of whom were little skilled in the work, though it was a function of which great account should have been made. The posts were many and far from each other, in which there were 150 pieces of heavy artillery, besides many smaller ones belonging to ships and to private persons.

The walls were better adapted for the sieges of the Natives with whom we were at war, than against European batteries, for they were altogether weak. The hillock of S. Sebastião,
though outside the regular battery, was too close. The city
was spread out over a large area around the bay, and though
it could have been reduced as formerly to the plain, which
lay where the lake opens into the sea, and to the hillock of
S. Lourenço, as was always considered convenient, and as
the Hollanders subsequently did, the residents never agreed
to the plan. The bay which forms its bar, does not exceed
three fathoms' depth where it is deepest, and it was so small
that it only admitted of a dozen and a half of rowing vessels.
On the West side it had no other refuge in time of storm
than the houses of the City, nearly all of which were low on
that side. The Portuguese selected this site because it was
near the ancient capital of Cota, with the King of which they
contracted friendship, and because in those days there was
much cinnamon in that district, and nearly all [the cinnamon]
that grew in Ceylon was on that coast of the Island. The
praça could be attacked from many sides, so distant from
each other that the artillery of Mapâne could scarcely be
heard in S. Joaõ in rough weather, and it needed more than
3,000 soldiers to garrison it according to the requirements
of war. In the whole of that rampart there was no modern
work save the diamante of the bastion of S. Estavaõ, one of
those facing the enemy batteries, and they say that it cost
the Belga more than 30,000 shot to dismantle it. The four
others which the enemy pounded most, were that of S. Joaõ,
the Couraça Xavier, the bastian S. Sebastiaõ and that of
Madre de Deus. And as it was ever understood that it
was the one of S. Joaõ which the Enemy had chosen for the
storming of the City, it was again strengthened with large
beams, and the platform filled with fascines and earth, and
the same was done in the other three, there being fourteen
in all.

CHAPTER 21.

THE HOLLANDER TAKES CALATURE AND DESTROYS THE RELIEFS.

The fortified place of Calaturé gave great concern, and
General Antonio de Souza Coutinho went in person to see
it. He gave pay to the soldiers and sent by land to the
pass of Anguratôta all the provisions he could, but so little
of it was able to enter, that they were able to sustain them-
selves only for a short time. The Aracheas and lascars of
Nigumbo having already experienced the treatment of the
Hollanders chose even in these straits to come over to the
service of the King of Portugal, and the Captain-Major Gaspar
Figueyra took them from that fortress, and the Belga was
unable to prevent it, though he sailed out in pursuit. These
men gave the news that 3,000 Europeans had disembarked
| the beach of Maravias; and upon these tidings our

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General held a Council and laid before them: the concern
caused by the arrival of the Enemy with so great a force of
ships | and | men, and so early that it was clear they intended
to besiege that City which was without a garrison as the
soldiers were partly in Calaturé and partly in Mutappali,
and the rest in Malvàna, Mutal, and in hospital; and [he asked
them] to give freely their opinion as to what should be done.
After a lengthy conference the General again proposed:
‘That for the security of Colombo it seemed necessary to
recall the garrison of Calaturé’ giving the reasons which made
him think so. But this matter of abandoning praças, even
those of lesser importance and for a greater purpose, is not
a method of warfare which the Portuguese had hitherto
practiced in India, nor is it my business to dispute the point.
though I might give many instances of great Captains who
did so, when they had no forces to divide, and experience
has shown that Calaturé lost Colombo and that Cranganar
lost Cochin. It was decided that for the nonce it was not
convenient to withdraw that garrison, but only that the
Captain-Major should be directed to get rid of the unnecessary
men, and to keep vessels in readiness in the river to cross it
on a second notice. They based this resolution on the words
of a letter of the Viceroy Conde de Sarzedas 1 who had reached
Goa in the preceding August, in which he said as follows:
“Now that we are masters of Calaturé, your Honour must try
to preserve it very carefully, and the Captain o’ the praça
must be a very satisfactory person.” They decided further
that the Captain Gaspar Figueyra should come down to the
lowlands [to a place] from which he would be able to help
on short notice, so as not to have to consume the provisions
in the City. The speed of the Hollanders, who was master
of the sea, did not approve these delays, and councils of war
are ever tardy when matters have not been foreseen, because

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1 Dom Rodrigo Lobos de Sivyer, Conde de Sarzedas, 28th Viceroy
1653-1659.
the chances of war cannot be settled by counsels from a
distance and the general principles of its theory do not embrace
all the circumstances of its practice.

Nothing of this was unknown to the Enemy, and knowing
of the dispersion of our troops, this seemed to him a good
opportunity to carry out his main object and to carry Columbo
by storm. But the Heavens diverted him with such showers,
that the meadows became flooded and he was obliged to desist
from his purpose, leaving many traces of the hurry with which
he retired, nor was this the first time that the passes of
Mattuall and Betal, though badly garrisoned, caused him
these fears, since it was the general opinion of India that
on their defence depended that of Columbo. He re-embarked
and without coming in sight of Columbo made for the deep
sea and went to the shores of Allégho and Berverim, and
disembarking in all haste, he marched to the Hillock of Macêne,
one league from Calaturé, where the Governor of Câle, Adriano
Vandermet, was awaiting him with the usual army, of that
Island, wherewith he again reinforced his gâte. Our
Captain-General had tidings of all this, and even then he
ordered Antonio Mendes Aranha to fortify the post of
Our Lady of Health opposite Calaturé, on the other bank of
the river, to secure the retreat.

In fulfilment of this order and for the purpose of protecting
that garrison, he sent João Banha Cardoso, Dissava of Maturé,
with some soldiers and the lascarins under his command;
but after he had arrived at that post owing to the ill-will of
the Natives who had already revolted, and for lack of the
information which he expected from them, he was taken
unawares by the Enemy and lost the post and some men,
because the Belga with the intention of preventing reinforce-
ments and intercepting that detachment of troops, as could
easily have been foreseen, had disembarked on the side of
Panituré. A remedy was attempted with still greater loss,
as could have been foreseen by the mearest intelligence.
The General sent Nicolão de Moura Brito, Captain-Major
of the foists and some others who joined him, with the Dissava
of Nigumbo, Manoel Gil Crespo, and the men under his
command, to hold that place and to collect provisions and other
necessary things to provision Calaturé. But impossible
ventures and tardy remedies never succeed, and as it befell
this time also, because when they approached the river of

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1 Church, situated on the north bank of the Kâhu-gânga.
darkness was such that the Enemy did not see the galiots till they were beyond reach of harm. By a fresh decision of the Council these soldiers were listed to this arrayal already doomed to the sword.

Others assert that at the very hour when these new comers landed, there came a message from Francisco Antunes that the force of the Enemy was great, for their General was in front of Calaturé on the other bank of the river with a large squadron, another [force] two leagues further at the pass of the river of Digaó, through which the reinforcement might have gone, and another over against Calaturé; that they were so far away that they were not able to reinforce in case of attack; that a cunning and faithful spy, who had made his way into the camp of the Enemy General, had seen a soldier sail out from Calaturé with a white flag and that it was said in the camp that on the next day they would surrender. And in spite of this news the General, on the following morning, the 16th of the month, without further [consultation] with the Council despatched the Captain-Major, to whom at the Morro Francisco Antunes repeated what he had already written; but though he already knew it, in order at least to undeceive the General, he ordered a hasty muster of the one and the other soldiers and found there were 650 men, divided into 22 companies, and nearly 1,000 lascarins; and at three o'clock in the afternoon he ordered Francisco Antunes to march with six companies, and Domingos Sarmento, Captain of the advance guard, in which he also placed Manoel Gil with 200 lascarins, to Paníturé, and collect boats for the relief to cross. When it was beginning to be dark they encountered the Enemy just near the banks of the river of Paníturé, on the side of Columbo and fought vauntingly with him; but the latter on account of the darkness and because he did not know the strength of the force he had to deal with, did not wish to get out of his quarters, and the Portuguese were so eager that more than 50 remained there, killed and captured. But Francisco Antunes retired as far as the lake of Linaña, which could easily have been opened to the sea in order to cut off the Enemy.

There, between nine and ten in the night, he was joined by Gaspar Figueyra, who, without full consideration of the danger in which he placed the arrayal and the peace of Columbo and still thinking of relieving Calaturé, which by that time was already surrendered, drew up his arrayal in three divisions giving each line a depth of eight men, and placing the greater part of the lascarins in the advance guard along with the Portuguese. In this manner he began the march as soon as the day dawned, and at the point of Paníturé he described the enemy who were marching in three squadrons consisting of 3,000 men, the central one a little in advance, and each with three field pieces besides 1,500 lascarins. Gaspar Figueyra realizing this could have retired to the Morro on the beach, which was narrow and suited to his scanty force, or even to Columbo without any discredit, as an encounter with so unequal a force could not but end in defeat. However he went ahead ordering Sarmento not to attack with the advance guard till he arrived, but forgetting this order, the latter involved everyone; and by nine o'clock in the morning the advance guard began the charge with a volley from 200 muskets and the arquebuses he had. The first squadron of the enemy replied with a volley of a thousand carbines, and the two side squadrons with the field pieces, whereby they straightway killed and wounded more than 40 men; and while our men followed up with other volleys, they received two others from the enemy squadrons. Thereupon Gaspar Figueyra perceiving the inequality of the game, charged the first squadron with sword and spear. The Hollander dexterously opened ranks and let the field piece play on them and kill others and then closed up again, and few of those who entered escaped. Those who were outside were surrounded by the three squadrons helped by the Asiatics, and they sold their lives as dearly as they could, killing and wounding many of the Enemy; and when they found that they were completely routed, and that the Belgia gave no quarter, they took to flight, some through the jungles and others along the beach.

In these two encounters we lost about 400 men. The Captain Francisco Antunes was found three days afterwards mortally wounded, and being recognized by the enemy, in whose hands he expired, was by him buried in the Church of Our Lady of Miracles. He was a man of valour and prudence and sagacity and served well in war. There died also Domingos Sarmento de Carvalho, who thus kept company with his brother, both being killed in this conquest, the Captains Antonio de Valadares, Antonio da Costa, Antonio Correa, and other captains, Ensigns and Sergeants, whose names did not come down to our notice, besides those who were wounded. Gaspar Figueyra, with a little more than

1 Now Milagoriya (Miracles), Wellawatta.
250 soldiers, reached Columbo that evening, and with those who were in good health he tried to fortify the post of S. Sebastião and Our Lady of Life, with a rampart from one Church to the other; but [it was done] in so short a time and with so few men that it only became a fresh disappointment. The General now fully alive to the danger ordered the garrisons of Malvāna and Matuāl to retire, and as he happened to be in the field along with the old General, Francisco de Melo de Castro, they learnt from the spies the news of the arrival of the Enemy and were obliged to retire in haste. On the morning of the 18th October the Enemy attacked that hillock, and of the few who attempted to defend it nine or ten were killed, and Captain Manoel da Veyga escaped by cutting his way through the Enemy, who had occupied the plain of Our Lady of Life, and his good fortune was equal to the desperate valour which made him prefer to die killing and wounding many than to be killed in cold blood like the rest by the Enemy, who was proud of such good fortune, because in five days Calatara surrendered for want of provisions, though that garrison had acted with great valour and with no little bloodshed on the one side and the other, and afterwards in various encounters he always succeeded, and if after this recent retreat he had once attacked the City, before they had decided on the manner of its defence, the danger would have been great.

Such were the sad vespers of the ultimate ruin of Columbo and of Ceylon, for that praça was given up for lost before it was invested; and all on account of mismanagement in consequence of the chastisement, for in that respect there is nothing greater than that valour should be frustrated by lack of counsel and that one should try to set one mistake right by another. But to show what difference there is between a warfare well conducted and the same mismanaged, though hitherto there was an appearance of weakness because blunders deprived them of success, henceforth there will be given greater proof of Portuguese valor, more wary because it was less rash, and as many heroic deeds [will be performed] in the defence of this City as can be expected from human endurance and valour, so that that Enemy will consider it sheer pertinacity and rashness; for Columbo which was given up for lost held out during a siege of seven months, and was it not for famine and pestilence and its other consequences, it might have lasted seven years, and had it been relieved, it would have shown itself to be delay of the power of the Hollander in the East.

1 Now Hulftsdrp, because Hulft fixed his quarters there.
Brito, with another company, helped in various posts, and after the first assault in the Couraça till he was taken prisoner; at the redout of the gate of St. João, at the foot of that bastion, on the outer side, stood D. Diogo de Vasconcelos, Manoel Guerreiro Netes and Manoel Gomez da Costa, with their companies in the casemate of the same bastion; Manoel da Veiga Ferreira with another company in St. Estevão; Antonio da Mota de Oliveira with his company in S. Sebastian; at the Queen’s gate, Alvaró Rodriguez Borralho with a company as Captain-Major of that post as far as the magazine; in the bastion of the Madre de Deus, Manoel Cabreya da Ponte with another company, in the houses of D. Jeronimo de Azevedo, Joao da Costa Giada; and as guard of that post three manchuras which were launched on the lake from the side of the moat under the charge of captain Domingos Coelho de Ayala.

The captains of the companies of casados were Antonio Coelho, Afonso Correa and Francisco Lobo da Silva; and many of the aforesaid had held posts in the army, for they were all men of valour and wisdom and experience. Francisco Lobo da Silva stood with his company in the magazine, Antonio de Magalhaes de Araujo with his company was deputed to relieve the bastions of St. Antonio and St. Jeronimo or wherever they were needed. Manoel de Abreu Godinho, Admiral of the foist, remained in the bastion S. Cruz. Domingos Pires, a casado of Negapatao, with a party of outsiders and Antonio Coelho with his company of casados and another of Topazes | of Delantota had charge of the post of Galboca. Manoel Rodriguez Franco, Captain of the General’s guard, was kept in reserve with another company to assist where need was greatest. The Sergeant-Major was Antonio Leao, the Adjutant Thome Ferreira Filho, Tristao Ribeiro, Joao Cardozo, Antonio de Abreu, Bras das Neves, Manoel de Souza, Antonio Madeira Cabral, the citizen Antonio Barboza Pinheiro was captain of artillery. They were all picked men, and in this siege they showed the mettle of their courage and constancy, though they were too few considering the extent of their charge and the diversity of posts.

The defence of the City being disposed in this manner on the side of the Portuguese, the Hollanders on their part informed the King of Candea of their good fortune so that he might assist them with all his force. The King at once sent 12,000 men, the best he had, and many pioneers, by means of whom they were able to fortify themselves well, since, on the testimony of all, they knew and were accustomed to do it well. The King himself promised to come in person in a short time, whereupon they became very proud and conceited. Some Portuguese were persuaded that this last resolution of the Candea King sprang from the indignation which Gaspar Figueyra provoked when he made him wear mourning with all his Court; and that he really ever desired peace, and they blamed General Diogo de Melo de Castro for violating it, since [the King] had given him to understand in various ways that he wished for peace, but that like a King, and a high minded one, he had waited till they came to ask for it; and that to instigate this desire that he had sent a present of mulberries to General Manoel Mascarenhas Homem saying that he must not mind their value, but note what the mulberries (amoras) signified, namely the love (amor) he had towards the Portuguese. This however is not in keeping with the reply he sent to Gaspar de Araujo Pereyra, which was the reason why the letter of the King of Portugal and that of the Viceroy, Conde de Obidos, were not sent to him. Nor does it square with the circumstances, which is the soul of true History, for there was no time after the success of Gaspar Figueyra to ally himself with the Batavian or to prepare that fleet, nor [does it square] with the desire he always had to be Lord of the lowlands on the one and the other side of the Island; nor with the haste with which he approached Colombo in the time of Manoel Mascarenhas Homem, as soon as he saw the field abandoned to the Hollanders. The truth is that, after the outbreak of the war begun by Diogo de Melo de Castro, he sent two Modeliars by way of Paliacate as ambassadors to Jacatra, or Batavia and thence to Holland, and it was agreed between them: That the King should be Lord of the lands and Holland of all the praças which we held all round the Island, dismantling only Batelcaul and Triquilimali, each of the parties thus securing what he wished, the Hollanders driving us out of Ceylon, the King remaining in complete Lord of the products of the Island, and with harbours for his trade. For although his Father on his death had recommended him to suffer the Portuguese rather than any other European nation, yet when he saw that Diogo de Melo in spite of the treaty, again sought him out in his own house, while it seemed to him that he had given no cause for open war, he followed a different course. And though the Hollanders conquest was delayed by the truce they made for ten years, this fire was rekindled by the conquest of Brazil, and with the men who escaped our sword they increased their forces in India to such an extent that they were able to carry out this undertaking and to continue the blockade of the bar of Goa.
The fortifications of the Hollander began on the 18th of October, as their assæs do not fear the fury of the vara of Choromandel; and on the 28th of the same month [our men] described five batteries of 20 cannon of 18, 24, and 30 pounds, against the five bastions facing them. Before they began to open fire, while our men were lining the bastions of S. Joaô and S. Sebastião, five companies sallied out daily to the field, under cover of our musketry to facilitate the work. The batteries opened fire with such fury that they soon dismantled the five bastions, smashed some pieces, disabled others, demolishing the parapets and ramparts. The greatest damage was done to the bastion of S. Joaô, upon which the batteries played hardest, and for this reason they built a strong redoubt on which they mounted two cannon. The other bastions, now ruined on many sides, were also repaired, but the shot destroyed everything, and deaths and wounds delayed the work more than was good, for the Hollander daily threw into the walls and the city more than 800 shot, besides many grenades of unusual size and other contrivances of fire, whereby they killed men, destroyed buildings, and terrified the majority of the ordinary people and even the most valorous who were not at any time of the day or night.

At this time there went over to the Enemy Joaô da Rosa, a Hollander by birth, who was married and had children in Colombo, whither he had fled from Galé, and shortly afterward, there fled also a soldier, a Native of Jafanapatao. And though the one and the other flight caused concern, they served to call attention to the fact that the wall which ran from the bastion of S. Sebastião by the Queen's Gate to that of the Madre de Deus, was weak and low, and that it should be lined with palm trees, fascines and earth, at which there laboured the captains of the merchant galleons, digging a closed way so as to attack the Enemy with greater security, and planting two mortars at the Queen's gate with low port holes opened in the wall, all of which was of great use on the day of the assault. On the 18th of October, when the siege began, our General sent Manoel Sarayva de Albuquerque, and on the 28th, when the battering began, Antonio de Abreu, a casado of Negapatao, both valiant and trusty men, in two light dhoneys to make their way between the vessels of the Enemy to Manãr, thence to send information by land to the Viceroy of India about the siege which the Hollander had laid to Colombo, the batteries which were opened, the scarcity of men for the defence of the praça, the shortage of powder, munitions, and provisions, and to ask him earnestly to reinforce that city with what there was in India and if possible in person.

The same message was sent to Antonio de Amaral de Menezes, Captain-Major of Jafanapatao, to have a Flotilla of provisions ready, and to Manoel de Magalhaes Coutinho, Captain-Major of Malavar, whom the General begged, demanded, and ordered in the name of His Majesty, to cross over to Manãr to convey to Colombo the succour of victuals and money which was ready there. The Captain-Major did not go and alleged in Goa as excuse that the winds were contrary and that at the cape of Comuri he lost some anchors, which was not accepted as a good excuse, for, although in the first fury of the Vara it might be very difficult for a rowing ship to negotiate the whole gulf as far as Manãr, far different was the expedition of D. Jeronimo de Azevedo, who by means of a tow rope got between the rock and the point of the cape and made 25 leagues as far as Manapara by sheer rowing and from thence he crossed over to Colombo with the same Vara at great risk; but this reinforcement had to negotiate another twenty-five leagues as far as Tutucorim and what remained from thence to Manãr, in order to conduct the flotilla thence and succeed in breaking through the blockade which the Enemy had laid to Colombo by sea. He returned to Cochim where he found the fleet of the North, of which the Captain-Major was D. Manoel Mascarenhas, and though this gentleman greatly desired to go to Ceylon where these two fleets could have placed 600 more men and more than 20 foists, as was thought in Goa, and would have obliged the enemy to raise the siege or to man their ships with the troops, to the no small risk of those who were on the field, as assaults might be delivered on them under cover of our artillery, which might have given us one successful day after so many bad ones, yet so great were the difficulties that they had in Cochim, especially the difficulty of money, that D. Manoel Mascarenhas offered to pawn the praça of Dio. However as the principal object was not merely to cross over to Colombo with a reinforcement of men, who would only consume its provisions the faster, but to convey provisions from Jafanapatao with all possible care and bring what other forces might be got together in Goa, the two Captains-Major returned to Goa, leaving Colombo to fluctuate between its fears and miseries. Wherefore all these reasons do not prevent one from saying that Colombo was lost owing to a mistake similar to the one...
which lost Gâlo; and as European war is dreadful, it will always be so, as long as the supplement of the chastisement depends only on valour.\(^1\)

\(^{P781}\)

In order to try every remedy, they resolved in Council (although this seemed a desperate one), to write to Raja Singa Rajû, Emperor of Candeia (a title which the Hollanders gave him, judging it convenient to humour his pride), representing to him that matters had come to such a pass that if the misfortunes continued, the Hollander might become master of all that we held in the Island, which was not his first intention nor should be his final decision for many reasons. This letter was sent on the 22nd of October, and though it was delivered to him, he neither deigned to reply nor ceased to favour his confederates who continued their bombardment and destroyed a great part of the walls of the city, especially the couraça of S. Francisco Xavier on the side of the beach, the fortification of which the General entrusted to his son, Christoforâ de Souza Coutinho, and to the Captain of the guard, Manoel Rodriguez Franco, who made it in some measure defensible; and in all the other parts they were ever busy repairing, even the Religious not excusing themselves from labour, and to the no small danger of the pioneers, some of whom were killed and wounded. For this work they made great use of the lake, by which they brought palm trees, timber, and fascines, and a certain bark of a tree which they call Valipára\(^2\) which made up for the lack of matches. And as the General greatly feared for the bastions of the beach, he took his position there to expedite the work and to be ready for their defence. The Enemy knew this and kept hurling grenades to make him give up the post, for the post of greatest danger was ever his, and he spent days and nights under arms, either in a shop or in the streets and bastions.

The Hollander General, thinking that he had reduced the City to a state in which it could be entered, on the Ninth of November, sent a laquey with a drummer and a white flag with a letter to the Captain-General. His purpose being understood, he was told to wait while the Council was quickly summoned; in which it was decided to receive him, for which purpose Diogo de Souza de Castro went beyond the ditch and told the envoy that a reply would be given on the morning of the following day. The Hollander General thought that this delay was a proof of fear and consultation; and ordered the batteries to continue with double fury\(^{P782}\) till the answer was received. The Belga said in his letter: 'That the successes of calcium and panturâ and the state to which he had reduced the ramparts, persuaded him that he had done so much, that no one would consider it presumptuous of him to call upon him to surrender, which did in the name of His Imperial Majesty, Raja Singa Rajû and of the Illustrious Company, enclosing the letters of our General to Antonio Mendes Arahã and to Gaspar Figueyra de Serpa, which had fallen into his hands, in which he had declared that the preservation of Colombo depended on the one and force under their charge; and that it would in no way lessen his valour, as the courage with which he had acted in this great siege was patent to all and that his demand was only intended to avoid shedding more blood, as he might not be able to check the victorious and disorderly soldiers.'

Our General replied to this letter in the following manner: 'The Fortunes of war Our Lord grants as He pleases; and just as He has given them to your Lordship, He can change them, as I trust He will, since the war which Your Lordship wages on us is unjust. This praça belongs to the King of Portugal, My Lord, on whose order I am entrusted with it, and of it I must give him an account. I am therefore not moved by the reasons which Your Lordship mentions to me, about which I might argue much with Your Lordship, but time will show and Your Lordship will see, that the state in which I find myself is far different from what you imagine. God keep Your Lordship. Colombo 10th November 1655.'

On the morning of that day there carried this answer Diogo de Souza de Castro and the drummer Thome Ferreyra Fialho, a practical soldier, who advanced a little more than necessary in order to reconnoitre the fortifications. A certain Eleuthenárat came out promptly with two earhineers to receive it, and when the two parties had retired, our men fired a general volley of artillery, a brave demonstration which disabused the Belga of the presumption which he had conceived on receiving the information of Joao de Roza. However he decided to storm the city forthwith on the 11th of November which, however, did not succeed.
CHAPTER 23.

THE HOLLANDER DELIVERS AN ASSAULT ON COLUMBO,
AND IS REPELLED WITH GREAT LOSS.

On the 12th there appeared at dawn the enemy fleet of 18 ships and many smacks, churries and launches, flying banners, pendants, and streamers of various colours, at sight of which our men hurried to their posts. Four ships made for the bay with a light breeze, but with many and good men and many launches, with ladders and other necessaries for landing and storming on that side on which the palisades were low and weak. On the side of the bastion of St. Joao and its neighbourhood, from the ditch to the beach, there attacked Captain-Major Joan Vanderlaen with 700 soldiers, ladders and other necessaries to storm the breastwork of St. Francisco Xavier. On the side of Queen's gate there attacked the General, Geraert Hulffz, with 800 soldiers, the bravest of his arrayal, with 60 ladders, many of which were of two rows of steps. The Enemy launched on the lake many very light and capacious vessels of extraordinary workmanship in which were 250 soldiers, to capture the houses of D. Jeronimo de Azevedo, where the wall of the rampart was three palm broad and little more than one fathom (brasao) high. On the side of the plain of Mapane there attacked 4,000 lascarins of the King of Canda under his Dissavas, Modeliares and Arches, with various banners and warlike instruments which looked as if the combat would be most perilous in that direction, but as these men seemed to have come merely to embarrass and divert, not many discharges of artillery were needed to disperse them completely, after they had halted; and in this manner the City was attacked on all sides at the same time, though the defenders, as we have shown, were few.

Coming now to the fray; the lightest of the four ships advanced and entered the bay, while another remained at the mouth, and the flagship and another [remained] further out at sea; and casting anchor they began to discharge volleys upon the bastion of St. Cruz and on the City. Our men replied from the same bastion, from the breastwork Xavier and from the redoubt of the Matrix, and such was the fury on the one and the other side, that in a short time the main, mast of the first ship came down and she went to the bottom, and only a few of those who were in the launch escaped. The other ship being overwhelmed by the fury of the artillery and many of her crew killed, succeeded in sailing out in the wake of the other two, when the wind rose. On the lake the three manchus that were on guard, in which were not 30 soldiers, sailed out to the encounter and fought for some time, but afterwards they retired, and landed the men on the beach and continued the fight behind a stockade which our men had built there in view of such an eventuality. But as it was a superfluous one and the troops few and the posts to be manned 33, this one had but a scanty defence. The Captain of the guard, Manoel Rodrigues Franco, who had with him only Sebastiao Caldeyro, an old but valiant citizen, opposed the Enemy, and from the windows of their houses they burnt some with pots of powder, wherewith they entertained them till some of our men came to their help. The Enemy, however, gained the lane which they called [the lane] of Caldeyro, where on one side there faced them Manoel Fernandez de Miranda and Francisco de Lemos, soldiers of note, and on the other side Diogo Leytao de Souza, to whose help there soon came Father Damiao Vieyro of the Society of Jesus; and these few men were able to enem the enemy in that lane and prevent him from getting into the street, as they tried to do in order to fall upon the rear of those who were fighting at the Queen's gate, which, if they had succeeded in doing, would have caused great confusion.

The Enemy attempted several times to cut their way in, but were driven back by furious discharges from the huge blunderbusses wielded by Diogo de Souza and Father Damiao Vieyro. On this scene of conflict there arrived the Sergeant-Major Antonio Leao, and he with his spear in hand and his companions with their blunderbusses at their breasts, made the Belgia return to a corner of the lane, where they defended themselves with continuous volleys of musketry. Soon Captain Antonio de Melo de Castro arrived with his company, and a little later the company of Antonio de Magalhaes de Araujo, who had been informed of the danger by the General. They took their position in the backyards of the houses, and the Enemy seeing that all was up, begged quarter which was given them, though they did not deserve it, so that our men might get away from this fray to take part in the others that were going on. Here died 65 Hollanders, and 74 surrendered with their Captain and officers; and they
were so badly wounded that they soon ended their lives, and out of all these only seven Hollanders returned, being exchanged for our prisoners. The others who belonged to this company had been killed in the lake and in the stockade. One of their vessels escaped with five soldiers, another was sent to the bottom by a shot from the bastion of S. Estevão, and seven remained in our hands.

Our men being thus rid of the sea force and that of the lake, let us see what happened to the land force. Joan Vanderlaenen intended to carry the breastwork Xavier, and on being devoured within the ditch, the three companies of the redoubt opposed them, and a furious fight ensued for a long while, till in spite of all perils and though many were killed and wounded, they made their way to the beach and attacked the low and ruined breastwork. They planted ladders, hurled innumerable grenades and other fire darts, in the attempt to gain it. Our men who were in it, before they could be attacked, did great havoc on them with three pieces of artillery which swept the beach, and with the arquebuses which they plied dexterously; and when they drew near, they threw much fire, whereby everything within and without the breastwork was burnt, and as the smoke enveloped both the defenders and the assailants, only the blows and the report of musketry were heard. The Citizens who were at the post of the Matriz, which was relieved only at this time, hurried to this conflict; and from other sides also there came some succour. And when the battle had been fought with extraordinary bravery for the space of two hours without the Enemy giving in, one of them succeeded in jumping in, but was promptly killed. In this conflict great help was also received from some arquebusiers of the two banquetas of the rampart and from some Caffres with their azagayas. Finally when many had been killed, burnt, or wounded, the remainder took to flight leaving the beach strewn with dead bodies and arms of all kinds. On our side also there were killed, burnt, and wounded.

At Queen’s gate, where the battle began, the loss of the Enemy was still greater. Their General came marshing with methods and order, and the officers who accompanied him moved forward and each one tried to approach the gate on his own side, but they were received with great spirit and dexterity [by those at the gate] as also by those in the flanking bastions of S. Sebastião and the Madre de Deus. The enemy receiving great damage from our artillery and most of all from the two stone mortars which were on the
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In the beginning of the battle he was under arms at the Queen's gate, and when he heard of the peril of the breastwork, he hurried to that post, and when the enemy retreated thence, he hastened on hearing the current rumour that they had entered the City by the lake, giving the necessary orders with great self-possession and with greater labour than his age permitted. His predecessor, General Francisco de Melo de Castro, though an aged gentleman, ever acted in this siege as if he had been in the flower of his age, and happening in this conflict to be in the bastion of S. Cruz, he was able by his presence and direction to give in that quarter a glorious beginning to the victory.

On our side 30 soldiers were killed and 50 wounded, some of whom died afterwards. The few Ecclesiastics who had acted with great valour, and the many who had distinguished themselves, were thanked by the General in complimentary terms for what they had done, and he gave various gifts of money which were the gifts of greatest consideration in the eyes of the lascarins, as they are folk who are better pleased with gifts than with words. Nor did the women who sallied out into the streets fail to show their desire to follow to the last their husbands whom they manfully encouraged, nor did they fail to succour the wounded with dainties and delicacies with which their houses were still provided.

The General ordered the sunken ship to be pushed further into the lake, and took from it 30 pieces of artillery which he distributed to the various posts along with some biscuits and other provisions which they could make use of and which were shared by the soldiers and casados who went to the wreck. The Enemy removed from the way all the dead and wounded he could manage to remove, and without thinking further about the rest, he continued his bombardment, though with greater slackness, betraying thereby the great loss he had sustained and the disgrace in which he was, as he had promised the King of Candea and had assured him that the City would be stormed that day, for even the Chingalâs did not spare them, but threw in their face the valour of the Portuguese. The question of raising the siege was put to the Council, and many of the Officers were for it, as they had lost their best men. But their General upheld the contrary, assuring them of reinforcements from the other garrisons of India, and [saying] that should the venture not have the desired result, he would be responsible to the company for the decision and would pay the expenses of that war.

CHAPTER 24.

OF THE FRESH FORTIFICATIONS OF THE ONE AND THE OTHER NATION; OF HOW ANTONIO DE MELO DE CASTRO WAS MADE CAPTAIN-MAJOR, AND OF OTHER SUCCESSES

The Captain-General at once informed the Viceroy of this success, giving him a detailed account of what took place, and of what there was to fear, urging reinforcements of men as well as of powder, munitions, and provisions; and while the enemy batteries were slack, he repaired our fortifications, because as our men desired nothing better than that the Enemy should again deliver an assault, every day they thought they would do so, which would have meant their total destruction and the destruction of all they had in Ceylon, for as they had nothing to fear from the Chingalâs, they engaged in that siege all the forces of their garrisons. But the Hollander thinking over his recent loss, and seeing the delay of our reinforcements, decided to wage slower war, and he sallied out from one of his first batteries placed in the house of Manoel Teixeira with a covered way, a hundred paces from the moat, where he erected a very strong redoubt, in which he placed 6 cannon, three to batter the bastion of S. Sebastião, and three that of S. Joaquim. Thence he went to the beach where he erected another redoubt with its moats and placed two pieces of artillery, which battered especially the breastwork and the curtain of the wall which runs as far as S. Joaquim, besides other posts which it commanded. From the first redoubt of six pieces, they made their way by another street to the side of the lake, which ends in front of the bastion of S. Estavao, where he built another redoubt and mounted a mortar, which constantly threw grenades into the City, and some musketeers who overlooked our defenses did no small damage. Between these two last redoubts the [covered way led] by means of approaches to the foot of the cross, where it turned, within about 30 paces of the bastion of S. Estavao, and they erected another pretty strong redoubt, in which they placed three cannon against

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the revez of S. Joao which hitherto their guns did not command. Thence it turned to the beach within 15 paces of the moat, where they erected a post with gabions and palm trees and mounted thereon three cannon, wherewith they battered the revez of S. Estavao, after destroying its camisa and being unable to remove its fillings, because it was a modern work, they made for the old callions, whereby they separated it from the curtain wall. With all these batteries they pounded the City all day long and often at night. They constructed a new contrivance, which at first was terrible, but afterwards contemptible. It was a large basket made of thin tarred cords which contained hand grenades charged with ounce bullets and iron barrels like small pistols without the stock but with a sharp butt end, charged with very fine powder and each with two balls. This device was recognized as soon as it went up in the air, and when it fell on the ground, the grenades and pistols went off, always giving time to those who were in danger to get out of the way, though they often exploded in the air when the matches took fire too soon, and only the burnt cords reached the ground, which furnished the boys with plaything.

It now appeared good to remove into the City the three companies and the two cannon which were at the foot of the bastion of S. Joao, and the curtain which ran between S. Joao and the breastwork was again lined with palm trees, fascines and earth, both for its defence and in order to have a banquet from which they might defend themselves better, and in it they opened five other portholes, on the side of the beach, with as many pieces of artillery. In the same way they lined the curtain between S. Joao and S. Estavao without sparing labour, which was very great, and from which no one excused himself, and were it not for the help of the elephants, it could scarcely have been done. The two Generals were engaged in this, when Fernao Martin de Souza, son of the General, Antonio de Souza Coutinho, a youth in his teens was mortally wounded in the bastion of S. Joao; for when he heedlessly exposed his head, a musket shot hit him, from which he died on the fourth day; and as the grief was great, because of the proof of valour that he gave, great also was the admiration at the resignation with which his father took it, without letting any one speak to him of the loss of a son of 19 years of age whom he loved greatly. The seven Hollander boats which we took on the lake as well as the three manquas of Domingos Coelho de Ayala were of great use, and though the enemy at times tried to hinder them, they ever escaped with slight damage. The works increased with the destruction. They built retreats for the bastions, but as their terraces became narrow, some were killed and others wounded by the artillery, grenades, and stones, those who suffered most being the marine pioneers; of whom a great number came by their death, the majority in the bastion of S. Estavao, which was pounded by three batteries, because it was a strong one. But Captain Lourenco Ferreyra de Brito repaired the damage by his constant presence and labour. From the foot of the Cross, fifteen paces from the moat, and the redoubt which they built here, they mined up to the moat; and our men were unable to prevent the works, for there were not enough soldiers for assaults, and they had no powder for continuous bombardment, and as the Captain-General could not believe that reinforcements would fail him, he opposed the proposals of some, more courageous than prudent, about attacking the Enemy in his trenches, in which they had fortified themselves with such art that all the redoubts were connected one with the other by covered ways, revezes, and retreats, with a piece of artillery in each revez.

It was clear to all that the recent events had diminished the valour of the Captain-Major of the Field, Gaspar Figueyra de Serpa, and by common consent there was elected for that post Antonio de Melo de Castro, who filled it with great satisfaction. Much of the credit for what was done during this siege, was due to the captains and the Portuguese who were there, especially to the Captain-General, Antonio de Souza Coutinho, to the Captain of the Field, Antonio de Melo de Castro, to the Captain of the City, Manuel Marques Gonsalves, and to the Sergeant-Major Antonio Leao, who laboured indefatigably and ever defended that praia with valour. They resolved to erect some defence for the moat which the enemy was making for, and in place of the abandoned redoubt at the foot of the bastion of S. Joao, they erected another on a different plan with revets, retreats, banquettes, and loopholes which looked into those of the Enemy, and they adapted the defences to the fortifications of the Enemy as suggested by experience, for there was no engineer. They called it the redoubt of the Conception and garrisoned it with three companies. It was the usual post of the Captain-Major of the Field, and he dug a trench along the wall of the moat, from the bastion of S. Joao up to that of S. Estavao, with outposts to spy the enemy's works.
He placed in it some trusty lascarins, and retired captains, patrolled them night and day, and at night they got into the moat, which was very shallow in comparison with former years when it used to rain heavily, but this year the drought was very great, showing clearly that Heaven was also against Columbo. They dug another countermines in the enclosure of the bastion of S. Joaõ, between the bastion and the moat, at the same depth as the latter, to hinder the passage of the enemy whose design our General had come to know from the spies he had sent into his camp. In the entrance of the bastion of S. Joaõ they erected another of beams and palm trees and with fillings of fascines and earth, placing two small pieces thereon, so that if the countermines should fail to impede the mines of the Enemy and they should succeed in getting into the bastion, this one might serve as an inner defence sheltered from their batteries. All the noblemen and those who held high posts toiled at this work and even the old age of Francisco de Melo de Castro was not alleged in excuse, but rather he stimulated the others by his age and authority.

And as the Vera, the monsoon of these seas, was blowing and on that account the creeks in the post of Galboca, from S. Cruz to Mapane, were greatly sheltered and calm, and as the Enemy might try to land there in spite of the rocks which nature had placed there, D. Francisco Rolim de Moura and Gaspar de Araujo Pereira were entrusted with the task of enclosing that extensive line with palm trees, trenches and other fortifications with the help of the other captains who were there. And thus it was made defensible and they placed some artillery in the revelles, and two cannon on the two platforms; but as the batteries of the Enemy never ceased playing, there was the same difficulty in all places to rebuild what they destroyed, making use of the trees that were in the City and the timber of the destroyed houses for entrenchments and as fuel for the smithy and the powder magazine. Great was now the need of mariners, some of whom were killed in the fortifications, others wounded, and others ill and feeble owing to the scarcity of provisions and continual labours, and as the labours were usually at night, the frequent loss of sleep prostrated them in spite of the zealous and charitable attempts of the captain of the guard, Manoel Rodrigues Franco, under whose care they were, and who tried to avert this danger. Our bastions were so ruined by continuous bombardments that one could have climbed

them on horseback, and there remained only a narrow terrace on the top, on which one was scarcely able to stand on account of the stones of the mortars, because grenades could be recognized by night from the light, and by day from the report of the mortar, and there was time to get out of the way or to lie flat on the ground and thus escape that diabolical contrivance, but the stones, being many and numerous, cannot be seen at night nor avoided by day.

In one of the parishes outside the walls, the Enemy found an image of the Apostle St. Thomas, and after keeping it for many days within our view in one of his batteries, where they badly hacked it, on the 16th of December they put it into a mortar to hurl it into the City. It fell into the moat, and as our men heard them shout from the batteries, "Take your Saint," the sacred image was ordered to be rescued and it was found to be utterly outraged. It was found hacked all over the body, the arms cut off to make it enter the mortar, for in this fashion under the cloak of zeal, they insult the Faith in these countries, maintaining a dogma which is altogether brutal, both with regard to what they hold and what they impugn to Catholics. It was taken into the City with great piety and tears and placed in the Church of the Society of Jesus, but as it was thought that it should go to [the church of] St. Francis, it was carried in procession and placed there with all the solemnity of Mass and sermon, which were the only celebrations the circumstances permitted; and all begged the Holy Apostle to take the City under his protection. On the 20th of the month, there escaped to the city from the camp of the Enemy, Simão Lopez de Basto, a Portuguese, who had fled to Vingura from Goa on account of a crime and as he was an experienced and intelligent man, the Hollander General had made him a comrade and did not keep from him the secrets of his Council and over and above good pay, whereby he had won him over for some special purpose of his, he had also given him many rewards, but honour and fidelity were stronger in him than self-interest, and led him to disregard all danger to life. He gave very valuable information, and he was one of those who laboured most in the last battles of Columbo. This was the only reinforcement which the praça received in the course of six months. One single soldier, free and well paid, came to it at such peril, while all the other praças of India failed to come to its assistance, though our Lords, the Kings of Portugal, had recommended it so highly, that they ordered everything to be risked for its preservation.
CHAPTER 25.

OF THE VARIOUS ENCOUNTERS OF THE PORTUGUESE WITH THE ENEMIES, OF THE CONTAGION THAT BROKE OUT IN COLUMBO Owing to the Shortage of Provisions, and of the Other Things Which were Lacking in the Praça

To oppose the fortifications of the enemy, the Portuguese dug a mine from the redoubt of the Conception towards the moat, crossing the latter by means of a double palisade filled with earth, ten palms in width, to keep back the water of the lake which poured through it into the sea; and keeping back the water breast-high, they held the Enemy at bay, but coming to hear that he meant to break through the moat, they covered up that dike which they called [the dike] of resistance with long palm trees which, being fixed on the two sides and joined overhead, sheltered ten soldiers from the fire, which the enemy hurled, and from his musketry. Here there took place continuous frays, our men sometimes mounting the ramparts of the enemy and performing feats of great valor, in which there distinguished themselves the Captains Manoel Rodriguez Franco, and Manoel de Sant-Iago Gracia, who had succeeded the defunct Manoel Gomez de Costa, and they were accompanied by Simao Lopes de Baeto, Jose de Abreu Ferrao, Father Damião Vieira and others, who with pots of powder made havoc of the enemy, who replied with many hand grenades and stones from the mortars. Here they also mounted some merlins and small iron falcons under the charge of Domingos Coelho de Ayala. This work was finished on the 10th of January, and on the first night there began in our trenches and in those of the Enemy heavy volleys of musketry, and much fire was thrown on both sides; and the enemy batteries discharged artillery and grenades in order to divert us and thus to take the moat, which he attempted to do from two sides, one in front of the bastion of St. Joao where he opened a large breach, whereby he introduced a gallery in pieces to be fitted up in the moat, which, when covered with fascines and earth, might serve as a bridge to mine the bastion.

Another breach was opened in front of the dike of resistance upon which they suddenly discharged a small piece of artillery with more noise than harm, as it was lower than the dike; and they attacked with so much fire and smoke that the soldiers were obliged to abandon it; but after the first confusion they returned with great intrepidity, and though thrice beaten back, they succeeded in again becoming Masters of it, and closed the breach made by the Hollander, being greatly helped thereto by a shot, which struck the wall of the moat on the enemy's side and which, as there was no ter Plaza, fell clean on the top of them and killed some. Then perceiving those who were working in the gallery, they discharged many blunderbuses at them and played havoc with them, but our men returned through the same breach, bringing the gallery with the other fittings of that contrivance. This fray lasted from eight in the night to four in the morning, during which time the artillery, musketry, and the throwing of grenades and pots of powder, went on incessantly and turned everything to fire and confusion. Few were killed or wounded on our side, but the Enemy received considerable loss and he was so terrified that he retired to the redoubt of the Cross and our lascarins became so bold that, getting through the breaches, they set fire to the mines which led to the moat.

The bombardments of the enemy ceased to a great extent in consequence of this retreat, but thegrenades and stones of the mortars did not cease, and in spite of all this risk, the bastions were repaired, especially that of St. Estevao against which nearly all the batteries of the Enemy were now directed, and many were killed and maimed. The greatest trouble they had was the scarcity of provisions which was now pressing and the disease due to constant activity; and it became clear that it was a contagious disease, of which many common people died and even some persons of consequence, and more especially when they began to despair of relief, because not more than a measure of rice, black and rotten, was given, whereby the sickness became an incurable one and finally a decided plague. In the midst of these sufferings they had for months past exposed the Lord in the Capuchin Convent, from morning till midday, being constantly visited by matrons and children to beg the Sacramental God to save that City. And though some persons were appointed to bury the corpses of the poor, there were so many deaths that the task could not be finished, and the atmosphere became daily more foul. Many of these people had been driven out, and those who remained did so on account of the obstinacy of the residents, who were never more headstrong than when they thought that they were needed for the common welfare of the city, though some of them had been most insolent after they had been pardoned for the expulsion of General Manoel Mascarenhas Homem.
The General determined to send away the unoccupied rabble who were useless for work. They were put on the other side of the lake, where many escaped; others through ill luck fell into the hands of the enemies who forcibly made them return to the city, and to terrify them the more, there appeared one day many galleys all round the city with many of them hanging thereon. However they sailed out at night, placing their lives in the hands of fate, but those who were taken were driven at the musket’s mouth into the city. Our men were obliged to do the same to turf them away, and not to let them throw themselves into the moat, or under the walls, and there, either as a result of their wounds or through hunger, they soon ended their lives and infected the atmosphere. A cruel action indeed and inhuman, but necessary; a heart-breaking spectacle, but the sight of Colombo would not have been so pitiful had its plight not justified such extremes. The lack of provisions grew worse, and the greatest of all, so far as the carrying on of the war was concerned, was the lack of match cord. They used ropes, but they were of little use. Others were made of the bark of trees of various kinds, which had to be fetched at great risk and danger from the plain within sight of the enemy and under cover of our musketry. They also used hemp from the cordage of the captured ship which they soaked in vinegar and wine and smeared for use with wet powder. In short there was no industry that they did not resort to in order to defend themselves so long as there was some hope of remedy. The preparations of the Enemy on the other hand were so great that 26 ships were brought to take part in that siege, though they never succeeded in keeping together more than 18; besides a large number of smaller craft, wherewith at night they held [the coast] from the point of the bastion of Sta. Cruz to the river of Mutual, so that not even a small almadia could go in or out without being promptly captured. Other ships were engaged in bringing reinforcements of men, munitions, and provisions, and their camp was so well provided with all things that they used to say with great truth, speaking of us, that their war was one of rich men, and ours of poor men, as was the case with all the prepas they captured from us.

However, after the soldiers began to despair of relief, they forgot their bounden duty and the constancy with which the Portuguese in former times suffered similar privations, and thinking only of what their fidelity cost them and [forgetting] that wise saying that an individual must not complain of what a whole City suffers, little by little, they began to desert to the Enemy; and in the course of this siege there went over to the Hollanders 60 soldiers, including two retired captains, and also the greater part of our lascars and some topazes. This they were able to do very easily, as the bastions and walls were crumbling, and even by day the sentinel abandoned his post and gained the ramparts of the enemy at the double, which sometimes cost not a little to some of them who were struck down by a spear on the way or killed by their officers; as did Antonio de Melo Coutinho, Ensign of Captain Alvaro Rodrigues Borralho, who chased one of his soldiers up to the trenches of the Enemy, where he left him dead of a sword thrust without being hurt by the Hollander archers. The General was not able to prevent this disorder, even though he hanged five soldiers who were known to have conspired to run away.

Meanwhile the warfare became one at such close quarters and the Enemy approached so close to the trenches and ramparts, that the most usual weapon was fire, and thereby they ran short of pots of powder and other instruments. They made up for it with flasks and goblets till they found a workman to make pots. And as all things ran short, even the Heavens failed them with its rain, for as that Island is subject to two Winters, and as it is so near the equator where there are constant showers, there is rain even in Spring, except when Heaven wants to chastise; and moreover the time of that siege was one in which rain usually never fails, but during the months that the siege lasted, October to May, nothing but the most intense heat was experienced. The level of the lake went so low that it dried up the moat and many other parts of that open space where water is found in other years to a considerable depth. On this account the Enemy was able to make his entrenchments with the least trouble, to live in them without any inconvenience, to dig mines without difficulty and open batteries without hindrance, all of which would have been far different if the weather had kept its usual course. The Hollanders profiting by the formidable weather at last reached the moat, with mounds of earth in front of him for greater security, and our men also began their mines and counteracted them, and in these they encountered each other daily. The heat was still greater therein and soon consumed the greater part of the men of greater worth, and as a soldier remedies for any kind of ailment were wanting, for a soldier to fall ill was the same thing as to be included among the dead.

On the 28th of February at dawn they found the bridge over the lake rebuilt in front of the Queen’s gate, which our men had dismantled during the last retreat. On that side the Enemy began new approaches, directed against the bastions of the Madre de Deus and S. Sebastião, and the narrow and old
CHAPTER 26.

The Portuguese and the Hollander fortify them- selves anew; our men deliver an assault with little success and have other encounters, while the relief from Goa delays.

As the intentions of the Enemy were quite manifest from the fortifications at Queen's gate, our men again with great labour and industry lined the bastion of S. Sebastião with fascines and earth; and because the bastion of the Madre de Deos was in complete ruin and the artillery had fallen down to the ground offering free entry to the Enemy, they built another on the inner side upon masts and thick beams with great industry and danger. And the Enemy seeing that we got rid of our useless men from the side of Mapâne and obtained match cord and fascines, closed that open space by a strongOCKade with redoubts, revetements and ramparts from the lake to the sea, which was all very easy for him because of the many pioneers whom the King of Candia gave him; and from the first of March onwards he cut us off from that relief. And though they exposed many to danger, their deaths cost the Hollander little; and on the 12th of March he commenced a new fortification and battery, ten paces from the moat [directed] against the bastion of S. Joâo; and on the side of Queen's gate he came quite near the wall with approaches. On the 16th of the month the revez of S. Estavoç and a part of the curtain stretching towards S. Joâo were found completely destroyed, and almost all the other fortifications of the City were incapable of holding artillery, as the parapets were razed, some guns broken, and others had their mounts destroyed.

In these extremities the soldiers in private meetings and in council discussed the remedy for so great evils, and the majority were inclined to the desperate measure of making an assault. The General and other sober persons dissuaded them from it saying: 'That the month of March was advancing and that there would arrive before long the relief which they expected from a Viceroy so zealous as the Conde de Sarzedas, who had the men recently arrived from the Kingdom; that the few men of Colombo were scarcely able to defend that praça from within the walls, and that they were still less able to do so with breast exposed against 17,000 men; that an assault needed the best captains and soldiers who would gain little by killing the men who were working in the trenches; and that the loss of any man of importance would be a great loss, when men were so scarce.' "What despair, Gentlemen," said the Captain-General "obliges us to expose to such evident peril, what we have preserved at such great cost with such valour and reputation? What account shall we give to God and to the King, if any disaster befalls us for placing this praça in imminent danger?" In loss, when we have every reason to expect its restoration; and the relief which, as these delays promise, will be such that we shall have a good opportunity for revenge?" However the opinion of the Captain of the City and of the majority of the other captains prevailed and they adopted it and picked out the soldiers who were
in good health, and they did not exceed a hundred. They sallied out on the 15th of March at eight in the night through a little port made for a gun at Queen's gate and with more bustle than caution they began the assault, the lightest of them advancing into the Enemy's trenches. They found only one sentinel who sleepishly sounded the alarm. The Enemy camp got under arms, and our men then realized how few they were and retired, and it was fortunate that it was at night, which did not betray their hasty flight, which was even disclosed by the loss of some arquebuses which remained there; and in exchange for this disorder, some soldiers skilled in the business wagered to dismount a cannon which was doing great damage to the bastion of S. Estêvão, and in fact they reduced the carriage to pieces, but it only made the gun unworkable for three days.

On the 17th of March before the dawn watch began, in the moonlight, the Enemy suddenly sounded the charge all through his quarters and fired three great volleys without stirring out of his fortifications. Our men got under arms, as they ardently desired an assault on the city so that they might either conquer or die killing the enemy rather than fall at the hands of famine and pestilence. The Hollander then discharged all his mortars charged with stones, but this feint stopped there and no one was hurt. As the Hollander continued to mine the moat, on our side also there was begun on the 21st of the month a countermine leading to their mine, strengthened with palm trees and boards, and when they discovered each other, there was fought a most obstinate encounter between eight of our valiant soldiers and many of the foes, and they drove them back with blunderbusses and pots of powder in such fashion that they abandoned the post, leaving the Portuguese Masters of the mine. Those who distinguished themselves most were the Captain-Major, Antonio de Molo de Castro, Símaco Lopes de Basto, Father Damião Vieira, João de Abreu Fernão, Manoel Fernandez de Miranda and Manoel de Sant-Iago Gracã. This success had its reverse that same day, for when a gun of Queen's gate was being fired, a box of cartridges and two chests of pots of powder which were at some distance, accidentally took fire and burnt João Pereira Corte Real, a valiant soldier, to the great regret of all, for in him died one of the most determined assailants of the enemy; and as the ruins of the bastion of S. João were a great peril, our men mounted another piece on the curtain which ran towards S. Estêvão in order to cover that field.

On the 10th of March, General Antonio de Souza Coutinho had written another letter to the King of Candaia; and some days passed without an answer, but on the 23rd there appeared four Chingalas on the plain of Mapâne to ask speech; and when some of our lascarins went to meet them, they asked to say that they brought a letter of the King and requested to be received with the ceremony due to their persons. Thereupon they entered with the usual ceremonies and were recognized to be men of the King's guard. The letter was opened in Council and was found signed by the Hollander General under the declaration: 'By command and order of His Imperial Majesty, My Lord.' And in it after repeating the points which our General had mentioned in his letter, he continued in discursive terms, unworthy of such a person, abusing as much as he was able the Portuguese nation and their doings in Ceylon, and ennobling in contrast the Hollander nation. Some held that the envoys should be chastised for their impertinence, but they were silenced on the ground that they had entered under a safe conduct, and that they affirmed that they did not know the contents of the letter, and Portuguese Rectitude was content with deeming this action a disgrace to the authors and dismissing them without reply, while it increased the determination of the besieged, though the forces at their command did not correspond ill. As a last hope of putting matters right, the Captain-General also wrote to the Conde de Sarzedas, Viceroy of India, on the 26th of March reminding him of the previous messages and giving him a description of the extremity in which they were, and that the praça would not be able to hold out beyond the Tenth of April because of the want of provisions and because of the pestilence, which carried away daily twenty to thirty persons, especially of the black and the common people, and that he must not expect any further news of Cumbolo for those were its last groans.

The Captain-General, however, supposed that he was communicating with the Count, who had died on the 13th of January, for the misfortune of India also affected the punishment of Ceylon; because, had he lived, the relief would have left Goa before the 25th of that very month, nor after he had come to hear of the plight to which that praça was reduced did he think of anything else save of relieving it. But God, who wished to chastise it, disposed that he should be succeeded by one who had seen himself deposed from it, and had decided within himself that his honour would not be
and the graves had not the depth necessary for so many bodies, the extraordinary drought craked the earth from which issued a pestilential stench and such vapours that it reduced all to a state in which they did not seem to be living beings, and the corruption of the atmosphere was increased by the foul vapours from the Enemy's field where also there died many of our foes; and all this spectacle made men frantic.

In order that the city might not fall by famine and pestilence sooner than by war, the General resolved to feed when necessary out of the King's granaries, all those who were in Colombo, whites and blacks, who were able to bear arms or be of some use for its defence as were soldiers, casados, lascarins, Topazes, mariners, workmen of all sorts, and pioneers, which reached the number of 2200, rank and file. But this was however so meagre a Portuguese casado received daily one measure of rice, with which he had to sustain himself and his wife and children, but they all bore it with such constancy, without it ever entering into their thoughts to seek to be relieved from that oppression save by force of arms. The price of all kinds of provisions reached so excessive a figure, as must needs happen, that a measure of rice cost five zerafins, a ration of cooked rice two zerafins, a root of country meat but one zerafin, an egg three, a hen twenty-five, and so on of the rest, because there was so little of everything. In this general scarcity the two Captains-General, the Capuchin Fathers and those of the Society of Jesus helped as much as they were able, and also the casados who still had some provisions, as for instance Manoel da Fonseca Moniz, Gaspar de Araujo Pereyra, Luis de Macedo; and in the house of the Captain of the City, Manoel Marquez Gorrat, many alms were given, and in this way were relieved with some greater liberality the confined women, and the wives of the noble cavaliers who had died in war; and the daily alms did not fail the poor mendicants.

The lively bombardment of the enemy almost laid low the bastion of S. Estavao, but not so badly, however, as the others, owing to the pluck and industry of its captain Lourenco Ferreia de Brito. To that of S. Joao the Enemy had easy access, but not to expose himself a second time, he continued his mines in order to raise it completely. Our men began a countermine at which those who still retained some strength laboured, and the foremost and the most constant were, Father Damiao Vieira, Simao Lopez de Bosto, Joao de Abreu Ferrao, and Ruy Lopes Coutinho. When the 4th of
April arrived, they began a new battery against the bastions of S. Sebastião and the Madre de Deus, and the curtain which connected them; and another at the foot of the Cross of two cannon, which commanded the redoubt of the Conception, which they soon dismantled, preventing us from defending the moat which they captured on the fifth. They ejected new trenches on its wall with heavy boards with loopholes opened in them, from which they did us great damage, and to evade this, our men commenced a countermine to open into the moat, which when the enemy perceived, he threw quantities of dry wood to burn our dike of resistance; but fighting fiercely each party defended his portion, and without great loss to us, the fire was put out.

CHAPTER 27.

THE HOLLANDER GENERAL DIES, THE SIÈGE IS CONTINUED
OUR GENERAL ATTENDS TO THE DISTRIBUTION
OF PROVISIONS, AND WHAT TOOK PLACE
TILL THE BELGA CAPTURED THE
BASTION OF S. JOÃO.

The enemy General, Geraert Hulfs, was killed in this encounter, because there was no fray in which he did not take part nor any work at which he was not present, but was ever the first in danger. He fell by an arquebuz shot which hit him in the breast, but whose hand despatched it is not known. The enemy felt this death very keenly, and had he died in the first assault, it is certain they would not have continued the siege; but as they were now so superior on account of fresh reinforcements which reached them, and as they saw our helplessness, they had no excuse for desisting from that undertaking. Our people went on approaching the Enemy by the countermine of the moat, and on the ninth of April the Captain-Major, Antonio de Melo de Castro, the Sergeant-Major Antonio Leadão, Captains Diogo de Souza de Castro and Manoel de Sant-Iago Gracia, Father Damião Vieyra, Joao de Abreu Ferrão, Simão Lopes de Basto and some others encountered the enemy in these subterranean passages and with blunderbusses and pots of powder they drove him from the post. On the next day our men threw into the moat a great quantity of dry wood soaked in pitch, and set it on fire to burn their mantlets, and some who exposed themselves in order to put out the fire, lost their lives being shot down by Father Damião Vieyra, Captain Manoel Gurreyro Neues and the Modeliar of Nigombo, a valiant Chingalá who was in our service. On the 11th the Portuguese placed a gun on the dike against the mines which could be descried from there, but it was of little avail, for the Enemy repaired it, whereupon they removed the gun and took no further pains about that post, and though they desired to begin another countermine, now there was no one able to do the work nor any taste for impossible remedies. And as the batteries went on, our men again encountered the Enemy on the 14th of the month in the countermine, and fighting with their wonted courage and spirit, they compelled him to give up the work. And from the little gate they had opened in the bastion S. João, our men commenced a closed way, because now the war was waged principally under ground, and we cannot mention all the combats which took place there, for day and night they met frequently and sometimes exchanged fisticuffs, those who frequently took part in these scuffles being Simão Lopes de Basto, Father Damião Vieyra, Joao de Abreu Ferrão, Ruy Lopes Coutinho and others.

On one of these occasions the structures of the enemy took fire and some were killed, and they were now so sick of the war and their men came so unwillingly to these encounters, in which they always lost men and reputation, that if some relief had arrived at this time, it would not have been difficult to defeat them, for contrariwise the spirit of the Portuguese seemed to increase in this extremity, and even the Religious assisted in the greatest dangers, some hastening to console the sick or to give the Sacraments to the dying, others labouring in the work of fortification, carrying fascines and others in the frays of greatest danger, fighting with all valour, as for instance Father Manoel Velez, Father Antonio Nunes, and the oft named Father Damião Vieyra, all of the Society of Jesus; the Father Visitor, Friar Francisco de Madre de Deus, of the Order of St. Francis, Friar Paulo do Rosario, of the Order of S. Dominic, Friar Fransco Pedro de Castelbranco of the Order of St. Augustine, and many others who spent the nights at their posts and by spiritual conversations and words of consolation encouraged the soldiers to endure.

We must now give an account of the relief of Goa so long expected in Columbo. It consisted of 21 rowing ships and two merchant galiots, in which were munitions and warlike

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provisions for a month, many new raised soldiers, and not a few taken from the hospital and scarcely convalescent, under the command of Captain-Major Francisco de Seyxas Cabreyra who had been appointed by the Count Viceroy, who being a newly arrived gentleman in India and distrustful by character, was in this case misled by the person in whom he most confided, and who was interested in the election of one who had not done badly on land, but was never thought to be anything on sea; and they say that the Count Viceroy before his death had determined to set him aside and appoint another in his place, but as he did not do so before dying, it served as an excuse to the one who succeeded him and who had decided to do nothing of his own accord. This fleet set out from Goa on the last day of March, when it should have set sail on the first of February, for the reason we have pointed out, and that was the decision of the Count written by him in the General-Orders, and we have ourselves heard him say that if God spared his life, he would not be in Goa on the 25th of January; and as we must believe his sincerity, we cannot but be surprised that the contrary was written to Columbo in excuse for the delay, misrepresenting the state in which the fleet was after the imprisonment of the Vedor da fazenda, Martim Velho Barreto, or before it. What the Count said of the state in which he and Martim Velho, on his credit, had placed it, and what was written to Columbo can be true only in different senses, though it is but a frivolous excuse, because it is known that the imprisonment was devised to frustrate the relief. But as Columbo had to fall by divine decree, it must needs happen that everything should make for its ruin. The [fleet] went past Coulaô without speaking, and on the 12th of April it was sighted by an Enemy ship which was in Calicoulaô, and forthwith she made for the deep sea fearing peradventure to meet it. At dawn on the following day off Cape Comorin the fleet became ill governed and divided into two squadrons; but as the breeze was fresh [the enemy ship] approached, especially when it appeared that the Captain-Major was retiring, and the enemy took courage thereby to fire on the ships. The fleet moored that night behind the cape near land, and on the following morning the ship came again in search of it and found none to attack.

... of being burnt, by repeated fire destroyed her mast and sent her to the bottom, capturing Simão de Souza and a few other soldiers, for the rest escaped by swimming.

This happened under the eyes of the Captain-Major who went to cast anchor in Manapir and afterwards remained in Tutucorim, course of action keenly resented in India but unpunished, for if the ship chased him, he ought to have made up his mind to burn her, and if he had shown some resolution, even that danger would have been averted. Francisco de Seyxas Cabreyra was a native of Ceylon and had a Mother, Brothers, and Nephews in the country; but neither these nor his good name made him succour the country of his birth. The Enemy received tidings of this encounter on 15th April from that very ship, which made them press the siege still more, and with six strengthened cannon he laid low the two bastions and the curtain of S. Sebastião and the Madre de Deos; and as the balls now fell in the streets and they could not defend the walls, our men blocked with stockades of palmtrees the principal street which began at Queen's Gate, and the two oriflons of the two bastions and placed there two pieces of artillery. The grenades caused equal damage, and one which fell in the bastion Madre de Deos hit Captain Manoel Guerreiro Neves and burnt him so that he soon died after having conducted himself with great valour in this siege. On the same day there deserted to the Enemy, Nicolao de Moura de Brito from the bastion of S. Estavaô, where he had been put in chains during the siege on the orders of the Count Viceroy and the direction of His Majesty for his part in the expulsion of the Conde de Obidos who was arrested and deposed from the Office of Viceroy of India. This gentleman took with him three soldiers, his servants. The same was done on the next day by the retired Captain, Manoel Fragoso, from his post of sentinel at the breach of the countermine, but afterwards when he was set down in Negapataô by the Hollander, he was taken by order of the Governor and hanged.

The affairs of Columbo reached the last stage of misery, and nothing necessary, whether for defence or for sustenance of life, was wanting, and there did not fail to arise some complaints against the factor of the King, because it was thought that he distributed some provisions contrary to justice and mercy, but the General dissembled what he could not altogether remedy, and ordered that everything should be distributed in his presence, the duty of those who govern in similar plights when it is neither safe to chastise nor right.

1 By a seditious movement, 22nd October, 1653.
to dissemble. The Enemy, seeing that there was less diligence in repairing the fortifications, strengthened his batteries more, and as the war, famine, and pestilence had consumed the pioneers, it became necessary to make use of the men and women slaves of the residents and to give them for their sustenance a quarter measure of rice per day, wherewith they somehow kept up the little strength they had. Shortly afterwards, Adriaen Rothaeus, Governor of Gâle, the first in power and authority in the Island, succeeded to the command of the Enemy camp, and he wrote a letter to the Captain-General in which he represented the state of the praça and called upon him to surrender, giving him the news of the death of the Conde de Sarzedas, of the succession of Manoel Mascarenhas Homem, of the encounter of the relief with their ships, falsely exaggerating its destruction, and that Samao de Souza de Tavora and the other prisoners confessed the impossibility of relief either by way of Manâr or across the Gulf without falling in with the ships which were lying in wait for it; asking him not to expect that that fleet would not stand the monsoon of the south, and not to blame him, if owing to his persistence in this obstinacy he should afterwards refuse the fair terms which he was then able to give. The General Antonio de Souza Coutinho replied to the letter in this manner.

'When General Geraert Hulff had a victorious army, I replied to his letter of ninth November, as befits my duty as a loyal liege of the King, my Lord, informing him of the spirit and provisions, which I had at the time, the which he experienced, being defeated in the assault he delivered on this City, where in another encounter he was killed. Even now, I lack nothing to enable me to defend the praça which His Majesty was pleased to entrust to me; and the failure of the relief is not enough to make me give up hope in the divine mercy which has defended us; and should this be denied to me on account of my sins, I will fulfil my duty with my life; and thus I answer the recent letter of your Honour (such was the term used by the Enemy) whom may God keep. &c. Columbo 19th of April, 1636: Antonio de Souza Coutinho.' And to show by some means that he was able to make good his words, some soldiers saluted him with the night to disquiet the enemy in his trenches among them the Captain Afonço Correia, Ignacio Fernandez Funchal, Father Damao Vieira, Samao Lopes de Basto and Joao de Abreu Ferraö. Issuing through Queen's gate they attacked the neighboring quarters and having gained their object by various shots from their blunderbusses, they returned in good order.

And as those who used to work in the countermeine were now without strength, they thought it better to place some barrels of powder there, near the mine of the Enemy, so that both the one and the other might end there, a resolution more desperate than valorous, and above all dangerous, for on the 22nd April, when the Enemy was hurling fire in that direction, it caught some matches and almost set fire to the countermeine, and it was only Samao Lopes de Basto and Joao de Abreu Ferraö who hastened to the scene, and throwing themselves on the fire put it out at great risk, while the Enemy were firing their muskets on them, from which they fortunately escaped with great credit to themselves. But to show their gallantry, rather than for any practical purpose, the General ordered some soldiers of note to embark in some of the manchusas, which we had on the lake, and disquiet the Enemy in the rear. There set out at dawn on the 23rd, Manoel Ferreyra Gomez, Father Damao Vieira, Samao Lopes de Basto, Joao de Abreu Ferraö, Joseph Cujilia, Sebastiao Rodriguez, Ignacio Fernandez Funchal, Manoel Pereyra Matao, Joao Pereyra, with many others whose names are not known. At day-break they attacked the fortifications facing Queen's gate, giving and receiving charges to the sound of the instruments of war. The Enemy with their superior forces only defended themselves and our men retired with gallantry and order.

As a final warning the General despatched a dhoney with a message to the Governor of India mentioning this letter the progress of that siege and the imminence of the loss of Ceylon which he foresaw would fall for want of a relief, about which they troubled themselves so little in Goa that when the news of the first assault reached there, after the death of the Count Vicery, it was ordered to be celebrated by the ringing of bells, giving out that the siege of Columbo was raised, and sending tidings of the victory to His Majesty, a thing which was not done when it was lost. The Enemy began a new battery on the 25th of April directed against the revet of the bastion S. Joao, and as our men had now no defences to oppose, they resolved to remove the powder which they had placed in the mine inside the bastion, as it exposed the defenders to greater danger, and they opened a small gate in the revet of the bastion of E. Estavaö, so that they might sally through it into the open space.

When May set in, there settled complete despair in the hearts of the survivors. On the first of the month the Hollander General sent a letter asking the prisoners of his nation in exchange for as many Portuguese, desiring (it seems) to
show thereby how much we stood in need of that supplement. The eight persons who were still alive, of those who were taken prisoner on the day of the assault, were given in exchange for as many of those who surrendered at Colatura. The Enemy approached closer to the bastion of S. Estavão, and on the 4th of May there salied from the recently opened doorway, Simão Lopes de Basto, Father Damiao Vieira, Joao de Abreu Ferro, Thome Ferreyra Leyte, Jose Pereyra Matosio, Ignacio Fernandez Funchal, Manoel Nogueira Freyre, Antonio Madeyro Cabral, Manoel Ferreyra Gomez, Sebastiao Rodriguez, and the other companions who also volunteered for such ventures, to deliver an assault in their trenches. They salied at midday with blunderbusses, pots and flasks of powder, and falling suddenly upon the trench, they made the Enemy retire. He was reinforced by one of his captains who brought a corps of soldiers, but he was killed there, and he must have been a man of some note to judge from the demonstrations they made with three simultaneous volleys of musketry. The others retired and our few soldiers within sight of their camp dismantled that fortification and set fire to the fascines and palm trees where with it was constructed, and retired with great gallantry, while the Enemy was unable to believe in the face of such feats that the fugitives spoke truth when they declared that our forces were already reduced to nothing; and in fact they were so few that in various posts the captains found themselves with only three or four soldiers, and consequently they manned the bastion of S. Joao with the few casados who still had life and strength.

However, realizing our weakness, the Enemy determined, after razing all the defences of the bastion S. Joao, to enter the city on that side, as they had always intended, and one Sunday, the 7th of May, he easily advanced to the top of that bastion, as its defenders were very few. D. Constantino de Meneses, who was the sentinel, gave the alarm, and Captain D. Diogo de Vasconcelos rushed to its assistance with the few survivors under his banner. They resisted with the utmost valour, preventing their entry as long as their lives lasted, and killing many enemies. After taking the bastion, they attacked the other bastion of wood which had been built further inside, but there they found greater resistance, because it was defended with somewhat larger forces by Simao Lopes de Basto, Sebastiao Pereyra, a retired captain, Father Friar Paulo de Rosario, Vicente de Silva, Manoel Figueira with some others, and though they killed and wounded them with great fury and determination, the Enemy charged with all his forces and they were forced to retire, beaten though well avenged, leaving the Captain Sebastiao Pereyra and Vicente da Silva dead, and taking Father Friar Paulo wounded with two musket shots.

The Hollander wished to follow up the victory and with picked and lusty troops he attacked with wild resolution the two streets which our men had barricaded in view of this danger. From them there salied out to meet them, the Captain-Major, Antonio de Melo de Castro, the Captain of the city, Manoel Marques Gorjao, and other cavaliers who accompanied them, and after the first volleys of arquebuses and blunderbusses, they attacked the Enemy at the point of the spear and sword, with such determination and valour that in this encounter they lost some captains and officers of great repute among them, and many soldiers, without desisting from the advance, because in place of the killed and the wounded there succeeded fresh troops; but they were not able to gain their object, for our men thrice drove them back to the bastion, leaving that short stretch of the street strown with killed and wounded and burnt, and five banners in the bands of the Portuguese, who in the third retreat pursued them with such hardihood that fighting furiously in the staircase, the one and the other entered the bastion through the gate, but as they were few and the might of the Enemy was there, they were compelled to retire. On our side there died in this encounter, Antonio Valente de Campos, Andre Afonso, Manoel Fernandez, Antonio Monzes and others, and the captain of the City, Manoel Marques Gorjaio, was so badly wounded that he died on the following day, without seeing the final fall of Columbo which he had defended with the utmost valour and unwearyed care. They say that the absence of two espalha fato (guns) which should have been fired from the neighbouring convent of S. Domingos was greatly felt.

CHAPTER 28.

OF THE RESISTANCE THAT WAS MADE TILL COLUMBO WAS SURRENDERED, AND DISPUTES BETWEEN THE HOLLANDERS AND THE CHINCALÁ

Not less was the combat which was taking place at this time in the redoubt of the Conception, in which were captains Diogo de Souza de Castro, Domingos Coelho de Ayala [and] Manoel de Sant-Iago Garcia. With a few soldiers and with all
kinds of arms they worked marvels on this occasion, till the enemy attacked them with all his mighty forces, whereupon they retired to the casemate of the bastion where the battle was continued and our men discharged a mortar which did great destruction on the enemy. Here Diogo de Souza de Castro was wounded on the head by a bullet, and though he fell senseless, the fray was soon resumed for about an hour, and the Enemy thinking that a greater force was now opposing him, and fearing the spear and sword, plied his grenades and other devices of fire from without. But as at this time they learnt from an ensign that our men were already fighting the Enemy in the streets and saw that they were being cut off and would not be able to escape being burnt to death without any advantage, they resolved to cut a way through the enemies and to join the main body of our men in the stockade, where they were received with great pleasure, for they had already numbered them among the dead.

When the Enemy gained the bastion of S. Joao and the wooden counter bastion, great was the loss he sustained from the artillery of the S. Cruz and of the breastwork, which kept up an incessant fire, and bodies and banners were seen hurled in the air with such destruction that they felt compelled to descend a second time to the streets, where they were received by Captain-Major Antonio de Melo de Castro, Antonio de Magalhaes Araujo, Afonso Correia, Diogo de Souza de Castro, Joao de Abreu Ferrao, Simao Lopez de Beato, Joao Pereyra, Sebastiao Rodriguez, Manoel de Seyxas, Francisco Pereira, Diogo de Souza de Carvalho, Nicolau Pereira de Sam Payo, Fathers Antonio Nunes and Manoel Velez of the Society of Jesus, and some others with furious resolution, with deaths and wounds on both sides, but more on the side of the Enemy; but after keeping up the fray for a long while, they were obliged to retire, when much superior forces were brought in. On our side there died in this combat Captain Afonso Correia, Nicolau Pereira de Sam Payo, and Father Antonio Nunes, who showed during this siege no less charity and zeal for the salvation of souls than valour on the occasions which he did not decline. Some were wounded and among them Captain Diogo de Souza de Castro with two sword cuts and Sebastiaao Rodriguez with one.

At this time General Antonio de Souza Coutinho passed from the breastwork to the stockade in which was the Captain-Major of the field, under great danger because the enemy swept the street, and they being all encouraged by his presence, it was decided to attack the bastion again and to drive the Enemy therefrom, but they would not let the General expose his person, lest any mischance should imperil the City, and on the contrary they forced him to return with no less danger, because he was already recognized by his arms. The General reinforced the few who were in the stockade with the Sergeant-Major Antonio Leao and Captain Alvaro Rodriguez Borracho, Manoel de Abreu Godinho, Manoel de Veyaga and a few other soldiers taken from the occupied posts. With this reinforcement our men attacked so valiantly and with such obstinacy, that it appeared to the few men who were in the breastwork, in which was the former General Francisco de Melo de Castro, that the bastion was completely wrested; and they cried victory, which made him, in spite of being past 80 years of age and very infirm, rush into the street where bullets were flying about, and with gallant impetuosity draw his sword and exhort all those whom he met to follow him, shedding his blood twice for his King and for his Nephew, the Captain-Major of the field, whom he supposed to be both victorious and in danger. But to put him out of danger, they dragged him by force into the breastwork. Our men likewise retired from the bastion in which they left a large number killed and wounded, having lost some companions and others being badly wounded.

Gaspar de Araujo Pereyra, a veteran soldier of that Island, was elected captain of the city, whose advanced age did not hinder him from giving proof of his valour in this siege. He picked out a few casados who were still able to bear arms, and joined Captain-Major Antonio de Melo de Castro and the others above named, not excluding Father Manoel Velez, which made up a corps of less than 30 men, with whom he attacked the wooden bastion, wherein they were received by more than 500 Hollanders with the advantage of position and numbers and dispositions of body. But determined to conquer or die, they entered it, having first thrown much fire on the Enemy and setting fire to the three barrels of powder which they had placed in the casemate and they made the enemy, white and black, fly through the air. Then they continued the fight with their swords for more than an hour with such valour that the Enemy again realized the superiority of the Portuguese nation in this method of warfare over them and over others, and giving way before such undaunted determination, he withdrew to the other bastion. Our men pursued them and being unable to move the door leading to it, because the enemy had locked it, Father Manoel Velez promptly fetched a handspike and a saw with which they soon brought it down, and there entered the Sergeant-Major, Antonio Leao (who took part in everything), the
Captains Antonio de Magalhães Araujo, Domingos Coelho de Ayala, the adjutant Thome Ferreyra, Antonio da Fonseca Homem, Francisco de Albuquerque, Francisco de Melo Gouvea and Father Manoel Velez, who were followed by Captain-Major Antonio de Melo de Castro and the Captain of the City, Gaspar de Araujo Pereyra, encouraging all and doing marvels, ten men against an army.

Here was fought a most stupendous combat, and our men were attacked by the flower of the enemy's troops and by all who were able to stand in the circuit of the bastion or play their musketry from without. On our side also there hastened to their assistance all those whose gallantry did not permit them to look on while their comrades conquered or died without keeping them company, when the defence of their own position permitted it. They burnt many enemies with gobelets and flasks of powder, they killed many with sword and spear, but accidents being added to misfortunes, one of our barrels of powder took fire and burnt Ruy Lopes Coutinho, Captains Domingos Pires and Manoel Correa de Barros, the adjutant, Francisco Arrays, Simaõ Lopes de Basto, Manoel de Sant-Iago, Francisco Pereyra and Bernardo de Castro, nearly all of whom died in a short time, and this disaster here deprived us of a final victory. For by this time the best soldiers we had were killed, and among them Manoel de Abreu Godinho, Manoel de Seyxas Valente, Ensign and retired Captain, Antonio Caminha de Azevedo, Diogo Jacques, and many others, and there were wounded Manoel Caldeyra de Briz, Joao de Abreu Ferraço, the Dissâva Andre de Seyxas de Silva, Manoel Nogueira Fereir, the adjutant, Manoel de Sousa, Manoel Salgado each with a bullet wound, Lourenco Paes with three, Antonio da Costa Monteyro with five, and Father Manoel Velez with two, who had laboured in this siege with all valour at various posts and always in those of the greatest peril. Worn out with a whole day's fighting, they could well be excused for retiring to the counter bastion of wood, which, to the no small disgrace of such a heavy force of Holland, they held till the city was surrendered; and Captain-Major Antonio de Melo de Castro, who was not a man given to exaggeration, was persuaded, (as I heard him say) that if by the end of that day they had 12 men alive and hale, they would have mastered that bastion, which is a mighty proof of the terror which those few men had been able to instil in so numerous an army. It was seven in the night when the Captain-Major retired to the stockade of the street of S. Domingos with 10 or 12 casados, both the one and the other badly worn out with a whole
to the new method of warfare, because such was the tyranny of those who had the greater might that they tried to put an end to valour by such devices; and on account of all these reasons, despair began to rise in the hearts of those intrepid men who had performed extremes of human endeavour in order to save their honour, and if they had had in the matter of relief the good fortune which they had in their valorous actions during the seven months of siege, no encomium would have been too great to extol the feats they accomplished, and had the praça held out, the feats performed for its preservation would have been further emolled, and the deeds of valour buried under the ultimate ruin of Ceylon would have been handed down as a memorial for ages to come. But for these very reasons the General and the higher Officers attempted to hide this hopelessness and to obtain such terms of honourable surrender as would be a testimony and a worthy justification of their extreme constancy.

The Procurator of the city, chosing an occasion when the Captain-General was with the clerk of the fazenda, made a protestation and requisition in the name of all the residents:

"That he should think of the safety of their wives and families, or else they would seek a remedy themselves, and that if it were not done promptly, the dawn of the day would find the City deserted." This step which under other circumstances would have been severely reprimanded had, in the present case, a great excuse. The General, however, did not yield to the request, but finding that such was the view of the majority, he summoned a Council in the convent of St. Dominic, to which besides the old General, Francisco de Melo de Castro, there came the captains of the City and of the Field, the Sergeant-Major, the Captains of the Companies, the Deputies of the Council, the Officials of the Camera, the Ministers of the Royal Fazenda and the Prelates of the Religious Orders; and therein it was decided that, considering the miserable state to which pestilence, famine, and war had reduced them, they should try by all fair means and precaution to see whether the Enemy was willing to grant terms, which they all doubted, because he had already captured the foremost position of the praça and had full knowledge that it was completely indefensible; but they thought they should not omit this measure, leaving in the hands of God their good fortune what was to be obtained thereby. For this task they then nominated Lourenço Ferreyra de Brito, Jeronimo de Lucena Tavares and Diogo Leytao de Souza, to whom they handed certain capitulations, and owing to the diligence they displayed in the Enemy's camp, they were nearly all accepted, the Hollander being content by a single praça to gain an Island so well known to fame, and so coveted by the world. The terms of capitulation which the Belg accepted in the name of the King of Ceylon and of the States of the United Provinces were the following.

P 811 | 'That if on the following morning they deliver up the praça, they will observe the following conditions:—That the Religious and Ecclesiastics may take with them the images, reliquaries, sacred vessels, candlesticks, silver vessels, ornaments, and all things that pertain to divine worship; and the service of the Churches; that they may depart with all the movable property they may have, and that two convenient places will be set apart for them till the hour of their departure. That the two Generals shall be conveyed at the first opportunity to this coast, and if they want, to the coast of Choromandel, and they may take their men and women slaves and servants, all their goods, gold, silver, rings, jewels and money, and till they embark they shall remain in their houses. That the persons of the Captain of the City, Captain-Major of the Field, Vedor da fazenda, Sergeant-Major and the family of the deceased captain of the City, shall be treated with the respect due to them, and they shall be protected from all outrages and insults, and they may take all their gold, silver, money, linen, and garments, along with the tapestry and other ornaments of their houses, and in what concerns men and women slaves, regard will be paid to the quality of the persons. That the surviving captains and the retired captains of infantry shall march out with their insignia, and shall go to the coast of Choromandel, being treated according to their quality, and they may take whatever goods and moveables their slaves and freed men, whose number is left to the discretion of the Hollander General, can carry: That the Infantry shall march out with all their baggage, banners unfurled, matches lighted, balls in their mouths, drums beating and shall give up their arms in the quarters of the Belga General, and the discharged Portuguese shall go to Europe, but the casados and those born in India, to the coast of Choromandel, being meanwhile maintained at the charge of the Company: That the Veadores, Ouvidor, Judges and other officers of the Camera, the Factor and the officers of the fazenda and of justice, shall have the same privileges and liberties as the Captain of the City and the Vedor da fazenda: That if any one wishes to remain under the obedience of the Company, he shall be treated with all favour and civility according to his quality and in the possession of his property and moveables; but if at any time they
should wish to quit that country, their landed properties shall be left to the discretion of the Governor of the praça, and the citizens, casados, and Portuguese of quality and their children, that shall remain in Colombo shall, when they quit the place, be treated like other superior officers, but the casados and Natives of the country shall be at the discretion of the Hollander Governor. That the merchants, white and black, and foreign traders shall go to the coast of Choromandel with the same favours and liberties as are granted to the officers. That the Modeliares, Araches, Lascars and their followers shall be favoured and treated like the Portuguese themselves. That all the sick and wounded shall be looked after in the hospitals and in their houses till they recover their health to embark, and that they shall be given the necessaries at the cost of the Company, if they have it not, or if the fazenda of the King of Portugal does not suffice. That in the entering of the city the officer, casados, soldiers and foot soldiers, women and children, shall be under the protection of the Hollander Governor against all affronts and violence whatsoever. That the vessels approaching that bar to relieve Colombo shall, until the 30th of May, have notice given them of the surrender of the praça and shall go away unmolested till they are out of sight of the City. All this was made and signed on Thursday, the 11th of May. They did not agree to grant pardon to Simão Lopes de Basto nor to the Hollander who had fled to the City during the siege, or who had come over to us in the preceding years; and it was a great mistake not to let them escape.

These capitulations were accepted by the Portuguese and confirmed on the 12th of May by the Hollander, and in fulfilment of them the praça was handed over; and it is quite clear that it was the confident bravery with which they bore themselves in this siege and especially in the final encounters, that wrung from the enemy such honourable terms, and it might be said with truth that they traded with other people’s goods, with one who having experienced the resistance, would not believe that what they were told was true. On that day, the 12th of May, there marched out to lay down arms, 94 soldiers, Captains and Officers, in the manner aforesaid, many of them sick and wounded and walking with sticks in hand; the casados were not so numerous, but equally emaciated and feeble and with their banners displayed, drums beating, matches lighted, balls in their mouths, swords and arquebuses were carried by those who were able to carry them. It seemed to the Enemy that this was a deception of ours and he frequently asked how so few men, so disabled,
demonstrations, the Natives were so displeased, that on the 16th of the month they raised their camp and went to the King. The latter then began by means of secret emissaries to stir up the casados and soldiers who had received affronts from the Holländer, inviting them to his service with offers of favour and lands to live in, and signifying that there would be fresh war with the Hollander. There went over to him about 300 men, white and black, some of them being men of note and valour, and besides fulfilling his promise, he allowed them to build Churches wherever they liked and to celebrate the divine offices publicly, saying that he would not forbid his lieges to become Christians and to marry the Portuguese. He broke with the Belgæ altogether, making war on them as much as he was able, forbidding all trade with them or to send anything from his lands to their praças and ordering the Chingalás to retire from the lands subject to Holland, which were very few according to the information that is generally believed, and in them they have lost some battles of importance. This warfare became still more declared, when they retook Batecalou and Triquimilâ, which they had previously given up according to the agreement between them, and the Hollander Ambassadors were detained in Candeia. But after the first favours given to the Portuguese in these recent years, he put some to death year after year, either to intimidate them or to satisfy his hatred, and few are those who have hitherto been able to escape.

Such was the final fate of Ceylon so clearly predicted by the venerable brother Pedro de Basto as we have related, for God was the more determined to chastise, because the reasons which provoked the divine justice were grave, and P 434 P 435 of these we shall give | a long and true detailed account, though the fact that God declared the aforementioned losses to be a punishment is a clear and evident proof that it was just. From all that has been related, one can form a very clear idea of what we lost, and of the mistakes of that conquest we shall speak at greater length, for what might have been for us the foundation of a Kingdom became ever a pool of Portuguese blood and a continual tax on the resources of the Eastern state. The Hollander was already the master of the cloves and the nutmeg, spices of the Archipelago; he only lacked the cinnamon of Ceylon, the scent of which brought the European nations to India; and though he purchased a quantity of pepper in the South, the pepper of Ceylon was superior to all the rest; and incredible is the wealth which he sends to Holland year by year in 17 or

1 See Introduction.
Vice-Admiral's ship, Captain Antonio Pereyra, 40 guns, crew 260. This was a fleet such as would have sufficed to destroy the Hollander completely, had it been united and all had done their duty, but the haughtiness of India did not let the zealous Admiral choose a seaman as Vice-Admiral, or to appoint two sailors to the two baxeys; but a respectable gentleman who sought this, as well as other occasions, merely for adventure and had come as captain-Major of the ship "Carmo", was so influential as to alienate the minds of some captains to prevent the complete defeat of the Enemy, and to dispose matters in this manner for the ultimate ruin of the South; which was better understood by the Enemy Admiral in the second conflict of the fleets which we shall presently narrate, as he himself declared to one of our Religious who was a prisoner with him, and to others; and this knowledge made the Enemy fight more stoutly in the later conflict; and thus an ill-disposed mind did not heed how much this helped the enemy against us.

The Hollander Admiral, Adriaen Roothaes, to whom Columbo surrendered, had nine frigates and two pinnaces, all the frigates having two gun decks with many and good infantry, though in seven of them, and especially in the Flagship, the Vice-Admiral's ship and the Fiscal's, which were powerful ships, the force was much greater, and all were well proportioned ships of war, in which they had a distinct advantage over our transport ships, because large vessels with few men and guns keep everyone at work and are only a better target for the enemy's shot. On the 22nd of January the General weighed anchor, and the fleet set out to meet the Hollander with the morning land breeze, and forcing him to cut his cables, he pursued him, because the Enemy did not await our shock from windward, because he never fights save when it suits him. As soon as the breeze (viração) rose and the wind was favourable to him, he fired various broadsides at our squadron, showing rather that he wished to reconnoitre our strength, or was waiting till someone deviated from his course, than promising battle, because there were only long distance shots on both sides. And after wasting the afternoon in this fashion, as when our people were separated into two squadrons, the flagship with those that followed her in one of the tacks, got windward of the Enemy leaving him leeward on the land side; but like a skilful captain he turned upon the other squadron which was leeward of him. But Gaspar Pereyra dos Reys avoided the shock of the two ships, and three of the enemy ships fell upon the Vice-Admiral ship by about nine in the night, while the others were fighting the other galleons. The Vice-Admiral, Antonio Pereyra, seeing himself boarded by the Hollander Admiral, by the Fiscal and the other ship, which were surrounding him, drove them off by dint of broadsides, one of them leaving her square flag on our bowsprit and the Fiscal retiring with the beak broken, and all three greatly damaged, as was shown by the time they took in refitting. This feat was greatly admired by the Hollander himself both here and in Batavia, in that the skill with which he got rid of such powerful ships showed him to be a seaman dextrous in that kind of battle. It was no small credit to him that though he was on that occasion ill with the gout, he dragged himself to a gun carriage and gave the necessary orders without leaving undone a single point of his duty. Our Admiral and Manoel Andre tried their best to assist him, but as the wind was low, they did not succeed. The Hollander sailed into the open sea with the land breeze, and remaining at a distance of four leagues from the bar, he repaired the damage received, while our ships remained in the roadstead till the Vice-Admiral's ship and the galleon "S. João e S. Jacinto" which had received some damage in the masts, refitted.

On the 29th of the month they again sought the Enemy squadron, but as he had not yet fully refitted, he made so far to sea that he disappeared from view, whereupon the pinnaces of Mozambique and China were able to sail freely out of the bar. After two days they returned to view in the evening, but the Enemy was always avoiding a fight on the leeward. But on the morning of the third of February he was unable to escape it, because our Admiral and Manoel Andre fell upon him and bore the brunt of battle that day, and the Enemy had time to fire 27 volleys at our Flagship which replied with great valour, because when she made ready to fall upon the enemies, those who were in charge of the helm and the sails were so unobservant that she slowly pointed to the bowline and to the wind, and gave Manoel Andre an opportunity to fire on them with greater safety to himself, because as he had them at his mercy, he was able to make fierce war on them. But on this day the disunion between our people showed itself very clearly, because the ship "Carmo" getting in the way of the others which followed, he gave an example to the others not to attack the Enemy as they might have done, and by long distance shot he even did some damage to the other two baxeys which were fighting, which gave occasion to those of the Flagship to say that the Hollander were not the only enemies...
with whom they had to fight. They did great damage to her masts and rigging, and the Belga seeing that he had received not a little damage, and that the rest of the fleet might again attack him, made for the high seas, and our men made for the bar; and here it was observed that though the heaviest guns we had did not exceed 24 pounds, some of the enemy E B 578 had not to be of 40. Great was the valor and wisdom with which the Portuguese Admiral acted on this occasion, infusing courage into all by his presence, (for he was the tallest in stature among the Portuguese in India in those days), and putting up patiently with those of his own people who abandoned him in this encounter, when the noble example which he gave them should have procured union and determination in his followers; and as this disorder concerned so many, it happened that not one of them was punished.

Our squadron sallied out again on the 21st of March, leaving the ship "Carmo" and the pinnace in the bar, and Francisco Gomez da Silva going as captain of the galleon "S. Thome" because Gaspar Pereyra dos Reys was ill, and Manoel Salgado as Captain of the galleon "S. Joao e S. Jerinutho". As the Enemy was making for the deep sea at Sunrise, our Flagship fired a challenge and was answered by the Hollander, and the two squadrons formed themselves in splendid fighting order. And as the two Flagships were vying with each other, the first volley which our ship gave the Enemy with ball and bar-shot made the Belga run up a black flag to warn the Fiscal and the others to come to her assistance; and as the battle went on with these three ships, they were completely destroyed, their dismounted artillery being visible on the decks and the blood seen to flow through the scupper holes. Captain Jeronimo Carvalho was turning his bows on an Enemy ship with the intention of seizing her, when it happened that at this time our Flagship fired a gun on that side, whereupon thinking that the Admiral was calling him, he desisted from boarding and unintentionally lost a grand opportunity. They fought till 11 o'clock of the day with equal spirit on both sides and between the land breeze and [the setting in of] the vireçao breeze, there were repeated volleys of musketry. The Enemy Flagship then fell upon ours, but seeing that our Admiral was preparing infantry on the mizzen and on the poop and forecastle to grapple her, she made away by means of tow ropes from four launches which came to her aid.

The galleon "S. Thome", which had not yet been able to get as near as the others, sought to grapple the Enemy Fiscal with [the setting in of] the vireçao, and made such a tack that she fell into the midst of the Hollander squadron. There, for a long while, she battled with the Fiscal and another powerful ship of the Enemy, and when she had already lost the shipmaster, the boatswain, and others, killed and wounded, a shot carried off the head of Captain Francisco Gomez. Another shot broke the stay of the mainmast, and she was so badly damaged that the sails fell on some vats in which were some lighted matches placed negligently upon a gun carriage. Others say that the disaster arose from the firing of two guns at this juncture, for the sail took fire, and either because the soldiers engaged in managing the guns did not notice it, or because all being in confusion owing to the absence of officers, there was no one to put it out, the galleon took fire and burnt miserably, without any one being able to come to her rescue except some foists, the captain of which had no presence of mind, and an almúdia, the valiant adjutant of which saved so many of the crew as he could, though some of his sailors were killed, while others fell into the hands of the Hollanders and the rest perished, being drowned or burnt, for the fire reached the powder magazine and by four in the afternoon the galleon sank.

Worn out and destroyed, the Enemy sailed away and our squadron returned to the bar. But to show that he did not give up the field, the Enemy Flagship returned with three frigates; but when our Flagship and the galleon "S. Francisco" turned upon them, the Hollander returned to continue her cruise. In the course of the battle some splinters drew blood from the General's hands and a spar falling from the top struck him so badly that, had he not been so strong, he might have perished, but taking no heed of these blows, he continued to act with valour. In the thick of the battle the Admiral sent a soldier with a message to those at the helm, but as he was going, a shot carried off his arm. A brother of the wounded man then came up, and being sent with the same message, a splinter cut off his foot, and a ball that entered through the porthole of the helm killed two men who were directing it. Another ball killed three in the "S. Lourenço". Few were the Portuguese killed and wounded in the first encounter; in the second and in the two baxes which fought, there died 25 in the Flagship and more than 30 were wounded in the "S. Francisco", there died six, and more than 20 were wounded. In the last encounter there were in the Flagship 27 killed, and among them some gentlemen, Diogo Boto and Gomez da Silva, who died in a few days, and 44 were wounded. In the galleon "S. Francisco", 14 killed and 20 wounded. In the Vice-Admiral's ship, 11 killed and
15 wounded. In the ‘S. Lourenço’ three killed, and one single ball which struck a basket of plates carelessly left near the galley killed nine over and above the others already wounded. In the ‘S. Maria’ there were five wounded and the rest badly maimed, some of whom died afterwards in the hospital. The loss in the Enemy ranks is not known for certain, though it appears the number was greater than ours, because the destruction was greater and the wounded were in the same proportion greater. On the 18th of April he sailed away towards the South and it is stated with certainty that some of his ships were not able to go beyond Gâle or Palecato; and the lack of forces prevented us from concluding with him in this bar.

As Francisco de Seyzas Cabreyra did not land in Colombo the relief, both of men whom he brought and the flotilla of provisions which was in Jafanapataô ready to meet him in Manâr as soon as he was sighted, and to set sail with him for Colombo, as has been done formerly, when the Hollanders were in that bar, and as should have been done on this occasion at all risks, it was expected of him that he would at least prevent the fall of Manâr and Jafanapataô by taking that relief to Manâr; but he did not stir out of Tutucorim; and when the Governor came to bear in Goa from letters of Coulão and Cochin, that Francisco de Seyzas would go to Tutucorim and thence to Manâr, and that he was at anchor at Treucchendem, he ordered Antônio de Amaral de Menezes who was in command of the operations in Manâr and Jafanapataô with the title of General, to depose Francisco de Seyzas without further ado, if he should be in Manâr, for not carrying out the order given to him and for exposing the City of Colombo to such evident peril. (—The General of Jafanapataô and the Captain of Manâr had arranged with the Marâvá to secure him free passage through Utâr—), and if he were not there, to go to the point of S. Joã in Manâr with the intention of introducing the relief into Colombo either by land or by sea. But in spite of all the demands made on him, neither his duty as a vassal, nor the duty of the office he held, nor the fact of having a Mother and relatives in Colombo, his birthplace, succeeded in moving him. Finally when this fresh order of the Governor was rightly interpreted, he was deposed and the fleet was entrusted to Manoel de Souza Pereyra at a time when Colombo was already lost, for the date of the order of Goa is the 20th of June [1656]. Manoel de Souza crossed to Manâr with it with the result which we shall now state.

CHAPTER 30.

HOW THE HOLLANDER TOOK MANAR AND JAFANAPATAÔ

Once the praça of Columbo was lost, there remained to the Hollander to turn us out of Jafanapataô in order to be fully Master of all we had in the large Island of Ceylon. For this purpose when he had made himself secure in Columbo and had nothing to fear from the gallions, in the year of 1658 General Ruychleif van Goesa and the Captain-Major of the Field, Joan Vanderlaen and other captains of note, came in 11 ships, three pinnaces, two smacks, an escusa gale and nine launches, in which they brought more than 1,000 Europeans, 300 Bandanese and many Chingalâs; and having on the way made himself master of the town of Tutucorim and the rest of the coast of the Fishery, without meeting with any resistance, because there was no opposition from the Portuguese to this force, in February he surrounded the coast of Manâr, which might have about five leagues of seaboard, though many Portuguese had believed that large ships could not bring their artillery to bear upon it, which was a manifest mistake, because for the great part there is near in his depth of three fathoms in low sea, and when the tide is high the depth is quite enough for the most capacious ships of the Hollander.

[There was in that Island the General, Antônio de Amaral de Menezes, who thought within himself, as others judged, that valour was preferable to good order; and the Captain-Major of the Field, Antônio Mendez Aranha, who had given good proof of himself on other occasions; the Sergeant-Major, Bento de Souza D'êjeca, and about 900 men, Portuguese and lascarins, distributed in the following manner. The fleet of rowing ships, of which the Captain-Major was Gaspar Carneyro Geraô, a veteran soldier from the frontiers of Portugal, and the Vice-Admiral Alvaro | Rodriguez Boralho, consisting of a few foists, sanguicêys, manchus and dhoneys, divided into pângos1 as they call them there, or squadrons, the ships and sanguicês on one side, the manchus on the other, and the dhoneys in a third squadron, all very few in number, but enough to divide our forces.

1 Tam. pângu, portion, division.
The force which was on land to garrison the stockade of S. João and the others, was divided into three detachments and in single file along that extensive seashore behind some small ramparts of sand made with their own hands, rather to prevent their being seen than to protect them from the balls of the enemy. In this fashion the General awaited the Hollander to attack the Island, either because he thought it was the most convenient or because he fancied it the most honourable. But the people who had some knowledge of Manár and of warfare, were ever of opinion that they should have awaited the Enemy fortifying themselves under the shadow of that small praça, sending out some separate bands and laying ambushes in convenient places to reduce his forces and to break his vehemence and force, because the loss he would sustain from the praça and from the arrayal drawn up near it, and therefore better able to stand the enemy’s onrush, could promise them some good success. But as the war of Ceylon began, so it came to an end, by palpable chastisement from Heaven, and the worst [chastisement] on the field was always mismanagement; and those who read these writings cannot doubt how God in this final encounter declared Himself against the residents of that Island and of that small Kingdom.

The enemy arrived one Sunday, and on the Wednesday following he set four launchas against one of our foists well manned and with good artillery, but he lost two and the others retired with almost all their men killed. For two days they did not cease to disquiet the ships, which he feared would oppose his landing, but so long as they remained at the mouth of the channel which separates the two Islands, they were beyond range of the guns of the two large ships, and he fared badly in all the encounters. But when the Captain-Major of the fleet saw on the following day that the Hollander was spreading his squadron along the shore, he abandoned this position, according to orders, they say, and put himself between the ships and the shore whence he was driven by repeated volleys to run aground at a distance from the arrayal which occupied the ramparts, to the no small damage of the ships and men, and if on this occasion he had attacked one or two of the enemy ships and tried to set fire to them, or if he had put himself to windward by rowing and awaited an opportunity of doing so, he would not have failed to prevent the landing, so long as the battle went on in this fashion. Or at least it would have been much less perilous to run so close that the enemy could not depress their guns enough to hit him, as other captains have sometimes done in India, because so long as this warfare was kept up, he would never have decided to take from the ships the infantry necessary for their defence, and then getting relief by land with great glory and lesser risk of ultimate ruin, they could have held Manár and Jafanapatao. But as I know that there were men of valour and experience there, I can only attribute these repeated mistakes to a punishment from Heaven.

The Belga followed up the victory by disembarking at the point of the rampart, on the side of the celebrated Pagode of Ramen-coir, commonly called Ramanancon, where the Captain of the advance guard was, and the ships arrived under sail long before the other detachments which were under the ramparts scattered over such a long stretch of beach; and that officer, either because he had so few men compared with the force of the Hollander, or because he lacked the courage, retired when he saw the Enemy land. His ensign sought to mend this blunder, and getting seven men together he attacked the Belga who was already drawn up on land, but as this was an action more desperate than valorous, he found he had only three companions when he came to charge with the spear. Meanwhile the Captain-General came up, and seeing that Officer retreat, he hastened with drawn sword to make him halt, while he mustered the men of his division who were coming in sight, but by a disposition of Heaven a random gunshot struck him on the head and he fell dead, though in the opinion of all, his kind and valour deserved a better fate. His place was promptly filled by the Captain of the Field, Antonio Mendez Arana, and with the few soldiers he was able to get together, he went on fighting with the Enemy at such risk to his person that he received two dangerous wounds. The Belga drew up all his forces, and seeing that the others retreated to the fortalice, he also went after them in good order. But as this was not sufficiently capable of a defence, and there were no higher Officers, and as there reigned confusion and some say even jealousy, the arrayal passed Mantóta, making for Jafanapatao, while some thought the opposite coast was safer. The Captain of Manár was Andre Velozo, and knowing the peril in which he was, he wanted to send his wife to Jafanapatao, but she refused to go saying that she would follow him to death, and when the praça was entered without any opposition and they became prisoners of the Hollanders, they chose to remain in Colombo, either because they were more true in love than in loyalty or in order not to have to give an account of the praça which they did not lose.

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As soon as the news of the fall of Manār reached Jafanapatāo, they prophesied the same of that fortalice recently confided to Joāáo de Molo de Sampaio, whom the Governor sent without indicating the powers he had, while Antonio de Amaral was still alive; and he employed all his energy in seeking to uphold the ancient [rights] of the Captains of Jafanapatāo, who were subordinate only to the Generals of Ceylon, of whom there were none now, and were it not for the modesty of Antonio de Amaral, this might have been also a reason for hastening its ruin, which was the greater, because there was no order nor any convenient disposition for defence in the one who governed, and because almost all were in alarm on account of the lack of arms and other things, because everything was lost. The fortalice of Jafanapatāo was a small praça, of four regular bastions and four towers in the middle of the four curtains, with its most and barbican, situated on the river which flows from the hills of Candea and separates the country of Vani from the small kingdom of Jafanapatāo, and empties itself into the sea between the small Islands of the quay of elephants, where there was a small fort, situated in the middle of the water upon a rock, two leagues distant from the praça. Andre Pinto da Fonseca, a veteran captain of India and Ceylon, who was a casado there, foreseeing what would happen, built two stockades at his own cost, one near S. Domingos, the other nearer the praça, which were of great use. And as Antonio Mendez Aranha was badly wounded, Alvoro Rodriguez Borrals was chosen to remain with him in the post of S. João awaiting the Enemy who was surrounding Ceylon with his fleet and had already posted three ships within sight of the fortalice, the others being moored at the quay of elephants, on the one and the other side of the Island of D. Clara.

Experienced men were of opinion that they should await the Enemy in the jungles of the Vani, where a few were able to give trouble to many by continuous ambuscades, but as this opinion was very reasonable, and they had to lose, it had needs to remain unheeded, and therein lay the ruin of Jafanapatāo in the opinion of experienced people. Tiderings reached them that the Belga was marching through the Vani, and the Captain of the praça ordered a man of the country who brought it to be arrested, as he also did to another who repeated the same news, and the first is said to have bought his release, about which I do not want to be a witness, the second is said to have been in prison till the praça surrendered. The Hollander came making for the pass of Sant-Iago. Andre Pinto da Fonseca contended that we should receive him there,

because as our men would be under cover, in a good position, while the enemy was exposed, he would not fail to receive great loss; but even this plan was not carried out, and he passed to Jafanapatāo through that without any opposition. The casados seeing the poor disposition of the military men under the new Captain-Major of the Kingdom, begged him to give the estancias over to them, that they would defend their country, houses, wives, and children, but he did not permit them. They resolved to receive the Enemy at the post of S. Joāáo, half a league from the praça, and though the Topazes who were in the advance guard began to fight, and some were killed, the others retired to the stockade of S. Domingos, without fighting and without making use of the places that were suited for ambushes, excusing themselves in that they were few and badly armed, because between Portuguese and Topazes, all those who were found in Jafanapatam at this time did not exceed 700; and had the stockades not been built, there would have been the danger of the Enemy entering the praça along with our people. He spent 17 days before he was able to take them, and when these were lost, our people went retiring little by little, first to the Miscordia, thence to the other houses, and finally to the barbican, during which time they carried to the praça provisions, wood, and other things necessary, in small quantities. In the quay was the powder which had come from Bengala, saltpetre and biscuits, but for lack of forethought these were not taken in time. Likewise there were outside two boats full of vegetables and others of salt near the fortalice; and the sick did not get the biscuits and delicacies which the residents of Negapatao sent them, because he who leaves these precautions to a time like this seeks to die of hunger.

The Hollander went on surrounding the praça with four batteries in which, besides guns, he mounted four mortars, and he built another stockade at the entrance to the quay to prevent relief. Because the fortified place of the praça was unable to hold out against the bombardment which the Belga directed on it from the Islands of Carduia and of the quay, and from the stronger battering of the ships, and because the garrison it had was small and it had no strength against such fury of shot, it was obliged to surrender. The enemy began the attack of the praça on the 10th of March of 1658 and continued it up to the 23rd of June, the play of the artillery and mortars being incessant, and as the praça was a small one, and there were many of the common people, the mortars caused most damage, and the besieged had at
the same time to battle with famine and the pestilence that follows on it, and with the war which was the cause of everything. The captains of the four bastions of the fortalice were four residents of that Kingdom, in that of St. Paulo, Pedro de Faria who lost his life therein, of the next, Antonio Ferreyra da Silva, who died of the contagion, of the third Matheus Vieira de Abreu, and of the bastion of St. Pedro, Andre Pinto da Fonseca, who was wounded in it. And though the batteries of the enemy laid low the parapets and parts of the rampart, the Belga never made up his mind to deliver an assault on the praça, both because on account of the lack of reinforcement he already considered it his own, and because it was impossible for him to do so without being completely beaten, as it was a modern praça, defensible and well curtained, and he had still the memory of the resistance of Columbo.

P 844 | There was in it by this time no powder, nor water to drink, because the wells were defiled by the mortars and the substance of dead bodies, which was especially the case with a good fresh water well that was in S. Francisco which was completely polluted by the substance of the bodies of the dead buried in the Church and in the graveyard. The want of victuals and other things was generally so great that there was no Arrack (Urraca)1 to dress a wound; and an ounce of tobacco reached the price of 20 patacas, five leaves of betel half a pardao. Many dogs and cats were eaten, and between famine and a raging pestilence, despair came to such a pass that there arose the beginnings of a mutiny, and as there was no hope of remedy, they begged terms from the Enemy who accepted only what he liked. When he became Master of the praça, he ordered all those who sallied out to be searched thoroughly, without regard to the modesty of sex, and seized everything belonging to the Portuguese and the Natives who were there in the three days during which the search lasted; and only four residents who on the advice of some enemy officers marched out on the fourth day were able to save some things of value out of the many things they owned.

The greatest battle was with famine and pestilence, and the worst the enemy did was by stones, grenades, and mortars, and for this reason after the surrender of the praça their Domine placed on its gate the following Inscription more worthy of Calvinistic Theology than of Ciceroian Latin: Lapidibus, et gratia Dei cepimus hoc fortalicium.2 There were noticed some incidents which indicate a chastisement from Heaven. It happened that men were killed merely by cannon balls passing near them. They killed a man one night, he was buried in the morning, and two hours later blood was seen seething and issuinglike foam over the grave. When the praça was about to surrender, some naked and ill-dressed soldiers begged a casado who had much clothing and jewellery, to give them something to clothe themselves with. He replied by asking, 'What will be left to give the Hollander?' And Joan Vanderlaen coming to hear of this valiantly thrashed him on the back with a rattan. Never did the Hollander afront the Portuguese nation in India with greater insults, a clear proof of how little they fear it now. He took the casados to Batavia with some soldiers, leaving the widows and maidens for some time in Jafanapatao in order to reduce them to his purpose, and they say that some daughters of prominent men were driven by these means to consent to marry heretics, and that some slaves apostatized.

God disclosed the final ruin of this petty Kingdom and peninsula by a notable prodigy which was well known in India and can be seen from a certificate of Father Thomas Telles, religious of our Society, which being summarised, because he relates and affirms on oath things which have no bearing on the present matter, says thus: "I, Father Thomas Teles of the Society of Jesus, testify that happening to be in the Kingdom of Jafanapatao in the year 1657 as Vicar of two Churches which were in one of the four Provinces of that Kingdom, by name Pachilapali, which is altogether a saucy plain, wherein no stones are found, but which has very thick jungle in certain parts, which are infested by tigers and elephants, one Sunday in the month of July, I heard at midnight three or four bombardments from the direction of the sea and a goodly volley of musketry, and immediately afterwards a rattling so extraordinary that it seemed to hurl the houses in the air. Then the servants of the house and the outside watchmen, who according to the custom of the Churches of that Province were sleeping in the open on account of the heat, came up the stairs and asked me whether I had seen what had happened, and when I replied that I heard, but did not see what it was, because it was already over when I opened the window, they told me in great terror

1 The Indo-Port. Urraca, from Conc. Arak, which is a corruption of Ar: Arak, properly 'perspiration'; and then first, the exudation or sap drawn from the date palm; secondly, any strong drink, distilled spirit, &c.—Hob-Job.

2 'With stones and the grace of God we captured this fortalice.'
that if I had seen it, I should have been awestruck, for it was a thick cloud of fire speeding like a flash towards Candi. On the following day the sacristan, who is there called Canacapule, told me that many had seen that portent and that the cloud had rained many stones over a space of two leagues. I sent the meyorinho of the Church to fetch some samples, and he brought two and I kept one of these, which I leave in the hands of Father José Cabral. This took place seven leagues away from the praça of Jafanapatão, one year before it was lost. The which I swear to, in serbo acredito, on this the 16th of January of 1666. Thomas Tales.

I have this stone in my possession, and it is scorched outside like a meteorite but not smooth, and is somewhat white inside and not a little hard. In this manner God wished to show that he would drive us out of that Kingdom by stoning in punishment for the hardness with which some individuals and some Royal ministers dealt with the poor inhabitants after the death of the renowned Captain Philippe de Oliveira, its last conqueror, a chastisement which God meted out to the impious, his anger turning to stone against hearts of stone, for though the Balalas were a quiet people greatly different from the Chingalás, they reduced them to the uttermost misery. But the greatest less I have in mind is the loss of souls, because as it was only a few years since that Kingdom had been converted, it will be very easy for the heretics to pervert it.

Salsete of Goa was in the same peril at this time, because the Hollander joined with the neighbouring Moorish King Idalhá and tried to wrest those lands from us. With this intent he first sent the captain Abdul Aquino with 500 horse and 4,000 foot; and without previously declaring war, after a long peace, he suddenly advanced as far as Margão, while the Hollander hovered about the sea coast behind the islets of Murmugão awaiting the issue with the Moors in order to disembark. There was Gaspar Carneiro P 446 with 40 soldiers, many of them very young, in Rachol | as he had tidings that the Moorish Captain had come down from the Ghates, where on All Souls' day of this year of [16]58 they brought him the hurried news that the Moor had surrounded the Church of Margão where the Father Bento Ferreyra, afterwards Provincial of this Province, and Father Antonio Fernandez, Vicar of Verná, were defending themselves with the help of some people of the country.

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1 Footnote in text: A petrosa ira plena mituntur grandines.—
Sap. V. 23. And thick hail shall be cast upon them from the stone casting wrath.—Wis. V. 23.

BOOK 5.

At the request of the Fathers of that Christianity there had set out from Goa as General of this war, Luis de Mendonça Furtado, Admiral of the galleons and of the sea of India, about whom we have already spoken, and arriving at the time when Gaspar Carneyro was drawing up his men, he set out at ten o'clock in all haste for Margão in search of the Moors. Março Furtado de Mendonça went ahead with a band to see whether he could seize the road of Navelim, but descriving the Moors from the slope of Margão, he wisely halted awaiting the General, and when he arrived, they descended into the valley near the Brook where the Moor had placed some lascarins with firelocks to attack the Portuguese therefrom with greater safety, while the cavalry was drawn up on the side of the palmgroves and the infantry in different detachment according to their fashion. Our General seeing that the grass was tall and dry and that there might be danger of some disorder in case the bombs which they threw should set them on fire, chose a more open place below the village of Arli, where he drew up awaiting the conflict of the Enemy.

One of his higher officers who was considered the most valiant among them, took manifest pains to get a view of him, and our General remarking this sallied out of the ranks to meet him with only the 'dress sword which he had at his side and a round target, which they had given him in Rachol by way of a shield, because the buckles were not large enough for his arms, and when the Moor galloped at him at full speed, he got behind the hind quarters of the horse and with his left he made the Moor's horse stumble and from one side ran him through to the top of the opposite shoulder, the Moor dropping dead, a feat characteristic of his strength and daring. Captains Fernão de Costa had a similar encounter with another chief of the Enemy, but not being a man of such strength, he received the impetus of the horse on his lance, but while his left hand was looking for the shield which was behind him, the Moor delivered him a blow, which however did not avail to save him from being killed by Costa. Then the cavalry charged with great spirit while the infantry did not cease to fire its volleys, though from a distance, but seeing the loss inflicted on them by our musketry, and that they were not able to disturb us, though the lances were poor and drawn from the racks, they slackened, and the Portuguese General approached the village, lest he be surrounded and cut off from water, as they were fighting in the heat of the day. At this time there appeared on the hill another Moor named Xaniro,
who was retiring into our lands with a troop of horse, and though they thought they were Enemies, they remained in the same order till the Moor gave up the field with a considerable loss of cavalry, there being only one killed on our side. And the Hollander learning of the issue, and that the Moor was out of Saleste, returned to continue the blockade of this bar, till (after taking also Negapatao where a few cassados surrendered without opposition), he made ready to besiege Cochim.

Though the success was great, if we measure our force with that of the Enemy, still greater were the consequences, for had the Moors succeeded, they would certainly have fallen upon these lands with all their forces, and joining hands with the Hollander, they would not only have kept them and deprived the State of that revenue which is the main part of its sustenance, but would also have aspired to take these prages and to conquer the island of 600 or at least to divert from us the reinforcements of Cochim, and to hasten the ruin by ending everything at one blow, for everything was in the balance. I leave it to the curious to consider whether the three spears which Christ said to the Venerable Brother Pedro de Basto, would be broken in Ceylon might be understood to refer to the large Island of Ceylon, the small island of Manar and the Peninsula of Jafanapatao; because though they had different governments they were all subordinate to that of Colombo, and according to the general acceptance of terms in India who says Ceylon means all this. Nor is there less propriety in the metaphor, because from the customs of the Abyssinians, which are perpetuated in those of the Hebrews, it is known that Joab did not kill Absalom with three equal spears, though he killed him with three missiles, but with a long spear and two smaller ones which they call brechis, because we know that the Hebrews used such weapons, brandishing the long spear with the right hand while holding the two brechis in the left; and applying these instruments to the war of Ceylon a more powerful spear was needed for the destruction of the large island than for that of Manar and Jafanapatao, though to understand that this was a punishment of God, it is not necessary to descend to these trifles, but only to be convinced that it was our faults which made most war on us.

1 Vida 382. "When the Brother was praying to God for the State and for the Missions of India, Christ our Lord appeared to him with three spears in his hand saying 'All these three spears have to be broken in Ceylon.'"
Xavier prostrate on the ground and praying for the fortalice of Colombo and at the same time he heard these sad words: 'Colombo is lost.' And he already knew that God had taken the Hollanders as an instrument for our chastisement, for when, seeing the heavy losses both temporal and spiritual which that nation was inflicting in this Asia on the Eastern Portuguese State, he begged the Lord to chastise them | the Crucified Christ Our Lord said to him as if rebuking him: 'O Pedro, do not speak so. Do not ask for chastisement; but pray that they may have the grace to be brought to the true Faith, for I mean to use them to chastise India, because I am not satisfied with the Christians thereof; and afterwars I will dispese them as salt in water.' The Chingalâz themselves knew of this chastisement which God had prepared for the Portuguese from their books and from the tradition of their Fathers and grandfathers, and they sometimes related it to them [i.e., Portuguese] as for instance when Pêlpe de Olivevra subjegated Jafanapatao, a Yogi announced it clearly to a soldier, who went a-hunting with his firelock. But no one declared it better, as has already been described in the 19th chapter of the Earth Book, P 281/7 than a Chingalâ in the very year in which the first two ships of the Hollanders appeared on this coast to sound these Eastern Seas, for speaking to Fernão Cardoso, a native of Linhares, who was afterwards a casadão in Cochim, a man of good conduct and very truthful, this Chingalâ told him:

'That there will come a European Nation with blue eyes, who will drive you altogether out of Ceylon; and though they will fortify themselves here in Colombo and in that Island, it shall not be for long, for the Portuguese will afterwards expel them from it and will subdue it altogether as the same Fernão Cardoso many years afterwards related in Cochim to all those who listened to him.

That it is a chastisement from the hand of God, is also clearly shown by the mistakes of that conquest, for when God desires to chastise, he perverts counsel, and these were ruinous indeed in Ceylon, as we shall see, for at present I shall deal with public injustices. And leaving for another work (should God give us life to compose it) on the Eastern Conquest, the right which our Lords, the Kings of Portugal, have to that Island, before and after the donation of the King of Cota, and whether this right, after the death of this King and others, includes also the Kingdom of Candaes, separated from it long before and in revolt against that of Cota; and whether that donation was enough for one to be sure that the King of Portugal is the sovereign of Ceylon wholly or in part, which are all juridical questions quite foreign to the present history; I will here point out the injustices, violences and wrongs, which the Portuguese there committed, a most sufficient justification for the chastisement which God inflicted on them. For whether we take them in time of war or in time of peace, the lot of the unfortunate Chingalâz was at all times the same; and though the public war was against the King of Candaes, or Macâne, or Rajû, or other rebels, the private war ever was against the Native lieges. And as warfare was so frequent and continual in Ceylon, it can be safely affirmed that they were treated like common enemies without there being any exception even in time of peace.

In time of war they were in all respects treated like rebels, and there was a General who, to avenge the mutilations which the Chingalâz inflicted on us, forced the Mothers to throw their children into mortars and to pound them like spicey with pestles, without being moved to compassion by the cries and mournings of the children at each blow, or pitying the mothers forced to be the terrible executioners of their own children, and their own hearts. In reward for these labours, when they had reduced them, he ordered them to be beheaded, as if they had not obeyed him. He ordered the soldiers to take the children at the point of the spear, and to raise them aloft, and as they were mourning and dying, he said: 'Listen well how those cocks crow,' alluding to the name of those people which some thought was Galas, as we have said, and to the habit of these birds to crow at certain times and when they awake. He ordered men to be thrown into the river from the bridge of Malvâna, so that the people might see them fall into the mouths of fierce alligators; and these were so accustomed to this carnage, that at the first whistle or signal for throwing these unfortunate men condemned to such a barbarous torment, their heads were promptly seen above the water opening the trapdoors of their terrible mouths. So Manoel de Faria e Souza narrates in his Asia in is it notorious in India. Nor was he the only one who resorted to such tyrannies; and though the Chingalâz sometimes gave occasion for some harshness and severity, by cutting off the noses, lips and ears, of some Portuguese and even of their own countrymen when they seized them in war or captured them, if we pay heed to Christian piety, we ought to be less prone to vengeance, and in no case should we have exceeded the

1 Ivoa, Liv. IV., p. 388. 2 Ib. 399.
heathen in tyranny. When Julius Caesar routed the squadron of Pompey on the fields of Pharsalia, he ordered his soldiers not to kill Roman Citizens but only to disfigure their faces with cuts, as L. Filius narrates: *Miles parce civibus; in faciem caedi*; and he was a pagan so accustomed to shed blood in battle that he killed therein more than a million men.

The Hollanders imitated this example a little in Brazil, when they opened the sides of the Portuguese with axes and drew out their hearts, as the English used to do in London to some Holy Martyrs, drawing their hearts out of their breasts. But these are deeds worthy of heretics, and we have not heard that the Portuguese avenged themselves when they were victorious in Brazil, for they not only remembered that they were Catholics, but also that they were Portuguese. After the aclamación of our Lord, King D. João IV, the Restorer, in the beginning and during the course of that long warfare, for the space of 29 years, some Castilians also resorted to similar cruelties, even glutting women with powder and firing them off, as if they were pieces of artillery, and justifying these terrible practices on the score of their being rebels. And in that war they even attempted to introduce Laws, new and iniquitous, according to the received usages of Europe, killing the captains who did not surrender when they had no power to resist, thinking thereby to set bounds to human valour, when the preservation of a Kingdom often depends on the delay of one day or even a few hours. Not for all that is it related of the Portuguese, often victorious in this war, that they ever adopted that style and that law.

It was not so in Ceylon. And after the evil example of the Captains, who ever treated them as enemies, one can scarcely exaggerate the cruelties which individual foreyros inflicted in their villages, or the cruelties which they committed therein; of which I will give here only two instances to justify these remarks. There was a foreyros who, because a certain Chingaló of his village did not give him arroz, crucified him in a novel style, and nailed him to the ground between the toes of his feet and the fingers of his hands and let him die there. Another he would have impaled, had the man not escaped from the prison. In another village, when the harvest was gathered, the Vidana and Cangana separated the share of the foreyros, and divided what remained between himself and the Cangana and measurer in such a way that there was very little left for the Husbandmen.

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2. *Sin., manambah.*

BOOK 6.

One of the latter raised his eyes to Heaven and said: 'Alas! Is there a God? If there is one, for one there is, how is it that He allows us to be tyrannized and wronged in this way?' The sky was serene, but suddenly there fell a bolt, which killed the Vidana and Cangana and the Measurer and the rest fell through fear. And though these instances and many others that are related were well known, these cruelties and tyrannies were never put a stop to, and always continued in Ceylon.

In times of war, matters generally came to such a pass that the natives were not able to obey the King of Cota and afterwards the Portuguese without completely losing their lives and goods and liberty, at the hands of the victorious enemies, and yet they were, on that account, imprisoned, harassed and sometimes punished with death, though in these straits, so often occurring in Ceylon, they could not help being reputed for traitors, because they could not act as loyal subjects, and the innocent and the guilty had both to pay, though they were not paid men obliged to war. But as this can be better seen when going through individual posts and offices, and because from the cruelties and the violence inflicted in time of peace, one can better conjecture what they suffered in time of war, and be better able to infer the causes of the punishment which God inflicted on the Portuguese in that Island according to what the Prophet Micah says in the 3rd chapter: 'Hear, O ye Princes of Jacob and ye chiefs of the House of Israel! It was your part to know what pertains to justice concerning the people you govern; but, occupied with your own interests, you hate the good of the neighbour and love the evil of your avarice, violently plucking off the skin, and the flesh from the bones; flaying them and stripping the flesh, and feeding on the flesh of their bodies, breaking their bones and chopping them to suck the marrow. But sure is the punishment. When Ye shall call on me in your tribulations, I will not hear you and I will hide my face at the time in return for the devices you used against my people.' After listening to the moderate complaints of the Chingaló, we shall dilate upon this subject. Considering that the Generals of Ceylon treated themselves as Kings, some as absolute Princes, conniving at the disorders, robberies, violence and tyranny, of the other Captains, soldiers, foreyros and royal ministers, and seeing what they and the others did, we have no reason to be surprised at the heavy punishment which
God there inflicted on the Portuguese nation, her enemies increasing in proportion as the guilt increased, till finally the whole Island was lost and God gave over to the Gentiles and Heretics what Catholic Christians did not deserve to keep.

But as there is no general rule in the matter of customs and government which has no exception, we saved no intention of blaming all, either in the matter of deeds or principles and conduct of government, because it sometimes happened in the case of Generals as well as Captains and Ministers, that their good morality prevailed over the principles of government, and on the contrary good principles sometimes prevailed over evil deeds; and there were not wanting persons in whom everything was adjusted by reason and policy, even among individual foreiros, in that they did not insist on more than was theirs; but they do not on this account deserve to be praised by all, which is the sad fate of those who govern and order, either because everyone wishes to govern according to his pleasure, or because even those who least understand, think they can give advice in the matter of government.

The last King or Emperor of the Island (as we have related) was D. João Perеспandar, who had been instructed by the Religious of St. Francis and was a good Christian. He was buried in the main Chapel of the Convent of St. Francis in Colombo on the Gospel side, as is stated on the Epitaph over his grave. And as he had no heirs, he made the King of Portugal the heir to the whole island, and in his name the General D. Jeronimo de Azevedo was sworn to as King thereof by the Natives, as we have written. He summoned the Modelares and nobles of the island to an Assembly, and left them to choose the laws by which they wished to be governed, whether by those of the Kingdom of Portugal or by those of the Kings of Cota; and they all unanimously said by theirs, or by those of Rajú, according to their way of speaking, because they had been brought up in them, and because of the natural affection whereby we all prefer the customs of our Fathers and Forefathers. On behalf of the King of Portugal, the General D. Jeronimo de Azevedo granted it to them, and thenceforth he and the others were addressed by the Chingaláez as Highness and treated as Kings. Never, however, did they take pains to find out what those laws and customs were; nor were they ever reduced to writing like our ordinances; nor were they published so that all might come to know them; nor was any order given to the Dissavas and other Captains nor to the foreiros. P 443r

CHAPTER 2.

COMPLAINTS WHICH THE CHINGALAEZ MADE AGAINST THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT AND A MEMORIAL OF THEIR CUSTOMS

To convince one of what has been said, it will be very desirable to point out here the laws and customs of that nation, in order the better to show the injustice with which they were treated, and the justice of their complaints. But just as there never was a Royal Minister to reduce them to writing, in like manner no historian has ever had the curiosity to relate them; and I am obliged to make use of a petition and Memorial which the Chingaláez presented to the General Diogo de Melo de Castro, for from his reply it is clear that they spoke the truth and imputed nothing false to the Portuguese, nor did the General find anything to reproach them with. This Petition said as follows:—

The lascarins of this Island of Ceylon, subjects of His Majesty, ask for Portuguese Captains for many reasons affecting the common weal,1 and the Mayors of the Corlas, Nilaz, Careáz, Chaleáz and other castes and Estates of the Island state, that on the death of the King, our Lord D

1 A translation of this petition will be found in the Port. Era II., 214 and Sqq. Compare however this sentence with the translation given there.
João Darmona Pala Astâna, Emperor of Ceylon, when there succeeded our Lord D. Jeronimo de Azevedo to the Government of the Empire in the name of His Majesty, at the Assembly held in Maluāna, regarding the observance of the Laws under which the Natives had to live, they promised us in the name of His Majesty to preserve our laws, which we choose because they were humane and benign, wherewith our Kings fostered and preserved us, governing us for the space of 2,200 years and more, so long as the empire of this Island was in the hands of the Native Princes from Vijā Bau, the first King thereof, to the last Emperor of Ceylon, the aforesaid Lord D. João of happy memory, Darmona Pala Astâna, otherwise Prebandar. But as the Lord D. Jeronimo de Azevedo did not endeavour to ascertain what our laws were, in order to put them into effect | and register them in the book of the fazenda, | the Vidānas and Dissāvas, new offices never in use in Ceylon, perverted the laws of their Princes, and introducing others with the evil and perverse customs which self-interest dictated to them, (as will appear from the relations hereeto annexed) they began to flay us during the government of the said Lord D. Jeronimo de Azevedo, and after his time up to the recent peri (or Rebellion) they tore of our flesh, and even after that with fresh impost and penalties and evils which they heaped upon us, they have brought us to the utmost misery and despair, registering as laws the evils they have recently introduced and not the laws which they ought, and promised, to observe towards us.

And since, in the midst of such evils, it has pleased God to appoint Your Highness as our Prince, to whom has been reserved the palm not only of a true and faithful conquistador but even that of legislator, because of the utmost vigilance with which Your Highness has ever tried to lighten our evils which are manifest to you, we are encouraged to beg for fresh favours, and (to beg) that Your Highness might take counsel to remedy the evils which have consumed us and reduced us to extreme misery, as is manifest and clear to Your Highness from the Corlas, villages and gamatoya,1 depopulated by the rigour of the tyrannical levies of new taxes to which we are not liable, excluding the host of opinions accumulated by those who first originated this evil; and opening the Books of the law of God and of good reason, and the provisions of His Majesty, who has provided for everything like the Catholic that he is, and the laws and customs of our former Princes; summoning to Your Highness' aid for this purpose the

Gentlemen of the Board of Government of this Island, to whom His Majesty has entrusted his conscience and honour; so as to deliver us from the injustices recently introduced, and that we might be governed with justice, according as it was promised to us in the name of His Majesty, and to foster us with fresh favours. For in the redistribution of villages, which Your Highness ordered to be made to those of us who served His Majesty in war, we have been very ill provided, because everything was given to the Portuguese Gentlemen, to whom we admit much is due, the Gentlemen who made this distribution not paying heed to the fact that we, the Natives of this country and lieges of His Majesty, are fellow creatures, and that we have no vessels nor commerce outside the island as they have; and when we are deprived of the land, as in fact we are, let Your Highness and the Gentlemen of the Board and they themselves judge how we are to live and support our wives and children. And while they feed on the meat, there is nothing left to give us for our support, not even from the worst that remains, which is the bones and the refuse. Wherefore we live afflicted and desolate; and we, all the States of this Island, entreat you, as set forth in the petition and other following documents, to observe justice, seeing that the majority of us natives are already Christians, so that we all and our posterity may be encouraged to receive Holy Baptism, because if justice and equity be dealt to all in general, the result will be that the service of God and of His Majesty will advance from good to better whereby we shall receive I. and M.

The Reasons which the Lascars Have for Asking for Portuguese Captains

The special reasons which we have, are the ill-treatment which the Modellars and Araches, our countrymen, inflict upon us, and the fact that they do not treat of our affairs with Your Highness and with the Dissāvas and the Portuguese; that they ill-treat us by acts of violence and oppression, and treat us rather with pride, compelling us to give them the honours of the white cloth due only to Kings, the said Modellars and Araches being oftentimes of lesser quality than the lascars; and to-day in the Seven-Corlas all are inferior

1 Infra p. 1015 'gamaço,' Sin. gamwoseam.
to us in quality save the kinsmen of Simão Correa. And in this manner the evils do to us will be remedied; for they, the factors of the Dissāvas, are those who judge us; and we never have an opportunity of making complaints against them; and sometimes our loss is unknown to the Dissāvas, at other times, when it is known to them, they dissemble, because they are their creatures; and if we have Portuguese in their place, as we beg, we shall be relieved.

If in [time of] war the King grants us any reward or gives us some laris, they take them for themselves; and from the villages and arms they take what they like best, and thus they dishearten us from gaining victories.

And generally speaking, from the time of the General Pero Lopes de Souza to this, when the Island was subject to His Majesty, all the Generals who were slain, the countries which revolted, the rebellions which took place, the pitiful and disastrous destruction of our armies and of the Portuguese forces, were all brought about by the treacheries of Araches and Modeliars, whom no honours or rewards, so often heaped upon them, were able to keep in due allegiance to His Majesty and to our Lords the Generals; but on the contrary they betrayed our armies to the King of Candeia, killing with shots and strokes of the catanas all those who took them deepest into their confidence, as is well-known to the world; and after severing us from the body of the Portuguese arrayal, they treacherously betrayed us to the King of Candeia, insulting us and taking all our kinmen as sureties and leaving our wives in Colombo, and even in time of peace they do not let us take them back. In such sort that these perfidious men, siding with the King of Candeia in time of war, injure and torment us, and destroy us in time of peace, relying on the Dissāvas whose office it rather behoves to destroy them than to favour and protect them.

If these posts are held by the Portuguese, the result will be, first of all, that the King of Candeia will be driven to despair, for he will have no one to exchange letters with or to plot fresh revolts. And far better it is a faithful and brave Captain than a weak and false one, who only trusts in treason, as has often been seen in their case. In the second place, if there is any disorder in the lands, there will be a punishment for them; because as they will not be creatures of the Dissāvas, they will take pains to watch them, and the poor will be protected and relieved; and we lascarins shall have a judge to resort to in the evils we suffer, a hope of relief which at present we do not enjoy.

**BOOK 6.**

**THE MANNER IN WHICH THE NATIVE KINGS TREATED THE LASCARINS**

Besides our paravénias,\(^1\) we were given bichāo\(^2\) (or quarterage) and they also distributed provisions to us every month according to the quality and ability of each one, and the arms he used. Afterwards we were allotted villages according to our deserts, filling our bellies with rice and our hands with laris, and not our heads with titles, which our native Princes granted with great stint and moderation.

In time of war we were given frequent gifts, nor were these or merited honours lacking in time of peace. But to-day we live in the misery which is patent to Your Highness, all that we possess they enter in the tombo and take from us, even robbing the areas from our gardens; and they make us carry it to boat, a thing which in the time of our Princes was never exacted from us; and the areas which the King took was only from the moto\(^3\) of his gabara,\(^4\) villages cultivated by his slaves, and even they had not to transport them, but only the oxen of the royal villages. Let Your Highness consider what we have to live on, when even the pepper which we cultivate for our own food is not spared. Whence it happens that we have not the wherewithal to buy buffalo, axes, mattocks, knives, and the necessary clothing to wear, nor the necessaries of life, nor anything, nor the means of getting them. And what is still worse is, they demand from us what we do not possess, and do not owe, and they force us to pay the same. How came the areas to be entered in the tombo as Royal property, when it is ours and cultivated by us in our paravénias?\(^5\) Over and above the duty we paid, they added another without any betterment of the lands but rather the more decayed and depopulated each time. And if one were to say that we deserve to be loaded with further tributes, and to be treated in the manner in which we are treated, we reply that the lascarins never revolted against the Portuguese gentlemen, but that only the Araches and Modeliars did so, as we have said; for the head governs the foot, and not the feet the head; and therefore in proof of our loyalty, we ask for Portuguese Araches and Modeliars and the wherewithal to support ourselves, for the greater P 645

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1\(^{\text{This is the general denomination of all lands, the possession of which was ceded by the Sovereign. Sometimes these lands were acquired by purchase, at other times by gift. These lands were frequently granted, originally, under service in tenure.}}\) —Bertolaet 286.

2\(^{\text{Vexcham.}}\)

3\(^{\text{Sin. Mutetitu.}}\)

4\(^{\text{Sin. gabadagama.}}\)
part of us cannot find a meal for ourselves and wives and
children, even from the best of the jungle; and we live in the
hope that we shall be treated as God and His Majesty and
right reason ordained; and time will show what loyal lieges we
are. It is known to Your Highness, that though you ordered
the contrary the arrayas are at present engaged in felling the
trees, and from this you can judge how much we have
to suffer and put up with, without any one to help us, and if
they do so to us who are men-at-arms, what will they do
with the others? We leave everything to the prudence
Christianity of Your Highness, and of those who listen
to these things, which are altogether true and are admitted
though they are against God and His commandments.

In the time of our Princes it was only for war they made
use of our persons, and each one exercised himself in the
weapons he used; but to-day they keep us all occupied in
their private work, and do not give time to till the fields, to
such of us as have them.

THE DUTIES OF MAYORS IN TIMES PAST AND PRESENT

In the time of our Kings our work was to farm the villages
and make everyone till the lands of his paravesias, to repair the
flood-gates, to plant and sow, and in time of war to watch and
guard the corals with the people thereof, and to appear once
a year before the Kings with the same people, and with the
custumary present. Our houses and gardens were privileged,
into which none might enter except with our permission; and
the King never ordered the contrary but rather chastised
severely those who entered therein in our absence.

To-day they have made us fanzes\(^1\) (a low caste, which
carries andors and palanquins) whether we are present or not,
any Pariah enters our houses and demands Royal honours
due to Kings alone, and usually we are made cooks, fetching
rice and preparing a variety of curries\(^2\) for all who come and
go, while we ourselves feed on the herbs of the forest. We
are continually carrying pingas\(^3\) on our shoulders, and they
compel us to fetch coco[nuts], pepper, and other spices for

\(^1\) Faras, Hind. faras, 'a menial servant whose proper business
is to spread carpets, pitch tents, &c.'

\(^2\) Carl. pl. caras.

\(^3\) An Indo-Portuguese word said to be from Mal. pungah, Anglice
'pingo'. The pingo formed of a lath cut from the stem of the areca
or of the coconut palm and still used as a yoke in carrying burdens.—
Ten. I., 497.

the gabaras, and butteries\(^1\) of the Dissavas, for we have to
give them even these over and above what they take from us.
They convert us into rowers, stone diggers,\(^2\) carpenters, and
their messengers (panaviras)\(^3\) come into our houses and put
our wives and children to the torture, if we fail to give what
they ask, and what we do not have, and do not owe. And
all this was introduced by the Dissavas who do not leave us
a tree unfelled; besides other things, which we do not mention
not to offend the ears of Your Highness.

And every class of persons who have dominion over us,
many as they are, as\(^4\) is well known, has right to inflict
penalties on us. It is for these reasons that the lands and
granos\(^5\) are depopulated, because there is no redress for the
violence done to us by taking sapan which we have in our
gardens, even obliging us to feed those who come to do it,
and many other intolerable wrongs, which it will be too long
to relate.

THE SERVICE OF THE NILAZ AND CAREAZ

We pay a pinga a year (which means a load) to the King
or to him whose alimony\(^6\) is the village in which we are. The
areas and pepper of our gardens were ours, and we paid oto\(^7\)
and anda\(^7\) for our fields. These oto and anda used to

\(^4\) 'Dispensas,' whence the Anglo-Ceylonese term 'dispence villages'.
\(^5\) Cavoukiers, lit. quarry men. The Anglo-Indian term for laterite.
\(^6\) Cabook, comes from cavuke.
\(^7\) Sin. purna (puvya), messenger.
\(^8\) See, supra, p. 1016.

\(^7\) Lit. who 'eats' the village, i.e., whose comedia (service-land) the

\(^8\) Sin. oto, tithe, the portion paid to the Crown or proprietor by the

\(^9\) Sin. anda, 'that is at halfes,' (Knox 101). Rent of half the crop

CONQUEST OF CEYLON

Cangānes \(^1\) and Mayorals, and we are employed in all sorts of ways; in short the great and small make use of us for their service; and not satisfied with this, they make over our bodies in gift like cattle to whomever they like; and we spend our whole life in this martyrdom, the Foregros and others making us carry andors, transport to Columbo areca, paddy, sapan and whatever they need, from the villages, and fell timber in the villages and the forests, and drag it to the river, and take it to the Madaduwa,\(^4\) where they have storehouses for its sale; and thus the villages are destroyed. And so great is the service that they compel us to do that we have no time to cultivate the lands, and though we are aware that His Majesty has ordered the contrary, no orders have been given, and we have lost hope of any being ever given.

In the time of our Kings, only they, and by privilege the Biemasingas, used andors. At present there is not a Pariah whom we do not carry, in spite of the complaints against this which we made during the recent revolt, and sent to Columbo, and many of us are, and spring from, honourable folk, and yet they make us carry many of low caste, and usually without giving us food.

In the time of our Kings, during war the munitions alone were entrusted to the Chalæz, and all the rest was carried by oxen and Afes, and we went in the army unarmoured, to dig trenches, and erect stockades when necessary. To-day we are so occupied in time of peace that we are not Masters of ourselves; nor can we sow or till; and in time of war we are laden like beasts, suffering want and cold from which many die as is well known, besides that we are cruelly cudgelled to death in payment for the trouble of carrying our loads, and when the arrayas retire, the greater part of us are left behind dead; and as soon as one of us dies, they at once take our paraventus, because our wives are unable to perform the same service, nor do they give them to others who serve in the place of the dead, and thus our wives as well as our children perish, and they do not regard the fact that we are freemen, not slaves, being heges of His Majesty, and that our service ought to have some limit, and that they must give our wives and children some means of sustenance. But if in our life-time they do to us what is here described, and what every one can see, what have we to expect after death, as is also notorious? It were better for us to be slaves than to live as we do, so ill-treated, that we have no help save to cry out to Heaven, to help us, since earthly help we have none.

BOOK 6.

CHAPTER 3.

CONTINUATION OF THE MEMORIAL OF THE CHINGALAZ AND THE REPLY OF THE GENERAL

OF THE CHANDAS AND OF ARECA

Our duty was to pay a recognized portion out of our plants or gardens. But to-day they take from us our pepper and areca, and they compel us to go in search of it to other parts depriving us of our liberty, as something due to them. And if we have no areca, because the areca trees did not bear, or because we did not find any outside our village, as it is sought for by all, they make us pay for it at the price of Columbo, alleging that we had to pay what is in the tombo, as if we and the others have bound ourselves to the tombo-makers to pay what we have not and do not owe, and even more. And what they exact from us, we give, however difficult it be, though we are not obliged. Because areca was abundant when the Portuguese first came to this country, it was rated at four laris, and at that price, both from their own villages and from outside, they found as much as they wanted. As time passed, the merchants and the Vidânes monopolized the whole and prevented us from selling it to whomever we chose, and this abuse grew, and they registered it as law in the tombo; and for what to-day is worth from 12 to 15 xeréns, they pay us at the rate of 4 laris. Is there a law which orders such a thing, or justifies such wrongs? The Fathers who preach to us, teach us the contrary.

The Kings took no pepper whatever from their vassals, and if they take from us dues and customs, how can they take our fruits? To-day, in addition to their customs and dues, as soon as the pepper is in season, they at once place a guard and seize it, as if it were their own and they had planted it; and they ask for more pepper than the pepper plants yield. And this is the reason why we do not grow either pepper or areca, in order to escape the trouble, as what we are continually suffering is quite sufficient.

OF THE FARMERS

In the time of our Kings the anda fields had two customs, one called Peldora\(^1\) and the other Asemadâs\(^2\); one was paid at the threshing floor and the other leaving that quantity uncut near the hut where we watch at night, because of the great

\(^1\) Tam. Kangany.
\(^2\) Medaduwa near Uragoswatta, Columbo; cf. Almanac 1852 LXXI.
trouble of watching. After these two customs in favour of
the Farmer, the crop was divided into halves. Not one of
these do they give us to-day; on the contrary they even take
from us our moiety; for when we come to divide it, the
Cangânas and Araquis have already eaten the moiety of our
portion, for they do not eat on the account of the lord but of
the Farmer.

As regards the do when we have sowed an anumam, and the
crop has failed, they take that same as dues; and if the crop
is good they took two anumams, which is double the seed
paddy. But to-day they take from us a worse than the ena,
for the Vidânas and Cangânas measure as they like, and we
have no one to appeal to save the day of Judgment.

OF THE CHALEAZ

We, the Chaleaz, came to this Island in a paguez of Moors
which came into Chilaș. We derive our origin from Chale,4
and the port of Chale took from us the name it has to-day. We
came seven, one went away, and we remain six. We married
in this Island in the Court of the King. The first peraessva
given to us was Calaturâ, and from there we spread along the
coast, as is seen even to-day. When our descendants had
increased, the Kings levied from us as dues, two jamaams from
each household, and as our duty was to weave cloth, we paid one
utetta or a year. Those who had service lands and villages,
paid their dues like the other natives. The first time we made
Cinnamon in the Island was in the time of Rajâ King of
Ceytavâca, and as what we made small, we were very | 40
well paid.

At this time they increased our tributes, and the two jamaams
which each household paid to the King was converted into
four larins a head per male; and when the King had made use
of us for preparing cinnamon, which is increased each time,
the Vidânas thereof kept us engaged in their private work; and
when we were hoping for relief from these engabadas 4 and
afflictions on account of which many of our people fled to
Cundas where they live free from these excesses, a sentence
that came from Goa was declared, making us slaves of the

1 Sin. Adücko, 'assortment of provisions ready dressed' (i.e., for a
chief or other important person).—Keg. Rep. 132.
2 Mahr. bapto, 'bapto, (Anglo-Indian. Buggalow) ' a name commonly
given on the west coast of India to Arab vessels of the old native
form.—Hob. Job.
3 Chale, Chalai (Chalyam) is an old port in Malabar, on the south
side of Baymur river and opposite Beymur. The terminal station of
the Madras Railway is in fact where Chalyam was. Abulfedâ calls
it Shaliyat.

4 Sin. 'body-tax.'
CONQUEST OF CEYLON

protect us and safeguard our liberties with justice, and govern as accordingly, giving us only what is our own, for that is all we ask; considering that it is not right that many parish for the conservation of a few; and meanwhile to deliver us from the continual presence of the Vidadas in the villages, for it is a yoke we cannot bear any longer, for we are unable to maintain them in addition to the other exactions we complain of. And for the same reasons we ask the same wish regard to the renters of the villages, and that Your Highness relieve us from having to go to and fro felling timber and performing other like services.

Moreover as our ancient Kings did not have Maraleiros, and that at a time when everything was in abundance, so as not to harass the poor, and as the Maradas were held only in three appointed places; [we beg] that the same may be done henceforth, for they cause great oppression where they go with many people in their train, living on the blood of the poor, and after making greater expenses than the Maradas yield; and though Your Highness last year, when you came to hear of it, tried to prevent it, the evil is going on.

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We beg to have in the arrayal a standard or banner of the arms of our ancient Kings of Cota, and that it be placed near the Royal Standard of His Majesty, so as not to forget the memory of such great Lords, and that by seeing the one and the other, we may be encouraged to do our duty, and outshine the arms of Candia.

Lastly we represent to Your Highness that we present these petitions and memorial through a third person, as we do not wish that a particular person should be involved, and in secret so as not to provoke the anger of the Portuguese Gentlemen; lest the same fate as befell the Mandoria of Belitota who in times past, by attempting to obtain justice, was for that reason killed, and deprived of all he had; we do not wish to run the same risk, though so long as we have Your Highness we are sure that no such misfortune will happen to us.”

The Petition and the foregoing notices, drawn up according to their little knowledge and capacity, was given by the Modelaes and Mayores in writing to a certain Religious of St. Francis, who after translating them into Portuguese handed them in secret to General Diogo de Melo de Castro, who, like a Christian and a sensible man, thanked him for his diligence and recommended him to console the people, saying that he would send an answer in the same way through him, as he did after eight days, in the following manner:

REPLY OF THE GENERAL

‘A copy of the petition and other notes are in my hands; and each time it appears to me better and that everything pointed out is well founded. I will make every endeavour to send it this year to the Kingdom [Portugal], and would to God I had received it earlier so as to send it by the galliot of cinnamon.

Your Honour tells me (for so they addressed the Religious in those days) to consider these papers in the Board and in the Council, but considering that these matters concern so many; and will perhaps meet with opposition, in revenge for what is set forth there, and they will demand correction, I think it better to send the papers to the Kingdom, without giving any information here, so that the remedy may come from there by way of a provision of the King, and thus do everything without this inconvenience, the more so because what can be remedied by me I will propose to the Board as if of my own accord. Let Your Honour tell me what you think about this.

I wish to do much good to the Chingalaz and to render justice, relieving them from the extortions they suffer from, and from being tyrannised. Your Honour can so notify to all, and that if these matters should not have redress at my hands, they will never have it, that they may hope that we will give it, for in Portugal and India I have some influence. Thus I only want them to be patient, and to give time for these papers to go to the Kingdom and come back, and the it will be seen whether I am a man of my word. However, meanwhile I shall not fail to try to relieve them, and assist them in every way I can, and to provide for those who have no means. I am awaiting orders from Goa which will come at the first opportunity. All things relating to your Honour’s service I gladly undertake, and may Our Lord reward you for the zeal wherewith you undertook this matter. Colombo, 19th December, 1638. Diogo de Melo de Castro.’

I have given the letter as it is, so that one may see from it that the Chingalaz had not exaggerated in what they said, and we shall see later, how respectfully they spoke, omitting many delicate things more closely touching their honour, and that even in the violations and oppressions that they mentioned they spoke so moderately and so timidly. The General at once proposed at a Meeting of the Board that it was necessary to put a stop to the following things, and that the Father Vicars throughout the Island be ordered | to read publicly to
the Chingalāz what was settled, for the welfare of all, and the following proclamation of the decision of the Board was notified.

I have settled in the Junta some matters, the execution of which I entrust to the Father Rectors of the Parishes, as they are for the service of God; and to avoid the trouble which the unfortunate will have in coming to me from such a distance with their complaints; where the Dissāva is near, let them go to him; and the Fathers will see this order carried out or inform me of it.

Firstly that no person shall be obliged to pay area if he has not got it, and if he has area trees, which do not yield as much as it is the custom to pay, he shall only be obliged to give to the lord what area he has and nothing more.

That the residents of the villages shall not be compelled to give to the lord a like share of what they rear or cultivate, cows, hens, eggs, pigs, &c. but that they may sell them freely after giving to the lord of the village what they are obliged to give.

That none shall have as Vidāna a man of low caste, but let them be of honourable caste, under pain of not being obeyed, nor can he complain of any discourtesy they do to him, nor punish them.

That no Vidāna or any other Chingalā or native of the country, shall go in an andor on the road, nor in any other manner be carried by coolies, under pain of punishment to themselves and to those who carry them.

That no Portuguese foreyro, nor native of the country shall reside in the village, and still less remain there with his wife and children, because of the inconvenience that results, to good government and the preservation of the villages themselves.

That all persons who contravene these provisions of the Board shall undergo the punishment attached to them. Your Honour shall proclaim throughout the Christianities sending

As no lombo was made of the Laws and Customs of these people and of the duties of the particular castes, it was left to the caprice, to the good or bad conscience of all those who had some authority over them, and to the good or evil nature of the Ministers of the King and Captains and foreyros to treat them as they like; and as their minds were soured by the continuous rebellions and the manifest repugnances which that nation showed to foreign domination, they were treated in all things as rebels and much worse than slaves, without anyone putting a stop to the tyrannies which were commonly inflicted on them; and some under pretext of war and others under pretext of the revenue and service of the King, they reduced them to the extremes of despair. And though these Asiatic people are most particular about the observance of their customs and the distinction of castes and occupations—so superstitious and observant indeed that no greater wrong could be done to them than to pervert them—they made them all without distinction carry andores and palanquins, a most vile office, which in the South appertains to those who are called Cules and in Goa to Farazes and boys, and they preferred to be cudgelled and oftentimes to be killed rather than perform a task so mean, when it did not fall to their lot by caste. And this grieved them the more because it was their custom that none save the King himself should be carried on the back of people of low condition, while others who were not wont to go on foot, rode by Permission on ales. But in the time of the Portuguese not only foreyros, going to and from their villages and to other parts, but even his Vidāna, though often of low caste, and even his slaves, made use of these people without any distinction, and they even made a gift of their service to any soldier, and these latter were already so mighty that when they went to the arrayal or returned, the Vidāna or Mayoral was obliged at the signal of a gun-shot to give them a cooly at least for the knapsack, from village to village.

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1 Palanquin bearer, from the name of the caste boyā.
They made them carry pinga and loads on their heads, the work proper to those whom they call Curumbis, and they sometimes made them come from Gâle to Columbo with loads of no value, and also from the most remote villages for many leagues, without giving them food, neither on the journey nor during the time they were detained in their service in that praca, though what had to be given to them, and what justice and reason demand, had been settled from the time of their native Kings. They indiscriminately made them build walls (taypae), and perform other services out of doors as well as within the house, though this appertained to particular castes and for a determinate time, with the obligation of feeding them, which is the first thing that many failed to do, obliging them to bring food from their houses if they had any, or to steal or die unless they found in the jungle some poor sustenance for life.

And all these and other tyrannies were inflicted on them after we had left them nothing of their own, for after they had paid the dues on their gardens, goods and paravenias, they were deprived of all their products, the coconuts, areca, paddy, pepper, sapan, betel, bunches of figs,\(^2\) butter, lacteals, poultry and other things; and they were masters of nothing, nor were they able to sell, for the foreyros or their agents seized everything. As they had no liberty to seek other masters nor leisure to cultivate their lands, being continually engaged in labouring for others, they were reduced to abject poverty, and the majority of them had not the wherewithal to buy a cloth for raiment for themselves and wives and children, nor cattle and implements for cultivation. To escape these inconveniences, in times past all the work that could be done by oxen and aleas was as a rule never done by men, so that they might have time and opportunity to cultivate their lands better, and the King has many thousand cattle and two hundred aleas for his service. But now any soldier laid hold of any one whom he met to carry his bedding and kapseak, without making any distinction between cooies and better castes. Once some soldiers compelled a man to carry the bedding on his back. One of his nephews followed, begging them to let him go, as he was a respectable man, that he would find them a cooly or would give money for one. They not only did not let him go but used such abusive words towards him that he exclaimed: 'What will become of us if

\(^1\) The Indian name for the prevalent Sudra cultivator caste Kuni, Kon-Mahar; Anglo-Indian Koonbee. See Hob-Job, sub v.

\(^2\) Plantains.

we had not Candia to go to! We shall all have to become slaves or at least coolies.' And these troops were as ill-disciplined as in other parts of India, and it was not easy for the Generals to reduce them to military discipline.

The foreyros ordered them to bring fowls, butter, areca, wax and other commodities from outside their villages and from the lands of Candia, and to carry them, often without giving them food, or making any allowance for risk, loss, or breakage, but taking their value from them, and they had oftentimes to pawn or sell their children for the purpose, and as this trade brought them large profits, there were many who took to it with these iniquities. | They had different measures for selling and for receiving dues and for buying. And with these they made a monopoly of the liquor of the palm, which they call svara, and other things at the price they chose, and after making it into wine, they made them carry it for many leagues, while it was only by bartering these products that they brought to their houses cheap provisions; while formerly it was their practice to pay the dues and to do some service, so that they might freely sell what they obtained by cultivating lands, or rearing cattle and fishing in the sea or river. They felled their jack trees to build houses and vessels, though that was the best fruit of its kind in Asia and their main sustenance, often without paying them, and at other times paying a very low price, though they knew from experience that the majority of the vessels built with such injustice came to a bad end. It happened once that a Chingalâ coming from the side of Gâle with a heavy load of nachini, met a Religious in Madampe, and laying the pinga on the ground, he began to shout and curse his life; saying: 'That they made him walk laden like an ox for more than 20 leagues with a load which at most was worth a larin, without giving him his food.'

In the division of the crop there was another crop of injustices, for after the reaping and settling what had to go to the foreyros, which was what the Vidâna, the Cangâna, or clerk of the village\(^1\) fancied, the paddy was piled up and they all ate from the Farmer's portion; but at the time of the division they used a large measure to recover their dues and sold by another smaller measure. Some foreyros used to go to the villages at this time with their families, and all feasted sumptuously at the cost of the inhabitants who went shares for these expenses, and in these exactons was consumed the greater part of what would have sufficed to sustain them for

\(^1\) Liannah.—Knox 52.
many months, and each village had a Vidâna continually resident who had, besides other profits, so many measures of rice per day and his curry, and these dues he recovered even for the time when he was absent. And as they were their judges, they whipped and imprisoned and inflicted penalties like the foreyros themselves. They also exacted the usual honours; their houses had to be decorated with white cloth, and they had to be carried in andores, though they were often of low caste or slaves of the foreyros; which they felt very keenly on account of their customs, and still more when they took their wives, even that of the chief man of the village, without fear of God, or respect for their neighbour. The fishermen, when there were any, were not exempt, for besides the tax they paid which was enough for the sustenance of the House, the Vidânas took for the lords whatever they liked, and when they had to pay them a larin (equal to a tostas) they gave them a quarter of it.

There was also an obligation, unjustly imposed on them, on the owners of the padas (fishing boat) to pay for each pada 3 or 4 amunoés of areca which came from inland, to be exchanged for fish; but when its value rose, this exchange ceased and the fishermen were unable to pay their impost. When this tribute failed, they seized all the fish to be sold for the foreyros; and though some complained to the General, there was no remedy and they were again penalized and persecuted. They also obliged the Farmers to be the purchasers of their fowls, butter, wax, areca and sapan, and other substances outside the villages and in the lands of Candea, and usually to carry them on their backs, without giving them food and sometimes without deducting for the breakage and loss which happens in the case of such goods, but forcing them to pay the highest price. In this way they seized other things not excluding even the sura of the palm trees, according to the measure and price they chose; and afterwards they ordered them carry it for many leagues, though they paid their dues promptly.

And though D. Jeronimo de Azevedo when he was General, on the advice of many, settled that the lordship of every village in which there was areca should be his, and that he would pay four larins or its equivalent one cachá, for each amunam to the owners of the gardens and areca trees, it was because at this time there was no lack of areca, and it was not so much in demand as it afterwards became, and for this reason that price was entered in the foral1; but as some

1 The register in which the foros or dues were entered.
to pay for them. So also did the Vidānas, who had jurisdiction in the villages, doing the business which those who governed the island entrusted to them, paying three or four for a thing worth ten, and taking for themselves whatever they liked from what was brought for the betties. Such was the manner of the vexations of the poor as may be seen from the following instance. At the season of the sale of cinnamon it was the custom to distribute the king's money in the villages for making the mats in which it is wrapped; and for each mat they gave six bazuques, giving one to four to each house. When the mats had to be delivered, the people had to feed at their cost those who came to fetch them; and this entertainment cost them more than the price of the mats.

Those who had to bear the heaviest burden were the Chaleaz, whom the Ministers of the Royal Fazenda sought unjustly to enslave, without a hearing or a defence of their rights, or heeding the most ancient possession of their liberty, in so grave a matter. The devisers of this and other expedients grew rich and possessed their villages, and as they, were on the roll of the Royal Fazenda, the Ministers carried them into effect, especially this one regarding the enslaving of the Chaleaz, without redress or appeal, in order to oblige them to make more cinnamon than they were bound to. It was quite a new custom for the bahar of cinnamon to be of four bales and each bale of 94 arratels, but as its price rose after the King made it a monopoly, the Ministers of the Fazenda of Ceylon either on their orders, which is more likely, or on order from Goa, settled that the bahar should be of 6 bales and each bale 110 arratels, excluding the seven which the Vidānas of the Mahāda took as reward for himself, which made up a very large quantity, and if the bahars of the seamen and of the privileged Lords were increased in like manner, one can well see the loss which resulted to the King in this way. The P. 657 araba 1 which was taken for the King, was of 75 arratels though formerly only 45, as had been ordained by a provision which was not carried out. They gave money to the Chaleaz for 600 bahars of cinnamon at 6 lāris, or tostoses a bahar, and each Chalā being a slave of the King paid one bahar per head; often they ordered them to supply a larger quantity, and as they were not able to contribute, they left their paravesines, abandoned the villages and went away, some to Cândea, others to the inland parts where they were not known, and the means by which these ministers sought to enhance the Royal Fazenda, and secretly their own, tended to diminish it.

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1 A Portuguese measure, 32 pounds.

as has often been seen in India, of which I shall mention only two instances outside Ceylon. A certain minister went to Diu, and not finding means to draw new certificates for his despatches, ordered that the Nacodaz 2 or the Captains of the ships of Meca, should not enjoy the privilege of a small packst of Venetians, which they were wont only to show to the officer of the Custom-house without paying any dues for them. This privilege corresponded to another which was given them in Meca where they paid no dues for the first bale of fine cloth. The profit which they thereby obtained for the King was that there did not appear in the following years a single Venetian, and they gave the excuse that they did not sell clothing, though it was known that at two per cent. this money passed in the English ships to Surat. Here in Goa the Ministers of the King struggled with a royalty on salt. A heavy price was set on it, and as the owners of the salt pans lost much, they gave them up. This price was reduced by a prudent Governor, but it was still so high, that in retaliation the Canarese who brought rice made a monopoly of it; and when we complained of the high price they had set on it, they answered that if it were removed the tribute on salt they would remove it from the rice, though what the Portuguese gained thereby was little in comparison with the cost of this provision, and the relief from famine which was raging for years.

Returning to the Chaleaz, their sons, so long as they were not old enough to peel cinnamon, gave only quit rent for it, later on the Vidānas increased this, from 6 bazuques upwards according to the age, for not less was the power of these kinglets. The Vidānas of the Mahāda, who are the Captains of the Chaleaz, again introduced the practice that they should be given 40 amunums of arace, and so of fish as of other things they had to get a share at the price they pleased to set. They made a monopoly of Tupi (a cloth with which they cover themselves) mattocks, coconuts, vinegar, poultry, butter, &c., and made them sell these things in dhonays on sea, and pingas on land, without giving them even their food, nor opportunity to look after their families, regardless of the profit they brought to the King by spending six months of the year in peeling cinnamon, often sustaining themselves with the herbs of the forest and at other times by stealing on the road, as they had no other remedy. In this way also they acted the under-vidānas, getting whatever profit they could and inflicting many other tyrannies on the poor Chaleas.

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1 Pers. na-khōna, ship's master, captain.
The Putabênas,¹ though of the caste of the Chaleaz, were only obliged to make the cinnamon into bundles and to erect the storehouses in which it is stored. They and those who peeled cinnamon in the time of their Kings did not contribute areca and were free to sell it to whomsoever they pleased, the head of each household paying a duty of only four laris which they called Decum.² But the Vidânas levied another from all the sons of each household, four laris per head, a newly invented tribute. Whatever areca they had was seized and entered in the tombo for the King, leaving them nothing whatever for their food or for sale; and if on account of the drought or other misfortunes they were unable to give what they were bound to do according to the tombo, or because their areca trees were cut down without regard to the great profit they gave to the King, they were ordered to pay for the areca that was wanting at the price of Columbo, and the Vedores da fazenda with patents (portarias) of the General, made this levy through their peons³ at the cost of many tears to the poor, for as they had not the wherewith to pay, it became a fresh misery and they had to pawn or sell their children. And what seems more incredible is that they obliged the widows of the Chaleaz to pay the cinnamon which their husbands were bound to supply. Ambrozo de Freytas da Camara, when Vedor da fazenda, being informed that the Chaleaz had to pay more areca than they had in their gardens, went to Belitâas, and being assured of the truth of the complaint, ordered at the time the amount to be reduced.

The lascars did not escape this oppression, though they were so necessary for war, which in that island could not be waged without them, nor were we able to safeguard what we possessed; however many Portuguese soldiers we might have,

¹ Sin. patahêna, dignitary.
² Sin. lit. ship (offering), what one takes when he goes to see a great man. ‘All the great men, the Nobles and the Governors of the country make their appearance before the King with their Decum, their New Year gift, which are due and accustomed presents.’—Knox 47. When there is a new Governor . . . the whole country comes up to see him before him. Neither may they come empty handed, but each one must bring his gift or present.’—Ib. 57.
³ Pioês, from pé, footman, a word that has survived as ‘peon’.
Even the soldiers took part in these oppressions inflicted on the lascars, regardless of the fact that they were their comrades in war and in labour. When they came down to the ports, they spent 10 or 12 days in a journey of 2 or 3, making them carry their knapsacks, and if they had any quarrel with them or found them in their way, they sometimes took their lives; and of those who were in the arrayal or in the garrisons, they violated the wives and daughters even of the highest born, and usually in the nearest Corlas in which we were most confident. And if one remonstrated with them, they replied that they had to feed themselves where they were, that they were rebellious dogs, and that the fewer they were the better. Nor would they permit them to defend themselves by arms, not to give them an opportunity of doing the same. Nor was it easy for those who governed to punish them, for as they were usually far away from the garrison, that is to say in the interior, it was rarely proved who was the offender. And it is a remarkable fact that though the Portugese were so few in India, they knew so little how to mix with other nations, though if the King had had the wherewithal to pay them, he would never have lacked Asiatic soldiers, foot and horse, who could have been of great use in that conquest.

On the Mayorals of Corlas and villages depends the peaceful condition or disturbance of the country, and so long as they did not appear, no arrayal considered itself safe. They were obliged to appear before the General two or three times a year, with certain dues in acknowledgment of [him as] their King, and to feed his officials when they came there with his messages, for which they enjoyed their privileges. At first there was a Corla which had more than 200, and afterwards many which had not even 10; for those that became vacant in the villages of the powerful, remained exempt from this obligation, and the foreyros profited by their service lands, and the burden which formerly fell on so many fell afterwards on a few. And while there was at first only one King with his Ministers, now everybody sought to be so, and any servant made himself a greater person than his master, and if what they desired was not done, or what they asked was not given, they raised false charges against them and the latter had not only to pay penalties but sometimes even to pay with their lives. After the villages called Gabara were taken from the Generals, they wanted those noble people to be their coolies, and do all the work of their household, and the Dissavas did the same. On the other hand there was a different excess with regard to the grandees of that nation, and that was to give them more than was due and to admit them into greater intimacy than was necessary, against the opinion of Raju, the only governor of the Chingalas, who tried his best that each might have what was necessary according to his state, but that none should have too much, lest he got it into his head to rebel. It happened that a Farmer among others, sang louder than the others in the tillage; he had notice of this, and ordered him to be called, and he found that the reason for this pride was that he had a fanam1 of silver, which was worth six bazarucos. In our time some grandees had a revenue of two or three thousand pardaos, which were given in such a way that there was room to give them more. And because a part of what had been given to him was withdrawn from D. Theodore, he plotted the rebellion against Constantino de Sá, to whom he owed much, and who placed the utmost confidence in him.

And adding to these oppressions those that we shall presently mention of divers Ministers and Captains, there is more room to wonder that they did not revolt oftener or that they sometimes served us faithfully rather than at the rebellions they made; and if we try to be good judges in our own cause, we shall find that the Portugese nation would not have put up with these insults had they justice on their side. Nor can the inconstancy of the Chingalas and their inborn spirit which brooked no foreign dominion be alleged as an excuse, for there is a great difference between justice and tyranny; and if we treated them as they deserved, they would not have considered us in the light of strangers; nor is one hatred ever remedied by another. This gave a handle to the King of Chandia to give out that the God of the Portuguese was inflicting on them the aforesaid punishment because of the many oppressions and injustices inflicted on the natives. But as the Portugese considered him an enemy, they would not admit his theology nor his counsel.

The Dissavas under pretext of war, generally concerned themselves with their own gains, and few there were who served the King otherwise than out of self-interest. They imprisoned and released entire villages; they withdrew from one and gave to another as they liked; and some there were who gave to their kinsmen what they took from their Araches and lascars. Of the villages distributed to the men-at-arms there was little more than the title left to them, for they took for themselves the whole crop and areca and other thing

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1 The silver Sinhalese fanam = 6 bazarucos, 20 = 1 larin, and 60 = 1 Ceylon parda or xeradin.—H. W. C.
which gave a yield; and there scarcely remained the where-withal for them to maintain themselves, many being without even this relief and without any grant. General Diogo de Melo tried to grant lands to those people who had none. He sent suitable persons to the four Dissávas in company with as many Religious to accommodate those who had no maintenance and they were able to remedy very little and many remained without service lands, because everything had already been given to the Portuguese. About this they complained to the General that the distribution of lands was very badly made. And it is much to be wondered at that the Portuguese should at this time be masters of all the low countries, and that almost everything was distributed among so few Captains and casados, who are sufficient to enjoy them but never enough to defend them, which was ever the greatest mistake of the government of Ceylon and Jafariapataé, and which ever will be, so long as each Portuguese, often forgetting his origin, wishes to be treated as a Ruler, without reducing himself to the limitations of his birth.

Thus in time of war, as more freely in time of peace, the Dissávas had on the frontiers and in the frontier towns of Candaia, storehouses for salt, opium, cloth, caps, and other things which were exchanged for areca, wax, sapan, and other things of that Kingdom, negotiating these purchases openly, placing their agents in Candaia, taking and removing one thing and another, and so great was the thirst for areca, that while its price there was formerly four liras, it was not available in the last days for 15; and so abundant was the clothing they took, that a cacha which in Colombo was worth 6 liras, those of Candaia would not have for 4, and there was no silver jewellery which was not disposed of to invest in areca, with the result that whatever the Portuguese had went into that Kingdom; and though at first there was shortage of many things, everything came in abundance, the Dissávas and the Portuguese who had some capital being so greedy in this matter, that they did not give those of Candaia time to bring it there, for when they could they bought it for 4 liras. And as the King saw this ambition, he levied a fresh impost which brought him not a little income. And all this made for greater oppression of the natives, as they had to transport on their backs all this merchandise.

In the lands which these Dissávas ruled, they collected quantities of areca, a custom which they themselves introduced, and there was not a person who had an areca tree who did not contribute to it. In the same way they gathered as much pepper as they could, and all other things which gave them profit, trading even in such things as butter, poultry, and spices, and everything from their butteries or galáras was collected at the doors of the Chingalaz. They had also their smithies in which were made muskets, arquebuses, flints, spears, sabres, (terçados) and javelins (Zagayas) and all other smaller weapons, many of them inlaid, for themselves and for the Generals, with whom they shared, but nothing at all for the King, though they were the blac smiths of the King who gave them paravenias for his service; and though the King spent on the maintenance of many smithies in Ceylon, it was often necessary to bring muskets, arquebuses and spears from Goa, the King making double expense, while the profit went to them without any scruple of conscience in these and other matters, for according to their loose theology these and other Captains and Ministers always found that the King owed them more. Those who exceeded most in this matter and had the greatest variety of things made, were the Dissávas of Maturé, for there were in those parts good workmen, statuaries, masons and likewise carvers in ivory and other things. In these manufactures even the coolies and villagers had to take part, bringing charcoal with great trouble, without being obliged to it, and on poor pay or none at all.

The Captain-Majors of the arrayals had at one time four fine villages wherein they had much areca, besides what they obtained with the arms of the King from other villages and from Candaia through the Vidães. None of the things consumed in the encampment cost them money, except bread and sweetmeats for their table, for poultry, cows, butter, pepper and other spices, and the fruits of the country came to them from the villages, and because they wanted more curd (lajro) they obliged the village of a blind Portuguese to supply it, and on that pretext they took the village away from him altogether, and all the pleadings of the poor blind man to take the curd and leave him the other produce were of no avail. They had moreover every day from the King’s granary (there called pataya), two paras of rice for their house, which made 50 measures a day, and amounted to 50 candles a year, and as pay they received 100 xerafins a year, with rice and other provisions for the private soldiers of their estancia. There was a smithy in the arrayal, and the various kinds of work that was done there, plain or inlaid, cost them nothing, for the smiths were paid and came from the villages of the King; and at most they repaired some muskets of the soldiers, which was all the pretext for keeping them. In the same way the silversmiths, who were granted villages of
the King with the obligation of working in his service, were kept busy working silver and gold and other trinkets of crystal. In their villages they collected areca like the Dissávas with all the other profits enumerated; and all this labour fell to the lot of the natives, and on the same pay.

The Captains of the Companies or of estancias imitated these, and they also had villages granted to them, from which came the few cattle that were killed for the soldiers, the fowls and chicken for the solemn feasts and for themselves, for there were no chickens for the soldiers, even when ill, and even of the measure and half of rice which the King gave each one per day, a fourth was docked, though the King gave an additional xerafin per month for provisions for each of the soldiers, and if there were 30, the Captain got as many pardoos, for everything came to him from the villages, and the food of the soldier was very frugal. Each one had 200 xerafins a year, but as everything was paid as they liked, they saved everything. They either increased the number of soldiers and obtained the provisions not due to them, or let them go tyrannizing over the villages, or sent them to the coast towns on their business without any reduction of what the King spent. The disorders and oppressions which they or their Viziers committed in the villages, in all places, without any other indecencies, made the natives flee to Candea, or to other places in the interior, and when the villages were deserted, they gave imaginary reasons for it and obtained others from the Generals, who, as it cost them little, easily changed, and with the same ease they again depopulated these; and as these offices were of short duration and the villages were not considered their own, they did not take any pains to cultivate them for the future, but only thought of the present yield, in such manner that they sold even the straw, behaving in all things like tyrants towards the natives. Under their shadow the soldiers became brigands of the highway and in the villages where they lodged or halted, robbing whatever they could from the natives, and taking whatever they liked for their entertainment and sustenance, and paying for the most part with blows and abuse, which all Asiatic people resent most. They abused their household, ill-treating and molesting their wives and daughters, an excess everywhere intolerable.

Of the Captains of the ports of Ceylon may generally be said the same as of the Captains of the prayas of India, for as their principal object and occupation was based on self-interest, those of Ceylon were guilty of everything of which the others were accused. But leaving this for another work on the Eastern Conquest, I will confine myself here to what they did to the Chingalaz. They also were generally engaged in the areca trade as already described, but the export of it gave occasion to fresh tyrannies, for when the natives brought P 232 to their ports or sold therein or shipped therefrom, they did not let them do so freely, but seized it at the price they liked, as may be seen in this instance among others. A short time before the Hollanders took Galle and Negombo there came a poor Chingalaz with a supply of areca to one of these ports, and its Captain took it by force, giving him only the old price of 4 larins, while it had cost him twelve, over and above the trouble which he and his sons took in carrying it: and much as he mourned and wept over his poverty, protesting that he had nothing else of his own, as may easily be believed, nothing availed to move the Captain to pity.

It was the custom for the Natives to give the Captain a number of amunams of areca. In the district of the port of Alcaô there was no areca, and though it had risen very much in price, he obliged them to pay it to him in full at the low price fixed formerly. And there was a Captain who obtained a despatch from the General that no Chingalaz in that district might sell areca without first giving him what was put down for him, at the old price. It was also the custom to give them a quantity of fish; they seized more, and in short there was nothing in which they could interest themselves which failed to give an occasion for oppressing the Natives.

CHAPTER 6.

THE WRONGS WHICH THE CAPTAINS-GENERAL OF CEYLON AND THE OTHER OFFICERS OF THE KING COMMITTED

We have much to say about their government, but here we shall deal only with what concerns the Natives, and the injustices which the General did to them or those in which they concurred. For as their power was almost absolute and like that of a King, among the other tyrannies which they practised upon | the Natives, the most usual was
this, as we have already mentioned, [viz.] to seize the people of the villages who did not come to make their submission, and to kill them if they did not submit, without protecting them from enemies from Candea. Whence it came about that they fell into this dilemma: If they submitted to the Portuguese, those of Candea captured and killed them; if they submitted to those of Candea, the Portuguese did the same with them; and in this warfare there was no escape, as in the recent wars of Portugal and Castille; and in these agonies the unhappy folk persecuted on both sides, found some refuge only in the forests, and even thence were they dragged out, without it being of any avail to them that many were Christians; and contrary to reason and Royal provisions, founded on the laws and ordinances of the Kingdom of Portugal, they not only seized them, but even sold them. The most common oppression of all was, that they did not prevent the crimes, robberies and tyrannies above-mentioned, though it was the duty of their office to do so; and though they had such unlimited jurisdiction that they not only regarded themselves as Kings, but even as gods, as was whispered. It was only to prevent those above-mentioned excesses that they showed they had no power, either because of negligence or because of their scanty zeal in the service of God and the King; or, because of favour and friendship or self-interest; because, as they say, one evil gave rise to another; and very little was the remedy applied to the excesses, and when one's own self-interest comes into the question their hands must needs be tied, and God and the King ill served.

There was a Royal provision that no jack* tree be felled, as its bulky fruit was in great part the sustenance of the Natives, and the jack of Ceylon was the most tasty in India. But the Generals did not think that this prohibition concerned them. They ordered them to be felled for building pinasses and other vessels for their trade and pleasure: and incredible was the labour of this work, some felling the trees in the villages and in the forests, others sawing them, others transporting the wood, iron, pitch, coir, and other things. As many Smiths and Carpenters as there were, were continually engaged in these works; and their sustenance was either very limited without any other pay, or none at all; and

* Note by the copyist: Jak tree is meant, though the text has areca tree.

1 'Cayo' from the Tam. kayiru, the fibre of the coconut husk.
The word 'coir' is from cayo.

consequently, accompanied by blows and ill-treatment; and the workmen were paid at these same rates. They did not abstain from anything that could interest them. In addition to the areca and sapan supplied by the Dissavas, they negotiated large quantities through the Dissavas. In Bulatagama, a village of the King, there were collected for His Majesty's 900 amunams of areca, and by a practice introduced by the Generals, without discounting the quantity, there were collected for them 400 to 500 amunams. There was a General who in one monsoon collected all the butter he could and made up 30 barrels, and he ordered them to be sold in the ports of this coast. Another put his arm up to the elbow into the capture and sale of elephants on the King's account, by trickery and in a manner which it is not convenient to explain here. Cinnamon was the monopoly of the King, and they ordered large quantities of it to be sold in the most remote parts. Precious stones were also a royalty of His Majesty, but as we said already they should not be taken from the same place more than once in 12 years if they are to be perfect, but some did it so frequently that they were for that reason found to be imperfect, and they always had goldsmiths in their houses and in Malavana, engaged in making jewels and trinkets of gold, precious stones and crystal. If the Dissavas had smithies, the General had a far larger workshop in Malavana where they made whatever works they wanted for themselves and their dependants. And though they could have had armours of weapons of all kinds without any cost to the King, they never did so; though they had villages with mines of iron, smiths, workers in gun stocks, charcoal burners, and other workmen who held their service lands with the obligation of working for the King, as well as goldsmiths, and the expenses were made on the King's account, the General receiving the profit. Sometimes they sent many boxes of presents to the Viceroys full of muskets, flasks, powderhorners, and shot, curiously wrought, spears and other arms, but for the conquest they made none, and every one came from Goa, and when the arms were lost in any encounter, as in the final loss of Gałe, they went to private houses in search of them, and took them from the outsiders, when they embarked, giving them very little for them.

Their Scriveners who were called Banacás, under their shadow, were the Judges of the Island. They compounded the caseas (suits) between parties, and whoever gave them

1 See ante p. 756.  

2 Sin. kāriya.
most had justice on his side. Whoever sued for a village had to do with them, because when the General wanted to give or take away, he took information from these, ordering the suitor to speak to the banācās about it, and if he gave him a present, or something to gain his favour, he obtained a despatch, and by many expedients they went half shares in the area, and in all other things which the villages of the Generals produced. Just as when their Kings passed through the lands, the villages in which they lodged were obliged to do them honour, with hangings of white cloth which they called manduaus and offerings of food stuffs, which were called articus, they did the same to the General in place of the King. And though this was so special a privilege, the same was done to the banācās though in a separate place. And as they were such favourites of their masters, no one dared to point out the violations and injustices they committed. And because a Religious once made up his mind to do this, a General waxed wroth against him and asked him to prove what he said about his banācās. The Religious withdrew saying that, if he had known that the information would give him so much pain, he would never have attempted to do it. The Generals were so much taken up by these Ministers of theirs because in that labyrinth of lands, selfishness and other collusions, they it was who held the thread. They made and unmade the spoils. About other matters concerning the Generals we shall speak further on.

The first Comptroller of Revenue (Vedor da fazenda) that there was in Ceylon after many years of that conquest, was Antão Vaz Freyre, who on the orders of His Majesty came from the Kingdom [Portugal] to prepare a Tombo, which he did; and not to speak of all, but only of the guilty, this office was always ill received in Ceylon. They had a salary of 3,000 xerasins, (more according to others), and they paid themselves first of all and even in advance. They received the twelve best villages which were kept for the service of the King, and they let out only two or three; of the rest they were the absolute masters, placing therein the Vidānas whom they wished to favour, and from them they received all the provisions and other things for their houses; and though the pretext for removing them from the well-deserving persons was that they did not render service to the arrayal, no one appeared in the arrayal from these villages, and only some rice was taken for the soldiers, and area for the King, and everything according to the pleasure and distribution of the Vidānas. There was once a Vedor, who within three months

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of his arrival, made a dozen sets of lacquered spears and as many darts besides other works; and ordered many trees and jak trees to be felled in the villages of the King, and distributed the planks to the ships of Goa, whither it was all shipped, while at the same time there was shortage of mouths for the pieces of ordnance and spears for the arrayal. In leasing, on the orders of the King, the villages set apart for the allowances to the Religious and Parish Priests of St. Francis, one of them secretly rented them; and continuous were the robberies in the extraordinary registers about which they drew up false papers in order to demand new favours. They all had authority to inflict fines, when they had any power over a village, in the manner they pleased; and though the fines belonged to the King, they kept back almost all, without entering them in the books of the factory, and because of the things which the Vidānas and other Ministers took, it was a proverb in Ceylon: 'That the devil of fines made his throne there.'

We have already referred to the dues of Marālas which the Vedores da fazenda ordered to be collected from the Pagans every year on the King's account, for the piety of the King exempted the Christians from it. There set out from Colombo one of these Marsleyros, who were always those to whom the Vedores wished to give profit, with a great retinue of servants and coolies, all living at the expense of the poor, making inventories as they liked and inquiring into matters with such exactitude as may be seen from the following instance. One of them knew that a poor man had hidden a bullock, and after imprisoning him for some time, he took him away tied at the brawn of the arms. Before he reached Colombo, a Religious pleaded for the prisoner, and after enlarging greatly on the dishonesty, he bargained that the Father should say six masses and he was released. The General hearing of the affair exempted the Father from the obligation of the masses, saying that the bullock did not belong to the inheritance, and that the Marsleyro was ill-informed. They were often so poor that they scarcely had a buffalo or cow or scythe or mattock, but of this poverty they took the duces of the King. But what cost them most, was that they were obliged to maintain this magistracy so long as his vintage lasted, and finally they took more for themselves than for the King.

Many things pertained particularly to the Vedores da Fazenda, but they never attended to them. It was their business to give the necessaries for the sick soldiers in the hospital, and because it was not given and they perished,
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first the Religious of St. Francis gave it up, afterwards those of St. Dominic, and finally those of the Society of Jesus; because they could not remedy, nor look on at the sufferings, and because of the troubles that ensued when they demanded the expenses, though the hospital in time of peace could have been well provided, with little more expense to the King than that of the medicines which came from Goa. For from the villages of the King, which went to the Vedores da Fazenda, many fowls could have been obtained, and the village of Vismava alone supplied 20 daily for his table, and a cow once a week, and so for the rest; and as there were twelve villages, nothing would have been wanting, if there had been piety and charity, and ambition had not prevailed. There came many patients suffering from beriberi, a disease caused by insufficient nourishment and weakness of body. They were never cured because they were not given the necessaries. They went about the houses begging alms, and many casados seeing their helplessness out of charity nursed them in their homes, and even then many died and there was a great scarcity of troops for the conquest, which owing to the death of veteran soldiers, had for the most part only raw recruits. In the last siege of Cumbum there were more than 200 sick of this disease, because they were not given the necessaries, little food and putrid rice. And though a soldier in Ceylon cost His Majesty so much, after escaping the diseases of the voyage, due to similar disorders and impurities, and the cemetery of Mozambique and the pestilential sojourn in Goa, they came to die helpless in Ceylon without any one to grieve over their miseries. There was no bed with ropes, or coir, or rattan, though it cost nothing to get them made in the village of the King, and a few at most slept on mats, the others on the ground, a most pitiful thing, and though they needed seven or eight things, nothing was given, except by force and as if they were taken from their pockets.

If in the conquest there were 500 soldiers, it became 500 when the pay was given, for the Generals, Vedores, Captain-Majors, Factors and others who had a suite, also presented their servant-boys and pages. A Viceroy was asked for fresh troops because there were none; he ordered the registers to be brought to Goa and from them it appeared that there was no lack of soldiers, and there was seen the manifest robbery committed on the King, and the credit of his arms, and the conquest. This is a fault, which, at least, in the absence of the Viceroy, had for a long time been prescribed.

BOOK 6

Of the Factors of the King it is enough to say in General that they were like the rest in India. Two died in the prison of Goa, it must be because they did not know their Arithmetic properly, for in India there were no galloways for Royal Ministers. In the registers there were many fantastic expenses, likewise in the list of provisions. In the Customs house they took for evaluation what they liked, in collusion with the other officers. To those who did the work of the King, after long complaints, they gave the three usual payments, Slow, Ill and Never. Of one it is said, that in making the addition of rice given to the soldiers, he added a zero to ninety and made it nine hundred. But enough of these details.

The same complaints were made against the Oudhadores of Cumbum and of the Conquest, and about the manner in which they treated the casados and soldiers, because he was judge of all, though usually he had never worn out his baize on the benches of Coimbra. And as these complaints were General throughout India, I shall only speak of their sessions. It was the custom admitted as Law, to decide the cases, or carees of the Natives before the Generals, or those appointed by him. But the Oudhadores on the strength of our laws, cited all before them, because of the profit they made, and the civil suits were tried but slowly or never, as in other tribunals. Every year they went to hold assizes, with great pomp of palaquins, marshals, clerks and pages, and all lived at the expense of the poor, and the pages destroyed everything, giving the honours of the way, and bringing fardo or certain presents for all. And after hearing injuries upon them, condemning and acquitting according to the bribes, they returned fully laden, and the officers did not return empty handed; and one among others admitted that the carees and arbitrations were so numerous, that the money which that session brought him was more than his bags could hold. And as all this was against the sworn laws and customs which they had promised to observe, it was a most manifest robbery. This method of judging verbally is received in the whole of Asia; it avoids great expenses and delays, as was seen here in Goa a few years ago, when a Minister, not to admit his ignorance, and not trusting another, never settled a case by a written judgment; and though he held the office for a short time, he left at his death 160 processes given to him, delayed by many years. And what this man did for lack of Letters others did for want of application. And no judge is unjust, if the conditions which justice needs and demands are observed.
CHAPTER 7.

PARTICULAR COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE CAPTAIN-GENERALS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF GOA

Too much ambition and misgovernment were the causes of the total loss of Ceylon as those who had experience of that Island clearly foreseaw, because though the manner in which the Chingalaz should have been conquered was ever understood, and though it was known that the Hollander had his eyes on the cinnamon, neither was the former carried out, as we have pointed out at length, nor was the latter provided against by fortifying the praças in a manner sufficient to withstand European batteries and by keeping them well garrisoned, provisioned and provided. The majority of [the Generals] only attempted to keep their posts and to be in the good grace of the Viceroy and Governors. [For this purpose they asked letters from the City, to the King and to his Viceroy and to those of the Council of State resident in Goa, often sending the drafts of these letters to be signed in the Chamber of the City and seeking by all means to lay hands on those which were written against them, and all this only to retain their posts. That none might withstand them, they disposed matters in such a way as to obtain all they wanted. They kept everyone in such subjection, and the ports were so well guarded, that none dared to write against them, both because of the risk of the letters being taken and because of the lack of secrecy in Goa. A certain Vedor da fazenda gave a small parcel of letters to a certain Religious who was going to Goa, and asked him to give it with his own hands to a certain judge, as it was important. The General knew of it and got it into his hands by the following trick. One of his servants visited the Religious in Cochin and told him that he wished to join his Order, and asked him for letters of recommendation to the Religious as he knew him in Ceylon. The Father gave them to him, and the man going later to take leave of him offered his services saying, that if he had any letters, he would be a faithful courier and would hand them to anyone he directed, as he would be going first and his Paternity would delay several days. It did not appear to the Religious that there was any guile, and among other letters which he gave him was the parcel of the Vedor, given with the request to deliver it to the judge with his own hands. As soon as he got hold of it, he sent it to Ceylon. The Vedor did not report well of the General, nor was the latter able to disable, and the matter went to such extremes that the dispute reached the Viceroy who gave too much credit to the complaints which the Vedor made in person, and it gave rise to a great disaster. This affair was well known and the Generals who followed had their agents everywhere for the same purpose, in Tuticorin, Negapatam, S. Thome, Bicholim, Sarquilim to take them [the letters] from the patamars.

The following cases were worse, because when those who govern do not keep secrets, they do not receive truthful informations and are ever deceived, and in this case he was wanting both in diplomacy and Christianity. A certain Viceroy wrote to the Guardian of St. Francis in Cúmbolm, asking to be informed about the disputes and disorders of that Island in order to apply a remedy. Like a prudent man he replied thanking him for the confidence shown to him, but excusing himself from reporting what he knew, because it had been in writing, and that if his own letter did not come back to the hands of the General, he would at least not fail to receive a copy sent by the keepers of the wardrobe, owing to the diligence wherewith they tried to obtain such letters; and he asked that he might be pleased not to make him or his Order hated by the General, because he knew that he would get the worst of it. The Guardian found that there followed a letter of the Viceroy to his desk, and taking occasion thereby and being moved by zeal, he wrote to the same Viceroy what was taking place in the Island, all matters relating to the service of God and the King. The Viceroy sent a copy of the letter to the General and concluded by saying: 'Your honour sees by what kind of people we are judged.' The General found that the Guardian had blamed him for some misdeeds, and he was so wrath that he said whatever his passion suggested against him and his order; and when two Religious of the same habit happened to come, he showed them the letter and shouted out three times: 'Ecce Homo.' In the same passion and with the help of the Viceroy, they wrote to the Kingdom [of Portugal] whatever they pleased against the Friars of St. Francis, but they were not heard, for much caution and even great malice is necessary to hide the dictates of passion.

On the orders of the Viceroy the Christians of S. Joaõ who live above Bassorã, went to treat with the General and the City of Cúmbolm about migrating with their families to that Island, and they asked for the parts from Chila to Manã,
lands which at the time were almost uninhabited, though they could have been populated and with little cost, as we shall see, if they were allowed. It is said that they did not wish to admit them, alleging that in a short time they would become masters of the Island and go on multiplying at such a rate as to exclude the Portuguese. This was not the true reason, but that they would have to take those lands away from the hands of the Portuguese who were making some profit there, without minding the advantages of making use of these people, either in the cultivation only or also in warfare, and that Ceylon was large enough for all, besides that they would impede the descent of the Chingaliz upon Jafanapata, and that they could have helped us in the war against the Batavian, as they are brave men-at-arms and given to agriculture, as was seen in those who remained in Goa and even gave a good account of themselves in war. And there could not have been a greater mistake than to consider themselves masters of the Island, and not think of the cultivation of the many lands on the one and the other side of Triquilema, which were altogether or partly abandoned.

Though there were veteran soldiers in Ceylon with great experience of the world, the men who served the post of Captains, few were those who obtained it, because the Generals gave them to their servants and to the gentlemen who were their friends, thus defrauding deserving men, who found that those who had no service were favoured above them; and this was always thought to be one of the causes of the destruction of Diogo de Melo in Candia, for as those who commanded had little experience, they were at a loss and were defeated, though there were men of valour there. Very little was the care they took of the soldiers, and of paying them their quarterage; and they did not try to find out whether the Captain fed them; whether they had enough or not, whether the rice was wholesome or putrid; and this complaint was of daily occurrence, and it was sometimes the cause of mutiny and of their coming to Malvâna or to the pass of Betal with arms in hand to demand their pay. They even did away with their breakfast, and a certain General brought from Goa a smaller measure wherewith he intended to distribute to Columbo five xerarins and not ten as was given to the Portuguese, which they did not put up with; and though he had promised the Viceroy in Goa to introduce this measure, the promise remained unfulfilled, and his credit was lost because he showed himself a stepfather to those to whom he should have been a father.

The same took place with regard to the lascarins in the treatment given to them by the Dissavas, in the violences, cruelties, and imprisonments inflicted on them, in the villages and paravesias which were taken away from them, besides the other things that have been pointed out, and they never tried to know whether they were provided for. And as everything was left to the pleasure of the Dissavas, they took from one and gave to another, leaving the wives and children of those who died in war without relief. Some Religious discussed these matters with the Generals and Dissavas, but they were told that such was the custom, and that the orphans and widows must shift as best they could.

In all things they behaved like independent Lords not excluding the Ecclesiastical affairs, arrogating to themselves the power of Nuncios. There was a General who even interfered in the allotting of sermons, 'I want this one to preach, not the other'; 'there shall be, or there shall not be a sermon'; even going the length of saying that he was King, that he would turn the Religious in a champana out of the Island, and sometimes saying to others that he would give slaps and whippings at the hands of Caffirs and other nonsense. One wrote to the Viceroy that twelve clerics were enough for the Christianities of the Island, and that so many Religious were needless. But punishment did not carry to one: take his person and honour. They even interfered in the elections of the Misericordia, designating two or three, and likewise in the election of the Chamber, so as to have them submissive to their views; and if they resisted them, they were either summoned to Goa where they came twice; and when one of the Vereadores complained to the Chancellor about this injustice and the little favour he met with from those who governed the State, he told him: 'Sir, it is not the time for us to be so public spirited'; or they were cudgelled and with such severity that of one it is related that he killed two citizens by blows dealt with his own hand, and being afterwards Viceroy he terribly harried a nephew for doing the same in Macao, it appearing to him an evil with good reason what he approved in himself without reason.

They observed the orders and mandates of the King only when it pleased them, and though many were appointed by despatches to posts they had merited, they had often to return without being admitted thereto. As happened to Antonio de Costa Monteyro, a man of note and a great servant
of the King, who took part for many years in the wars and sieges of Ceylon and was trustee (curador) of King Joao Pera Pandar; and though he was a person of such merits, when His Majesty gifted him the post of Dissava of Maturé, the General would not put him in possession, because he did not want to remove the one placed under his own hand. And for this purpose he went to Goa and returned three or four times and on his last visit he ended his life there, having spent what he had and leaving his children helpless. In the beginning of the conquest, before matters were settled, they distributed the villages as they liked. To satisfy complaints the King ordered that it should be done in council in the presence of the General, the Vedor da fazenda, the Captain of the City, and in the absence of the Bishop of Cochim also of the Guardian of St. Francis, and that the distribution should be made according to merits, greatly recommending those who had served in the Island, the widows and orphans and daughters of those who had died in war, or had served well. But the General arranged matters in such a way, that only those whom he liked were provided for; and the others, however great their merits, or however poor or needy they were, had to bewail their misfortune. For this purpose they resorted to this trick. They gave the villages at first by olas, as they say there, afterwards they told the Vedor da fazenda and other members what they thought about those whom they wished to accommodate. The clerks of the fazenda first presented the petitions of these, in which they often alleged services and qualifications they did not possess, and as the votes were already bespoken, they were provided, and generally they were their favourites and strangers whom they recommended. And as the Guardian was outvoted, he could not help, and sometimes he declined to sign, upon which there was much unpleasantness. He even wrote to the King that his presence was of no use in the council, and in the same manner to the Viceroy begging to be excused. The King did not consent to it, and the Viceroy wrote to him that he must conform with the rest, as that is the custom in all tribunals, this reply disclosing the request of the General to remove these scruples of his, and from this resulted that in Colombo there were some people who did not serve in the Island and even strangers, who had so many villages, that leaving enough for their support, they could provide for half a dozen others who had none but deserved to have.

The greatest anxiety of the Government of Goa was that 2,000 bahars of cinnamon should be sent thither and elephants to Tutucurim to be exchanged for saltpetre, and about 40 bahars of cinnamon, which were set apart for the fortification of Colombo were sold and taken. And this was one of the greatest negligence of Ceylon that they did not erect respectable praças, nor garrison, provide and munition them in the manner required by European warfare. What was sent from Goa in the beginning of the conquest and when it rendered us less, was much more, as we have already pointed out. Afterwards it was not even a quarter of what was taken, for the pay came to about 15,000, and for rice, wheat, and drugs for the sick, and munitions as much again, though in Ceylon there were for the Royal Fazenda the areca-dues, and the custom duties which were applied to the Hospital. And as the disturbances of the territories were continual, and the dues were very little, after the Hollander began the blockade of the bar of Colombo, everything diminished to such an extent that the soldiers were always ill-paid and many of them were going about ragged, naked, cled in mats, sleeping on the floor, and even the plate of rice failed them. They did not attend to the great inconvenience of sending the cinnamon made the same year to Portugal, for it arrived late in Goa and while they were despatching it and bundling and lading, the ships were delayed, and they set out so late that they had to struggle with the tempestuous winter of the Cape of Good Hope, where many were lost for this reason, for relying on their strong build, they struggled with the waves and finally sank in disastrous shipwreck.

For this reason the Royal Treasury in Ceylon was ever in debt, and though His Majesty preferred this conquest to that of the whole of India, yet private persons could not approve that the means for preserving, fortifying and defending it should be drawn therefrom without depending on the State; and those who saw it tyrannized over, not only by those who live therein, but even by those whose duty it was to help it, according to sound reason and the wishes of His Majesty, never gave the necessary information to the Council of Portugal, about the conquest of that Island or about its misgovernment, but drew up fantastic certificates of the preparations that were being made and of other services to His Majesty, though each one was looking to his private interest and not to what was for the greater service of the King, in a matter of such great importance, as the conclusion of the conquest of the Kingdom and Island of Ceylon, which as we saw, could have been accomplished years ago, if the forces of the State had not been employed in matters of lesser importance.
CHAPTER 8.

VEXATIONS AND MACHINATIONS AGAINST THE RELIGIOUS

To escape the complaints made against the Captains and
Royal Ministers, that they gave cause to the Périls or rebellion
in that island, as was described, they attempted to throw
the blame for this on the Religious, that it was because of what
they and their servants and meyринhos did to the natives,
making use of the Coolies of the villages to build Churches
and houses and to carry andore and other things for their
pantry; that they had stocks, that they whipped, birched,
inflicted fines; and made seizures; that they would not bury
the dead &c the alms for the funeral were paid, that they
made the children of the catechism [classes] work, that their
meyринhos were continually harassing the Christians; and
sometimes even touched on matters of greater weight. These
complaints were not confined to Ceylon, for the judge Pero
Nuguesyro Coelho (a free spoken and extremely ambitious
minister, who when holding a different office was finally
killed by the Portuguese of Ros) after rigorously punishing
those of Culumbo in their puruse, ordered some principal
Chingalaz to be called from each Coria and questioned them
about the Religious and their meyринhos from the notes he
brought. This was a misunderstood right, for though His
Majesty had the powers of a Nuncio, as this right was spiritual,
it could not be exercised through purely secular Minister;
nor in a general examination could special inquiries be made
about Religious. But this Minister must not have found
matter for any action, for it came to nothing. The
complaints must have been repeated, for His Majesty wrote to
the Bishop of Cochin D. Frey Miguel Rangel, that he had
complaints about the Religious, and asked him to inquire
about them, and to inform him in particular about the matters
mentioned to him, so as to provide as seemed best for the
service of God and his own: but the State of Ceylon did
not give opportunity for this measure. The complaints
had their beginning in the little regard they paid to the
Religious and because the latter rebuked the Vidânas for the
tyrannies they committed, and for their excess in delicate matters, whereupon they complained to their masters
who gave them full credit.

BOOK 6.

Now I wish they had taken greater heed of these complaints.
For as often as there were rebellions, and those of Candeia
descended on our territories, there was neither a Portuguese
nor a Chingalâ to rebuild the destroyed Churches nor to
give favour and assistance to rebuild them. On the contrary
many opposed it, at least under the plea that there was no
security in Ceylon; and that as long as this was wanting, it
was enough to build them of wood. For these buildings
humble or majestic, the Religious went to the forests to fell
timber, and they rebuilt them at the expense of the little
they had. After the King withdrew from them the villages
of the Pagodes, they had no service-men, and they only
remained for them to employ Coolies, with such good pay
that they were delighted to help them. In long journeys
the old Religious in particular made use of them, though
the usual thing was to walk on foot. Those who had them
in their villages, made use of them; and because of the
good treatment given to them they loved to serve them.
And it is greatly to be wondered that those who reproached
the Religious with it should approve it in the case of their
Vidânas and servants, who forcibly made persons more
honourable than themselves do it. Nor does it appear how
the Seigneurs could be defrauded by what the Religious
took for their pantry at a just price, when there was enough
for all, except that they were in the habit of buying them at
half the price. But this point needs no answer if one
remembers that the Parish priests have to live.

They greatly disliked being sent to the Vigayro da Vara,
because of the distance, the expense, the punishments and
the disgrace. Therefore some had stocks or a guard house,
for the incorrigibles and those living in concubinage, into
which they were put for some time. They never birched
decent persons, who were only admonished: the Coolies
and persons of low caste were birched if they were absent
from Mass many days. The Bishops had ordered them to
deliver 12 bazaruos to the meyринho, for absence from Mass;
and those guilty of concubinage, by received custom, paid
them a larin; but none of these concerned the poor. And
when people kept away for two or three holy days, they
ordered seizure to be made to oblige them to come to Church,
and if any meyринho, exceeded in this, he was deprived of
his baton. Others had nothing besides the name, and bore
the baton for dignity, for they did not enter the villages of
the mighty, nor those of the King, nor of the servants of the
General, who did not come to Mass, except when they liked,
having lost the respect for their Parish priests under shelter
of those who ruled them.
It was the general custom in the Christianities of India, and it was so in Ceylon, for the children to come to catechism, because when they grow up, they cannot learn. This the masters of the villages did not approve, thinking only of the temporal; and so great was their opposition that the Fathers did not desist from their clear obligation, in return for their labours, they were calumniated, and insulted by word and by writing.

It was an order of the Prelates that any Christian who should want to be buried within the Church should give 9 larins; 3 for Masses, 6 for the building; and 3 for [burial in] the porch besides the Masses, but burial in the church yard was for charity. This was observed with regard to those who had wealth; and many who had no wealth, but were honourable persons, were interred within [the Church] without payment; and to others who paid less the same was done. And when the deceased had not the wherewithal to have Masses said for him, they said none out of charity which all did, and we know especially that the Fathers of the Society of Jesus, when they were Parish priests, were dispensed from certain Masses in order to apply them for the deceased poor of their Parishes. And if any of them committed any excess, there was a Prelate, who could be informed to remedy it; and those who do otherwise do not want to remedy but to defame.

Now I ask, did the Religious send into Candea in time of war the things that have been mentioned? Did they go there in time of peace to fetch areca, introducing cloth or other things which are valued there? Did they melt jewellery or silver and gold for their trade? Did they violate sworn peace by erecting new fortalices? Did they tyrannize over the Natives by seizing their paravenias and villages and service-lands? Did they rob them in Marâlas and asizes, employing them without pay or food, taking their cows and bulls in punishment? Did they cut their Jak trees? Did they make them pay for areca at higher prices, and commit other robberies related? Did they wound? Did they kill? Did they inflict rigorous punishment? Did they employ them in their services when they were paid by the King? Did they allow Pagodes to be built and the disgraceful game of Combo1 and the rest already related? They did nothing of this, to be sure.

1 Tam. kambu, horn. The reference is to the game called anbeliya.
of 2,050 zerafins one larin and nine fanams of bazaruco.\footnote{A silver fanam in bazarucos or small base metal. Indo-Portuguese coins.—H. W. C.} Owing to information given to the King he ordered by his Alvaras that they should be withdrawn, and wrote to the Conde de Redondo, and entrusted its execution to the Bishop of Cochim, D. Sebastiao de S. Pedro, who put them to auction and obtained 3,364 xerafins. So they were for over a year; but as the number of Rectors was already larger and a large revenue was necessary for their allowance, which had to be paid from the treasury, \textit{\textsuperscript{p} 372} the Governor Fernao de Albuquerque was informed of the loss which fell to the King, and he passed a provision ordering them again to be delivered to the Syndic to be managed as formerly. And though these villages did not yield a revenue of more than 80 xerafins for each Rector, they were content because of the advantage of the service in the building of Churches and the Convent of Columbo, which at the time could not have been done without this help.

Things remained in this state till the time of the Conde de Linhares, who on further information arranged with the Rectors of the Order that they should give up those villages, and that he would undertake to give a sufficient maintenance from their revenues to 56 Rectors, and should money fail, it would be paid from the Royal treasury. The Comptroller of Revenue, Amaro Rodriguez, took charge of them and entrusted them to the factor on the same understanding. As the price of areca was already higher, they were leased for 4,200 xerafins, an amount which sufficed to pay the Rectors, as their number was reduced and the Churches burnt in the recent rebellion. In the third leasing it amounted to 5,010 xerafins, as areca was worth 16 and 18, on condition that the Renters should supply a certain number of coollies for the building of the Convent of Columbo, which they never did and the Comptrollers never obliged them to do. And there taking place afterwards the rout of General Diego de Melo de Castro, the lands were lost in the general rebellion. But when they were retaken, the renters recovered the produce only after six months of the winter during which there is no yield, and though the Rectors were then 35, they were never paid in full, and 500 xerafins were still due to them, but no Minister obliged them to pay it; and if the number had risen to what it was former the King would have had to pay a great deal out of his estate. And as matters were ever becoming worse, they again wrote to Goa, whence it was ordered that the villages should again be given to the Syndic of the Religious at the highest possible price, till His Majesty could be informed of the unsatisfactory state of those villages. They were given to the Syndic for 3,500 xerafins, a price which he alone set on them, for they were in jungle and without men, and many of the trees had been felled by the renters; and it never came up to the price set in the \textit{valor}. Can greater meaness be imagined?

When the Fathers of the Society of Jesus came to Ceylon, a. has been related, on the intervention of the Bishop of Cochim, they were assigned the lands that lie from the river of Caynel to the North, and His Majesty said in his letter: with regard to them my Captain-General of the said island D. Jeronimo de Azevedo, gifted in my name to the College of Cochim the lands which lie from the strait, which begins in the bar of Chilao and stretches as far as the great river of Corbulo, all that lies between the said strait and the Sea, from the bar of Chilao to Corbulo, which forms an island, and which at present is for the most part depopulated and turned into jungle; and none others save the said Fathers can henceforth make use of them at any time; and because they are adapted better than any other part of the Coast, to the ministry of the said Fathers of the Society, these lands we grant to them as an emphyteutic gift, for ever, free from duty and any tax whatever, so that they may be for the maintenance of the Fathers and Scholastics who are being prepared to be sent to the Island of Ceylon, with the only obligation of placing in the said lands, Fathers and Ministers sufficient for the administration of the Christianities and the Churches which shall be erected therein. And seeing how mean this is conducive to my service and to my duty of favouring Christianity and of maintaining Ministers therein, I am pleased to gift to the said Fathers of the Society, for the said College of Cochim, the said lands in emphyteusis for all time, with all the pasture grounds, appurtenances, revenues, dues and dominion, in such manner as they belonged to me, without any obligation or rent whatever, other than the obligation of having a sufficient number of Fathers and Ministers therein for the administration of the Christianities and Churches which shall be there erected.\footnote{Notwithstanding this ample grant, as soon as they saw the Fathers making good use of them, they at once ordered them to be taken away, and because they were compassed by destroyers at the hands of the Renters, they again restored them, and finally D. Phelip Mascarescapes, when he began to govern the State in Ceylon, took them away again, but when he was going to Goa to be Viceroy he was wrecked within sight of them, as has been related.} 

\textit{BOOK 6.}

\textit{Cap. 8.}
They were not satisfied with taking away the villages from the Religious, for a certain General sent to ask the Viceroy for the village of Calâne, the principal one of those which maintained the Rectors, in order to place the men-at-arms there, because it was near Colombo. One of the leading Citizens came on this business, and he at once obtained a provision that it be given to the lascarins and that the Fathers be given another in place of it; but the Hollander prevented it. It was intended to place in it the Pachas and to oblige the residents to abandon their gardens and possessions and go in search of a place to live in. And there was no other village wherewith to supply the needs of the Fathers, for they were all given away. And near the passes from Malvâna downwards, on the two sides of the river, there were not wanting villages if any were needed, wherefore, they say it was only an excuse to get hold of it. On the other hand the Synodic of St. Francis asked for a village, from the revenues of which to say some Masses for the soul of King D. João Perera Pandar and for the adornment of the main Chapel of the Convent in which he was buried, and in whose honour no burials were permitted therein to private individuals who offered large alms, neither in Ceylon nor in Goa did they approve this act of gratitude to a King who had bequeathed that Island to His Majesty without reserving anything to himself nor for his soul, and if the friars of St. Francis had not said some Masses, no other soul would have been so uncared for as his.

The palmyra called ‘the King’s’, situated in Canisurie, which was set apart for the oil of the lamp of the Most Holy Sacrament of the Mother church, from the revenue of which were paid the Father of the Christians and the Rector of the New City, 100 xerafins each, did not escape; nor the two villages Dunaga and Orna, set apart for the Catechumens and some orphans and the poor, maintained by the Father of the Christians, Rector of S. Thome in the suburbs of Colombo. They took everything for the King, and they gave these villages to the Religious of St. Augustine in place of the candle of rice and the ten xerafins which His Majesty ordered to be given to them monthly as charity, and the same to the Fathers of St. Dominic. At the very time when they turned the Religious out of the villages, they created new offices, as for instance that of the Captain of the General’s guard, to whom they gave villages, and one admitted that from his villages he made 180 amunams of areca alone. In the arrayal they created Sergeants and Ensigns, with double quarterage and a sergeant-Major with a salary of 500 pardaus which they had not formerly, and if the revenue of the King had not been so involved, it would have been advisable even before the Hollanders set foot in Ceylon, to have these aforesaid officers of war, but the remedy for it was not to take anything from the Parish priests, but to see how the King’s money was spent and squandered on unnecessary things, to increase the dues which were only an acknowledgment of Royal Dominion, and the lands of Ceylon which we conquered were not so few that by this means alone there should not have been enough for all.

The infidels of India and Ceylon who saw this and knew it, could not but wonder at it, as well because they have given to the Pagodes at least a sixth part of the lands, as also because the Kings of Candea on retaking possession of the lowlands, made it their first care to rebuild the Pagodes we demolished, especially those of greater veneration like that of Tanavaré, Calâne, Nagao and others of the kind, though not with the former grandeur, and they gave promise of doing so, if they continued in possession of the lands, at once restoring the lands which were dedicated to them. And it is a custom of the Natives, and of all those who have a village, garden or palmgrove or other things, to give something to the Pagodes, and so great was the respect they had for them, that no person would touch what was dedicated to them, even though the fruits fall and rot. But among the residents of Ceylon, rare were those who wished to have a Church in their village, and one from the side of Galle allowed himself to say that he was very happy that there was neither Church nor Father nor Christian in his village. And when a Religious once asked a resident of Colombo to build a Church in his village, as he was able to do without any cost, and that he would help in whatever way he could, as his people were very far from the parish, and he did not like to give trouble to the Christians, and to those of the other neighbouring villages, who for that reason were often absent from Mass, and that he would take the trouble to go there once a week to say Mass and to administer the Sacraments, he replied most coolly: ‘Father, if there were a Church in my village, I should not be Master of it’: but a few months afterwards he died in Candea; and this gives the point in a nutshell; they want to be absolute masters, without any one to rebuke them.
CONQUEST OF CEYLON

The Nayque of Tanjaor had given lands for the maintenance of the Mother Church of Negapatá and had placed as a mark a beautiful cross. The Uparaja (Barajo) of S. Thome had given lands to the Church of the Holy Apostle into which no one entered save those who collected the revenues: and on the feast day of the Saint, the Pagans with great joy brought palms, rushes, and flowers and other things needed to celebrate it, and though the Christians know this, they did what was related: and no land was more pounced upon than the villages set apart for the Churches. They took the service men and the workmen from them for unnecessary labour; they fell the timber, though not for the King’s work, while those of the friends of the Generals were altogether untouched.

Finally, when a mighty storm laid Columbo to the ground, there was not a house that was not repaired and rebuilt, and the Mother church alone remained for long years half ruined, with the facade on the ground, and separated by a fence of wattle with a hut for Sacristy. What would the Romans say to this? Since so long as their temple was not covered with tiles, none, however mighty he was, would cover his house with anything but thatch! And it is a remarkable fact that in this matter the infidels are more heedful of the suggestions of the Devil than Christians are to divine inspirations. The Portuguese of India could well have known that so long as they did not promote conversions and the things of God, the temporal State would never prosper; and well has experience shown this in the loss of Ceylon and the other præcas and territories which our enemies have taken from us. And as regards individuals, it has likewise been remarked that from the great riches acquired in India none ever profited, nor founded a house with children and grandchildren, and to show how much justice the Religious Orders had in the eyes of God, and how much God was displeased by scandal in this matter among pagans, I will here mention what took place in Diu. That little Island on the side of the sea is all rock, and on the land side and on the side of the Strait which separates it, all is sand, and it is only in the centre that there is a line of gardens of no small profit, because of the esteem which the pagans have for any greenery. The King Sultan Badur had a Pagode and a palace a little outside the walls of the present City, which was afterwards turned into a hermitage of Our Lady. A casado of Diu bequeathed the right he had to a garden called Jazu to this hermitage, asking his wife by his last will, to bequeath it on her death the other part. She married again, and the husband had recourse to the Senate of Goa, and judgment was given against Our Lady not to offend his Lordship, and because the disposition of the deceased had not been made with the permission of the King. Then happened a thing which had not taken place since the Universal Deluge. The sand rose from the sea and soon covered the greater part of the gardens with such mounds of sand, that they traversed the Island | covering the Jeusz. And the punishment not stopping here, in the year of the drought, when the Conde de Linhares was viceroj, nearly all the wells turned brackish, and they blasted the rocks, and the cisterns were opened therein; and even to-day most rare is the case of a Portuguese woman brought to bed and the mother and child do not perish.

But to resume our thread. Such was the gratitude which Ceylon showed to the Religious, especially to those of St. Francis, who from the beginning of that conquest helped them in matters temporal and spiritual; being present at the sieges, the invasions and the sallies of Candaia; and in the most dangerous retreats which took place, in the arrayal and in the stockades, in which died more than 50, and of those more than 20 were martyred, including in this number the Custodian and 12 other Religious in the first rebellion of Jafanapatá, besides others who were taken to Candaia as prisoners, 12 captured by the Hollander in Gâle, and one killed in the taking of Nigumo. It was they who persuaded the King D. João Perea Pandar to bequeath his rights to the King of Portugal, thus confirming the general right of that conquest, and as they were the first to preach the Faith of Christ there, irrigating it with their blood, they ministered to 200,000 Christians; [which number would have been] much more if each Portuguese had been an apostle within his possessions. With the same spirit came the other Religious Orders and laboured in the territories allotted to them, and were it not for the scandals narrated to them, and the incessant disturbances of war, the whole or the greater part of Ceylon would have been converted to our Holy Faith. The Fathers of the Society after their arrival were ever present in these wars, and once did in Uva with Constantino de Sá, another in Candaia with Diogo de Melo. In the rebellion which took place in the time of Nuno Alavez Pereira there died two, and two were prisoners in Candaia where they died, three were captured by the Hollander in Gâle. In the rising against Constantino de Sá on the side of Mature they killed the Prior of St. Dominic of Columbo, another was captured by the Hollands in Gâle, and a Father of St. Augustine, who was in the arrayal of Diogo de Melo, remained captive in Candaia.
CHAPTER 9.

ERRORS IN THE CONQUEST OF CEYLON

Besides the above related violations, injustices and scandals, which are the greatest mistakes in the conquest of lands and souls, others were pointed out by some zealous persons soon after the defeat of Constantino de Sá de Noronha, along with the remedies that should be applied. And though the state of that Island is far different after it was lost, and though after the entry of the Hollanders we have two enemies against us, yet should it please God that the Portuguese dominion be restored, under which supposition I speak, it will be useful to know what they thought formerly, so as to avoid fresh errors in a matter of such importance and to tread the paths more accommodated to the end. But as some things which were noted need some correction, we shall add them here in order to shorten the discourse.

They say: 1st. So long as His Majesty is not Lord of the highlands of the Kingdom of Canada, it is absolutely necessary to have constantly on the field an array in a good number of Portuguese, and so long as this is not done the lowlands will never be secure, because of the inconstancy of the Natives who had continual wars even in the time of their Kings as well as because of the difficulty they have in accepting a foreign rule, for it is natural to all, and in the case of the Chingalaz it seems a [second] nature; and one of the greatest errors of that conquest was not to maintain in it such a force as would make the rebel of Canada despair of being able to get the better of us in the lowlands.

2nd. This error consists in the selection, as is done in more modern times, of the officers for war; for as the conquest of Ceylon requires the observance of many rules, greatly different from the military arts that are learnt in other parts, and as because of the hills and forests, in which squadrons cannot form, they must necessarily march in single file, and the ranks of the Portuguese take up a long space, that of the lascars still greater, it happened that the advance guard and the rear guard fought without each other's knowledge, and without the possibility of one succouring the other. It is necessary that each individual captain should have as much experience of that warfare as the senior officers, so as to command in their absence, and if this is wanting, they are soon defeated. To this is ascribed, in part, the rout of Constantino de Sá, because he had few veteran soldiers and captains of companies of little experience; because if that is required in inferiors, there is greater reason to require it in the leaders; wherefore it is necessary that the Captains be taken from those who have greater valor and experience of this warfare, which is needed above all in the case of the Captain-Major of the white troops and of the Dissávas of lascars. And it happened not rarely that these posts were given for a certain period to men who came from abroad without any knowledge of the Island, when the captains should have been taken from among the ensigns and should have been promoted according to merit without regard to intercession. And because it was not so, the veteran soldiers were disgraced or went away from the conquest, because they had no hope of promotion. So free from this was D. Jeronimo de Azevedo, that for no reason would he admit new comers till they had learnt that discipline for some years; and so long as one served well, he did not listen to reasons for deposing him, especially in the case of the Captain-Major and Dissávas, and he did not consent that they should be appointed from India or from Portugal, especially if they had not been bred in that militia, as was afterwards introduced. And when it was necessary to make some change he, on the other hand, took the Captain of greater valor and experience from other parts as he did in the case of Luis Cabral in Sofragão after the death of Simão Pinhaõ and D. Constantino in Matara when he displaced his brother-in-law D. Fernandez Samaracon; though, when the latter was asked who should be Captain in his place, he replied that it should be the Captain of his advance guard, Domingos Carvalho Cão a man of many years of service in that island, who afterwards occupied that post for a long time and often. The same he observed with regard to the Captain of the Field; for the valorous and fortunate Captain Salvador Pereyra was replaced by D. Manoel de Azevedo and he by D. Francisco Royo, both men of great valor and military ability.

3rd. The error of the conquest was the little or no punishment inflicted on those who rebelled. For it is as bad a policy not to give rewards to those who serve well as to leave such great faults unpunished, for which they had no reason to be astonished, knowing that their Rajus acted with such rigour that he killed even to the fourth generation, and even then there were not wanting those who rose against him.
However we do not recommend this rigour against the innocent, but only against the guilty. This sometimes gave courage to many to whom they afterwards gave more than they had at first, besides other emoluments, though they were the ring leaders, and in their former outbursts had robbed and killed whatever bore the name of Portuguese and those who were on our side, without sparing churches and other sacred things. Afterwards, when they sought means to return, they were forgiven everything without any satisfaction, and this was done without hope of their doing any further service, but merely that there might be fewer enemies informed of our affairs. And though they found fresh guilt in some, they did not do it to all, as there were in Candaia other guilty persons who were watching how we acted towards the former. These men made show of greater gallantry in war in our favour, the sure stratagem of every traitor. And though the reason given has its force, a greater reason is the scantly confidence we could place in them, and the bad example given to the others to do the same; nor could Candaia support so many men, and these the most presumptuous, without great detriment to itself and loss of satisfaction.

4th. They gave as the fourth error of that conquest the inroads and sallies into Candaia and into the other highlands which were attempted without any precautions in the lowlands, and without the intention of remaining in the hills, both because of the reasons we pointed out, [viz.] the many men that were there added to the Candiot within those hills, and because of the experience of the past losses which we had received in those hills from the enemy; and generally more of our men-at-arms and service men were left there than we killed or captured. And there was no considerable capture to justify such risks and danger to life, for once Candaia was burnt, it was never rebuilt in our time, and we know what the houses of Asia ordinarily are; and while our arrayals were getting ready, which was never unknown to the enemies, they had time to get their families, moveables, cattle and some provisions to the loftiest hills which we could not ascend, and when we did ascend them, it was with great peril. The King had his treasures on the Rock which could only be captured by a long siege. And as the Chingalas never await battle on the field except when they have plotted a treachery or in narrow passes, from the heights of the hills they watched the march of our arrayal, and with large shot gave signals for them to escape or to get ready, placing moreover some good firelocks in ambush in the forests, to take aim on persons of note whom they knew well, as many of them were our servants or followers and skilled in the business, who had fled there because of the good rewards given them; and if any of our parties sallied forth to seize prizes or to seek provisions, they fell on them from the ambuses, and if they did not succeed, with the same agility they hid themselves in the mountains. In this way the arrayal advanced two months and three, from hill to hill, till the diseases resulting from these evils from the cold and the rains and famine, obliged us to retire, and usually with less men than at the start. Which rarely happened without our being attacked in the narrow passes and roads blocked with large fallen trees, or strong stockades, garrisoned with many men, which they let us enter very easily, so that when our men were worn out and sometimes overloaded, their heads might be cut off in the retreat, and generally those who died within doors were more than those killed on the field. The serving men went only under compulsion, and they preferred rather to be impaled, because of the immense trouble they suffered with the loads they had to carry, either because the required number was wanting, or because their loads were increased when others fled, fell ill or died; and they were not sorry to have some occasion to sling the provisions and munitions on the ground, on the plea of saving their lives, and this reason also would have been enough for us to seek another way of conquest, so as not to depopulate our territories. Besides, the Natives were awaiting one of these expeditions to show their mind, as was so often experienced, and though it may be excused once, and it might be gallant to break the charm of crossing the river of Candaia with a good number of Portuguese if the people had not been scandalized by our excesses, we cannot understand what considerations made the other Generals rush headlong with limited forces to penetrate those difficult hills and those impervious forests. We have not heard that the Hollander, though he has fallen out with the Chingalas, has attempted such a mode of warfare, though it is 31 years since they took Columbo, though they have no lack of troops in India to place in Ceylon larger squadrons than we had here; and if we admire their military administration, we must admit that the mistake was ours and this was wisdom. Let it be borne in mind as settled by experience and by reason, that on no account ought we to enter those hills to give them up again. Afterwards we shall say what others discussed upon this point.

5th. In this point it will be shown how they disapproved a proceeding approved by all statesmen and great Captains, because though they are all of opinion that at least on the
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Frontiers, and in the case of restless nations, there should be good garrisons and fortalices, experience shows that such did not seem convenient to the Portuguese in Ceylon, for in time of rebellions all the garrisons of the frontiers came to grief, though only 15 to 20 leagues in the interior, because there were very few men in them, with a small supply of victuals and munitions; and as the force of white troops was so small, and on those occasions the lascarins were not forthcoming, whatever was in the garrison diminished the arrayal, and if they had been well garrisoned, the arrayal would have been altogether exhausted. This was seen in the time of D. Jeronimo de Azevedo in the rebellion of Domingos Correas, because as these dovecots did not exist, and as he had many men, he retired when he could with less loss, while the contrary happened to him in the rebellion of Cangrane Arque, because of the garrisons in the interior, and in this retreat he was neither able to garrison them nor was he willing to withdraw them, and all was lost before he could relieve them. And on account of this experience he did not want to fortify Manicaremaré; and to protect the movable of the soldiers, and to remove the maimed and wounded, he thought it better to send them down to the ports, and the goods of the soldiers in dhonies or on aleas, or to entrust them to the obedient villages, in which nothing was wanting, and because the sick and wounded would be better cared for in Colombo. He did not care for garrisons in Gurubêille, Seytavâca and Ruanêla and elsewhere, and only consented to Simão Pinaõ erecting that of Sofragoã, which though a strong one, was twice lost afterwards. He only cared for Balané to facilitate entry into Canoea, though it cost him much to erect, maintain and defend it with Portuguese and lascarins, because at that height the cold was great, in course of time the lascarins retired and the Portuguese who were changed from time to time dimini hed, till in the first rising that followed it was lost with nearly 100 soldiers. All the rest at all times was sheer waste, as happened to Raji himself in his invasion of Canoea, though he had other forces and a discipline very different from ours.

And even in case any of these posts were ever so well garrisoned and provided, what can it well defend, what passes of the hills, and what passes of the rivers does it defend, when there are so many [passes] to the low country? When they are unable in troublesome times to come to the sea ports to refit and find provisions, soldiers and lascarins, and return with them to quell the fire of rebellion? But when there is a garrison, the first anxiety is how to relieve it without equal danger to the relieving party when the country is in revolt, as has been seen in the course of the foregoing history. The whole of this argument is founded on the scanty fidelity of the Natives, and the scanty force of the Portuguese that was kept there, for if we had two arrayals, one in the lowlands and another in the highlands, or at least one on the field and another in the garrison, the inconveniences pointed out would cease, as we shall show later.

6th. It cannot but be a manifest error to distribute the rents of Ceylon in such manner that the King remained poor; and the Hollanders found occasion to say with truth that our war was a war of the poor. Because this also prevented the harbours of Ceylon from being fortified, as they should have been after there was reason to fear European enemies. And though the Portuguese had succeeded in conquering and possessing all the lowlands of that Island on the one side and the other, and the Kingdom of Jafanapatão and Manâr altogether, the distribution was such, that the conquest of Ceylon always depended on reliefs from Goa, not only of men but of other things likewise, and even at the time when the war was at a standstill for some years, the royal treasury was in debt. And since Ceylon was so fruitful this could not have happened except from misgovernment, even though some Ministers robbed largely. And those who know that all the rents of Ceylon before the tombo of D. Phillipe Mascarenhas yielded an income of a little over 10,000 xeralins, will easily understand that the whole distribution of the Royal Revenue was a piece of jobbery, when every reason demanded that at least till the whole of Ceylon was conquered, a large revenue should be assured for His Majesty so that without further reinforcements from the State, which was ever distracted with other enterprises, that conquest might be provided for, and not be dependent on one which was often unable to give it. After the loss of Colombo, there were not wanting some Portuguese who in order not to have to live poor amidst their own folk wanted to go over to the Hollander. The reply, however, was that if they did so in the hope of receiving villages they were wholly mistaken, for as the Company had conquered Ceylon by war, all the profits which the Island yielded must be for it. But as the Portuguese wished to spend freely before the conquest was over, they did not even succeed in doing it, nor did the few whom the war spared receive any profit from Ceylon. And some were so blind that they surrendered to the Chingala King year by year and he sacrificed them to the Pagodes.
7th. Finally leaving other errors of minor import which can be easily understood from this history, the principal mistake of this conquest was its delay; because if we had set about it with the needed forces, which were not lacking at the time, it would have been achieved even in the times of the Kings of Cota, or immediately after the death of King D. João it could have been done with greater ease for good reasons. First, because the people of Candaia at that time were not accustomed to the firelock and musket. Secondly, because in the time of the Kings of Cota, everything outside the hills was subject to them, and the people were more ready to follow the fortunes of their native Kings than a stranger and a rebel, and if the Portuguese forces had been added, the [King of Candaia] could not have secured himself within a diameter of nine leagues, of which alone that Kingdom of the hills consisted, and whether we had so often entered with less forces. Thirdly, because if D. Afonso de Noronha after entering Seytavâca had continued the war with the 4,000 Portuguese he commanded, each time augmenting them with the forces of Cota, in the manner we have said above, he could not but have obtained the complete conquest of Ceylon as he had men and money in abundance from the sacking of Seytavâca and from his unjust exactions in Cota; and if the tidings about the Turk diverted him, after conquering him in that, he should have continued this undertaking, at least to make up for the discredit he earned by his first expedition. And if the jealousy of India and the corrupt minds of that time had not reduced the forces of D. Constantino de Braganza, as we have left recorded, after conquering Jafanapatao it would not have been difficult for him to subdue the whole of Ceylon, for as no harm had yet been done to the King of Cota, his subjects would easily have accompanied him. Fourthly, because as we shall show, no affair of India was of greater importance than the conquest of that Island, and amidst so many unnecessary things which were undertaken in India, this should have been the first, for in those brave days, there was no lack of forces in India to carry out this undertaking, nor can one see what excuse can be given by those who governed it for not doing so, and for writing with such inconstancy to the King, that after erecting the praça of Columbo he ordered it to be demolished. This conquest would have been effected if after Andre Furtado de Mendonça had conquered Jafanapatao, they had increased his forces; and every reason demanded it, as the revolt of the Kingdom of Candaia under the rebel apostate D. João was fresh and the treachery he practiced on Pero Lopes de

Souza would have been avoided; matters which demanded such a punishment as would resound throughout the whole of India; but when passion and jealousy reigned, reason was ever wanting. The two Generals, D. Jeronimo de Azevedo and Constantino de Sá | de Noronha had brought that conquest to such a state, that if they had been reinforced as was needed, they would have succeeded in subjugating the whole of Ceylon, and when the Batavians had great forces in India, every reason of state demanded that we should place the largest forces in Ceylon, to remove from them every hope of entering it as well as to assure for ourselves that refuge in case of an emergency.

CHAPTER 10.

MEANS FOR ACHIEVING THE CONQUEST OF CEYLON

After pointing out the mistakes of that conquest, they proceeded to give the means for its amelioration, and to some extent it seemed so difficult to set it right in the way followed by its government, that they were of opinion that everything should be brought back to the starting point, annulling all the grants and gifts of the ports in which there were no fortalice, as well as the villages and Vidanias, in whatsoever way they might have been made, even if made by the King of Cota o: by His Majesty, since the King did not wish to consider as settled, without further order from him, all that had been confirmed by the Board of Ceylon. Wherefore it was not convenient that anything, save the grants of the fortalice and factories, should remain in vigour, which is a course approved by those who did not wish to be completely ruined; for which purpose they thought that a fresh tomo should be made, distributing them with such moderation that the King should always have what was necessary for that enterprise, a resolution which can be reproved only by those who place their self-interest above all things.

And that there might be no suborning or presumption in the mighty ones in order to retain what they possess, they recommended that a tomo be made in the following manner, | which I give here in order that it may be done in better times from the tomo that is kept in Coa: [Viz.] That a list of the villages of each Coria should be drawn therefrom; and that

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men of conscience and truth with experience in the Corla, be chosen to go there, each taking a clerk of the country who should be sworn to observe faithfully the instructions given below and others that might seem good, promising them advantageous portions if they should do it well and that on the contrary they would lose all rights, if they distorted the truth. They should be given authority to chastise those who hid the truth, and a guard of two uscarins, without further expenses. And after entering minutely in the tombo all the fields and other products that have to be registered therein, using the words of Ceylon as shown in the tombos of Goa, and after settling the price of which these virtuals were rated in that country, they should limit the price of the pepper of the mutelos at five measures a larin, and areca at ten an amunam, and of the gardens of private persons at six, out of regard for the four laris that is wont to be given | them for each amunam. They should do the same with all the dues, without leaving out in each village more than the service lands required for one single mayoral, even though formerly there were many, and if it be a large village there should be left some service lands] for a Maudina and canacapules, without omitting to enter any other thing in the tomo. The same should be done in the Corlas which the Vidanas and the Atacorlos enjoy, who must be removed both in those villages found to be ruined and concealed, and in those dedicated to the Pagodes, and in the cultivated fields that happen to be outside their villages, noting down against the villages the district to which they belong, to avoid the inconveniences that result from the contrary practice. Of all the villages of the Pagodes in each Corla a special tombo should be made to give effect to the order of the King and to obtain thereby the maintenance of the churches and their Ministers. Of the gardens and properties which are outside the villages, there should be made another tombo, to recover dues (and we do not call them tithes as they are commuted into dues), and to know the number of people for the distribution of salt; and every 20 years there should be held an inquiry as to what further yield there is in those properties and what others have been since cultivated; all of which should be given for three lives, and when these were over, the surplus produce should be distributed among those who deserved it, and finally it should be stated: This village has so many houses of such and such a kind, in which are so many people, for the purpose of distributing salt to them; their rents amount to so much: taking care not to put down in one village those who have run away from another, unless they were residents of ten years standing or unless they came from Candaia. And when there were many brothers in one house only one should be obliged to live therein, the others being free to marry and live wherever they found better prospects; the same of the females if there are no males.

The same orders should be observed in the villages of the Bada, for the distribution of salt and in order to know better what cinnamon there was for the King and the customs of the Vidams, restoring to each village the Chaleas thereof, even though they had been absent for 10 years. As for the Chaleas who were not of the Bada they shall be aratus, or belonging to the villages in which they had lived for 10 years serving as coolies. The same with those of Gampa. Because if all those of the Bada were together and they were given their service lands, they would give more cinnamon, and if more were necessary, as much as they wanted for themselves and their relations, over and above their obligation, on condition that they were paid, and that in weight not more than a quarter should be taken away as discount. This Vidania should be leased for three years to the one who undertook to treat the people best, and to give some more cinnamon than the usual quantity in return for the many profits that he had. The same tombo and lease should be made of the villages of the Agra, because otherwise much will be lost and few good gems will be forthcoming; and the villages of the Curo [should be leased] to the one who undertook to give most elephants and alaes, paying a certain sum for those that were above the number, or paying double for any shortage at the end of the three years. And should any one ill-treat the people of his villages, he should be removed at the end of the year in which he should be found to have done so. And if they treated them well, other things being equal, they should never be removed. And the villages of Mangeliscola, in which also elephants are hunted, should be distributed in the same way, and if by their labour they captured a large number, the King should pay them a certain price, for few were taken there, and they were of lessor value. In the same way the lands of Bulatagama should be rented to the one who gave most pepper, areca, and money, besides what was entered in the tombo, for great were the profits.
obtained from other sources. And one must not consider as a trifle unworthy of this history a matter on which depends the conquest and preservation of that island.

On three points, however, I must comment on this proposal. The first is the leasing of the agra of precious stones, since it has been mentioned that in the time of the native Kings they were not dug except once in 12 years, and that in this way they were perfect, which is not the case when they are dug every year or within a shorter time. Therefore it seems better to resort to other means, either renting in the preceding years only the stones that may be found by chance and in the year they are dug Ministers deputed for it assisting thereat, for sometimes one single gem exceeds in value all the rest, or by renting for that year, if anyone is found to be prepared to take this rent under such great risks.

I remark, moreover, that there is no talk of increasing the land revenue, because it is a wonder that so many and such extensive and fertile lands yield a revenue of only 10,000 xeracines, though in them, to be exact, the tithes are commuted, as is done, or should have been done, generally in the lease. Lands of Goa and of the North, because in the case of gift (merce) lands (as they are called) the King D. Manoel set no duty, but only the obligation of tithes. And if jurists consider it well, they will find that he has retained only the high dominion, giving up the direct dominion and usufruct from the lands he wrested from the Moors, because he held them as traitors and destined the [lands] for the Portuguese who would settle down in Goa, because they are few, seeing what he did, and that he could well do so.

They reply to this by saying that besides the revenues of the custom house of Colombo, of cinnamon, and other ordinary rents, there should be applied to the expenses of Ceylon all the areas of the villages of the foreyers, which by ancient custom was Royal (property) which the Kings sold only on their own account; but in order that some profits from this area may go to the foreyers, let it be given to them altogether at the price of the tombola, and let them give the money in two payments. Nor should those be listened to who say that without it, and without the revenues of the custom house of Colombo, there will be enough money for everything, because it cannot be believed of so many Royal Ministers that they were all thieves, for there were very few or none who had an abundance of money, or paid all the arrears owing to the King, though many of them had the areas of the villages which they afterwards gave up to rent the dues of the custom house, wherein they lost about 8,000 pardaos a year, for the dues amounted to 2,000 and the area up to 10,000, and they ever tried not to pay the dues and to keep the area. Such was the zeal for the common weal, the residents of Ceylon persuading themselves that all that the Island yielded should be theirs, and that the expenses which the King made therein and the right he had to it, were recompensed by the honour of possessing it, drawing the necessary expenses from other parts, where customs levies and other taxes were paid, and that it was not unfair to have custom duties in other ports and to do away with them in Colombo—All of which are plans unworthy of Portuguese zeal, and ill devised at a time when the State was in need of larger expenses to oppose such doubled enemies. They behaved so dishonestly in this matter that with false oaths, because of bribes received, many of them freed the properties of the Pagans as their own. And this could not be excused on the plea that the King of Cota had given this permission to the Portuguese casados and their descendants not to pay custom duties in Colombo, for at this time they possessed nothing outside the walls to trade with; and it was little that entered their houses, for which it was not reasonable to pay in time of siege and of so many troubles. Afterwards, however, when they became Masters of greater territories, they had another King, who could order the contrary for the common good. Neither did the properties of the Pagans ever have this privilege, nor could a King, Pagan or Christian, give them the right to swear falsely.

For these same reasons and other great advantages, they thought it convenient to take for the King all the salt that was made in the Island or brought to it from abroad, as was done especially from the coast of the Fishery, paying those who brought it a suitable price; and to distribute and sell it to all at the rate of two measures for a fanam of cayxas and they made so much of this proposal about salt that, as we shall see, they thought that the conquest of the kingdom of Candea depended on withholding salt from him for five years.

In spite of all these additions I cannot be persuaded that there will be enough revenue for the whole of that conquest including the building of praças, which they wish to be erected in the Island, their garrisons and provisions and the two arrayas necessary for the conquest of Candea, unless greater taxes and the State come in, and still less for the King to derive from it any other profit save the cinnamon.

A silver fanam in cayxas, i.e., cash (kau). The Portuguese never applied the term cayxa to their own coins, and it may be supposed that the kau in question were the medieval Sinhalese coins.—H. W. C.
The third remark is about the gift of villages; because from the experience of those of Bacaém and Damaão, if they are given in perpetual emphyteusis, there will be nothing left to distribute to deserving persons in time to come; and the mighty ones become new potentates, drawing around them the people of the other villages to increase their revenue, and not permitting Royal Ministers to carry out any matter for the service of His Majesty, besides other notorious inconveniences. If they are given for lives, they only try to take the products, and the less the number of lives, the more is the damage they do, as they fell fruit trees, spending nothing for their improvement, even though it will need very little expense, so long as they think they work for another. The remedy for this seems to be to give them for lives, stating the rents and the state in which they are, with obligation to improve if possible, and should they not do so to deprive them at once. If however they improve it, it will at any rate be renewed, because if they think that this obligation holds good in ecclesiastical emphyteusis which, as is to be seen in Father Finheyro, is more privileged, it can with greater reason be done in secular emphyteusis. And if His Majesty as Grand Master [of the Order] of Christ should make commanderies of some villages of Ceylon, it will be not a little convenient, for as many have valour and capacity to merit, and not all have capacity to govern prazas, he can in that manner satisfy many deserving people and employ in the prazas only those who have the needed qualities to defend and govern them; a suggestion which so far I do not know whether any one has mentioned, though it is very necessary in India, and remedy and honour are thus found together.

For the same purpose of increasing the Royal revenue, they treat of reducing expenses; and they considered it not only unnecessary to have a Comptroller of Revenue, but even convenient and necessary not to have one, and that a General and a Factor were enough, because of the great inconvenience which the experience of so many years had shown, because they were always in continual dispute, the well-intentioned Generals pressing for the conquest, for soldiers, health and ill, and for the pay of the lascarins, and the Comptroller of Revenue making these completely impossible; and the Generals who were inactive gave as reason that they could not do otherwise because they had not the wherewithal to pay, and from this arose the incessant writings and complaints which they mutually made to the Government of Goa. And as we are speaking of reducing expenses, we might mention the 5,000 or 6,000 prados of the Comptroller of Revenue and his clerk. For in times past, when the wealth of the State was great, the Comptroller of Revenue of Goa had not more than 2,000 prados, and because one of them rendered a great service, they doubled this pay; and as this was not remarked when another succeeded him, he and the others retained double pay. And because Nuno Vaz Freyre came from the Kingdom [of Portugal] to set right the affairs of the island, they ordered him to be paid as in Goa, and those who succeeded him drew the same pay, as there was no one to pay attention to it, and as perquisites they received another thousand, for when they went out of Colombo, they wanted to be paid a daily allowance for every day. The clerks had nearly a thousand prados, besides the great profits of their pen. They wanted everything to be provided for, paying what was just to the one who wrote the new tombo, till it was known what the revenue of that island amounted to, and then to entrust everything to the Factor and his clerk, making the General a superintendent of the Royal revenue, and giving every year the balance to the Factor, since on him falls the trouble, when money is short, and he will have no excuse for providing the fortalices and arrayals badly. And as His Majesty entrusts to him [the General] so great a matter, he may be entrusted also with the revenue, for if he wants to rob, he will do so in spite of the greatest precautions, and there will be none to do so, and there will be a rivalry and a wrangling one against the other, and the retarding of the royal service. And if these reasons are not enough to do away with the office, let him be given a thousand prados without further emoluments from cinnamon, wherewith he increased his quarterage, or his goings out from Colombo; for there will not be wanting those who will accept it, and do the work as well or better, because they will not have so much power. The profit of his pen will be enough for the clerk, who will have the post for life.

They also asked that the Ensigns and Sergeants be removed along with the Sergeant-Major, recently introduced by Constantino de Sá de Noronha, because a Sergeant-Major was altogether unnecessary and the warfare of Ceylon was not like that of Europe. But as I do not see who has to succeed a Captain-Major killed in war, or who would carry the banners if there were no Ensigns, let this proposal be left to the judgment of experienced Captains. They do not want that there should even be a Captain of the General's Guards, introduced by D. Nuno Almares.
two Motiares, or clerks, and the General should have in his keeping a copy of the toMbo; and each Motiar 20 xerafins, and the same to the Motiar of each Diswā; and to each Modeliar who serves with lascars 60 xerafins. And if these officers serve well, they should have their rewards increased and likewise all others who discharge their duties satisfactorily, and all this for three lives, because though it was not the custom of their Kings, it is good to do them this favour, putting them in this matter on the same level as the Portuguese, so that their children and grandchildren might profit 472 by the labours of their ancestors.

But in the case of villages given for lives, they shall pay taxes, payment for areca, and all other services, because this is now a gift. But in the case of those that are given as pay for actual services, they shall make no payments, as has been said, nor render any service, for there will not be so many that more will not be needed for the arrayals and garrisons, as we said of the villages of the lascars. In this way they will all be satisfied, and the more so if they are in the neighbouring corals, because they will have more certain sustenance in time of war, though those who receive them as gifts might have one or other in the more distant Corals. And when one cannot or does not name [a successor], he shall be succeeded by his son or most capable son-in-law. And though in those days some of the grandees had more revenues, it was not for three lives, nor with such privileges, and just as there is a limit to [what is given to] the Portuguese, so it is just that the Natives should have it also, so that there may be enough to give to their lascars, and kinsmen, without whom they cannot be grandees nor hold such posts.

But it must be a fixed rule that if any one who holds a gift [land] should reside, he and his successors would lose everything, and that the King would never again use their services; and in the rebellion against Constantino de Sā de Nornorha it was found that one must at least take action against the leaders and pardon those who were carried away by the violence of that storm, setting great store by those who have been faithful for generations.

If we had to seek examples, the Turk pays all his Timarrotas with lands, and the Mogul does the same to his Captains with the obligation of [supplying] a certain number of horse; and he has them ever ready for any disturbance or fresh conquest that he undertakes, and those who are acquainted with that great Monarchy say that he has 900,000 horse, though he was never known to place them all on the field; because almost always there are disturbances, both on the frontiers and in

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1 Remunerative offices given by Royal Despatch.
the interior of his Kingdom, caused by his tributaries and neighbours and by the Rajaputros, who living in high mountains generally disturb him, as even his own sons do, either in the lifetime of the Father or on his death; and if this [present] King holds out for some years more, after conquering Vizapur, in a short time he will reach the Cape of Comorö; and already the Kings of Golconda, Maynes and Canara, are tributaries to him, and if he succeeds in conquering the Mountains or the Druggas of that new bad neighbour, the whole Portuguese State, which we hold, will be a neighbour to this great Monarch, which ought to give great concern to Portugal, for there is no trusting the Moors. However, they follow a different style from what has been here pointed out, for they do not distribute the lands for lives, or in perpetual emphyteusis, but [give them] to those who deserve most, or prove themselves best in war, and on the slightest suspicion or petty fault *they freely take them away, although for a* different reason, for such mighty Princes generally care little whether the lands are fruitful, provided they are obeyed; which is the reason why I do not dare to condemn what has been settled in Ceylon.

They hold that it is convenient to have 6,000 lascarins for the security of the lands, and to quell any rising in the one or the other Coast; 1,500 in Maturë, with 100 soldiers; 1,000 in Sofragâô with 70 soldiers; 200 for the guard of the General; 1,000 in the Four-Corlas with 30 soldiers; 1,500 in the Seven (Corlas) with 60 soldiers; 1,500 in Mangula-corla with 70 soldiers, where there must be another Dissâva to rule the lands bordering on that river as far as Tayriela and those of Mantota and Vâny, having his garrison on a rock on which formerly a King had his City, as it is a very strong position and there is water at the top, and because these lands cannot be governed from the Garrison of the Seven-Corlas, and for that reason they had been almost lost. And this number of lascarins must not seem too great, since Rajû had 60,000 and paid them all without drawing upon the 1,900 villages of his Gabâra nor those of the Pagodes; and with the surplus he maintained his Court and hoarded annually large sums of money; and in our time D. Fernando Samaracon had 12,000 paid lascarins in Maturë, besides the expenses of his person. In this way a great service will be done to the foreigner in that they have not to supply men-at-arms as has been settled, according to the manner in which the Moors are ruled, because if they gave them as they ought, it would be another tax and since they could never be persuaded to give them, because in Ceylon they never did what they should.

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this was ever the gentler means, and we shall avoid the inconvenience of the Portuguese not desiring to have lascarins in their villages and of coming to blows continually with them. Nor would it be always necessary for them to bring their wives to the fortalices, from which they received great oppression, and generally they had two [wives] and supported two families and rebelled without minding those that remained. They desire also that these troops should be, at least in great part, from the villages of the coast, and near our ports, because they are more reliable and more united with the Portuguese, to whose obedience they return sooner, because the punishment is more speedy: that they be mixed with foreign troops who would always be more faithful, disclosing any plots that there might be; for even Rajû made use of this means, keeping with him men of various races; and for this reason they greatly approved the coming of the Christians of S. Joaö, as we have already mentioned.

After making the total of these men, and of what is necessary as pay and gifts to each Dissâva, they set aside the villages that fell to them, so that the Dissâvas might distribute them according to the order of the Generals; and those who receive gift lands [they thought] should receive patents, and new lascarins should be enlisted for the service lands of those who are promoted to higher posts. In each frontier corla there should be appointed a village, accommodated to the service of the one who shall be chief thereof and keep watch over the lands. Great account should be had of the sons of Modeliares and other nobles, that they might intermarry with the Portuguese, picking out for this purpose soldiers of good nature, who do not make light of such kinship, for should it succeed, one single person was enough to prevent a rising or to give warning of it, just as one single person was enough to disquiet them; and the greater the authority he had, the greater would be the advantage drawn therefrom, and the more the better. Such Portuguese should be given in the name of the King a thousand padracos in money and a village that yields a revenue of 200, if before the distribution, and if after it, the first or one of the first that became vacant, out of those distributed to the Portuguese and which would yield that amount, besides what he deserved for his services, and the dowry which the father-in-law might give him; and they consider it a great mistake not to have done this as was [formerly] done.

Against this proposal there is in the first place the recent example of D. Theodosio, the leader of the rebellion against Constantino de Sá de Noronha, who though closely related
to the Portuguese, declared himself, because a certain revenue, out of the many he had, was withdrawn. I did not ever approve this mixture of our blood, which afterwards shows itself in valour and in customs, and rare is the case of one who lives as God commands and gives the respect which is due to the one who becomes his wife. In Ceylon, however, considering the great convenience, I propose, I should not reprove some kinship with the most notable person of that island, for the example of D. Theodosio does not weaken the force of the advantage.

Passing from the lascarins and their Captains to the Portuguese Captains, to whom the King was wont to give other grants by despatch and gifts: To avoid some injustice springing from the Captain-General not having enough service men, after the villages he held were withdrawn by the King, they think it convenient that over and above the villages of his palanquin Chalias, he should have one or more villages suitable for other services, of 500 pardoas of revenue, and a similar sum in other places for his servants, the Yeador, Bandigarras and Captain of the guard, if this post is retained; for the Vidanias, from which they formerly had their profits, must be discontinued; and the Captain-Major of the field should not have more than one village out of those which he formerly had for the service of his person with the former salaries, so that they might not seek to obtain this post by Despatches, because it must always be given in order that one may serve, not as a reward for past services. For the same reasons each Dissava must have only one village applied to the service of his person, and another smaller one to provide for his household, with 200 pardoas in money and other perquisites, about which we shall speak later, on condition that he will not make use of the villages of his lascarins to whom he must be a Father, to distribute to them what the King gives, and thus avoid the expenses of those whose revenues came to 10 or 12 thousand xerafins. To the Captains of companies they assign a village, one of the small ones, for each having 10 or 12 coolies. And when they march they should be given aleas or coolies of the foresee.

All the above-mentioned villages should always be applied to these posts, and those who govern them should be made to take great care not to depopulate them, and those who commit violence should be severely punished, because excepting those of a General and his dependents, the others should be under the obedience of the Captain-Major of the field in the same manner as the Dissava govern their own. And since others must be confirmed, if the number of Captains

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deputed for the Conquest should be less, [the lands] must not be given to others, but should be rented out on the account of the King, either to buy slaves for the Captains who have less service-men till they have enough, or for the rice and provisions for the most needy garrisons and fortalices. In all these villages they should pay dues, or it should be discounted from their salary, for the reason already given. To the Captain of Colombo they also say, should be given in the same way a village of 200 pardoas of revenue, since it is not reasonable that he should be denied, as some wished, what is given for lesser reasons to many who come from outside, as he does not get the dues which the Captains of other places get.

They say that 12 other villages should be set apart for the upkeep of the garrisons, because of the many inconveniences arising from the contrary practice, as has already been pointed out with great insistance but without effect. There should be two in the Dissava of Maturé, in which it is necessary to have always a garrison of soldiers; another in Sufragado, six in the Four-Corlas for the larger arrayal, one in the Seven-Corlas, two in Mangula-Corla. These [villages] should be rented out to those who undertook to supply the greatest quantity of rice to the garrisons. If these have no need of so much, it should be given to the nearest fortalices; where there must always be provisions for a year, which should not be consumed until they have been replaced, especially in the most remote fortalices, [which should be] accommodated to receive the garrisons of the interior or to supply them with provisions when the country does not yield, so that it might not happen, as was sometimes seen to the great discredit of the Portuguese name, that they surrender for lack of provisions. And as Colombo is the capital, it should be an example in this matter and keep this deposit from one year to another, the King supplying what is necessary for his soldiery and the city levy a contribution of one per cent. In those districts in which this cannot be done, another village should be applied, rented out in the same manner as the rest, and all on condition that, if the people were ill-treated, they would be punished in the way they deserve and the villages taken away at the end of the year, but that if they do well, doing good to the people, they shall never be taken away, other things being equal.

Having settled the maintenance of the men-at-arms and the provisioning of the praças and garrisons, they come to the distribution among the Portuguese, and they condemn [the practice whereby it happens] that the King has very
rich citizens while the conquest is very poor. But in order that the conquest may be profitable, the fortalice provided and the citizens rich, the distribution must begin with the persons who have been longest in the wars of the Island, and of these [they must begin] with those of greater service and qualities, and not those who merely come to settle in Ceylon, counting as half a year an expedition in the arrayal, or stay in one of the garrisons of the interior, because these were then [posts] of greater danger and trouble, and usually without pay. On presenting their petition, they shall be rewarded by despatch; but any one who tries, or at any time, shall be found to have deceived, or shall be convicted before a Judge, shall lose all the right that he had to the favours of the King, for in this matter there was much falsehood. For many reasons no one shall be given more than 300 xerarins according to the tombo, nor shall the number of those who receive this amount exceed 40 persons. A revenue of 200 xerarins shall be given to 60 persons of lesser service and abilities, being despatched according to the rent, either every 10 years or less, and the number of years shall be stated in each despatch. And whoever exceeds this limit or the number fixed, shall lose half that amount, because the revenues of the Island are not enough for more, save when it shall be altogether ours. On this point Luis Pinto and Luis Teixeira were consulted, and many other persons of great service and merits, who held many villages, and they were satisfied with 200 xerarins, because they understood from the manner of that warfare, that neither they nor their children would enjoy them long in peace. And if the disposition of the war should be different, and different the taxes and the cultivation of such fertile lands, there is no doubt that the pay and favours could be more generous.

For persons of lesser services and abilities, they assign 150 xerarins, not to exceed 200 persons. To the rest they assign nearly a hundred; and to no one who has seven years service would they give less than 60, because all these gifts with a little industry and capital, yielded a third more than is valuated in the tombo; and if they choose to make improvements, they will soon double this amount with less burden to their conscience than when they trade. If this order and limit were kept in their entirety, His Majesty would be pleased to confirm them, and if they are not observed, then they shall be annulled; and whoever convicts them in a court can have them for himself, the King also waiving the tithes and fortieths.

CHAPTER 12.

OF THE DISTRIBUTION TO THE ECCLESIASTICS, AND OF THE REMEDY AGAINST THE VIOLENCES MADE ON THE CHINGALAZ.

From what has been observed, they unanimously judged that in conformity with the First order of the King, the villages and revenues of the Pagodes should be allotted to the Ecclesiastics and the Churches for their construction and adornment, and to the Bishop, if there should be one, without
duty or fee, by way of a decent stipend, discounting therefore the areas and pepper, on condition that they should sell the pepper like the others. And as those Parishes cannot be kept up without Convents, whence to supply the Vicars who fall ill or die and where they can learn the language, they desired that revenues should be given for their maintenance and erection to those who need them: That they might make use of the servicemen of the villages, because it was certain that they do better treatment than the Seculars commonly do. And if the Vidanas and the mayorals do wrong in this matter, the Dissâvas can proceed against them as in the lands of the Seculars. And should there not be at the time so many Churches and Vicars as to need the whole of this revenue, the villages must not be given to Seculars but only rented out for the King till they become necessary for the Ecclesiastics. They rebuked the false zeal of those who say that it was not convenient for Churches and Religious to have immovable property, on the ground that they do not die and that rents and properties become entailed, because this might well be true in the case of villages of the King and of foreinei, but not of the Pagodes, because the native King who gave the royal [villages] to His Majesty, gave these to the Religious and Ministers of Christianity. And even of the Royal villages, when there is need, the Religious are not undeserving, because they always accompany the soldiers on their campaigns and there was no rout in which some Religious were not killed, or wounded or captured; and often a Religious animating the soldiers with the crucifix in hand, after giving them the sacraments, was of more avail than many soldiers put together. And if a Secular thinks that a despatch [appointing him] to a fortalice and granting villages for three lives is a small recompense even for seven years of service, what will a Religious order think, which gives continually and so long as the Royal service lasts, Religious for the military expeditions; for if the Religious do not die, their services do not die either, nor do their spiritual services, which are far more important according to their statutes.

As this point touches judicial matters, it is somewhat out of place here, and all this scruple about the villages of the Pagodes can be removed by a nominal rent without going into the discussions whether before the gift of the King D. Joao Perea Pandar the King of Portugal had any right to the conquest of that Island

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1 Lit. 'rent of an egg.'
should have all [the other's] jurisdiction, with Manar as well as the whole of Ceylon, and that much good would result from this both in the political as well as the spiritual Government, for in temporal matters it would make the Generals proceed more carefully and keep the Viceroy informed of the truth. He could assist at the distribution of villages, and other things of importance that are treated in Council. For this reason His Majesty had already ordered the Bishop of Cochin, D. Frey Andre de Sta. Maria to go to Columbo, and because he did not go, there were many disorders in the distribution and in other matters of importance, which it was not desirable to leave to the judgment and will of one single person, for there was no one who had the authority to propose what was convenient, especially when [the Generals] were inexperienced and tried to become absolute Lords. If [Ceylon] had its own Bishop, he could be assigned a stipend out of the villages of the Pagodes, or without taking one vintem from the Royal revenue, he could be paid in cinnamon, which the Prelate could order to be made without prejudice to what was made for the King, and he might be given for his service one of the twelve villages which the King took for himself, as was said, so that he might not have to depend on the Generals.

Under the protection of this Prelate Christianity could be more easily promoted throughout the whole Island, especially if it be altogether conquered, or if we live in permanent peace with the King of Candea, as did Philip de Olivera in Jafanapatao, because if each Portuguese became an Apostle of his village, in a very short time they would be converted to our Holy Faith; and when the authority of the General and the zeal of the Bishop are combined with the diligence of the Parish Priests, in a very short time will be accomplished that which is most to be desired, and which the King recommended most of all and which is our greatest obligation. The Ecclesiastics, moreover, would have been more respected and venerated than they were wont to be in Ceylon, the Royal Ministers forgetting what was related of the celebrated Captain Duarte Pacheco that because he insulted a cleric when Captain of Mina, he ended his days in a Hospital. And for a greater crime a Governor of Brazil was wrecked in a storm, when he had previously hanged on the yard of his gallion a Cleric whom he killed without remembering what Pope Gelasius wrote to the Emperor Anastasius, that he should be careful how he regarded the honour of the Ecclesiastical dignity which exceeded the Secular dignity much more than gold exceeds lead, and that the temporal must obey the spiritual authority and not the other way about.

It is however necessary, before undertaking the general conversion, to banish all manner of infernal Ministers, because they persuade the Chingalaz that by giving freely to them they would be delivered from sickness [which is] the greatest stumbling block of the whole of heathendom. For they have no lack of ordinary medicines, and for surgery they have many medicinal herbs whereby dangerous wounds are cured, of which [herbs] they make great use in Surgery, because they have some books, or know them from memory. However they make little account of natural medicine, thinking that just as sickness arises owing to wicked men already dead and reborn as devils, so they can cure them also; wherefore they sell all they have and pawn their children, leaving themselves nothing to live on. And the worst of it is that this evil attacks even some country-born grand-daughters of the Portuguese and their families, a reason for obliging one to inflict the punishment of imprisonment on the Masters, as they are called, and the forfeiture of their property to the one who convicts them, publishing beforehand a general proclamation, so that the ignorant may not be scandalized, and declaring that the remedy for diseases must be from God and natural medicines, more ancient than these Masters of the Devil, and that in the times of their native Kings there were physicians paid on the King's account to treat them, for they have enough knowledge of medicine, and that Ramãnsur Arache has made a summary of their books, and that whoever should do this again would receive the title of Chief Physician for himself and his descendants, so that they may practise it and teach it to others, who may exercise the art all over the Island, receiving a village on the King's account; and that no one should practise without the approbation of the Chief Physician in writing, and that they may communicate their doubts to him paying him for the trouble and offering him their presents.

They assign a Master for each place where there is a Christianity, to whom the rich shall pay something, which will be twenty times less than what they gave to their soothsayers, and the poor shall be treated free. For this the Vicar shall give them two annuums of nêle, or a part of it in other provisions, gathered at the time of the harvest; and in the same manner the portion of the Canacapule and a part of the pay of the meyrinhas, so that they may not take bribes nor commit violence by not having the wherewith to live. under pain of being punished by the Vicars in what pertains to the Churches and by the Dissâvas in political matters. The foreysros must assist in this, depositing it in their villages
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... till the time of payment. But where there are no Churches, there shall be taken a tenth part for the Vidānas of the Corlas, if there are any, and the Dissāvas must always help to root out these wicked people and not let it be said with scandal that the Vidānas had an understanding with them and shared the profits, and should they do this, they shall incur the same punishment. If anything remains over from this amount, it shall be given to the Vicars, either as alms or for Mases for the poor.

... In the same way and with the same rigour the Negatās or diviners must be got rid of, to whom they give more than twenty per cent, because there is neither work nor loss in which they are not concerned; and though they are unable to escape them themselves, they think they can deliver others. All the husbandmen know the proper time for tilling, but they say they do not know the hour and they go to ask it from one who knows less than they, more than twenty times before beginning and harvesting any kind of crop, and never with empty hands, under pain of going away without an answer, over and above the usual pay when the harvest is gathered, though there is no proof of their science and knowledge except that they say they know. And as the Holy Office, for good reasons, does not so far proceed against these wicked folk, it becomes the more necessary that the other Ministers of the Faith and of the King should not be negligent.

... Because it may happen that the villages of the Pagodes may not be well distributed in the Corlas, for it is only in them that Churches can be conveniently erected, a perpetual exchange might be made, or they might be built where it is most convenient without acceptance of persons. To the foreyros, however, who give favour and help for these buildings, for the conversion of souls, and for the observance of the precepts of the Church by their men, there shall be given authentic certificates, so that they may be rewarded with favours as promoters or defenders of the Faith, conferring a right on their heirs, if they had not been rewarded in life; because it is certain that if the one and the other Ministers join and the Natives give up hope of having a Pagan King again, and all live in peace, the whole of Ceylon will soon be converted, and their children and grandchildren will afford still better results.

Sin, nekatiya, astrologer.

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All this will be better attained by avoiding the acts of violence that were committed on the Natives, whereby the Portuguese and the Faith they professed were made hateful to them. To this end no foreyros, however privileged he may be, shall be exempted from giving to the arrayal, and for other services of the King one out of every five coolies, and the same shall be done in the villages of the Pagodes so as not to let a work which needs a thousand fall on a hundred as formerly, an exorbitant measure practised by the mighty. No lord of whatever quality shall oblige the farmers to carry earth or stones for the erection of his houses, though those who have service-men may use them to fell timber, to transport it on ales or buffaloes, and to take them by river to the ports, giving them the necessary sustenance and when the harvest allows of such work. They shall fell no jack tree, though the tree be withered, without permission in writing from those who rule that part of the country, nor for the service of the King, as has been ordered by his Provision, the which shall be done only in the presence of the Mayorals, giving oath about the number felled, and the planks made, which shall be sawn, so as not to waste such good timber, and whoever does the contrary shall pay three pardaos for each plank. The lords who have enough service-men of the low castes shall be carried to their own villages or from them, but nowhere else, without payment, and the persons who cannot go on foot shall use horses, or oxen, or ales, or their slaves, or coolies of the ports, of whom there will be no lack, because of the pay. And no Vidāna, even though he be a Portuguese, shall be carried by the coolies of the villages, nor shall he be of low caste or a slave under pain of rigorous chastisement and forfeiture of the slave to the powder house. Neither banners nor ornaments of white cloth shall be set up for the Vidānas of the Villages or of Corlas, but only for those persons to whom this honour is due, and for the foreyros who go to the villages at the time of the harvest, during which they shall be fed for only a space of three days at the expense of the Natives. The Bellalas and honourable people shall not be ordered to pound rice, as they have been greatly oppressed by this new custom, and other ways were not wanting. The Seigneurs shall not take the areca by count, but by measure as made by the officer of the village, and if [the nuts are] larger they will be worth more. Nor shall they order their farmers to bring anything from outside the village, under penalty of 50 xerafins to go to the one who accuses, because they greatly resent this abuse. No villager of whatever quality shall sell areca, pepper, sapan, wax, poultry, butter,
and calālas to any other than his Seigneur, under pain of having to pay him three times over, and whoever buys will forfeit it to the same. They shall however, buy areca and pepper, in the manner already pointed out, and other things at the price usual in the country. As for all other things the villagers shall be free, such as for instance all kinds of provisions, fish, sura, the nut, coconut, betel, except the betel of Bulatagama and other betel villages, where the custom shall be kept. And if the Captains find this detrimental, let them buy from the Seigneur though at a somewhat higher price.

It will be more advantageous to the King not to take areca from the Chalas, but to let them sell it freely to whomsoever they like, because when they are able to shift for themselves they will make more cinnamon, and they will be more content when they see that they are looked upon as free men and not slaves. Nor shall they give any areca to their Vidana, nor shall they remove from them as Decua four laris per head but only per each household. There shall be no under Vidanas to live continually in the villages of the Madaba, but only at the time when the cinnamon is gathered. Nor shall there be taken from them fish, topitās, mastic, coconuts, and oil for the Vidana, nor shall they be required to be constantly at their service, because when they see that they are favoured by the King and his Ministers, all those who now keep away will return to their villages, gardens and paravenias. And since that Vidanaship is always given by despatch in reward for services, he shall either be given a salary or some bahars of cinnamon free, with orders to the one who governs to see how he conducts himself and to find out his perquisites, because they never had anything save by fleecing the poor Chalas, who have enough to bear in having to go about the wood for six months collecting cinnamon. It is said of the Hollanders of the Molucas that they tried their best to get a supply of cloves by doing favours to the Natives and giving ten patacas to the one who plants a clove tree and waters it, leaving the tree to the owner, provided that when it bears he sells the produce at the usual price. In Ceylon there would have been no lack of pepper plants without giving patacas, because the Natives sowed them, had the pepper not been taken from them, the Seigneurs even asking more than the plants yielded; and because of this misrule the pepper failed. It is convenient to oblige them to plant pepper promising not to subject them to any violence but to pay them the due price as has been pointed out.

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1 Sin. kalala, a kind of carpet or mat.—Clough.
Foreyros needed these things they should not resort to any violence: that they should not have stocks to imprison them in, but that when there were grave crimes and it became necessary to punish them, the Generals should do so or those deputed to be judges, about whom we shall speak presently. That they should take away from the fishermen of certain villages the payment of certain amanseis of arësa that was put down in the foral, and that they should pay duties on fish, and that the dunes which are in the ports and in villages should pay the dues only to the foreyro to whom it was due, and not to the Vidanas, Canganes; Clerks, and other individuals, because by that unjust division they took all the fish. The captains of the ports levied a certain quantity of amanseis of areca by custom, and they seize as much again. It is good to find out how much the people obliged to it can give, and to prohibit them for forcing the people to give more, leaving them free to sell what they have to those who pay them more.

There were in some Corlas as many as 300 Mayoralts, and they came to be less than 10, and there were as many Magistrates (Corregedores), an institution which they thought should be altogether abolished, leaving to the Mayoralts of the neighbouring villages, where the Generals happen to lodge, the obligation of doing the customary honours to them as well as to the Dissávas once a year. And as it is the custom throughout the whole of Asiatic heathendom to erect resting houses (amboloes) in public places, covered with tiles at the cost of the people, for the convenience of wayfarers, it was convenient to have them in Ceylon, and some person with a sufficient service-land should be always there, to keep the necessary utensils, at least those necessary for cooking rice, where all might sell their merchandise. Whoever commits any violence here, however venial it be, should be rigorously chastised, thereby preventing them from going to abide in the villages and commit violeces and injustices. It was also the practice in Ceylon to give food in these places to those who did not carry food, as is done in other Kingdoms, and there were lands of the Kings for this purpose; but all these good customs were allowed to die out. When these (resting places) are built, every soldier who is found to have gone out of his way into the villages, must be rigorously punished, and all those who have been proved to have killed a native out of war time, or violated a woman should, besides the deserved punishment, forfeit all gift lands in favour of the one who accuses him. The same will be done in case of thefts, according to the amount, lest while one part is being conquered, the natives rise in another, and if one wants food, let him bring it or buy it and he will spend less days in this journey. The same applies to those who carry messages from the General and the Dissávas; and the obedience which the chief men of the Corlas paid to the General should fall to the account of the Mayoralts of the villages in the usual manner, and only once a year when the week for his Corla is announced, to give him an account of any vexation done to them, or to answer any question; or as often as they like or shall be summoned, and the officials of the General should not ask them for anything from the pingas they bring, nor should the Controller of Revenue, if there is one for the King, which is no way convenient, because of the low position to which this reduces the Captain-General, whom the natives acknowledge as their King in place of the King of Portugal who must not care for these trifles. And in the remote parts of the opposite coast, this visit should be paid to the Captain.

To prevent the abuse of many persons making themselves Kings and making use of the workmen and artisans, who have service-lands from the King, especially the Dissávas who kept them engaged in their own service and in the service of their friends, while the arrayal was short of arms it is convenient to withdraw these service-lands and that they should be paid by those who employ them. The Dissávas should be obliged to have arms made for the arrayal, the fortalices and garrisons, according as they should be ordered by the General, always giving preference to the service of the King, and giving them a parda or for each firelock or hand musket, and two pardas for muskets on supports, besides the iron which could be had from the villages in which it is found by leasing them to those who [promise to] give most iron, and more work will be turned out for the King within one month than was done previously in one year, and with greater smoothness, if they are brought from the villages to the nearest garrison of the Captain-General, to the arrayal and the garrison of the Dissávas and the fortalices. And no other firearms or spears should be made without permission of the afore-mentioned in writing, stating the number and the kind and shape thereof, which however should not be used by any save men-at-arms, Vidianas or servants of the Portuguese, under pain of grave chastisement and fine [to go] to the one who accuses. There should be in Columbo an arsenal of all kinds of necessary arms in great abundance, with a special salary to the one who takes care of it. The other praças and garrisons should be supplied with the necessaries, and even with some extras in the keeping of the Captains, to be kept in Racks and storerooms with strict orders not to use them save in war, and making a list of
the number and kind, so that they might not be exchanged but handed over to their successors, and paying him the cost of cleaning and repairing them, which should be done with all care, investigating about everything at the trial on giving up office and making him answer under oath.

Because the twelve villages which the King ordered to be kept apart for his service, and which had been leased to Vidanas by the Controller of Revenue, who alone prosecuted them, giving no service to the arrayal, though that was the plea for the proposal, are almost wholly destroyed and unoccupied, as for instance, Gampá, one of the best villages which always belonged to the King, and is now reduced to such a state by the renters that timber is felled even for catamaróts, and remains abandoned by its inhabitants, and they do not even allow a shed, still less a Church to be built for saying Mass; as was customary, it is convenient to give these twelve villages to private foreyros, and those in which there is rice with the obligation of supplying so many candles to the arrayal, and those which have cinnamon with the obligation of supplying so many bahars for the King who will thus be benefited and the village carefully cultivated.

In order that everything may be well regulated, it is convenient that the Dissávas and captains of ports should be Ouvidores and Tandesares, with a determinate district including the villages of the Pagodes. And every mayoral who conceals any disorder in his village shall be punished along with the delinquents just as the judges themselves in their trials. P 903

For lighter offences there shall be in every Corla or pato a noble Christian who shall judge them and inquire into grievous offences and report on them and assemble the lascarins, cooíles, and workmen for war and service, who shall be appointed by the Dissáva or Judges of the country. No Vidána or foreyro shall have power to put in the stocks or chastise a mayoral, or any other noble person for any fault whatever, but they shall deliver him to, the person of the Corla who will take him before his judge. In light faults he shall have power to place him in the circle till he pays the fine that seems just, which shall be deposited in the hands of the surety till he is brought to court, and if therein the fine is judged well levied, it will be given over to the depository who must always be a reliable person, and it shall be placed to the account of the motiar to be paid to the King. All causes between the residents, if of some importance, shall be judged by the appointed judges, from whom they may

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1 Sin. weleka or ana-ira.—H. W. C.
prohibited by the King, they never gave it up, in order thereby to lord it over all and not to be obliged to do anything save what they liked, a thing which is not conceded to vassals in any Kingdom, and if it is necessary to punish, the King has prisons, fetters, the axe, and the halter, and there is no need to punish their wives and children by taking away the necessities of life on every occasion; nor should it be allowed to the General to give the village by das to those of his faction, whether the villages be vacant or possessed by someone on good title, because according to Royal orders those that are vacant must be distributed by the Board. A heavy weight on their conscience was this matter of praying upon the lowlands, when people were either unwilling or unable to obey, because if they were subject to the King of Candea, our arrayal seized and killed them, taking what they had, and if they were obedient to us, those of Candea did the same. Whence it appears that so long as we are unable to protect them, we have no right to capture them. This kind of warfare was lately waged between Portugal and Castille upon the people of the frontier who were subjugated by the one and the other army.

It was the custom of the Generals to reside always in Malvâna, but the last General settled down in the City letting the houses which D. Jeronimo de Azevedo had there go to ruin, with the object of governing the City in all things and forgetting the conquest, to the great detriment of those parts, because the people of the most remote Corfas could not easily come to Colombo nor have speech with the Generals, and in what concerns war they were nearer the arrayal of Sofragao and other garrisons. They must be ordered under severe penalty to reside in Malvâna, and if they did the contrary their salary should not be paid.

Those who had experience of the Island were persuaded that it could have been completely conquered many years ago if the want of a good reinforcement and the private interests of the Generals had not delayed the conquest; or that it could at least have been preserved in peace: but they resorted to inventions for gaining credit in the Kingdom, writing by themselves, or by others, about what they were doing against Candea, killing and capturing and doing other things in their interest at the same time; and in war and peace they allowed the Dissavas to supply Candea with whatever it had need of and from the sea ports the same thing was done, while the Generals winked at this [practice which is] nothing short of manifest treason, which gave room to say that they were interested in it while everyone maintained that they could have reduced Candea in five years by cutting off opium, cloth, and salt, which are the things they were most in need of, because without them they cannot live. [The Generals] were busy with their own gains, their trade and their pinnaces, 'felling the timber prohibited by the King without remembering the necessary fortifications and provisioning of the praços, even after they came to know of the Hollander's intention as to that Island. And the reason why the Candiot joined the Hollanders was that he did not trust the Portuguese, because when he was in friendship with them after the peace which was made in the time of Diogo de Melo de Castro, when he restored all the prisoners and among them three Dissavas, [saying] that he would pay the tribute which he used to pay, till the matter was made known to His Majesty to whom he wished to be a brother, and for which purpose he sent a Religious of St. Francis giving him the expenses of the journey to treat with the King about his claims; but they kept none of the things that were agreed with him, and at Goa the Viceroy did not even allow the Father to go to Portugal, who thereupon returned to Candea, gave an account of himself and restored the money to the King. They thought they had Candea under their thumb, but God so disposed things that had it been at this time they would have accepted peace on lesser terms.

To prevent the robbery inflicted on the King at the time of the general payments, in regard to the number of soldiers as well as in the distribution of rice, they deemed it absolutely necessary that the Bishop should be present, if there was a Bishop, otherwise one of the Superiors of the four Religious orders, to take note of the number and the work of the soldiers, as was done in Jafanapata where the Guardian of St. Francis was present. And therein they likewise required that all the things here pointed out should be observed. And in the other garrisons the Vicar should be present. As regards the rice that is distributed to the lascarins, it should be according to the roll signed by the General, in which the number should be marked, because there was great deception in this; that the Captain-Major of the field should be deprived of the two parras of rice per day which makes 50 candles yer day, giving him only what was necessary, discounting the absent soldiers, by the list of the Captain-Major, with whose permission they go down to the ports.

That it should be very profitable to the Royal revenue, in case there is peace with Candea, to make a monopoly of area for the King, since the Generals and Dissavas alone profit by the area that comes from that Kingdom. That the Generals...
should be content with the areca given by the Dissāvas and Banacas. That all the areca from Bulatagāma should be for the King, because the 400 amanções for the General was a custom introduced by themselves and as it would be hard to withdraw it, let it be done by a Royal provision.

That the Captains of estancias should be taken from among the veteran soldiers of valour and experience in that warfare, because of the great harm done by the contrary practice. Because of a complaint which the Viceroy D. Philipe Mascarenhas received about a General of his time concerning this matter, he sent from Goa as Captain of a relief, Nicolão de Moura de Brito, who was still a young man and a favourite of the General, and he wrote to him that he was sending this Archangel to keep company with his Angels. That honours should not be given to Araches and Modeliars who are not of noble birth, because those of noble birth feel keenly when they are deprived of this honour. That all lascarins should be well treated and their sustenance should not fail, because they will be reliable, when they do not lack what is due to them in justice. That the same be observed with regard to the soldiers, and that their pay and provisions should never fail, because if they are given what the King has ordered, they will neither fall sick of the berebere nor go about plundering on the roads and villages for something to eat, nor will there be uprisings against the Generals for keeping back their pay and reducing the rice, which it was always the custom to give them, and the Generals would be better able to chastise them when they do anything contrary to what is laid down by military discipline. That to prevent the neglect of the Hospital by the Royal ministers, seeing that the Custom-house duties of Colombo were set apart for its expenses, it would be a great service to God and to the King if a person of conscience and authority were present when the goods are despatched, and that the money recovered should not be in the hands of the factor, but promptly handed to the Religious who administers the Hospitals, and that there should be a treasurer and a book of Receipts and expenses so as to give the factor an account of the expenses incurred.

This, in substance, is what zealous men, well versed in the affairs of Ceylon, and men of good judgment thought at that time, without failing to foresee the opposition which these proposals of theirs would have from those who are self-interested, as well as from those who think that the Chingalaz were deserving of being totally destroyed as being rebels often convicted of that treachery, and that all that they possess should be taken and that they should even be enslaved. But they ought to consider that they gave them no favours, that they did not give them fair treatment, but deprived them of their liberty and their goods, sufficient reasons for not letting pass an opportunity of freeing themselves; and if all things were diligently examined, those accused will be found to be innocent and the innocent to be accused. And if this does not silence them, they must consider that we always found in them strength and courage to defend themselves, and that their highlands on which they rely are not so easy to conquer as all those who fell there presumed. And now that we have listened to the judgments of others, and have seen the chastisement which God inflicted on us in Ceylon, and the great losses we had in that Island considered by itself, it remains to compare it with the rest of the Portuguese State in India, to realize the better its convenience and how much we ought to attempt to recover it.

CHAPTER 14.

PURPOSE OF THE CONQUEST OF INDIA

In the comparison which we now propose to make of Ceylon with the rest of the State of India, one may first consider in general the difficulties of the enterprise, and then compare Africa with Asia and see whether it is convenient that Ceylon should be the head of the State or at least its principal member, before we treat of the convenience of its recovery and of the possibility of its conquest. Because to wish to escape difficulties altogether, is to banish grand enterprises, as it is certain that undertakings are called great only because of their arduousness, and that actions devoid of difficulties are also devoid of glory. When King D. Manoel wished to discover India in the year 1596, the second year of his Reign, he held various Councils in Monte-Mor-O-Novo where he was, in which he discussed this most grave topic. The majority were of opinion that India should not be discovered although they already had sufficient information of it, and they indicated these three reasons which João de Barros gives in decade 1, book 4, chapter 1. Firstly, because this great enterprise entailed great expenses and obligations.

1 Sic for 1496.
as it was too vast a State and too remote for conquest and preservation against the might of the most wealthy and powerful Potentates and Monarchs. Secondly, because it would greatly weaken the forces of the Kingdom of Portugal which would remain without the necessaries for its own conservation, considering the might of Mauritania and the disquietude of Europe. Thirdly, because there might arise new competitors, and Portugal might be drawn into war with the whole of Europe, since one profit, at the time, almost merely imaginary, was enough to cause the world to be divided between the two crowns of Portugal and Castile, which would also excite the other European nations if they should see in Portugal the far famed riches of Oriental Africa and India.

These reasons contain greater force than they show at first sight, because as regards the first, new seas never before navigated had to be discovered, although there was a Portuguese who to display his erudition tried to detract this glory from Portugal, and even if it be true that Carthage achieved it first, what information remained to us of that voyage to take away the glory of that discovery in which voyage it was necessary to navigate with the lead always in hand, advancing by day and heaving to at night? Nor could they avoid great delays in such extensive climes, nor lamentable shipwrecks, as were afterwards experienced, some owing to storms, others owing to shoals, some owing to the ignorance and rashness of the Pilots, and sometimes owing to the passion and blind malice, which obliged the foreigners, after taking the altitude of the Sun or the stars to consult all those who understood the matter, and the same should be enforced by law in Portugal, to prevent the rash and desperate measures of one single man carried away by his passion, who, the more ignorant he is, becomes the more presumptuous; and they should take great pains to honour and foster the Nautical Science and Mathematics in Portugal where they were first resuscitated, and without which a pilot may be experienced in currents of the Ocean and signs and other matters of navigation and the bowline, but he will have a complete lack of other necessary information, while the computation of one eclipse is enough to show whether one is going out of his route, as happened in the Voyage of the Viceroy Pero da Silva in the year of 1635, because when one pilot said out of malice that he did not know where he was, and another said that he was outside the island of S. Lourenço the contrary of what he believed, merely to contradict the former (as was communicated to us), an eclipse which was seen afterwards made it clear to all that they were within, as the Mathematical men showed him.

Nor were the disasters on the coast of Natal due only to the size and great weight of the ships with poops and forecastle and four decks, though the make and the load might have helped them to sink the sooner under the storm, but it was because they set sail at the wrong season, and because relying on the strength of the ships they tried to brave the winter of that stormy cape, and all that delay arose from their waiting for the cinnamon of Ceylon and the flotilla of cloth from Cannibaya, for covetousness would not let them avoid this greater danger, nor the self-interest of the sailors let them reduce these unwieldy structures which were approved at that time only by self-interested Portuguese, though they were as inconvenient for navigation as for war.

Nor could many deaths be avoided in climes so various, for though the sea is certainly more wholesome than land, there are many causes for sickness, as for example the stale, reboiled and rotten victuals, the ill-protected barrels of water, especially after passing Guiné, the half diseased persons taken from Limoeiro and Gabria, the number of sailors, and the scanty accommodation of cabins; and if people fell sick in great numbers, the great and inevitable lack of cleanliness was the certain cause of their great danger. [There is also] the bad distribution of food stuffs without regard to the requirements of climate, and other accidents of less importance, [all of which are] reason enough for the loss of health and lives. And when the voyages are long and without refreshment, the scurry or the corruption of living men is certain; and these inconveniences I wish to point out because they can be forestalled by taking precautions and by revictualling on the voyage as foreigners repeatedly do. A ship of ours sets sail rather late for Mozambique, and though there are many ports and islands at which they can take refreshment, without doing so she makes for the Indian Ocean, and when the monsoon fails, she arrives so late that the moility of her crew is dead or at death's door, or if she does put into Sacatora or winters in Mozambique, where no proper arrangements were ever made for so many people, they miserably fill the graveyard of S. Gabriel, without the Royal Ministers feeling any compassion for their great misery, as if the King had ordered them only to take the

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1. Marens nunca d'antes navegados, a classic phrase from Camoens.
2. Cabo Termentoso, stormy cape, was the name first given to the Cape of Good Hope by Bartholomew Dias in 1486.
3. Limoeira is a prison in Lisbon. Gabrea is a ship for prisoners.
ship to India leaving the men buried at sea or land, and though the danger was so usual and well known, the necessary remedy was never applied, because of want of foresight and punishment. About the might of the African and Asiatic Princes we will speak later.

As for the second reason, that the Kingdom would be enfeebled for lack of men if they were employed in this conquest, it is certain that the Portuguese character takes to arms more readily than to the mechanical [arts] or the plough, the lower orders in order to improve their condition and the second sons and illegitimate children of the nobility in order to obtain a suitable means of living, although they see that the mechanical arts made other Kingdoms prosperous and wealthy and that they regard labour as their inheritance, and industry their birthright. And if we argue from experience, Botero has already noted the disproportion of the Portuguese force with which King D. João went to Ceyla and afterwards Afonso V repeatedly to Africa, before our conquests, and after the conquests the force which King D. Manoel had when he wanted to succour Arzila, and D. Sebastião when he fell; which seems a manifest proof of the reduction of the population caused by conquests. And in our time, we have seen families becoming extinct by failure of heirs for reasons which are generally not known. And the Portuguese nation did not as yet accustom itself to mix with foreign nations, and as all these are losses of our blood and of our lives, they are therefore felt the more. Neither does the maritime power of other nations or the neighbouring [power] of our rivals, cease to demand preparation for any fortune of war. And since Portugal is too small, to keep what it has already discovered in Africa, without taking deeper root therein, it does not seem convenient to attempt fresh discoveries, because if we place larger forces in Africa, there will be an abundance of gold and riches; and if we place less, we expose our labours and sweat to become the prey of other nations, whose covetousness and jealousy had already opened their eyes for our destruction, and by seeking to grasp everything with scanty forces, we shall end by having nothing, because in the matter of conquests and of Kingdoms in Heathendom and Christendom, arms and cannon were ever the most forcible arguments, and in the laws of acquiring we must not expect improvements in the world, nor wait for the time to come when we shall repent having discovered new causes for our ruin, new reasons for our shame and new echoes of our disgrace: and above all, if the greater Asia had always been what it was, vices would be therein more certain than riches, voluptuousness than Portuguese frugality, and if they have been enough to corrupt the good customs of other proud and gallant nations, they will be enough to taint our own, and the more so because the farther it is from the head, the greater will be the licence, which is ruinous to discipline, because if under the eyes of its Kings and of their rod the forces of Portugal were never sufficiently kept under restraint, when they are far away and beyond fear, the regions of India will never be without scandals, ill in keeping with the principal purpose of spreading our Holy Faith, without which one can scarcely justify the attempt to conquer Idolatrous Kingdoms.

The third reason was of no lesser but rather of greater importance, from what we have pointed out, because as other nations have no lack of might and industry, they do not desire that they should forgo profiting by them, and that we should determine the quantity and the price of everything, because if they are Heretics, they will find justification for anything, if they are Catholics, they will not fail to find some pretext, and if they are mighty, whether singly or united, we shall have to take them to task and take the field against Europe; and as the lands and seas are so vast, and as it is impossible to have equal forces everywhere, we shall be defeated if our forces are unequal, and we shall be destroyed when they are equal, as we shall have to carry on war with the resources of one single Kingdom and nation against all those who seek to compete with us.

This was as well foreseen by prudence as it was shown by experience, since in India we contended at the same time with the two European nations most powerful on sea, as well as with the other who came. Nor was there any negligence in making due opposition to them, as people commonly say, because the State at once sent help, and it was only the disobedience of India that frustrated the object of the expedition of Captain Lourenço de Brito. Nor would André Furtado de Mendonça have been tardy in 1602 if God, who wished to chastise us, had not divided the forces by a storm in the gulf of Ceylon when he was giving chase to Jacob Nek, the first Hollander pirate that ploughed these seas. Nor was the force which the Conde de Feyra brought in the year 1604 so small as not to be sufficient to destroy them, had the divine hand not been against us, [and caused] the loss of his life and of eight of the largest ships out of the 18 that came in one fleet, in which they say there came 9,000 men. Nor would D. Martin Afonso de Castro, in the year 1606, have been late, if the Batavian had not foreseen
CONQUEST OF CEYLON

everything and had not promptly employed his heavy forces in India, or if disorder had not been mistaken for valour in the seas of Malacca. But though we prevailed in India at that time, these nations grew so much in maritime forces that they confronted us with equal opposition and equal loss in all the seas and conquests, and uniting themselves for our ruin they were able to establish themselves in trade; and the Batavian began to develop greater pretensions of expelling us from our conquests, for he infested all of them, though he could not keep up all. Now we see that other European nations are also passing the Cape and that there is difficulty in opposing them all, because the Asiatic Princes who favour them are glad to find rivals in trade for their own advantage, and those who are aggrieved or destroyed by us, [find in toem] means to avenge themselves, since the other European nations are persuaded that where we entered they too can find a way, this finally was the greatest difficulty of the conquest of India that was pointed out, because from Asiatics we would take only what time and circumstance should teach us.

These grave reasons, fairly foreseen even then, were not enough to make King D. Manoel desist from his plan and the principal reasons which moved him were, as pointed out by Barros, the feeling that he had inherited along with the Kingdom which God raised, the obligation of carrying His Holy name to foreign nations; and that his Father, the Infante D. Fernanado had also labourd at this discovery, over and above the special love he bore to the memory of the affairs of his uncle the Infante D. Henrique, who had been the first Author of this grand enterprise and to the title of Lord of Guinea, which he enjoyed, without the expenses and bloodshed which other smaller States cost him; and finally, to those who proposed these difficulties as his reason that God, in whose hands he placed the success of his design, would facilitate the means which made for the welfare of the Kingdom, and though he went against many opinions, and did not defer this enterprise during his reign, people did not refrain from saying that he was waiting for a special order from Heaven about this affair, and if such had been the case, there was no reason for blaming delays, which did not exist, but rather [there would be reason] to qualify as inspired by God the determination which the King took, and the intention which he had therein of spreading the Faith of Christ among heathen peoples; and as he thought that such was the end for which God had founded the Kingdom of Portugal, he would proceed all the more securely, the more he was persuaded that God would favour

A WORK in which there was so much of God's interest that it would be manifested by his own face. These are motives which assured him that he was right in proportion as he conformed himself to the will of God which guided him.

Nor did the reasons proposed to the contrary seem to him insoluble; even before the discovery of India, nor did it seem to him that he would be blamed for having recourse only to the superior reason in matters political which God desires to be regulated by prudence. Because as regards all that was said in the first difficulty, reason and afterwards experience showed that the great length of the route to India was no reason to be terrified into giving it up as too long, if it were carried out with prudence and caution, because all the dangers of a voyage and the inconveniences of such prolonged navigations were easy to obviate by means of places of call in which one could be refreshed both on the outward and on the return voyage, and this was never the reason why our rivals called these navigations insane, for they were able to say so only of the manner in which we carried them out, because though we could have been refreshed and supplied with water and other things in going and returning, we never attempted to reduce this great inconvenience, as should have been done especially after the enemies infested the Island of S. Elena which we should have garrisoned, as well as the bay of Saldanha or of S. Bazo for the return voyage, and we should have kept in all those the refreshment necessary for our ships, whereby we would have preserved lives which must be more esteemed than the eastern spices. And by this means going to Angola and Brazil could have been avoided, for experience has shown that the weak food-stuffs of India are not sufficient to nourish the dispositions and strength of the human body, so as to sail therefrom direct to the coast of Portugal, without many deaths and great disadvantages, and that without such renewals of health a voyage becomes a perpetual wastage of lives, which they do not suffer who go so well provided that they have an abundance of all things. But what we did not do was done by the two nations, the English and the Hollanders, and the latter have recently erected a praça in the bay of Saldanha to the great detriment of Angola and of the passage of the Cape of good hope, from which they can impede the navigation of other nations. All the other inconveniences mentioned could be easily surmounted if the management of all this were left to men of experience, zealous for the common weal, and administration of the sea and on the sea were left to those who have experience of it, so as not to pretend to or expect miracles by
presumption, because nothing is so opposed to them, for God
does not assist the presumptuous but those who, while relying
on divine favour, have recourse to the proper means to which
God is wont to give efficacy.

As for all that was said in the second difficulty about
enfeebling the Kingdom, it was disproved by experience
and knowledge of Portugal, wherein time has shown that a
few inhabitants within narrow limits have in a few centuries
spread and inhabited them, and that as they could not be
contained therein, they went to inhabit new Islands, and
that so long as only those were given to India who could be
dispensed with in the Kingdom, there could be no prejudice
to the safety of the latter, and if in time to come the contrary
experienced, let them see whether it is not due to dissoluteness,
at least of the youth. Nor was it possible to populate
what was discovered, nor is it convenient even if it were possible,
because the African countries of the new conquest were of
such a kind, as regards climate, that no beginnings of settle-
ments should be made there, but only garrisons for the spiritual
and temporal fruit, and when those barbarous people are
reduced, as in the case of Angola, by Christian policy, they
may be protected from inimical invasions, and by means
of the Faith of Christ and good customs their minds can be
purified, and by that means even the dispositions for their
own defence, which will dispense with the need of our
patronage. They will not refuse to trade with those from
whom they first learned trade, if violence and tyranny be
not introduced therewith; and peace will always flourish
if the Portuguese do not earn the hatred of those races.

Even in America there would have been no need of slaves
from Angola, if the unjust slave-driving of Brazil had not
preceded, which not only alienated the Natives from our
service, but even from our trade. Finally Africa is a country
more suited to gain profit from, than for habitation, but the
latter is a matter of greater importance, because all other
advantages must give place to the propagation and conserva-
tion of life, especially in the case of the Portuguese nation,
as it is limited in number and in conquests and does not
mix with others.

The third difficulty is answered by the contradiction it
supposes, because when the riches which are supposed to
be in India are brought to Portugal, they will ever supply
the sinews of war, and opportunities for making it will never
be wanting, and one who has treasures to support it will not
fail to succeed therein. And being the first to enter,
we would greatly have improved our cause if we had
distributed ourselves in India according to reason and not
according to ambition, driving such deep roots as would have
enabled us to overcome any foreign invasion, while [on the
other hand] if we were careless, the way was not so unknown
as to make it impossible for others to try and improve their
fortune by the very same principles by which we could have
supported our own, for reason foresaw that whoever entered
first would have a better foundation for his business; and
we had this advantage that justice was on our side, that no
nation would nor could set foot in India for the first time
with such a large force as would suffice to expel us, so long
as we were in possession of it. If we knew how to take it and how
to forestall. Nor could there be such a great preparation
in Europe which could remain hidden from us, and if we
had known how to win those nations to our side, with them
and with the prudent and lawful exploitation of their wealth,
we could oppose any power that should come to make war
on us, and there was time for us to know by better informa-
tion and experience how far our conquest should extend.
That nothing was lost by attempting that voyage, because
if it were not convenient to continue it, the first expenses
would be recovered by the glory of having achieved it, and
others would not attempt what we had given up. But if
it is expedient for us, it is by all means convenient that we
should be the first, and it would be no small discredit if, after
looking the Cape of Good Hope in the face, we gave up the
hope of King D. João II. and gave in to the fears of those
who discovered it, since there are no seas which are not
regulated by the stars, and those which at one time were
most rough at other times were navigable, nor do the seas
of our coast enjoy so great a tranquility as to make us
fear those we have discovered, and after Portugal had invented
and facilitated the use of the Astrolabe and had made use
of the cross staff, sailing on the high seas and beyond sight
of land in square rigged and mighty ships, all navigation
became easy, however lengthy it be, both as regards the
convenience of provisions as well as the difficulty of storms.
All these reasons are so solid that they have since been
confirmed by experience.

Such were the discourses in Portugal before the expedition
of Vasco da Gama, but on Pedro de Aluaraes Cabral's return
to the Kingdom after having discovered the land of Santa
Cruz, which was the name he gave to it and which was after-
wards unjustly changed into Brazil, those conferences were
resumed, as is related and discussed by João de Barros in
decade 1, Book 8, Chapter 1.
When it was already settled that India should be discovered, as was done by Vasco da Gama to his undying glory, the Portuguese soon gained sufficient information about Africa from the Cape of Good Hope onwards and about this Greater Asia extending all along this coast, which is well marked in the maps and the sailing charts, and about the might and wealth of their Kings and monarchs both in peace and war, though the interior of both Africa and Asia is not at all properly described in our maps, especially Africa, of which for that reason I shall give a clear, though not perfect account. And to begin by the sea coast:

From the Cape of Good Hope inwards as far as the Kingdom of Inambane, we do not know whether there are any people who are not barbarians, without Kings and without any further product save that which can be obtained by the cultivation of land, such as the Hollanders are doing under the protection of the praça which they erected in the bay of Saldanha. The Kingdom of Inambane extends from the Cape das Correntes to the Cape of Good Hope, but [its King] does not rule over the barbarians of the Cape, who live on the cattle they rear. From the river of Inambane inwards as far as the river Satiba, lies the Kingdom of Botonga, the limit of the territories of Manamotapa, which of old had Emperors, and which they call the land of Mocaranga, which were all of one King, but were afterwards divided into these four, Manamotapa, Quitene, Secuda, Chica, and for, because the King was unwilling or unable to attend to the government of such large territories, or to show his confidence in his sons, or because in truth he wished to give them all a heritage, during his lifetime he divided the lands of Mocaranga, giving to Sedanda those that lie southward, from the River of Sofala to that of Satiba; to Quitene those that lie northward from the river of Sofala; to Chica the interior lands of Manica which are contiguous with these two kingdoms. On the death of the Father, they rose against the eldest Brother who retained the Kingdom of Manamotapa [which was larger than the other three put together, and all retained the name and language of the nation of Mocaranga, except in the small fringe of the sea which belongs to it and in which among the Botongas, there is some difference in language; and though the Manamotapa wages continuous war on the three rebel [brothers], he never succeeds in subduing them. This Kingdom has a length of more than 200 leagues and a breadth of almost as much. On the North-west it borders on the Kingdom of Bôtua, with which it is often at war, and the last named is thought to extend to the neighbourhood of Angóla and to have commerce with these lands, because some articles of Portugal appear in those kingdoms through that way. On the East of it is the river of Zambézi; on the South-east it extends as far as the sea, a part of the Luabo River and the river Tanda, which would embrace eleven leagues of Coast, where the kingdom of Quimhêne ends. On the North-west, it borders on the two Kingdoms of Quítue and of Manica or Manies; which will have a length of about 100 leagues as far as the sea. To the north of Manica is the Kingdom of Abutua, on the North-east Monamotapa, on the South the Kingdom of Bére. From Luabo to Mocambique there are 130 leagues of Coast in which are diverse Kings of whom we shall presently give an account.

The Zambézi river which waters our Colonies is in some places one league in breadth, and is navigable for 200 leagues up to the cataract of the Kingdom of Secumbi, which extends for 20 leagues as far the Kingdom of Chicóu, where are the mines of silver which the King ever concealed from us. From Chicóu upwards, it again becomes navigable as far as the large lake from which it rises, and whence many erroniously thought the Nile began, because our Fathers who dwelt many years in Ethiopia saw its source in the manner described by Father Balezár Telles in the History of Ethiopia, and Plutarch already gave sufficient information about it in the life of Augustus. The conquistador Francisco Barreto reached this place, taking the flocks in pieces on the back of elephants, which he put together after passing the cataract. But he was obliged to return, because the Caiffs of the lower [Zambezi] did not understand those of the Interior, as we know from a certificate of his which was shown to us in Trapor by Gaspar de Brito Gadis who accompanied him on that journey. The river proceeds straight West-north-east, and the lake from which it rises is very broad and strewn with Islands. From it, they say, rises the river Zayre of Angóla, being thus very similar to the great lake of Brazil, whence rise the Rio de Prata and the Grampará, the largest rivers of the known world.
Thirty leagues from the sea, the Zambesi divides into two branches, and making a more perfect triangle than Sicily, those branches enter the Ocean at a distance of 30 leagues from each other. The larger is that of Luabo, which again divides into Luabo and Cuína Velha, from which the others take the name of rivers of Cuína'. The lesser is Quelimâne, which Vasco da Gama called the 'Rio dos bois sinaes' because of the fresh information about Moçambique which he found there, and from this issues the Rio de Linde, within the triangle. The Luabo is navigable all the year round, and Quelimane only in winter, and nevertheless the Portuguese frequented it most, though out in the sea it has a shallow and very dangerous bank. From which may be seen how small the vessels of Vasco da Gama were, for they sailed along that coast over the sandbanks of Sofala, and through the channel between this sandbank and the mainland, as there was no other channel by which to go out. By this Zambezi river one can reach the river Zayre, and by it one can descend to the lands of Angôla; and when there will be forces enough to conquer these lands, the limits of the conquest shall be these rivers and that lake. In our days Cizinando Dias Bayãô, a native of Evora, tried to reach Angôla by land through the Kingdom of Abútun, with 10,000 or 12,000 caffirs of his territories, and when he was already far advanced into the interior of that Kingdom, he had to return to Sena, the town from which he had set out, where he wanted to procure some refreshments of which he was in need, without knowing the plot which they had made against him, and a desperate woman killed him by poison through fear.

In the Interior of the Quelimâne and in that coast there were the Macua Caffirs, a small Kingdom of little importance, but the people were well inclined and friendly to the Portuguese. Five leagues higher up, flows the river Larange, and the Caffirs are subject to a certain person called Bano, who used to share his territories with his brother, though he was a King with few vassals. These Caffirs are well disposed and well inclined. Within the Interior, on the other bank of the Zambesi, live some mighty Kings, among whom Marâne is the Lord of large territories, and Mauréns in the neighbourhood of Moçambique, is King of the heathen Macáas, very savage and thievish folk, the most evil inclined among them, hideous in gallantry and other barbarous customs. They conquered those countries under the name of Zimbaz, about whom we shall presently speak, and the native Macáas who escaped their teeth abandoned them owing to their ferocity, but they retained the name of their predecessors. And though the King afterwards forbade them to eat human flesh, when they find it, they do not spare it. They spread as far as Cape Delgado, and these 300 leagues, up to the Cape das Correntes, is the district of the Governor of Moçambique.

Sixty leagues from this forte lies the twelve islands of Quirimba, besides other uninhabited islets, extending as far as Cape Delgado. From the Cape das Correntes to Cape Delgado there lies over against the mainland, the large island of S. Lourenço, 300 leagues in length and 90 in breadth, where it is broadest, being 60 leagues across from Moçambique, for so great is the breadth of that channel. From Cape Delgado to the Line [of the Equator] there lies the coast of Milinde, under the jurisdiction of the Captain of Mombaça, the whole of it being inhabited by Caffirs, differing in language and customs, and all savage like those of the coast of Quirimba. Along the shore lies the Kingdom of Mogálo, and inwards of this, to the North, there extends the large Kingdom of [Munimungi, belonging to a powerful heathen] Caffir. On the South it borders on Mauraça and Embece, and on the North and North-east [it borders] on the ancient Kingdoms of Abexim, which the Galas took from it; on the East [it borders] the Kingdoms of Corajé, which is 5 degrees from the Line [of the Equator] towards the tropic of Cancer. It consists of heathen Caffirs, has many gold mines, and on the North-East and West it is surrounded by the ancient territories of the Abyssinian Empire. The islands of this coast have each its Moorish king, all vassals of the King of Portugal, and all of them hail from Arabia Felix and from the City of Larach, [and are] of the sect of Ali, and the majority of them have contracted marriages and are mixed with the natives. In all these islands the Portuguese have inflicted so many tyrannies on them, depopulating many, that they were obliged to call in the Turks to avenge them, but after many robberies they perished under our steel and in the teeth of the Zimbaz to whom we delivered them. And landwards, in the Interior of the Coast of Milinde, there dwelt the Caffirs Mosseguejos, as savage as they are valiant, and according to the fashion of the Abyssinians they cut the foreskin in war, which the Galas also observe, who must have learnt it from them, for we do not know of any other nation that does it, and the Abyssinians took it from the Hebrews, which must be understood more widely than the word sounds.
On the side of the Line [of the Equator] to the North, there is low land, the most barren and arid that can be imagined, which on this account they call the desert. At an altitude of one degree there is Brava, which is governed like a Republic and was a tributary of ours, Magdaxó, at three degrees and a half, fortified by art, and the Moors are our enemies. Inland there dwell the heathen Maracatoes, very dark, but sleek haired and well featured, well bred, intelligent, and like the Abyssinians in manners. The coast runs beyond Magdaxó for more than 150 leagues up to the Island of Sacatora, and is thinly populated and most sterile, and at the end of it is the Cape of Guardafuy. Inland there are some villages pertaining to the Kingdom of Adel, the capital of which is Arar, and the stretch [of coast] as far as the ports of the Red Sea is called the Coast of Baragáño. Six leagues before the ports is Zeyla, where the King of Adel usually dwells because it is a sea port. He is a rebel from the Abyssinian Empire like the others. From the ports within [the Red Sea] besides [the territories of] lesser kingdoms, 12 or 13 leagues in front of the island Massua, there stretch the territories of the Abexim, and from Suaquen upwards are the Funges and Balous and the other countries of Nubia as far as Suez, which is the end of that strait, which is at a distance of 22 leagues from Cayro, and there end the territories of Africa.

The Caffirs are generally robust and strong, and among them are found men of very large bodies; they are as voracious as they are able to bear hunger. Among the Mocaranagas the Quiétèes or Quettèes are considered the most valiant. The people of the Coast of Molinde and desert are all strong, robust, and daring, whether they be Arab inhabitants or Abyssinians or pure Caffirs or Half-breeds. And if these people of curly hair who inhabit the whole Interior of Africa, from the sea coast to Cape Verde, had been men of intelligence and good government, they could have been masters of the world by means of the wealth of gold that is in those vast regions. In proof of this I will recount the origin of the Galas who have conquered the greater part of the Abyssinian Empire and have become masters of the interior of that Coast, since our Fathers could not find out this truth from the Abyssinians. In the years 6 and 7 of the current century, some of our Religious went as missionaries to the Coast of Guiné, and among other Kings they converted the King, D. Pedro, a man of more than 100 years of age, and of him Father Baltazar Barreyns says in an Annual [Letter] which has been printed:

"The King, D. Pedro, disclosed to me that about 70 years ago, a race of Caffirs made up their minds to conquer other lands, because their own were not able to contain them any longer, (he does not say from what part they set out) and that he had come in that arrayal in command of his men. They were armed with brechis and zogayets and with targets of rattan which protected them, and they lived on human flesh; and they continued this march for ten years, till they separated and occupied and lived on the lands from Serra Leoa up to about the Red Sea," and he concludes: 'These are the people whom we call Manes here, in Angola Iagas, in Mozambique Zimbás, in Ethiopia Gálas.' They are very dark, strong, robust and bold, and as we had encounters with them in Angola, in the Rios and in Mozambique, they paid us the compliment of admitting that the Portuguese were most valiant, but that they were second, God sending this punishment on the Abyssinians, as was prophesied to them by Father Antonio de Azevedo, for their contumacy, and to the rest of Africa for its barbarity, because they depopulated entire Kingdoms.

We have given an account of the Kingdoms and peoples of East Africa, and now we shall point out briefly the chief spices of these seas and these regions. Those who want other curious details must read the work of the Dominican Father, Friar João, on East Africa, where they will find information about the fertility of the countries in which the Portuguese live and trade, and which owing to the neglect of the Caffirs do not produce more for sustenance and enjoyment.

In the sea of the Busica islands, 20 leagues to the south of Sofala, there are many mermaids, from whose mouth issue four tusks, of the length of a palm, like those of the wild boar, and are greatly valued [for their virtue] against all fluxes of blood when brought near the flesh. There is also an abundance of seed pearls and pearls, and the Natives being accustomed to take them by diving, become capable of remaining half a quarter of an hour under water.

In all the rivers of the coast of Sofala, and in the Zambezi, there breed many sea horses. They have four tusks of more than two palms in length, a good palm outside the mouth, and those of the lower jaw are straight, and those of the upper jaw curved. From these are made articles much whiter and more durable than with ivory. Elephants are numerous throughout Africa wherever food is found, as may be gathered from the innumerable tusks which they barter every year, though not more than two are obtained from each, and they are so large that in this respect they excel all Asiatic ones, and sometimes tusks are found of half a bahan in weight.
In all the lands of Manamotâpâ, or at least in the greater part of them, there are mines of gold, especially in Chirôro, where there are many, and the most perfect are in this Kingdom, in Manica and Abûtna. Nor is it only in these Kingdoms, but also in that of Monimungu, as we said already, and in that of Ađêa in Ethiopia, and in others of that large country from which proceed the riches of Egypt; and if we add to this that of Mina, the whole of Africa may well be called a mine of gold, and God has deposited these great treasures among barbarous people who do not know how to esteem them, in order to make men realize that value does not consist so much in what things are, but in what they are esteemed to be.

It is obtained in three ways. The first and the most ordinary, by digging pits and mines, and following the veins of the earth which they know already; from which they take it out and put it into buckets, washing and scraping off the earth, whereupon the gold, being heavier, remains at the bottom. For this reason they dig near water, not because it is not found at a distance from water, but for the convenience of not having to bring water from a distance. But it is not without great risk to life that they do this, because as they are poor architects, their mines often give way and bury them. However the desire for the things of little value for which they exchange it, makes them overcome every obstacle. The second manner of seeking it, is when it rains, because then they all go about the rivers, brooks and rills, in search of gold which is exposed by the currents and floods, where they find many chips and nuggets. The third manner is to extract it from certain stones which are found in the mines and have veins of gold, for they reduce them to powder and wash them in buckets, the gold remains at the bottom. This gold is called Matâca and is base, of few carats; all the others [they call] Dahabo, be it dust or in nuggets, and the latter more or less solid, because when the red earth, which is found in some veins, is removed, there remains only the gold. The Caffir who discovers a large mine of gold, incurs the penalty of death and forfeiture of goods to the King, if he does not call out to another to come to his side to bear witness to what has found, and of how he has taken nothing of it; for himself, and he is bound to cover it up at once with earth, placing a branch on top; and if others see this, they run away from it as if from death, to which they will be condemned if they approach it, even if they should not take the gold, because the King does not want the Portuguese to know that there are large mines of gold in his territories, lest they take his Kingdom from him. So great is

the force of the stars, that it makes the gold to spring out of the ground as if it were plants, which is best seen in large mines | where the earth seems cleft in many places and in the clefts nuggets of gold. At other times in frequented and well trodden places, gold is seen to spring out in nuggets, and sometimes in quantities of a thousand cruzadoes and of great weight, sometimes in powder, like fine sand, sometimes in grains like small or thick beads, at other times in nuggets or lumps which seem molten, or in boughs, with springs enveloped and penetrated with earth, and when this is removed it becomes hollow like a honeycomb or, iron slag that comes from the forge; and as this earth is red, it seems to be turning into gold, and the gold of these nuggets is of the best quality.

From the Cape of Good Hope to the Red Sea, there is found much amber, which the sea throws upon the shores, for it grows at the bottom of the sea, whence it is torn by the movement of the water and of the currents, especially in times of great storms in places of less depth, because the waves dash with greater force, and this violence wrenches bits of it, which rising to the top of the water are carried by the wind and waves; to the shores, and it is at this time that they seek it to sell. There are three kinds of it. One is called Griz, and is very white, [another] Amexyeera, which is grey, the other black as pitch, and often soft as jelly and of bad odour. The natives say that this is what the whales eat, chew and vomit, because it was found in the stomach of some which died in that Coast, and birds and other fish were often seen to eat what was floating on the water, and it is one of the signs they have to come to gather it. But from this one can conclude, that it is not only the whales that throw it up, but even the other fish, because though it tastes well, it is so heavy that when they eat much, they cannot digest it. The Griz amber is more esteemed, and they say, it greatly strengthens nature and gives new life to the old. But in those warm climates I should not approve its use, as of other heavy things taken regularly. There is no doubt that it grows at the bottom of the sea, because it has sometimes happened that it was brought up with the anchor of vessels. Often there come up large pieces of 20 and more arrastels, like the one that was thrown in Brava in the year of 1596, which was so large that the men around it could not be seen, and so broad that it looked like a hillock, of which the whole of that coast was full, and for more than a year it was distributed very cheap to merchants, Moorish and Christian. And such large pieces cannot be thrown up by whales so as to suppose that it grows in them.
CONQUEST OF CEYLON

There is plenty of cotton, from which the Caffirs owing to their ignorance, make only machiras which are rough sheets. The Moors of the Coast of Milinde make finer cloth. The Portuguese here follow the same policy as in Brazil, taking the cloth of India to keep up commerce, and at the same time bringing it hither from Portugal. It comes from some shrubs which are sown, cultivated and lopped, in the same way as the vine, and without any further trouble than that of taking away the seed or capacă, which being heavy is given to cattle in cold weather, which they do by shaking it with a bow and bow-string, which also serves to twist it. It is one of the greatest riches of the whole of Africa, and especially of this Asia, where very fine cloth of excessive price is made, and in the known world there is no finer cloth or greater abundance. They also make other ordinary cloth altogether white or coloured, for which they make use of Xaya, just as we use woad.

They cultivate fields of sugar cane, which grows everywhere in Africa and Asia where there is water and humidity. And there is no limit to its cultivation, though in the better lands there is more substance and the canes are thicker and taller. The Caffirs cultivate the cane only for food. Here in Asia they work it with such ease, that they are greatly surprised when they are told of the structure of the Brazilian mills, and though some in this country do not know how to refine it, in the north, in Cambaya, Bengāla and Kina, they refine it with lime and they make sugar candy like crystal and very hard.

In Río there is the precious Aguilha (aloa), and if it is old, Calamă; especially in the hills of Lupāla, 90 leagues away from the sea and four or five leagues in breadth, which the Zambezi gets round by breaking up rocks strong as steel, carving them out as with a pickaxe, and leaving them overhanging the river to a breadth of only 50 spacious, and at the time of the floods it is navigable with great risk and not without damage. There are also various kinds of wood, and roots with medicinal efficacy for purges and discharges of blood and wounds which are cleansed from all putrefaction within 24 hours, and the wound however dangerous cured in a few days. Throughout all the country of Manamotăpe, there is found another kind which, when pounded and drunk, brings milk to the breast, not only of women but even of men.

BOOK 6.

A very brief Description of this Greater Asia

Passing to a brief description of Asia, because it is now well known, more especially the coast than the interior, João de Barros, in Decade I, Book 9, Chapter 1, divided Oriental Asia into nine kingdoms, following the sea coast. The first begins in the Red Sea and ends at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, because he does not yet speak of the distance of the coast of Arabia from the gates of the Red Sea as far as Suez, but only of what is watered by the Ocean. The second begins at this gulf, and ends in the mouth of the Indus River. The third [ends] in the Gulf of Cambaya and in the City which gave it this name: the fourth ends in the Cape of Comori; the fifth in the river Ganges, in Bengāla, the sixth in Cape Zingapure, the seventh in the large river Menā, which flows through the middle of the large kingdom of Siaō, the eighth in the most Easterly cape of Liampō, a word corrupted by us from the name of the city of Nimpó; the ninth stretches in a north-westerly direction up to the straight

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1 Machira, plural of chira, an African word for rough cotton cloth.
2 Dal. II. 6.
3 From Kand. kopus, cotton.
4 Eagle wood.
5 The finest kind of aloe wood.—Hob. Job.

1 Hind. mahuā, bassia latifolia.
2 Another kind of aloe.
which separates Asia from the country of Yēsu, of which it is now doubted whether it belongs to the new world. If what we read in one of the Annual [letters] of China is true, that the Moscowsites have taken a praca there on the North, it is clear that they not only discovered those seas, but that they separate Asia from America even in front of Japan, because the Tartars, who already reigned in China, are not Lords of the whole of Asiatic Tartary, but only of a tract of land which will have a length of 300 leagues and a breadth of 60, consisting partly of barren highlands and partly of extensive plains, inhabited towards the east of Tartary, whither a short time ago the Emperor of China himself marched against the Moscowsites, who like exiles had taken possession of some tracts of land under the protection of a fort, where the (Emperor) took them and captured many; though now some people write that the Moscowsites have recaptured it.

From the mouth of the Red Sea to Aden, the capital of that Kingdom, there will be about 40 leagues, from thence to the Cape of Tarque, at fourteen and half degrees, there will be 100 leagues; from that place to Curia-Muria, 120, thence to the Cape of Roslagate, at 22 degrees, a sterile and desert country, another 120. At this Cape began the kingdom of Ormuz, and from it to the Cape of Mohandal at 26 degrees, there will be 87 leagues, where the first division terminates and the Kingdom of Ormuz on that coast of Arabia comes to an end. The whole of this country is called Hiamen by the Arabs, and by us Arabia Felix, because the interior of it is the most fertile and populated part of the whole of Arabia, which is also divided into 'stony Arabia,' and 'desert Arabia,' a very wide land, which stretches from Egypt as far as the Euphrates and Caldea, and terminates in the Angle made by the rivers Tigris and Euphrates called Mesopotamia. And leaving aside also the Persian Gulf, which waters the inner coasts of Arabia and Persia and ends in Bajor, or the mouth of the two rivers after their confluence, the cape opposite to that of Mohandal, at the mouth of that strait is Tazquez, and from thence to the Indus there are 200 leagues of coast, thinly populated and full of hidden rocks, and the country is almost a desert, which we call Carnamia, the Persians [call it] Heras or Ajain, in which are the Kingdoms of Macran and Guadel, upon a cape of the same name. Trajan reached Carnamia, and they say that seeing the unfriendly face of India he returned to Italy, but we suspect another reason, as we shall say.

* Footnote in text: in the neighbouring Tartary.

In the third part of this division, there will be 150 leagues including the bay of Iaquate; from Diul to Iaquate 38, from thence to Dío 50, this being at twenty and half degrees. From thence to Cambaya, at twenty and half degrees, 53 leagues, including part of Guzirate and the lands of the Rajpuramrus. From Cambaya to Comor, along the coast, there will be 200 leagues, the portion most frequented by the Portuguese, and the flower of India, in which are the kingdoms of Dekan, Balagāte, Canarā, and Malavār, separated by diverse inlets below the Hills of the Gāte, and above by diverse rivers, all of which flow into the bay of Bengal, breaking that coast into inlets, which being surrounded by mountains, form most diverse ports, well charted and known in the sailing charts and in Maps, though in Malavār there are fresh water rivers, which they call Mangātes and flow from the Hills of the Gāte, forming many Islands, and nearly as many Lordships, which make the country delightful and their water very beneficial to the health. From Cambaya to the river Batā, there will be 70 leagues in which are our lands of the North. From Batā, which is 5 leagues from Chaul, to the river Aliga of Sintacorā, where the lands of Dekan end, there will be 75 leagues, thence to Zanguisar 25, and from that to Sintacorā 25, which is 12 leagues to the south of Goa. Such is the division of José de Barros, to which I add that the Natives call that tract of land below the Gāte, Conca, and the inhabitants Canam, and the country above the Gāte [they call] Dekan, and the inhabitants Dekins. But the most usual thing among these people, is to reckon Conca from Banda, which is 5 leagues, to the North of the bar of Goa, up to Mirzoe; and the territories above the Gāte corresponding with this, they call Alagāte, the head of which belongs to the King of Irakā, but in this year of [16]86 the Mogul took from him Vizapur, the Capital of his Kingdom, and he has only to conquer some hills which they call Drugus, wherein the rebel Samba, son of Xivā, who has subjected the greater part of this Kingdom, still holds out.

The third division begins at the river Aliga, [and extends] as far as the other river called Canjecorā, 5 leagues to the North of the Mount Deli, a prominent Cape of this coast, in which there will be 46 leagues of the province of Cambaya. Thence to the Cape of Comor, there will be 93 leagues, and from the province of Malavār, which is divided into the Kingdom of Cananor which begins at the river Cañerco [and extends] to Purepatan, up to Chetū, stretches the Kingdom of Calecuth, which has 27 leagues of coast, in which is Tanor, the capital of another small Kingdom subject to
the Camori. At a short distance from Chatnā begins the Kingdom of Crangamor [and extends] as far as Cochin. This latter Kingdom ends in Porcā, 14 leagues further. From Porcā to Travancor, for a distance of 20 leagues, runs the Kingdom of Chulā; from there the Kingdom of Travancor, as far as Cape Comori, the distance from Goa to that Cape being 150 leagues. Between Cape Comori and that of Cingapūr, lies the Ganges Gulf, which we call the bay of Bengal, in the middle of which are the Islands of Ceylon and Čanatra, which are believed to have been separated from the mainland. From Comori they count 110 leagues to the furthest place, the head of this bay, beyond Ceylon, where the great river of Ganges flows into the sea, which though it does by many mouths, there are two principal ones, which make the figure of the letter delta of the Greeks. The first mouth is called Satigāo, and the most eastern Chatigāo, at a distance of 100 leagues, but in a straight line to the north-east, from Cape Comori to Chatigāo, there will be 370 leagues, 200 [of which] are in the Kingdom of Biznāgā and 110 in the Kingdom of Orixā, and 100 in the Kingdom of Bengāla, subject to the Mogol already from our beginnings in India. From Chatigāo to the cape of Zingapūrā, which is at one degree to the north of the Line and 40 leagues from Malāca, to the East, there are 380 leagues, which are divided in the following manner: 100 leagues to the Cape of Negraes, at 16 degrees, the beginning of the Kingdom of Peqū, the district in which is the Kingdom of Arracā. Thence to Tayvāy at 13 degrees, the last City of the Kingdom of Peqū, there stretches the great bay, into which enters a mighty river which, rising from Lake Chiamay on the North side, irrigates the whole country of Peqū, and from that Lake, which is 200 leagues from the shore, there rise six notable rivers. Three of these rivers join the others and form the great river of Siaō, the three others pour into the bay of Bengāla; the Caver, above Chitagaō in front of the island Sornagā; that of Peqū, which waters the Kingdom of Aya in the interior of the country; the third is Martavao, at an altitude of 15 degrees, between Tayvāy and Peqū. In Tayvāy a short time before we entered India, there began the Kingdom of Siaō, which ends in Camboja in the Eastern sea, where we conquered Malāca from a Moor who had rebelled against it. From Tayvāy to Camboja there will be 500 leagues of Coast. Beyond Siaō and the river Menāo, there lies the 5th division, and the State of Camboja, through the middle of which flows the lordly river Mecon, which, they say, rises in China and flows enriched by so many streams and for so long a distance of country, that when it flows into the sea it forms a Lake of more than 60 leagues in length, and at its estuary it issues through many mouths. Others say that when the winds are contrary, and the ground very level, the waters turn back till the wind ceases, and then F 491 flow into the sea. Then follows the Kingdom of Kampa, on the mountains of which grows the finest Camboja. Then comes Caulkinkinā, which afterwards revolted from the kingdom of Turkūm which is the larger. The coast of these Kingdoms is very tempestuous and has many shoals and there is little navigation, but already they have war Galleys. Then follows that of Kina, one of the largest Monarchies in the world, and the most populous country that is known, the size of which is already well known and which requires a longer description. From the Island of Aynānā, where the seed pearl is fished, the coast runs for 275 leagues, and then begins to turn to the North-west, the Cape of Nipūm being at an altitude of 30 and two-thirds degrees and the coast running North-west to South-east up to there, and proceeding 400 leagues up to 50 degrees, there ends the most Eastern and northern land of Asia. In the archipelago of S. Lazaro, strown with large and innumerable islands, the Portuguese were Lords of Maluco and of others, and still keep those of Solor. After they reached India, the islands of Japan were also discovered.

The extent of these Kingdoms, the riches of their Kings, and the valour of those nations, and of other Eastern ones who love them, are fairly recorded in our decades. There governed at the time the Arabs, a race that conquered a great part of the world, and threatened Europe, either by means of kinglets, of Xeques or of Moorish gangs, which greatly facilitated our enterprises, and their united forces can drive fear into the greatest potentates, because the countries are very vast, the people robust, bold, daring, patient of toil, and free from luxury. In the interior of Arabia, says Holy Scripture, there is also gold. They are great traders, and on this pretext they went on introducing the Mahometan Sect along the maritime parts of Africa and Asia. The power of the Persian, who at this time was called Xeques Ismael, was greater than that of ancient Darius, and Persia was a country of the mightiest potentates of the world, especially after he mastered Mesopotamia also, which was afterwards taken from him by the Turk, a part of Armenia and the peoples of Gorjestan, a passage to Persia so difficult that only Alexander and Soleyman accomplished it, and this it was that was symbolised by the Gordion knot which Alexander cut. Their principal strength consists in cavalry,
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of which they make great use, managing [the horses] with great skill, gallantry and valour, as the Romans already experienced, and as Paulo Jenio testifies, saying that three Persians are enough for five Turks. These people are the flower of Asia, but they never took to seafaring, because in the maritime countries of Persia, as well as in Arabia, there is no wood for ships of war or for high decked ships; and even in the rest of Africa, the Moors do not build anything save poor vessels, and [when they wish] to have vessels of some worth, they buy timber from this coast.

Carmania is divided into the kingdoms of Maeran and Guadel. It also has valiant people, of whom the Arabs make use, but the country has little wealth. In those days the King of Cambaya was Lord of the Indus as far as Batê, and of many lands of the interior; but on the death of Sultan Badur, in the time of Governour Nuno da Cunha, the Múgi: King Achebar seized that Kingdom, one disorder following another greater one; and as for commerce, King Badur used to say that for riches he was one, the Emperor of Velur, two; and the king of Bengal, three. By commerce and by means of arms the Múgi Monarchy grew to such an extent, that he is to-day one of the greatest Lords of the world, and [his empire not only] borders on that of Persia and Tartary, but even reaches the walls of China, extending from Sinde to the Ganges, and in the interior [it extends] up to the Kingdom of Tiporâ in the Interior of Araccaë; and after the recent capture of Vizapur, he has already made the neighbouring Kings tributaries, and he will soon reach Cape Comori, if there should be no civil war between the sons; and men of experience say of this Monarchy, that there are in it 900,000 horse, and if he comes down the Gâte after reducing the Drugos, all that remains of the Portuguese State in Asia will be at his pleasure and will, which being that of a Moor, will ever be suspect, a thing which ought to give great concern. Its riches are immense, and the expenditure is likewise enormous, as the lands are distributed to Captains who are obliged to war. These Princes came from the province of Moguestan in Tartary; they descend by the female line from Tamerlan; they conquered other Kingdoms on that frontier, defeated the great King of the Patânas who live in Vdeli, whence they styled themselves Vdeli Patka [= Padshah], which means the great king of Vdeli [Delhi].

The Kingdoms of Dekan, Balagâte and Carâr belong to Captains who have revolted against the Emperor of Velur, and, because the latter was called Narçinga, the Portuguese confounded the title with the proper name. He was P 482

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a Lord of great wealth and large territories which extend from this to the other sea of the bay of Bengâla. When he found himself ruined, he affected a friendship with the Portuguese, and made a gift of the territories of Concaë near Goa to the State, after destroying the French forces with which the Sâhâyân began to make war on us. We speak of him in another place in this History, and to-day there remains only the memory of his former power, his empire being altogether extinct.

Carâr is still retained under the Government of a woman now subject to the Mogi. The other Kingdoms of Malavâ are well known. They are all independent people, and courageous in war, which the Nayres of Malavâ hold as their peculiar trade and occupation. With all of them we had long warfare on sea and land. And though Afonso de Albuquerque had pointed out that Carâr was the battery of Goa, and that it was convenient to keep a mutual peace, on the occasion of a contract about pepper and because of the rise of the price of gold in Goa, after the rise of gold and silver in Portugal, they refused to receive payment in that coin, because gold was very cheap in their territories, and the result was that we lost the preços which we had there; and when afterwards so great a tax was imposed on salt, that even the vessels were ruined, they raised the price of rice so high, that all that we acquired was not sufficient for our sustenance, and it was distributed with such niggardliness, especially after the war with the Mogol began, that this country has experienced severe famines, for it is a sure consequence, that when the value of money rises, merchandise must rise also. In all these lands, from Cambaya to the cape of Comori, there is plenty of excellent timber for ship building, though to-day they raise the price of this also, and as everything necessary for their construction and for our sustenance had to be bought, all the loss fell to us.

In the Coast of the fishery, the Maravaz were ever dreaded as a savage people and daring thieves; and after it came into the hands of the Nayque of Madurê, we received no little damage, as likewise from the Nayque of Tanjaor and from the Kings of Velur and Golconda in Nagapatâ and S. Thome. The people of Bengâla and Araccaë are men of little value. The large Kingdom of Pegû was conquered by the Bramaz who had come down from the Interior. After Afonso de Albuquerque took Malacâ, the King of Siaô lost many lands in that promontory, which was seized by various Mahumetan Kinglets; but still he has a large Kingdom, most flourishing for its wealth, even after the loss of the
Kingdom of Malaca, where this Kingdom began at two degrees and a half to the North, while it ended in the Mountains of the Kingdom of Gauva, which begins at 29 degrees. It still has a length of more than 300 leagues, in which are eight Kingdoms, and in might 30,000 elephants, of which 3,000 are elephants of war, which most Oriental Princes make use of in battle. The Kingdoms that come next, Cambuca, Champà, Caukenkina and Tunquí, are all very fertile countries and well populated, and of the river Meron it is known that if in a day it rises by a palm or a cubit or more, immediately the paddy stalk grows as much, the ear being always above water, and they cut it from vessels, which sometimes go to Champà above the trees. In all these Kingdoms there is so much silk, that all wear silk, and they greatly esteem a cloth of cotton. They are separated from the Laos by a desert, lying between, and they have more practice in arms than the Kinas, who being peaceable in everything, are women in war, and being satisfied with their own, they withdraw into their own limits, of the size, fertility, industry, wealth and government of which, it is better to be silent than to say little. After the Hethen Tartar became master of that Empire, he launched large fleets on sea, whereby he subdued the Chinecho and drove him out of the island Formosa, which by means of more than 20,000 somas, [viz.] large ships of war, he captured from the Hollander, and the latter from the Castilians. In the Archipelago the Moorish King of Achem is a mighty potentate, and the Malays are valiant and impulsive. In Maluco we were received as people predicted in their vaticinations, and when four European nations contested for the cloves and nutmegs of Banda, as they could not be faithful to all, we reputed them as traitors, which gave rise to warfare and a siege of 30 years, and when the Kingdoms of Maluco became ours, the Catholic King, on the score of being the recoverer, took them for himself, from whom the Hollander took them. The riches of the South are greater than in these lands of the North, and as they were very far from the Capital of our State, the Hollander first began to drive roots in that direction, and as the injustices and violence of the Portuguese, not to call them treacheries, were so great in the kingdoms of Maluco, only such chastisement could be expected. And incredible is the profit which the Hollander obtains there. In all these lands there is timber for ships of war, especially in Cambuca; in Kina there is plenty of pine. There was afterwards discovered Japan, a nation as intelligent and determined as it is valiant.

CHAPTER 17.

Discourse on the Subject of the Two Foregoing Chapters

Considering the vast extent of the countries of Oriental Africa and this Greater Asia and the two Indies, on this side of the Ganges and beyond it, the might and the wealth of such extensive Regions, | Kingdoms and Monarchies, under the sway of Hethens and Mahometans, it does not seem a matter for dispute whether it is possible to conquer them and garrison them and populate them to such an extent as to enable us to keep the dominion over them all, when there is in addition the aversion herewith all nations resist the domination of foreigners, men of a different religion, as diverse in colour as in customs. Neither does the example of the conquests of Alexander and of the Romans now facilitate this enterprise, because we are neither able to bring to India by sea the force which Alexander led by land, nor did he and his successors keep up what they conquered, at least beyond the Euphrates, nor did they gain so great a power till they were able to conquer what is another's without danger to what was their own, and though he reached Cambuca and the world shrank before him, in spite of the fact that he had formerly signified for more words to conquer, when he learnt of what still remained of Asia Minor and its extensive seas, he judged it impossible to do what in the heyday of youth he thought easy. Trajan reached Carmania, and his Historians say that as he was already old, he did not undertake further conquests; but whoever considers the lands and the power of the Princes who had to be vanquished, will find that it was prudent not to cross the Indus or climb the Caucasus. For though a European army well directed is able to cross some provinces of this Asia, the first industry [of the Asiatics] will be to set fire to the lands, to do away with the supplies for the Cavalry, and the sustenance of the soldiers, as they learnt from the King of Persia, who did so on the arrival of Soliman; and when [the army] is distributed in Garrisons, it will soon be ruined, for every war waged in haste or by surprise, such as those which Europe tried in Suria after the capture of Jerusalem, is exposed to great dangers and complete destruction; and large conquests must not only be in continuous lands, but must also be made after securing what is conquered. Having laid down these principles as undeniable, it is convenient to consider whether we should merely carry on commerce as the English did afterwards, or whether it is
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convenient to maintain maritime power along with that on land, and how far we should extend and multiply therein. Pure commerce seems to dispense with warfare with these nations; but everything being well considered, it was always more convenient to have a force on sea and land at the same time, because without a sea force we could only be merchants, for if they closed us the door, as the Mohometans tried to do everywhere, we should be obliged to make a way for ourselves by force of arms, and thus learn from experience what reason had suggested before; and as it is not impossible to set foot on land, and spread therein, since the world discovered by us is so great and belongs to our conquest, all good reason recommends that it should be kept up without fresh consumption of Portuguese people, which can be brought about in a few years, if we live in peace, and if the choice of the climes is good, as we already experienced in our Islands, and as can be seen in the land of Santa Cruz, since the prosperity of Kingdoms is the sure result of wealth and the multiplication of children in good climes. And it is very important to unite prosperity with fecundity by a good choice of climate in recently inhabited lands. Which was a thing greatly bemoaned in India, when they realized the mistake, and when it was seen that though the Portuguese could have peopled one or more Kingdoms, instead of increasing, we were daily decreasing for want of good disposition, both because we were exposed to the invasions of Asiatic enemies, whose enmity we made on land and sea by our absolute dominion, as well as because we were assailed by the rivalry, envy, and hatred of Europeans, whereby we became reduced and consumed, and because the lands we inhabited did not generally help propagation. It may also be feared, that, though India was discovered by us, if we do not make ourselves powerful therein and only treat of commerce, there will not be wanting a European nation that will also attempt the conquest, as was intended and achieved by the Hollander, when we had taken root in India.

Having thus settled that it is convenient to have a land force also, it next remains for us to consider whether it should be in Africa or in Asia, or in both, whether separate or united. It might seem that Africa should be preferred, as being nearer to Portugal, and in order that we might continue our conquest and the praças which we formerly had or might have in future on that side of the Cape, because those savage people, it would seem, could be subjected in course of time more easily than the mighty Asiatic Princes, and it would be the more easy for us, the less praças we erect. And as the treasures which God deposited among those savages are great, we should esteem them all the more, because they know and appreciate them less. And this must be attempted with few praças in the beginning, and if possible with their goodwill, and when peace is established with them, by many factories in which the articles of trade can be stored and secured from other nations. And though praças of great strength are not necessary to defend ourselves from the Natives, so long as they are wild, yet every consideration of prudence requires that they should be such as can resist any European power, since reinforcements must come from a great distance. Because if we now think of subjugating them completely, we shall find it impossible, because of the extent of the territory, the opposition, the number, the wildness, the distrust, and state of those people, as we always experienced in Angolas for centuries, and in Rios during the conquest. For men of judgment, who set foot there, were all of opinion that to secure all the products of those territories the first and the most convenient means was to set those Kings at their ease, so that they might be persuaded that we seek their trade and not their captivity, nor the dominion of their territories, the which can be attained only when our forces are such, and we multiply in such manner, that we can achieve it without manifest danger. Because as those savage people have no rooted property nor movables, and live chiefly by the chase, without sparing any kind of animal, when they see themselves pursued, they will readily go in search of other lands, and all our great plans will be frustrated, if we lose their service. It will be quite otherwise, if we treat them in such manner, and even train them to prefer a Christian and politic dominion to the barbarous dominion of their Kings, as can already be seen in the lands we possess, where they have great regard for us as well as great loyalty. And though the whole of maritime Africa is unhealthy, it has been experienced that the Interior has a good climate, as had also been observed in Arabia, Persia, Carmania, and India as far as Malavar, with regard to the more inland territories, and that the children of the Portuguese who live in the Rios are robust and well proportioned.

These reasons were not so weighty as to prevail in those times, because the first intentions of D. Manoel were upon Asia, the riches, drugs, and spices of which were better known and celebrated in Europe, as well as because, when once it was discovered, its trade was inviting and, if given up by us, could excite other nations. Nor did it seem convenient to think only of the riches of Africa, when we were able to profit by the many things which Asia produced. And in truth, as we shall
see, the mistake was not here, because we might have enjoyed everything to our great utility and the satisfaction of the Asiatics. Nor could the trade of Africa be well kept up without the cloth and other trifling merchandise of Asia, since matters came to such a pass, that they were taken over from India to Portugal for a similar trade with Angola. And above all, throughout the whole coast of Africa, (even if no other land was known outside the Island of S. Lourenço) there was not discovered any port suitable for ships of burden, save that of Moçambique, the Cemetery of the Portuguese, and exposed to the fury of the Monomoycas, and to the roto or sharp rocks, which cut the cables and which even iron chains were not able to resist. Nor did they find depth in the river of Fornão Veloso, except in a small beach of sand, and as it is so near Moçambique, it was exposed to the very same drawbacks.

But the mistake in this was not one of choice, but our ruin sprang from three sources. The first, that we wanted to dominate on sea and land at the same time; the second that we divided ourselves in many praças, all weak and ill garrisoned and ill provided; the third that we did not chose more healthy cliques in which the Portuguese could multiply. The first won us the hatred of all these nations, because they were compelled to navigate with our safe conducts or become our prey, which was felt not only by the Moors, who were already declared Enemies by their Sect and again by the loss or detriment which they suffered thereby, but also by the Natives, because we imposed this yoke on them, and because a few strange men thus tried to confine all the trade to themselves, and to subdue such powerful Princes to that new tribute, while they considered us pirates rather than simple conquerors.

The praças were so many that King D. Manoel took another course and in the last letter which he wrote, ordered those of Calcut, Colombo, and Pocem to be demolished, so as not to have to contend with so many enemies as the Canorri, the Chingola and Achem. And as they never fortified them as was necessary, when every reason demanded that being at such a distance they should at least be able to hold out for a long time, they finally came to an end. And the worst mistake was, that the temporal and spiritual conquests were never in accord, because all that the zealous Missionsaries did on the one hand, was undone on the other by the evil example of the Portuguese; and if in Goa, which is the capital, there was such an abundance of outrages, there must have been much more in remote praças, and they were scandalized...
exist between men for the preservation of the human race, and forbid the commerce and intercourse which are the means whereby love and peace are maintained among men, since commerce is the foundation of all human polity; and should they resist both the one and the other, in that case bitter war was to be made on them with fire and sword. By this he intended especially to justify himself before the infidels and idolaters, because as for the Moors, by the law of the their Alcoran, they are enemies of the human Race, and especially of Christianity. But the preaching of the Faith could not at the time be of any effect, because the new Missionaries did not know the native dialects and the interpreters were not able to declare the Faith and the lofty Mysteries of our belief, in the proper way so as to make them credible, and Mohammedanism and Idolatry incredible, as was necessary for them to change one Religion for another.

The third reason for our failure, was the selection we made for our habitations, because they were for the most part unhealthy climates, where men soon ended their lives, if they were not sober and provided with the necessaries for human life, or where they lived with little or no health for propagation, which can and must be remedied by looking for lands with more benign climates, which are not wanting in Asia and in the interior of Africa, for it is of all human causes the most important and a matter of the greatest consequence for the common weal. And we saw on the contrary, that through mismanagement and owing to the multitude of people put on board a ship bound on this voyage, oftentimes a half would perish; and there arrived a ship Belem in Lisbon with more than 400 dead, apart from those who had died on shore. If she winters in Moçambique, she leaves the greater part buried, because of the lack of things and because of the evil hospitality of that climate, as was experienced by the ships of D. Antonio Telo, and by the Galleons of D. Pio Masearenha, who there buried 1,600 men. And for the commerce of the Rios, the bay of Jesus, otherwise called the River of Sant-Iago, in the Island of S. Lourenço, was far more to the purpose, and thither we set our prow to escape the sandbank of S. Romão and the shoals of India. For they were able to go every year to Quilimâne with the Eastern and Western monsoons, and under the protection of that praça acquire great power for commerce and dominate in that large and fertile Island where large plantations of sugar cane could be grown, and many ships built with the fine wood of the pine and other kinds, had we known how to get on with the Natives. The harbour is safe and has depth for large ships, and it was easy to blast the rock that lies in the channel; and it was certain that there was an abundance of fish and provisions, and that the climate was better than the one we experienced in Moçambique, which lacked all the conveniences; and there were in that Island other harbours in which there could have been a large trade.

The same disadvantages were found in Ormuz, which was a most warm place, as it was an Island of salt, as were generally all the ports of Arabia belonging to that Kingdom. Goa, the capital of the State, declared against us at the very beginning, obliging King D. Manuel to write to Afonso de Albuquerque que not to let the affection of having conquered it twice make him blind, because in addition to its being neighbour to a mighty King, if so many and such good riches were to be lost therein, it was much better to abandon it. Some attribute this to the fact that it lies between two mountains, from which the Sun reflects morning and afternoon and makes it an oven; others attribute it to a neighbouring lake, into which much filth enters, to the detriment also of our neighbours of S. Joao de Carambola; others, still, to its being built mostly on mud and surrounded by marshes which are full of it. And in the beginning this contagion could not have been attributed to the multitude of people, for it was only 31 years since the Sabaim had shifted from old Goa in search of better river facilities, to that site where formerly there was a forest of wild boars and other mountain game; and it was a small City. Finally others consider it due to lack of cleanliness, which, in spite of all the diligence that was practised, could not be remedied in the case of the lower folk, especially when they are protected by the power of their masters, and in the case of Pagans on account of their superstitions. The maladministration in this matter was so great that when an elephant happened to die, they threw [the carcass] into the aforementioned lake, and caused a pestilence in the environs, and there died in our old College of St. Paul alone 16 Religious, and the Fathers were compelled to fill the garden and cloister with goats in order to purify the air. Afonso de Albuquerque expected an improvement by changing its situation, and there is no doubt that we could have experienced better health outside of it, just as it is certain that this was the greatest enemy of the State. And in the present ruins there is a continual pestilence, because of the many noble houses that we saw erected there, very few are still standing, and the large suburbs of St. Lucia, St. Thomas the Light, and Our Lady of Lourdes, and the whole parish of the Rosary, are laid low, though in the parish of the Rosary there were 17,000 souls for confession, and
in St. Lucia, even in the time of the Conde de Linhares, there were 29,000 pagan families for the traffic and trade, for all were attracted by the prosperity of commerce. And as each Portuguese house was a convent, all this was no inferior to Lisbon in the number of souls.

In Malacca some found a better habitation, though it was so near the equinoctial line, but even that is not a good site, and those who suffered most were the soldiery, both because of the scanty care they took of them, as well as because of their misconduct, as for instance their going about in galleys, Catáres and foists, without any protection from the Sun or air, being drenched almost every day owing to the continuous Samatras, or showers that last a short while, and their clothes drying on the body, whence it happened that more died from beriberi and from their own attacks, than from the weapons of the enemies, as we saw in our own days on the occasion of some quarrels of the General Luís Martíu de Souza Choncorro with the Captain of the praça, D. Diogo Coutinho, in which, they say, there died 70 men. And even in Goa, in the first year of the Viceroy D. Pero da Silva, there was so great jealousy between the sailors and the military that in the course of that winter about 80 were killed. But owing to the fresh discipline of Portugal, this fury is now abated, which was often caused by hatred but by pride and envy, as may be seen from the following instance. There landed in Goa, having come from the Kingdom, one of two brothers, named Pitas, with a great reputation for valour and skill with the sword. On the second or the third day, on the pavement of our Lady of the Mount, he encountered five others coming down, and they ordered him to draw the sword. 'I do not know,' says the Newcomer, 'how I have given you offence to be ordered to draw the sword from my side.' They replied that they had no grievance and only wanted to know whether he was valiant. 'Are you five,' replied Pita, with good reason, 'to make that trial on one man?' Thereupon one of the [Luso] Indians said with arrogance 'That is cowardice,'! and Pita, 'That is impertinence.' Thereupon drawing his sword he killed two and withdrawing he said 'That seems to be enough for a trial.' One of the other three replied 'After killing two? You must die.' 'You will have to die first,' replied the Newcomer, and that one fell too; but the greatest pity was that Pita went home to die of his wounds. Of such cases and infamous attacks many can be recounted.

1 Many people in one house.
2 Sudden squalls such as are common in the narrow sea between the Malay Peninsula and the Island of Sumatra.
taken by interested Christians, we cannot doubt that Moorish Princes, the Lords nearest to Egypt, instigated by those of India, would consider it no less prejudicial, because some dreaded the loss of the market for those spices, and others feared even conquest.

Afonso de Albuquerque saw (before he had clear information about the continent and the Islands beyond the two straits of Zimpura and Sunda) that the three great trading centres of the East were in the hands of three Mahometan Kings of limited might, and that they were so situated that he could make the head and arms of the State, with harbours of sufficient capacity for trading ships, and as his valour did not consider anything impossible, and his good administration of war rendered everything easy, he resolved to take Ormuz, Goa, and Malaca, making Ormuz the right arm of the State, Malaca the left, and Goa the head, where there were very capacious poris, timber, and many of the provisions necessary for commerce and war; and one who attempts to carry out a similar project in the part of India hitherto discovered, excepting Ceylon, could not easily have made a better choice, if only the results had been in keeping with the desire. But experience showed that all these places were unhealthy, as we have pointed out; and after they were conquered, he did not live long enough to remedy what he had disposed. The others continued what was begun, and involved themselves in so many wars, that it was never possible for the State to take more thought for the future than for the present, and when European nations came upon us after a century, we found we had laboured for others, and that profits were purchased for them at the cost of our blood. For, when they entered India, there was no Prince therein who had any considerable power on sea, nor a Turk to plough these seas, and the only one he of Achen, who, backed by Holland, wanted to take his all, was taken by Nuno Alvarez Botelho.

After conquering Malaca, Afonso de Albuquerque attempted, with that great spirit which embraced all things, to obtain clearer information about further India and the innumerable Islands of the Archipelage; and the King, being informed by him about the immense riches, drugs, and spicery of those countries, tried by means of embassies to make friends with the greater Princes, and to open fresh trade and conquests in those seas and in the Kingdoms of Maluco. But afterwards when it was found that, owing to the variability of the monsoons, two years were necessary to go and come back from Goa to Maluco or to Banda or Borneo, and when the difficulty of commerce and reinforcements was, F 497v

seen, they say, that in the time of King D. Sebastian the question was treated of placing another Viceroy in the Island of Formosa, for so great was the request for cloves and for nutmeg and for other products of those faraway regions. But, they say, the Hollander already discovered a way to Macassar, which made the voyage easy, and as the Island of Formosa had passed into the hands of the Tartar Emperor of Kina, it would have proved a source of greater loss, if it were again attempted. There is no denying that the riches of the South which the Hollanders now enjoy, is greater, and that the voyage from the Cape of Good Hope to the Strait of Sunda is more unobstructed; but time and experience might afterwards have shown better whether this division was convenient, since it requires a greater outlay of men, arms, and money to maintain two States.

It is also held as an infallible maxim in India that whoever is Lord of the Sea will be so also of land, and that the greatest destruction of the King's ships consisted in letting them waste in Panellim without any kind of commerce. And the former was so clear to the mind of the Hollander, that whenever he saw us with a fleet of large ships, he never rested till he succeeded in destroying them, either by treachery or by fire, as we saw here in the case of two galleys within the bar, in one of which, when about to set out to fight, manned by 130 men, explosives were placed by a Fleming, bribed for the purpose, and he had already fled to Bardez, when the galley blew up. The other [was destroyed] in the docks of Panellim, where His Majesty has lost many millions for lack of a careen once a year and a cruise every six months, because the wood which gnaws, seeks warmer water within two palms of its surface. And if the Batavian cannot destroy them by treachery, he resorts to surprise attacks, whereby he burnt in Mormugao the three finest ships that were ever together in India, under the guidance of a traitor born in these parts, who also instigated him to conquer Malaca. And when he cannot attain it by these means, he seeks to meet us in battle, and though in this bar he burns a galleon of ours, on another occasion two of our large ships were set on fire by one of our galliots, and in the seas of Malaca they did us all the damage which I have related in another work.

But as it is impossible to keep up a large fleet of large-sized ships without commerce, people realised that this would never be remedied by the Royal Ministers, as was recently

1 In the Vida, p. 331 et seq.
together would not only be able to keep what still remains to us, but even to recover what is lost, and to aspire to still greater things. Because they think that the riches of Africa alone are sufficient to make it most prosperous, if there be good administration, which at present consists (as was also the case in the early days of the State) in consolidating the mind of the King of Monomotapa, avoiding the tyrannies and injustices done to him. It was the custom of that King to distribute his territories to Caifers of the greatest worth, whom they call Fumos and Encoses, which corresponds to our Counts and Marquises, in order to keep them quiet and peaceful, for otherwise they raise great revolts and rebellions, which the King cannot prevent, because they took his people and he is not obeyed. It is these people, who, out of self-interest, disclosed the mines of gold to buy therewith clothes for their wives and children; and when they were provided with this, they turned to their scanty cultivation, for their riches consist of 400 to 500 cattle, and as many wives as they can support, and slaves by whom they are so venerated that they address them only with their breast on the ground, and even their wives address them on their knees, an adoration which even the Portuguese Lords of the land also arrogated to themselves. But seeing the large quantity of gold that was brought to the fair of Dambarare, they were blinded by avarice, and dispossessed the Fumos and Encoses of their lands, intruding themselves therein with patents of the King, who granted them because of his interest in the cloth trade and in return for bribes given to him. And on account of the insolences of the Christians, the Caifers gave up disclosing and working in the mines at the instigation of those who saw themselves dispossessed and on account of the ill-treatment they received. And as they are people of little ingenuity and the country is extensive, and while some invite them, others ill-treat them, they readily change their abode, and not only are the lands left uncultivated, but even their owners find themselves without the profits of barter. And at present without better arrangements no good can be done, even if we conquer those lands, because in order to live according to their pleasure and in freedom, they would rather cover themselves with the skin of an animal they kill, than suffer insults and violence, as they have no lack of lands for cultivation and for pasture for their cattle, because these lands are most fertile, and if they are industrious, they can draw great riches for them alone. This presumption of the Portuguese reached such a pass, that a few years ago Antonio Rodriguez de Lima

experienced in the trade of Mogambique and Rios, and that Captains and Merchants lost India, the former by devastating the ports and banishing commerce by the injustices and violences they committed, which set the world in wonder. In order that one man might become rich in three years, all others have to be poor for ever, and the latter by carrying on commerce in unarmed vessels, and usually in parangues, galiots, and pinnaces, badly provided with arms and defenders; about which I shall mention only two instances, and one of them still quite recent. There lived in Dio a Moor whose ancestors had been from father to son Nacodas or Captains of his people, and ever faithful to the Portuguese. On coming from Moçao, he asked a nephew of his to take a jar of quince to the Captain. Instead of quinces he took by mistake another jar in which a quantity of Venetians was hidden under some other sweets. When the mistake was found out, they wanted to exchange, but the Captain would not give it up, saying that God had done him that favour; but if he thought them forfeit, they belonged to the King and not to him; but he did not enjoy them nor did his heir. The result was that the Nacoda went to Cambaya, saying that the Portuguese were not what they were. Instances of this kind one can relate without end.

But to come back to merchandise. There set out from Moçao, Gomez Freyre de Andrade in a good pinnace in which besides a good quantity of gold there was merchandise worth 600,000 patacas. To escape Hollander pirates in the two straits of Zingapur and Sunda, he passed through that of Bima, and as they were all eager to increase their capital they decided to go to Bengala. On the coast of Choromandal they came across a Hollander pinnace with goodly artillery, while they had nothing more than five pieces of small calibre. The pirate began to batter them on the side, and as there were 70 passengers, they decided to attack and take her. The Batavian understood his design and avoided the shock once and several times. They then placed a piece in the sternwalk (varanda), and at the first shot it fell into the sea and put the ship into such confusion as to impede the use of the helm. Finally there was no help but to surrender, putting such a great treasure into the hands of a few enemies, and they were taken to Musulapata, where they received the mockery and ridicule of those people.

On realizing this, they are for many years past planning a company of merchants, in which all would care for each one's own as well as for the common interests, and all working
took the field against that Emperor, and because his might was dreaded and because his people forsook him, for they did not dare to go against their King, either through treachery or hatred of the Natives, the King was killed by his own people while fighting valiantly. The action [of Antonio] was reproved by all, but punished only by God, for he died suddenly in Goa and realized little gain from the great riches with which he wanted to go to Portugal.

The remedy they propose for this is, that the King [of Portugal] should give strict orders to give up the lands which were not conquered for the Crown, and forbid [his subjects] to ask for them in future; and that he should ask the Monomotapa to give up the site of the fair of Dambrâre, where we already have a Church, as the | Christians are all there, and have built a Chuanbo in which they might live protected from the arrows of the Caffirs, with no fortress at present because there are no batteries. And then there will be plenty of gold as in former times, and the Caffirs will be satisfied with us, when all disorders are forbidden under grave penalties.

| It was also the custom to pay the King a cloth or chuabo ḫw for each moto of cloth which the residents brought to Dambrêre into his territories. And the Portuguese and other Christians usurped even this tax, and the King complained with reason, that though he was Lord of the territories, he received no profit from this commerce. And his poverty obliged him to give up his lands to the Christians because of the bribes they gave him, for he had not the wherewithal to clothe himself or the 700 or 800 wives whom he has, and whom he thinks right to retain in spite of the Baptism he received. But as he was proud of the name of Christian, he even said that had it been in his power he would have left his States to the King of Portugal. And there is no reason for us to complain of his not disclosing the mines of silver, because he is quite convinced not only by his reasoning, but by their prophecies or persuasions of the Devil, that once these mines were disclosed, we would take his Kingdom. And as they make no great esteem either of gold or of silver, but only of copper for their jewellery, it is very likely that it is not profit which prevents them from disclosing [the mines], since they take no silver, but fear and dread lest their State be taken. And neither the Portuguese nor the Castilians, who also came to discover them, though without success, were so cautious as not to utter a word about the dominion which the Catholic

BOOK 6.

King has over the silver mines of the new world. And they are not so stupid as not to understand that the more riches they give us, the greater will be the war we make on them. For the same reasons similar fairs and habitations must be sought in the kingdoms of Manica and Abuta.

They say that the fair of Dambrâre is at a latitude of 18 and a half degrees to the South, and that the distance by land from Quilimane to the mouth of the Zambezi, is 280 leagues to the West, which on the chart makes more than 240; from Cape Negro, which is at 15 degrees, 130 leagues; from Angola, which is at 8 degrees to the south, 200 leagues, save for the impediment of some mighty rivers. So that the way from Angola to Dambrâre is shorter than that from Sena where we live and whence we set out. And in case there is an intention of conquest, these two forces can unite. This is what they say of Africa, which I wished to mention here, so that one might prevent the inconveniences which retarded the commerce, because to know what can be drawn from Asia, it is enough to consider what we draw from it, what the English, the Danes, and the French draw from it by pure commerce, and what the Hollanders draw by piracy, commerce and conquest. Wherefore who is there that does not see how powerful the company will be which handles all these treasures? Before we lost Ceylon, Zealous men persuaded us to draw up a scheme about the form of such a company, and the Viceroy Conde de Sarzeda promised us that he would send the scheme for discussion to learned men experienced in such matters; but on his death the papers remained in the hands of the Conde de Odemire, who in a letter showed himself quite pleased with them. But because in another more secret paper it was said and proved that the Viceroy and Governors should be Presidents, as they are in the Council of revenue, he only objected to the diminution of the power of the Viceroys, though an attempt was made to increase it in another way, for it was clearly shown that it was not convenient to administrator [the Company] by way of a 'round table' and that the government should be divided between five Consuls, to whom should be given the administration of the docks, the treasury, the arms, the people and justice [respectively], with the title and power of an Auditor-General; but owing to the death of King D. João IV., of the Count and the Bishop-elect of Japan, who was greatly concerned in this transaction, this endeavour led to no result, though even then our final downfall could still have been averted.
CHAPTER 19.

This chapter treats of the Right of this Conquest.

Lest the reader imagine that the suggestion to keep peace with the Oriental Princes arises from some scruple or doubt about the right to this conquest, when I am merely adopting the course which seems most convenient, I shall treat briefly about the right of the Portuguese to enter India, and the ground on which the King of Portugal called themselves Lords of Guiné and of the conquest, navigation and commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia and of India on this side of the Ganges and beyond it. The curious [reader] can read Seraphino de Freytas, the jurist Vazquez, and others who treat this matter after Hugo Grotius brought out his 'Mare Liberum'. João de Barros treating of this point in decade 1, chapter 1, repeats the difficulties which were again brought forward in Portugal about this conquest; but neither then nor at any time [afterwards] was it ever doubted that it was just; on the contrary, King D. Manoel added to the title of Lord of Guiné, which King D. João II. had taken, the above-mentioned one of [Lord of] the conquest, navigation and commerce. And what we have proposed may be the more confirmed by what he says there.

For, says Barros, as is quite natural, that in the two first voyages of Vasco da Gama and Pedro Alvare Cabral, the enterprise did not manifest itself so much in the resolution to set out, as in the expediency of the return, because the toils of the sea and the perils of land which Pedro Alvare Cabral went through, and what he saw and experienced in trying to communicate with the Oriental Princes, again revived many doubts in the opinion of notable persons in Portugal, even of those who had approved of the discovery of India. For it was one thing to consider whether it is good to discover what one does not know, supposing it to inhabited by Pagans as peaceful and submissive as the ones of Guiné and of the rest of | Ethiopia, with which we had communication already, and whence without arms or other din of war, by bartering things of little value we obtained much gold, ivory, and other substances of great value; and it was quite a different thing to consider whether it was convenient and profitable for Portugal to attempt to conquer lands by force of arms, for the sake of the commerce of India. Because as experience showed, and as the Moors prevented us from having commerce with the Pagans of the country, we had to rely more on the might of arms than on merchandise. And for some it was enough to see in the sailing charts so great a stretch of coast and so many turns of the rumb as to make our ships twice encircle the known world before coming sight of the one which is to be discovered—a picture which so astonished the imagination that it frightened their wits, seeing that the Kingdom [of Portugal] was taking upon the shoulders of its duty a world not painted like that of Hercules, but so real a one that it might crush it with the weight of land and sea, and storms andclimes, and the heat of the sun. For if out of the thirteen ships of the fleet of Pedro Alvarez four were lost in one moment, it was due to the fury of the elements and was the effect of nature, which, being regular, only blows at certain times, and can be partly forestalled by precaution and choice of the proper seasons. But to deal, converse and trade, with the people of India, whose Idolatries, abuses, errors, vices and sects [were] the first object of the discovery, required another St. Thomas the Apostle, who would enter only with the intention of proclaiming the doctrine of peace and salvation. But if our preaching comes with arms, and men more concerned with their private interests, instead of making an impression on those Pagan people and on the Moors, who by profession are enemies of the Gospel, it would only serve to make it more despised. They were already possessed of this commerce to an extent that they were absolute Lords of all the riches of the sea ports, whereas they were able to make war on us more easily than the African Kings. And because our arrival in India made them lose their trade and with it their power, they would all conspire to oppose us as has already been begun.

Other Lords of the Kingdom, [men] of great authority, admitted these difficulties but brought forward other advantages which prevailed over those fears, as for instance, the proclamation of the Gospel, for which God would help with an abundance of grace and great progress of the Catholic Church, and that in spite of the opposition of the Moors and of the Samory, who was instigated by them, we had already three friendly Kings of Cochin, Cananor and Coulao, who vied with each other for our friendship and trade, because of the gains they experienced. And as money was the sinews of war, there was so great profit that the expenses could be met therefrom, if the Moors wished to try their hand, and the Kingdom could still be rich, because from the spices that were brought in the fleet of Pedro Alvarez the return was five, ten, twenty, thirty and even sixty to one; and all other reasons gave way in face of the extent of this gain, which ever prevails in all political councils.
But it is certain that neither the one nor the other reason
had such effect in moving the heart of D. Manoel to this
discovery and conquest and its achievement, as the inspirations
of God, and difficulties only served to make him more provident
and cautious. He decided to continue what had been begun
in the course of more than 70 continuous years, and he derived
from it greater fruit than his forebears without being deterred
by the dangers of that still to come, because he was conscious
that great things like that, which surprised the world, were
not achieved except by many and divers vicissitudes and
perils; and he wished to add a new title to his State.

Joaõ de Barros discoursing on the question of right says,
that [D. Manoel] did not take [that title] without cause or
claim but with great circumspection, justice, and prudence.
Because on the return of Vasco da Gama and especially
of Pedro Alvarez Cabral, he effectually took possession of all
that had been discovered by them and had been given
and granted to him by the Supreme Pontiffs, and afterwards
he took possession of the rest of India through his Captains.
This donation was founded on the many and great expenses
that the Kingdom had incurred, on the blood and lives of so
many Portuguese who perished in that discovery by sword
and water and sickness and the thousand other sorts of labours.
Afterwards [BarROS] goes on to declare what a title is, and what
rights are implied by the one which the King took. For
the word title among jurists has various meanings, as being a
generic name which includes divers species. Sometimes it
means property of honour or dignity, a count, marquis,
or Duke. At other times it means the Lordship of property,
whence the very writings which a man holds for his goods are
called titles. But more properly and [more to our [present]
purpose, a title is nothing else but a sign and indication of a
right or just claim which has to what he possesses, either
on account of dignity or ownership. With this difference,
however, between Kings and lieges, that a King's title requires
no other writing than that he calls himself such in his letters;
but in the case of a liege in order that the title of his dignity
may be observed, he must have a writing from the King, | from
whose hand he received it, and if it is a title to property, he
must have a writing | from the one from whom he received it.
Wherefore, properly speaking, a title of honour must be called
a dignity, as that of property Lordship. Just as the term
King, when applied to the Royal dignity, denotes jurisdiction
over all his lieges, but when it refers to the Kingdom and not
to them, denotes sovereignty, similar to what each one has
over his own private property and which therefore he can sell,
omnique aóvo memoratu digníssimo operi, insistere ualeant, et insitant. 1 And as King D. Manoel discovered the navigation of unknown seas, for they sailed from Portugal to East India, he took possession of that navigation by [taking] the title thereof. He discovered lands inhabited by Idolaters, Pagans and Mahometans, so as to conquer and take them from their hands as from unjust possessors, since they refuse the Glory due to their Creator and Redeemer; and he entitled himself the Lord thereof. He discovered the commerce in spices and other drugs and substances of the Orient, in which those infidel people traded by sea and land; and by the same principle, since he was Lord of the route and of the conquest, he was entitled to the Lordship of its commerce. For these titles he had no need of other writings save the first Apostolic donation and [his own action] in entitling himself such. And afterwards they were confirmed by right of prescription for one hundred years before any European nation came to India, none of whom was Catholic, so as to entitle them to the Pontifical donation which they never had.

And as for navigation, we began with such a large might of arms that, making ourselves Lords of these seas, we forbade the Pagans and Mahometans from sailing in them without carta2 or safe conducts, and captured in fair war all those who refused. For although by the common law, seas are common [to all] and sailing free, and by the same law we are obliged to give right of way to others who have properties near ours, as there is no public way, this law holds good only where the Imperial and Roman Law prevails. Not because the Christian Kings and Princes are subject to such a law, specially he of Portugal, and others who are immediately under the Pope by obedience and not as feudatories; but [because] they accept these laws in so far as they are conformable to reason, the Mother of law. The Moors and Gentiles, who do not follow the one and true law of Christ which all are obliged to observe under pain of condemnation, are not included in that law, as they are not members of the Evangelical congregation, though they are our neighbours, being rational creatures and so long as they live, they are able to receive it, because if the principal part of [man, namely] the soul is condemned, the part which it animates cannot be privileged to have the benefit of our laws as they are not members of the Church.

And even conforming ourselves to that common right, it is not only these people that are excluded. By that same principle no heretic whatsoever, separated from the Church, or even a member of it, can ask the right of way to those

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1 Not a European but an Arabic word, Quríras, papers, documents.

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oriental regions. Because before our advent in India and before our possession of it, there was no one who had any inherited or conquered property therein, and where there is no previous action, there is no right of way present or future, because just as every act requires a natural principle of right for its continuance for any length of time, in the same way, action to be just must spring from a precedent principle of justice, which in common law is a universal centre to which all the acts of men, who live according to the law of God, conform. As there is no sea or land to which there is a way through these seas and these lands over which the right of Portugal extends, and as the right of way does not imply a right to force of arms, to the prejudice of a just possessor, no title devolves on other Kingdoms and nations, even if they may be Catholics. For who is there who thinks he has a right of way by sea or land to other lands or seas outside the Portuguese conquest? Or who thinks that he is obliged to open the door to another who seeks it by force of arms? These reasons are as conclusive as they are evident.

Besides the right of conquest, and over and above the Kingdoms and lands which are well known to be in our possession, the King of Portugal is, by treaty, Lord of the Kingdom of Tigris in Upper Ethipia or Abácia; by inheritance he is King of the Islands of Mannále, and by the same title, of the Island of Ceylon; by donation inter vivos [he is King] of the Kingdom of Pegu, and by last will and inheritance, of the islands of the Maldives and of the Kingdom of Mâlico, over and above the other titles and rights above mentioned; and he has the right which every Christian Prince has, unless there is a pact to the contrary, to make war on Mahometans, [who] by their sect and according to the writings of the Alcoran are enemies of the human race, since they cannot claim the right to preach the true law and Faith; and to [make war] on Idolaters who blaspheme the name of the true God and oppose the preaching of the Gospel, as is proved from Holy Scripture, and as Father Tirino points out in his Commentaries on Scripture.

Nor is there less certainty about his title touching commerce which requires two contracting parties, an act which presupposes peace, friendship, or obedience, as is testified by every ship that came to Portugal laden with all the articles that are made or produced therein. However, to speak especially of this commerce, we have the use of it in three ways. The first is, when [such things] are produced in the lands and Lordships we held or hold by conquest, among lieges of the same King, though the dues on imports and exports belong to the Crown of Portugal. The second way is, by
permanent contracts with the Kings and Lords of the land, to
give us merchandise at a certain price or to receive ours, as has
been settled with many of these Lords. Which the King
wanted to restrict to spices, leaving other contracts free to the
Portuguese without a tax calculated on true value. The
third is, that we navigated all those parts, and accommodating
ourselves to the usages of the country we contracted with the
natives thereof by exchange of one thing for another, according
to their price and ours. And though these three titles of
Conquest, Navigation and Commerce are indeterminate acts,
as regards time, yet as regards place, they are so extensive that
they comprise all that which lies from Cape Bojador to the end
of the earth and the Oriental islands, in terms of the demar-
cation of Alexander VI. between the Crowns of Portugal and
Castille; and King Manuel could not take other titles more
conformable with justice, and the actual hold he had over this
Oriental property. But this is not the reason why we do not
approve the many unnecessary wars which we carried on in
India, and which were in great part the cause of the ruin of
the State, because if we had been content with resisting the unjust
aggressors, and had not sought to keep the whole Orient under
foot, we would have justified our cause in the eyes even of the
Native Princes and we would not have given them a reason to
justify resorting to foreign arms for their defence. And hosti-
lities and offensive wars being at an end, we should have been
able, in a short time, to keep a united force and to multiply
in such manner as to dispense with reinforcements from
Portugal, as we should then have had enough forces not only
to withstand any Oriental or European invasion, but even
to remove from them any hope of getting any advantage
therefrom.

CHAPTER 20.

That in the First Place the Island of Ceylon should
have been chosen for the Capital of the State

If anything could weaken this statement it can only be the
inconvenience of the climate, the [difficulty] of navigation or
provisioning or of conquest. But it has already been seen
that there is no better climate anywhere in India, nor greater
conveniences for the health and increase of the Portuguese
nation in whom there is seen this great difference from the
Northern races whose propagation fails, or if there is a child,
his does not reach or does not pass the 25th year, a disillusion
which God gave them [to show] that this conquest was not for
them; and the promise which God made to King D. Afonso
Henriques is confirmed by experience, for it is evident that
the very term of Empire among strange nations cannot mean
merely the narrow limits of Portugal, without including the
spread of the Faith, and [the increase] of Native vassals and
even of the nation itself.

For navigation there is no place in these seas better suited
than Ceylon; because at the extremity of that Island are
divided the two monsoons which blow in these seas, and ships
can come there or go out with the right monsoon, either to the
North or to the West, or to the South or to the East, a pecu-
liarity which is not found in any other Island. About the
capacity of the ports, we have already said enough, because
there are at least two at the top of the Island, deep enough for
the largest ships, and four in the opposite coast, while that of
Triquilimalá is such that it is doubtful whether there is any
other like it in the known world. Nor was it an unhealthy
land, provided it is cultivated and peopled. There is timber
in abundance in Ceylon, and if it is cut in due season, there
will not be the inconvenience of its not being durable. But
it is a notable fact that no care is taken in India to fell seasoned
trees and when the moon is favourable, to which many people
attribute [the fact] that the King’s ships last so short a time in
Portugal, because they are built of green wood, and they say
that it was again experienced in the fantastic Galleon ‘Padre
Eterno’.

As for what concerns provisioning, that Island, if cultivated,
is most fertile, as has been said, and though at present it lacks
wheat, it does not seem possible that it would fail to produce
it in all the cool lands, and D. Antonio Mascarenhas grew it as
an experiment in the lowlands. Meanwhile, just as we bring
it to Goa from abroad and send it to the other praças without
minding this inconvenience, it will not be a novelty in
Ceylon.

The whole difficulty is in its conquest. All those who were
versed in it were persuaded that it could have been easily
achieved, if as soon as that Island was discovered and the
Princes defeated by D. Francisco de Almeyda (a war which we
provoked by the manner in which we acted) and before we
engaged ourselves in other wars, we had placed all our forces in Ceylon. Thither the Viceroy D. Afonso de Noronha took 4000 Portuguese, and he could have had the King of Canar and all his force on his side, if he had not robbed him, and as the island was divided among four chief potentates, he could easily have subdued the three of Seytava, Candaia, and Jafanapatao. For in those times those people had no practice in firearms; they fought unprotected as they always did, and the Portuguese used them [firearms], besides defensive armour which they then used but gave up afterwards, because on the sea they could not easily manage with them, and both on sea and land they were scorched by the violence of the heat of those climates. But it was the case rather with arms of steel than with those of leather and Coats of mail, which should have been retained for attacks on sea and investments on land, if the poverty of the Royal treasury and of the soldiers had not been such as may be seen from this History, because if the Mogul troops and other Asiatic Cavalry make use of them in those same climates, no sufficient reason can be found for showing less concern for life than for some trouble which they may cause, thus making victories easy to the enemy and even despising any preparation for them. And though in ancient warfare in which they vied with each other at close quarters, sword to sword, and spear to spear, the number of the dead was greater than in | battles of these modern centuries, yet experience has shown, that fire is more effective, for we see among Europeans that everything is reduced to that method of warfare; and much more than does it appear necessary for defence.

The same could have been done by the Viceroy, D. Constantino de Braganza, who had taken 3000 men for the conquest of Damao. His intention was to chastise and vanquish the King of Jafanapatao, as he had been ordered from Portugal, and to continue the conquest of Ceylon, had the whole affair not been frustrated by envy, as we said in its place. And after we inherited the right to that Island, and when the war would have been all to our profit, no zealous person or man of good sense can realize why it was that no greater heed was paid to so opulent a Kingdom, in which were found together all the good dispositions that were wanting in India, because in those days there was no pressing war in other parts, and no more important one than this presented itself. Experienced men were the more confirmed in this [opinion], when they saw us take the field against the rich and mighty King of Cambaya, because we did not refuse, but rather provoked a war of such consequence; and what reason can be given for not undertaking one of lesser difficulty and of greater importance, seeing that after so much expense and so many deaths, we only obtained the island of Dio, [which was] so unhealthy, and some lands of the North, without any protection or means of defending them against the King of Deka, the neighbouring Kinglets and finally the Mogul, [which was] the reason for their being constantly invaded, each time with loss of population, over and above the fact that the conveniences of Ceylon are not found therein, and that the increase in the race was so small that in Dio and Chaul we have to-day | little more than the 

And to effect the conquest of Ceylon, two methods were constantly put forward. The first, to conquer the lowlands of those four provinces, Maturi, Sofragado, the Four and Seven Corias, which was never so difficult as not to be achieved by 700 men or less, and the more easily, when the Natives helped us. This done, they proposed a larger force for the garrison of Balne and for the incursions into Candaia, with the object of remaining and fortifying [ourselves] therein, and after fortifying ourselves in a suitable place and after inviting the Natives peacefully, by making known to them the right to the conquest and the laws that will be inviolably observed in their regard, to open up military roads to the chief sea ports, as the Romans did, obliging the Natives under grave penalties to preserve them in that state, and keeping always the same effective arrayal in the four Provinces, and the one of Candaia continuing regularly to subdue the highlands, in such manner that they would lose hope of the war cease, so long as the revolt lasted, without risking ourselves in narrow passes, but carrying on the undertaking with all prudence and caution.

For experienced men were persuaded that neither the King nor his lieges would be able to hold out and withstand war for a long time, if once they understood that the Portuguese would not desist therefrom, because it would not be possible for them to live on the top of the Mountains nor to sustain themselves on the unproductive hills if we were Lords of the whole plain from which they draw their supplies, because however much they exaggerate it, neither in the woods nor on the heights can such a crowd of men find what is necessary and requisite for human life, as will be better seen from the following consideration.

For this incursion into Candaia some people were content with a 1000 Portuguese which, it is certain, can be enlisted in India many times over. What I am sure is, that the greater the number, the more assuredly and briefly will the result be achieved, by men already accustomed to such warfare and to
the conquest of the lowlands. And if we should not be able to enter Candeia with a goodly number of Natives, it would always be dangerous to deal with such a large number of enemies. But it is on account of all this that they made this division of two armies, because they understood that so long as the lowlands were secure, those who accompanied us would never rise against us in the highlands, and on this they founded their greatest hopes of achieving the total subjection of the Island, because once the Crown of the Mountains is subdued, there will be no difficulty, nor did we ever find difficulty in subjecting the lowlands of the opposite coast, and the Kingdom of Jafana. Patao was often vanquished and finally held by us.

Such was the common opinion of military men; and to accomplish this was the desire particularly of two Generals, D. Jeronimo de Azevedo and Constantino de Sá de Noronha; but they never had a sufficient force of Portuguese men-at-arms to form two camps and to secure permanently the one and the other lands. And though to one who has not fought in Ceylon and has no knowledge of the determination and constancy of the Natives in defending their independence, this division might not seem a sufficient security, as there will be Chingal soldiers in both camps, and though it will not seem possible to him that ingress and egress into those inaccessible mountains will be facilitated thereby, [yet] so strong is the argument of experience that I think it a safe thing to submit to what is approved by men well versed in that conquest. And all those fears will be dispelled the easier by a larger number of Portuguese troops than D. Afonso de Noronha actually led and D. Constantino de Braganca thought he had brought, and Andre Furtado de Mendoca could have hoped that they would not fail to give him, after he had conquered Jafanapatao, for nobody doubted but that if he had such a force and captains experienced in that warfare, he would be able, on those and other occasions, to vanquish any opposition of the Natives, even in the time of RaJu with whom D. Constantino had to contend.

Others recommended another method as less risky and more assured. For they believed that if the Candiots were cut off from salt, opium, and cloth for five years, they would either die or submit. Because when they have no salt, they swell and die, and one who is accustomed to opium will soon faint and lose all dexterity when deprived of it. And though they wrought some coarse cloth, it was done in such small quantities that it was not enough to cover themselves with, in those cold lands or to put on any other garb save that of the inhabitanter.

of Brazil or of the Interior of Cafraria. And if this were carried out, they would be obliged to come to obedience, for all these three articles come from abroad, except for a part of the Salt, for what is manufactured in Valavé in the land of Chilao and Putulaao and in the openings of D. Constantino and that of Comoripiti, was all in our hands, and what came from abroad, especially from the Coast of the Fishery, can all be prevented, both because those Christians were lieges of the State and because it was not difficult to hold all ports and entrances. From Valavé comes the greater part of the Salt of Candeia, and the lands of Batecou, and if the ring of sand is cut open at the time the salt begins to form, filling the salt pans with more water, the quantity will be much greater than at present, without any labour. So long as no prazas were erected in those regions, when there was war only with the Chins, it was found enough to keep there some manchaus, Dhonesys, or foists, to prevent anything being taken without falling into our hands. But for greater security they desire that some new prazas be erected, in which all the Salt could be collected, and that all those who are obedient should every three months go according to the division of Corias to take the share that will be found conveniently necessary for each person, or family, and all should be enrolled in the factory of the nearest praz, making a rough estimate for once, reckoning one measure enough for a person for a month, at least if incorporated in one family, and keeping strict watch over all entrances and noting down what is taken. And for every measure of Salt that shall be found in excess, they shall pay a laun, and our officials double, to any person who shall denounce them for letting pass anything extra. The same punishment shall be given to those who give salt from one village to another, though in the same village one may help another; and this will be the principal means for putting a bridle on revolts and for subjecting the whole Island. Every one admitted this, but it was never carried into effect because of the selfishness of individuals. But if the King should forbid it as treason and chastise it as such, in the case of any person, of whatever quality he be, everything will be carried out. For this must be carried out with the same rigour in Jafanapatao and Manar, and also as regards other substances like opium and cloth, without distributing more than is necessary, and only to the lands which are obedient to the Portuguese dominion.

With the revenue of these three substances they could go on erecting fortifications and maintain their Garrisons, which will not only serve for the possession of the obedient lands in
peace, but for the relief of the praça of Triquiliomalé and Batecalou, either by land or sea, without the arrayals having to cross the lands of Candeas. The experiment must be made whether it is possible to keep the great river of Jaffanapatão always open, by cutting once for all the ring of sand, since on the opposite coast there are many lagoons and rivers that are opened by the force of the tide, because if this is achieved, the Kingdom will be a perfect Island. For the same reason they thought it convenient to deepen the more shallow passage of this river, in such a manner as to make it always navigable, to dispense with the dromies that come from Batecalou, since it was seen that the openings of D. Constantino were never closed. This will not only serve to make service more easy, but will also make the defence of the Kingdom better, for the river is very broad, and if this had been done, it would not have been so easy to the Hollander to ford it. It should be forbidden under grave penalties to divert the labouring people from Jaffanapatão who pay poll tax, nor to let them be taken outside or sold, on the pretence that some of them are slaves of the King, for even if it were so, it belongs to the ministers of the King to make use of them, and there can be no greater outrage, not to call it by any other, than to sell them out of the Kingdom, leaving it depopulated, when there were so many in Ceylon which ought to be repopulated. And the King can well be undeserved, that in so remote a state there will be any remedy to such excesses, unless they are given the punishment due to them. The celebrated Captain Philipe de Oliveyra acted so differently that he never took a fine, because they were so poor, and punished them in another way to keep them obedient. They found that for the good Government of that Kingdom it was necessary that the captains should not be appointed for three years, as has now been introduced, as it was a post to serve in and merit, and not one to be given as reward, and that it should be given only to one who has served well in the Island, and were one not satisfactory, he should be removed at once, he being always, like the Captain of Manar, under the orders of the General, as was first done, under penalty of intolerable disorders resulting from the separation.

They also found great disadvantages in the place and position of the fortalices of Batecalou and Triquiliomalé, with regard to the purposes for which they were ordered to be built with such instance, danger and cost, contrary to the peace settled and agreed with the Candiot, which came to be the final ruin of Ceylon; especially Bate-calou, because it was too far out of the way, and could not be reinforced by land except through the lands of Candeas, nor by sea except at [the time of] the monsoon, when the bar might happen to be blocked, as happened in some years, or obstructed by stockades and firearms, as it sometimes happened, because the fortalice lies on the side within the Anchorage of the ships, as it were, in the Interior, on an islet, which has a passage in which the water, for a great part of the year, comes up to the knee, and at the F 453 other, to the waist, through which 3000 men can pass | together, and on the opposite side where artillery fire could not reach. It has but a small view of the sea, and nothing at all of the bar, unless they keep watch there. It lies too near the Salt water and broad river to command it so well as to let no hostile vessels pass, and therefore it has no good water within it for some months in the year, nor is there a place outside the praça, wherein the casados and other people of the wings (azas) or inner stockades can live, though no one is safe out of them. And as there must be room for the play of the artillery, it had need of better walls and bastions, which might cost three times as much as the praça; and it would cost less to build a new one, than to build what is necessary in this, and this praça can be shifted to the sea-shore, where it can receive reinforcements by sea and land with greater ease, by opening a good canal from the lagoon to the sea, between the rocks and the tank of the maynatos (washmen), because as it is full of sand, when the bar is blocked, it opens here with greater depth, seeing it has not water from the mountains but only from the ordinary tides. Therefore it can become an island or at least a peninsula, with a large field for palmgroves and shelter. And if the force is together and near the bar, it can be easily defended by vessels and trenches, whether opened or blocked by the Cachaõ or South wind.

We do not know whether the Hollander has shifted it. It may be that he has done so, to make sure of being reinforced by sea at any time and because it has only a garrison without a town of Hollander casados. Which was more convenient in our time, so long as the Portuguese did not multiply to such extent as to need a division, keeping there a good garrison of 150 Portuguese and 100 tascars, either from the other side of the Island or from the ports of Maturê and Belitiça who trade there, giving them lands to cultivate and two larins a month, and the Belâlas who serve the Vanei will soon betake themselves to the place in which they see greater security. Instead of having to wait for pay from Columbo, which failed them for a long time, there should be set apart for its 200 hares of cinnamon to be sold in Musulapatão or Bengala, and exchanged for munitions and other things necessary, as they
had been set apart already to be sold in Sinde. This [cinnamon] should be made on the side of Gâle, and should be entrusted to the factor of that praça, with order to sell it along with some elephants that shall be taken in those lands, keeping that praça immediately subject to the Government of Jafanapataô, whence it can be better provided than from Columbo. It is also convenient to add to it the lands of the greater Paneva, and others along the sea-shore to the north, which do not belong to Cutiar. And because there is cinnamon on that side also, it can be had there. And they did not judge it convenient that this praça should be given as a reward by despact, but as a post to serve in, so long as matters were not altogether well disposed and ordered, because those people are more valiant, bold and treacherous, than those of Jafanapataô, and they have defeated two of our fleets by treachery.

| But as they understood that it would be difficult to undo what had been already done, they said that since from the bar of that lagoon to Calarma there was a length of three leagues, with many palm groves and nele lands, and the whole was sometimes reduced to an island, because another bar opened there, and there was another small island on which the fortalice should be situated, if that bar had been always open, as the natives desire, at least a small stronghold should be erected there, with heavy artillery below and smaller [artillery] above, with lodgings for 15 persons, which would suffice for the defence of the pass against the Chingalâ, and it should be erected on a sandbank which lies to the east, so that by means of a barricade and some black troops it can prevent the formation of the ring of sand, whereby the bar is blocked, and defend the passage to the small island on the west side. By this means they can withdraw into those three leagues [of country] from the island to the principal bar, and be secure against all the might of Candes. Some dhonies in the river at the suspicious passes will be quite enough, because the inhabitants of those regions will never be secure by any other means, and they will never lose hope of being secure, nor will they take a contrary resolution, when they are between two strong places and surrounded by a strait and vessels of war. On the contrary we shall be able to assault them more easily by land and by the strait and the lands of Chapanturè which are the most important.

As this arrangement was meant only against the Chingalâ, and on the other hand all praças of little strength were a drawback to the State, I neither approve or disapprove these suggestions, but I only record what was most spoken about and was considered to be the best.

CHAPTER 21.
The same Subject continued

Triquilemalê on the contrary, has all the advantages, in that those of Candes cannot lay siege to it without the provinces near Columbo coming to know of it and falling upon their rear, because there are no mountains nor rivers but level lands of low jungle, and it is the same for reinforcements from Jafanapataô by land. Nor can it be reached to its two large bays with their long view towards the sea coast be obstructed by sea. There was, moreover, ample accommodation within the stockades for all sorts of troops, and water and tanks inside. And if Batecalou had much paddy (nele), it was because there were people to cultivate it, and not because it had more or better lands than Triquilemalê, at least if they repair a large dam which would cost only 200 pardaoes, and [which] was allowed to go to ruin through misgovernment, though some natives offered to maintain it. And when there is water in the tank, then other lands will be abandoned by people in order to go there. Which is not the case in Batecalou, where the Vanes always diverted the people from submission to us, so that they might remain Lords of the lands, paying only some tribute, as they always did. The result which the ministers of the King obtained thereby was, that these lands were lost along with their great profits, and the lands afterwards became unhealthy on account of the swamps and the water stagnating in those extensive plains. And for want of a garrison and ships of war, the praça became a cage, looking on what entered or left for the profit of the Candiot without being able to do him any injury or to prevent him from doing any.

It would have been [quite] otherwise, if there had been there a Captain of valour and energy, with 100 white men and some barks manned by lascars, and if some of the dams had been repaired, and they had been supplied with necessaries by Jafanapataô and Mañâr, since this praça served to protect them. To which all the lands of Cutiar should be subject as they were of old, without allowing any salt to be distributed at Ilambirurê, but obliging all to come to the fortalice for it, according to the manner described above. Nor should vessels go to Cutiar for provisions, but instead they should go to this praça, selling and bartering their merchandise for necessaries, and the opposite should be allowed [only] in exchange for 100 candis of rice which can be brought from
there. If there were in the praça a captain or inhabitants of means, there would be no lack of provisions from the mainland, and if the lands were again peopled, there would be no need of anything from outside. The lands of Urias should be under his jurisdiction for the good government of the Kingdom of Jafanapatão and Columbo, and also the lands of Cantaíle, where, after repairing the dams, there will be rice in abundance for that praça and for the whole of Jafanapatão, and meanwhile Batecalou can help, if the necessary disposition be not lacking. They also wished that there should be vessels which could put out to sea, with pioneers not only to cut the sand bars of the natural salt pits of Valavé, but also to do the same to other distant ones.

It is convenient to build a fortalice on the river of Valavé, one of the four principal rivers of the island, which has on its banks such fertile and extensive lands as those of Batecalou, which at the time were almost wholly abandoned; and the site of the praça should be at the mouth of the river on the Western side, and it should be of such a form that the town, between the river and the sea, might be protected by artillery, since it is more exposed to attack on the land side, and that the people and the garrison might take refuge therein in case of danger, as it is easier to go to the praça along the shore. At the beginning it is convenient that there should be there two or three foists and some dhoneyes and the arrayal of Maturé and Saffrago, and the praça should be built of wood, an easy thing in Ceylon, in such sort that artillery can be mounted on it, till a better one is erected. And if there is anyone who is willing to do this at his own cost, it might be given to him for some lives, so as not to burden those lands and because there is lack of service men, giving him 2,000 pardaus to buy slaves and for other expenses with the lands of Valavé for five years, and when these are over, he should have a fourth part, another fourth part going for rice for the fortalice, and two fourth parts to the Portuguese casados, who might go to dwell there, and who should be given 50 pardaus each, even if they have other portions elsewhere, and to the Topaz Casados up to 30 pardaus; and they should all be given lands for palm groves and ground for houses; and as all this will be in our lands, when there is need to punsh, it can be easily done, and the arrayal will warm to the work and the greater part of the expenses will come from the lands and from salt. When that is over, the Dissávas of Maturé and Saffrago must come [and sollicite] business to this coast, in a place suitable for defence and for union in case of need. The jurisdiction of Valavé should be the nearest Coroa and the salt pans of lesser Faneva.

They likewise desired that fortificatoes should be erected at the two openings of the estuary, which separates the island of Calapiti, which has a breadth of two leagues and a length of ten, both for the sake of securing the arrayal of the Seven Cororas from the obstruction of rivers, and also in order to form by means of the praça of Patalao on the North a new Dissáva for the King, out of the lands of the two Dissávas which in those times were abandoned and so remote from the post of the Seven Cororas, that they could not be governed therefrom. It is from there, they say, that Ceylon began to be peopled, of which there are many ancient ruins, as we already mentioned, and four tanks, and some of them ten and twelve leagues in circumference, irrigate from 15 to 20 leagues of land. These were destroyed and the land became a jungle; and besides these, in Mangula Coroa alone there are 306 ordinary tanks though many of them were then without dams because of the little zeal of the Royal ministers. The new Dissáva should pay heed to this and prevent the pilgrimages to Anu-Raja, whither Pagans and Christians resort on the pretence of visiting these antiquities, and under such a plea a Rebellion was plotted there. And though the praça might seem to be more secure within the island on one of its bars, yet as it will then have to be built more for the sake of the land than of the sea, for the commerce and security of the arrayal, they thought that a site should be chosen near the river Pomparati, in the manner described [in the case] of Valavé, because under its protection there will be many and extensive paddy lands, all abandoned, which can be distributed to Portuguese and Chingalá inhabitants and to those who wish to come from outside, without any duty for 20 years or less, and there will be no lack of people who would wish to go there because of the fertility of the lands and the trade of the Interior.

In the corresponding port of Chilaó they would like to have another fortalice, because the Chingalá [King] had his eyes on it, and carried on trade therefrom with those of the opposite coast of the continent, during the previous rising against Constantino de Sá. The arrayal and the Vicos of the Christianities can retire to it in case of danger, without the trouble of having to cross rivers, and some Portuguese foreiros can live there, and there is no need to have a large number of soldiers. And indeed this port had a Captain with a salary, though there was no praça and he did not live there. It might be given for lives to one who is willing to build one at his own cost together with the lands it formerly had, and the salt which can be collected at Anabulounda and Maripo, as these places are near and Patalao is far. It can have under its jurisdiction
the whole of Jaticapato of Diunedi, with the lands of Monicerao from the river inwards, and all the adultu (arutae) villages of Manigao with the whole of Madampé.

To Nigumbo, they said, should belong the jurisdiction of the lands from Salpe right up to Galalá, excluding the latter however, but including what lies from river to river; and that the Captain of Columbo should not have jurisdiction over [these] lands, because he generally came from outside and did not know the customs of the island, and because his salāy, gains and perquisites, were quite different from those other Captains, and it was enough for him to have a good village. That it behoved to change the quarters of the Captain-General from Malívina to the Great Stockade, which was the foremost stronghold that Rajú had against us, where there was a half-built fortalice recently renewed by the Candiot. And there vessels can come at any time, while the post of Malívina was out of the way, because of a large hill on account of which in the last rising it was ordered to be given up, and as it is only a little more than half a league distant, what is done from Malívina can be done from the Stockade. That the Captain-Major of the arraial should retain the jurisdiction of Beliga Corla, along with the villages of the Captains who were with him, and that all the rest of the Four-Corlas should go to their Dissáva as formerly; and from the [Dissáva] of the Seven Corlas nothing else should be withdrawn save the new Dissáva of Manga-Corla and Nigumbo. To Calaturé they gave the jurisdiction of the neighbouring Corla, together with all that lies between its river to that of Panituré, all the rest going to Sobrao as formerly. As the Dissáva of the Four Corlas had no fortalice from which to derive any profits save Columbo, whether the merchandise of Candea did not go, because there were other places more convenient principally Ruanela (they gave him a moiety of the merchandise that came there, and of that which came to others they gave to the Captain-General, leaving the administration to Ruanela), and Bulatcágama to the Vídána who is there instead of the Dissáva, and that those whom the General and Dissáva shall place there should be visited by spies, so that they might be punished, when they deserve it.

That those of Candea would not object to the prices fixed for the merchandise they order to be sent to our ports, since before the last route, they used to ask almost the same terms, and those articles were sold at the same price in Tríquilémálé, Jafanapatao and Maná. And those things which they take from our ports, save the excepted ones, shall be at the prices current therein, and as much as they please. And though the number of people who are there, cannot be known for certain, at least when peace shall be secured, it will be possible to determine how many candis of salt will be required for each F 998 Port, because even if they take something more, it will never be more than will be consumed in a short time, and the very thought that they and their lieges can run short of it, is enough to make them circumspect in their rebellions.

As the ports were forbidden to have lands subject to them and as Alicaó and Beliagao had many villages, it is, they said, not convenient to have fortalicés in those ports. It is necessary to annul the grants given by despatches, and if the people thus deprived happen to be [people] of the Island, they must be given in compensation some increase of their portions, but if they be people from outside, let them be compensated by an equivalent village, and let the jurisdiction of Beligaó, as well as its coria, belong to Gaë, with a village of 200 xeráins in compensation for the loss in area that is thus withdrawn. In conclusion, they say, that it is convenient to have some vessels in all the praças, so that they may relieve each other and defend the sea and rivers through which the produce come to them from the mainland, all joining together for enterprises of greater [moment]. And just as it is not enough for us to have the city of Columbo without an arrayal in the field in order to become masters of the Island, in the same way it is not enough [to have] other praças without vessels always at hand to make up for the lack of arrayals. And in order not to depend on Goa for everything, if each village gives a mature jack tree, sawn into planks, they can build as many vessels as they like, keeping them drawn up on land with headmen (mecodaés) paid to look after them, as the rest of the crew can be had for pay at any time in the ports. They wanted two bestegros in Valavé, one in Gaë with a Sonquivel, in Calaturé one or two manchaus in Columbo two foists with three manchaus in Nigumbo, Chila and Putlalo a manchoa each, in Manár two bestegros, in Tríquilémálé two bestegros, in Batecalou four.

But I do not make out the reason that moved them to hound the ports of lesser importance on the side of the Gulf with praças, leaving the most important ones in the extremity of the Island unprotected, because it was ever necessary to have strong ones, especially after the European nations began to cruise in these seas; and they could only say that those ports of the Gulf, as well as of the bay, were better adapted for the
trade of the Chingalā. But as they are so many, it does not seem possible, nor did they think it so, to fortify them all with substantial praças. And as they could not all be defended in this way, it was possible with lesser cost and greater fleet to hinder the Candiot from any sort of commerce by erecting stockades instead of praças, till the revenues of the Island permit greater expenses. Because if they promise themselves the submission of that Kingdom in five years, and place the security of the other lands in the distribution of salt, what is the use of dividing the forces so much before we are able by means of reinforcements or by natural increase to build and garrison so many praças? Therefore, I conclude, that the whole mistake was, that in those early times we did not surround the island with a good fleet, either to pursue this method of warfare, which they think the most secure, in case they had no hopes of reducing it, or of pacifying for good the people of those Mountain ranges; or along with the other things which we first proposed. But if it is certain that the Hollanders have already fortified all those ports, all their fears will cease, when once Ceylon is recovered.

And because this uneasiness confirmed by experience ever prayed on some conquistadores of Ceylon, even after all these precautions, and even on the supposition that the King of Candea would be obedient, they warn us all to lay aside the illusion that we should be able to possess those lands in peace for any length of time, if they are governed according to our way, since Rajā himself could not do it by his method, though he had set up some stockades in the Interior and had cut them off from arms and salt, because with arrows made of the areca tree they captured one, and with the arms they found there they went on taking others, and when he appeared on the scene, he died of poison or of grief, as we said already. For the causes whereby we fomented their pertinacity, are not less than those given by the people of Seytavaca, and the resentment that seized them, when someone urinated into the mouth of a cooly for taking a measure of salt to his house, a matter which they took so ill that besides calling upon God for justice, they made up their mind to avenge it. And if for so long a time we were unable to secure what we had conquered outside the hills, it would be wiser to let them govern them in such a way as to derive good rents, and to make the following terms:

That neither the King of Candea nor his successors shall claim any right to the lowlands, but only to those within the hills, as of old, for he is called King of Candea, wherefore he had nothing either in the lesser or in the great Paneva.

That he shall possess nothing in Bate-calou, Tambacarave, Hamdutari and in Cutiar, as they ever were under the dominion of Triquilemalē, as he acknowledged, when he became master of them, by sending pingas and acknowledgments every month.

That he shall have no right over the tanks, and the lands of Urla and Caludeva, as far as our lands of Mangula-Coria, nor in the lands of Anu-Rajā-purā.

That he shall be friend of our friends and enemy of our enemies, and will never admit any European nation into Ceylon, nor give them entrance into that Island, nor have any agreement or pact with them, either for trade or for any kind of hostility that they may intend against us.

That he shall liberate all the Portuguese or people of the country that might be in Candea, whether they be taken in war or had fled thither, whether slaves or freemen.

|  | That he shall deliver all pieces of iron or bronze ordinance of whatever kind they be, which he has within his lands or secretly in ours.

That for the first time he shall give 100 muskets on supports, and 1000 standard firelocks, and in the following years 20 muskets on supports and 50 firelocks, as he has there many of ours, much iron and many workmen; that he shall give every year 6 tuskers, and four areas, out of the many he has there.

That he shall not send any elephant or area out of the island, nor any vessels with merchandise on his account, nor receive from outside whatsoever or materials of war.

That he will send all the areca of his territories, pepper, sapan, wax, ivory, calālas, and all other merchandise into our ports which are nearest to him, selling the areca at 7 laris an amanam, the pepper at 5 measures a larin, the sapan at 12 laris a bar, the wax at 6 laris a maund (maō), fine calālāc at one and a half laris, if coarse at one larin, delivering these articles on account of the King of Portugal to his ministers, a quarter of the profit going to the Dissāvās, another to the Captains of the praças, another for their erection, and the last for their casados. And any other person that buys them will lose his money, and the share of the Dissāva in Bate-calou shall go to the sea Captain, who may be there, and of what goes to the lands of Manār this portion shall be divided between the Captain and the chief of those people. The share of the Dissāva of Triquilemalē shall go the Dissāva of Jafanapata. Of what goes to the new fortalice at the openings of D. Constantino, the captain shall have two shares, and the two others shall go for its erection.
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That in time of peace the merchandise which is not exempt shall be taken to Candeia, but neither in peace nor in war shall any one be allowed to go up to Candeia from our lands in search of any article of trade, without permission in writing from our General, and the watchmen or neighbouring villages which shall let them pass, shall be severely chastised, because of the inconvenience that can arise therefrom, and in order that so many people, freemen or slaves, may not flee thither; and whoever arrests a slave in the frontier villages shall receive a third of his value, and a freeman shall pay a third part of the fine as if he were a slave. All the frontier villages shall, whenever it is proved that any such person has passed, pay the same penalty to the owner of the slaves, and to the accuser, in case of freemen.

CHAPTER 22.

CONCLUDING PROPOSALS AND THEIR CRITICISM

And because the merchandise of Candeia ruined our lands, enriching those of Candeia, as our people ceased to cultivate them and occupied themselves in this business, notwithstanding the decree of excommunication passed against it, and as the Generals and Dissavas allowed them to violate the peace, going so far as to seize and kill people in our lands by means of Vaguea because of this interest, besides other inconveniences, they said, that this trade should by no means be allowed on our side.

That there should be no hostages, because unless it were one of the Princes they would be of no use; and if they give [as Prince], not only would the expenses be greater, but he would be of little avail, since the others could make believe that he is dead, and it could be the occasion of some fresh, treason plotted with our people; and this would also be a reason for them not to ask hostages from us, [and we might tell] them that we hope to have a lasting peace without hostages. And if they press for hostages from us, they should be [given] only on condition that a Prince should come to us, and that the King with the greater persons of the Kingdom would become Christians admitting Fathers and Churches, and not as formerly, when, though there was a Church and a Parish priest, they did not let any Christian go into it, though there were nearly 2,000 of them, including fugitives and merchants. And it seemed certain that they would neither give a Prince nor become Christians except in a case of special Divine inspiration.

Such was also the reply given to the inquiries which His Majesty ordered to be made in that Island, about which the Bishop, D. Frey Sebastião de S. Pedro, collected information, without any other result save a fresh provision about cinnamon and another about Moors, which was rather a scandal to them than a profit to us, as nearly all of them remained in the Island, though not one of those who did not show himself faithful to us in the last rout should have been pardoned, nor the others allowed to remain in our lands: or to trade in our ports, under pain of becoming slaves and of forfeiture of property to him who accused them. And those who remain as being faithful, should not dwell in the interior nor serve as Canacepulos of the factories. And those who come from outside, as merchants or sailors, should be immediately entered in a list, to know how many they are, and the time when they came; and if they remain beyond 6 months, they should incur the penalty aforementioned.

The King also asked: What they considered the best means for keeping the people secure and content without being tyrannized, and what number of lascarins would be necessary, which questions have been answered in the preceding discourse. And as for having more Dissavas, whatever name they please to give them, it was necessary that they should have the requisite power and authority. And if there be one in every Corla, as those of the frontier and furthermore Corlas desired, they will never be secure with so small a number of lascarins. Wherefore it is better to let this office be what it was before, except for the changes above mentioned.

The King inquired further: What was the reason why the conquest was so long delayed and who was most guilty in the matter? The answer was that the cause was a long standing one and involved many who were dead, some who erred through lack of experience, others through misgovernment, which could not be remedied now except in the manner aforementioned, and that their successors would be more guilty, if they paid little heed to these observations, because the greater part of them had been approved by experience and by common sense, and must be examined and approved by the King and his ministers, who would never be blameless, before God, and before the world, if they acted otherwise, for persons, since it concerned a Kingdom of great profit in which there was a large Christianity and greater conversions were expected. Such were the proposals of persons, zealous for that conquest and for the rights which the King had in that island, before the Europeans went to India and even afterwards, before the Hollander set foot in Ceylon.
But I do not know what star [it was that makes] the policy of India, however independent it pretended to be, always favour the pensioners and not the military, as at the beginning when we entered it, thereby draining the Royal treasury in order to feed those who are not bound in duty to defend it. It is a practice altogether contrary to the order of the Hollander. In Holland they are engaged for such a pay, and for so many years of service, a moiety of which they receive in Holland. Once they set foot in India, all their clothing and expenses are at the price of the factory, which is high in everything; and when they come to close accounts, either very little remains to them, or they are again involved in debt. At the time when their service is coming to an end, they send them betimes to some remote praga, or employ them in some lengthy enterprise, and if they allege that they are free from engagement, they make the passage to Europe difficult, or satisfy them by giving them some military post, if they are worthy of it, resorting to all kinds of subterfuges to keep them at work, often without letting them set foot on land, and though the treatment they give them is mean and the food and drink limited and unclean, the certainty that these things will never be lacking and the rigour of military discipline joined to the Lutheran and Calvinistic pernicious, which is the origin of the hatred they bear towards Catholics, are the motives why the greater part of them do not desert to us, whose decent and honourable treatment they acknowledge, though they object to the lowness and uncertainty of the pay. And so far | they P 511 do not concern themselves about increasing the race, for only some of the officers have wives, and they know from experience that they are unprolific, as we have already pointed out. The result is, that with them everything is reduced to a question of profit to the Company by pillage, trade, or war, and there is no question of benefiting the pensioners, because this must not be tried, till peace has been assured by means of arms.

P 965 | Another fatal thing was that we disposed the condition of our pragas as if there were no danger from the natives, nor anything to fear from Europeans, even after they began to invade us, or if they were unable to attempt the conquest of Ceylon, after they had twice besieged Mozambique, conquered the Malacca, invaded Macao, after a siege of 40 years, and after awaiting a good opportunity, they had ended by getting the whole of Malaca, as they afterwards did with all the rest as far asCanonor. All this was not enough to make us perfect the fortifications of Ceylon, and keep such garrisons and provisions as would enable us to resist, as it behaved, any foreign power.

And if they thought that to close the ports to the Chingalaz and even to cut them off from salt, was so efficacious a means as to subdue them in 5 years, would not ships of war be more efficacious and less expensive to bring them to that subjection? And it would not have been impossible for them, at the time this was discussed, to avail themselves of European help, in which case neither fleets of such limited strength nor praças of such little resisting power, would have been enough to prevent an enemy from entering, and as the principal object of the conquest of Ceylon was not only to gain the products of the Island, but also to increase the Portuguese race, one cannot understand how it could have been achieved by continual war. The King will not desist from conquering the lowlands on any terms, so long as he has dominion and power in the highlands, a thing which is never forgotten in [the course of] such long years in good fortune and bad, continuing what was begun by Madame and his son, even when the legitimate King of Ceylon was alive; and all this in order not to have a foreign King. If one considers this well, he will be persuaded that it will not be more difficult to conquer the whole of Ceylon once for all, than to keep up so continuous a war in the past 150 years, and that all the energy and money that will be expended then will be well rewarded by the conquest of so fruitful a Kingdom and a foundation for our increase, from which will result the prosperity of the State and the conversion of so many pagans.

Many were persuaded that, if we had known how to combine the mildness of peace with the rigour of war, after the death of Ray and after we became Lords of Seytavas, it would not have been difficult for us to conquer the whole of Ceylon, for in peace the Natives should have been treated like lieges and not as enemies, as Countrymen, and not as strangers, so F 511c as to win their love towards the Portuguese. And though it is common for Asiatic nations to attribute favours to good fortune, and sometimes kindness to fear, a thing which is known to dispose them to ingratitude and pride, there is no stone so hard which does not surrender to kindness, nor a mind so rebellious that it does not recognize a benefit, nor a will so depraved that it does not let itself be moved by kind deeds; and the more excellent and honourable the Chingalas are among the Asiatic nations, the greater are the dispositions that will be found in them for captivating them. And if they should not be able clearly to realize how much better their condition would be under the Portuguese Kings than under Chingalas [Kings], one could scarcely believe that good treatment would fail to be sufficient to appease them altogether, and to make
frontiers, and in the case of restless nations, there should be
good garrisons and fortalices, experience shows that such
did not seem convenient to the Portuguese in Ceylon, for in
time of rebellions all the garrisons of the frontiers came to
grief, though only 15 to 20 leagues in the interior, because there
were very few men in them, with a small supply of victuals
and munitions; and as the force of white troops was so
small, and on these occasions the lascars were not forthcoming,
whatever was in the garrison diminished the arrayal,
and if they had been well garrisoned, the arrayal would have
been altogether exhausted. This was seen in the time of
D. Jeronimo de Azevedo in the rebellion of Domingos Correa,
because as these dovecots did not exist, and as he had many
men, he retired when he could with less loss, while the contrary
happened to him in the rebellion of Cangrane Arache because
of the garrisons in the interior, and in this retreat he was
neither able to garrison them nor was he willing to withdraw
them, and all was lost before he could relieve them. And
on account of this experience he did not want to fortify
Manicaruaraé; and to protect the movables of the soldiers,
and to remove the maimed and wounded, he thought it better
to send them down to the ports, and the goods of the soldiers
in dhonkeys or on aleos, or to entrust them to the obedient
villages, in which nothing was wanting, and because the sick
and wounded would be better cared for in Colombo. He
did not care for garrisons in Gurubebile, Seytavaca and
Ruanélia and elsewhere, and only consented to Simão Pinhaó
erecating that of Sofragaó, which though a strong one, was
twice lost afterwards. He only cared for Balané to facilitate
entry into Candaes, though it cost him much to erect, maintain
and defend it with Portuguese and lascars, because at that
time the cold was great, in course of time the lascars
retired and the Portuguese who were changed from time to
time | dimini·hed, till in the first rising that followed it was
lost with nearly 100 soldiers. All the rest at all times was
sheer waste, as happened to Rajá himself in his invasion of
Candaes, though he had other forces and a discipline very
different from ours.

And even in case any of these posts were ever so well
garrisoned and provided, what can it well defend, what
passes of the hills, and what passes of the rivers does it defend,
when there are so many [passes] to the low country? When
they are unable in troublesome times to come to the sea ports to
refit and find provisions, soldiers and lascars, and return with
them to quell the fire of rebellion? But when there is a
garrison, the first anxiety is how to relieve it without equal
the treatment that was given these, and according to their
convenience they submitted, being ever ready for fresh
affronts and risings. And where the Portuguese hoped to
improve their position, they encouraged old enemies to inflict
fresh losses, though experience had shown that however ill
they take injustice in time of peace, so much the more is justice
able to silence and convince them in time of war. And at the
same time, they often acted with severity, as has been
mentioned, towards those who could not help being with the
Enemy. The rebels were pardoned and given great favours,
because they were powerful, while the unhappy folk who
could not do otherwise, were destroyed. There was a great
difference indeed between the subjection of the Chingalâz, who
were ruled by a Native King, and the extinction of the heirs of
the rebellious Candiot, because so long as the latter lived, they
disquieted the Natives and attempted to extend their dominion.
But if the Chingalâz were without a King, they would be a
people without a head, exposed to every evil as in other
Kingdoms, and more disposed to foreign subjection, if we had
known how to win them by good treatment and benefits, as
many people advised before the Apostate D. João rebelled.

But as the disposition of the State after the loss of Ceylon
and the other praes is different from [what it was] when we
first dominated it, and as that conquest cannot be undertaken
without first turning out the Batavian from that Island, no
one doubts that the force necessary to invade and conquer it
will likewise be sufficient for the complete conquest of Ceylon,
especially of the lowlands. The difficulty, however, is to
dislodge the Hollander, either from Ceylon or from India.

Some people thought it easier to take Ceylon by storm before
reinforcements could be sent from Batavia in sufficient
quantity to withstand our forces. But as they have information
about all our actions, both in Portugal and in India, where
from Vingiri, which is at a distance of 9 leagues from
this bar of Goa, they are watching whatever is taking place
therein, it is scarcely possible to take by storm so many well-
fortified praes, though the garrisons be limited, without their
being able to forestall the damage. The talk which goes on
among them about a decisive resolution in Portugal, is what
was declared in Maláca by one of their Magistrates or skippers
to one of the two Fathers of the Society who were going about
there in disguise, | on the occasion when Antonio Telles de
Menezes sailing out with a fleet from Brazil and drifting
through a tempest, came near the Cape of Good Hope,*where
a Hollander ship, seeing 32 of our bayreys, was persuaded that
they were making for India,
The skipper met the Father and asked for a word in secret, and [begged him] not to refuse to answer his question. The question was: 'Why are 32 Portuguese Galleons going to India, and where are they making for?' The Father found the question a strange one, because it seemed to him that the disposition of Portugal, owing to the war she was carrying on against Castile, could not give room for such a great undertaking. [The Hollander assured him that there was no doubt, because one of their ships had sight of them off the Cape of Good Hope, and he only wanted to know where they were going. The Father replied to him: 'That supposing it were true, they would be going straight to Goa.' 'No,' he retorted quickly. 'The 32 galleons are making straight for Batavia, and we have no help but to muster all our maritime forces and give them battle on sea, to see whether we can burn some (because it is very difficult to sink ships of war in these seas), or cause such damage as to enable us to keep the country.' He then asked him, in case [the ships] came to Malacca and if the Father were sent with some message to them, whether he would return to that praza. He replied smiling: 'I would return as to my own home, because there is no force in Malacca to resist 32 Portuguese galleons.' The Hollander was surprised and added: 'That he should remember the hospitality he had received there, and that such were the fortunes of war and that if he were prisoner [the Father] should not forget to help and favour him.' But the hospital they gave to those two Fathers was that, though they were then under their safe conduct, they were taken as prisoners to the fortalice of Nigumbo. Such is the opinion of the Hollander that has persuaded men of experience that everything depends on a victory on sea, for they are disliked by the Natives who all, and especially the Chingalaz, will rise against them, if they see them defeated at sea.

They won this hatred of the Oriental nations by delusion and by disillusion. By delusion, they persuaded them that they did not come to conquer like the Portuguese, but only to trade, and as the nations of India were not firm in friendship with us, but retained a fresh remembrance of the successes of the conquest, and of the war which we waged on them, in which they lost blood and lives beyond reckoning, till they became altogether weakened in maritime power and in riches which increase by commerce, under such a violent yoke they yearned for nothing else save for vengeance and freedom. And because the Hollander offered it to them by means of his arms and favour, endeavouring by all means to embitter them against the Portuguese State, in order to lay his own foundations and form an alliance among them against the Portuguese, they did not take a single praça of consequence in India save with the favour of the Natives. They perverted the Japanese, as we said already, by persuading them that we would make them Christians so that afterwards we might conquer them by means of their own arms, showing them what the Catholic Kings had conquered in the New World, as they said, by this trick. They snatched the Kings of Malacca, those of Java and many others from their friendship; they estranged the Persians and finally the Chingalaz and Dyalx. And thus these and others all declared themselves as our enemies, all through the agency and deceits of this nation.

Then as they waxed great by pillage and by commerce, which they turned to their own advantage, beginning by Malacca they became masters of those Islands and those seas. To the clove which yields them much, being set at a very high price, they added nutmeg and mace of Banda. They conquered Macassar, and recently Bantāo, three leagues distant from their Estavia, which they made the capital of India in spite of the opposition of the Matara; and under the pretext of favours the son of the King of Bantāo, they excluded the one and the other, multiplying praças in the isle of Sumatra and in the Strait of Sunda. From Malacca to Cananor they excluded the Portuguese, and they also tried conclusions with the Persian, setting foot on the Island of Quexyalone, but they soon desisted from this enterprise when the Sufi treated them as rebel pirates, without consenting to receive their embassy. From this resulted the disillusion of all these nations, seeing that their whole armament ended in placing a yoke on them, and that the more they grew in wealth and power, the greater would be the tyranny with which they treated them, especially in Ceylon where the hatred which they had earned from the King, does not promise them any fresh help against us. And from all information we gather, that in the enterprise of recovering that Island we shall have only the Hollander against us, and that the difficulty in which we found ourselves when those two nations expelled us therefrom, was greater than the one we shall meet with when we want to recover it, unless we forget ourselves to such an extent as to let the Batavian make up his mind to conquer it altogether, with a greater force in order either to increase his might or to ensure his independence in case of an ultimate peril, by transferring to Ceylon what he cannot maintain in Europe, for not less is his foresight, nor does the hatred that he has won promise him less danger.
CONQUEST OF CEYLON

CHAPTER 23.

THE FEARS OF SOME PEOPLE REGARDING THIS CONQUEST

In speaking of these matters, the first remark of some despondent persons is: "How will it be possible in the present state of Portugal to undertake so great an affair as turning the Hollander out of India, or at least out of Ceylon?" To this common objection I reply, in the first place according to the opinion of the whole of Europe, that the might of Holland considered in itself is small and limited, and that the Catholic Kings would have subdued it many a time, if the rivals of their greatness had not taken it as an instrument for their revenge, the Duke d'Alva being cut off by four armies and D. Joaõ de Austria by as many. And that if the assistance of France alone had failed, she [Holland] would have been conquered long ago. But as she has reached such a height of power that she already thinks of becoming the arbiter of war, it is not possible that the Catholic and most Christian Princes will fail to understand, that by giving her help they give her arms against themselves. And Castile must have already realized that she had armed the King of France against her own State, when by her reinforcement she impeded the final progress of the conquest of Holland, after it had been shown that Holland could be conquered within her marshes and her own rivers in spite of all the power she might have on sea. And though Farnamio Strada appealed to the sea, thinking that that nation was invincible therein, Crõmwell (Crõmel) has already shown that this opinion is false, since he defeated the Batavians in Rotterdam without the help of any other nation in a battle fought between the two powers, English and Hollander; and as all the forces Holland has in India, consist of people brought from Europe, when the source fails, the stream will fail also. And if God so disposes matters, that on the expulsion of the Turk from Europe, the might of the House of Austria becomes more free, it will not be difficult for it to subdue the Batavians in punishment for their rebellion and for the offenses received at their hands.

A few years ago, after comparing the might of Turkey on land with that of the Hollander on sea, they would all have said that there was no comparison, and we already see that the might of Turkey is not invincible, if the league of the Christian princes against it persevers, and we trust in Our Lord that it will soon be expelled at least from what it possesses in Europe. When the news of the recovery of Brazil reached here, [p. 574] great was the confidence they had in those praças of Arroio, that the Hollander prisoners said: 'The Portuguese might take Amsterdam; but Arroio, never.' But we see that they not only gave up Arroio but even the whole of Brazil into the bargain. The same thing happened in Angola, [which was] conquered by a force smaller than what they had, because as they had taken it against all human faith, God did not give them valour to maintain it; and driven by fear or by sickness or by the sword, they have also abandoned the Island of S. Thome and what they had taken in Maranhão. All these are instances to make us believe that they would likewise abandon India, if they find there a force that could defeat them, since in Brazil they had placed 8 to 9,000 men on the field, which they could never do in India.

And whoever considers well the progress and object of Holland, will not fail to see that they only treat of their aggrandizement to the prejudice of the Roman Faith, and that they are never of any use against the enemies of Christianity; as [for example] at present, when with their maritime power they could have diverted that of the Turk from the Mediterranean and helped the House of Austria, towards which they have so many obligations, and the Republic of Venice; but heretical arms have their edge generally only against Catholics.

For all these reasons, it is not so impossible to drive them out of Ceylon and out of India, as some people believe. And if [the idea of] a Company for trade in India were accepted in Portugal, the more they are divided here, the greater is our persuasion that the result will be the same as in Brazil, and it will be made clear that there is a great difference between self-interest and the common good; that if Captains and Merchants lost India through selfishness, the one by banishing trade from our harbours by their violence and injustices, the other by enticing the enemy by lack of resistance, zeal for the common welfare can correct these mistakes, when they are persuaded that by seeking the common good they increase their individual advancement. And the capital with which such a company is started can, and must, be so great, that it can not only hold its own in opposition to that of the Hollander, but that it can even extinguish it here. It is not good to publish the means [for it] and Portugal is not unaware of them. A great minister once told us that when His Majesty, who was [then] governing that Kingdom, explained to him what a certain Lord had arranged with a Catholic Potentate of Europe, [he replied] that at that time it seemed to him an
undertaking above the forces of a Kingdom enfeebled by the preceding war. That reason has not the same force now; because it will always be necessary for Portugal to undertake some conquest by means of its surplus population, both for its advancement as well as for exercise in war, because as Africa is almost entirely abandoned, as there is no school of Flanders now, and as those whom the war with Castile had trained are now dead, we shall find ourselves without men who profess a military career, while the malice of the times is opposed to such negligence. And as no conquest can be more profitable than that of India, and in India (none more profitable than that) of Ceylon, no cost in men and money must be regarded. Because when we multiply under the shadow of that Kingdom, we shall be able to be Lords of India or of its commerce, which I always consider to be the better plan.

What confirms this the more is, that though the Hollander has monopolized almost the whole trade of the three quarters of the world, it is notorious that the trade of India alone yields him more revenue than all the others, and that whoever lets him retain this power, gives him arms against himself and against all Catholic dominion, which is the greatest foundation of Calvinism. And the longer his destruction is deferred, the greater will be the difficulty of destroying him, because where there is no lack of money to pay, there will be no lack of men for war, and they will always have plenty of needy men and vagabonds who regard neither conscience nor honour and offer themselves to serve in undertakings as unjust as are those of Holland.

And just as it is necessary to try to get together a sufficient Capital in Europe for the purpose of so great an armament, so I consider it quite evident that if some of the Asiatic Princes and merchants see that it is well established, they will invest their capital, if we want to be helped by them, obtaining by means of us what they cannot attain against Holland by their maritime forces. Because they are now quite persuaded of Portuguese good faith, and that in public commerce faithful intercourse will never fail, because of conscience and honour. Constantinople was surprised at what it experienced a few years ago, because when a Moor of Granada died in Macao, the Misericordia of that place sent to the one of Goa the capital he left behind. From there information was sent to Constantinople and two of his kinsmen, men of Granada, came here to recover their heritage, which was ordered to be paid to them in the Congo, and they went proclaiming the good faith of the Portuguese throughout Asia. And as these people, being merchants, place great value on such things, if they are sure of

profit in our Company, I am sure, they will invite us to take them in, and that if we are willing, we shall be able with the capital of Asia to be masters of it as well as of Africa.

They turn round and ask: 'How will it be possible either for the King or for a Company to place in Ceylon immediately so great a force as will suffice to attack some of those praças on land, and at the same time to withstand on sea the forces with which the Batavian will come to their help? I answer that if there were a league with other Princes or with England, with the necessary pacts, it can be effected in one of two ways; either this power will at the same time attack Batavia and the other praças of the South, or if the forces are larger, the Portuguese can attack Ceylon, the others Jaconar, and the Hollander forces, being divided against two nations, will have less strength and will make less opposition in that Island, where one or more praças can be already taken before they have reinforcements from Batavia, if she can send any. Or at least, we can set foot on land, as they always did, out of range of the artillery of their praças, and when sufficiently fortified, we can either fight them on land, if they come to meet us, or lay siege to one of their praças, which in my opinion should be Galle, both because, when once it is taken, our fleets can take shelter under its protection, and can receive reinforcements throughout the year, in the manner indicated, as well because it has so long a circuit of walls that neither can the usual garrison resist an assault, nor can an extraordinary one, if it is attacked on all sides and stormed by artillery.

But what will happen, they say, if Holland makes war on us in the harbours of Portugal and in the other conquests? And if it is true, as they publish and show in print, that Castile has given them the right to the Indies through hatred of Portugal, (which can scarcely be believed of a Catholic King), they will say that they do it with the same justice with which Castile presumed to do it, and we shall never find that Monarch on our side, if once Spanish politics decide that it is better for it to aggravize Holland than to help Portugal. But as for this point, if it should be so, this confirmation of the right is quite unnecessary for Calvinistic justice, since without it they entered India and made war on us. It has been already remarked that not only Castile but even other Princes of Europe [who have] no rivalry with Portugal, are becoming interested in the downfall of the United Provinces, and a league can be arranged with them. And as they have no means of egress or ingress save through those channels, it will be all the more easy to hem them in, if there is a force to attack these channels, or to invade them at the same time.
Because if France or England attempt it by land or sea, it is certain they will succeed; however much the Hanseatic Empire may unite itself, of which we have so far seen no other effect, except that each one thinks of his own interests. Nor does Portugal fear them on land, if precautions are taken, nor are the conquests in danger now, unless the armament of the enemy be very great, which cannot be the case, as they have so many distractions, and if the European Princes will finally realize that it is not only the Portuguese nation that is concerned in the downfall of Holland, because if they continue to enjoy India in peace for a long time, just as no Prince of Europe is now secure on sea without very great expense, so also no one will be so on land, if they continue to increase their riches. And well can one be deceived seeing that, if they are so proud of their fortune as to put forth so many roots abroad, they will not fail to grow fresh branches nearer home, for their wealth supplies them men and might to carry it out. And there is no one who is not surprised to see how such powerful neighbors can put up with their threats or the losses they inflict on them with grievous insults, which are not unknown to the world, or who approves the policy of such unjust enterprises or allows a republic, which, beginning with a few fishing boats, rose not only to lay down the law to Europe, but even to overawe her by its deep-laid plans. For in order to understand that these people are the very soul of Calvinism, it is enough to see how they govern India, without allowing any Catholic Ministers to set foot in Malacca, Ceylon, Jāsnānada, Malac, and other præsas, where there were large Christianities, and all [of them] perished under their dominion. They allow Mosques to the Moors and Pagodes to the Pagans in Malacca, and when one of our Fathers asked a Domine of theirs, why they do not allow a Church to the Catholics, he replied unblushingly that if there were any of them, every one would frequent it. And in Betavia their Secretary said to another Father of the Society [of Jesus], that Father Becano was a prophet, because the chief men of Holland and of those States were Atheists.

They also say that if the whole capital of a Company were forthwith all involved in war, before previously receiving any profits wherewith to cover the expenses, it could not fail to go to ruin, before it was firm established. I confess I do not understand such arguments. They see that the Hollander [came to India] and that before he had any root therein, he profited by pillage and Commerce, whereby he waged war, and though we have so many roots in India, they think that we shall not be able to do what the other did. I do not determine a time in the midst of so great contingencies, for that must be regulated by the power of the Company, by its conventions, leagues and circumstances, which the course of time will show. The Hollander kept up the blockade of Malacca for 40 years, till he met with an opportunity to attack and carry it. Ceylon cost him 20 years of conquest, before he had finished with the Island, interposing truces as long as they served his purpose. Let the Company be formed, and the riches it has, either in the way of its own capital or of money from others or from leagues with other nations, the more suited will it be to conquer and to obtain better terms from other nations. Provided however, that it will not be so lax as to be satisfied with a little and desist from the greater and the more important. And though many spices of India are in the hand of the Hollander, even England loads 7, 8, or more ships every year, and the Dane and the Frenchman also find a cargo for their ships, though they have not, what we have, the entire commerce of Africa, which in the opinion of all is enough to make a Company very rich in a short time. A Captain of Mozambique made, besides other great revenues, more than 600,000 to 700,000 xeræsins in three years, though he was in debt when he arrived and had to answer for ships and money, and though he did not put into the ports within his jurisdiction a fourth part, or even less, of what he could easily distribute through faithful hands, because in the future he could do much more as the extensive district of Mombasa was not in his jurisdiction. Nor can an argument be made of what took place in recent years, when the King took for himself the trade of the Rios, because everyone knows that in India to rob the King was a Portuguese indulgence, because punishment did not ensue; and this was a thing so well foreseen that no zealous or experienced person approved of it; and the well-intentioned foretold all that happened.

CHAPTER 24.

SOME FURTHER DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE COMPANY ARE EXPOSED

When it is settled by common sense and disinterested reasons, that it is only by a Company that one can maintain and recover India or at least Ceylon; and that by means of it we can get the better of Holland, just as she got the better of us by means of her company, they pass on, in the
first place, to the manner of its Government, and ask whether it is convenient that it should be by 'round Table,' without any priority in votes or offices, or powers, or whether it should be the contrary. And it was always considered convenient, that [the administration] should not be by a round Table, but that there should be a President, with other Assistants who might be called consuls or Deputies or any other [name] that seem good, because the importance of the Government does not depend on this. And because it is not convenient in India to reduce the authority or power of the Viceroys or Governors of the State, they should preside over this, just as they preside over the Board of Revenue, because, otherwise, owing to many and very grave reasons on the one and the other side, I think unnecessary to point out, as I think they are very clear, no good will result.

This was the first point to which the Conde de Odemira objected, as I mentioned already, when he saw the papers which we sent him about the formation of such a company, as he did not know of the other, which had to be presented to the King in secret. Nor do men of business fail to understand that it should be so, but they tell me that they desire His Majesty to confirm one out of two or three persons whom they will have always seemed to me to be the only thing for the King to diminish this Royal right, the more so when one considers that our Lords, the Kings of Portugal, always selected one of the foremost men of the Kingdom for that post, and as the King entrusts the state to him, it seems a sufficient reason to entrust to him the Government of the Company. And he will proceed the more cautiously, the more interested superintendents he sees at his side. Now I am sure, no Portuguese gentleman will accept this post, unless he is appointed by the King alone, since such has always been their privilege. But as this depends on the good pleasure of the King, it is enough to suggest it, so that His Majesty may choose the best, determining also the manner of his emoluments and pay, and whether he should have a share in the Company, because we do not pretend to give instructions here, but only to point out the conveniences and difficulties, leaving the decision to the one who has to settle them.

But as so large a machinery cannot be moved and managed by one single man, it is necessary to give him many assistants, to whom he can entrust the work, namely a Controller of the Revenue and capital of the Company; another over the docks, another over the troops, another Auditor-General, with the powers that are wont to be given in armies, without withdrawing from the Viceroy or Governor the power of a Captain-General over those of the Company. A Secretary and other lesser officers are also necessary, according to the needs of the number and the working of such a large concern. And what is said of India holds good also in the same way of Portugal, where it must be settled whether the votes of the Assistants, Deputies or Consuls are decisive or consultative, and whether it is the obligation of the President to follow either all or the majority, and other difficulties that spring from a Government of this kind.

In the second place, they point out the payment for services. And it does not seem a matter for doubt that there must be a distinction between pay and rewards, since it is clear that in so far as they serve the Company, they must be paid by it, and it must be settled what must be given to the Deputies and other Ministers of the Board of Government and its administrators, how much to the Generals [appointed] for particular enterprises, the Captains-Major, Admirals, Chief Officers and Captains of sea and of war, and other officers of the militia; to the soldiers, and sailors, and to those who handle the artillery; and whether these payments must be made only in money, or whether there should be some freedom in this matter, especially as regards the voyages to Portugal, and for how many years of service they should be bound.

Speaking now of gifts, the liberality of our Lords the Kings of Portugal always bestowed special gifts over and above the pay, which they give their lieges as long as they served, to those who specially distinguished themselves by their valour or ability or quality. And although the services of India were wont to be remunerated in India, and many praças are now lost, and only Castilians must be admitted to those that remain, without liberty to trade, from which arose the violations and injustices which depopulated them completely or in part, nevertheless what remains is not so little, but that many still remain to be given, and service lands are better expended on those who serve in this arduous conquest than on those persons who never sailed out of the bars and never saw the enemy face to face. And if in Ceylon, in the villages dedicated to the Pagodes, there be set up commanderies, as we have already pointed out, the King can reward the deserving therewith, and also with such others as seems best to reserve for that purpose. And generally [speaking] in all Kingdoms and Monarchies as long as there is much to give, there will be no lack of claimants, or of those
who complain of want of equity, because no one thinks that he is inferior to another, but when the door is altogether or partly closed, everyone will be content with the opening that is before him.

And if we reflect on the administration of Holland, in this Company of theirs, pay there is, but besides that there are no gifts, and [yet] they never lacked either their own countrymen or foreigners to serve them. For already the Viceroy Pero de Silva sent Amaro Rodriguez to the South to ascertain the number of troops the Batavian had in India, and he found that in the garrisons of their praças and in ships, there would be between 10 to 12,000 men. And there is no doubt that at present there are rather more than less, though being distributed over many praças [the force] is more enfeebled, as we experienced in the many præas which we kept up with a very small garrison of soldiers or of casados only and pensioners. And though the Hollander's make up, for the scantiness of their garrisons by the good fortifications they erect, and by good provision of victuals, arms, and munitions, and more especially by their maritime force, which is always effective, since it is asserted that they always have in Betavia about 25 large-sized ships only to sail in case of any danger, over and above the squadrons wherewith in due time they undertake some new enterprises, neither are these ships provided with their full crew, nor has the Batavie more than a thousand European troops, nor can the ships be made ready without taking in the men who are distributed in garrisons and other bases. But they make all these expenses in order that they may drive terror into India, and that there may be less delay in hastening where necessity calls. It is, however, a great proof of the amount of revenue that India yields them, and of the plenty they have wherewith to pay those who serve them, in which consists, as we said, all the gifts of their Company. If it will therefore not be a strange thing, if our company is administered in the same way, at least so long as there is such a terrible enemy of the Portuguese conquests. For if some people marvel at their policy and administration, what reasons can they allege for condemning in us what they admire in them? Let them leave aside injustice, but in all other things let them act like Hollanders, and I assure them that they will get the better of them, and that in India [the Hollanders] will be no more permanent than they were in Brazil and in Angola, unless they want to persevere in a mistake so gross, and a blindness so manifest, as knowing the error and persisting in the disorder.

Another question is whether it is good to admit into this company foreign capital of Europe or India. For some say: 'What profit can we derive by shedding our blood and losing our lives to augment other people's capital? And what profit shall we gain by enriching other nations or potentates?' From these I only ask whether Portugal in her present state, or even in greater prosperity, can withstand the forces of Holland in India without foreign help? If they say she can do so, the proposed difficulties disappear: if they admit that another mightier power is necessary, then their objections have no force, for no one fails to see how great is the danger to that which we still hold in India, because of the war they make on us with their own and with foreign arms, and that their greatest object is to drive us completely out of India, and to become absolute Lords of this conquest and this commerce. Let it not seem to any one that the reason why they disregard us for the present is the little harm they receive from us, because it is in order that they may have a better opportunity of increasing their might so as not to be vanquished by any military expedition that seeks them. For after making peace with the Portuguese, they never keep pace with the Natives. They made themselves Lords of Macassar, they took Bantaé, they attacked Quezume and already, they say, they have laid siege to Mussulpadá, and want to begin a praça there, despising among other Kings, the might of Persia, though with ill success, and that of the King of Golconda, imposing that yoke on him in order to become Lords of the best cloth of India, making for themselves a monopoly of the Diamonds and other great riches of that Kingdom, and profiting by the distraction of the Moguls' war, as he of Golconda, being already tributary of the latter, was so unmoved that he is unable to make any considerable resistance.

Let Portugal be undeceived [of its belief] that Holland takes no notice of the Portuguese in India in order to spare them, [since it is] in order to turn them out of it with greater security [and also] any other European nation whatever, and to root itself in this Orient in such fashion as to get the better of all, and to prevent any progress of the Catholic Faith. Not even in the time of the truce did they treat us like friends, nor did they appear in our ports, rather, they refused us [admittance to] theirs, and on some pretence or other, even though it might have been nothing more than the striking or not striking a flag, when it served their turn, they profited by our negligence, and took occasion to fall upon us unexpectedly and carry off all that remained to us. It always seemed to me a good thing, that we should have
recourse to God and put our trust in His Divine protection, but I do not approve of our relying on Miracles alone, because God ever wishes that secondary causes should ever be applied, and we have seen the downfall of many a Christian Kingdom of greater might and wealth than the State of India ever reached.

But to consider independently this objection, which they make, to admitting foreign capital into this new Company, it seems certain that it must not be offered to those nations who have already entered India, and those from whom we have anything to fear, because as we only deal in commerce, so long as this is not prevented, they only seek to increase their own. Those, however, who do not attempt to enter India, can be of no prejudice to us either in Portugal or in the conquests, however much they prosper. But in India, if the capital comes from Princes, they would not like to arm us against themselves, first in order afterwards to retaliate by means of what they gained by our means; if the capital comes from Gujarates and from Bannee merchants, those people have never cared for war but only for commerce; and it will be a good plan indeed if we become masters of India with the capital of Indra itself; and if we question the Hollanders, we shall find that they began and continue their company in the same way, and that they consider it a matter of Statecraft to manage the capital of some of the Potentates of the Orient, so that by that dependence they may make them put up with the insolences and violence they do to them. Finally one cannot reprove what the whole of Europe approves by various banks of commerce [consisting of] their own and foreign capital; and what experience and reason have proved to be a wise course in other nations, cannot be a mistake in our case.

They also object to the limit that must be placed to the capital of this company, which can have diverse meanings. The first is a minimum that must be accepted from each shareholder in order to facilitate the accounts of so great a business. The best opinion in this matter can be given by men of business, who have experience in such things. It would seem good, however, not to give a share to any individual for less than two thousand crusados; and if some people wish to invest less, let them settle among themselves.

The other meaning is: what is the limit that must be set to the total capital of the Company, because some people think that if the capital were several millions, there is no place now in which to invest it or to divert or to trade with it.

This doubt is strengthened by the fact that there are very few substances brought from Portugal to India, in which it can be invested to any considerable extent; and in India, if we exclude Africa, the greater part of the merchandise is in the hands of the Hollanders and of other European nations who resort to this commerce: and the policy of Holland is such that when they were at war with the English, they sold in the same harbours in which the latter were trading, and at a very much lower price, the same substances in which the English traded, merely to destroy them, inflicting that loss on themselves in the hope of greater profit in other things, so that the British might not have profits; and many find themselves so embarrassed by this difficulty that they do not see a way out of it; and they come to the conclusion that if the capital be great, there will be greater loss, and if little, it must be of no consequence. There is no arguing with people who always jump from one extreme to the other without halting at the mean whereby great enterprises can, and must, be promoted.

The first thing that must be settled is, that just as this company is founded for India, so its principal dealing and commerce must be in India, as we see in the case of that of Holland. And as at present we are at peace with almost all the nations of India and of Europe, we shall not knock at the door of any friendly nation without it being opened to us, when they understand that we do not go with armed forces against them. Therefore, except for the few ports of the Turk in the Red Sea, and those which we lost in Arabia, unless there is some agreement, those of Ceylon and of the Maldives, which the Hollanders enjoy completely under the title of Conquest, and those of Japan to which it is hoped we shall soon be admitted, in all the other ports of Africa on the continent as well as on the islands, and of Asia likewise, any well-manned nave of ours can trade with security. And there are so many [such ports] and so profitable and so rich the merchandise that, when exchanged in India, they will not fail to yield great wealth. They oppose this with the [example of] various English companies that were founded in a few years and were soon destroyed, and [they say] that the same might happen to us, since we are not shrewder merchants and traders than they. I shall not be able to give a full explanation of the reasons for these vicissitudes, for I do not know what happened in England. | I know that the first company made war on the Portuguese, which caused it grave loss, and that when peace was made, Captain Ethna- P 419 came at once with 8 ships, having founded another company | 142 | 03-25
about which they do not speak now, and we presume that it was undone at the request of the first. Afterwards they formed others, and one came again a short time ago, and we only see that they persevere in this trade, although they are chartered ships, and that they would not have continued it, if they received no profit therefrom, which is the chief object, whatever be the reason for their chargeableness, and they never abandoned their factories in which they have cargo ready to be quickly taken, and make their voyages in due season; so much is certain, the rest is uncertain conjecture, so far as we are concerned.

Another thing that must be settled is, that the seas of Europe must not remain enchanted ones for us, but just as the English and the Hollanders voyage therein and trade on the one and the other coast of the Mediterranean sea, in the channel of Flanders and in the seaports of France, England, Ireland, and on the one and the other coast of the North Sea, as far as the most remote bounds of Livonia, Muscovy and Sweden, trading in those harbours with the merchandise they take from India; and before they had those men to buy them in Lisbon, bringing the products which are exported from the ports of the North; so also must we do, because we cannot suffer loss in what gives them profit, even when bought from us. And it will not turn out as it happened to the great fleet of Filipe II. commanded by the Duke of Medinasidonia, which came to grief in the channel of Flanders and on the coasts of England and Ireland, because there were no pilots who had any knowledge of those seas. And at present, if we look for pilots in Portugal, rare will be the one who knows the way to the Levant or to the North. And if we frequent these ports, we can bring to India what the foreigners bring of things that have value here, though as the voyage is so long, the cargo that needs most space will usually be the provisions. Of other merchandise I do not speak, because it is not unknown in Portugal, and it is well known that there was always profit in gold, silver, amber, coral, emeralds, woven fabrics and brocade, and other fine cloths of good colour. And because experience has shown that the heat of the ships' hold not only corrupts the provisions, but even damages everything else, foreigners were wont to open trapdoors on deck with iron gratings, through which in time of fair weather they get air, but which are closed in time of storm, a trifling precaution which I always considered to be of great importance, like others which they made use of and which we must imitate and not despise, both for the conservation of health as well as the

**BOOK 6.**

durability of the ships, since we know that their ships succeeded in making 14 and 15 voyages to India, and that ours were very fortunate, if they made two, all on account of the scanty care they took of them, whereby the King lost many millions, without being able to make up for that waste owing to the sheer neglect of our Government. Let them do what others do and we shall keep our ships for many years.

They again insist on the policy of the Hollanders who can undersell the substances we sell wheresoever we go, in the manner described. It is however certain that they will not succeed, if we wrest them from their hands, which is the principal object of the plan I propose. Nor will they be able to forestall our counsels, if these are kept secret. Nor does it seem possible that they can do so in such a variety of harbours and, least of all in those of the nations with whom they wage war in India. And everything is reduced to uncertainty in time of peace, and determination in time of war, because if all our ships of commerce are well provided with artillery and have sufficient crews, which is generally lacking in theirs, in those seas in which they think themselves safe, they will never dare to take us by surprise. Nor can this take place in the case of perpetual commerce, for it is idle to imagine that they can thrive by such losses, and if they sometimes did it to the English, it was only to prevent them from entering some port, and all this fear is more an echo rather than a voice, an accident rather than a substance. Let us pass now to the third meaning of the foregoing objection.

**CHAPTER 25.**

The same Subject continued

The third meaning which the preceding question can have is with regard to time: Whether it will be convenient to increase in years to come the total capital of the company, and in how many years its profits should be distributed. The first question is easy to answer, because if experience shows that with large capital the gains will be greater, there is every reason for increase, because the greater it is, the greater will the profit be, and the greater the power, the greater its effects...
in peace and war. And this needs no further discussion. As for the distribution of gains, this also depends on the future, because while this commerce is being established in Europe and India, and the whole machinery provided, it will be necessary to spend the greater part of it. Wherefore it would seem that at least for the first time the shareholders should not be paid the profits, till at least ten years are past, the first share and entrance capital being always kept intact, and giving every year a balance [sheet] of receipts and expenses so as to see what the gain is. In the first years it will happen as in the case of the Captains of Moçambique, when they had in their hands the commerce of the district, though it was a much smaller affair than the company we are concerned with. Because in the first two years, little came back into their hands out of what had passed through them, and all the reaping was in the third year, and that in the case of a trade that was already going on and established. Wherefore there is no reason to wonder when one sees that we fix a longer time, since we are concerned with a greater organisation and a greater traffic, which has for the most part still to be settled. Though we do not fix [a period], experienced men can decide what is best, and when the first balance [sheet] is passed, they can decide whether others should be made in shorter periods, and whether a still longer time must elapse before beginning to satisfy the shareholders, for as all these things depend on contingencies of experience and on the wishes of the persons interested, the wisest course must be decided on according to that.

They ask also: What will be the part of His Majesty in this Company? And now we are not speaking of the distribution of rewards, which was already discussed, but of the capital in money, and especially of custom duties and other profits which might accrue to the Crown by this new commerce, and of the royal prerogative of the conquest. And the first thing to observe is, that acknowledging myself a liege, I do not pretend to set bounds to the Royal pleasure, but that urged by zeal for the commonweal, I point out what seems to me to be most convenient for the welfare of the Crown and the restoration of India. And as for money, the Ministers of His Majesty can best decide, though I am sure that the capital of the King will have greater profit if it is put into this concern. About custom duties, especially in India, there is greater difficulty, and the same is seen in the case of the revenues of the lands we possess. Because either we must undo what we call the State, or it must be as before, and neither the one nor the other seems to be of greater profit to the Company, because
security. And as some vessels of war and rowing vessels are always necessary to convoy the Flotilla [of trading ships], and as open ships can with a little skill be turned into closed galliots, it is convenient that the King should not only keep up the necessary galliots for that purpose, but also a sufficient number of these vessels of war in the docks for reinforcing and for other purposes that present themselves.

I must remark, however, that when our rowing vessels used triangular or Lateen sails, they gave chase to the lightest Malavar parós, which did not take place afterwards when they used only square sails, [a practice] reproved by the veteran Captains and those well versed in the former warfare which we waged in India. And even now those who know how to manipulate the rigging of their rowing banks never let themselves be overtaken by any Hollander ship, because when becalmed, they row and get to windward, and when they go right before the wind, no ship can catch them, and for lack of this experience many were lost. I speak of galliots in which the men can take cover in war, fight with their feet firmly placed on deck, and protected from Sun and rain, and able to carry a complement of guns, which was quite the contrary in truncated rowing vessels; and I do not speak of Galleys, both because a frigate is more effective with the same crew, and because they are not used in the Oceanic sea, nor do the oarsmen of India row them well.

Finally, they say, that we cannot deny that the Hollanders are soldiers, that they have good Officers for war both on land and sea, that they are very clever in navigation and in handling artillery, and that as their power in India is so great, and they are determined in a last emergency to put their whole force on the sea, it will be so difficult to oppose them with a force sufficient to vanquish and defeat them altogether. And as often as war broke out with them and we went to seek them out in their home, even though it may be only in Ceylon, we found all their forces pitted against us, as if they were in need of all to defend them against the Portuguese. I do not know which to blame here, whether it is our presumption or our neglect, because if any Portuguese is asked whether he thinks they are more valiant than the Portuguese, he will certainly say, No, and that he is ready to cross swords with two or three of the best of that nation put together. If he is asked whether they are better skilled than we in the management of ships and artillery and other fire-arms, he will unhesitatingly say, No. But it must be admitted that discipline and exercise, dexterity and knowledge, of both the one and the other [kind of] warfarce, give them the advantage in both the one and the other, and to such an extent that we saw here an English document in which it was said with great surprise, that it is a notable fact that the French now vied with the Hollanders with equal dexterity in the battle of Sicilia; because these two nations pretend to be the best at that business, though it is well-known that there are nowhere better soldiers than in France. Now we come to the conclusion that everything depends on discipline, practice, and dexterity. From which I infer, that this defect in us springs only from our negligence. Because if the soldiers had been exercised during the voyage to India and in India, to use musketry and handle the spear and sword and other exercises of war, they would not have shown themselves so awkward in battle. And if the naval men had been properly exercised in their task and in the management of ships of war, when there was a battle with the Hollanders who seem to guide them by reins; if they knew also the manner of setting fire to any enemy ship without danger to themselves, and how they must board them; and if the gunners had been men practiced to that art, in which there is not a little to learn in order to be as clever as the English gunners of the Flag-ship St. George, who carried off the flag of the Prince Robert at the first shot, and the top mast at the second in the bar of Lisbon, and if everyone had made it a point to know everything, the soldiers how to manage a ship, how to pilot, and how to handle guns, and the mariner and the gunner the other functions, so that in case of need they could help anywhere, as Cornelius Magalith boasted when he said that he had 150 captains, 150 soldiers, 150 mariners, and 150 gunners, because the 150 men whom he had, knew how to do everything, the Author of the 'Hollander Republic' would not have insulted us by falsely relating that a Mogul King had said that a single Hollander was worth seven Portuguese. But when I see that the soldiers are not exercised in the ships during the voyage nor in military service in India, and that there is not in the whole of India a fencing school, that the pilots have no knowledge at all of mathematics, that the mariners and gunners are often Lascars taken from the servants' hall of the mighty ones; what can we expect from such as these in time of war?

Artillery was less used at the time when we came to India, and [yet] the Portuguese were most dexterous in handling it, as may be seen from our histories. But now when it is greatly improved, and when we are most in need of the arts, the negligence and carelessness is greater. And as we have not men ready for everything, we have need of a larger number of men for any naval battle, and the greater part of them,
of a large bateau, because few are the harbours where it can be moored, and if it strikes a rock, it is damaged beyond repair. And though experience has shown that wooden wedges, well fastened, preserve the timber better than nailwork, and make the ship lighter and cost less, I fail to understand why we object to that structure, and do not use iron only when it is absolutely necessary. They make their rigging thinner, because it is better twisted, better wrought, and consists of more strands than ours, which though thicker is much weaker, more bulky, and the wind makes a greater impression on it. And they take great care not to let it rot through the heat of the hold, tarring it often, and the mast every 15 days, being usually of one single piece of wood, because when saturated with tar they are more durable and less corruptible, which we did not do with ours though they are made of divers pieces of wood, and when penetrated by the heat of the sun and the damp of rain, they soon rot and at the first atom the ship remains masterless. It might seem unnecessary to speak of these things, but so great are the losses and the consequences resulting from these disorders, that they must not be considered trifling things but matters of very great moment. And if zeal for the common welfare on the one hand and on the other a knowledge of these things had remedied them, we should not have had to acknowledge any inequality in this war.

It is an inviolable rule amongst them not to load a ship more than she can hold, always leaving the waterline exposed, and even on the rudder they have numbers to guide them in this matter. But the ambition of individuals was so great that in this bar, when the Viceroy D. Philipe Mascarenhas ordered Joã de Costa Valente to be warned to take heed that the Galleon S. Joã was already overloaded, seeing that this did not move him, he ordered some packets of rough Diamonds belonging to him to be removed. These admonitions from one who understood the matter, did not suffice to make him heed the danger, and when he was a little way off the bar, she went to the bottom of the sea either because water entered through the hawse-holes or through the port holes of the stern, or from both; and not a few similar cases are recounted in India. And though the ships should ever be prompt and ready for sailing and for war, when they leave the harbour and even on the voyage, they are so encumbered that the guns can neither move on their carriages nor are ready on deck. And let him who does not see how easily this is remedied go on board a foreign ship and he will realize it, for they are completely ready for action, because of the cleanliness
they observe, as if they were in their homes, washing them every day, and if they happen to be scorched by the sun, they cool them with water, lest the caulking dissolve by the heat of the Sun. These are matters which require little talk but great zeal and some trouble. And when they come on board our transport ships and see how greatly they are encumbered and how little cleanliness there is, quite contrary to the customs they observe, they are not only surprised, but even greatly shocked that among civilised people no heed is paid to the destruction that results both to lives and ships.

CHAPTER 26.
LAST OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THIS MATTER

In order to enable one to judge fully [the subject of] the foregoing discourse, we shall conclude this work with an account, such as we were able to obtain, of the might of Holland in India, and especially in Ceylon, and with a record of what that Island, Jafananpata or Manar yielded us as revenue. Because as that nation has little or no dealings in our ports, and because of the caution with which it deals with us, concealing everything that concerns their government and their dispositions, and because after the loss of Malaca, the Portuguese never traversed that part of the Archipelago, we cannot give a detailed account of the might on sea and land which they maintain throughout the extent of India. Two things, however, are quite certain in this matter. The first, that from Camar to the Persian Gulf, and throughout the whole of Arabia and Africa as far as the Cape of Good Hope, they have no praca whatever, but only factories in Mocha and on the Coast of India, and that they have recently been excluded from Persia. The other certain point is, that they do not always maintain in India anything more than the usual garrisons, and that when they desire to undertake some new war, they bring fresh troops from Holland, because they do not care to maintain unnecessary troops, but only to reinforce with the usual reinforcement, the garrisons and the crew of the merchant ships which even in war time are not very numerous, and much less in peace, because they know how to manage with few men skilled in all the necessary duties. But as this company has a very large capital, and as it is not impossible for it to undertake various invasions, as was seen when they at the same time blockaded the bar of Goa to impede reinforcements, and made war on us in Malaca and in Ceylon, and almost at the same time they lost a great squadron in Malaca and placed another in defence of Tayau in the Island of Formosa, which the Chineho conquered—nor does any enterprise of importance fail to cost them great expense and preparation—as Francisco Caron admitted after taking Cingho, when he said to many of our Religious: That if D. Antonio Macarinhas had kept the order of his Brother there would have been consumed there a squadron which was prepared during 7 years—from which it appears, however, that for any fresh enterprise it is necessary to keep a silence similar to that which King D. Jose I kept, when he marched upon Ceuta; because neither is there in Holland any lack of intelligence of what is being made ready in Portugal, nor is there in Europe any lack of reasons for getting a fleet ready under a similar pretence. For this reason I will here give only such information as I was able to gather regarding their ordinary garrisons, according to the information of a Holland pilot who serves the State with fidelity and without hope of returning to his people, remarking that all the pracas and factories have officers engaged in the government and management of them. And beginning with the Archipelago; in the Island of Macchiem and of Bachi (there are) the fortalice of Ternante with 40 pieces and 80 soldiers; the fortalice of Ambayno, 50 pieces, 100 soldiers. Banda, with a fortalice, 50 pieces, 100 soldiers. In the Island of Burro, a stockade, 7, 20; in the Island of Plouora, abandoned by the English, 2, 10; in Bima a stockade, 8, 30; in the Island of Manseca, the fortalice of Rotarda, 50, 300. Emgoa of Maccaur, the palace of the King, with some stockades and some pieces and soldiers. The same in the coast of Serra. In larger Java, Jacatra, 400 pieces, 4,500 soldiers, besides free people. But though this is their capital in India, all the Portuguese who returned thence in these last years, say that there are not more than 1,500 soldiers, and the prisoners of Galle already reckoned them at 1,500. In the same bay there is Betavia, half a league to the North, with 40 pieces, 150 soldiers. On the Eastern side on the river Anjol, a praca with 24 pieces and 80 soldiers. Nortste, half a league behind Jacatra, 20, 50. Half a league to the West, the praca Regiasqui, 24, 40. On the Western side, on the river Anquee, a praca of the same name, 30, 80. To the South-west a praca (called) the star of the North, 24, 60. Half a league behind it, the praca Feyfue, 40, 100. These pracas are always well garrisoned, so that thence they can reinforce the others. On an island three leagues from Betavia, 300 men besides caulkers are at work, and it has 32 pieces. Bantao
with stockades and redoubts, 150 pieces, 800 soldiers. On the river of Cayva, a stockade, 20–50. On the river Andramayo, a stockade, 20–50. On the Mount of Tegul, a stockade, 20–50. On the river Samaren, a stockade, 24–60. In the island Cuai they make galliots and other small vessels, 20 carpenters; and in the stockade there are 16–40. In the fortalice of Iapara, 80–400. In the stockade of Rambao, where 12 carpenters are building small vessels, 20–80. In the Bay of Gracu, a stockade with 16–50. Upon the river of Sorrenaya, a stockade on the Mount, 30–100. In the City of Cartacur of Neugrat, twenty leagues inland, where the King lives, a guard of 100 soldiers. It must have been during the peace, because they are almost always at war. In Malaca, 150 pieces, 500 men. Years ago our travellers gave them a lesser number. In the stockade of Bangacal, 24 pieces. On the river of Pera, a ship with 80 pieces, and 100 men. In the island Puladeden, a stockade, 16–40. On the coast of Siam, the factory of Ligor from which comes tin. A little further a factory with a few men. In Siam, a factory with some pieces and 60 men. In Tunkin, a factory with its officials. On the river Queque of China, a factory, 3–15. But for many years they were not allowed any commerce and they only trade in the neighbouring Islands. Now they say it is open to all, but they were not allowed a praça. In Japan, a factory with 15 men, in which they get little profit and much contempt. In Samatra, upon the strait of Malaca, on the river Palembang, a fortalice with 20 men and some pieces. In the river of Jambe, a factory with 20 men and some pieces. On the outer side Minas Sifida, with some people and labourers, which must be [a mine of] gold. The fortalice Pedam, 40–100. A little further to the South, in the Island Perelineco, a stockade 15–40. In Arabia at Moca a factory with 5 men. In Bacora, another, with 3. In Persia and in Comoro, a factory with 6 pieces, 25 men. In Aspa, a factory with a factor and two clerks. But after they wanted to take Quezuma, the Persians did not listen to their ambassadors, nor is he likely to receive them into his territories. In the lands of the Mogul they have the factory of Surat, with 7 small pieces and 40 men. In Beganagar, a factory with 3 or 4 men. The same in Andabata. In Vingurla, nine leagues to the North of Goa, a factory with 6 pieces and 10 men, and because we did not want to break with Dialza, we never expelled them from it. In Barcao, a factory with 4 men. In Canar, a fortalice with 24 pieces and about 30 men. The Samori drove them from a fortalice of Panane. In Cranganor, a factory with 10 pieces and some 20 men. In Cokim, a fortalice with 60 pieces and 200 soldiers. Others say there are less. In Porca, a factory with 2 or 3 officers. In Calicoorla, a fortalice with 5 or 6 men. In Coula, a fortalice with 20 pieces and 60 soldiers [but usually there are less]. In Manapar, a factory with 2 or 3 officers. In Tutunuram a fortalice, about 30 pieces 100 soldiers. In the Coast of Choromandel, Negapatao with a fortalice and stockade, 20 pieces, 500 soldiers. Everybody thinks the number is too much. In Porto Novo, a factory with 6 small pieces and about 20 men. Six leagues further, a factory in Currur with 7 pieces and 20 men. In Tegnapatao, a factory, 16 pieces, 50 men. In Soscrapatao, another large factory with two bastions, 16 pieces, 50 men. The fortalice of Paliceaste and Muquleapatao, two houses with native merchants. In Muqulepatao, a factory with 6 pieces and about 50 men. In the same place, a fortalice which they built in time of the war which the Mogul began to make on the King of Golconda, with 16 pieces and 50 soldiers. And as they have made peace, it is not yet known whether it still lasts. On the river of Nayaapur, a factory with 5 pieces, where there is a smithy with more than 50 smiths for the provision of the ships. Three leagues inland, in Balicycol, another factory where they make cording and other tackle and there will be 16 persons. In the City of Daorso, six leagues inland, another factory with 50 small pieces and their officers. In the City of Bimbalapatao, another factory with 2 pieces and 7 men. Then in Bengal on the coast of Bajaro, a factory with 3 men. Another in Pipi, with 8 others. Another in Vgalim with 4 pieces and about 40 men. Further inland in Cacamebezo, another with large trade and about 3 men. In Dasca the capital of Diva, another factory of great commerce and about 10 men. In the port of Ugul there comes every year about 40 sail of lesser size, on account of the entrance, whence they take many provisions, cloths and quilts, which they make in their factories.

CHAPTER 27.

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED

Before we speak of what the Hollanders possess in Ceylon, we shall give an account of the revenues which those lands, including the Island of Manar, yielded to the Crown of Portugal, so that one may better understand the profit which the Hollander draw from it. As at the time we were in Ceylon,
warfare was almost continual, our possession of the four chief Dissâvas varied considerably, and very short was our hold on some of the highlands and on the lands of the opposite coast, both of Bate-calou and Triquilemale; and lands which are plundered and ruined could not, even in time of peace, be of great profit, as the poor Natives had no cattle and other necessaries for cultivation. Added to this were the violences and injustices [already] related. The dues of these lands always served as an acknowledgment of dominion rather than as a [source of] utility to the Crown, as the Ministers of revenue did not dare to lay a greater burden on the foreyros. And though His Majesty passed various provisions for the government of those lands, and sent as Vedor da fazer da Antaê Vaz Freyre, who in the year 1613 was still in Columbo, carrying on this distribution, and though other Vedores of the Royal fazenda had the same commission, as is shown by the documents which are still preserved in the casa do dos contos of Goa, I will state here only the revenues which were then distributed by the Viceroy, D. Phelipe Mascarenhas, who was nominated Viceroy when he was in Ceylon, and began to govern from there, at a time when the Island was already in the state which this History shows, and when what it yielded in the time of General Constantino de Sâ de Noronha was already known. This I will do briefly because they are described at great length in the tombo which the Viceroy made of what is properly called Ceylon, as well as of Jafananpatâo and Manâr.

The dues of Ceylon amounted to 11,264 xerainos. The petty rents of Columbo, 35. The income from the passes of Calaturé, Panituré and Angaratota, 43 xerainos. The fishing rents of Vellari, Macônê, Paygal and Angabad, 108. The revenues of tithes of palm groves and gardens, 100. The rents of the village Cutapató, 10. Of the port of Putalâ and Chilâo, 41. Of the port of Caymel and Nigumbo, 267. The fishing rents of Madampé, 13. From the tithes of fish from Columbo to Mutual, 301, of the port of Alicaê, 54. From what was recovered as customs from the port of Gâle, 70. The same from the port of Beligaê, 237, the same from Maturê, 594. From the dues and customs of Pencuariê, 50. From the Mamâda and from the Chaleas, 216. From the residents of the Agra, 208. From the Natives of Beligaê, 90. From the Custom House of Columbo, 7,608. From Decussus and Marâlas and dues, 413. From the boutiques and thatched huts of S. Lourenço, 17. From 926 bares of cinnamon at the rate of 121 xerainos, which the foreyros paid over and above the quit rents, and five babars as discount for Decussus and other dues of the villages and 800 bahars of the Chaleas of Mabâda at the rate of 120 xerainos a bahar, 11,120 xerainos. From 23 candis three paras and six measures of rice at the rate of 20 xerainos a candil which was paid by the Archde of the village of Cutapató and by the inhabitants of Agra, 400. From the thirteen amanos of paddy at the rate of two xerainos an amana which was paid by the inhabitants of Agra, 26. From 36 amanos of areca at the rate of eight, which the foreyros paid, and one which the inhabitants of Agra paid, and 361 which the Natives of Beligaê paid, and 26 and a half which the Natives of Mananarita and Gampa paid, at the rate of two xerainos an amana, 3,865. From the eight measures of butter, three to the xerain, which the foreyros paid, 24. From 33 elefantes and aleas at an average of 1,500 xerainos, 34,500. From the seven measures of oil from the inhabitants of Agra, three measures a larin, 13. From the 3,588 lumps of iron, four to the larin, of which the foreyros paid 3,160, and the Chaleas of the Mabâda, 428, 299. From the thirteen bahars of cinnamon, a bahar at 220 xerainos, from the embellishments, 2,860. From the village Galmanor of the Chaleas of Madampé, 2 larinís. The whole amount, omitting the details of laris and fanos, comes to 175,073. 1. 01.

Gemming was also rented to a Vidaâ who paid 700 assorted topazes, a thousand sapphires, eighteen cat's-eyes, fifty eight rubies, 8,000 stones of all sorts, in which were included three packets of seed pearls from the Fishery. There were sold 4,312 coconuts from the rents of the King's palm grove called Patangori, 150 bunches of Indian figs and 28,000 leaves of betel of Buligama and 16 and a half lumps of steel from the custom house revenues.

REVENUES OF JAFANAPATAO

From the quit rents of Jafananpatâo, 1,380 pardos. From the quit rents of the Vaní, 302. From the rents, 8,156. From the Province of Beligama, 9,637. From the Province of Tenerache, 3,491. From the Province of Badamarache, 2,953. From the Province of Pachelapali, 2,421. These rents of the Kingdom and of the Vaní amount in all to 28,341. 4. 12.

From this must be deducted 2,171 pardos, one chacarado and eight and a half mará 1 which the foreyros of Cardiva, Tenaíva, and those who had villages in that Kingdom used

1 Sin. m, the Tamil m, or 1-20th. A Jaffna-coin of account, the twentieth of the chacarado.
to enjoy. And there remained 26,170 pardaos, three chacaroés, and four maz 26,170.3.04. The pensioners used also to pay 37 aleas, which when sold at an average at 250 pardaos, the least price in those days, made 9,250 pardaos, which when added to the above total make 35,420 pardaos, three chacaroés, and four maz 35,420.3.04.

Revenues of the Island of Manár and Lands of Mantóta

The rent from tobacco, 1,535 pardaos, 1,535 at ten fanoés a pardao. From the custom house, 383 Pardaos. From the tobacco of Mantóta, in the large island of Ceylon, 300. From the passage of that channel, 191. From the rent of the Tarag, 309. From the tithes of Mantóta, 60. From the rent of urucus [arrack], 50. To the dues on the cattle that went to Colombo, 13. From the quit rents of the island, 487. From the quit rents of Mantóta, 289. From 20 bahays of xayo rented out, 100. From the pararés of the Fishery of seed pearls, 6,000. From the fines of Jures and Pagans, 1,277. From the rent of the purse, 273. From the rent of the bazar, 70. From the rent of the Chapa, 40. From the rent of the cleaning, 20. From the tithes of the island, 10. Which, with details omitted, make 11,599.3.00.

In the lands of Mantóta, annually they hunted 30 aleas, which being sold at the price mentioned, made 7,500 pardaos, which when added to the preceding make, 19,099 pardaos and three fanoés 19,099.3.00.

These were the revenues of Ceylon, Jafanapatao, and Manár, to which the lands of Mantóta were subject, though these and the lands of the Vani, and the other lowlands on the North side were greatly depopulated as a result of the preceding wars and the tyrannies of the Pagan Kings, the violence and the violence and the lack of interest of the Portuguese; and the same was to be seen in the other lands of Ceylon, as we have pointed out. It is quite manifest that these rents are very little for so large and so fertile lands, from which are derived not only the profits of cultivation usual in other lands but also the profits of drugs and spices of such great value, as we have declared, enough to make a Kingdom very rich, if there had been peace, population and cultivation and good government, besides the other emoluments we have left recorded.

What the Hollanders get at present is as uncertain as the little we know of their government. What is certain is only this, that they are complete Lords of the island of Manár and that of Mantóta annexed to that government, and of what belonged to the Kingdom of Jafanapatao, and that their industry is such, they say, that even by means of slaves brought from the mainland, they increase the cultivation of that Kingdom; and that they have made a monopoly of xayo which yields them much money. It is also affirmed as certain that they keep up all our praças and in better state than that in which we erected them. Because after having given up Batecolau and Triquilimalé, according to the convention they made with the King of Canjia, because they failed to have over Colombo and the person of Gaspar Figueura de Souza, as they had promised, they were ever at war: and to avenge themselves, they retook the praças of Batecolau and Triquilimalé, and the King detained two other Ambassadors, as he had already done to Commodore Coster after the capture of Gâle.

It is however generally reported that in the other ports of the island they have built at least stockades and have made a monopoly of salt, and it will be so with the rest, as is their wont. But we do not know that they refuse salt altogether to those of Canjia, or that they have power in that part to prevent them [from taking salt] from the salt pans of Paneva. About what they hold in the interior of the four chief Provinces of Maturé, Sofigaó, Four and Seven Corlas there is notable uncertainty in what they say; and we know from experience that they do not bring to this India any fine cinnamon of Ceylon; and it does not seem likely that if they were Lords of it, they would reject the profit they would get in this India. However the same Hollanders pilot and others of their nation say as follows:—

They have in Manár a fortalice with 20 pieces and about 80 soldiers. In Calpitim, a stockade, 10 pieces, 30 soldiers. In Nigumbo, a fortalice, 20-80. In Colombo, a fortalice, 140 pieces and about 500 soldiers. Others give it less. In Malvina, a stockade, 20-80. Two leagues further, on the same river, the stockade of Gurbèle, 10-30. Three leagues further inland, on the mountain Pópe, a stockade, 6-12. In Ceytivaça, a fortalice 18-80. In Ruvela, the last fortalice 20-400. Another six leagues to the North of Malvina, a stockade at the foot of the mountain Dantóta. The stockade of Aranduré, 16-50. In Pancuré, a stockade, 5-20. In Calaturé, a large stockade, 20-50. On the river of Aleriá, another stockade, 10 and about 30 soldiers. In Belotue, another stockade, 5-20. In Rirbirim, a stockade, 6-15. In Guinduré, another, 6-15. In Gâle, a fortalice 80 pieces, 300 soldiers besides free people; [here] also our travellers give it less. In Biligaó, a stockade,
5-15. In Maturê, a large stockade, 24-40. And here they say cinnamon is collected. Two leagues further, the stockade of Dondrä, 6-15. In Sofragaö, a large stockade, 20-80. Near the sea, the stockade of Nivêla with about 20 lascarins. The stockade, Sinicaletendel, 16-60. Batocalou with 49 pieces 150 soldiers besides free people. This is the place of exile for criminals, where they saw much timber. In the bay of Velosbay, some lascarins on watch. In Triquilimalê, after the war with the French, a large praça with 100 pieces and about 350 soldiers. In the Bahia dos Arcos, on top of the Hill, a fortalice with 32 pieces 30 soldiers; and on the one and the other side of the entrance, two breastworks each with 16 pieces, and even thus they could ill prevent an entrance, even though they had 60 men, on account of the great distance. On the side of Velosbay in the south, two stockades, Cuçar and Arsalar, to recover the taxes, and in each 16 pieces and 40 soldiers. In the Ponta das Pedras, a fortalice with 12 pieces and about 40 soldiers. The fortalice of Jafanapataö 40-50. The fortalice of Caes, 16-40. They say that there go to Europe every year 14 or 15 ships, (wespeke above at great length according to the current reports of the Portuguese) with great wealth, and that with great and small they will have in India 180 tall ships. And as in the ships which are altogether for trade, they do not carry more than 50 men, and these mixed with men of India, one can form an opinion of the number of people they have more or less according to the various turns we have given to this information; of the great distance and distribution of these garrisons, not only throughout India but also in Ceylon; of the slowness with which they will be able to get an army together in this island, from the garrisons without fresh help; and the infantry they can withdraw from them, leaving them in some security against any maritime power whatsoever, if they are attacked unawares. Finally, in the bay of Jacatrâ, under the shadow of an island beyond range of the fortalice, they always have about 20 to 25 sail of tall ships, ready for any emergency of trade or war, as well because it is necessary to go to reinforce them, as to cause fear and to make it understood that they are ready to hasten in case of any invasion, though it is not possible to equip so many ships with the men of those garrisons, ever exposed to the proximity of two enemies such as the Mataraö and the King of Bantaö, who was recently dispossessed of his praça, which is within the same bay and is a little more than three leagues from Jacatrâ, as the Aldea Galega from Lisbon. And it does not seem to me proper to disclose here the manner in which the Governor Nuno Álvarez Botelho undertook to take Batavia and Jacatrâ.
SECOND PROTESTATION OF THE AUTHOR

In conformity with the Apostolic Decree of the Most Holy Pope, Urban VIII., issued in the year 1625, and his declaration made in the year 1631, and its confirmation in the year 1634, after completing this work of the 'Conquest, temporal and spiritual, of Ceylon', I declare that though I speak therein of virtues, miracles and martyrdoms, and of Men of Holy life, approving their spirit as that of men of great virtue, it is not my intention to assert them with any greater authority than that of History and human testimony, and the fallible judgment of an individual person, though the documents I follow when compared with each other, show that there is moral certitude. And I do not pretend to assign them ady cult or veneration whatever, or reputation, or fame for Sanctity or Miracles or martyrdoms, based on the authority of the Catholic Roman Church, which in this matter has not yet interposed her irrefragable decision, to which I submit my judgment in all things related in this work. And I desire all to understand that it is my intention to observe in its entirety and inviolate, the aforesaid Decree in its proper meaning as has been declared and confirmed.

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