

# AMIR AS ARAFAT

— Mervyn de Silva



**LANKA**

# GUARDIAN


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**THE LAW**

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**Ethnic Issues**

— Kumari Jayawardena — B. A. Kader

**Making of Foreign Policy**

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**'Crippled Minds'**

— Susantha Goonatilake replies

\* **Marx, Lenin and the Poor World**

— Dayan Jayatilleka

\* **Third World Cultures**

— Neville Jayaweera

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● INDIA's NEIGHBOURS

● THE JUDICIARY

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## THE ORGANISATION MAN

Lin Piao put out the theory of 'encircling the cities' from the village as a strategy for 'peoples' war'. Prime Minister Premadasa, reports a correspondent who watched the Gam Udawa celebrations in Nikaweratiya last week, has obviously reversed that strategy. This strikes one, he adds, not only as a national policy ("homes for the homeless", the PM's U. N. resolution) but a political strategy conceived by the author in the light of his own personal experience. Significantly, **Gam Udawa** (Village Re-Awakening) marked the PM's 59th birthday.

Mr. Premadasa came to politics as a youthful admirer of Labour Leader A. E. Goonesinghe. City-born, his terrain was exclusively urban when he went into Colombo Municipal politics. But he broke out of the urban enclave as Deputy Minister of Local Government with the highly controversial "poottu palam" project of "instant bridges" in the village. The city politician was building bridges to the village where he had obviously recognised the true seat of popular power.

A logical extension of that plan, GAM UDAWA has been criticised by the World Bank and some local economists as "low-yielding" projects which devour scarce resources but the philosophy and general strategy behind it seem to overshadow the bloodless economics. Reporters returning from the ceremonies shared one other observation. They were amazed at the highly skilled organisation which made the show move with clock-work precision. Of course, this is always possible when the State machine and the government's resources are readily available. But the more vigilant reporters noted that it was not all supplied by the State. There was a personal apparatus, a private 'machine' at work too. Which goes to make the 59 year old Premier, Sri Lanka's No. 1 Organisation Man. To what use he will put this personal drive

and private 'machine' is of course a question that awaits the future.

## IMF TALKS

The "Ceylon Observer" surely got the Secretary to the Treasury, Dr. Tillekeratne wrong when it quoted him as saying that there were no on-going negotiations with the I.M.F. What he must have meant was that there were no official negotiations with the IMF in Paris during the "Aid Club" meeting in mid-June.

Like an appointment with the dentist, talks with the IMF cannot be postponed **sine die**. If Mohammed does not go to the mountain, the mountain will surely come to Mohammed in paradise! An IMF team will probably visit Colombo in the middle of this month and we shall then know the value of the rupee vis-a-vis the dollar. Will it slide down from 23/- to 26/- to the dollar or even further. Not if Mr. Esmond Wickremesinghe and his assorted group of experts (income tax, central bank, mass media etc) can help it. This group is conducting a guerrilla operation against the Finance Ministry Establishment. Their report will be studied by the President this week.

## INDIA'S NEIGHBOURS

Buried under the innocuous headline "**N.A. concepts for all systems, says Indira**" (CDN 21/6) was a remark of the Indian prime minister which raised many a DPL eyebrow here. Speaking at an India-West Europe Conference, Mrs. Gandhi argued that NAM advocated peaceful co-existence as a concept for practice by all countries and not merely democracies... Mrs. Gandhi illustrated the point said the **Press Trust of India**, "by saying that none of India's neighbours were democracies."

**TRENDS  
+  
LETTERS**

## Reply to Shan

I read with interest the veteran Leftist Leader N. Sanmugathasan's views on the Tamil problem (LG May 1, 1983). I fear that Sanmugathasan still lies buried in his rhetorics such as "all bourgeois Tamil parties", "reactionary forces", "Sinhalese masses" and "armed struggle". Though he is entitled to his views on the perennial problem of Sri Lanka, his de-emphasis of the extra-parliamentary struggles initiated by S. J. V. Chelvanayakam and Amirthalingam in mid-fifties is as silly as pleading that the plane built by Wright Brothers cannot be used for mass transport of present day era and hence their navigational effort is worthless. Many of us in the younger generation hold the view that the satyagraha campaigns, 'sit-in' at Galle Face (1956) and the anti-

(Continued on page 16)

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# “Crippled Minds” — Import Substitution and Alienation

Susantha Goonetilleke replies

I am grateful to the *Lanka Guardian* and Mr. Gamini Seneviratne for reviewing my book *Crippled Minds*. I found valuable points in the review which will be useful for me in a second edition of the book. I enjoyed both the barbs as well as the kudos written in the tradition of English literary criticism. (Reading the roughly ten reviews on the book so far has been for me a deeply educative experience specially the passages of both exaggerated praise as well as of cant) There are however two technical points in Gamini Seneviratne's review which would create some confusion, that require clarification specially for the reader who may not have access to the book. First, a brief remark on the central purpose of this book, it was a survey of the development of world regional cultures from very early times, upto the 16th century, the subsequent dominance of these cultures by the European variety — specially within the recent past — and the problematic of re-asserting regional cultures. This is a complex problem covering a wide variety of fields and disciplines. My aim was to identify the patterns in the spread of colonial cultures in the cases of mercantile capitalism, industrial capitalism of the 19th century and in the present transnational phase and the nature of its impact on the three continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

To make a meaningful whole of these factors in any coherent narrative demands, a systematic “scientific” theory of history. Of all the theoretical schemes available and in spite of its many shortcomings — the core Marxist framework provides the only comprehensive theory of history yet around. Thus the theoretical schemes of Ranke, Hegel, Weber, to name but a few of those who attempted historical explanations are far less powerful,

in the ability to provide an overreaching theory covering economics, social classes, technology, culture etc. Yet Marxism was developed essentially to analyse European society, the major modes of production in classical Marxism being slave, feudal, capitalist and thereafter, all appearing within the domain of geographical Europe.

In analysing regional civilizations, such a crude euro-centrism is inadequate. I have therefore implicitly used in my analysis as a peg to hang my arguments a flow of independent regional modes of production that is, till the coming in of world wide capitalism. It is this disaggregated framework of culture as a part of the super-structure related to the forces of production and production relations that forms the underlying fabric in my analysis.

Marx's theory of alienation which Seneviratne refers to is a complex bundle of ideas. The core of Marx's alienation concept deals with estrangement (“*entfremdung*”) of man from the product of his labour, from the act of production within the labour process as well as from other men specially through participation in the capitalist labour process. Alienation is a useful concept and could be applied specially in analysis of the condition of man within the particular factory labour process that developed over the last 150 years through, say, the ideas of Adam Smith, Babbage, Taylor and Ford.

In fact I have done precisely this, in my analysis in the chapter on technology as a social gene. Here I trace in considerable technical detail the growth of the labour process inside the factory floor leading to the motor car assembly line as a congealing of external capitalist social relations. The ironical

situation that I tried to show in this chapter was that a transfer of such a capitalist derived package of technology to the Soviet Union has resulted in reproducing at the factory floor some of the same symptoms of alienation as in capitalism.

The analysis in that chapter, as even a brief glance would indicate, is firmly within the alienation critique of man in the labour process.

The next point I wish to clarify is the role of import substitution in Sri Lanka and its partial role in nullifying the attempts at a cultural renaissance in the fifties and the sixties. Firstly, a comment on the broad product structure and the cultural implication of import substitution programmes in general. Import substitution as an industrial strategy occurred over large parts of the Third World after political independence. There is general agreement in the technical literature that the products that tended to be manufactured under import substitution programmes were generally the same package that was imported earlier for the colonial elite and their allies. Import but to elite wants and tastes. To take the case of our neighbour to the North, India, the import substitution package of industrialisation basically feeds ten percent of its population (a market as large as that of West Germany) a fact commented by very many students of development. This tendency in import substitution, one should understand is independent of well meaning and patriotic officials in Ministries of Industries. It is the outcome of social processes and class dynamics.

What is additionally important in some of the items which were manufactured in Sri Lanka during the import substitution phase (which phase was also an

(Continued on page 16)

# IN DEFENCE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

NEWS  
BACKGROUND

**T**hat was the week that was. David Selbourne the Oxford don and free-lance journalist who has become one of the most astringent critics of recent developments in Sri Lanka may have had cause to regard the popular pronouncement that 'democracy in Sri Lanka is dead' a premature verdict. Before he was bundled out of the island as an 'undesirable' Dr. Selbourne who now specialises in Sri Lankan affairs would surely have watched the Supreme Court, the Bar Council, Lawyers' Associations throughout the country, the CRM, the opposition parties and press, the Law Students Union, the Church, Municipal councils and other local bodies in action. But most of all, as a part-time journalist himself, he must have reserved very special admiration for the *SUN* and *ISLAND* newspapers, which produced in the course of a week, some of the most scorching editorials published in our mainstream media in recent years.

Sometimes, history in its unpredictable moods, has an uncanny way of creating the oddest of occasions to test the public commitment to democracy and the fight-back capacity of the people, both the so-called man-in-the-street and the intelligentsia, those opinion-makers who are called upon from time to time to bear the burden of moral and intellectual leadership in times of stress and challenge.

As usual, such occasions are not always free of the comic or the bizarre. Such was certainly the quaint contribution of Mr. Lakshman Fernando alias Kalu Lucky, late of the 1971 JVP insurrection, and now a self-admitted UNP'er and a self-styled 'Colombo businessman'. Unfortunately (some may say fortunately) Mr. Fernando's business on that fateful Saturday morning

(June 11) was to organise (his sole responsibility, he says) "demos" near the homes of three Supreme Court judges. Forty eight hours earlier these judges held that a sub-inspector was guilty of a violation of fundamental rights when he arrested Mrs. Vivienne Goonewardene as she was returning from the US Embassy where a delegation from a Sri Lanka Women's organisation had handed over a petition about Diego Garcia. An official of the US Embassy, in the best traditions of diplomatic decorum, had accepted the petition. Nothing would have happened if a photographer 'covering' the womens' procession along the city's main highway, Galle Road, had not taken pictures of policemen "confiscating" banners.

## Lucky Man

Mrs. Goonewardene, Mrs. Keuneman and others went into the police station only to inquire about the fate of the photographer who had been taken there. The only other relevant detail is that the guilty sub-inspector was promoted the next day. Truly, it could be said of the sub-inspector as indeed of Kalu Lucky, 'O Lucky Man'!

At least in the public mind, there is a history to this case. The sub-inspector has joined in what one hopes is not going to prove a long line of lucky officials who receive prompt promotion on conviction by the supreme Court! In the PAVIDI HANDA case, one of the many incidents, which marred the December Referendum, the ASP who was found guilty of a violation of fundamental rights had his 25,000/- fine paid by government and promoted S. P.

This is probably why the Chief Justice in the statement issued after

a meeting of the entire Supreme Court spoke of "incentives".

It is the underlying issue however which vests the utmost importance on what might otherwise have been dismissed as a particularly tasteless act of hooliganism. For the Supreme Court spoke of these incidents as "planned" and "coordinated". False numberplates, telephones that went mysteriously dead, missing log books etc may have added colourful touches suggestive of a popular crime thriller but in the public mind it only confirmed the impression of planning and coordination. In his defiant statement ('We shall not be deterred from discharging our duty etc') the Chief Justice hinted strongly of the possibility of a pattern in all this. **And it is this pattern which creates the issue and makes it a question of grave concern.**

As this edition goes to press, the Bar Council has demanded the appointment of an impartial commission of three — a Supreme Court judge, a nominee of the Bar Association and an official representative.

The Bar Council President, Mr. Herman J. C. Perera, who recently requested police protection, referred to two matters in the course of the discussions held on June 25.

(a) The Parliamentary Select Committee appointed to inquire into a complaint made by Mr. K. C. de Alwis, a former judge, against two Supreme Court Judges.

(b) The *SUN* report of May 30 headlined "Procedures to remove Judges by Parliament", and the unconfirmed report of amendments to the Standing Orders to allow impeachment.

# Nothing will deter us—CJ

**T**he judges of the Supreme Court declared that the recent demonstrations in front of the homes of some of them will in no way stop them from independently discharging their duties.

"They feel that certain actions taken in recent times have been an incentive to the events of last Saturday. We need hardly add that such events will in no way deter us from being independent in discharging our duties," a statement said.

This statement was issued from the Chambers of Chief Justice Neville Samarakoon after all the judges of the Supreme Court had met to consider the events. Mr Samarakoon said that the statement was from the judges of the Supreme Court.

They added that they have taken note of the assurances of the Prime Minister and await the outcome of his actions.

Last Saturday certain elements staged demonstration opposite the houses of Mr Justice Ratwatte, Mr Justice Colin Thome' and the former residence of Mr Justice Soza. This was a sequel to a judgment of the Supreme Court delivered by these three judges.

The demonstrations appeared to be planned and co-ordinated. State owned buses appear to have been used to transport the demonstrators. Slogans and obscenities were shouted at the judges. Attempts by two of the judges to obtain police protection proved futile. It was reported in the press that the Acting Inspector General of Police has offered police sentries to those Judges who do not have such protection at the moment.

These judges do not feel encouraged to accept the offer.

The judges however note the assurance given by the Prime Minister and await the outcome of his actions.

"The judges feel that certain actions taken in recent times have been an incentive to the events of last Saturday. We need hardly add that such events will in no way deter us from being independent in discharging our duties.

"Exposed as we are to the winds of criticism, nothing which is said (or done) by this person or that, nothing which is written by this pen or that, will deter us from doing what we believe is right; nor, (we) would add, from saying (or doing) what the occasion requires, provided that it is pertinent to the matter in hand."

A legal source said the quotation is from Lord Denning.

— 'Daily News'

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
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# Govt. will uphold judiciary — P. M.

**P**hile Minister R. Premadasa stressed that government will always uphold the judiciary as an essential part of the democratic process and said that appropriate action will be taken about the complaint by three Supreme Court judges.

Mr. Premadasa said after the cabinet meeting where this matter was discussed that President Jayewardene was being kept informed and had approved the action taken.

In a 6-paragraph statement issued after the meeting, the Prime Minister said: "The Government takes a serious view of the complaints made to the police by three judges of the Supreme Court in regard to certain incidents reported by them where some persons are alleged to have demonstrated in front of their houses.

The Government has always accepted the need for an independent judiciary and has in the 1978 Constitution incorporated provisions to ensure this.

It will be noted that in the 1972 Constitution such safeguards did not exist.

This government will always uphold the judiciary as essential part of the democratic process.

Inquiries are being conducted on the complaints made by the three judges to the police and on receipt of the report appropriate action will be taken in consultation with the Attorney-General.

The President has been kept informed of the situation and has approved of the action that is being taken."

Copies of a 6-page report from acting IGP S.S Joseph regarding police investigation into the incident were tabled at the cabinet meeting by Mr. Premadasa.

This report set out in detail the contents of statement made by the three judges concerned their neighbours and other witnesses and said that further investigations continue under the direction of DIG (Metropolitan) Edward Gunawardene to trace the CTB buses supposed to have been used to transport the demonstrators and also establish conclusively whether the police emergency phones had been inoperative at the time as has been claimed.

Mr. Joseph has also reported that due to a part of the judgement in the Vivienne Goonewardene case dealing with the conducting of a procession, the police were faced with certain difficulties.

— "Daily News"

## Spate of protests against demonstrations

**The Civil Rights Movement** describes the demonstration as "the most grievous instance of contempt of court in the history of our country."

It says: "The Constitution recognises that such contempt is an offence which the due administration of justice requires be suitably punished. The primary duty to have those responsible dealt with by the Supreme Court lies with the Attorney General.

"The Working Committee calls upon the Attorney General, as a matter of urgency, to see that the police record statements of persons who witnessed the incidents, statements which help identify as many as possible of those who participated directly or indirectly, and collect other evidence.

"The Attorney General should thereafter without delay file an application in the Supreme Court to have such persons dealt with for contempt of court."

**The Colombo Law Society** vehemently condemned the outrage perpetrated by an organised show of violence calculated to intimidate and ridicule the Judges of the Supreme

Court on June 11 in retaliation against their judgment delivered on an issue involving the fundamental rights of citizens enshrined in the Constitution, and demanded that the Government makes an immediate investigation into these dastardly acts and bring these offenders to book without delay.

**The Council of the Synod of the Diocese of Colombo** in a statement issued by the Bishop of Colombo, Rt. Rev. Swithin Fernando is both grieved and shocked at the escalation of violence in the land expressing itself in dangerous ways especially in relation to the respected Supreme Court judges with their responsibility to safeguard unity, freedom and justice.

"We urge that investigations be initiated immediately and action against those culpable be taken without delay," the council states.

**The Bar Association of Kurunegala** viewed with alarm the action of persons who demonstrated opposite the residence of judges of the Supreme Court who delivered the judgement in which they hold the fundamental rights of a citizen had been violated. Further viewed with grave concern this attempt by those

persons to intimidate judges and nullify the rule of law in this country.

**The Nava Samasamaja Party** says the reason behind the demonstration conducted opposite the houses of the three Supreme Court judges is the judgement delivered by them ensuring and consolidating the right of demonstration and against the unlawful arrest of and assault on a citizen by a police officer. The intention of these so called demonstrators was clearly to deter the judges from delivering such judgements. This essentially is a fascist action directed towards the demise of democratic rights.

**The Law Students' Union** states "We vehemently protest against the action of the authorities who had been inactive regarding the use of the SLCTB buses and the inaction of the police to inquire into the alleged incidents even during an emergency.

"The Law Student's Union has decided to have a picketing campaign, to fly half mast the national flag in front of the Law College and to support the Bar Association in the decision it would take on this matter.

"We vehemently condemn the undemocratic attitude of some thugs to undermine the judiciary."

# Judiciary under Mrs. B.

Chandra Karunaratne

I have seen the newspapers of 15th June, 1983 carrying statements alleged to have been released by the SLFP and LSSP regarding the recent unfortunate events that occurred outside the residences of two Judges.

One headline even said "SLFP, LSSP horrified by attack on Judges." No Judge has complained of a physical attack on them or any damage to their property. So the attack that has horrified these parties must refer not to violence but to the attack on their dignity.

In any event, no law abiding citizen would condone the conduct complained of by the Judges and our government will use every endeavour to identify and deal with the miscreants. The leader of our party has always decried violence and has made some very valid observations on the need for an independent judiciary when dealing with this matter in Parliament. In fact, the Constitution that he piloted has entrenched in it the independence of the judiciary.

I issue this statement because two totally bankrupt political parties one of which has been destroyed by the people and the other rejected, seem to think that this is an opportunity not to examine a problem objectively but to play politics.

Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, if one is to give credence to a statement reproduced in the local dailies has visions even of Hitler. It is worth examining her conduct when she was in power.

She utilised the Emergency for almost the entire period of her 7 year government when there was no need to do so. In this respect, it is interesting to remind her that the Special Presidential Commission found that she had continued the Emergency even when it was not necessary to do so in order to suppress legitimate political opposition to her government and to interfere with the rights and liberties of her political opponents. "Even the ranks of Hitler could scarce forbear to cheer."

Was it not her own Justice Minister and kinsman Felix Dias Bandaranaike who advocated a little bit of totalitarianism. Innocent persons who sought to enter a temple in the Attanagalla electorate were obstructed, property was damaged and individuals injured. Has she forgotten how she, in Parliament, enunciated the infamous Attanagalla doctrine and applauded the conduct of hooliganism on that occasion. Has she forgotten how the Army swung into action on this occasion.

The Special Presidential Commission finding on this matter was that she abused her powers by approving a course of action which resulted in unlawful acts calculated to disrupt the Sathygraha. Would not Hitler have said "well done" my disciple? I don't think the people have forgotten how the 128 Opposition meetings were stopped with one stroke of a pen and how the Police were brought in to breakup other peaceful sathyagrahas.

Can she, who had a mandate to rule for five years and carried on for seven, and that too under the Emergency, afford to talk about Hitler.

Let us now examine the attitude of her government to this self-same Supreme Court whose cause she thinks is politically expedient to champion now, over whom she wishes to shed crocodile tears.

Let me remind her of a few matters which may be useful for the public also to remember. Her Ministers using parliamentary privilege, shamelessly attacked Judges of this self-same Court. They alleged that these Judges were incapable of interpreting the law and suggested that they should be sent abroad to widen their outlook. In fact, I believe some were sent to the Soviet Union. Judges were likened to villagers seated under a coconut tree discussing the Constitution.

Judges were sent for by the then President to be reminded of what would follow if they did not retire. On one occasion when Judges wanted

more time to deliver orders they were accused of wanting to perpetuate their tenure of office. All these were her parliamentarians in action. Has she forgotten that some of them said that the people could demonstrate their sovereignty by throwing the Judges out. Lawyers and Judges have not.

Neither have lawyers and judges forgotten how she had politicians perched on the bench with judges. Petty officials sought to interfere with ceremonial sittings.

People remember how judges were stripped of their robes and herded in single cars whilst Ministry officials travelled in solitary splendour.

All these were pithily summarised by an eminent ex-Chief Justice Mr. Victor Tennekoon when he said that the Justice Ministry was making a calculated effort to establish a hegemony over the courts. If this was how that Chief Justice felt, is it not all too clear that she was getting her message across to the people that the courts were mere showpieces and that judges were intended to be puppets who only performed when strings were pulled?

I would like to say that though Mrs. Bandaranaike and other discredited leaders may try to forget all this and pretend concern for the dignity of the Supreme Court people are not fooled.

Did not Mrs. Bandaranaike go before judges of this self-same Supreme Court and say that she had no confidence in them and shout political slogans to them. She may not have carried placards but she carried this wanton abuse to the other capitals of the world. Has she forgotten how she labelled the proceedings of a Tribunal presided by Supreme Court judges as a "Carnival of Calumny". Is it her position that she and she alone can decide when to abuse and when to praise judges?

The following are extracts of the proceedings of the National State Assembly during the period 1970 - 1977.

— Daily News

# Canards says F. D. B.

**S**upporters of the Government. Trying to explain away Government inaction to investigate and bring to book those responsible for recent actions to humiliate Judges — and this includes the promotions to fundamental rights violators in the Police service — are adopting diversionary tactics, by claiming that the former Government too had humiliated Judges, says former Minister of Justice, Mr Felix Dias Bandaranaike in a press statement.

Not everyone however knows the facts or even remembers them; and a canard oft repeated, could sometimes be mistaken for the truth. Hence this letter.

**1st canard:** That the former Government “disrobed” the Judges — by taking away their wigs and robes, coming down to them as a form of Judicial attire from colonial times.

**Facts:** This change was brought about in 1974, by a Rule of Court, published in the Gazette, and ap-

proved by Parliament. Rules of Court are made by a majority of the Judges of the Supreme Court, and require the concurrence of the Minister of Justice. The decision to “disrobe” was a decision of the Judges themselves.

**2nd Canard:** That the former Government forced the Judges to walk on the roads, after they were sworn in, to greet the Prime Minister.

**Facts:** The Judges of the Supreme Court who had come to President’s House for their swearing-in, by car, decided very graciously that they would like to pay their respects to the Prime Minister — an unscheduled event. When they found that she was at her office in the former Senate Building, they decided to walk the twenty five or thirty yards to get there, without getting into and out of their cars. Nobody forced the Judges to walk, or to greet the Prime Minister.

**3rd Canard:** That the former

government forced the Supreme Court to accept the presence of the Minister of Justice at ceremonial sittings.

**Facts:** This was accepted by the then Chief Justice and the then President of the Bar Association Mr. H. W. Jayewardene, Q. C. It is a practice that has been followed by the present UNP Government and its Minister of Justice.

**4th Canard:** That the former Government compelled Judges to travel together in one car, in conditions of discomfort.

**Facts:** Every Judge of the Supreme Court was given the opportunity to purchase a car upon very favourable concessionary rates of duty from the Government Stores, for their use. If they chose not to travel in them to the Courts, or even to sell them it was their choice. At that time, the Government was not in a position to provide an official car for each Judge as well. The number of cars in the official pool of Supreme Court cars was insufficient, for each Judge to have the exclusive use of one for himself.

— ‘Island

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# Some Implications of the S. C. Order

A Special Correspondent of the 'Sunday Observer'

AFTER finding that the arrest constituted an infringement of fundamental right the court considered whether it amounted to an infringement by executive or administrative action of the State. The respondent submitted that liability on the basis of executive or administrative action can be established only if the State expressly or impliedly authorized or adopted or condoned or acquiesced in the act constituting the infringement. The court followed the judgement of Sharvananda J. in the case of *Mariyadasa Raj v. Attorney-General* where it was held that the State is liable for infringement of fundamental rights committed under the colour of office by its public officers. The court agreed with the formula set out in that case.

"What the petitioner is complaining of is an infringement of his fundamental right by 'executive or administrative action, that the State has through the instrumentality of an overzealous or despotic official committed the transgression of his constitutional right. The protection afforded by Article 126 is against infringement of fundamental rights by the State, acting by some public authority endowed by it with the necessary coercive powers. The relief granted is principally against the State, although the delinquent official may also be directed to make amends and/or suffer punishment".

Therefore, the court held that the arrest of the petitioner was unlawful and contravened Article 13(1) of the Constitution. The State was ordered to pay Rs. 2,500 as compensation to the petitioner for such infringement. The Court also directed the 2nd respondent to proceed with his inquiries and

take appropriate action in accordance with law in respect of the various allegations made against the 1st respondent.

The judgement in this case, i.e. the application made by Mrs. Vivienne Goonewardene, has far-reaching implications. Up to now, conducting a procession of which due notice had not been given under section 77 and a permit obtained was considered to be illegal. The Police acting under section 56 of the Police Ordinance and section 32 of the Code of Criminal Procedure dispersed such procession. The Supreme Court has now ruled that the absence of a permit does not make the continuance of the procession an offence. Therefore, such a procession can no longer be dispersed by the Police. Any arrest to be made in connection with such procession can only be done on a warrant issued by a Magistrate. This decision has removed many of the restrictions on the right to hold processions and demonstrations in urban areas. Therefore in time to come a large number of organizations will surely make use of this right to organize processions without notice to the Police. Not merely political parties and large associations but even small groups with a single cause can utilize this right not only, against the government but also against private associations and individuals.

## Ambit

The Supreme Court has also brought within the ambit of the fundamental right of peaceful assembly Article 14(1)(b) the right of holding processions. Therefore, the question arises whether a police officer of the rank of ASP or above has a discretionary power to refuse an application under section 77 in

(Continued on page 10)

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# AMIR — the man in the middle

Mervyn de Silva

**W**hen the gravitational centre of Tamil politics was steadily shifting from Parliament in Colombo to armed attacks in the Jaffna province, this journal suggested that Mr. Amirthalingam's dilemmas may be compared to the predicament of Mr. Yasser Arafat, the PLO chairman. Admittedly, it was (pardonable) journalistic exaggeration, a hyperbole chosen to dramatise the painful plight which always seem to await the man in the middle. But today, despite the vast differences in magnitude, the analogy strikes us as less tenuous.

The Palestinian problem not only involves nation states, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and in a way, Egypt but it is truly regional, the whole Middle-East. It is more than regional, it is international. If Mr. Arafat is caught between armed struggle and diplomacy, he is also trapped by so many forces — Israel and its all-powerful patron, the US, the Arab states (conservative and radical, near and distant,) and the factions within the parent PLO, with their own varying tactics and strategies. Those conflicts were ever-present. But the Israeli **blitzkrieg** in Lebanon, the massacre in Beirut, the eviction of much of the PLO's militia from Lebanon, the Israeli-imposed Gemayel regime in Beirut, and now the US-sponsored troop pull-out plan, have forced these tensions to erupt and explode. In the eye of the raging storm is Mr. Yasser Arafat. He is caught by conflicts **within** the PLO, and by powerful forces **outside** (Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and of course the superpowers).

## Recognition

During the NAM summit in Delhi this March, an Indian spokesman for EELAM the president of the Kamaraj Congress, urged the NAM to grant the Tamil Liberation Front the same "observer status" as the PLO. (The PLO is in fact a full member, and a member of the NAM's Coordinating Bureau). The mere title "Liberation Front"

as Mr. Neduraman ought to have known, does **not** automatically gain recognition for a political movement and the TULF or TELO cannot convince the NAM that it possesses the same qualifications as the PLO, SWAPO, ANC or even POLISARIO. Yet, the attempt was interesting — a move, however naive or ambitious, to gain **international** recognition.

While there is no parallel on **that** point (NAM recognition) it is in the **internal** dynamics of the Tamil situation and in the problems of the Tamil leadership that some similarities can be traced. Naturally, the impact of **external** forces does affect and influence the **internal** process, which is essentially one of polarisation.

The PLO pinned its faith on the Fez proposals — by no means, an expression of the **maximum** demands of the Palestinians, but the difficult consensus reached by the Arab League, a heterogeneous body. When Israel rejected the Fez proposals, the 'moderates' leaned towards a combination of the Fez proposals and the Reagan plan. The Reagan plan is a far cry, a very far cry, from the basic Palestinian demands, but as one PLO delegate told me in Delhi "it is a recognition, however vague or ambiguous, of the concept of a bi-national state and therefore, some advance from the previous unyielding American position.

## Polarisation

This may have been wishful thinking. Yet the "pragmatists" of the PLO held on hopefully to the possibility that a step-by-step advance may be achieved through combining the two plans, though the PLO officially stood only by the Fez plan.

Jordanian participation was a key element to the success of these plans. When the PLO-Hussein talks broke down, the plan collapsed. Diplomacy came to a dead end.

Meanwhile, of course, Israel had launched its merciless military campaign — the pressure, physical pressure, from outside. These two

developments — the diplomatic failure and the military onslaught — had a dramatic impact on the Palestinian leadership and movement. What to do? Divided opinion, division, factional conflicts, and polarisation were inevitable. Arafat is in the crossfire. And literally so, because it is with guns.

The DDC's is nowhere near the Fez plan. It may be compared to the Reagan plan. Yet, it is on the DDC's that the TULF has negotiated these past 5 years, with Messrs Wilson, Tiruchelvam and other members of the Tamil intelligentsia, both resident and expatriate (from New York to Geneva) playing roles oddly similar to Kissinger, Vance or Habib. The DDC "compromise" is apparently still alive but time has run out fast. In the meantime, there has been the military pressure in the north.

Starting probably with a tiny minority of a minority supporters of the militants swell in ever-increasing numbers as the day-to-day operational sweep of the PTA widens. The military presence in the North and the PTA become the symbols of the 'outside' force.

These two developments (the protracted and fruitless search for a diplomatic-political settlement and the stark, everyday facts of life, the PTA and the military presence) have had their inevitable result — polarisation.

## Troubled TULF

On June 17, a bomb was thrown into the Point Pedro U.C. office. Three TULF concillors were present of the U.C's total strength of 9. It was the inaugural meeting of the newly elected U.C. the two U.N.P. members were absent. A letter left behind asked the TULF members to resign. The Jaffna M.C., and the Chavakachcheri and Valvettiturai U.C's have not met in the face of threats, reported D.B.S. Jeyeraj, in the ISLAND. Meanwhile, the same report said, the clandestine Eelam Liberation Army has said it has "no truck with the TULF".

(Continued on page 10)

# Pauperising the professor

The "open economy" or "free enterprises" has now made a sneak entry into the field of higher education. Like food and health, education was one of the foundation stones of the Sri Lanka social welfare system. That system has been under attack by the IMF-IBRD sponsored anti-subsidy, pro-market forces policies of recent times.

We are now on the brink of the privatisation of the plantation sector, privatisation of education may be next. It has started in the sphere of Higher education with the establishment of a private medical school. An attempt to extend this to Law studies was resisted by the student community but this may be a temporary success. A senior government politician who has much to do with this subject admitted to the *DIVAINA* that "the cluster schools system" has already been introduced in some areas. That system was one of the major "reforms" of the White Paper on Education. The White paper itself produced such strong and widespread protests that it was shelved. Now, some of its "reforms" seem to be introduced administratively.

The "privatisation" is a response to pressures which are not only economic. Upper-middle class parents find that their offspring cannot always succeed at the highly competitive university entrance ('A' level) exams. They have money to pay fees but not enough money to send their children abroad. So the pressure has grown for new institutions and courses in the so-called elite professions — medicine, law etc. Soon, state schools may be told they could charge fees while the government will only guarantee the payment of teachers' salaries. Thus, the upper income groups will be satisfied.

The teachers and the university lecturers, including professors, however will remain in the 'new class' into which they are being steadily drawn. They are the "new poor".

If education is very much a mark of social standing in Sri Lanka, so was one's mode of transportation to work a sure sign of relative affluence or poverty. Today, few professors (except those who have grabbed a dowry or enjoyed a stint in Nigeria or the mid-east) can drive to classes everyday in a car. Unlike the professors in Dutch or US campuses, they think it 'infra dig' to cycle or jog to the campus.

So, the agitation for a revision of salaries grew. Now, some professors find that they have won the handsome pay rise of Rs. 4/- per month! What is particularly galling is that their students (less qualified) get jobs not only in the private sector but in the State sector (banks) which carry salaries more than double their own.

## Some Implication . . .

(Continued from page 8)

accordance with Article 16 of the Constitution or whether such power is limited and can be questioned by the court. Can a procession be dispersed if it is peaceful? Does it mean the right to hold processions anywhere if it is peaceful? The ruling of the Supreme Court has brought far reaching changes in the law regarding processions. But at the same time the perimeters of this right has not been clearly defined.

## AMIR . . .

(Continued from page 9)

On July 21, Mr. V. N. Navaratnam M. P. Chavakachcheri will throw a "bomb" which will have an even greater impact on the TULF. He has no mandate to sit in Parliament after July 22 1983, he argues, because he was elected in July 1977, and he does not "recognise" the December 1982 referendum to extend the life of parliament. By absenting himself, he will create a vacancy. The TULF will have to nominate a successor or cause a by-election. Mr. Navaratnam will recontest the seat only if he has convinced the voters that the TULF is the main or sole voice of the Tamils.

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# MAGGIE CLOSES AN ERA

Flora Lewis

FOREIGN  
NEWS

LONDON

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's landslide re-election looks dazzling. This has to be written before the final count is in, but the statistics matter less than the sense already established that the vote is a watershed for Britain and in a way, for Europe.

There is a paradox in the conclusions to be drawn. It has been an inward-looking nationalistic campaign, with little sense of what is going on in the rest of the world. But that in itself part of a pattern in the democracies, where crisis is driving vision down to a local focus.

At the same time, it is a signal from the country that first launched the idea of non-revolutionary socialism, with the Fabians in the 1920's that the idea can go no further.

The philosopher Sir Isaiah Berlin with the self-mocking wit that is the hallmark of continuing British civility, suggests it means that the counterrevolution has arrived.

In the last couple of years conservatives have been winning almost everywhere but in France. And in France the Socialists are in grave trouble precisely because they overestimated the public's desire for a radical change of society, and cannot deliver a painless cure for transformation.

One of the nice things about British society is its intellectual tolerance. Sir Isaiah, who is leftish, sees the demonstrative rebuff to Labour as a popular verdict of failure in its promise to deliver a better world. Peregrine Worsthorne, an arch-Tory Publicist, sees the result of Labour success in achieving reform.

This is still a profoundly democratic country, for all the vivid rhetoric in the campaign. Mrs. Thatcher has won votes from the decisive floating middle and even the unemployed (polls estimate one in four jobless endorsed her), because nobody really believes she is going to abolish the welfare state. She



*'Better Than Those Cardboard Men'*

couldn't. She can trim it, reshape it somewhat, shame it.

She cannot reverse profound changes that have occurred since World War II, and to which she contributed by enabling large numbers of workers to become home owners. A lot more people have a stake in stability and keeping steady now, which is what Mr. Worsthorne meant. Despite the recession, Labor's traditional supporters have acquired access to social benefits they want to protect, while the party has succumbed to radical theories they do not share.

Pie in the sky has lost credibility. A better-educated, better-anchored public has come to accept Mrs. Thatcher's homilies that you can't expect to consume what you don't turn a hand to produce. That, I think, is what Sir Isaiah meant.

Mrs. Thatcher does believe in her Victorian values. "She considers the idle rich just as reprehensible as the idle poor," is the characteristically stylish way Mr. Worsthorne puts it. It appeals because, like her or not, people consider her straightforward. She gives a feeling of reliability and dedication to national as opposed to sectarian interest.

Of course, there are circumstantial factors. Labour ran a miserable, bickering campaign. The emergence of the alliance of Social Democrats and Liberals served primarily to split the opposition. The Conservatives triumph, aided by favorable redistricting is based on about the same percentage of less than half the total vote as Mrs. Thatcher's more modest win four years ago.

It remains to be seen what will happen to the Labour Party. It won't be the same. The alternatives are that the unrepentant left-wingers arguing for more audacity will take over completely and drive it to the fringe while the alliance begins to consolidate into an effective second party, or that it will regroup and seek the center-left again.

There are Conservative extremists, too, who might intoxicate Mrs. Thatcher with her own slogans and lure her into misreading her overwhelming majority. These are the short-term questions and the likelihood is that the answers won't be dramatic but will sort themselves out into a tolerable balance.

Thoughtful Britons on both sides of the political divide, exultant or abashed, are already beginning to think of the longer-term questions that the end of the era of belief in socialist promise implies. They know that Mrs. Thatcher has no prospect for resolving the heavy unemployment that her rigorous policy accelerated. They are concerned that a Victorian revival of pride that pleases the haves, new and old, offers nothing to inspire the young.

The elections have proved again that you can't beat somebody with nobody in troubled times, people go for Churchillian truths ahead of airy promises. The vote also shows the persisting big gap between the past and an memorable future — a gap still waiting to be bridged.

(The New York Times)

# Foreign Policy Decision - Making in Sri Lanka

Shelton Kodikara

**D**ecision-making approaches to study of policy formation and implementation have now increasingly gained currency in political literature, and some have even claimed for such approaches the status of disciplinary individuality. Whether or not we could agree with Sidjanski, that decision-making studies constitute a new phase in Political Science, following the institutional phase, the group approach, and the study of ruling classes and leaders, there can be no doubt that the decision-making approach "weaves together the other approaches used in political science", that all political institutions can be looked upon as top level decision centres and all parties and pressure groups as autonomous decision centres in a polyarchical society, while the leaders—as the persons who actually take the decisions—participate in or influence their formation.

Snyder, an early theorist on foreign policy decision-making defined the subject as follows:

Decision-making is a process which results in the selection from a socially defined, limited number of problematical, alternative projects, of one project intended to bring about the particular future state of affairs envisaged by the decision-makers.<sup>2</sup>

Snyder argued that if a sound conceptual framework could be constructed, decision-making analysis would be appropriate for any area of political science where there was an interest in policy formation or judgment of some kind. In Snyder's analytical model, enquiry was focused both on the decision-making unit or nucleus and the persons responsible, but the criticism has been made that he failed to take sufficient account of the role of the environment in the decision-making process.

This lacuna was filled by David Easton's application of the systems model to decision-making, by means of which he drew attention to the relationship between the decision and the environment. Easton ascribed to the decision—viewed as an output in a political system—a tangible effect on the environment, which in turn influenced the political system through the operation of inputs. The link between decision—output and effect—input was illustrated by a feedback loop. Easton was not concerned specifically with foreign policy decision-making. He considered the environment, which must be assumed to extend beyond the boundaries of the political system as an inevitable if not central concept of decision-making analysis, owing to the interplay of inputs and outputs.<sup>3</sup> Snyder's and Easton's analyses have been considered as supplementing, not supplanting, each other, although both have been criticised on the ground that their conceptualization is vague and tentative.<sup>4</sup>

Moreover, as Sidjanski has pointed out, certain risks or disadvantages inherent in the decisional method must not be overlooked. Political life is not made up exclusively of decisions, and it might therefore be risky to concentrate wholly on decisions or conflict situations of exceptional nature at the expense of imperceptible but lasting changes. Political decisions are, also, often based on attitudes as much as on rules, reflecting decisions and explicit acts may not be the sole reflection of political reality. In particular contexts, failure to make decisions might be just as significant as their existence, and exclusive concentration on decisions overlooks a wide range of political reality.

A crisis situation and the feverish atmosphere associated with it, mass demonstrations, the pres-

ures of public opinion, the flavour or climate of a period, and imperceptible changes—all these are essential political factors, even though they are not always reflected in decisions.<sup>5</sup>

Thus it is possible that a decisional analysis can give a fragmented picture of political events. Even so, this writer as stated above views decision-making studies as constituting a new phase in political science, since they have the merit of bringing together other approaches used, while the leaders participate in or influence their formation. "While reintroducing the dynamic and evolutionary factor, the decision-making process brings all of these elements into play in an attempt to capture dynamic reality."<sup>6</sup>

These preliminary observations are not intended as an exhaustive account of theoretical approaches to decision-making, nor as providing a micro-level analytical framework for the study of Sri Lanka's foreign policy, or a specific aspect of it. But they are considered as providing a useful backdrop for a consideration of institutional and other factors which are relevant to a study of its foreign policy, in its declaratory and operational aspects. A decision-making approach to the study of foreign policy can be especially rewarding in a participatory democracy such as Sri Lanka, where the government in power has changed at every general election since 1952, and where leaders, parties, groups, as well as institutional structures have all articulated a consistent interest in foreign policy issues. It is realised that any meaningful discussion of the basis of foreign policy cannot be made without a good deal of empirical research into considerations which entered into specific decisions in specific situations and, moreover, that all the facts which influenced a parti-

cular foreign policy decision are facts which influenced a particular foreign policy decision are not usually available to the scholar or writer, and may be unknown to the decision-makers themselves. One cannot also take it as granted that decision-makers necessarily act on the premise of a rationality of choice between alternative policy options, for the issues involved may be obfuscated by lack of information, the cognitive faculties and personal predilections of the decision-makers themselves. But if we were to proceed from the assumption stated by Millar, that "all writing on foreign policy which is not theoretical and abstract is a collection of approximations to the truth incompletely assessed on the basis of inadequate evidence,"<sup>7</sup> no academic exercise in the field would be possible at all, though Millar himself recognised that a duty was cast upon scholars and others writing on foreign policy to provide as many relevant facts as they could, assessed as validly and objectively as possible. From the Sri Lankan perspective, it might be helpful to describe the institutional framework within which foreign policy is made, and then to identify environmental constraints and inputs which influence foreign policy decision-making.

### **The Institutional Framework of Foreign Policy Making in Sri Lanka**

For thirty years, from 1947 to 1978, the Prime Minister stood at the apex of the foreign policy decision-making process in Sri Lanka. Section 46 (4) of the independence (Soulbury) constitution required that the Prime Minister should also hold the portfolios of Defence and External Affairs, and even when this constitutional requirement was done away with under the First Republican Constitution in 1972 the then Prime Minister, Mrs. Bandaranaike continued to hold these portfolios until the change of government in 1977. After the July 1977 elections, Mr. J. R. Jayewardena as Prime Minister retained the office of Minister of Defence, but for the first time appointed a separate Minister of Foreign Affairs. When the new government, first by a constitutional amendment, then by an entirely new (second) republi-

can constitution, instituted a Presidential form of government in place of the Westminster model, Mr. Jayewardena as first executive President, Head of State as well as Head of Government, continued to impart initiatives, and give directives, on important foreign policy issues, <sup>8</sup>apart from conducting personal diplomacy in his official capacity, as when he led the Sri Lanka delegation to the sixth Non-aligned Summit held in Havana in 1979.

In this regard Mr. Jayewardena was merely continuing a long-established tradition in foreign policy decision-making in Sri Lanka, where the Head of Government has customarily had a large, perhaps the largest say, in the formulation of foreign policy. The situation was not unlike that which obtained in India, where Nehru combined the offices of Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs in his person for the first seventeen years of independent India, becoming during this period "the philosopher, the architect, the engineer and the voice of his country's policy towards the outside world".<sup>9</sup> Since 1948, eight different persons have held the office of Prime Minister in Sri Lanka, and one of these the office of executive President since 1978. If we exclude the present Prime Minister, who has no foreign policy responsibilities and the caretaker administration of W. Dahanayaka (September 1959 to March 1960) every other Head of Government in Sri Lanka has had his or her personal style and personal influence on foreign policy decision-making. From a decision-making point of view, this holds good even for the various administrations of Dudley Senanayake (1952-53, March-July 1960, 1965-70), which generally adopted a low profile in foreign policy. D. S. Senanayake's foreign policy, for example, (1948-52) veered towards strong support of the Commonwealth, the connection with which was considered to be the essential conditions of Sir John Kotelawela's (1953-56) was marked by a strident anti-communism, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike (1956-59) articulated an eloquent, often rhetorical Nehru-style non-aligned philosophy, while Mrs. Bandaranaike developed a special relationship with

China but at the same time emerged one of the Non-aligned Movement's most ardent advocates. The quiet but successful diplomacy of the present Minister of Foreign Affairs (Mr. A.C.S. Hameed) is a feature of the present government's foreign policy, but the special links forged by this government with Japan and Singapore are clearly due to decisions and attitudes emanating from President's House.

The Prime Minister as Foreign Minister and the present Foreign Minister in his own right is assisted by a Deputy Minister (formerly known as Parliamentary Secretary), who is a member of the governing party in Parliament, but his decision-making functions have been minimal. Nor has Sri Lanka had the counterpart of the Cabinet Foreign Affairs Committee, as was established in India. The principle of Cabinet secrecy is observed, and Cabinet decision normally do not come within the purview of public knowledge. The Prime Minister, Foreign Minister or the President (who now presides at Cabinet meeting), as the case may be, would not in normal circumstances be insensitive to views on foreign policy issues expressed at Cabinet level, but it is reasonable to suppose that usually the authority of the Prime Minister (in the past) and of the President (at present) combined with the fact that they have access to a greater range and volume of information on foreign policy questions than any of their Cabinet colleagues have been decisive in ensuring Cabinet acquiescence in their proposals. No Cabinet minister has so far resigned from the Government on a foreign policy issue, unless C. Suntheralingam's resignation on the citizenship question in 1948 is regarded also as an expression of dissent on the conduct of Indo-Lanka relations. In 1952, three senior members of Dudley Senanayake's Cabinet opposed the projected Rice-Rubber Agreement with China, but decided to abide by the majority view after the Cabinet endorsed it.

India's membership of the League of Nations, and the constitution of its Political Department, which had responsibility for relations with the Indian princes and foreign states had created, before 1947, the

nucleus of the institutional set-up which formed the basis of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. Sri Lanka's original Ministry of External Affairs and Defence, however, was wholly a post-independence creation, drawing its original cadre at the higher level from the Ceylon Civil Service, and at the lower level from the General Clerical Service. Foreign Affairs within the Ministry was organised at a rudimentary level, due both to problems of financial and personnel resources. In the early independence years, therefore, Sri Lanka's diplomatic relations were confined to a few countries, mostly in the Commonwealth (UK, Australia, Canada, India, Pakistan,) with Burma and Italy added, the last presumably on account of Sri Lanka's Catholic population. Sri Lanka had signed Defence and External Affairs agreements with the UK, which came into effect on the day Sri Lanka became independent, and by section 4 of the latter the UK agreed, if so requested by Sri Lanka, to make available the facilities of its diplomatic and consular missions where Sri Lanka itself did not have such missions, and Sri Lanka in the early independence years availed itself of these facilities, as well as Britain's advocacy in the United Nations. Sri Lanka's membership of the Commonwealth of Nations, the regular meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers and the paraphernalia of the Commonwealth Relations Office did much in these years to offset Sri Lanka's inexperience in foreign affairs as well as the lack of a proper institutional structure to sustain these. In 1955, Sri Lanka had diplomatic representation in only nine countries, together with accreditation in twelve other countries. Partly this was due to the policy of governments, until 1956, not to establish diplomatic missions in communist countries, even though the Peoples' Republic of China had been granted *de jure* recognition by Sri Lanka, following upon a British initiative, as early as January 1950. After 1956, Sri Lanka has had diplomatic representation in China, USSR and Yugoslavia, with accreditation of representatives in other socialist countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, and in 1956 Sri Lanka also established its mission in New York after admission to the United Nations

in December 1955. In 1980, Sri Lanka maintained diplomatic missions in some 26 countries with accreditation to a further 38 countries.<sup>10</sup>

The key official of the Ministry's institutional structure is the Secretary, and it is significant that this office has always been filled since independence by a Civil Servant and not by a career diplomat. The internal organisation of the Ministry has developed structurally from the time of independence, when the Department of External Affairs was constituted into only two divisions under Assistant Secretaries, viz. (a) Foreign Relations and (b) Protocol and Nationality, and these divisions were further subdivided into a limited number of geographical and functional areas.<sup>11</sup> In 1965, two posts of Director of Foreign Relations were created as an intermediate cadre between the Secretary and the Assistant Secretaries, and a post of Assistant Secretary (Publicity) was added. Recruitment to the career service began in 1948 on the basis of the same competitive examination as was conducted for the Ceylon Civil Service, with an additional interview for applicants for the Overseas Service and an extra paper on World Affairs for such candidates, the age limit, 24 for Civil Servants, being raised to 30 for overseas service applicants during the period 1950 to 1955, after which it was brought to a par with that for the civil service.<sup>12</sup> During Mr. Bandaranaike's time, a few recruits were taken above the age limit of 30 by open advertisement on the basis of an interview by a Selection Board which considered general intelligence, personal qualities, experience abroad, knowledge of International Affairs, International law, and languages.<sup>13</sup> Apart from these variations in role recruitment, however, the Sri Lanka Overseas Service has more or less steadfastly adhered to the open competitive examination as the basis of entry to the career service. There has been no instances of lateral entry by persons suitably qualified from the professions, and, in fact, in 1957 members of the legal profession were specifically debarred from sitting the open competitive examination.<sup>14</sup> Partly this has been due to elitism in the career service itself and to the strong opposition which has manifested itself from time to time

from the Overseas Service Association against political appointees as well as lateral entrants from outside. But partly it is also a reflection of the apathy of successive governments to undertake a serious reform of the Foreign Ministry during the thirty years of its existence, and even at the present time when Sri Lanka's international role and responsibilities have increased out of all proportion to her size and status as a small Power in the international community.

The Table (on P 15) shows the present structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since the sixties, a Director-General of Foreign Affairs has functioned immediately below the Secretary, and the number of Directors working under him have increased with the functional and geographical diversification of the Ministry's responsibilities. In 1981 second Director-General was appointed and 14 Directors now head the Divisions of UN and Conferences, South Asia, East Asia, Middle East, Africa, West, Publicity (three Directors) Economic Affairs, Non-Aligned Conferences and Overseas Administration, while the Protocol Division is headed by the chief of Protocol and the Legal Division by the Legal Adviser. The Citizenship Division, located in the Department of Immigration and Emigration, is headed by this Department's Controller, who was *ex officio* Assistant Secretary in the Ministry is no longer part of the Ministry. Heads of Divisions are assisted by Assistant Directors or Assistant Secretaries, as the case may be.

Although a Policy Planning Division has existed for some time in the Ministry, it is common knowledge that it has had no impact at all on research or policy planning to speak of and it has now been abolished. Nor has there been a Historical Division such as existed in India to such good purpose during India's 'time of troubles' with China during 1959-62. Storage and retrieval of information in the Ministry is, therefore, still primitive, and it has not been unknown for ministry officials to seek the assistance of foreign embassies in Colombo in the preparation of their briefs. In such a context, it is not surprising that the range of advice and background data which the Foreign Affairs Minister could draw upon in a given

situation from his ministry officials is necessarily limited. This is not entirely to disregard or devalue the ministry's role in the island's foreign-policy formulation. In the negotiations leading up to the Sirima-Shastri Agreement of 1964, e.g., or those preceding the signing of the Maritime Boundary Agreement with India, ministry officials have played a valuable role, and the same can be said for Sri Lanka's contributions to the Law of the Sea Conferences in recent years. But these apart, it would be true to say that the ministry today functions in much the same way it did in the fifties, and that important initiatives in foreign policy decision-making are still politically inspired.

Writing about Presidential decision-making in the White House, Theodore Sorensen averred that "there will always be subordinates who are willing to tell a President only what they want him to hear, or what is even worse, only what they think he wants to hear".<sup>15</sup> This tendency is not unusual in decision-centres, and persons ultimately responsible for making decisions, in Sri Lanka as well as elsewhere, may consider it insufficient or inadvisable to place

reliance on official channels of information alone. Outside the Foreign Office, unofficial channels of information and sources of influence may be located in the Press, or particular representatives of it, in personal relations with foreign emissaries or Heads of State/Government, or from pressures emanating from the domestic milieu.


In Sri Lanka, the top decision-maker in foreign policy, whether Prime Minister/Foreign Minister or President, has therefore come to depend, apart from the ministry sources of advice, also upon independent sources of information. D. S. Senanayake and Sir John Kotelawela gave a weekly breakfast appointment to the Political Correspondent of the *Ceylon Daily News*, and the present President is said to be in close touch with the head of the Lake House Press as well as with a feature writer of the *Weekend newspaper*.<sup>16</sup> At the time when the Prime Minister was also Foreign Minister, the Secretary to the Prime Minister, though outside the structural framework of the Foreign Office, often became a policy adviser in his own right, and sometimes played an important part in inter-

national conferences where the Prime Minister was involved. Mr. Felix Dias Bandaranaike, when he was Parliamentary Secretary for Defence and External Affairs in Mrs. Bandaranaike's first administration (1960-65) played the most active role in foreign policy decision-making of any other Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs to date, largely because of the Prime Minister's political inexperience when she first took up the office; but even when he was unconnected with the Foreign Office and held other portfolios during Mrs. Bandaranaike's second administration (1970-77), he was entrusted with important foreign policy responsibilities and virtually acted as Mrs. Bandaranaike's Foreign Minister. In some instances, notably in the case of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, the Prime Minister was to all intents and purposes his own adviser. According to H. S. S. Nissanka;

Sri Lanka's stand on various issues at the General Assembly seems to have been directly guided by Bandaranaike. This is apparent from his public statement on the Suez and Hungarian issues. In his speech at the United Nations on

(Continued on page 16)

## ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE SRI LANKA MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1981)



NAC = Non-Aligned Conf. Division

OAD = Overseas Administration Division

Protocol Division is under a Chief of Protocol

22nd November 1956, he described how he gave instructions to his representative at the UN at 3 a. m. at night.<sup>17</sup>

### (To be continued)

- 1 See Dusan Sidjanski (ed.), *Political Decision-Making Processes* (Amsterdam, London, New York, 1973), Ch. I, and Charles Roig, "Some Theoretical Problems in Decision-Making Studies". *ibid.*, p. 20.
- 2 R. C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and B. Sapin, *Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Relations* (New York, 1982), p. 90.
- 3 David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York, 1965).
- 4 Roig, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23. 5 Sidjanski, *op. cit.*, p. 5. 6 *Ibid.*, p. 4.
- 7 T. B. Millar, "On writing about Foreign Policy", *Australian Outlook*, 21:72 April 1967.
- 8 Sri Lanka's condemnation of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is believed to have emanated from a Presidential initiative.
- 9 Michael Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography* (London, 1959), p. 564, quoted in K. F. Misra, *Foreign Policy and its Planning* (Bombay, 1970). Misra writes that in practice till at least 1982, Foreign Policy remained Nehru's monopoly, and not much parliamentary or scholarly attention was devoted to its various facets. In the sphere of planning, he exercised almost exclusive influence, though traces of the tangential impact of certain individuals and institutions might be detected here and there. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
- 10 *Directory of the Overseas Missions of the Republic of Sri Lanka*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Colombo.
- 11 See W. A. Wiswa Warnapala, *The Making of Foreign Policy: A Study of the Origin and the Nature of the Overseas Service*, Ceylon Studies Seminar 1979 Series No. 2/79.
- 12 *Ibid.* 13 *Ibid.* 14 Exceptions to this principle are provided by the short-term recruitment of 10 officers to the service from the professions and Public service in the period leading up to and immediately succeeding the Colombo Non-Aligned Summit.
- 15 Theodore Sorensen, *Decision-Making in the White House* (Columbia University Press, 1963), 1966 Indian ed., pp. 19-20.
- 16 See J. L. Fernando, *Three Prime Ministers of Ceylon* (Colombo, 1963), p. 33 and *passim*. The author was the correspondent in question. Migara's widely read articles in *Weekend* reveal inside information of policy decisions at the highest levels which demonstrate regular access to President's House.
- 17 H. S. S. Nissanka, *The Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka under S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike* (Colombo, 1976) p. 84

## "Crippled Minds"...

(Continued from page 2)

outcome of the social changes of the late fifties and sixties) was its relationship to the cultural demands of the late fifties. To refresh our minds, let me draw attention to some of the symbolic aspects of these demands. Switching over to Sinhala as well as to the national dress, eating of traditional foods (symptomatic being the late S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike's Kiribath, Kevum and Kokis at press conferences) abhorrence of Western dancing, decrying of drinks such as whisky and brandy and even foods such as ham and bacon were some of the more over zealous symptoms. A very striking imagery in that cluster of cultural and social demands was that classic election cartoon **Marayuddhaya**. The latter depicted **Mara** as being those than in power, eating meat, bacon, ham, drinking whisky and brandy and night clubbing. These demands of the 50s may on hindsight appear "extreme" to some but they were not dissimilar to demands in similar socio-economic contexts elsewhere, whether they were in the case of the early DMK in Tamil Nadu or Iran's Islamic fundamentalism (albeit without the particular arbitrary "justice" of the sword that has characterised Khomeini's regime).

What was significant about the import substitution product range ultimately adopted in Sri Lanka was that it helped change consumer demands in a large section of the population. Thus biscuit earlier consumed largely by the elite was now available at roughly Rs. 1/- a packet and replaced partially kevum and kokis; ham and bacon (manufactured say by Goldi together with the old established firms) spread to a larger section of the population, the Distilleries Corporation manufactured artificial brandy and whisky sold at Rs.25/- a bottle helped develop whisky and brandy consumption, and the wide spread selling of Hentley, Maxim and Diplomat shirts and trousers eroded the brief fashion for "national" dress.

The partial erosion of the cultural reforms of the 1950's was not limited to the effects of import substitution. It was only one aspect of a cluster of socio-economic forces which I have described in the chapter dealing with Sri Lanka that helped in time dilute the thrust of the cultural demands of the 50s.

Let me, lest I should be misunderstood, emphasize that I do not necessarily agree fully with all the cultural demands of the 1950s. I was only describing a process where Sri Lanka embedded in a macro world socio-economic framework gave a particular cultural response and this response was overcome by social forces generated both internally and externally to Sri Lanka.

## Letter...

(Continued from page 1)

Establishment demonstrations (1961) are obviously the forerunners of contemporary volatile activism of hyperactive Tamil youths.

Chelvanayakam was the first leader to kindle Tamil nationalism and he did it in grand style by practising extra-parliamentary struggles which had the backing of the Tamil masses. He was successful in uniting the Hindus and Christians of the Tamil population under one umbrella. Incidentally Sanmugathasan does not mention the term 'Tamil masses' anywhere in his article. Doesn't he recognise the presence of this class among the Tamil speaking population of this island?

**Sachi. Sri Kantha**  
University of Illinois  
U. S. A.

# Class and Ethnic Consciousness in Sri Lanka

Kumari Jayawardena

**E**thnic and religious conflicts have been sources of violent confrontation in Sri Lanka for the last hundred years. Much of the writing on the subject by foreign and local academics has consisted merely of descriptions of such conflict, providing only superficial and misleading explanations of the causes — e.g. the 'eternal' tribal, caste or race antagonisms of the Third World, or the 'wickedness' of one group towards another. Recently, however, Sri Lankan social scientists and historians have begun to analyze the material base and ideology of ethnic, linguistic and religious conflict and violence against minorities. With this aim in view, the Social Scientists Association organized a seminar on Nationality Questions in Sri Lanka at which several aspects of this matter were discussed. This article is a revised version of a paper presented to that seminar in Colombo in December 1979.

Sri Lanka is composed of several ethnic, linguistic and religious groups: the Sinhalese form 72 per cent of the population, the Tamils (Sri Lankan and Indian) form the largest minority (20 per cent), and the Moors, Burgher and Malays account for 7.5 per cent. In terms of religion, the population is composed of Buddhists (67 per cent), Hindus (17 per cent), Christians (eight per cent) and Muslims (seven per cent). Tension between the groupings has remained in certain periods, but violent incidents have also occurred which have marred the image of a peace-loving stable country, as this was portrayed by the colonial rulers and the succeeding government of independent Sri Lanka.

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Under British rule, Sri Lanka (Ceylon) was referred to proudly as the 'model Crown Colony'; prospering under plantation capitalism and other 'benefits' of foreign rule where *pax Britannica* prevailed and where rebellion, sedition and violent disturbance hardly occurred. Reality was somewhat different, however. Armed popular resistance was continuous from 1815 (when the British finally conquered the whole island) until 1848: a protracted war of independence was fought in 1818-19, and a serious peasant rebellion occurred in 1848. Working-class agitation was common from the 1890s on: major strikes were organized by the printers in 1893, the carters (1906), railway workers (1912), while the first general strike took place in 1923. In addition to these confrontations, there was a tension and violence between the major ethnic and religious groupings. With the revival of Buddhism in the late 19th century, conflict arose between the Buddhists (who felt themselves to be politically and economically deprived) and the Christians and Muslims. This was sometimes expressed in violence (e.g. the Catholic-Buddhist riots in Colombo in 1883; the outbreaks in Anuradhapura in 1903, directed towards churches, taverns and butchers' shops; and the Sinhalese-Muslim riots of 1915). The major arena of conflict, however, has been between the Sinhalese and Tamils, the enmity between them erupting in major conflagrations in 1958, 1977, and August 1981. Again, in August 1982, serious rioting broke out between Sinhalese and Muslims.

This article will re-examine some aspects of the structure of the economy in colonial Sri Lanka, the nature of the nationalist and revivalist agitation of the period, and the class character of these movements, in order to stimulate the understanding of the present contradictions between

the Sinhalese and the minority groups. The historical period under consideration is that of the 19th and early 20th century when local merchant capitalism developed, resulting in new class formations and the first expressions of nationalism through religious and cultural revival. It was during this period that 'communalism'<sup>2</sup> took on its modern form. We shall not go into the details of the ensuing conflict, but shall discuss those aspects that provide some background to the analysis of the continuing presence of communalism in Sri Lanka.

Historians have frequently emphasized the incipient nationalism associated with the Buddhist revival and temperance movements of the turn of the century, and, have given due credit to the patriotism of leaders who aroused the people to awareness of national identity, giving leadership not only to movements of protest against various aspects of foreign rule, but also providing assistance to working-class struggles. Less notice, however, is given to the process by which early nationalism also gave rise to communalism against minorities. It is in this context, therefore, that I shall examine

(a) the rise of Sinhala merchant capital in the 19th century and its weakness in relation to non-Sinhala capital associated with the minority communities and to foreign merchant capital;

(b) the assertion of a Sinhala-Buddhist identity by the Sinhala merchants and petty-bourgeoisie through the religious-cultural revival; and

(c) the communalism inherent in this revivalist ideology.

## Class Formation In The 19th Century

An outline of the formation of classes in Sri Lanka under the impact of the establishment of a plantation

economy in the mid 19th century is a necessary prelude to this discussion

The mercantilist and monopolistic practices, first of the Dutch and later of the British up to 1830, restricted the trading and other opportunities of accumulation that were open to local entrepreneurs. In this period the colonial economy offered only modest profits to this class as contractors, traders, paddy tax collectors, shipper and arrack renters. After 1830, however, the population economy provided scope for a class of merchant capitalists who made quick fortunes from the arrack trade. Under conditions of strict protection and control by the state, monopoly rights to sell liquor were auctioned by the government. Under these circumstances, combinations and cartels developed among renters who were able to control most stages of the arrack industry, especially the distillation and the wholesale and retail trade. This laid the basis for the first squirt of capital accumulation by an emerging local bourgeoisie. The big arrack renters invested their profits in coffee, graphite, coconut, rubber, and urban property. By educating their families in English and sometimes abroad, these liquor merchants gained in status and added social respectability to their amassed wealth. The new class of merchants and plantation owners was able to challenge the traditional landowning class, financially socially and professionally,<sup>3</sup> but the limited investment opportunities provided by the colonial economy stunted its growth and left it ideologically backward.

The principal class groupings in late-19th century Sri Lanka were roughly as follows:

*The bourgeoisie, including*

(a) the Sinhala and Tamil and plantation owners, mainly of the *goyigama* and *vellala* castes, who were rewarded with grants of land for their services as *Mudliars* (local officials) to the Dutch and British administrations. Despite the mercantile opportunities of the time, they did not invest their monies other than in plantations; they were feudal in their life-style and remained faithful to the British, many being converts to Christianity. In the Kandyan provinces there was also a stratum of aristocratic landlord who held

bureaucratic sinecures and controlled the land cultivated by peasants;

(b) the new class of merchants, speculators and plantation owners of all communities and castes, mainly in the non-agricultural coastal regions. These people were innovative and enterprising, and moved to remote areas of the country in search of quick profits — especially in the lucrative liquor trade after 1830, and in the coffee, tea and rubber plantations. They were essentially a weak bourgeoisie, however, investing their profits in coffee, graphite and coconut, unable to venture into the export-import trade and, in the colonial context, with no opportunity to expand into the sphere of industrial capital. They assimilated British social values and basically accepted British rule, while making demands for limited reforms. They were thus in no sense a 'national bourgeoisie' in opposition to imperialism.

A petty bourgeoisie consisting of of two segments which cut across casts and communal barriers:

(a) small landowners, artisans, craftsmen, small traders and petty producers, mainly rural-based, who had their origins in the precapitalist economy and were adjusting to the new economic trends. These people were educated in the indigenous languages, followed the indigenous religions and were active in local level associations from moral and social 'upliftment';

(b) a new group of (mainly urban) clerks, minor bureaucrats, shopkeepers and teachers, generated by the needs of the plantation economy and the expanding activities of the state and the service sectors. The petty bourgeois intelligentsia (especially in the urban sector) were articulate on economic and social matters and the supported movements for social reform.

*The working people, composed of:*

(a) plantation workers of Indian origin whose employment relations were of pre-capitalist nature, and a few Sinhala, Tamil and Malayali wage workers in the public utilities (port, railways, and roads) and in numerous enterprises servicing the city of Colombo. Through strikes and

working class protest had begun by 1893, the urban workers had not developed a class consciousness and were therefore under the ideological influence of the more articulate section of the petty bourgeoisie;

(b) the peasantry and agricultural workers engaged in paddy cultivation and other crops. Many were small producers working on their own plots or as sharecroppers, eking out a precarious existence in a stagnant agricultural economy. There was also an expanding stratum of landless agricultural labour in the process of formation. These groups were strongly influenced by the ideology of the rural petty bourgeois intelligentsia, and supported movements of religious revival and social protest.

## SINHALA MERCHANT CAPITAL AND THE MINORITIES

The ideological content of the incipient political movement of the late 19th century should be considered in relation to the condition of merchant capitalism in Sri Lanka. This class of merchant capitalists failed to give leadership to a bourgeois nationalist liberation movement directed against British rule. Far from competing with the British, the interests of the local capitalists were subsidiary to, and dovetailed into, those of the British; in fact, they benefited from their links with British business and with the colonial bureaucracy.<sup>4</sup> But differences existed among the sections of the Sinhala bourgeoisie: the 'new rich' merchants wanted limited reforms, such as franchise for the middle class, political representation, and equal opportunities. They were opposed by the *Mudliyar* group of 'old rich' landowners who unquestioningly supported British rule and like the British, were apprehensive of the effects of such reforms. The conservative section of the Sinhala bourgeoisie was predominantly *goyigama*; the reform-oriented section included both *goyigama* and other castes, of which the *karava* was prominent. The frequent caste polemics, which were the outward expression of the (somewhat classical) antagonism between landowners and a rising merchant class, have led some historians incorrectly to analyze this period in terms of caste conflict and to interpret the rise of

the new merchant sector as the 'rise of the Karava'. We are not concerned here, however, with this debate among Sinhalese, but with the ideological aspect of yet another contradiction, namely, that between Sinhala merchant capital and the foreign and minority groups of traders. The following discussion will deal with the resentment and hostility of the Sinhala merchants and other groups directed against non-Sinhala traders, comprising both Indian and other minorities, and the growth of a communal ideology among the Sinhala capitalists and petty bourgeoisie.

At several levels in the colonial bureaucracy the Sinhalese felt at a disadvantage vis-à-vis other ethnic groups. First, the plantations, agency houses, banks, and key areas of foreign trade were controlled by British interests; furthermore, British policy was aimed at restricting the growth of local industry through a denial of bank credits and by tariff structures that favoured British manufacturers. Second, the export-import sector and wholesale trade were dominated by merchant capitalists from India. These were 'merchant princes' with business connections abroad, in India, Africa, and the Far East. They owned fleets of 'buggalows' which traded with India, the Maldives and nearby islands, and had access to ample financial resources and credit facilities. These merchant princes thus had a virtual monopoly of an important part of Sri Lanka's external trade, importing rice, sugar, flour kerosene, and a variety of other products, and exporting non-plantation produce. At the beginning of the 20th century this trade was dominated by seven leading Borah firms organized on a family basis, and by a few Memon and Parsee traders, most of whom owned plantations, lived in great splendour, gave liberally to British and local charities, and were politically loyal to the British. With access to finance and shipping, and with regional trading connections, these Indian traders effectively controlled the relatively complex and lucrative lines of commerce in which British capital showed no interest. The entrenchment of the Indians caused the emerging Sri Lankan merchant capitalists to confine

their business interests to plantations, graphite mining, and the liquor trade. In Colombo, the few Sinhala merchants, themselves retailers and importers of foreign goods, were unable to emulate the successful Indians, or to break through into the country's wholesale, retail, or export-import trade to any significant degree.

Third, in the area of retail trade, the smaller Sinhala traders were hard-pressed to compete with the traditional trading communities such as Muslims and Chettians. Local minority groups also had a large stake in the petty retail trade and peddled all over the country, even to the smallest village—the itinerant Muslim hawker being a common feature of village life. The small Sinhala shopkeeper, trader or pedlar was thus constantly aware of the competition from counterparts of minority groups.

Fourth, in the area of wage employment, the Sinhala white-collar workers and other skilled and unskilled wage workers had to compete with Indian migrants and workers of minority groups for the limited employment that was available in an undeveloped colonial economy. The largest section of the working class (plantation workers were migrants, and competition for employment was particularly acute in government service and in the ports, on the railways, and in the urban factories, where were a high proportion of Indian workers, both Tamil and Malayali.

Fifth, aggravating the disadvantages of competition in trade and employment, was the fact that money lending was a virtual monopoly of other ethnic groups, and Sinhala merchants at all levels, Sinhala white-collar workers, etc., were forced to go to them for credit. Even the prosperous Sinhala arrack renters and the planters of the 19th and early 20th century were not considered creditworthy by the foreign banks established in Colombo and, denied access in this way to institutionalized credit, had to go to the migrant Chettiar money lenders from South India who charged usurious rates of interest.<sup>5</sup> The urban petty bourgeoisie also had recourse for quick loans to the

Pathan (popularly called 'Afghan') money lenders who were a prominent feature of city life. The almost sinful practice of usury being associated with minority groups, it is hardly surprising that the economic problems of the Sinhala traders and petty bourgeoisie became tied up with feelings of chauvinism, and that emotional tirades against foreign money lenders were common among the Sinhalese.

In discussing the popular prejudices which were then fostered among the Sinhalese, it is also necessary to stress that in times of economic difficulty, the hostility of the poorer sections of the population could be more easily directed against traders of ethnic minority groups. This became clear in 1915, for example, when price rises and shortages caused by World War I intensified the popular hatred of Muslim traders. The result was serious rioting which, although it flared up over a religious issue involving Buddhists and Muslims, had strong underlying economic and political causes. Governor Chalmers, in trying to explain the animosity of the peasantry towards Muslim traders, stated that the latter had 'always been viewed by the villager with feelings entertained at all times and in all lands towards transitory aliens who make money out of the local peasantry by supplying their wants at the "shop", adding that in a peasant economy 'where retail prices are expressed in cents and half cents, even a slight rise in prices is both felt and resented by the customer.'<sup>6</sup>

However, the animosity of the Sinhalese towards the Tamils had political rather than racial origins, taking the form of rivalry between rulers of kingdoms. In periods of cooperation, relations between the communities had been cordial, to the extent that not only were the last kings of Kandy of the South Indian Nayakkar dynasty from Madurai, but pretenders to the throne (in the post-1815 period) who led revolts against the British, had to feign to be Tamil even when they were of Sinhala origin, in order to establish their legitimacy.

It was with the development of

the colonial economy in the 19th century that tension between the Sinhalese and the Tamils took a communal form. As we have seen, neither were able to enter the lucrative export-import trade or the equally profitable retail trade. Moreover, the Tamils, unlike the Sinhalese bourgeoisie, had no avenues of accumulation through graphite or liquor renting, and only a few had large coconut or other plantations. In this situation, the Tamils were the principal competitors with the Sinhalese for the few remaining avenues of advancement, i.e. government employment at all levels and the professions. The struggle to advance through the educational system thus became aggravated, as did that for employment-

#### **NEXT: Sinhala Merchant Capital and The Buddhist Revival**

##### **NOTICE**

1. The Sinhalese and Tamils are linguistic and ethnic groups, the former being mainly Buddhists and

the latter mainly Hindus. The 'Indian' Tamils are those who migrated in the 19th century as plantation workers and traders. The Moors are of Arab, Southern Indian and local origin and are Muslims, and the Burghers are of mixed European origin. A group, which existed until the 1930s, were the Malayalis from Kerala, referred to in Sri Lanka as 'Cochins'. Missionary activities, cutting across ethnic lines, created a group of Christians, some of whom held key positions in colonial and post-colonial society.

2. 'Communalism' is used in South Asia to describe aggressive and violent actions against ethnic and religious minorities.

3. For example Jeronis de Soysa paid £38 in 1829 for the right to run a tavern at Kadugannawa; he invested £7000 in the Central Province arrack rents for 1836, which gave him a profit of £1800. In 1837 he became the first important local coffee planter, buying 400 acres in Hanguranketa for £411. His son Charles was the leading Sri Lankan capitalist in the 1870s, with interests in coffee

and coconut plantations and graphite mining. His sons were educated in Britain and his sons-in-law were eminent doctors and lawyers whose qualifications had been obtained in Britain.

4. A moderate reformist politician, whose father was a leading arrack merchant, said in 1908, that British Planters 'deserve the credit for having brought capital into the country and shown us the path along which we may all win prosperity. The interests of the Ceylonese planters are identical with those of the European planters', *Ceylon National Review* (February 1908).

5. Many of the early arrack renters were given loans by Caettiars and it is said that the Chettiar had prominent place at Sinhala upper class weddings since he had often advanced the money for the wedding.

6. Cmnd Paper 1867, Chalmers to Secretary of State.

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# Peoples united not on basis of races but on basis of nations

B. A. Kader

**T**his progressive i.e. race mixing tendency is being interrupted by various new factors causing genetic drifts. Geographical isolation which played the main role in stimulating genetic drift, in the early stages of human history, has given away to factors of **social isolation** such as ethnic, linguistic, class, professional, religious, political, etc. In addition, two main factors viz. **state** and **endogamy** (i. e. that couples mainly marry with their own community) are helping to preserve their social isolation since the former restricts free mixing among countries, and the latter, among communities.

The role played by endogamy in creating genetic barriers was left out of the account until recently, by researchers. To understand its role it is sufficient to recall the generally recognised fact that endogamy was characteristic of the basic ethnic units of primitive communal society — the tribes. Anthropologist V. V. Bromley correctly puts it: "Endogamy helps preserve the ethnies, thus ensuring the inheritance of traditional culture from one generation by another. At the same time marriages within an endogamous circle inevitably furthers cultural uniformity" (See *Ethnos* and its definition.)

Therefore it goes without saying that for the complete elimination of the dying races all the factors causing social isolation should be eliminated. Such a favourable condition can be conceivable of only under **world socialism**.

Only in the period of the victory of socialism on a world scale, when exploitation and classes are abolished, worker's democracy is fully realised, states whither away, socialism is consolidated and becomes part of every day life, all nations are brought closer together voluntary

fusion, and scientific inventions are efficiently, systematically and correctly applied to influence genetics, will all racial differences **die a natural death**.

Until then this mechanism — **race mixing and the formation of new varieties of mixed races** — will continue. Marx and Engels in their "German policies" wrote that racial differences etc...should and could be eliminated.

**Pure race:**— There are no such "pure races" in any part of the world. Metisation took place from the most ancient times. Here are some facts:—

"Palanthropological research provides good grounds for believing that the early neolithic and perhaps even mesolithic population of North Eastern Europe arose from a fusion of north proto — Mongoloids of Siberian origin.

Similarly on the Indian sub-continent, from the most ancient times metisation took place between the indigenous australoids and southern Eurpeoids — Melanochroei — penetrating from the north west, and various groups of Mongoloids, originally from south east asia.

Even to day racial heterogeneity can be seen in the large and small populations of southern, central and eastern India, Bangladesh and Nepal" — G.F. Debet: "The anthropological composition of the population of South Asia". (P 45-50)

"Metisation between Europeoids and Mongoloids started at least in neolitnic times also took place in central asia, Kagakhstan, and Southern Siberia.

No matter how we resolve the problem of the initial genetic relations between the various australoid and Mongoloid races of the Pacific Basin, it is obvious that they have been mixing to-gether over many

millennia in Indochina, in Indonesia, the Philippines, Japan, Micronesia and Polynesia.

Even the Japanese, regarded by several anthropologists as a "special group of races — austroloids — ainu, Southern Mongoloids — astronesians — and eastern Mongoloids — Proto Japanese probably altaic speaking. The subsequent long immigration resulted in the present situation (N. N. Cheboksarov — 'Human Races Populations'.

**Let alone the concept "pure race", even a small homogeneous ethnic group cannot be identified today.** For eg:— I quote the references made by Y. Y. Roginsky and M. G. Levin:— Northern Italians are taller, More brachycephalic than Southern Italians and their hair is lighter; Northern Frenchmen are taller and their hair fairer than of the Southern Frenchmen etc.....

"In recent decades the study of genogeography of odonto-logical, dermatoglyphic, serological and other features with clear regional variation (Sensibility to PTC test, types of ear-wax, colour blindness etc.) permitted a new approach to the problems of racial classification..... In the light of this new data there is a much greater probability in the hypothesis that african Negroids are more closely connected in their origin with Europeoids than the morphologically similar asian and Oceanian, austroloids and the latter are genetically closer to the Mongoloids than the Negroids". So says N. N. Cheboksarov.

Furthermore he says "Recent geogeographical data indicate that the frequency of the shovel shaped incisors, the distal crest of the trigonoid, the Larabellis cusp, certain forms of palm prints and various genes of different blood and serum groups — Rhesus, Duffy, Luthera, allotypes of Haptoglobins and

immunoglobulin etc.— allow us to divide mankind into two large groups of population, the Eastern and the Western”.

Finally, Metisation of race mixing is a process which could not be irrefuted. From the social scientist view point it is, easy to establish this fact. Man is a social animal and not a Robinson Crusoe. He is interconnected with other people by thousands of links and as such he has to mix with them. The Race mixing process, of course in slow pace, took place in the ancient times and in the modern society it takes place in even greater degree and faster. **Therefore the concept “pure race” is baseless.**

**Race and Civilisation:**— Several typologists hold that human civilisation is created by the “civilised superior race”. This concept also unscientific since the genetics can transmit man’s bodily features from generation to generation but not Civilisation. Cultural achievements and social and historical experiences are transmitted from one human generation to the next through learning and imitation; through socialisation of the individual — but not, of course, genetically.

Let me give few examples from M. Nesthurh’s “Human Races” to refuse this myth.

Germany — which once so pompously propagated this theory under Hilter—provides the classic example for this. The Great German people have contributed very much towards the development of the human civilisation in later years. But the very people were leading a life of savagery with bow and arrow in their hand, when the Roman Empire was thriving. Only their labour, efforts, and historical conditions developed them as a civilised nation — not their “racial qualities”.

Nowadays not only mental growth but also physical growth is very much determined by the socio-economic factors:— When an examination was held to select candidates for military services in one of the civilised nations — Sweden the following — fact was observed: The average height of the candidates who came from well-to-do family was

173.1 cm while those who came from poor families was 171.9 cm.

Bodily growth does not determine the intelligence of the people:— The famous French writer Anatole France’s brains weight was only 1,017 gramme while many others whose brain’s weight was 1,800 gm or more, did not possess any extraordinary abilities!

From what has been said above it is obvious that race is a external phenomenon of man. It has nothing to do with his ability or intelligence.

**Race and Language:**— “Superior language of the superior race” and “Pure language of the pure race” are popular myths that deserve our attention. At the outset let us say there is no “pure race” no unmixed “pure language” in the world. Language is one thing — the main medium of human intercourse. Race is another — an external feature of human groups. Therefore connecting these two different — although they have some relations — entities together is unscientific. Further, races are unable to be, differentiated on the basis of languages since:—

There are nations formed of several races, speaking the same language. Germany again provides the classic example for this — Once Ariya concept was very popular there:— Germans are formed of six racial groups but are speaking one language — German. Here each racial group posses no separate languages.

On the other hand, a single race can speak different languages. For this the classical example is Negroes. The Negroes in Africa speak in their original mother tongues while in the U. S., they speak English and in Southern America, Spanish. In African countries too the linguistic situation is exceedingly complicated. Besides, such widespread languages as Arabic, Swahili, Hausa, Manlinke, Ibo, Yoruba and Fulfulde, almost every state in Africa has thousands of languages spoken only by a few thousand people.

Therefore such arguments are also baseless and unscientific. The “Pure Superior Language” concept is as harmful and reactionary as “Pure” or “Superior” race concept. The race mixing, linguistic crossings — assimilation of Languages — too is

a progressive phenomenon. Any attempt to obstruct such mechanisms is reactionary. We shall have occasion to deal with this subject later.

**Race and its role today:**— Although it is a bitter truth, race is a reality. In fighting against racialism several theoreticians of the populationist school go to the other extreme or as not only to deny the reality but also to avoid this word race — in their publications. Socio-populationists hold a contrary view. They say “We don’t desire to exaggerate the role of race but it would be immeasurably more harmful to close our eyes to it”.

V. V. Bromley aptly puts it:— “What is clearly overlooked here is that **racism arises from the idea of the inequality of races and not from recognition of racial distinctions whose existence beyond dispute**”.

The special character of race is that it was not a symbol of an artificial phenomenon imposed on man by man — such as classes are it is not a phenomenon of the artificial social environment created by people to suit their material and spritual needs — such as religion, ethnics etc.. But on the contrary it was the symbol of the **phenomenon imposed by nature on man** against his will.

With the mastering of nature by man, the racial influence over the latter started to decline but, however, not vanish. It still exerts a certain influence over man in the formation of his physical features but as always it cannot determine the development of the human psyche.

When compared with the natural orders — sex and age — both race plays lesser differentiating role. “Pure race” or “Superior race” are myths rather than conceptions until it dies, a natural death will continue to function. It may under specific conditions exert a certain influence over ethnic process. Eg. Andaweanese, Semangs, Aetas. Owing to their age old isolation there Negroid groups in South East Asia have come to possess the character of ethnic communities.

Under specific conditions it could exert a certain influence over  
(Continued on page 28)

# A prognosis for Third World cultures

Neville Jayaweera

The arguments developed above, for and against the application of the new communication technologies in the Third World, will remain purely theoretical and entirely irrelevant to the question as to whether or not they will in fact be introduced widely. The next line of argument will be to draw together the different strands of reasoning that were laid out earlier on in this paper and to suggest that global and domestic imperatives will render their introduction into the Third World both necessary and inevitable.

Firstly, it was argued that the cultures of these societies have been disintegrating for centuries. Secondly, it was observed that the cultural renaissance that characterised Third World countries in the decades that followed immediately on their liberation from colonial servitude, had also run its course and had petered out. It was also observed that simultaneously, the economic model, viz. the closed or controlled economy, that had been adopted widely in the Third World shortly after independence had also collapsed, and with it, the socialist values that initially propelled them. Further, we also noticed that these events within the Third World were accompanied in the industrialised world by two significant trends. One was the desperate search for markets in the Third World in order to be able to sustain rising standards of living at home. And the other was the shifting of the burden of production from the old labour-intensive, heavy energy-consuming technologies to the new automated, low energy-consuming, labour-displacing electronic technologies.

The global scene is now set for a massive onslaught on the Third World, which will exceed in its intensity, range and impact, anything that we have known in history,

surpassing even the colonial enterprise in its most redolent days. This onslaught will also be guaranteed successes on a scale not hitherto vouchsafed to the eighteenth and nineteenth century colonisers. That guarantee will be provided by both the "push" factor, i. e. the need among the industrialised economies to expand at whatever cost, and the "pull" factor, i. e. the need among the Third World countries to provide their people with the consumer benefits of modernisation, at whatever cost, even if that cost was reckoned in terms of permanent dependency, cultural degradation and national indignity. The communication, or "electronic colonialism" as it is now called, will provide the technological underpinning for the convergence of the "push" and "pull" factors. The transnational cooperation will provide the managerial and institutional underpinning while the World Bank and the IMF will supply the financial undergirding. The stage is now set for the appearance of these three actors together in a single global drama.

1. At the level of industrial production the Third World countries will soon lose the initiative they were about to wrest from the historic industrial countries. With rising standards of living in the traditional industrial economies, costs of production climbed to levels that caused industrial products to be priced out of world markets. Consequently, industries began to close down, unemployment increased, and a deep and seemingly interminable recession gripped the industrial economies. Simultaneously, industrial capital started going out in search of low cost labour, which was available primarily in the Third World. This led to the emergence of several Third World countries as serious contenders for places in the industrial firmament vacated by the giants of

the nineteenth century. Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and India and Brazil began to pose a serious challenge to the once dominant industrial powers. The latter have bought time by erecting tariff barriers. But that is only an interim arrangement. Meanwhile they are investing massively on the application of micro-electronics to industrial production with the effect thereby, of denying to the Newly Industrialised Countries (NIC) the comparative advantages they now enjoy through their access to cheap labour.

Within a decade the Free Trade Zones and the new industrial landscape of the Third World will be as deserted and look as gaunt as the once massive and powerful industrial centres of the nineteenth century, such as Lancashire and Sheffield. The entry of Third World countries into industrial production on a serious scale will have been short-lived. And they will soon revert to the status of being markets for the traditional industrial economies. Except that, unlike during the first industrial revolution, the poor countries will now be enabled to buy the burgeoning productions of the new automated industrial machine. That facilitation will be done not by governments directing colonial policy from London, Paris or The Hague. It will be accomplished by the simple arrangement of global lending institutions such as the IMF placing in the hands of Third World governments the means with which to sustain effective demand, artificially. There will come into existence a symbiotic relationship between creditor and debtor, whereby the creditor will find it in his interest to service the debtor with the means required for repaying even the interest on the debt. The words "credit" and "debt" will lose their heavy puritanic and negative moral overtones. They will in all probability

replace "thrift", "hardwork" and "initiative" as the Puritan Ethic of the new industrial revolution!!

2. This new global industrial system will be held together and serviced by a global information system based on satellites, cables, optic fibres, computers and video cassettes. The heart of this information system will be the capacity to gather, classify, store, retrieve and transmit information and data in quantities, at speeds and over distances which are literally mind-boggling. That capacity and power are firmly vested in the hands of the metropolitan industrial countries and amount to more than merely a technological advantage. It is a power over the one of the most fundamental factors of production. Information-power is tending to replace labour-power as the most basic factor of production. That fact further underscores the extent to which the capacity for maintaining global hegemony is being consolidated by the old industrial powers.

3. The new global economy dominated by the metropolitan powers requires more than electronically automated industries and electronically managed information systems. It needs, very crucially, markets that are not susceptible to the violently variable and often contradictory decision-making that has hitherto characterised Third World economic and political choices. That is to say, the markets of the Third World must be guaranteed by the masses themselves. They must be beyond the capacity of Third World Finance Ministers or Central Banks or ideologists to determine, whatever the level of the balance of payments deficits and whatever the theoretical promptings. The consciousness of the people must be so irreversibly linked to the satisfaction of their constantly escalating consumer needs, that whatever government may be in power, the people's consumer desires will have to be met first, even if that meant placing the country permanently and irretrievably in debt. It is at this point that the culture industry of the western industrial systems takes on a developmental or economic role in the Third World.

The proliferation of television networks in the Third World, the

extension of their geographical reach and the phenomenal increase in the volume of entertainment traffic handled by them (through linkages to satellites, cables, optic fibres, etc.) are generally validated on the ground that they promote the eleven objectives that we discussed at length earlier on in this paper. But what is not normally mentioned is that the volume of programmes produced locally, in most Third World countries is barely adequate for filling even 25 per cent of the channel capacity or the air-time available. This means that the larger bulk of the programme material that flows in these networks has to come from metropolitan sources. But that material is generally beyond the capacity of the local networks to purchase. That results in cheap and invariably inferior programme material entering the system. Financial constraints and the need somehow to fill air-time cause a down-spiralling programme quality.

Cheap foreign programme material seems to promote several results simultaneously. Firstly, they set the wrong standards for the local producer. Secondly, they cater to, and sharpen people's palate for sex, violence and false stereotypes. Even if the local producers succeed in developing the skills required for producing quality programmes and obtain the funds for using those skills, they find that meanwhile they have lost their audience, who through long exposure to cheap imported material, demand a similar output from the local stations. Thirdly, without overtly trying to do so, they project life-styles, sartorial tastes and music values that are either unsupportable by the local economies or run contrary to the values and tastes of the indigenous cultural traditions. Unknown to the local planners, these foreign programmes help to shape and constrain their developmental choices. People begin to think as a matter of course that the life-styles they seen on their TV sets, day after day, are not only desirable, but are also obtainable. That sets in motion emotional and cultural pressure that governments find impossible to contain except on the basis of borrowing from the IMF. The primary objective of any government then becomes the fulfilment of these escalating

expectations. That basically represents a large part of the solution to the problem of finding markets for the new automated industrial systems of the metropolitan powers.

The new electronic networks contribute to the erosion of indigenous culture and the emergence of a new "human being" in another way. And that is independent of the quality or content of the programmes.

In the opening pages of this paper we tried to sketch out a rough profile of Third World cultures. Some of its defining elements were a sense of community, the prevalence of strong kinship and family ties and a preference for participation as a social mode. That is to say, Third World cultures, if one can refer to such a concept, is non-individualistic.

Exposure to TV as a medium, regardless of the content of its programmes, tends to undermine community and promote individualism. It is essentially a one-way medium with a strong tendency to addiction. Whole families sit around their TV sets for hours on end, day after day without communicating among themselves. Members of the family lose the capacity for communication. They cease to be involved with each other. The capacity for discourse, for expressing dissent and for engaging in healthy creative conflict deserts them. The very basis of indigenous culture, that is, the closely woven family and the integrated community gets dismembered into atomic individuals, who sometimes degenerate to the level of zombies.

These atomised individuals, with a great capacity for consuming commodities and with a minimum willingness to forgo fulfilling their individual appetites, prove naturally unable to see the claims of community or submit to the demands of social control. On the other hand, they are a great economic asset. They are the ultimate guarantors of the market and of the political system based thereon.

Exposure to TV indiscriminately, and over long and sustained periods, can envelop other socially dysfunctional values. For instance, TV Programmes generally project a very simplistic approach to the understanding of conflict and violence. A child exposed to TV continuously

tends to lose certain social skills such as those required for confronting and managing conflict and for coping with violence. The reality outside has little or no bearing to the reality of the TV set. The result is serious social maladjustment.

The integration of Third World countries into the global economic system, in the role of markets for the industrial systems of the metropolitan economies, straightaway puts them out of alignment with their own historic and indigenous cultures. While the new economic alignments require individualistic and acquisitive human beings to undergird them, the local cultures do not generally produce such persons, except as maladjusted delinquents. The tension between an economic system and a culture is invariably resolved in favour of the economic system, especially if it is spearheaded by a massive technological thrust as in this instance. And the old culture withers away to allow the emergence of another that is better adapted to the new economic realities.

Third World cultures, though eroded and distorted over a period of three centuries by colonialism and the first industrial revolution, survived in a recognisable form well into the last decade. But now they are under a new threat from a combination of economic and technological forces that may prove to be incomparably more difficult to survive. Certain characteristics about the contemporary situation override and reduce to a negligible entity whatever has survived of the Third World cultures. Let us try to identify some of these characteristics.

1. The domestic situation within Third World countries renders them highly susceptible to the new drive for "modernisation". The majority of the peoples of these countries are disillusioned with the economic models they had to live with in the past three decades. And they are equally weary of preoccupation with "culture". They find that the energies they had expended on trying to revive their cultures are more urgently required to enable them to secure their "basic needs".

2. The new economic thrust, i.e. the second industrial revolution, seems to be able, at least super-

ficially, to supply those "basic needs" to a larger number of people in a shorter time than had been found possible under earlier economic models. It is true that this fact runs completely contrary to conventional radical social theory. But the mass of the people seem equally weary of theory and may not be prepared to wait until intellectuals reconcile theory and practice, before they satisfy their needs.

3. Weariness with the domestic reality, and the simultaneous appearance of the commodities cornucopia from outside, are underpinned by a saturation of the people's minds by a massive electronic media onslaught. The media onslaught are the fifth column, the supply services and the rear-guard, all at one and the same time, for the new drive for modernisation. Unlike media of an earlier era, the new electronic media are truly a mass media. They have the capacity to leap over all the barriers that in the past hampered their outreach. Illiteracy is no longer a problem. Neither is poverty, because the poorest peasant can be persuaded to forego some essential need and to invest in a TV set. The lack of electricity is not a problem because transistorised receivers are available. And a government's inability to provide transmitter facilities and adequate programming are not problems either, because direct broadcasting satellites will soon be able to bypass terrestrial infrastructure and reach householders in their sitting rooms, directly from space, with little or no cost to the viewer !

4. These three elements, viz. domestic susceptibilities within the Third World countries, the surge of consumer commodities and the media onslaught are orchestrated by the great international lending institutions.

It should be observed that nine of these elements were present when the old colonialism and the first industrial revolution were in full bloom. The influences of the earlier phenomenon reached beyond the elites. They took decades and even centuries to work their way through. They were not centrally

co-ordinated or fuelled as the latter-day phenomenon is, i.e. by the lending institutions. And the earlier phenomenon could be easily identified as alien. Not so, the contemporary event.

We are witnessing today not only a homogenisation of world cultures, but a globalisation of the world economy as well, both under the hegemony of the western industrial-military-media-banking complex.

## Conclusion

In conclusion it is necessary to emphasise that it has not been the intention of this paper to suggest that the march of technology could be stopped. Quite apart from a question of ethics, such a position would be historically naive and false. Also, while this paper clearly laments the passing away of the community-based Third World cultures and their replacement by the "red in tooth and claw" cultures of industrial societies based on individualism, it does not claim that Third World cultures could, as a practical proposition, even if they tried to, stay for long outside the global mainstream. The few countries that have tried to do so, such as Albania, Burma and Sikkim are not notable for the levels of contentment their populations enjoy. This paper also recognises technology, or the invention and application of tools to the production process, as the final determinants of history. The class struggle, the other important determinant, develops out of a disequilibrium in the structures evolved by society to cope with technology. But the character of that struggle, its duration and direction, and the modes and levels of its progressive resolution, are shaped more by development within technology itself, rather than by organised social forces.

Current developments in technology call for a new social theory. Conceptual tools constructed in the mid-nineteenth century to explain the first industrial revolution will be hardly adequate to cope with the realities of the second industrial revolution, not any more than Newtonian concepts are adequate for explaining the world of Einstein.

# Marxism — Leninism and the Third World (PART 2)

Dayan Jayatilleka

(Continuation of the text of a Marx Centenary Commemoration Lecture delivered at the Marga Institute)

**W**hat happens in the post-war period is that the United States capitalists shift their factories, very close to the source of consumption. This is really a way to dodge tariffs. In other words, it's a struggle for the market. This is the birth of the multinational and the transnational corporations. Then everybody else starts doing this, and here I refer to the weaker capitalist powers.

Thus you get the 'second wave' the shift into the tricontinental areas. The first outward thrust of the United States capital, was really to Texas, Mexico and so on. But in the post war period we have the Marshall Plan and the outward thrust of United States capital into Western Europe and Japan. The 'second wave' is when they all turn to the tricontinental areas. So together with the phenomenon of the multinational corporation we have the inter-nationalisation of capital and production, the shift of certain industries from the centre to the periphery. And why is this? Because the fundamental driving characteristic of capitalism in the post-war period is the search for maximum profit and maximum profit can be realised only through minimising, through lowering to the minimum, the cost of production. And cost of production is lowest in the periphery, because wage rates are held several times lower, eg 4 — 5 dollars in contrast to the 100 dollars obtaining in the centre. In other words, low wages for equal productivity. Low wages obtaining in the periphery make the periphery the primary source of maximum profits. This explains the shift of capital and production to the periphery. With this shift you have the alliance between the national bourgeoisie and multinational capital.

In the meantime there has been a certain change in the periphery

where the national bourgeoisie has assumed state power either through some form of struggle — where they have violently, forcibly wrested it from the earlier colonial power — or through a peaceful transition. We find the national bourgeoisie moving from a subordinate class — it was earlier a dominated class under colonialism — to the position of the hegemonic class. The national bourgeoisie becomes in effect the ruling class. This question of which is the ruling class is a fundamental question, because Lenin in his April thesis points out very clearly that the stage of the revolution is determined by the question of which class wields State power. In other words, the stage of the revolution is not determined by economics but is determined precisely at the level of politics, at the level of State power. This is the point he makes in his April thesis, but you must take it in its evolutionary context. From 1905 onwards Lenin and the Bolshevik party talk about the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry i. e. it is the first stage of the revolution because state power is wielded by the Czarist autocracy and the struggle is to topple the Czarist autocracy. By April 1917 however, that is after the February Revolution, there has been a change and the Czarist autocracy has been toppled and replaced by a liberal bourgeoisie. So you have a change in the stage of the revolution, a shift a new stage is that of the proletarian revolution. Now you find that very shift taking place right throughout the periphery in the post-war period, where it is precisely the national bourgeoisie and no longer the colonial or imperialist bourgeoisie — that wields state power. State power is wielded by the autochthonous bourgeoisie. Therefore the stage of the revolution is no longer new democratic or national democratic anti-imperialist/democratic. The im-

perialist democratic revolution is now articulated, is combined in a very specific form, with the anti-capitalist revolution, because it is the capitalist class, that is the native, the indigenous capitalist class that wields state power.

The World Communist Movement did not grasp this shift which is why we still find the formulations of the national democratic revolution, the new democratic revolution, peoples democratic revolution, etc concerning the periphery. And the Chinese Communists, I am afraid, are no less guilty of this than the Soviet communists! In 1949 at the World Federation of Trade Unions meeting Lia Shao Chi presents the view that the path of the Chinese revolution is the path of the Asian revolution — and that was fundamentally misleading! It is on the basis of this that Dr S A Wickremasinghe returns to Sri Lanka and presents, together with comrade N. Sanmugathasan, the famous theses of the CPS 1950 4th Congress at Matara. The 3rd Congress of the Ceylon Communist party taking place in Aturalaya in 1948 had presented the correct perspective of an anti-capitalist revolution and the formulation that Ceylon is no longer a 'colony' but a 'satellite' — it is this new word that was used. In this situation said the 3rd congress, the struggle must take the insurrectionary path and have an anti-capitalist character. Two years later and 10 miles later, that is from Atureleya to Matara, we find a dilution taking place and the whole idea of the carrying through the democratic revolution to completion by the four class block is brought back into play. What has taken place in between is the 1949 meeting and Li Shao chi's speech! In other words, concerning the fundamental question of what revolution, of the character of the revolution, the class forces of the revolution, both the Soviet and the Communist Parties adopted nothing less than a revisionist perspective. This is why I think when we talk about revisionism — this term revisionism has been incorrectly understood as Soviet revisionism or something that is the exclusive vice of the Soviet Communist party leadership — I think

it would be much more correct to say that from 1956 onwards and in 1957 at the meeting of the World Communist Movement, and in the 1960 Moscow Declaration 'Modern Revisionism' became the dominant tendency of the World Communist Movement. A revisionist perspective came to the shared both by the CPSU and the CCP.

However the Cuban comrades were not present in 1956 or 1960. They were not therefore tainted with these Krushchevite formulations and therefore they were much more capable of reflecting on their own revolution and of the Latin American situation, and coming out with certain correct formulations. This is in fact the contribution of Ernesto Che Guevara. Che Guevara has been held up as a heroic guerrilla, a military strategist, he has been praised or condemned for his contributions to socialist planning—the whole debate with Charles Bettelheim ...and so on, but what is over — looked is Guevara's formulations concerning revolution in the new colonies. We find Guevara in his guerrilla warfare: A method, written 1964 and then again in 1967 in his 'letter to the Tricontinental' and in many, many speeches and writings, talking about rapprochement between the national bourgeoisie and imperialism. He says very clearly, in 1967, in his letter to the tricontinental, that "In this continent the national bourgeoisie has become the last card imperialism's Jack. Therefore the revolution will ineluctably be a socialist revolution. Guevara is very clear on this score and it is a pity that there have been attempts to identify Guevara, because of this formulation, as non-Stalinist or anti-Stalinist or semi-Trotskyist or something like that. This could be said only by somebody who is intellectually dishonest or by somebody who really has not studied Guevara. In February 1964, Che writes (and this is available in "Selected Writings" edited by John Gerrassi,) "Marx could only intuit the development of the world-wide imperialist system, Lenin listens to its heart-beat and gives his diagnosis. Stalin systematised Lenin's idea to the point of considering the possibility of socialist revolution in the periphery". Now Guevara is obviously very clear in his own

mind about the existence of these three stages of capitalist development. So Guevara's formulations concerning socialist revolution are very clearly within the Stalinist school of thought, and Debray makes it even clearer because Debray's writings are very anti-Trotskyite. You find this kind of thinking on another continent; I refer to the ideas of Franz Fanon and Cabral. Cabral is very clear. He talks about two stages i. e. those of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Both Fanon and Cabral say that now it is a question of either 'Neo-colonialism or Socialism'. So this idea of accepting the historical validity of the two stage revolution while seeing very clearly that the revolution in the periphery has now grown over to its second stage, is an idea we find on all three continents, in the speeches and writings of Guevara, Cabral, Fanon and Le Duan. Le Duan in his "Essential tasks, Fundamental problems of the Vietnamese revolution" booklet penned in 1973, makes explicit reference to Stalin's last speech in 1952 at the 19th Congress of the CPSU-B and he refines Stalin's ideas and presents the slogan of "upholding the twin banners of national independence and socialism simultaneously".

No we are faced with the task of integrating these partial perceptions into a single macro-level theory of colonialism and socialist revolution at the periphery. Why? Marxism can be said, very schematically, to accord with the stage of pre-imperialist or competitive capitalism. Leninism is the Marxism of the era of imperialism. What then is the Marxism-Leninism of the stage of neo colonialism? Where is the continuity, because of the rupture from 1956 onwards.

1956 and the rise of modern revisionism, can be seen only together with the rise of U.S. hegemony. As I said earlier, all these things are interlinked and this is what many of us fail to realise. The rise of U. S. hegemony, the postwar expansion of the World capitalist market, on the basis of the expansion of the World capitalist system, decolonisation and the rise of the Third World, and the rise and strengthening of modern revisionism. One is linked with the other, because it all proceeds on the basis of the expansion of World

capitalism — an expansion which has now come to an end, as we all know.

So what are the implications of the end of the long boom at the level of practice and at the level of theory? We are now in a depression and World capitalism, as we know, has three options of getting out of it — intensifying the existing field of exploitation, extending the field of exploitation and recourse to war. Let us take the third one first. What kind of war can they have? They can have mini-wars, they can invade Nicaragua, they can start off a war in the Middle East but that is not going to help the United States to 'spend its way' out of the crisis. These wars are insufficient magnitude for their purpose. Can there be an inter-imperialist war? With the consolidation of national imperialisms into a single World-wide imperialism dominated by the United States, there is no longer a **polarity** in the imperialist camp. That does not mean that there are no contradictions. There are contradictions, there will be trading blocs and so on and so forth but whether these contradictions will develop into antagonism, into a polarity which will lead to imperialist war, is very, very doubtful. Then can they go to war with the Soviet Union? But it is very doubtful whether World capitalism will risk that even to external the capitalist market, because we had the first World war and as a result the Russian revolution, and the Second World War was followed by the Chinese revolution and the extension of the Socialist camp. I am sure the U.S. must be considering what will happen if there is a Third World War. So I think that too is a non-option.

So what options do they have left? There is no other area to which they can expand. How can they extend the capitalist market? There is insufficient purchasing power both at the centre and the periphery. In Mexico, workers manufacture automobiles but they don't have the money to buy it back, and in the United States they cannot do so either. So the pith and substance of this crisis, in that there is a glut. It is a crisis of over production. There is a shrinkage of the market.

The world capitalist system is in a contraction and in this period of contraction many theoretical or ideological constructs and organizational forms of the past cannot survive any longer. Detente has collapsed. The rise of detente, was part and parcel of the postwar expansion of World capitalism and the collapse of detente cannot be seen at anything but a by-product of the downturn. Together with the collapse of detente you also have the crisis of modern revisionism, from Poland to El Salvador. Late last year, the General Secretary of the El Salvadorean Communist Party Schafik Jorge Handal presents a far reaching self criticism in a pamphlet entitled, 'Power, the character and path of the revolution and the unity of the Left'. He talks about the reformism of the Latin American Communist Party, he talks about the peaceful path, and he talks about the stage of the revolution. It is really a very a interesting document. So we have the crisis of the modern revisionist line, and its collapse is on the agenda.

It is precisely the class struggles in the periphery that are the motor of contemporary history. Intensifying in the field of exploitation is something that Metropolitan capitalism will not risk in their 'home bases'. I correct myself immediately — it is not that they are not intensifying the exploitation of 'their' working class, but there are certain limits beyond which they will not go because that undermines the social fabric in the Metropolitan centres, that risks social strife, and even revolution in the centres and that is something they will not do unless they have run out of options. So the burden of the crisis is being transferred on to the periphery — has been transferred on to the semi-periphery and the periphery. It is precisely in the periphery that all the contradictions of the modern world system are present and interact and feed upon each other and it is precisely in the periphery that you will find that we are in the period of wars and/or revolutions. It is a period very similar to that which the Comintern defined out in 1928 and its 6th Congress as a "period of wars and/or revolutions".

And it is in this period, when we

are striving to transform the reality of our peripheral societies, that we have to work out a scientific theory — because without a theory there can't be a strategy and without strategy there can be no tactics. Without a correct theory there cannot be a correct analysis of the reality, and without correct analysis you cannot change the reality. So we have to integrate what is correct in the earlier mentioned formulations. What are the elements we can pull together? We have the formulations of Stalin and the Cominform, and the conceptual thread is broken from that point onwards. Then we have the formulations of the revolutionary theorists and practitioners of the so-called Third World, Guevara, Cayetano Carpio Cabral and Le Duan. Then we have the insights provided by the neo-Marxian political economists—theories of dependency, dependent accumulation and the world system. I refer to theorists such as Gunder Frank, Samir Amin Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Immanuel Wallestein. We must not take their formulations ready made, but there is nothing wrong with integrating their insights critically. After all Lenin's theory of imperialism was a pulling together of some of the work of Hilferding and Hobson who was a Liberal who was not even a Marxist. Hilferding was of course, a Social Democrat. There is nothing unMarxist or unLeninist in our critically sifting through the work of these theories of dependency and the World system and pulling together that which is valuable, but it must be integrated with the rigorous central tradition of the World Communist Movement, the tradition of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin — because otherwise it is disembodied. And this is the task of the day. To put it very bluntly I think we can discern a link between Stalinism and Guevarism. You find it in several revolutionary movements of the 'Third World' — a combination of an appreciation of the writings of Stalin, of Guevara and the dependency theorists. You find it in the Iranian Fedayeen, the Palestinian PFLP of Habash, the Salvadorean, Guatemalan and Mexican left and you ever find it percolating back to the Soviet Union. This is manifested in the work of certain Soviet academicians like Yevgeni Pri-

makov and Kiva Maidanak. Maidanak, who criticises the strategy of peaceful path in Chile also talks about 'dependent capitalist development and writes, in 1975, a very complimentary article on Che Guevara. So, perhaps unconsciously all this thinking is converging and linking up, and it is up to us to synthesise, because the act of synthesis is also an important act. The act of synthesis can in fact be an original act. At one level both Marx and Lenin synthesised. It is up to us to synthesise these diverse currents of thought into a single, overreaching, macro theory, of neo-colonialism as a distinct stage in the historical development of world capitalism, and draw the necessary conclusions strategies for revolution in the periphery.

## Peoples. . .

(Continued from page 22)

national process. **This was recognised by Lenin.** He wrote in his article "Russians and Negroes" about the U. S. Negroes as follows:—"How can a race be compared with a nation? It is a permissible comparison. The Negroes were the last to be freed from slavery and they still bear more than anyone else the cruel marks of slavery — even in advanced countries.....". (Lenin Col Vol 18)

Marxists stand not only against all varieties of racialism but also for the complete elimination of races. They are fully aware that man can accelerate, by his own efforts, the process of race elimination. This effort is necessary in two areas. Firstly, political efforts to smash the social isolation. Secondly, scientific efforts to influence the genetics that transmit races from generation to generation.

What is important here is that race — or the mark of the natural environment following in man from the time of geographical isolation, is not the main factor that is differentiating man today but the socio economic factors. Therefore today peoples are not united on the basis of races but on the basis of nations.


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