

Special report

Gail Omvedt



INDIRA AND THE LEFT

LANKA

GUARDIAN

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GAMINI vs THE SYSTEM

- ❖ Reggie Siriwardena on problems of translation
- ❖ Brain drain by Mervyn de Silva
- ❖ The Jaffna Tamil by K. Sivathamby

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United May Day

The LSSP wants a Joint May Day Rally with all the Left parties and the SLFP. But the SLFP does not want the JVP and many of the other Left parties refuse to appear on the same platform as the SLFP. So the SLFP will probably go-it-alone; likewise the JVP. Meanwhile the UNP will walk-it-alone, in silence.

Another, stronger move for a joint Left rally is being sponsored by the CPSL and other Marxist parties with majority backing from the JIUAC in which the SLFP trade union federation is a member. A similar proposal has also come from the newly formed 5-party 'bloc' of Maoists. While serious divisions exist between these parties at the political level, the main tendency at the trade union level is for the closing of ranks, with common economic demands as the cementing factor.

The question of a joint May Day will probably be the principal topic of discussion at the JIUAC-sponsored National Convention on March 9th and 10th.

Another Queue?

The GMA's tacticians are busy on deciding the Association's next move. In the view of the amendment to the Establishment Code on sick leave for doctors, the old stratagem won't work. So lawyers may help in discovering a new loophole.

Any doctor who falls ill must get his leave chit approved by an official specially authorised by the Health Ministry's Secretary. Supposing the authorised individual is the S.H.S. of the area how can a doctor in some remote rural hospital reach him? Can he, poor sick man, undertake a journey of many miles?

Since the doctors have been asked to 'present themselves' at the authorised official's place of work, will a couple of hundred doctors present themselves at the same time at the same place and form a queue? Would this be within the law?

JSS Trouble

It happened at Angoda. But still... The UNP-controlled J.S.S. has quickly acquired an unsavoury reputation not entirely on account of its unfortunate initials. Even the President has had to tick off the JSS from a public platform. Recently, two pro-UNP groups clashed at the Angoda CTB depot.

Enough's enough said the Transport Minister last week and cracked down hard. But what of other work places, like banks, where officers of managerial rank have been abused and assaulted. Will the word go right down the line that unruly unionists, JSS or not, should be dealt with firmly.

Lonely Backbencher

Cabinet Ministers, Non-Cabinet Ministers, Deputy Ministers, District Ministers and now, Project Ministers. With devolution and District Development Councils, there could be yet another category enjoying this delightfully loose title. In the meantime, the backbencher may feel that he, like the elephant, is a dying species.

TRENDS + LETTERS

Questions

We know that Muzorewa is Abel and that Sanjiva is Reddy but we Giscard not figure if the Ayatollah Ruhollah would be willing to khoméini from the cold and settle d'Estaing that has come up between Iran and the US. Though Bani may not have been Farsi-ing enough will he turn out to be a Sadr but wiser man? Will Leonid be Breshneff to move on to Iran and Pakistan? Will the Zimbabweans welcome Joshua with N'Komiums? If the Gang of Four are brought to trial Hua the people who'll benefit? Finally, will JR recontest at the end of his term or will 1984 (year of portent) bring a new Bosphorus? Here's Xiaoping everything will turn out right. Zia later.

Dematagoda. **Boyd Almeida**

DPL Conventions

As one who served in two of our foreign missions (although in a non-diplomatic capacity) I should like to pose this question to Sir Senarat Goonewardene, or any of our other veteran envoys or even to the pundits in the Foreign Ministry.

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COVER PICTURE : Still from Gamini Fonseka's "Uthumaneni"

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Sir Senarat made a loud protest against the holding of US diplomats as hostages by the Iranian students since it was a flagrant violation of international conventions and DPL norms. Did not the Canadians who helped six US embassy personnel to escape from Iran with the help of forged passports and visas violate the same rules too?

Colombo.

K.

Standardisation

I am sure there will be others who will give an extensive answer to Dr. Colvin Gunaratne's idea of the "best method we have of conferring some degree of reliability to raw marks for purposes of ranking." I am writing this only to show that slogan's with political implications cannot be judged by the validity in the sphere of academic arguments. I am sure Dr. G. has perfectly logical arguments to show that this method is the best. But of

course all that will be highly abstract and formal.

Truth is more concrete. Today the lunatic elements in the Sinhala Mahajana Peramuna are making use of exactly these arguments mixed up with a whole lot of nonsense, to whip up hatred against Tamil youth and Tamil intelligentsia in particular. Dr. Colvin has no alternative but to join the bandwagon with his "best method".

We are living in a changing world and not in a formally logical static world. Movements and developments are the most important. This was said by Buddha long before Marx or Hegel. Truth of what one says has to be judged according to its relation to socio-political movements and the influence it brings into the political scene. There is no other way to judge the truth and the interest of fairness.

Vickramabahu Karunaratne
Colombo 2.

Religion and change

First of all, its unclear to me whether the revelwer was (i) briefly summarizing the Canon's speech or (ii) critically evaluating it. As it seems to me that the first possibility is correct, I submit these observations.

It's suggested that "The radicalism of Jesus Christ MUST be the activating force for any realistic structural change of society! While not de-emphasizing one iota of Christ's radical message, it should be realised that the above formulation

(Continued on Page 24)

By an error in our office, Reggie Siriwardena made two unintentional appearances in our last issue. The first was on the cover, where the review of "Gamini's new film" was wrongly ascribed to him instead of to Touchstone. The other was on page 2, where the poem "Letter to my Wife" was inadvertently credited to him as his translation. We apologise to him for both these errors.

— Ed.

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DOCTORS' DILEMMA

NEWS
BACKGROUND

The confrontation between the GMOA and the government has ended. But is it only the first round? On points, the government may claim it won the day. The government refused to accede to what remains the most controversial of issues — the post-graduate examinations and the GMOA demand that its members be allowed to sit the UK exams locally. The government says that the new Institute of Post-graduate Medicine is one of the regime's most progressive measures. On the question of academic standards, it has the authoritative verdict of the three visiting UK professors. They said that Sri Lanka has followed the example of 'advanced' countries like Canada and Australia, and the standards the Institute will maintain compare favourably with Canadian or Australian.

But has the GMOA retired from the ring? Is it licking its wounds? "Not at all.....this is only a tactical withdrawal... the union action proved that the association had the support of the membership whereas the former committee which was negotiating with the Ministry had lost their confidence" observed a source close to the GMOA's new leadership.

Trade union solidarity, though important, is not in itself effective if the consequences of collective action do not make a sufficiently strong impression on the employer. In this instance, it is the government, and the government is particularly vulnerable to public reactions in an area as sensitive as health. On February 11th, hospital services in Colombo and Kandy came to a virtual standstill. By mid-week, the services in most hospitals were paralysed as hundreds of doctors reported sick. The undeclared "strike" spread to the provinces.

The government did not invoke the provisions of the tough new **Essential Public Services Act**. The draft law, challenged in the courts and criticised in the NSA,

had attracted the unanimous opposition of the major trade unions and earned itself strong condemnation from the Bar Council, Civil and Human Rights organisations etc. A professional could even lose his licence.

"We are all in a state of depression....." was the curious comment made by a top GMOA spokesman to the 'SUN', when asked to explain the virus that had suddenly struck down the GMOA's membership. The cause,

.... and the Govt's too?

evidently, was a sense of oppression; the oppressor being the State. While a long-suffering public steeled in cynicism was left to wonder whether this self-diagnosis was something of a sick joke, the medicine-men staged a miraculous recovery that is bound to make medical, if not trade union, history.

By the time the doctors found themselves fit for work the government has performed a minor miracle too. In less than 24 hours the Government Press put out a gazette in which the Secretary, Public Administration, announced an amendment to the Establishment Code (Sec 6. Chap. XII). Any government doctor who feels unwell must present himself before a medical officer designated by the Health Ministry. In short, no more 'sick notes', the easy way.

On the same day, the **CDN** reported that both the President and the Health Minister had refused to meet the GMOA because its new committee had threatened direct action if its demands were not granted.

Will the GMOA give up the fight against a determined Government or bide its time? (See **TRENDS**)

While an uneasy calm prevails, it is already clear that the GMOA action is a sharply revealing

manifestation of much deeper problems, both peculiarly local as well as Third Worldist and international.

Of all professionals, doctors constitute the most powerful lobby. When he tried to introduce the idea of state assistance to the poor, President Kennedy was shocked to see himself denounced as a communist. Here the 'licence to kill' was the passport to privilege and high

income, within the state system and more so outside it. The first Bandaranaike government, bravely supported by an enlightened GMOA, abolished private practice.

The recovery of lost and restricted privileges (private practice and channelled practice) was the main issue in the long drawn-out battle which marked the 1970's. In this, the AMS (the specialists) formed a profitable coalition with the much larger GMOA. Though numerically weaker, the AMS was the dominant group which exerted its enormous (and often subterranean and dubious) influence at the highest levels, including the national press, specially the English-language newspapers. The medical-mudalalis had access to the top rungs of government and soon won many a concession.

Watching the AMS-GMOA coalition at work during the last phase of the U. F. regime, it was increasingly evident who was the organ grinder and who the monkey. Under the new dispensation, the specialist must echo the sentiment expressed in a medical journal patronised by the drug firms: "Happy times are here again".

The GMOA story is significantly different. As the social complexion of the average medical graduate changed, so did the corporate personality of the GMOA.

The young gov't doctor is no longer a rich or privileged individual. On the contrary, he has been caught up in the general process of pauperization of the public service salariat. Those who by professional status or administrative rank belonged to the upper-middle class are being pushed downwards to the lower middle class. Real income ensures downward mobility. This is the fate of the young doctor, the vast majority of the GMOA membership.

He has many grievances. Where there are no GP's, a DMO or house officer can earn several thousand. But not where patients have access to private practitioners. He has to share a room with 3 or 4 colleagues, sometimes sleeping on a mattress. Living conditions are terrible, transport difficult, and the allowances barely adequate. All this is a fertile ground for resentment. He sees UN 'volunteers' highly paid but sometimes less qualified, reside in nice houses, with refrigerators, garages and fans, and using State vehicles for touristic weekends.

At a higher level, a smaller group is keen on foreign post-graduate qualifications as an escape route to jobs abroad. Not all the passport restrictions, the bonds and the Compulsory Service Acts of the U. F. regime could stop well over a hundred skipping the country. The "pull" (the reasons are both economic and personal) is part of the phenomenon popularly styled the 'brain drain'. (See the U. N. Feature 'How the Poor Aid the Rich' P. 12)

CRM protests

The Civil Rights Movement has issued a strongly worded statement on the proposed law to control social service organisations. The CRM describes it as "a gross and unprecedented violation of freedom of association".

Observing that the draft law seeks to bring all such social service bodies under direct government control, the CRM notes that "a government official may enter and inspect the premises of the

organisation, may convene an executive committee meeting or general meeting to take place at such place and time as he directs, may attend the meetings himself, and give directions to the executive committee".

The CRM's president is Bishop Lakshman Wickremasinghe, and its Secretary is Mr. Desmond Fernando, Attorney-at-Law.

Re-shuffle ... really?

That was the Cabinet re-shuffle that was....

Whatever else may be said against the UNP it surely cannot be faulted for lack of novelty. The novelty does express itself, it is true, in the most breezy forms.

Once upon a time there was a small group of intellectual busy bodies known as the Sri Kotha experts. Some of them have taken wing, while others have swung smartly into various enterprises. A few have discreetly sunk into silence. But even a Sri Kotha Socrates would be hard put to squeeze rationality out of the re-shuffle although at least one change may appeal to his dialectical sense.

The Minister of Public Administration is also the Minister of Plantation Industries! The fact is that whatever plantations he may administer would not be too public. The two largest public sector organisations running the plantations, the JEDB and the SPC, are no longer part of his turf.

Everybody knew that Nissanka Wijeyeratne was for the high jump. But whoever thought he would jump as high as Hultsdorp Hill? On the way up, things get curious. The new Justice Minister will be called upon to do justice also to the aims and ideals of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation UNESCO, headquarters Paris.

The truth is that this looks more like the principal's observations in the mid-term report of his unusually crowded, weirdly

assorted and not very bright class of 1977. As a highly intelligent Rector he deserved a better batch of students but, as the man said, aiyo what to do? (Oh for old pals, like N.M. and Colvin!)

Some of those found weak in the sciences have been transferred to the arts while a few who have shown a talent to play too many games have been put onto the field.... or to grass. A few prefects have had their badges removed; a monitor here and there has had some of his powers curbed and some well-behaved boys from the back row have been brought up front.

H. E. works in dharmysterious ways His miracles to perform.

'JVP split' alleges K. P.

"There is a split in the JVP leadership on the Afghanistan issue" said the Communist Party's General Secretary K.P. Silva, speaking to a largely student audience at Peradeniya campus' New Arts Theatre, on the subject of 'The path the Left should take today.' The JVP's public silence on Afghanistan flies in the face of its militant internationalist pretensions, he said, commenting significantly that "the neo-Trotskyist top leadership was reluctant to solidarise with the Afghan Revolution and the USSR, while the genuinely internationalist, non-Trotskyist segment of the leadership wished to declare such solidarity."

Replying to a question from the audience, K. P. Silva said that the CPSL and the JVP were at one in their common rejection of the Chinese characterization of the USSR as 'social-imperialist.' The JVP had also taken correct positions on the Kampuchean issue, solidarized with Vietnam and supported Cuba. However at a deeper level, the JVP held to a Trotskyist view of the socialist bloc and the world communist movement, alleging that it had 'degenerated into Menshevism following Lenin's death.' Furthermore the JVP

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An Olympian tragedy

by Sidat Sri Nandalochana

Whether the Soviets are in Afghanistan or Americans in Vietnam or yet still whether there is a repetition of the Bay of Pigs, the Olympics deserve to be held. From its small origins the Olympics have developed over the centuries, engendering rich traditions to become the greatest single sporting event of the world. To allow it to be snuffed out by the whims of individuals would be a tragedy of Olympian proportions.

The International Olympic Committee has shown a remarkable unanimity and independence in resisting the many efforts to muzzle and muscle them by standing firm in their decision that the games will be held on schedule in Moscow. Quite unfortunately its views as expressed by Lord Kilanin have been submerged by the welter of opinion calling for an Olympic boycott.

Surely there is great substance in the view that the Olympics is not the private property of the U.S.A. or China or for that matter the Soviet Union. Moscow is only the venue of the current Olympic games, and the decision to hold it there was taken by the I.O.C. after having examined the claims of different nations.

It is well to know that the matter is not allowed to rest there, for the development plans and their progress are under constant review with the ever present threat of the games being shifted elsewhere should specifications and standards not be met. It is therefore appropriate to mention that Lord Kilanin has gone on record as saying that the facilities that Moscow is providing for the competitors is exemplary, and that is certainly high praise coming in the wake of Tokyo, Munich and Montreal.

To get hysterical about Afghanistan is easy, but those who do so and advocate a boycott of Moscow must realise that the very existence of the Olympic movement will hereafter be in

jeopardy. It needs no clairvoyant to foresee the fate that awaits the Los Angeles games in 1984. Predictably the Socialist Block will retaliate and the line up of boycotters there is bound to be equally impressive.

There is no gainsaying the fact that an American pull-out of Moscow will effectively doom both the track and field and swimming events. For long now the Americans have not only dominated these events but even shocked the world with their super-human record breaking prowess. In their absence the winners will have to be satisfied with hollow victories and their achievements will always be of a dubious quality. With China also allowing her present anti-Sovietism to blind her, the prospect of this mighty giant emerging as a redoubtable Olympic contender must for the moment at least be forgotten.

Many other small nations will undoubtedly line up behind the U.S.A., but this numerical strength of the boycotters though regrettable will not have quite the same effect as the absence of the U.S.A. and China. The one exception perhaps if it answers the call of Carter will be the British squad, because it contains two exquisite natural athletes in Sebastian Coe and Steve Ovett that the world would dearly love to see. Despite these crippling blows the Moscow Olympics are bound to be held as planned and although the Socialist media will do its utmost to shrug off the debilitating effects of the American and Chinese absence the games will certainly be devoid of its glamour.

What is it that Jimmy Carter hopes to achieve by his call for a boycott in this his re-election year? Could this be his way of shoring up his dwindling image in his race against the Kennedy charisma? Will the Americans who feel that he is too soft be impressed by his hysterical posturings

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Central role and convergence

FOREIGN
NEWS

In what the **International Herald Tribune** described as a "leap forward in US-China relations", the US has granted China full status as a trading partner. One of the main results of this bilateral agreement is that US tariffs on Chinese goods will be reduced from 20% to 10%. In return, China will facilitate US business activity in China.

The Congressional decision, the IHT noted, makes the USSR the only major socialist country that does not enjoy such status as a trading partner of the US. The question was discussed as long ago as the Nixon-Brezhnev summit. The Budget office revealed that the most-favoured-nation resolution on China will cost the US Treasury about 70 million dollars.

The Congressional move came soon after Defence Secretary Harold Brown's return from China. The IHT report said: "Pentagon officials who asked not to be identified said that the Defence Secretary had told the Chinese that the US was prepared to consider military sales on a case-by-case basis".

In the Senate the same week, Sen Henry 'Scoop' Jackson, the foremost rightwing 'hawk' and Peking-supporter observed that the US had a "significant stake" in a strong China that could play "a central role in the geopolitical balance of power".

The American conception of this central role became clearer during Mr. Brown's visit. Reporting from Hong Kong, Nayan Chanda, of the **Far Eastern Economic Review** wrote: "The US Defence Secretary spoke rather approvingly of Chinese 'pressure' (meaning the February 1979 invasion) on Vietnam and admitted (the first time a US official has done so) that Washington has 'done quite a lot in terms of urging others... to impose economic penalties on Vietnam'. Mr. Brown remarked that the common task now was

to "ensure that our converging assessments are translated into effective responses". This is interpreted in Peking, added correspondent Chanda, as "parallel and coordinated action against Vietnam".

During the Brown visit, it also became clear that in line with this joint strategy the US would recognise Indo-China as a "sphere of Chinese special interests" while China extends active support to US policies elsewhere, especially the Middle East and South Asia.

While Peking has virtually blocked negotiations with Vietnam

and announced its unwillingness to resume talks with the USSR, China is intensifying its pressure moves on Vietnam on all fronts. The Peking press has recently launched a new propaganda campaign to justify Chinese claims on the Paracel and Spratly islands. Diplomats in Bangkok are also watching two new developments: the remnant forces of the discredited Pol Pot are now being helped with fresh arms supplies and Chinese military advisers, and trained subversive groups of ethnic Chinese who lived earlier in Vietnam and Laos are being infiltrated into these countries.

Amnesty International on Latin America

Amnesty International announced that a regional conference of human rights activists had recommended the creation of a "Latin American Human Rights Commission". At a four-day meeting (11-14 January) in San Jose, Costa Rica, the human rights campaigners brought together by Amnesty International said that the establishment of a non-governmental human rights organization for the region was an "urgent and unquestionable necessity".

The meeting also urged the competent bodies of the United Nations and the Organization of American States to work towards the "internationalization of the right of *habeas corpus*".

The meeting had been convened to focus on the need for practical action against the torture, killing and "disappearance" of political detainees in Latin America.

More than 50 people, including members of human rights groups, lawyers, trade unionists, peasant leaders, medical doctors and others committed to the defence of human rights, attended the conference.

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INDIRA GANDHI AND LEFT UNITY

by Gail Omvedt

The most significant fact about the recent Indian parliamentary election may not after all be Indira Gandhi's impressive majority, but the fact that for the first time she is confronting a united Communist left that has become the major opposition force.

Gandhi's Congress (I) won two-thirds of the Lok Sabha seats but with only 42.58% of the popular vote—a bit less than in her equally big 1971 victory and lower still than the undivided Congress party received in the years of its unchallenged dominance from 1952 to 1967. In the process she nearly decimated the bourgeois opposition parties and left the two big Communist parties—the CPI and CPI(M)—together holding more seats than any other single opposition force.

More significantly, the Congress (I) juggernaut was checked in the Communist strongholds of Kerala, West Bengal and Tripura. Here CPI (M) — led left fronts (including only Marxist parties in West Bengal and Tripura, and some small bourgeois parties in addition in Kerala) won a larger share of seats than Gandhi did in the country as a whole.

And this was followed up by a Communist victory in state assembly elections held in Kerala on January 23, when the "left-Democratic front" won 93 of a total of 140 seats. This happened in spite of an united opposition under the Congress (I), in spite of an intensive whirlwind campaign tour by Mrs. Gandhi herself fresh from her new status as Prime Minister and with a much higher voter turnout than in the national elections (80% as compared to 63%). The left victory, which gave the CPI (M) 35 seats and the CPI 17 in the Kerala assembly, ended a period of 10 years in which the CPI (M) had been excluded from governmental power in Kerala by an alliance between the Congress and the CPI. It has resulted now in three

state governments in India under Communist leadership.

Though Communist electoral strength is now "regionalized" (they put up few candidates and gained few seats outside the three states), their's was not a regional vote. Other regional (i.e. linguistic-national) parties, including the Akali Dal of the Punjab and the AIADMK of Tamilnadu, were decimated by the Congress (I) sweep. In the country as a whole the Communists, though united, could not present themselves as a really viable political force, but in the three states they could. And it is clear that the toiling masses of Kerala, West Bengal and Tripura voted for the Communists because they saw them as the best protectors of their interests whatever they may have felt about the limitations and deficiencies of the movements under their leadership.

It is also clear that as Prime Minister Gandhi moves to resolve the tremendous economic and political crisis shaking the country, the strongest forces of repression will be directed against the working class movement in general and the Communist left in particular, including the state governments of West Bengal, Kerala and Tripura.

As for the working class, every editorial comment and every industrialists statement following the election has not only breathed a sigh of relief at the prospect of stability but made it clear that the most serious problem is the so-called "law and order" situation in industry, where the workers have been engaged in one of the biggest strike waves in history. "Labour is controlling us, not we controlling them", capitalists have complained, and expressed their satisfaction that now Indira Gandhi will take a "bold and aggressive policy". In fact to compete under the conditions of international imperialism, Indian industry is being forced to impose speedup and to "discipline" its militant workers, making repression a necessary

*Special to the
Lanka Guardian*

feature of existence. Since the two Communist-led union centres (AITUC and CITU) together have over 2 million members (including socialist and small marxist-led unions this would be nearly 3½ million), it is inevitably their cadres who will face the brunt of repression, whatever may be the compromising tendencies of the party leadership.

Similarly, efforts of the CPI (M) and CPI to follow "moderate" policies in the states under their leadership will in the end make no difference as popular militancy pushes their cadres on and some state governmental support gives their movements chances to grow. Already Indira Gandhi is vigorously engaging in attempts to overthrow the remaining opposition-led state governments in northern and central India, and defections to her party are rapidly causing the demise of these Janata, Lok Dal and Congress (U)-led governments. This will not work with the Communist-led governments, and in the future there will be a complex process of pressure and discrimination from the centre (withholding of aid for projects, police interference, etc), fostering of communal and reactionary forces internally and attempting both to whip up anti-communist hysteria and give it some popular base.

This confrontation between Indira Gandhi and the organized left (and not simply repression of Naxalite-organized armed struggle) will soon become the central political feature of India. And this is a totally new situation. For from the beginning, and particularly since 1971 when Indira won her first massive popular victory, the main oppositional force was a bourgeois one, and the Communists were divided, some supporting the Indira Congress, some supporting the bourgeois opposition. As a result they remained politically ineffective and it was this bourgeois force, the Janata party, that was

voted into power when the Indian people rejected the Emergency in 1977. Now it is the Janata that has been discredited and divided and the left that is beginning—only beginning—to stand forth as an alternative. **And this is a momentous fact.**

Left: From Disunity to Unity

This of course assumes that the newly formed and fragile "left unity" will stick. To assess this, it is important to look a bit at its history.

The undivided Communist Party of India had strong internal factional differences since before independence which produced a split in 1962 into the CPI and the CPI (M) and a second major split in 1967 when sections of the CPI (M), following the Naxalbari revolt, broke away from the party to call for rural-based armed revolution and of these nearly half formed the pro-Chinese CPI (ML) in 1969.

The Naxalite movement after much repression and flux remains large but extremely factionalized; thus the CPI and CPI (M) are still organizationally the biggest communist parties. Of these the CPI accepts the Soviet line of peaceful transition to socialism in alliance with an "anti-imperialist and anti-feudal" progressive national bourgeoisie. It has tended to identify the Congress and especially Indira Gandhi as the political representative of the national bourgeoisie because of a generally pro-Soviet foreign policy, public sector promotion etc. Since the Congress party split in 1969 and throughout the Emergency the CPI subordinated its organizing to an alliance with the Indira Congress.

The CPI (M) in contrast argued that India was a "bourgeois-landlord state dominated by the big bourgeoisie having increasing links with imperialism"; the Congress party was identified as the representative of this big bourgeoisie and thus as the main political enemy of the working class. The CPI (M) in contrast to the CPI, does not clearly identify any major bourgeois party as a "national bourgeois" section or call for a strategic alliance with it; as

a result its policy tends to be more flexible, that is to say less tailist. Nevertheless it has identified the opposition to Indira Gandhi and finally the Janata Party as a "democratic" anti-authoritarian force and so allied with it and with smaller regional parties.

The Naxalites define the Indian state as controlled by the "comprador and bureaucratic bourgeoisie and feudal landlords" a position which initially led them to reject an alliance with any "revisionist" party, to reject any form of electoral participation in favour of armed struggle. Nevertheless two trends also exist within the Naxalites. One section, originally led by Satyanarayan Singh (SNS) and now consisting of the Chandra Pully Reddy-led CPI (ML), has tended directly or indirectly to call for an alliance with Janata and some other opposition forces, mainly on the grounds of identifying "social imperialism" (together with its agents, which are considered to be many: the Indira Congress, CPI, CPI (M), Lok Dal etc) as the main enemy. Other sections have tended to maintain the position of denouncing and staying aloof from all bourgeois and revisionist forces.

The result of this communist split was politically disastrous. Although Communist influence was spreading in the working class (in particular in new industrial areas like Faridabad and Ghaziabad around, Delhi, Bangalore, Pune etc the more militant unions of CPI (M) and some smaller communist groups were growing dominant), although rural struggles especially of agricultural labourers and poor peasants were intensifying sometimes to the point of armed conflict, although the dalit (anti-caste) movement was taking a more militant form and beginning to open up to the left in a new way, the Communists as a whole totally failed to make any political impact at all. Communist electoral vote stagnated after 1962 in spite of widening mass influence. As for nonelectoral politics, not only was the Naxalite armed struggle crushed (though Naxalite mass bases have remained and often face police repression, these are no longer seen as offering a serious political threat in the way the

1967-69 outburst did) but neither the CPI (M) nor the Naxalites could emerge as a leader in the fight against the Emergency dictatorship. Thus in 1977 the Indian masses, in voting their disapproval of the Emergency, could only turn to the bourgeois opposition, the Janata party.

It was the last few years, the experience of both Emergency and post-Emergency repression, that forced some change in this tendency to split. Criticism grew within CPI against the party's disastrous support of the Emergency, and at its January 1978 Bhatinda party conference there was self-criticism for this and a repudiation of the "Dange line"—then party chairman S. A. Dange has been throughout the most consistent follower of Indira Gandhi among the communists. Thus in the 1980 elections CPI supported the left front and Lok Dal/Congress (U) alliance and refused to support Dange as the party's candidate from his own personal stronghold in the textile area of Bombay as (it was Dange who led the Communists' first historical establishment of a working class base in a six-month 1928 strike of 200,000 textile workers). Dange openly supported Gandhi and his followers broke party discipline to campaign for her. Nevertheless the anti-Dange group in the CPI is now firm and though Dange persists and retracts some hold, he will probably at best be able to force a split.

The CPI (M) has also changed. Its alliance with the Janata also came increasingly under criticism particularly from party cadres who found themselves facing repression in Janata-ruled states after 1977 and clearly saw Janata's base among merchants, reactionary sections of the middle class and some landlords. This produced no open change in its 1978 party conference, but nevertheless more militant sections began to increase their influence and in 1979 the party finally withdrew its support from Janata after the Charan-Singh-led Lok Dal broke away from it, leaving Janata mainly based on the ex-Jan Sangh cadres. Though there are still pro-Janata forces within the party (particularly

In west Bengal which is controlled by the most conservative sections, the CPI (M) is also not likely to go back to this particular bourgeois alliance. And so "left unity", based on the CPI and CPI (M) but including also smaller marxist parties and opening up to naxalites and other nonparliamentary marxists, has now become a fragile and beginning reality.

As for the ML groups there are now three sections among the Naxalites. The Chandra Pully Reddy-led CPI (ML) not only maintains its anti-"social imperialist" position, but supported Janata in certain west Bengal constituencies against the CPI (M). Most other sections continue their boycottist line one group, organizationally small but representing probably a significant section of ML and ex-ML opinion, is giving "critical support" to the left front. This group is led by Kanu Sanyal, the former peasant leader of the Naxalbari revolt itself. Similarly, many independent Marxists who feel that all the hitherto dominant communist trends are wrong in seeking a "nation bourgeoisie" to ally with, are also split between boycottists and critical supporters, but those with most mass work have generally hailed the emergency of left unity on the grounds that "this left unity itself is not revolutionary but it is a medium in which the revolutionary movement can grow."

Future prospects

What of the future? First some have argued that the present situation is in many ways a throwback to the pre-1967 period politically: both the Congress (now of course the Indira Congress) and the Communist have about the same percentage of the votes and seats they had in the 1952-62 years. But this is only superficially true. The Communist base has increased and solidified significantly in Kerala and West Bengal, and its mass organizations (though not its political support) have expanded significantly throughout the rest of the country. More important, Indian society is now engulfed in an all-around crises that was simply not there when the task of beginning some kind of capitalist development

after Independence was first undertaken: In the earlier period there was significant development, people had hopes in the new independent Indian state, and mass movements fell to a low ebb. Now mass movements are on the rise everywhere as workers, poor peasants and an increasingly desperate middle class fight against inflation and wage cuts and struggle to survive in the face of unemployment power cuts and shortage of essential items like cooking gas. Communists are increasingly at the lead of these and even more significant, Indian industry must repress its volatile working class to compete internationally.


There are however very significant weaknesses to the new left unity. Not only are there powerful forces in both major communist parties trying to drag them back to their old tailist policies, but the revisionist, bureaucratic tendencies and theoretical weaknesses that have been the basis of the tailism and the splits remain. (This is also true of the ML movement which is proving itself to be if anything more dogmatic than its revisionist opponents and less open to developing a renewed marxist analysis of Indian society that can take account of such phenomenon as caste). More important, The left front is still in very initial stages and has not yet based itself on a program of struggle that would present it as a political alternative.

Nevertheless important steps have been taken. And it is clear that the bourgeoisie itself hardly feels secure; most political commentary has stressed as crucial, the "volatile" and "unstable" nature of the popular vote which swung from 44% for the Indira Congress in 1971 down to 34% in 1977 and within only two years back to 43%. Such commentators themselves are recognizing that the Indian masses are beginning to shake off their bondages of dependence on rural bosses and ties through caste and kin to almost actively search for leadership out of their misery and towards a new society. Thus in spite of the evidence that Indira retains her popularity, there is a real fear among the ruling classes about what lies ahead.

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
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Popular unity, Sandinista hegemony

by a Special Correspondent

The formation and transformation of various bourgeois oppositionist coalitions, and the shifting alliances they were drawn into with the mass organisations representing the popular sectors, is a complex and fascinating saga which does not bear a detailed chronicling within the compass of this series of articles. We may however permit ourselves some generalisations while attempting to sketch in outline the important turning points in this process of achievement of broad popular unity. (See chart on opposite page)

The bourgeois opposition (and those 'enlightened' sections of U. S. imperialism's policy-makers) failed in their repeated attempts to present a viable reformist option because they had no political 'space' for manoeuvre. On the one hand they were unable to effect a negotiated settlement with Somoza, thanks to the latter's intransigence, while on the other hand they were incapable of unleashing or spearheading a consequential struggle against the Somozist oligarchy.

Throughout the twentieth century sections of the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie had supported and participated in struggles against the U. S. presence and successive Somoza regimes. Sometimes these struggles had taken violent forms leading to armed uprisings or partisan warfare. However, these sections of the bourgeoisie had also proved unsuccessful in the efforts to unseat the dictatorships.

Moreover, these bourgeois fractions had proved susceptible to imperialism's financial and political blandishments, decelerating and finally abandoning violent mass struggles in favour of negotiated solutions which in turn proved illusory or ephemeral. Indeed, General Sandino (who was himself an oil worker at one time) led the worker-peasant masses in guerilla warfare against the U. S. marines at a stage when the bourgeois opposition had abandoned the struggle. So, the new generation of Sandinista revolutionaries which emerged in the 1960's had learnt the lesson from Nicaraguan history that while it was possible and necessary to win over certain fractions of the national bourgeoisie to the struggle against imperialism and the Somoza oligarchy, these bourgeois fractions could not and would not lead a struggle to a definitive conclusion.

If the struggle was carried out under a bourgeois leadership it would be aborted and the national aspirations and social demands of the broad masses would remain unfulfilled. Even if the bourgeois sectors were deprived of a vanguard role they would prove to be transient and vacillatory allies, many of whom who would be satisfied with a situation of 'Somoza-ism' minus Somoza. Still such allies, whom it would be difficult to lump under the catch-all category of 'national bourgeoisie' — a term so dear to and deployed so indiscriminately by our local

Maolists — had to be integrated into the struggle, "however temporary, unstable or vacillatory" they may turn out to be.

Expand national-popular unity to the maximum extent possible while circumventing a bid for leadership by the bourgeois oppositional sectors. Ensure Sandinista leadership and the hegemony of the revolutionary perspective as opposed to the reformist one. This was the FSLN's project which it carried through by according primacy to the strategy of armed struggle; seizing and maintaining the political initiative by means of decisive military actions at crucial moments; and strengthening the relative weight or specific gravity of the **working people** within the revolutionary process (thereby reducing the weight of the bourgeois sectors) by taking the lead in creating, strengthening and expanding mass organizations equipped with the perspective of genuine national independence, radical social change and popular power.

As the struggle went on Nicaragua became polarized into two camps leaving the non-Somoza bourgeoisie no room for manoeuvre and negotiation in between. On the one hand, there was the camp of Somoza and the National Guard, on the other hand there was the camp of the masses in which the bourgeois opposition found itself situated in, with no viable option. Since Somoza's ferocious repression had rendered armed struggle inevitable and since the gun was grasped firmly in the Sandinista fist, the masses identified fully with the FSLN.

CHART

* 1972: Earthquakes devastate much of Managua. The oligarchy swindles relief assistance and exports blood plasma.

* 1974: Union Democratic de Liberación (Union for Democratic Liberation - UDEL) is formed, comprising seven political parties and their trade union federations including the Communist Party and its T. U. organisation, UDEL is committed to the ouster of Somoza, and hopes to enlist liberal opinion in the U. S. to force this ouster. It has no programme of social transformation and envisions a model bourgeois - democracy for post Somoza Nicaragua. Only the CP and its T. U. call for the nationalization of all Somoza's property.

* end of December 1974: FSLN makes a dramatic comeback after its 1967 defeat and years of clandestine political activism, by attacking an X'mas party and taking 12 members of Somoza's court camarilla, hostage. These are exchanged for 14 political prisoners. A state of siege is imposed and armed struggle recommences.

* 1975/76: The internal debate gives rise to three distinct tendencies within the FSLN.

* post 1975: The majority tendency decides to open its ranks to non Marxist but radical Christians who envision a pattern of socialism based on co-operatives. The majority tendency actively seeks to win the support of important sectors of the Church, which since the end of the 1960's has opposed Somoza for his massive violation of human rights.

* 1976 - 1977: UDEL launches human rights campaign, seeking to sensitize opinion in the US and mobilize U. S. Congressional support in its anti Somoza cause.

* 1977: After considerable debate, the U. S. Congress votes to continue military assistance to Somoza, thus exposing the fundamental frailty of UDEL's strategy.

* September 1977: The Group of Twelve, is formed and calls on the people to support the FSLN's armed struggle.

* October 1977: In a sop to the U. S. Congress, Somoza lifts martial law and press censorship after three years.

* late 1977: The FSLN seizes the initiative with daring attacks on the National Guard garrisons in several provincial towns. These attacks marked a change from defensive to offensive operations for the FSLN, according to Humberto Ortega. The FSLN simultaneously entered into broad tactical alliances.

* January 1978: The Carter administration's efforts to effect a reformist solution was delivered a shattering blow when Pedro Joaquín Chamorro was assassinated by Somozaist elements. Chamorro, editor - publisher of the opposition newspaper 'La Prensa', influen-

tial member of the conservative party and a founder member of UDEL was a staunch opponent of Somoza and a key figure in a bourgeois solution to the crisis. The C. I. A. however, alerted Somoza to the State Dept's efforts, and Chamorro was killed.

* Jan - May/June '78: In the immediate aftermath of Chamorro's murder, UDEL called a general strike plus a lockout i. e. a joint effort by labour and sections of the bourgeoisie, to overthrow Somoza. This paralyses the capital Managua and other major cities.

* March - July 1978: Movimiento Pueblo Unido (MPU - United Peoples Movement) is formed comprising 22 mass organizations representing the popular (i. e. non - bourgeois) sectors. This coalition of labour, student and neighbourhood organisations include the CP and its T. U. federation. The MPU issues a programme for a post Somoza Nicaragua, which envisioned a reformed economy, all the basic branches of which would be nationalized.

* July 1978: The Frente Amplio de Oposición (FAO - Broad Opposition Front) is formed after negotiations which began in May. Comprising all opposition groups including the Twelve, UDEL, labour organisations, business groups and traditional opposition political parties, it achieved a broad unity of the entire opposition. In its ranks were 16 opposition parties (including the 4 factions of the Conservatives, the Social Christians, the Socialists and the CP) and the 3 major T. U. federations, two of which were affiliated to the WFTU and ICFTU respectively. The Group of Twelve linked the FSLN into this FAO, which was dominated by bourgeois democrats.

* August 1978: US State Dept. officials as well as liberal bourgeois Latin American govts. suffer a grave setback in their efforts to negotiate a reformist compromise with the bourgeois sectors of the F. A. O., when the FSLN steps into the breach created by the latter's attempt to call off the general strike. The FSLN seizes the popular imagination by its daring and successful assault on the National Assembly, while it was in session. Exchanging their hostages for 59 jailed comrades, the FSLN detachment, belonging to the Insurrectionist Tendency and led in this operation by Commandante Zero (Eden Pastora), staged a triumphant ride to the airport through streets thronged with cheering Nicaraguans.

* September 1978: Following a fresh general strike, the FSLN launched attacks on National Guard garrisons in its provincial cities. Thousands of youngsters fight alongside the FSLN regulars and 4 cities were liberated. The insurrection is crushed in a sea of

blood, but this merely serves to isolate Somoza even from the rest of the hemisphere, and renders untenable for the U. S. A., a policy of overt support to Somoza.

* March 1979: The MPU (United Peoples Movement) in which FSLN influence was predominant, issued a 12 point programme which guaranteed broad political and individual liberties as well as a substantial toll for the private sector in a post Somoza Nicaraguan economy, where all Somozaist property would be nationalized. The 3 FSLN tendencies announce publicly that they had agreed on a unified military command and strategy, and had endorsed the MPU programme.

* April/May 1979: Frequent armed clashes occurred between the FSLN and the Guard. The FSLN organised 130 workers commissions in the urban factories, in preparation for an insurrection.

* June 1979: A new general strike commenced, timed to coincide with the FSLN's final offensive which sparked off the massive national insurrection.

* late June 1979: The Organisation of American States (OAS) meeting in Washington rejects the U. S. call for a 'ceasefire and peacekeeping' force to be sent to Nicaragua.

* July 6th 1979: Somoza announces his willingness to resign and leaves the timing of his departure upto the US to decide upon.

* July 10th 1979: The FSLN, forced out of Managua during the earlier stages of the insurrection, begins to march on Managua.

* June/July 1979: The US tries to enlist the support of the OAS to undercut the 5 person junta backed by the FSLN. This junta comprises Sergio Ramírez Mercado - a writer belonging to the Group of 12, Alfonso Robello Callejas - an industrialist belonging to the FAO, Moises Hassan - a young university don of the MPU, Videtta Chamorro of the Conservative Party and Daniel Ortega. The US attempts to change the composition of this provisional govt, fails since it is rejected by all sections of the opposition.

* July 14th-15th 1979: The 5 person Junta names an 18 member provisional cabinet comprising representatives of the FSLN, the Social Democratic parties and the Conservatives.

* July 16th 1979: Somoza's successor takes over and announces his intention to remain until 1981. The National Guard begins to disintegrate.

* July 19th 1979: Managua is taken by the victorious FSLN.

HOW THE POOR AID THE RICH

by Mervyn de Silva

(One of Sri Lanka's proudest boasts is a system of free state education from primary school through university, including medical school. Its highly reputed medical college, over a hundred years old, has produced doctors who now work in the U.S., UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and for international agencies. Yet the country faced such a critical shortage of doctors that in 1978 the UN initiated an assistance programme that brought into the island a fair number of foreign doctors.)

The Sri Lankan episode is a grotesque twist to the phenomenon popularly termed "the brain drain". Strictly speaking, this was not a case of the migration of skilled personnel, a problem which has rapidly assumed alarming and universal proportions. The "brain drain" involves an outward flow of skills and an intake which links developing and developed country, poor and rich.

However aberrant, the Sri Lankan experience underscores many of the interesting and sometimes disturbing observations made in a recent report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on "development aspects of the reverse transfer of technology". Based on recommendations of a group of governmental experts, the report includes a statistical survey of the migration of doctors from a number of developing countries, including India, Iran, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Syria.

In 1975/76 the Philippines lost 21 per cent of its annual increase in the domestic stock while India (1966-67) saw an outflow of 30 per cent of her annual output of physicians and surgeons. The comparable figure for Pakistan in the 1970's exceeds 50 per cent. For Iran and Syria the only available figures (1971) show a loss of 30 per cent and 40 per cent. Sri Lanka's difficulties took such an acute form by 1977-78 because more than a fifth of the doctors the country had at the start of the decade had left by the mid-70's.

Stark Ironies

Statistics, wrote Arthur Koestler, do not bleed. But bloodless figures can drip with stark ironies.

While "asymmetries" in the international market may sustain the "brain drain" the sheer symmetry of one single statistic spotlights the injustice of this particular international transaction. In 1961-72 the imputed value of skilled migration to the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada was 46 billion dollars or about 3.8 billion dollars per year - an amount almost as large as the Official Development Assistance (ODA) from these countries during the same period.

A report to the U.S. House of Representatives called it "a reverse form of foreign aid". A study by the U.S. Congressional Research Services speaks of it as "a countervailing force to foreign assistance". In plain words, it represents the extent to which the poor have aided the rich.

Remedial Measures

The UNCTAD report identifies three broad types of remedial measures adopted by developing countries confronted by a common predicament. Sri Lanka had tried out all these policies ("incentive", "regulatory" and "delinking") with little success. While India banned the holding of certain examinations for foreign medical degrees, Sri Lanka held as many post-graduate medical exams as possible locally. It passed a special law to enforce a statutory period of domestic service for all medical graduates. With passport control tightened and a system of "bonding" introduced the government held out the carrot of higher salaries and special perks. Meanwhile the "indigenisation" ("de-linking") of the entire educational structure was declared a new policy ob-

This is the first part of an article commissioned and circulated by the UN's Public Information Department, New York. The second part will appear in the next issue.

jective of an "environment and job-oriented" training.

Far from making a growing problem manageable, these steps produced direct and spin-off effects which the UNCTAD report correctly describes as "deleterious". The problem now is how - or if - the burdens and benefits of skilled migration can be better shared. How great are the possibilities for co-operative, practical steps which could minimise the adverse consequences of this phenomenon?

The UNCTAD report offers a succinct, analytical presentation of the nature of the problem and its true dimensions.

Between 1961 and 1976, over 300,000 engineers, scientists, doctors and other technically qualified persons emigrated from developing countries to the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, the three developed countries which have most attracted migrant skills. In arriving at this figure, it is the highly selective classification of the U.S. immigration authorities that has been used. A less rigid definition of "skilled personnel" would make the figure somewhat higher. In any case, western Europe, another popular destination of skilled migrants specially from countries like Algeria, Tunisia, Yugoslavia and Morocco, has been excluded from this computation. So has Australia. If these had been taken into account, the figure could be closer to half a million.

The United Nations emergency operation of supplying Indian and Filipino doctors to Sri Lanka is a strangely ironic manifestation of the problem because Asia has been the largest supplier of skills to the developed world. With almost 50 per cent of the total flow to the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada,

Asia has been the biggest catchment area.

Revealing Percentages

But numbers can falsify or understate. Percentages matter and certain categories of skills are strategic. The loss of even a dozen doctors could lead in some African countries to a critical dislocation of medical services. If the outflow, large or modest, relates to a "key" skilled group—say, engineers—the resultant blow to the nation's development effort could be crippling.

Besides, another factor, now recognizable as a constant, aggravates the problem of the loser while enhancing the benefits derived by the rich recipient. The migrant's skilled services are given in the period of peak productivity. About 50 per cent of the doctors who emigrated to the U.S. in the 1960's were less than 40 years old, while 49 per cent of engineers and scientists (in 1970) were less than 30, and 46 per cent between 30 and 44 years.

Although the U.S. in particular, draws talent from other developed countries too, in 1971-72, just over 50 per cent of the net addition to the domestic stock of doctors in the U.S. came from the poor world. The corresponding ratio for the U.K. was 40 per cent. In the case of engineers, 26 per cent of the 'incremental stock of engineers in the U.S. in the early 1970's were immigrants from developing countries.

Demand is Regulated

The magnetic pull of the developed world's market for high-quality skills is also manipulated through periodic modifications of immigration policy in order to attract the skills most needed by these countries. Thus, the pace and content of the flow is often determined by the changing demands of their labour markets.

The catch-phrase "brain-drain" therefore does poor justice to the complexity of the problem and its many-sided impact on the resources of the poor nations. What is involved is no mere migration of individuals. It is in effect a transfer of productive resources from poor to the rich, a reverse transfer of technology.

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PROFILE OF EXPECTATION

by Godfrey Gunatilleke

The dialogues provide a wealth of material which require careful and detailed analysis. Even though this first set of dialogues suffer from the methodological looseness arising out of the experimental character of the exercise, there is a very large mass of information relating to a wide range of typical rural situations as well as some general view of urban approaches and attitudes to development, that comprehensive study and analysis would be certainly profitable and rewarding. The work involved in such an analysis might be assessed from the fact that in all there have been approximately 200 household dialogues, approximately 10 village seminars, and 10 national dialogues. A mode of analysis of a somewhat impressionistic character has been adopted. The researchers have attempted to assess the level of expectations in relation to each of the major categories of needs,

In making these assessments, no attempt has been made to apply a set of rigorous measurements. The researchers have attempted to set the future expectations against present conditions and try to evaluate these expectations. In the first instance, researchers have grouped present condition in terms of 3 or 4 categories ranging from low to high. As against this categorisation they have placed the expectations once again in terms of the categories which describe the present conditions. In some instances refinements have been attempted. For example, where present conditions are already high and expectations go beyond this level, the range of future expectations may be placed as high plus. All the researchers have not followed an identical scheme for evaluating the profile of expectations in the manner suggested. They have adopted their own scheme

in relation to specific conditions of living within the village in which they have worked.

For example, the low condition in regard to food may be different for a village where there is no serious food insufficiency even in the households at the bottom income level in the village, whereas it would be different in a village where the households at the bottom are in conditions of absolute poverty and where the main expectation is an increase in quantity, i.e. ability to have three full meals a day. The researchers have described in detail the content of low, medium or high or any other criteria they have used for grading. This crude attempt at evaluating expectations is however successful in indicating the nature of the gap between present conditions and future expectations, where present conditions in a community are largely weighted towards the low level and where future expectation are generally in the high range, it would be possible to make some conclusions about the magnitude of the gap between present conditions and future expectations and the resulting tensions, the discontent and the sense of deprivation in the community. But in order to use these assessments as a more reliable tool for measuring the degree of inner deprivation and the pressures that are mounting in regard to future expectations, it would have been necessary to refine these measurements to a much greater degree.

(i) The views expressed in the dialogues tend to support the conclusion that the expectations at the rural level are contained at a level of moderation and do not on the whole manifest any inordinate pressure towards high levels of material well-being which are substantially above the levels prevailing in the village. In other words, in most of the villages

that have been excluded in the project the frame of reference is internal to the village and the ideal level of expectations appears to be derived from the better conditions prevailing in the village. This is illustrated even in the villages where the high income groups have reached income levels which compare favourably with middle class incomes in the urban area — e.g. Kaledivulwewa. It is also generally true that the pressures of future expectations are contained within a relatively moderate increment. For instance, those who are in the low category seek to reach the moderate category. Many in the moderate category aspire for improvements which are still categorised as moderate. If one uses the criterion suggested by Durkheim for assessing the sense of inner deprivation or unhappiness — the gap between expectations and the possibility of realising these expectations — it might be said that in the rural context this gap is not very wide, and that the increments to well-being which are sought after by rural communities are within the capacity of the system to deliver with the right effort.

Food

(ii) When this is said, however, there are specific areas where problems of a more critical nature emerge. There are large groups as yet in a number of rural communities as well as in the slum community who visualise the improvement in the food intake in purely quantitative terms. This is very likely an indication of absolute poverty as many of these households place the possibility of having three daily meals as being the most important improvement in regard to food. The fact that the households are still at a level where improvements are exclusively seen in the quantity of food taken clearly suggests a

level of food insufficiency which is indicative of absolute poverty. Where the expectations regarding food relate to improvement of quality and inclusion of protein-rich food, there is evidently an income level which is above the poverty line. Taken together, the dialogues again indicate a modest food package. In many cases what is expected in the future is a better supply of protein food — milk, eggs, fish, meat. The dietary style remains very much a rural style. The desire for tinned foods as well as butter and jam is not pronounced. They are considered essentially luxury items.

Education

(iii) It is evident from the dialogues that aspirations in regard to education remain quite high for all income groups, whereas the levels of education in the low income groups are generally low. This is clearly due to socio-economic causes. The emphasis on education also reveals an interesting feature in the profile of expectations at least for some of the rural communities. The low income groups see their betterment not only for themselves but for their children and are ready to wait for their children to move upwards in the social ladder through education.

Housing

(iv) In almost all cases one sees that savings and increments to income are perceived as a means of improving, building or acquiring one's own house. In this context it is important to note that the dialogues reveal both a desire and a significant propensity to save among all economic strata in the rural sector. This is manifested to a degree which is unexpected in the prevailing socio-economic conditions of these households and belies conventional notions about their capacity and inclination to save. The expectations regarding housing go with a certain package of improvements in the interior of the house and the acquisition of consumer durables. Here again while emphasis is given to furniture such as a wardrobe, table, chairs, the desire for highly expensive

consumer durables such as a refrigerator or a television set is rare. The range of consumer durables which are popular and which are symbols of a better life are bicycles, radios, cassette recorders, sewing machines and so on.

It would be however interesting to see how these responses withstand the flow of consumer durables both as a result of liberalisation and as a result of the outflow of large numbers of young people from low-income households to the Middle East.

(v) This perhaps has to be qualified in terms of the picture which emerges from the dialogues in the slum community where the youth as well as households with middle incomes are ready to spend their money on expensive clothes and consumer durables. Even while neglecting basic needs, this is of course the impact of the exposure to urban styles of living.

(iv) The majority of the dialogues in the rural sector as well as in the estates indicates that there is no marked preference for outward mobility. This comes out fairly clearly in such rural communities as Wegalla, Kaledivulwewa and Henegama. The younger generation does show evidence of a desire to find employment outside the village, but this does not apply invariably to all households. On the whole the communities seem to be centred on themselves and to that extent inward looking. The dialogues do not give evidence of a widespread pressure for outward migration. This would imply that as regards future expectations, the development in and around the rural communities would to a large extent be adequate if the improvements that are expected for the household and the village are met.

(To be continued)

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WHO'S SUBSIDISING WHOM? (2)

Aid — an efficient instrument of the new Colonialism

ECONOMICS

by U. Karunatilake

For what have the subsidies been removed. For fivefold and some times tenfold increases in the cost of plantation tools suddenly flooding in from outside in spite of the fact that the entire requirement of the plantation sector had earlier been met by local hardware manufacturers. For four fold increases in the cost of agro chemicals and fertilizers imported at very disadvantageous prices. For our hundred-fold increases in the cost of estate civil engineering works, plant repair and replacement, inflated on an unprecedented system of local and foreign commissions which Asian observers have described as the worst in this region.

One brown sahib at the Central Bank had worked out the cost of consumer subsidies at Rs. 5,000/- million. The people can test his Arithmetic by getting him to work out the cost of corruption as a percentage of the budget. This then can be applied as a coefficient on all expenditure to find out where our real budget stands. It can also be applied as a coefficient on apparant inflation to find how much inflation is real, and how much is only Swiss rolls.

The economic breakdown inherent in this corruption is already signalled by three indices for Sri Lanka, (1) The massive increase in the cost of production per kilo of tea when compared with India, where wages are in fact higher than Sri Lanka. (2) The drop in output of tea. (3) The decline in the average market price of tea.

Forget about it, say the new pundits, tea economics is only a relic of our colonial past. Then tea was the main foreign exchange earner. Now it is Aid. That

reminds me we must apply that same coefficient to Aid.

Less the factor for corruption, what does Aid mean? It means that the slaves on our plantations and the peasants in our rice fields provide the main means by which our Aid donors can rehabilitate entire areas of their badly recessed economy, providing heavy machinery, power generating equipment, construction materials, plant, tractors and agro chemicals at several times their world market prices.

Three years ago Sri Lanka was obtaining four wheel tractors on world wide tender at a c. i. f. price of Rs. 25,000/-. Today, on Aid the c. i. f. price of a tractor is Rs. 100,000/-. A medium sized industrial boiler for steam generation came in three years ago at under one lakh. Today, on Aid you are lucky if it costs under one million. So where, really, do our subsidies operate?

They operate in the EEC, US and Japan. They operate in England, Canada and Australia. They operate very effectively. So effectively that poor countries like Sri Lanka are helping to push up the prices of capital goods, and manufactured consumables to levels which tend to reverse the spin of Western recession even temporarily and put off the inevitable slump.

Hence as far as the relations between the old imperial masters and their teeming, undernourished, Asian, free men are concerned, the basic economic position has not changed much in this century, which is now drawing to a close. The freed men are continuing to subsidise their tottering old imperial masters and local collaborators at a volume which

(Continued on Page 20)

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MASTERS

THE NORTHERN PROVINCE

by K. Sivathamby

Within the Northern Province one could mark out three different areas in terms of socio-economic bases—the Mannar region, the Vanni region consisting of Vavuniya and Mullaitivu districts and the peninsular region i.e. Jaffna district proper. The socio-economic situation in Mannar is somewhat similar to that of the Eastern province; commenting on the situation during the Donoughmore constitution era, Jane Russel said that "the Eastern Province Tamil member, and Mannar member, for instance, represented quite different kinds of electorates from those of the Northern members. Those former named members were far more interested in agricultural policy than the Public Services, and they were more conciliatory vis-a-vis the Sinhalese, as a goodly portion of their constituents were Muslims". But the social organisation of the Tamils of the Mannar district does not differ very much from that of the Tamils of Jaffna district. Here, among the Tamils the Catholics are in a dominant position and they have had a history of conflict with the Hindus. In fact the bulk of the Hindus of Mannar are Jaffna-oriented. The Hindu-Catholic conflicts over the re-discovery and the development of the historic Tiruketheeswaram temple are too well-known.

But here again the increasing popularity of the Federal Party and now the TULF has softened the Hindu-Catholic conflicts within the Tamils community, but the Muslims generally have always expressed their individuality by professing support to non-Tamilian political groups. The support the UNP has among the Mannar Muslims should be seen in this light.

Among the Tamil areas, the Vanni region had been the least developed. Though in terms of traditional social organization one

does not notice any great difference from Jaffna, economic underdevelopment has left an indelible mark on the society. Vanni has been largely a closed social system until recently and the main agents of socio-economic change had been the Jaffna migrants, both traders and agriculturists. The traditional Vanni inhabitants had thereby developed a hostility towards the immigrants from Jaffna to the extent of forming a secret organization the Yari Akatti Sangam. (The society for Removal of the Jaffna Man). In terms of economic demands the Vanni peasant is one with the Sinhala peasant of the Rajarata region. In fact during the period of S.L.F.P. rule there was some understanding forged with the Tamil politicians of the Tamil Vanni districts. But the action of successive governments in settling Sinhala peasant colonists in and around the Vavuniya district and the corresponding increase of Sinhala residents of the area has always given rise to Sinhala-Tamil conflict and confrontation in this district.

Vavuniya has always been considered the Southern boundary of the Northern Tamil homeland and the increasing Sinhala settlements have made this the most sensitive area in terms of Sinhala-Tamil hostility. With the opening up of several agricultural development schemes in the Vavuniya district and the migration of the Jaffna peasantry into those areas, the Tamilian character of the population is being consolidated. Vavuniya district has the largest number of Indian Tamil labourers outside the Central highlands. Even this is contributing towards the further strengthening of the Tamilian identity. The pressure of Indian-Tamil population—the overflow from the estates—is very important for it is at this level that one sees a tendency towards

an Indian-Sri Lankan Tamil merger through marriages. Being the border area, "communal" consciousness is markedly obvious. And there has been, of late, a revival of historical memories. The Vanni chieftains were the last of the Tamils to surrender their authority to the British and Pandara Vanniyan, the last Vanni chieftain killed at Katsilaimadu in 1803, is now presented as a great hero of the Tamils and the name of Kakkai Vanniyan, who betrayed Pandara Vanniyan to the British regiment, has become synonymous with treachery and betrayal. Anyone who goes against Tamilian solidarity is now referred to as a Kakkai Vanniyan. Pandara Vanniyan has become the Puran Appu of the Sri Lankan Tamils.

The Jaffna Tamils form politically the most articulate group among the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Sri Lankan Tamil problem has often been presented as one of deciding the role and the status of the Jaffnaman within the island. Jaffna, besides Colombo, was the earliest region to receive the benefits of modernization especially in relation to English education and the people from Jaffna have been enjoying a disproportionate quota of jobs as state officers, teachers and professionals; they are thus found in all parts of the island. The Jaffna trader, quite adventurous had also established himself in like manner. But in spite of their island wide distribution they have had a sense of exclusiveness which prevented them from being one with those among whom they worked. The one distinguishing characteristic of the Jaffnaman is that he has always been Jaffna-centric. Jane Russel's characterisation of the Jaffna Tamil deserves attention.

"The Jaffna Tamil man was fiercely conservative and he maintained a jealous pride in his attachment to the peninsula and to the language costumes and beliefs of his ancestors..."

It could perhaps be termed a peninsularity of mind, the spatial isolation of Northern Province being its most conditioning factor. However when combined with a natural atavism stemming partly from Hindu religion, an atavism which a British governor described as the preference of the Ceylon Tamil for the methods of his ancestors, this peculiar conservatism becomes an ingrained trait. The admirable virtues of the community has been well expressed by Sir P. Arunachalam: "I have great belief in the Tamil Community. They will be saved by their commonsense and marvelous industry, their innate disdain of comfort and spartan simplicity, their long knowledge and love of mother-tongue".

It is important to understand these traits of the Jaffna man in terms of his socio-economic base. Clearly these characteristics of the Jaffna man mark him out as a distinct group within Sri Lanka and this is well expressed in the operation of the legal system, based not on the legislative enactment of any single man or power but evolved out of 'the traditions of the country'. A literal translation of the term *Tesavalamai*, law that governs property rights in Jaffna would be 'traditions (usages) of the country'. The manner of its operation is very symbolic. A Jaffna man living outside would be subject to the norms of that area but within Jaffna the tradition of the place dominates and continues to dominate. The *Tesavalamai* law is very much unlike the *Mukawa* for the former is a peculiar combination of patrilineal and matrilineal societies. Though originally based on the *Marumakkattayam* law, its evolution in Jaffna has brought within it many patrilineal aspects, thus making it a unique combination peculiar to the people and the place.

Tesavalamai law also reveals the basic social organization of the Tamils of Jaffna. It is based on the caste system. Here again the ranking is quite different from that of the other Tamils, either in India or Sri Lanka. A closer analysis of the *Tesavalamai* law character of the caste-continuity would reveal it as *Vellala*-based; with even the Brahmin, though he occupies a position of ritual supremacy, coming below him in social power authority. The caste system

as it operates in Jaffna is a form of social control exercised by the highest group.

The rather 'monolithic' view that Jaffna is all-Tamil would be not correct. Time and again it has been proved that is the dominant *Vellala* caste (having for itself certain class characteristics) that has expressed its own needs and demands as the demands of the Tamils. Karalasingham has referred to this as '*Vellala domination*'. Analysing the political history of Jaffna from 1933 to 1947, Jane Russel said: "Governed as they were by a 'peninsula' outlook, the *Vellalas* felt secure in their numerical predominance and without their active co-operation any effective social transformation proved impossible".

An analysis of the social background of the leaders of Jaffna upto the time of the formation of the TULF would show that they have been from the *Vellala* caste and it could also be seen that some of them were Janus-faced on this problem. The classic instance is that of Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan who opposed the introduction of adult franchise on the ground that it would give the lower castes the right to vote. He was also against the introduction of equal seating and commensality in Jaffna schools.

A closer look at the manner educational opportunities were provided by Hindu English schools would reveal that the depressed castes were largely left out. Even the Christian schools had to take cognizance of the caste system. It was the coming of the free-education scheme and the introduction of the *Swabasha* medium that radically changed the socio-educational set-up in Jaffna.

In terms of intra-political divisions among the Tamils of Jaffna the caste system has played an important role and continues to do so. But here again politicization on ethnic lines has enabled the election for the first time of an M.P. from Depressed Castes.

Even the traditional Hindu-Christian hostility seems to have

lessened in recent times. Of late the Catholic Church has produced clergymen who have identified themselves fully with the Tamil cause.

The main economic source of the political problems of the Jaffna Tamil has been the public services. The post 1930 Sinhala-Tamil relations were almost centred round this main problem of recruitment to the Public Services. Sir A. Mahadeva's statement—

Much of the gulf that exists today between the Sinhalese and the Tamil communities is due to the fear that there may be a lack of impartiality in the recruiting of entrants to the Public Services.

made in 1935 is as true today as it was then—the only difference being that the government of the day has accepted by implication the charge that there is a certain imbalance in recruitment.

Public service-oriented education had been an economic necessity in Jaffna and when efforts were made to solve the problem at the 'lower stage' of the provision of education (so that there would be no problem for the state at a later stage in providing the jobs) the character of political agitation in Jaffna changed for the system of standardisation effected only the youth. And with the departure from the island of those who had the education but not adequate opportunities, the Sri Lanka problem has been given an international standing.

Next: Patterns of political thinking

Aid . . .

(Continued from Page 17)

In monetary terms is a hundred fold more than in the days of open Colonialism.

The only glimmer of comedy in this sordid picture is the sight of various groups representing the World's poor meeting at international conferences to tell their exploiters how big and bad they are, and then in the same breath ask them for more Aid, without realising that Aid is the most efficient instrument of the new Colonialism.

CINEMA

Gamini Fonseka's 'Uthumaneni'

— Another view

by J. Uyangoda

The other day I was among a packed audience to watch Gamini Fonseka's latest creation "Uthumaneni" ("Your Honour"). By the intermission I had slowly begun to realize that Gamini had done something marvellous. Even before the last sequences unfolded on the screen, I thought to myself, yes, in 'Uthumaneni' Gamini Fonseka has found himself.

'Uthumaneni' illustrates the new and vigorous trend in the Sinhala film-making which originated in the last decade. With its powerful social content, this film seriously questions the legitimacy of that nonsensical, escapist cinema which the Sinhala filmgoers were used to over three decades.

Sinhala cinema still suffers from its original deformity — a malady arising out of a falsification and vulgarization of life itself. Both the film industrialists and a good section of our audience still believe, perhaps quite innocently, that this deformity, itself, is precisely the healthiest feature of Sinhala cinema. That is why the efforts of giants are required to set things moving in the right direction. With his immense popularity as the leading Sinhala film actor, Gamini Fonseka is in a better position than anyone else to play this new role. 'Uthumaneni' is a clear indication that Gamini is conscious of this need.

'Uthumaneni' carries a theme which can be considered as one of the most powerful to appear in the Sinhala cinema. Its extremely strong appeal for justice is itself a clear indictment against the authority of the established order, with its essential and omnipresent element of injustice. The two

incidents where Siripala goes to the police station to make a complaint that his sister is raped by Baby Mahaththaya (the village tyrant with wealth and power) and the sequences of the girl being subjected to the torture of cross-examination at the courts, are simply shocking. In this system of injustice, the poor and the helpless become the victim. Again, the system is such that the innocent becomes victimized, even where justice is said to prevail. These two instances will remain unforgettable for many years to come in the Sinhala Cinema.

There is a strong element of irony running through the whole movie. The victimized are the victims; the persecuted are the innocents; tortured are the humblest. Whose fault? There is only one answer in the film both implicit and explicit — the fault of the existing order of things. Gamini, displaying his maturity as a filmmaker does not suggest anything, directly. He is an observer with a sharp, sensitive and critical eye. He invites his audience to walk through this world with him. He takes us to a mountain top and enables us to have a panoramic view of the world we are already familiar with. We are horrified to see that it is not the world of dreams and fantasies, but one of power, privilege and cruelty, social inequality and injustice. And it is a powerfully shocking revelation. Revelation itself suffices to make us think and ask the question: What is wrong with this society? In this context Gamini Fonseka, by his faithful portrayal of the real conditions of society, dispels some of the dominant conventional illusions concerning them, and shares the optimism of the existing social authority. Is this alone not a major achievement?

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GARADS

Indirect translation and its perils

LITERATURE

by Reggie Siriwardena

Until very recently English was always the medium through which works from other literatures were translated into Sinhala. This practice arose at a time when it was impossible to find anybody with a knowledge of Continental languages who could write expressively and correctly in Sinhala. English served as the medium even for the translation of Asian works of literature into Sinhala. Tagore has been translated mainly through his own English versions, while whatever Chinese poetry has been rendered into Sinhala has come by way of Arthur Waley and other English translators.

In recent years this situation has begun to change, with learning of foreign languages being diffused among a broader group of students and intellectuals. Thus, in the last decade we have had a few works translated directly from Russian, French and German into Sinhala — a welcome development. But until there are enough Sinhala translators with a knowledge of a broad range of European and Asian languages, it is likely that the practice of translation through the medium of English will continue.

One need not scorn this process of 'indirect translation', as it is called: it has been a necessary stage in the growth of many cultures. At one time, for instance, French, as the dominant cultural language of Europe, served as the intermediary through which Russian works were translated into English and vice versa. However, indirect translation has its perils, and the translator needs to be on his guard against them. I should like to draw attention to some of these dangers and suggest ways in which they can be averted. My particular examples will be taken from the translation of Russian literature, but what I have to say is equally relevant to indirect translation of other foreign literatures.

The pitfalls are greatest in the translation of poetry, where nuances of feeling and rhythm and connotations of words are most likely to be obscured when translating from a translation. Moreover, one of the recurrent problems of translating poetry is that of reconciling the claims of sense and form. Translating into English from a Russian poem, one may sometimes depart from literal sense in order to satisfy the needs of rhythm, metre or rhyme. Thus, in a recently published translation of one of Anna Akhmatova's poems, *The Grey-Eyed King*, I have thought it necessary to keep the rhyming couplets of the original, with their suggestion of a popular ballad, even at the cost of some deviations from the sense, and would consider that a defensible liberty. But if a translator were to take my version as a source for translation into Sinhala, I would think it necessary to warn him that my variations of the sense of the original should not necessarily be carried over into Sinhala: he might on the other hand, need to make other departures to suit the demands of his own verse form.

Translating prose fiction, one is not confronted by problems of like complexity, but the indirect translator of fiction has his own difficulties with which to cope. With the masters of classic Russian fiction, the indirect translator has often a plethora of English translations between which he must choose. Without access to the original, he is likely to judge by what reads best in English, but this is not necessarily the most accurate translation! Constance Garnett's versions of Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Chekhov and Turgenev made their great impact on several generations of English readers as well as on many of us in Sri Lanka because she wrote with style and elegance — her versions didn't

sound like translations. But looking now at some of her translations through which I first discovered Russian literature as a young student, I find their virtues greatly counterbalanced by their frequent inaccuracies.

It is only necessary, for instance, to skim the pages of Garnett's version of *Anna Karenina* to realise that she was a most slipshod translator. Some of her errors are no more than amusing howlers which don't make a great difference to the reader's response to the novel, as when she renders *Sam Nikandrov* (Nikandrov himself) as 'Sam Nikandrov' or confuses *edim* (we eat) with *edem* (we ride). But sometimes her slips interfere more seriously with the understanding of situation and character. Thus, when Princess Shcherbatskaya, early in the novel, troubled by the possibility that Kitty might make what in her eyes would be the wrong choice in love, asks her to promise not to have any secrets from her mother, Garnett makes Kitty answer, '....but there's no use in my telling you anything.' The reader may well wonder why the Princess is satisfied with such a rude answer. But what Kitty really says is, 'But I have nothing to say at present,' meaning she hasn't yet had a proposal. Again, in Anna's anguished reflections just before her suicide, when she recalls guiltily the son she deserted, Garnett has her think, 'I gave him up for another love, and did not regret the exchange till that love was satisfied.' Instead of till one should read as long as, which makes a great difference to the sense.

However, even with more conscientious and accurate translations (Rosemary Edmond's versions of Tolstoy are greatly to be preferred to Constance Garnett's), one still has the problem that

certain nuances of relationships and emotion disappear in English translation because of differences inherent in the language itself. I have discussed some of these in an article in the **Lanka Guardian** entitled 'The missing second-person pronoun' (15.6.79.), where I pointed out that the second-person pronouns in Russian (the same would be true of French or Spanish), with their polite and non-polite forms carry indicators of personal or social relationships which are obliterated in English translation since English has a single form, 'you'. The Sinhala translator who renders a Russian novel through the medium of English may therefore be deprived of an expressive resource which is in fact available to him in his own language.

Another important expressive feature of the Russian language which is blurred in English translation is the use of diminutives. Many Russian words have an accompanying diminutive form: thus, *ruka* (hand) has a diminutive *ruchka* (literally, 'little hand'), which could be used of a child's hand, but could also be used affectionately of one's girl-friend's hand even if it wasn't particularly small in size. Diminutives contribute tones of feeling ranging from the tender to the contemptuous which are often difficult to render in English without awkwardness, so that English translators frequently leave them out. It seems to me that Sinhala in this respect may often be better able to capture the shades of feeling of the original, so that the indirect translator is again losing something which he may well be able to keep.

Assuming that indirect translation is often an unavoidable necessity, can we not find methods of overcoming its dangers and limitations? I suggest that a translator who seeks to render through the medium of English a work of literature in a foreign language of which he is ignorant should always have the collaboration or assistance of somebody who knows the original. A model for such collaboration can be found in the account by Jon Stallworthy and Peter France of how they worked on their generally pleasing English

translations of the poetry of Aleksandr Blok. JS was a poet who knew no Russian, while PF was a Russian scholar. PF would send JS a literal line-by-line prose rendering into English of the original Russian poem with notes on rhythm, tone, ambiguities of meaning etc., from which JS would make a creative rendering into English verse, to be refined and perfected later in the light of PF's criticisms.

This method can well be adapted for indirect translation of European poetry into Sinhala. Prose fiction doesn't require so elaborate a process, but the guidance of a collaborator who knows the original language can help the indirect translator in choosing an English version from which to work, and in checking that version as well as the finished translation against the original. ●

JVP split . . .

(Continued from Page 4)

adhered to the Trotskyist theory of Permanent Revolution and rejected united fronts. This rejection of the CPSL's call for left unity, helped only the UNP and its bourgeois substitute (not alternative), the SLFP. Presently the JVP was readying itself for possible by-elections in Kalawana and Anamaduwa. Breaking up the 5 party campaign of united action for petty parliamentary gain reveals that the JVP had now moved from left adventurism to parliamentarist right opportunism.

All this, said K. P. Silva, had caused a rift in the JVP leadership. On international policy, the neo-Trotskyist sections of the leadership choose to remain silent on Afghanistan, are less enthusiastic about Cuba and speak of the need to set up a new International a la Trotsky. However, most of the party and even some leaders will eventually realize the correctness of the CPSL's positions, concluded Silva.

The SLFP 'Nation' has carried several frontage reports which claim that serious divisions have emerged in the JVP leadership. In deep trouble, evidently is Lionel Bopage, one of the few surviving 'veterans' of the 1971 insurrection. ●

An Olympian . . .

(Continued from Page 5)

and interpret his call for a boycott as toughness. Whatever the end result, and whether or not Carter finds his way to the White House once more, he has ensured that posterity will remember him as the man who destroyed a historical event that brings the people of the world together for a fortnight of unparalleled athletic competition. ●

Letters . . .

(Continued from Page 2)

has grave and far-reaching repercussions. Doesn't it mean that all attempts to restructure society have to draw their sustenance and motivation from Christ? And, given that, doesn't the christianization of the liberation movements necessarily follow, before any attempts are made to bring about social change? (It is very relevant to study the relationship between the radicalised Christians and the the liberation movements of Latin America; (NICARAGUA in particular!) Attempts to give a unive, Christian, orientation would create destructive tensions of such magnitude between the liberation movements and progressive Christians that any structural changes in society and Christian involvement in the struggle may be delayed for decades.

A study of pre-and-post-Revolutionary situations would reveal that it is exceedingly naive to link up 'bureaucratisation' and the partial gains of the revolution with the lack of a "Christain sprit" among the revolutionaries. The difficulties connected with revolutionising social and production relationships, creating collective forms of work in agriculture and industry, raising the productivity of agriculture and industry while NOT compromising revolutionary social goals, tackling the issue of the family, women, and human relationships must be finally understood in all their complexity.

Jagath Senaratne
Battaramulla.



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
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
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